ML19344B331

Forwards LER 80-018/03L-0

ML19344B331
Person / Time
Site:	Cooper
Issue date:	07/17/1980
From:	Lessor L NEBRASKA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT
To:	Seyfrit K NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
Shared Package
ML19344B332	List: ML19344B331 ML19344B334
References
CNSS800438, NUDOCS 8008260627
Download: ML19344B331 (2)

Text

.

o o COOPER NUCLEAR STATION h Nebraska Public Power District .

" " * ?A'E#*oMM;"Is'"M** "'"

CNSS800438 July 17, 1980 Mr. K. V. Seyfrit U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Inspection and Enforcement Region IV 611 Ryan Plaza Drive Suite 1000 Arlington, Texas 76011

Dear Sir:

This report is submitted in accordance with Section 6.7.2.B.3 of the Technical Specifications for' Cooper Nuclear Station and discusses a reportable occurrence that was discovered on June 23, 1980. A licensee event report form is also enclosed.

t Report No.: 50-298-80-18 Report Date: July 17, 1980 Occurrence Date: June 23, 1980 Facility: Cooper Nuclear Station Brownville, Nebraska 68321 Identification of Occurrence:

Observed inadequacies in the implementation of administrative or procedural controls which, threaten to cause reduction of degree of redundancy provided in reactor protection systems or engineered safety feature systems.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence:

Reactor power was on a flow ramp at approximately 852 of rated thermal power.

Description of.0ccurrence:

On June 23, 1980, surveillance procedure 6.2.2.3.1, HPCI Steam Line High Flow Calibration and Functional / Functional Test, was initiated.

The purpose of this surveillance procedure is to perform an instru-ment calibration and functional test of HPCI-dPIS-76 & 77 (high steam line flow) pressure switches. This procedure, if conducted as written, does not cause an isolation of the HPCI steam line.

hoo) s ili 800826 0 6 CT

e Mr. K. V. Seyfrit July 17, 1980 Page 2.

A part of the surveillance test requiring the isolation signal to be reset was overlooked by the Instrument Technician while per-forming the test. When the motor operated valve (HPCI-MO-16) was energized in a later step, the valve closed due to the isolation signal being present. The isolation was immediately reset and HPCI-MO-16 valve returned open.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence:

The cause of this occurrence has been attributed to personnel error due to the failure of an Instrument Technician to perform all procedural steps in the sequence outlined by the procedure.

Analysis of Occurrence:

The remaining high pressure ECCS System (ADS System), the low pressure ECCS Systems (LPCI Subsyst'em and Core Spray Subsystems),

and the RCIC System were operable during the peried of time the HPCI System was being tested.

< The HPCI System isolation was immediately reset after the closing

- of HPCI-MO-16 which allowed the valve to open again and the E!CI System was operable for automatic initiation.

This occurrence presented no adverse consequences from the stand-point of public health and safety.

Corrective Action:

The procedural step sequence error was immediately corrected. A written reprimand has been issued to the person involved. This occurrence has been reviewed with all Instrument personnel.

Sincerely,

E *

.( ' f( *} b % n M A l L. C. Lessor l

Station Superintendent

( Cooper Nuclear Station LCL:cg Attach.

I l

l l

__. _ _ _, __. _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ , _