ML19344A696
| ML19344A696 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | McGuire, Mcguire  |
| Issue date: | 08/13/1980 |
| From: | Parker W DUKE POWER CO. |
| To: | Harold Denton, Youngblood B Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19268D000 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8008210493 | |
| Download: ML19344A696 (72) | |
Text
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DUKE Powsu Co:.11wxy POWEtt IlU11.1MNG 422 Sours Cnuncu Srneur, CuantoTTE, N. C. usa m w w A.4 o. Pa n u n..; a.
August 13, 1980 Vice Pacoormt TtLtemont:AacA704 S *tane Paoouctsom 373-4083 Mr. II. R. Denton, Director Of fice of Nuclear Reactor Reguhtion THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P00R QUAUTY PAGES Washington, D. C.
20555 Attention:
Mr. B. J. Youngblood, Chief Licensing Projects Branch No. 1 APPLICATION FOR WITilHOLDING PROFRIETARY INFORMATION FROM PUBLIC DISCLOSURE Re: McGuire Nuclear Station Docket Nos. 50-369, 50-370
Dear.Mr. Denton:
Enclosed are:
1.
Twenty copics of Information Related to Electrical Equipment Qualifica-tion (Proprietary).
2.
Twenty copics of Information Related to Electrical Equipment Qualifica-tion (Non-Proprietary).
Also enclosed is:
1.
One (1) copy of Westinghouse Affidavit, CAW-80-31 (Non-Proprietary).
As this submittal contains information proprietary to Westinghouse Electric Corporation, it is supported by an affidavit signed by Westinghouse, the owners of the information. The affidavit sets forth the basis on which the information may be withheld from public disclosure by the Commission and addresses with specificity the considerations listed in paragraph (b)(4) of Section 2.790 of the Commission's regulations.
Accordingly, it is respectfully requested that the information which is proprietary to Westinghouse be withheld from public disclosure in accordance with 10CFR Section 2.790 of the Commission's regulations. Correspondence-with respect to the proprietary aspects of this application for withholding or the supporting Westinghouse af fidavit should reference CAW-80-31, and should be addressed to R. A. Wiesemann, Manager, Regulatory and Legislative Affairs, Westinghouse Electric Corporation, P. O. Box 355, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15230.
8008210 M h 3 h
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Mr. H. R. Denton, Director August 13, 1980 Page Two This information is provided in response to NRC letters dated.0ctober 15, 1979 and February 15, 1980 which requested a comparison of.the qualification of
' Class IE equipment at McGuire to NUREG-0588, " Interim Staff Position on Environ-mental Qualification of Safety-Related Equipment." Additionally, the response to
. questions concerning containment fan motors qualification which was requested in a letter dated March 7, 1980 is contained in the submittal.
It is expectr.J that these tables will be updated to include additional'informa-tion as it Eccomes availabic.
If there are any questions regarding the attached, please advise.
/l Ve y truly yours,
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William O. Parker,'Jr.( _
GAC:scs Attachments
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CAW-80-31 AFFIDAY!T_
C0ff0NWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA:
ss COUNTY OF ALLEGHENY:
Before me, the undersigned authority, personally appeared Robert A. Wiesemann, who, being by me duly sworn according to law, deposes and says that he is authorized to execute this Affidavit on behalf of Westinghouse Electric Corporation (" Westinghouse") and that the averments of fact set forth in this Affidavit are true and correct to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief:
Robert A. Wiesemann, Manager Regulatory and Legislative Affairs i
Sworn to and subscribed before me this n day of u,
_1980.
J a Aft d.d ce jf, liotiry'Public ve.u.
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. CAW-80-31 (1) I am Manager, Regu1 story and Legislative Affairs, in the Nuclear Technology Division, of Westinghouse Electric Corporation and as such, I have been specifically delegated the function of reviewing the proprietary information sought to be withheld from public dis-closure in connection with nuclear power plant licensing or rule-making proceedings, and am authorized to apply for its withholding on behalf of the Westinghouse Water Reactor Divisions.
(2) I am making this Affidavit in conformance with the provisions of 10CFR Section 2.790 of the Commission's regulations and in con-junction with the Westinghouse application for withholding ac-companying this Affidavit.
(3) I have personal knowledge of the criteria and procedures utilized by Westinghouse Nuclear Energy Systems in designating information as a trade secret, privileged or as confidential commerical or financial information.
(4) Pursuant to the provisions of paragraph (b)(4) of Section 2.790 of the Commission's regulations, the following is furnished for consideration by the Commission in determining whether the in-formation sought to be withheld from public disclosure should be withheld.
(i) The information sought to be withheld from public disclosure is owned and has been held in confidence by Westinghouse.
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. CAW-80-31 (11) The information is of a type customarily held in confidence by Westinghouse and not customarily disclosed to the public.
Westinghouse has a rational basis for determining the types
~
of information customarily held in confidence by it and, in that connection, utilizes a system to determine when and whether to hold certain types of information in confidence.
The application;of that system and the substance of that system constitutes Westinghouse policy and provides the rational basis required.
Under that system, information is held in confidence if it falls in one or more of several types, the release of which might result in the loss of an existing or potential com-petitive advantage, as follows:
(a) The informaticn reveals the distinguishing aspects of a process (or component, structure, tool, method, etc.)
where prever. tion of its use by any of Westinghouse's competitors without' license from Westinghouse consti-tutes a competitive economic advantage over other companies.
(b) It consists of sup>orting data. including test data, relative to a process (or component, structure, tool, method, etc.), the application of which data secures a competitive economic advantage, e.g., by optimization or improved marketability.
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. CAW-80-31 (c) Its use by a competitor would reduce his expenditure of resources or improve his competitive position in the design, manufacture, shipment, installation, assurance of quality, or licensing a similar product.
(d) It reveals cost or price information, production cap-acisles, budget levels, or commercial strategies of Westinghouse, its customers or suppliers.
(e) It reveals aspects of past, present, or future West-inghouse or customer funded develcpment plans and pro-grams of potential comercial value to Westinghouse.
(f) It contains patentable ideas, for which patent pro-tection may be desirable.
(g) It is not the property of Westinghouse, but must be treated as proprietary by Westinghouse according to agreements with the owner.
There are sound policy reasons behind the Westinghouse system which include the following:
(a) The use of such information by Westinghouse gives Westinghouse a competitive advantage over its com-petitors. It is, therefore, withheld from disclosure to protect the Westinghouse competitive position.
o
. CAW-80-31 (b) It is information which is marketable in many ways.
The extent to which such information is available to competitors diminishes the Westinghouse ability to sell products and services involving the use of the information.
(c) Use by our competitor would put Westinghouse at a competicive disadvantage by reducing his expenditure of resources at our expense.
(d) Each componeht lif broprieta'ry 'inf6rmation pertinent'
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I to a particular competitive advantage is potentially as valuable as the total competitive advantage. If competitors acquire components of proprietary infor-mation, any one component may be the key to the entire puzzle, thereby depriving Westinghouse of a competitive advantage.
(e) Unrestricted disclosure would jeopardize the posif, ion of prominence of Westinghouse in the world market, and thereby give a market advantage to the competition in those countries.
(f) The Westinghause capacity to invest corporate assets in research ar.d development depends upon the success in obtaining and maintaining a competitive advantage.
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. CAW-80-31 (iii) The information is being transmitted to the Commission in
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confidence and, under the provisions of 10CFR Section 2.790, it is to be received in confidence by the Connission.
(iv) The information sought to be protected is not available in public sources to the best of our knowledge and belief.
(v) The proprietary information sought to be withheld in this submittal is appropriately marked information provided to Westinghouse utility customers in WCAP-9745 entitled "Results of Westinghouse Review of Environmental Qualifi-cation References for WRD Supplied Category II Equipment with Respect to the Staff Positions in NUREG-0588" for their use in responding to the NRC request to review their qualification programs against the standards established in NUREG-0588.
This information enables Westinghouse to:
(a) Develop test inputs and procedures to satisfactorily verify the design of Westinghouse supplied equipnent.
(b) Assist its customers to obtain licenses.
Further, the information has substantial commercial value as follows:
(a) Westinghouse can sell the use of this information to customers.
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. CAW-80-31 (b) Westinghouse uses the information to verify the design of equipment which is sold to customers.
(c) Westinghouse can sell testing services based upon the experience gained and the test equipment and methods developed.
Public disclosure of this information is likely to cause substantial harm to the competitive position of Westinghouse because it would enhance the ability of competitors to design, manufacture, verify, and sell electrical equipment for com-mercial power reactors without connensurate expenses. Also, public disclosure of the information would enable others having the same or similar equipment to use the information to meet NRC requirements for licensing documentation without purchasing the right to use the information.
The development of the equipment described in part by the information is the result of many years of development by Westinghouse and the expenditure of a considerable sum of money.
This could only be duplicated by a competitor if he were to invest similar sums of money and provided he had the appropriate tala.t available end could somehow obtain the requisit 2xperience.
Further the deponent sayeth not.
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McGuire Nuclear Station - Unit 1 Environmental vaalification of Class 1E Equipment NRC letters dated October 15, 1979 and February 15, 1980 concerning the environmental qualification of Class lE equipment defined the NRC Staff's requirements with respect to NUREG 0588, Interim Staff Position on Environmental Qu ~dfication of Safety-Related Electrical Equipment, Basically, the Staff's requirements were as follows:
- 1) Provide a table listing by generic type all Class lE equipment including the appropriate qualification data for the equipment. The format for this table was provided in the Staff's October 15, 1979 letter.
- 2) Review the adequacy of the environmental qualification for the equipment identified in Item 1 aSove with respect to the Staff's position described in NUREG 0588, document the degree of conformance, and justify any deviations.
Further, the NRC issued a Memorandum and Order on May 23, 1980 establishing NUREG 0588 as the requirement which applicants must meet in order to satisfy General Design Criterion 4 relating to the environmental qualification of Class lE equipment.
In response to the NRC Staff's requests for information in this matter, Duke Power Company is providing the following: - Summary of Environmental Qualification of Class lE Equipment Located Inside Containment - Summary of Environmental Qualification of Class 1E Equipment Located Outside Containment and Exposed to HELB Environment - Summary of Environmental Qualification of Class lE Equipment Located Outside Containment and Exposed to the Post-LOCA Recirculation Radiation Environment (This information is scheduled to be submitted in September,1980.) - Duke Power Corrny /osition on the Category II Guidelines of NUREG 0588 - Compariso.. of the Environmental Qualification of Class lE Equipment Located Inside Containment to the Duke Position on the Category II Guidelines of'NUREG 0588 l
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/ - Comparison of the Environmental Qualification of Class 1E Equipment Located Outside Containment and Exposed to HELB Environment to the Duke Position on the Category II Guidelines of NUREG 0588 - Comparison of the Environmental Qualification of Class 1E Equipment Located Outside Containment and Exposed to the Post-LOCA Recirculation Radiation Environment to the Duke Position on the Category II Guidelines of NUREG 0588 (This information is scheduled to be submitted in September,1980.)
Attachments 1, 2, and 3 provide the tabular listing of Class 1E equipment exposed to a harsh environment and includes appropriate qualification data for the equipment. Attachments 4, 5, 6, and 7 document the degree of conformance of the equipment qualification programs with the Category II guidelines of NUREG 0588.
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ATTACHMENT 1 SUP9tARY OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF CLASS 1E EQUIPMENT LOCATED INSIDE CONTAINMENT I
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e McGUIRE IIUCLEAR STAT 10sl - UNIT I Page 2 SuretARY OF ENWBRosetENTAL QUALIFICAT10810F CLASS IE EQUIPMENT pevision I LOCAS ) INSIDE CONTAINMENT Non-Propel tery EquirMini MonEL 04 ACCIDENT ENylmotetENT OPERAtiLITY OPfRASILITY ACCURACY ACCURACY QuRLIFICAtless
)
lof witF IEATION MANufACT9AfR 4CENilflCAfl04 EuvincestENT TO WHICH REQ'IIRED IN H MONSTAATED REQutRED SEMONSTRATES atroet Am0 MEfM00 wtrsER (2)
QUALIFIES ACCl0ENT of Span)
M of SM ggy (I)
ENvih0NMENT (3)
I e
e.6e ei>c RTD -
Rosesmuuet
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327 F Temp:
Reactor Trly 40 year
- life 1 0.21 WCAP 3157 and puhe i
ACS Tegerature (mm)
Press: 14.8 psig Press:
(post SLS) plus I hr letter Parker to AN:
3 AM:
post SLS Denton dated peceeer (Lower contelanent) 13, 1973 Red:
IIl0 med:
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Cham 5 prey: IS/A Chen Spr"ey: Boric (40 year life acid and sedlue based en red Method: Test / Analysis hydromide sola, effects only) ed..c e
e.bgs af0 -
Rosearsent
[
],c Temp:
327 F Temp:
l)2 F 2 weeks Il year life i O.2%
WCAP 1157 and Duke aC5 Temperature (14)
Press: 14.8 psig Pressa post SLS plut 100 days letter Parker te Senton dated Dece.6er RH:
post SLS 1005,R (Lo==r cont Irment)
RM:
- 13. 1973 talo-med:
~
med:
Chee Sprey: Soric Chen Sprey: Boric (Il year life acid and sodlum acid and sodlue based est red Method: Casparlson to i
tetraborate sein.
hydronide sola.
effects only)
Model 176 RF Test / Analysis c
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The pesar range new ron detectors are not required for accidents that conne a change Escars Neutron W IGiB Ditecttrs (Pomer in the normel conte amont operating awi ronment.
Reage)
(Lower contalromat)
Elsctric Hydrogen W Sturtevent A
Temp: ISO F Temp
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3 months I year N/A II/A WCAP 7820 and R xcelner Press: 14.8 psig Press:
post ett post DGE supplements I-4 (Upper contalemment)
RH:
100%
SM:
7 WCAP 77094 and Red:
8.1110 R Red:
- Boric Supplements 14 Chem $ prey: Soric Chem Sprey:
l ocid and sodlun acid and sodlus Method: Test tetreborate soln.
hydromide sola.
Contrieuaent Alt Joy /Rellence 2RF-))0081 Temp:
100 F Temp:
))0 F 3 months I year n/A n/A Test Report fi-14282 f
RIturn Fan Motors Presst 14.8 psig Press: 85 pelg post pgE post DSE and Supplemental l
Techalcel Peper TA4061 (upper contalrunent) an:
100%
AN:
1 7
Test Report R404 med:
7.6180 R ReJ:
III fest neport auf-9 and Chem Spray: Soric Chem Spray: Soric Suppleaent 4/14/80 acid and sodlum acid and sodlun Metted: Test tetroborate soln.
hydromide soln.
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huiutRE IsuCLEAR STAfl0el. UNIT I Page )
SLDenARY OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICAT80ll 0F CLASS It EQUIPMENT Revision I LOCATED INSIDE CONIAINMENT Non-Prc9r le t ery squsmini MODEL On ACCIDENT 11VIRosett NT OPitAslLITY OPERAglLITY ACCURACY ACCURACY quAtlFICATIou IDE FflF ICA f lom MAN'IFACTURf A IDENelFICATION ENVIR0ic1ENT 80 nellCN REQ'IORED IN DEMO NS T RAT E0 REQUIRED DEMONSTRATES aE*0er Am0 Mtti3 E R (2)
Q'IALIFIED ACCIDfMT MitH00 gg)
ENVIRosetENT (3)
(4)
MyJrogen Skleiner Jay /Rellence I TF-882)l5 Temp:
ISO F Temp:
330 F 2 months I year N/A N/A Test Report FF-14282 i
Fan Motors Press: 14.8 psig Press: 85 pelg post Det post set and supplemental (Upper contalesment)
RH:
100%
RN:
8005 Techalcol paper.TA-4081 7
9 Red:
7.6x10 R Red:
lx10 R Test Report x-606 Chee Sprey: Doric Chee Spreys horic test Report seUC-9 and acid and sodlms acid and sedlue Supplement 4/14/80 tetreborate soln.
hydroalde soin.
Method: Test p*fest flaports:
V13ve Motor motork 7 1648. Il NAl.
Temp:
327 F Temp:
340 F 5 ein 30 deys II/A N/A i H/4. Dece.ber 1970 Operstars 14 NAl. 56 fiAl.
Press: 14.8 psig Press: 75 pois (flotes 8 and 9) post Det
+TR 116. October 197)
AN:
I (Lower conteleont) 30 1041, 40 NAl.
RH:
JOSE 7 (R 222. June 1975 70 1841. 30 NAl Red:
e.75l0 A Red:
2al Chee Spray: Doric Chee Sprey: Doric MetkMI: Test acid and sodlwa acid and sodlwe tetroborate soln.
hydroalde sola.
valve Motor Limitorque SMs Temp: 327 F Tamp:
340 F
$ ein 30 days N/A N/A Test Report: 600-3'/6-A Operrtors Press: 1%.S psig Press: 105 psig (Notes 3 and 9) poet Pet Septa =6er 1972 RN:
1001 (Lower contelnment)
RN:
J001 7 Red:
e.7210 R Red:
2al00 Test Report: 600 le56 Chee Spreys soric Chen Sprey: Soric Deces6er 1975 scid e.ed sodlum acid and sodlue tetraborate sein.
hydromide sola.
Method: Test Valve Solenold Welcor V526 Tony:
327 F Temy:
346 F Operet, upon
)! days N/A N/A Test Reports i
Operttor e V57)
Press: 14.8 psig Pressa ll) psig receipt of a post DOE 0R-52600415 and (Lower contalemment)
V70900-21-l RN:
100%
AM:
100%
safety' 41gnal QR-70900-21-1 6
0 V70900-21-)
Red:
1.8x10 n Red:
2x10 4 Chee Sproy: Soric Chee Sprey: Boric itethod: Test acid and sod!ue ocid and sodlue tetreborate sola.
hydroalde soln.
Conttinsent Alr motork IINA28 Temy:
140 F Temy:
340 F
$ ein (ames) 30 days N/A N/A Test Report Mll/%
9ettre isolation Press: 14.8 psig Press:
75 psig post Det post Det Dece.6er 1970 3enver Motor RM:
1001 RN:
800E (Uppsr contalement)
Red:
8.IIl0'A Red:
Isl0 R Test Report TRil6 0
Chee Spray: Soric Chee Sprey: Boric October 1973 ocid and sodlus ecle and sedlue if tatseborate soln.
hydromide soln.
Method: Test i
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McGUIRE NUCLEAR STAT 10se - UNIT I rege 4 5tmMR's CF ENVIR0es* ENTAL QUALIFICAT10sl 0F CLATS If EQUIPMENT Revlston I LOCATES IIr510t COItTA111 MENT Non-Propeletary E QUIPM MI nopEL Os ACCIDENT E NVI A08etE NT OPE RAtlLITY OPE RASILITY ACCURACV ACCURACY QUALIF IC A tl0N 81E ast lF it (1804 MANUFACTURfA 10ENitFICATION ENVIRosetENT TO UNICM REQ'ilRED IN HMONSTRATED REQUIRED M MosISTRAfte RE*0ct Ano MtMst R QUALIFIED ACCIDENT M(TH00 II, (2)
ENVIR00 STENT (3) p)
Vstvs Solenold Asco NP8316E34E Temp:
327 F Temp:
346 F Operate upon 30 days N/A N/A Test Report NP8)l6E36E Press: 14.8 psig Pressa lie psig receipt of a post DSE AQ521678/TR Operators RH; I
safety signal.
l0g1 RH:
(tower contalruent) 6
.aX10 g Red:
2ml Method: Test Red:
Chen Sproy: N/A Chem Spray: Beric ecid and sodlum hydroelde soln.
Vilve Solenold Target 77CC Temp:
327 F Temp:
385 r (slote 10) 14 days N/A N/A Test Report 2375.
Opertfors Rock Model Press: 14.8 psig Press: 66 psig post OSE 9/26/79 RN:
100%
RH:
1005 Red:
5.7X10 R Red:
1.3mloh Method: Test 7
Chem Spray: Soric Chem Sprey: Soric acid and sodlue acid and tetraborate soln.
hydrosine Sif fsrential Pres-Solon 7P5tADW Tene:
440 F Temp:
ISO F I min 5 min 1 0.5 psig 1 0.3 pit, Test Report A293-80 surs $ witch for Press: 14.8 psig Press: 15 psig post 90E post Det Test Report A298e-80 Desper Control NH:
1001 RH:
8001 5
6 (Upper contairement)
Red:
8.III0 R Rad:
1.la10 R Method Test Chen Sprey: Boric Chen Spray: Boric acid and sadlun acid and sodlum tetraborate soln.
tetreborate soin.
Electrical.
0.G. O'Brien Types A.B.C.
Temp:
327 F Temp: 340 F 4 monthe
% months N/A II/A Test Reports IR-247.
Pene t ra t ions 0,E,F G.H. J.
Press: 14.8 psig Press: 85 pstg post DOE post DOE ER=2$2 and ER-227 (tower contalesment)
R.L,n, and RN:
1001 RH:
100Eg cathodic pro.
Red:
8.5Xio7R Red:
2 ale R Method: Test / Analysis tection pene.
Chen Sprey Soric Chen Spray: Soric 1
i tretton acid and sodlue ecle end sodlum (Note ll) tetraborate soln, hydromlde soln.
1 (Note 12) a tabla -
Okontco EP insulation Temp:
327 F Temp:
345 F 30 days
$30 days ll/A N/A Test Reports FN-1, Control, Inst rumen-Press: 14.8 psig Press: 104 pelg post DGE post DOE N-8, G-), 110E, and d
tition, and 2 aLV RH:
8001 RH:
500E I48 7
E Red:
6.7X10 R Red:
2ml0 R power Method: Test (Lower contelnment)
Chen Spray: Soric Chen Sprey: Soric scid and sedlan acid and sodlum 1
tetraborate soln.
hydroxide soln.
e 1
McGUIRE HUCLEAR stall 0N - UNIT l Page $
SUPHARY OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF CLA55 IE EQUIPMENT pevision I
)
LOCATED.N510E CONTAlletENT Non-Proprietary EQUIPNINI MOCEL OR ACCIDENT ENVIRO *ENT OPE rag lLITT OPERA 51LITY ACCURACY ACCURACT QtALIFICAlice IDEpilflCAllog MAWuf ACTURf R lefMIIFICATION LNVIROMtENT 10 WICH REQ *lREs IN DEMONSTRATED REQUIRio DEMONSTRATED pEroet Amo FLlMeth (2)
QUALIFitD ACC10fMT
- 1(IM00 (g)
(MVih0NM(NT (3)
(48 Cabis -
Okontte Tafael 280 Temp; 327 F Temp:
34l F 4 months 120 days N/A II/A Test Report R-0-1 last rument at ion lasulation Press: 14.8 psig Press: 112 psig.
post 00E (Septe eer 1979)
AN:
100%
AN:
1 7
Met' hod: Test (Lower contelement)
Red:
8.5x10 R Red:
2ml Chee 5 prey toric Chen Sprey: soric j
ecid and sodlum acid and sodlue tetreborate soln.
hydromide sola.
Cabla -
Aneconde EP insulation Temp:
327 F Temp:
)M F 3 months 4 months II/A N/A Test Reports F-C4350-2 j
Control and 2KW and Press: 14.8 psig Pressa ll) psig post 084 post DDE and F-C4350-3. and Supplement EP/?typelon RN:
1001 RN:
100%
I 0
power (Lower contalement) lasulatlan Red:
8.tx10 R Red:
2ml0 R Method: Test Chan Sprays Soric Chee 5 prey: Soric scid and sodlum acid and sodlum tetreborate soln.
hydroalde soln.
I Cabla -
Brand Rem XLPE insulation Tony:
327 F Temp:
3M F 30 days 30 days II/A N/A Test Report F-C481)
Control Press: 14.8 psig Press: II) psig post OSE post DSC Method: Test (Lower contelennent)
AN:
100%
RN:
800K I
8 Red:
6.7El0 R ReJ:
2ml0 R Chen Spray: Soric Chem Sprey: Doric acid and sodium acid and sodlue tetraborate sola.
hydroalde sola.
Cobla -
Samuel Moore (P/Hypelon Tempt 327 F Temp 340 F 30 days 30 doye N/A N/A Test Report F-C)68)
Ins t rument a t ion Insutetton Press: 14.8 pelg Press: 105 pelg' post get post SSE Method: fest i
(Lower contelnment)
RN:
800%
RN:
- 100E,
?
I Red:
6.7X10 R Red:
2m10"A Chem Sprey: Boric Chen Sprey: Soric ecid and sodlum acid and sodlue tetraborate soln.
hydromide soln.
Cable Terminetton/
Raychem WCSF-te Tony:
327 F Toege:
357 F 4 months 4 months N/A II/A Test Reports F-Cbo))-)
Syllce Meterlat Sleeves Press: 14.8 psig Presst 70 psig post DSE post Det and 7tl00 (Lower contel wont) and RN:
100%
RN:
800E 7
g Method: Test / Analysis treakouts ReJ 8.5x10 R Red:
2 ale R Chem Sprey soric Chem Sprey: Soric acid and sodlum acid and sodlue tetraborate soln.
hydromide soln.
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Page 7 Revision 1 Non-Proprietary MCGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION - UNIT 1 ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF CLASS 1E EQUIPMENT LOCATED INSIDE CONTAINMENT Note 1 All equipment identified in this table is located Inside the containment, specifically in the lower compartment except for the electric hydrogen recombiner, containment air return fan motors, hydrogen skinsner fan motors, containment air return isolation damper motors, differential pressure switches for damper control and cables associated with these devices which are located in the upper compartment.
Note 2 The parameters that compose the overall worst-case containment accident environment are as follows:
Temperature (Upper Compartment):
180F peak; time history as shown in FSAR Figure 6.2.1-24 (Rev 36).
Temperature (Lower Compartment): 327F peak; time history as shown in FSAR Supplement 1, q042.73, Figure 7 Revision 39.
Pressure (Upper and I.ower Compartment): 14.8 psig peak; time history as shown in FSAR Figure 6.2.1-23 (Rev. 36).
Relative Humidity:
100%
Radiation: Total Integrated radiation dose for the equipment location includes 40 year normal operating dose plus the appropriate accident dose (except for the narrow-range and wide-range RTD's).
Chemical Spray:
Boric acid and sodium tetraborate spray resulting from mixing In the containment sump of borated water from the RWST and sodium tetraborate solution from Ice bed melt.
Note 3 Equipment operability requirements in the containment accident environment are as identified in FSAR Table 3.11.1-1 (Rev. 25).
i r
,-,.m.
,. - -,,,,,w_--,
-,------.,yp,.,-
,yw-y-,.-wv.,
-.g--w-i.-
,-,,9
Page8 Ravision 1 Non-Proprietary Note le Environmental qualification test reports for the following equipment have previously been submitted to the NRC Staff:
Transmitters-Barton (by Westinghouse)
RTD's-Rosemount (by Westinghouse)
Electric Hydrogen Recombiner (by Westinghouse)
Containment Air Aeturn Fan Motors (by Duke)
Hydrogen Skimmer Fan Motors (by Duke)
Solennld Operators-Valcor (by Duke)
Electric Penetrations (by Duka)
Cable Termination / Splice Material (by Duke)
Stem-Mounted Limit Switches (by Duke)
Cable Entrance Seal Material (by Duke)
Note 5 a,b,c One of the transmitters tested exhibited an error of approximately as shown in the Lot 2 test report. This matter Is being pursued by Westinghouse and will be addressed in a supplement to the Lot 2 test report.
Note 6 The containment pressure sensors and associated transmitters were tested as a system, even though the pressure transmitters are located outside the containment in the annulus and, therefore, are not exposed to the extreme environment. The accuracy requirements of the sensor / transmitter system are under evaluation.
Note 7 The cc,ntainment pressure sensor devices are made of stainless steel and therefore not degraded by chemical spray.
Note 8 l
Five minutes is adequate time to assure containment isolation and the required repositioning of other safety related valves.
Note 9 During the 30 days foll w inj a postulated accident, the containment temperature and pressure will apprcach normal; therefore, additional I
service can reasonably be es ected from this equipment.
y w
--.,m 2-
-s--
9-,-
.y-
,--,.-,.,,.4,, -
Page 9 Ravision 1 Non-P rop r ie ta ry Note 10 The Target Rock solenold valves are used In the reactor head vent system to provide a path for removal of non-condensable gases. Core events leading to the generation of significant amounts of non-condensable gases occur early In the postulated accident sequences and are of short duration; therefore, these valves are only required to operate within the first few days of the accident. The need for venting non-condensable gases is not anticipated beyond the 14 day qualification of the valves.
Note 11 Electric penetration types 8,C,F,G and K are the only penetrations required to function electrically in the containment accident environment. All electric penetrations, however, are designed and quellfled to maintain their mechanical Integrity under normal and postulated accident environmental conditions.
Note 12 The McGuire electric penetrations are protected from direct spray Impingement by galvanized steel boxes.
' ^
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ATTACHMENT 2 SUt9%RY OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF CLASS 1E EQUIPMENT LOCATED OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT AND EXPOSED TO HELB ENVIRONMENT i
l
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lesGutet uuCLEA4 STAT 30m = Wellt 8 newleton p lipotAaf 0F EIAfl#0esetNTAL QuntiflCATION OF CLASS IE 94110Peetsi i
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QUALIFitt setts sensecta tavleessetus (2) 9mme sepeet:
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01C 4 - Limiting St rut t.e rs-Dunn 219 Temp: 212 F Temp: 212 F Continuous Continuous 10 4 NA Montre Nuclear Station Pipe Rupture Compe uent : ne lay s Temperatus e Com-ponent Iest flle No. CS-640.00 Method: Test OTC 40 - t imit Ing S t rut he rs-Dunn 219 Temp: 212 F Temp: 212 F Continuous Continuous een lea McCulre Nuclear Stat ion Pipe Rupt ure Compom mt : laelays Temperature Com-punent Test file No. CS-640.00 Method: fest CIC 6 - Limitlag States ZWM Temp: 212 F Tony: 311 F Continuous Continuous een NA UL Listing.
10/24/75 letter Comswuent: 511 ding f ran Rot >ert W, Link terminal Blusks Chapmen 6 (u.
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Page 13 Revision 0 McGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION UNIT 1 ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF CLASS lE EQUIPMENT LOCATED OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT AND EXPOSED TO HELB ENVIRONMENT Note 1 The methods employed to evaluate pipebreaks and to determine the resulting environmental parameters are discussed in Duke Power Company Report MDS/PDG-77-1 The Evaluation of the Effects of Postulated Pipe Failures Outside Containment for McGuire Nuclear Station.
Note 2 The HELB environment is assumed to exist for 2t hours based on 30 minutes at the peak temperature after which action by the operator isolates the break and allows Auxiliary Building temperature to decrease to normal ambient in 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.
Note 3 The motors installed on Unit 1 pumps will be selected from the shop order numbers l isted. All motors listed have been qualified in the same manner, Note 4 Rotork Test Report TR-3025 shows that when the qualified temperature for these valves is exceeded, the torque switches may fail on the next operation of the valve. Since at least one additional operation is available after the valve's temperature qualification has been exceeded, the valve can be relied upon to move to its safety position.
Note 5 The HELB analysis has identified pipe breaks resulting in higher temperatures; however, there are no cables exposed to temperatures above 330*F.
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i ATTACHMENT 3
SUMMARY
OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF CLASS 1E EQUIPMENT LOCATED OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT AND EXPOSED THE POST-LOCA RECIRCULATION RADIATION ENVIRONMENT (This infonnation is scheduled to be submitted in September,1980)
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ATTACHMENT 4 l
DUKE POWER COMPANY POSITION ON THE CATEGORY II GUIDELINES OF NUREG 0588 i
i
MCGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION NUREG 0588 CATEGORY II DUKE POWER COMPANY GUIDELINES POSITION i
i 1.0 ESTABLISHMENT OF THE QUALIFICATION PARAMETERS FOR DESIGN BASIS EVENTS 1.1 Temperature and Pressure Conditions Inside Containment -
Loss-of-Coolant 1.1.1 The time-dependent temperature The containment structural design and ptassure, established for the has been based on the results on design of the containment struc-an analysis performed by Westing-ture and found acceptable by the houre employing the methodology staff, may be used for environ-described below. The results of mental qualification of equip-this analysis are reported in Sec-ment.
tion 6.2 of the FSAR.
1.1.2 Acceptable methods for calculat-Westinghouse employs the methodology ing and establishing the contain-described in WCAP-8312A for calculat-ment pressure and temperature ing the LOCA mass and energy release.
envelopes to which equipment Appendix A to NUREG-0588 indicates should be qualified are summarized that this methodology is acceptable below. Acceptable methods for cal-to the Staff.
culating mass an2 energy release rates are summarized in Appendix A.
Pressurized Water Reactors (PWRs) i Ice Condenser Containment - Calcu-Westinghouse conforms to the Staff late LOCA containment environment position for Ice-Condenser Plants using LOTIC or equivalent industry by employing LOTIC to calculate the codes. Additional guidance is pro-containment transient following LOCA.
vided in SRP Section 6.2.1.1.B.
NUREG-75/087.
1.1.3 In lieu of using the plant-specific Plant-specific profiles are the containment temperature and pressure basis for McGuire equipment quali-l design profiles for BWR and ice fication testing.
condenser types of plants, the gen-eric envelope shown in Appendix C may be used for qualification test-(
ing.
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NUREG 0588 CATEGORY II DUKE POWER COMPA.W GUIDELINES POSITION 1.1.4 The test profiles included in Plant specific profiles are the basis Appendix A to IEEE Std. 323-1974 for McGuire equipment qualification should not be considered an ac-testing.
It should be noted that the ceptable alternative in lieu of IEEE 323-1974, Appendix A temperature using plant-specific containment and pressure profiles envelope the temperature and pressure design worst-case McGuire containment acci-profiles unless plant-spe ific dent temperature and pressure condi-
~
analysis is provided to-rify tions and have been used by some manu-the adequacy of those profiles.
facturers for generic qualifications.
1.2 Temperature and Pressure Conditions Inside Containment -
Main Steam Line Break (MSLB) 1.2.1 Where qualification has not The environmental qualification been completed, the environmen-testing for equipment located in-tal parameters used for equip-side containment has been completed.
ment qualification should be calculated using a plant-speci-fic model based on the staff-approved assumptions discussed in Item 1 of Appendix B.
1.2.2 Models that are acceptable for Westinghouse employs the methodology calculating containment parameters described in WCAP 8822 for calculat-are listed in Section 1.1.2.
ing the mass and energy release fol-lowing a Main Steam Line Break (MSLB).
At the specific request of Duke, Westinghouse has completed the mass and energy release calculatior,s assum-ing no entrainment. Westinghouse conforms to the Staff position for Ice-Condenser Plants by employing LOTIC to calculate the containment transient following MSLB.
1.2.3 In lieu of using the plant-Plant specific profiles are the specific containment temperature basis for McGuire equipment quali-and pressure design profiles for fication testing.
BWR and ice condenser plants, the generic envelope shown in Appendix C may be used.
hTREG 0588 CATEGORY II DUKE P0k'ER COMPANY GUIDELINES POSITION 1.2.4 The test profiles included in Plant specific profiles are the basis Appendix A to IEEE Std. 323-1974 for McGuire equipment qualification should not be considered an testing. It should be noted that the acceptable alternative in lieu of IEEE 323-1974, Appendix A temperature using plant-specific containment and pressure profiles envelope the temperature and pressure design worst-case McGuire containment accident profiles unless plant-specific temperature and pressure conditions analysis is provided to verify the and have been used by some manufacturers adequacy of those profiles.
for genric qualification.
1.2.5 Where qualification has been The environmental qualification tests completed but only LOCA condi-for equipment installed inside the tions were considered, then it containment at McGuire that is required must be demonstrated that the to function during and following a MSLB LOCA qualification conditions envelope the maximum calculated MSLB exceed or are equivalent to the conditions.
maximum calculated MSLB conditions.
1.3 Effects of Chemical Spray 1.3.1 The effects of caustic spray Chemical spray is included in quali-should be addressed for the fication tests for equipment located equipment qualification. The inside the containment provided the concentration of caustics used equipment is required to operate in for qualification should be the spray environment.
equivalent to or more severe than those used in the plant containment spray system.
1.3.2 If the chemical composition of In the McGuire containment spray the caustic spray can be affected system, no single failure can occur by equipment malfunctions, the that will result in a more severe most severe caustic spray environ-spray solution composition than the ment that results from a single anticipated composition.
failure in the spray system should be assumed. See SRP Section 6.5.2 (NUREG-75/087), paragraph II, Item (e) for caustic spray solution guidelines.
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NUREG 0588 CATEGORY II DUKE POER COMPANY GUIDELINES POSITION 1
1.4 Radiation Conditions Inside and Outside Containment l
l The radiation environment for The calculated radiation environ-qualification of equipment should ment is based on the 40 year normal be based on the normally expected operating dose plus the appropriate radiation environment over the DBA dose.
equipment qualified life, plus that associated with the most severe design basis accident (DBA) dur-ing or following which that equip-ment must remain functional. It should be assumed that the DBA-related environmental conditions occur at the end of the equipment qualified life.
The sample calculations in Appen-dix D and the following positions provide an acceptable approach for establishing radiation limits for qualification. Additional radiation margins identified in Section 6.3.1.5 of IEEE Std. 323-1974 for qualification type testing are not required if these methods are used.
1.4.1 The source term to be used in The radiation environments through-determining the radiation environ-out the station following a DBA ment associated with the design LOCA are determined assuming instant-basis LOCA should be taken as an aneous release from the fuel to the instantaneous release from the fuel containment of 100% of the noble gas
,to the atmosphere of 100 percent inventory, 50% of the core iodine in-of the noble gases, 50 percent of ventory, and 1% of the remaining core I
the iodines, and 1 percent of the fission product inventory. This source remaining fission products. For term is used to derive radiation levels all other non-LOCA design basis for all equipment requiring radiation accident conditions, a source tera qualification. The release fractions involving an instantaneous release are consistent with TID-14844 and from the fuel to the atmosphere of NUREG 0578, Item 2.1.6 b.
10 percent of the noble gases (ex-cept Kr-85 for which a release of 30 percent should be assumed) and 10 percent of the iodines is acceptable.
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NUREG 0588 CATEGORY II DUKE POWER COMPANY GUIDELINES POSITION 1.4.2 The calculation of the radiation All radioactivity released initially environment associated with de-remains within the containment. Air-sign basis accidents should take borne radioactivity is assumed to be into account the time-dependent homogeneously distributed throughout transport of released fission the containment at 10 minutes into the products within various regions accident because of containment air of containment and auxiliary return fan actuation. Recirculation structures.
of water from the containment sump is also assumed to begin at 10 minutes into the accident. Prior to initiation of recirculation, normal radiation environments are assumed to exist throughout the station outside con-tainment. 1he time-dependent transport mechanisms considered are consistent with NUREG 0578, Item 2.1.6b.
1.4.3 The initial distribution of acti-See the response to 1.4.2 above.
vity within the containment should be based on a mechanistically ra-tional assumption. Hence, for com-partmented containments, such as in a BWR, a large portion of the source should be assumed to be in-itially contained in the drywell.
The assumption of uniform distri-bution of activity throughout the containment at time zero is not appropriate.
1.4.4 Effects of ESF systems, such as To increase the conservatism of the containment spraya and contain-calculated radiation values, no credit ment ventilation and filtration is taken for removal processes such as systems, which act to remove air-containment spray, filters, or natural borne activity and redistribute deposition. The only removal mechanism activity within containment, should considered is radioactive decay.
be calculated using the same as-sumptions used in the calculation of offsite dose. See SRP Section 15.6.5 (NUREG-75/087) and the re-lated sections referenced in the Appendices to that section.
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NLTEG 0588 C/.TEGORY II DUKE POWER COMPANY GUIDELINES POSITION 1.4.5 Natural deposition (i.e., plate-The assumption of an instantaneous out) of airborne activity should plate-out of 50% of the iodine released be determined using a mechanistic from the core is not used. As stated model and best estimates for the above, natural deposition is not used model parameters. The assumption in the development of post-LOCA ra-tf 50 percent instantaneous plate-diation levels.
I' out of the iodine reinased from the core should not be made.
Re-moval of iodine from surfaces by steam condensate flow or washoff by the containment spray may be assumed if such effects can be justified and quantified by an-alysis or experiment.
1.4.6 For unshielded equipment located The gamma dose in containment is that in the containment, the gamma dose dose calculated at the centerpoint of and dose rate should be equal to the containment. Shielding effects are the dose and dose rate at the considered for equipment located out-centerpoint of the containment side the crane wall and in the accumu-plus the contribution from loca-lator rooms.
tion dependent sources such as the sump water and plate-out, un-less it can be shown by analyzes that location and shielding of the equipment reduces the dose and dose rate.
1.4.7 For unshielded equipment, the beta Beta dose calculations are consistent doses at the surface of the equip-with the gamma dose calculations as cent should be the sum of the air-discussed above. Also see the response borne and plate-out sources. The to 1.4.8 below, airborne beta dose should be taken as the beta dose calculated for a point at the containment center.
1.4.8 Shielded components need be All Class IE equipmeat located in-qualified only to the gamma radi-side containment that is required to atica levels required, provided mitigate a LOCA, MSLB, or HELB in-an analysis or test shows that side the containment has sufficient the sensitive porr. ions of the shielding to prevent the exposure of
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NUREG 0588 CATEGORY II DUKE POWER COMPANY GUIDELINES POSITION 1.4.8 (Continued)
(Continued) component or equipment are not ex-any organic materials associated posed to beta radiation or that with this equipment to a beta ra-the effects of beta radiation diation environment.
heating and ionization have no deleterious effects on component performance.
1.4.9 Cables arranged in cable trays See the response to 1.4.8 above.
in the containment should be as-Additionally, armored cables are used sumed to be exposed to half the in safety-related applications inside beta radiation dose calculated containment at McGuire; therefore, for a point at the center of the beta radiation effects on cable insula-containment plus the gamma ray tion is considered negligible.
dose calculated in accordance with Section 1.4(6). This reduction in beta dose is allowed because of the localized shielding by other cables plus the cable tray itself.
1.4.10 Paints and coatings should be See the response to 1.4.6 and 1.4.7 assumed to be exposed to both beta above.
and gamma rays in assesing their resistance to radiation. Plate-out activity should be assumed to remain on the equipment surface unless the effects of the removal mechanisms, such as spray wash-off or steam condensate flow, can be justified and quantified by analysis or experiment.
1.4.11 Components of the emergency Radiation levels outside containment core cooling system (ECCS) lo-following a design basis LOCA are l
cated outside containment (e.g.,
based on the release fractions dis-pumps, valves, seals, and elec-cussed in 1.4.1 above. This released i
trical equipment) should be quali-activity is assumed to be retained fied to withstand the radiation in and diluted by water from safety l
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NUREG 0588 CATEGORY II DUKE POWER COMPANY GUIDELINES POSITION 1.4.11 (Continued)
(Continued) equivalent to that penetrating injection and ice bed melt. Where the containment, plus the exposure appropriate, radiation penetrating from the sump fluid using assump-the containment is included. This tions consistent with the require-analysis is consistent with that re-ments stated in Appendix K to 10 quired by NUREG 0578, Ites 2.1.6b.
CFR Part 50.
1.4.12 Equipment that may be exposed to The subject of in-service aging 4 rads mechanisms is addressed under Ites 4.
radiation doses below 10 should not be considered to be exempt from radiation qualifi-cation, unless analysis supported by test data is provided to verify that these levels will not degrade the operability of the equipment below acceptable salues.
1.4.13 The Staff will accept a given The calculated radiaiton environ-component to be qualified pro-ments for McGuire are comparable vided it can be shown that the to those values presented in component has been qualified to Appendix D.
integrated beta and gamma doses which are equal to or higher than those levels resulting from an analysis similar in nature and scope to that included in Appendix D (which uses the source term given in item (1) above), and that the component incorporates appropriate factors pertinent to the plant design and operating characteristics, as given in these general guidelines.
1.4.14 When a conservative analysis has See the response to 1.4.13 ebove.
not been provided by the applicant for staff review, the staff will use the radiation environment guide-lines contained in Appendix D, suit-ably corrected for the differences in reactor power level, type, contain-ment size, and other appropriate factors.
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N1' REG 0588 CATEGORY II Dt:KE POWER COMPA.W GUIDELINES POSITION 1.5 Environmental Conditions For Out-Side Containment 1.5.1 Equipment located outside con-Equipment located outside the con-tainment that could be subjected to tainment that could be subjected to high-energy pipe b eaks should be a postulated pipe break environment qualified to the conditions result-and that is required to either miti-ing from the accident for the dur-gate the break or bring the unit to ation required. The techniques a safe shutdown condition is qualified to calculate e environmental for the pipe break environment.
parameters described in Sections 1.1 through 1.4 (Category II) above The methods employed to evaluate pipe should be applied.
breaks and to determine the resulting environmental parameters are discussed in Duke Power Company Report MDS/PDG -
77 - 1, The Evaluation of the Effects of Postulated Pipe Failures Outside Containment for McGuire Nuclear Station.
1.5.2 Equipment located in general Equipment located in general plant plant areas outside containment areas outside containment and not where equipment is not subjected exposed to a DBA environment is de-to a design basis accident envi-signed and/or qualified for the normal ronment should be qualified to and abnormal range of environmental the normal and abnormal range of conditions postulated to occur at the environmental conditions postu-equipment location. For these general lated to occur at the equipment areas outside containment except in location.
the control complex, the environment considered is that which results from a loss of the normal powered venti-lation system. The environment in the control complex, however, remains within a normal range because the con-trol complex is served by a redundant Class IE HVAC system.
1.5.3 Same as Category I; or, there For general plant areas outside con-may be designs where a loss of the tainment where the area temperature environmental support system may could be postulated to exceed the expose some equipment to environ-design tesperature of the equipment ments that exceed the qualified in that area, a temperature monitoring limits. For these designs, appro-system is provided. This temperature priate monitoring devices should monitoring system is discussed in the be provided to alert the operator McGuire FSAR, Supplement 2.
that abnormal conditicas exist and to permit an assessment of the con-ditions that occurred in order to determine if corrective action, such as replacing any affected equipment, is warranted.
NUREG 0588 CATEGORY II DL*KE PC%T.R COMPA.NT GUIDELINES POSITION 2.0 QUALIFICATION METHODS 2.1 Selection cf Methods 2.1.1 Qualification methods should a.
For equipment required to perform conform to the requirements de-a safety function in a postulated fined in IEEE Std. 323-1971.
IDCA, MSLB, or EELE environment, the environmental qualification methods meet the intent of IEEE 323-1971 requirements.
b.
For the equipment not required to oper-ate in an adverse accident environment, environmental testing per IEEE 323-1971 was not performed. Rather, the equip-ment was designed and analyzed to assure that it maintains its required perfor-sance capability throughout the speci-fied range of normal and abnormal en-vironmental parameters. In general, factory performance / functional test-ing at ambient conditions is completed on equipment prior to shipping and, for some items of equipment, a produc-tion unit may be tested at the specified maximum ambient temperature. These pro-duction tests, together with the design specificaton for the equipment, which specifies the range of normal and abnormal environmental parameters and engineering analysis, provides sufficient assurance of equipment capability in accordance with the Staff position under Item 2.1.4.
2.1.2 The choice of the methods selected For equipment located inside contain-is largely a matter of technical sent that is required to perform a safety judgement and availability of in-function in a postulated LOCA, MSI.3, or EE*3 formation that supports the con-environment, environmental qualification is clusions reached. Experience has in general by testing.
shown that qualification of equip-J sent subjected to an accident enyt-For equipment located outside centainment l
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NUREG 0588 CATEGORY II DUKE POWER COMPAh7 GUIDELINES POSITION 2.1.2 (Continued)
(Continued) ronment without test data is not that is required to perform a safety adequate to demonstrate functional functi.on in a postulated HELB environ-operability. In general, the staff ment, qualification is in general by will not accept analysis in lieu of testing, analysis, manufacturer's spe-test data unless (a) testing of the cific design, and/or combinations of component is impractical due to these methods.
size limitations, and (b) partial type test data is provided to sup-The qualification method is provided port the analytical assumptions and in the equipment tables, conclusions reached.
2.1.3 The environmental qualification of equipment exposed to DBA environ-ments should conform to the follow-ing positions:
The basis should be provided for The required duration of operability the time interval required for is based on assumptions in the FSAR operability of this equipment.
accident analysis, system requirements, and/or the time the environment is expected to remain outside its normal range following a DBA.
The required and demonstrated dura-tion of the safety function of equip-ment subject to a LOCA, MSLB, or HELB environment is provided in the equipment tables.
The operability and failure cri-The primary purpose of equipment teria should be specified and the qualificaiton is to reduce the poten-safety margins defined.
tial for common-mode failures due to postulated environmental conditions.
Equipment will therefore be considered to have failed the test and/or analysis if the functional requirements identified in the attached tables cannot be met, unless an investigation can establish that the failure mechanism is not of cocoon-mode origin or that plant specific analyses can demonstrate that the reduced capability is acceptable.
In certain cases, failure criteria, per se, was not specified prior to qualifi-cation testing; however, the failure of the equipment would have been an obvious failure (i.e., equipment would not function).
Margin is discussed in Section 3.0-
NUREG 0588 CATEGORY II DUKE POWER COMPAhT GUIDELINES POSITION 2.1.3a Equipment that must function in Equipment that must perform a safety order to mitigate any accident function in a LOCA, MSLB, or HELB should be qualified by test to environment, is qualified by test demonstrate its operability for and/or analysis. The acceptance the time required in the environ-criteria for the test and/or analysis mental conditions resulting from is that the safety-related function that accident, must be demonstrated for the specified duration of operability in the postulated accident environment.
2.1.3b Any equipment (safety-related In general, the failare of safety-or non-safety-related) that need related equipment that is not re-not function in order to mitigate quired to perform a safety function in any accident, but that must not a postulated harsh accident environment fail in a manner detrimental to is not detrimental to plant safety.
plant safety should be qualified by test to demonstrate its cap-The effects and consequences of adverse -
ability to withstand any accident environnents on non-safety related environment for the time during equipment has been identified as a which it must not fail.
Category I item under NUREG-0585 "TMI-2 Lessons Learned Task Force Final Report" and will be resolved as part of the action plan set up to address Recommendation #9. Addition-ally, the subject of non safety-related control systems was addressed in IE Information Notice 79-22.
2.1.3c Equipment that need not function Where an item of safety-related equip-in order to mitigate any accident ment is located in an area such that and whose failure in any mode in it can experience the environment re-any accident environment is not sulting from a LOCA, MSLB, or HELB, j
detrimental to plant safety need,
but is not required to perform any only be qualified for its non-safety-function as a result of the accident service environment.
breaks, the failure of such equipment, due to the adverse environment, has been Although actual type testing is determined not to prejudice the safety preferred, other methods when functions of other equipment claimed justified may be found acceptable.
in the accident analysis.
The bases should be provided for concluding that such equipment is not required to function in order to mitigate any accident, and that its failure in any mode in any accident environment is not detri-mental to plant safety.
l
NUREG 0588 CATEGORY II DUKE POWER COMPANY GUIDELINES POSITION 2.1.4 For environmental qualification of As stated in the response to Item equipment subject to events other 2.1.1b, the design specification re-than a DBA, which result in abnor-quirements for equipment not required I
mal environmental conditions, act-to function in a LOCA, MSLB, or HELB ual type testing is preferred.
environment together with factory However, analysis or operating performance / functional tests and history, or any applicable com-engineering analyses (including some bination thereof, coupled with cases where the testing is performed partial type test data may be at maximum ambient conditions) provide found acceptable, subject to the the requisite assurance for equipment applicability and detail of in-capability.
formation provided.
2.2 Qualification by Test 2.2.1 The failure criteria should be The response to Ites 2.1.3 is appli-established prior to testing.
cable for equipment required to operate in a LOCA, MSLB, or HELB environment.
2.2.2 Test results should demonstrate As stated in Ites 2.1.la environmental that the equipment can perform its qualification demonstrates the cap-required function for all service ability of equipment to perform safety-conditions postulated (with margin) related functions when subject to the during its installed life.
consequential adverse environment to LOCA, MSLB, or HELB. For equipment not required to operate in a harsh environ-ment, the response to Item 2.1.lb applies.
The requirement to demonstrate this capability during the installed life implies an addressment of aging. This subject is discussed under Item 4.
The subject of margin is discussed under l
Item 3.
2.2.3 The items described in Section 5.2 The Duke Power Company position with of IEEE Std. 323-1971 supplemented respect to Section 5 of IEEE 323-1971 is by items (4) through (12) below provided in the response to Item 2.3.3.
constitute acceptable guidelines for establishing test procedures.
l i
1 - - -
3 NUREG 0588 C.\\TEGORY II DUKE POWER COMPANY GUIDELINES POSITION 2.2.4 When establishing the simulated In general, a single profile, envelop-environmental profile for quali-ing both MSLB and LOCA, is used for fying equipment located inside qualification of equipment located contaicsent, it is preferred that inside containment which is required a single profile be used that enve-to perform a safety function to mitigate lopes the environmental conditions a LOCA or MSLB. The exceptions to the resulting from any design basis use of a single qualification envelope event during any mode of plant for LOCA and MSLB are, in general, when:
operation (e.g., a profile that envelopes the conditions produced (a) A component is only required by the main steamline break and to mitigate against either the loss-of-coolant accidents).
LOCA or MSLB. In such a case, qualification has been completed to conditions enveloping the possible consequences inside containment from the single event and additionally, it is verified that failure of the component in any other more limit-ing enviz :nment will not prejudice any safety-related function
]
(b) The resulting test conditions would unjustifiably exceed acceptable conservatism.
2.2.5 Equipment should be located above In general, safety-related equipment flood level or protected against is located above the maximum post-submergence by locating the equip-LOCA water level. The exceptions to i
1 ment in qualified watertight en-this design philosophy are certain closures. Where equipment is motor operated valves and associated located in watertight enclosures, cables. The submerged valves are dis-qualification by test or analysis cussed in FSAR Section 15.4.1.3.
j should be used to demonstrate the
)
adequacy of such protection. Where l
equipment could be submerged, it should be identified and demon-strated to be qualified by test for the duration required.
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NUREG 0588 CATEGORY II DUKE POWER COMPANY GUIDELINES POSITION 2.2.6 The temperature to which equipment In performing qualification tests for is qualified, when exposed to the equipment exposed to a LOCA, MSLB, or simulated accident environment, HELB environment, the external environ-should be defined by thermocouple ment temperature is measured as close to readings on or as close as prac-the equipment surface as practicable.
tical to the surface of thd compo-nent being qualified.
If there were no thermocouples located near the equipment during the tests, heat transfer analysis should be used to determine the temperature at the component.
(Acceptable heat transfer analysis methods are provided in Appendix B.)
2.2.7 Performance characteristics of Where the safety-related function of equipment should be verified the equipment requires operation in before, after, and periodically the LOCA, MSLB, or HELB environment, during testing throughout its the equipment performance before, dur-range of required operability.
ing and after the simulated event is verified.
2.2.8 Caustic spray should be incor-The response to Item 1.3.1 is appli-porated during simulated event cable for equipment located inside con-testing at the maximum pressure tainment and qualified by test to oper-and at the temperature conditions ate in the LOCA or MSLB environment.
that would occur when the onsite spray systems actuate.
2.2.9 The operability status of equipment The response to Item 2.2.7 is appli-should be monitored continuously cable.
during testing. For long-term testing, however, monitoring at discrete intervals should be justi-fled if used.
2.2.10 Expected extremes in power supply Class 1E equipment is supplied by voltage range and frequency should guaranteed stabilized power supplies.
be applied during simulated event As a ccusequence, the range of the environmental testing.
electrical parameters is considered to be within equipment capability.
l
NUREG 0588 CATEGORY II DUKE POWER COMPA.%*
GUIDELINES POSITION 2.2.11 Dust environments should be Duke has implemented housekeeping pro-addressed when establishing quali-cedures to preclude adverse dust con-fication service conditions.
ditions at McGuire. Therefore, dust environments are not required as a qualification parameter.
2.2.12 Cobalt-60 is an acceptable gamma In general, Cobalt-60 sources are radiation source for environmental used to simulate the effects of gamma qualification.
radiation for equipment qualified by test to operate in a LOCA, MSLB, or HELB environment.
l 2.3 Test Sequence 2.3.1 Justification of the adequacy of In general, when testing is used tc the test sequence selected should qualify equipment required to perform be provided.
a safety function in a LOCA, MSLB, or HELB environment, the following test sequence is employed:
1.
The equipment is subjected to a calibration and/or veri-fication test at ambient con-ditions. This test include' verification of safety related functions.
2.
No specific abnormal tests are required since the accident environment envelopes the ab-normal condition with margin.
3.
The equipment is irra-diated, using a Cobalt-60 source, to the estimated worst case gamma dose ob-tained from in-service oper-ation and required ac-cident and post accident performance.
4.
The same equipment is test-ed to verify equipment cap-ability during a simulated seismic event.
h
hTREG 0588 CATEGORY II LUKE POWER COMPANY GUIDELINES POSITION 2.3.1 (Continued)
(Continued) 5.
The same equipment is test-ed under applicable simulated accident and post-accident conditions.
Completion of the above test sequence
' i-gives assurance that the equipment can perform safety-related functions under normal, abnormal and design basis event conditions. The design basis event testing applies extremes of radiation, vibration (seismic), temperature, humid-ity and chemical spray in a conservative i
sequence and verifies that the equipment being qualified is not marginal with respect to these parameters. The subject of margin and aging are dis-cussed under Items 3 and 4, respectively.
2.3.2 The test should simulate as For equipment that is qualified by closely as practicable the post-testing, the test environment simulates ulated environment.
as closely as practicable the postulated environment.
2.3.3 The test procedures should In general, the qualification testing conform to the guidelines des-of safety-related equipment at McGuire cribed in Section 5 of IEEE Std.
conforms to the guidelines of IEEE 323-323-1971.
Fi71. The Duke position with respect to
~
one documentation requirements of IEEE 323-1971 is provided in the response to Item 5.2.
2.3.4 The staff consideres that, for For equipment which is qualified by vital electrical equipment such testing and which is required to per-as penetrations, connectors, form a safety function in a LOCA, MSLB, cables, valves and motors, and or HELB environment, the test sequence transmitters located inside con-identified in the response to Item 2.3.1 tainment or exposed to hostile is generally employed and as a con-steam environments outside con-sequence does not, in general, employ tainment, separate effects test-separate effects testing. Separate ing for the most part is not an effects testing, is used, is justified.
acceptable qualification method.
The testing of such equipment should be conducted in a manner that subjects the same piece of equipment to radiation and the hostile steam environment sequentially.
~
NUREG 0588 CATEGORY II DUKE POWER COMPANY GUIDELINES POSITION 2.4 Other Qualification Methods Qualification by analysis or Duke does not necessarily rely on operating experience implemented, operating experience to establish as described in IEEE Std. 323-1971 the qualification of safety-related and other ancillary standards, may equipment, rather, operating experience be found acceptable. The adequacy may be included in support of quali-
~
of these methods will be evaluated fication by test and/or analysis. The on the basis of the quality and equipment tables identify the qualifi-detail of the information submit-cation methodology esployed for each ted in support of the assumptions item of safety-related equipment.
made and the specific function and location of the equipment. These methods are most suitable for equip-ment where testing is precluded by physical size of the equipment being qualified.
It is required that, when these methods are employed, some partial type tests on vital compo-nents of the equipment be provided in support of these methods.
3.0 MARGINS 3.1 Quantified margins should be For most plant specific applications applied to the design parameters margins are available between the qual-discussed in Section i to assure ification parameters and the plant that the postulated accident con-specific requirements.
ditions have been enveloped during testing. These margins should be Margins are as shown in the equipment applied in addition to any margins tables.
(conservatism) applied during the derivation of the specified plant parameters.
3.2 The margins provided in the design Same as 3.1.1 will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Factors that should be considered in quantifying margins are (a) the environmental stress levels induced during testing, (b) the duration of the stress, (c) the number of items tested and the number of tests performed in the hostile environment, (d) the per-formance characteristics of the equipment while subjected to the environmental stresses, and (e) the specified function of the equip-ment.
NUREG 0588 CATEGORY II DUKE POWER COMPANY GUIDELINES POSITION 3.3 When the qualification envelope in This generic envelope is not speci-Appendix C is used, the only fically employed by Westinghouse or required margins are those account-Duke for qualification testing.
It ing for the inaccuracies in the should be noted that a given manu-test equipment. Sufficient con-facturer's test curve may approximate servatism has already been included this generic curve.
to account for uncertainties such as production errors and errors associated with defining satis-factory performance (e.g., when only a small number of units are tested).
3.4a Some equipment may be required by In general, equipment required to oper-the design to only perform its ate in an accident environment is quali-safety function within a short time fied to perform its safety function over period into the event (i.e., within a considerable period in excess of the seconds or minutes), and, once its calculated worst case time to perform function is complete, subsequent the safety functions as derived from the failures are shown not to be detri-accident analysis. The arbitrary ad-mental to plant safety. Other ditional one hour time requirement has equipment may not be required to not been applied to all equipment. The perform a safety function but must time margins indicated in the equipment not fail within a short time period tables are considered acceptable.
into the event, and subsequent failures are also shown not to be detrimental to plant safety.
Equipment in these categories is required to remain functional in the accident environment for a period of at least I hour in excess of the time assumed in the accident analysis.
3.4b For all other equipment (e.g.,
In qualifying equipment required to post-accident monitoring, recom-operate in a LOCA, MSLB, or HELB biners, etc.), the 10 percent environment, margin is included in time margin identified in Section qualification testing by selecting 6.3.1.5 of IEEE Std. 323-1974 may conservative qualification parameters be used.
and test sequences. Some of the areas where margin is usually implicit in the test sequence is as follows:
1.
The full radiation dose, simulat-ing effects of in-service and high energy line break (EELB) applica-tions, is applied in a single step prior to seismic and HELB test simulations.
l NUREG 0588 CATEGORY II DUKE POKER COMPANY GUIDELINES POSITION 3.4b (Continued)
(Continued) 2.
The seismic event simulation applies significant mechanical stress to the equipment prior to the HELE simulation.
3.
The single envelope normally employed for HELB simulation, not only encompasses the effects of LOCA and MSLB accidents, but a whole spectrum of break sizes and locations within these accident definitions. As a consequence, the envelope employed invariably contains significant margin with respect to the transient for any single break size and location.
4.
The single HELB simulation normally employed combines the high irradia-tion dose associated with the LOCA with the high temperature associated with the MSLB.
4.0 AGING 4.1 Qualification programs that are Safety-related valve operators (motor committed to conform to the and solenoid) located inside containment requirements of IEEE Std. 382-1972 and continuous duty motors located _in-(for valve operators) and IEEE Std.
side containment have been mechanically, 334-1971 (for motors) should con-thermally, and radiation aged to an sider the effects of aging. For equivalent of 40 years of service in this equipment, the Category I accordance with IEEE 382-1972 and IEEE positions of Section 4 are appli-334-1971, respectively.
cable.
4.2 For other equipment, the qualifi-Addressment of aging was not a require-cation programs should address ment in qualification programs for aging only to the extent that Category II equipment. However, with equipment that is composed, in the wealth of in-service experience part, of materials susceptible to covering a variety of equipment types, aging effects should be identified, no significant in-service aging mech-and a schedule for periodically anisms have been identified which could replacing the equipment and/or prejudice the qualification tests per-materials should be established.
formed on new equipment within a few During individual case reviews, the years from start-up.
staff will require that the effects
l EUREG.0588 CATEGORY II DUKE POWER COMPANY GUIDELINES POSITION 4.2 (Continued)
(Continued) of aging be accounted for on selec-Duke Power Company is evaluating the ted equipment if operating experi-in-containment Class IE equipment and ence or testing indicates that the will report at the time of discovery equipment may exhibit deleterious any equipment for which significant aging mechanisms.
aging mechanisms are identified in-
~
cluding the justification for continued use and/or reasonable alternative action. This on-going investigation will necessarily be very time consuming and will rely heavily on EPRI research, NRC studies, NPRDS information, IE Bulletins and Circulars, and industry research and testing.
5.0 QUALIFICATION DOCUMENTATION 5.1 The Staff endorses the require-Duke Power Company will arrange ments stated in IEEE Std. 323-and maintain in an auditable form 1974 that, "The qualification sufficient qualification documen-documentation shall verify that tation that will support the quali-each type of electrical equip-fication that is required for each ment is qualified for its appli-type of safety-related electrical cation and meets its specified equipment.
performance requirements. The basis of qualification shall be explained to show the relation-ship of all facets of proof need-ed to support adequacy of the complete equipment."
" Data used to demonstrate the qualification of the equipment shall be pertinent to the ap-plication and organized in an auditable form."
5.2 The guidelines for documentation The qualification test reports in IEEE Std. 323-1971 are ac-referenced in the equipment tables ceptable. The documentation for equipment qualified to operate in should include sufficient infor-an accident environment, in general, mation to address the required meet the requirements of Section 5 l
information identified in Ap-to IEEE 323-1971 by providing certain pendix E.
A certificate of con-essential information. For example:
formance by itself is not accept-safety-related functional require-able unless it is accompanied by test data and information on ments to be demonstrated the qualification program.
1
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l
/
NUREG 0588 CATEGORY II DUKE POWER COMPANY j
GUIDELINES POSITION 5.2 (Continued)
(Continued) range of applicable environmental parameters to be considered identification of the test unit descriptica of the test facility and monitoring instrumentation description of test unit mounting and interfaces summary of the test procedures summary of the test results w.,
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O S
O ATTACHMENT 5
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COMPARISON OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF CLASS lE EQUIPMENT LOCATED INSIDE CONTAINMENT TO THE DUKE POSITION ON THE CATEGORY II GUIDELINES OF NUREG 0588 c
I
McGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION = UNIT l Pop 1 aevision 0 COMPAtl50N OF THE ENWORONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF CLAS$ IE EQUIPMENT b a-Proprietary LOCATED INSIDE CONTAINMENT TO THE DUKE POSITION ON THE CATEGOGY ll GUIDELINES OF NUREG 0588 valve Motor Moutron Cont. Air Return Operators Cont Press IkI" (LI*ltorque Recediner ($)
and H2 EQulPMINT Transaltters Sensors Transmitters e,c RfDs Detectors h2 IDECilFICAll0N (8erton Lot 2)
(Sarton )$1)
(Verltrek( })
(Rosesount)
(MIGTD)
(1 Sturtevent A)
Fan Motors and Rotork) i CADIG 0588 Item 2.5.1 e C
C N/A C
N/A C
C C
2.l.1 b N/A N/A C
N/A C
N/A N/A N/A 2.1.2 C
C N/A (3)
N/A C
C
- C 2.1.)
C C
N/A C
N/A C
C C
2.I.) e C
C N/A C
N/A C
C C
2.I.3 6 C
C N/A C
(4)
C C
C 2.1.) c N/A N/A C
N/A N/A N/A N/A C
2.1.4 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A C
C C
2.2.8 C
C N/A
=
2.2.2 C
C N/A C
N/A C
C C
2.2.)
C C
N/A C
N/A C
C C
2.2.4 C
C N/A C
N/A C
C t
2.2.5 C
C N/A C
C C
C C
2.2.6 C
C N/A C
N/A C
C C
2.2.2 C
C N/A C
N/A C
C C
2.2.8 C
C N/A C
N/A C
C C
2.2.9 C
C N/A C
N/A C
C C
2.2.11 C
C N/A C
N/A C
C C
2.1.ll C
C C
C C
C C
C 2.2.12 C
C N/A C
N/A C
C C
2.3.8 C
C N/%
C N/A C
(6)
C 2.1.2 C
C N/A C
N/A C
C C
2.3.)
C C
N/A C
N/A C
C C
2.3.4 C
C N/A C
N/A C
(6)
C 2.4 C
C N/A C
N/A C
C C
3.8 C
C N/A C
N/A C
C C
3.2 (I)
C N/A C
N/A C
C C
3.3 C
C N/A C
N/A C
C C
).= e (2)
C N/A C
W/A N/A N/A C
3.4 b C
C N/A C
N/A C
C C
4.1 N/A N/A N/4 N/A N/A N/A C
C 4.2 C
C N/A C
N/A C
N/A N/A 5.I C
C C
C C
C C
C 5.2 C
C N/A C
N/A C
C C
e
=
w+M-m a. em
Mc543f AE IsuCLEAR STATION - UNIT I Pe9e 3 COMPARISON OF Test ENylhosMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF Cl.A51 IE EQUlPre(NT 8evision 0 LOCATED INSIDE CONIAleB9(NT TO THE DUKE POSITION ON THE CATEE0av Il GUIDELINES OF NUAEG 0580
- oa-Proprietary Velve Solenold Operators Despe r Olf f Press Electrical Cable Term /
Stem-Maiented EQUIPntNT (volcor,Asco, Motors Sultches Penetrations Cables Spilce Material Clelt Sultches seal Meterial IDf;silF IC AT ION Ter9et Rock)
(Rotork)
(Solon)
(D.G. O'Drlen)
(All Suppliers)
(Reychen)
(elenco)
(1st)
NCtG 0588 Item 1.1.1 e C
C C
C C
C C
C 2.1.1 b N/A N/A N/A N/A C
le/A Ig/A g/n 2.1.2 C
C C
C C
C C
C i
2.1.3 C
C C
C C
C C
C 2.l.) e C
C C
C C
C C
C 2.1.3 b C
C C
C C
C C
C 2.1.) c C
N/A N/A N/A al/A N/A N/A N/A 2.1.4 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A h/A N/A N/A 1.1.1 C
C C
C C
C C
C 2.1.1 C
C C
C C
C C
C i
1.1.1 C
C C
C C
C C
C t t.k C
C C
C C
C C
C 2.2.5 C
C C
C C
C C
2.t.6 C
C C
C C
C C
C 2.2.7 C
C C
C C
C C
C 1.2.0 C
C C
C C
C C
C 2.1.9 C
C C
C C
C C
C 1.1.10 C
C C
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 3.2.11 C
C C
C C
C C
C 2.1.11 C
C C
C C
C C
C 2.3.1 C
C C
(7)
C C
C C
1.3.2 C
C C
C C
C C
C 2.3.3 C
C C
C C
C C
C 2.3.4 C
C C
(7)
C C
C C
.4 C
C C
C C
C C
C 3.1 C
C C
C C
C C
C 3.3 C
C C
C C
C C
C 3.)
C C
C C
C C
C C
3.4 e C
C C
C C
C C
C 3.4 b C
C N/A C
C C
C C
4.1 C
C N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 4.2 N/A N/A C
C C
C C
g 5.1 C
C C
C C
C C
C j
5.1 C
C C
C C
C C
C 4
l t
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Revision 0 Non-Proprieta ry MCGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION - UNIT 1 COMPARISON OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF CLASS lE EQUIPMENT LOCATED INSIDE CONTAINMENT TO THE DUKE POSITION ON THE CATEGORY II GUIDELINES OF NUREG 0588 Note 1 The reported tests on the prototype, Lot 1, and Lot 2 units ir.volve multiple tests on multiple units. The differences between the individual units are known and are minor, and thus the experience in total represents an in-depth knowledge of the characteristics of these transmitters under severe environment conditions. This experience, together with the conservative parameters employed for testing, provide an unparalleled assurance that these units will per/onn to specification under all anticipated service conditions.
Note 2 Certain Barton transmitters are claimed for short-term functions,that is until the containment pressure reaches the point at which safety injection is initiated by high containment pressure. A conservative estimate indicates that these trartsmitters are required to perfonn their short term functions until a contzinment pressure change of 8 psig has occurred. This pressure corresponds to a maximum contaicment temperature of 280*F and would occur no later than 3 minutes following the initiation of the break inside containment. Thus, Westinghouse specifies a trip accuracy of t 10% for up to 5 minutes as a conservative qualification requirement. The Westinghouse qualification program [
] a,b,c an additional I hour while maintaining the specified trip accuracy.
The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> margin requirement has been introduced by the Staff due to concerns over the consequences of transmitter failures after a few minutes into the accident scenario.
In particular, that such failures could lead to negation of the safety function or generate information that could mislead the operator.
These concerns are not valid in this case due to the manner in which these transmitters are employed and qualified:
Trip Function The qualification tests demonstrate that the trip accuracy requirement is maintained for up to 5 minutes and that the requisite trip signal will be generated. Once the signal is generated the signal is ' locked-in' by the protection system and will not reset should the transmitter fail to continue to generate the trip signal at some time after 5 minutes. Thus, all automatic protective actions will proceed irrespective of the performance of the transmitter after 5 minutes.
Page 4 Revision 0 Non-Proprietary Infornation to Operator The transmitter qualification verifies that equipment failures do not occur in a period up to 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and 5 minutes after initiation of the accident. In fact, the qualification verifies that the transmitters will continue to operate for at least 4 months post-accident while maintaining the accuracy requirement specified for post accident monitoring instrumentation.
Note 3 The only difference between the RTD models supplied by Rosemount is in the[
3a,b,c; therefore, the environmental results reported in WCAP-9157 for Rosemount [
Ja,c are equally applicable to the Rosemount [
3a,c, Note 4 The power range neutron detectors are not required to perform any safety functions in an adverse accident environment. However, Westinghouse in-vestigations into potential system interaction scenarios resulting from adverse accident environments identified a possible scenario in which an adverse accident environment resulting from an intermediate steamline break inside the containment could cause a malfunction of the power range neutron detectors. This interaction scenario is one of four which were the subject of IE Information Notice 79-22.
Duke Power Company has analyzed the effects of an adverse accident environment on the power range detectors and has concluded that there are no credible failures of these detectors that could result in unsafe plant conditions.
Note 5 The referenced topical reports, WCAP-7709L (Proprietary) through Supplement 4, and WCAP-7820 (Non-Proprietary) through Supplement 4 which summarize the Westinghouse' qualification tests on the Model A Hydrogen Recombiner to l
IEEE 323-1971, have been reviewed and approved by the NRC as indicated in a letter from D B Vassallo to C E Eicheidinger dated May 1,1975. This evaluation indicates that the Staff will not require any further review of these documents except to verify the plant specific applicability of the qualification parameters Note 6 NRC letter dated March 7,1980 requested Duke to provide justification for the acceptability of separate effects testing for the containment air return and hydrogen skimmer fan motors. Specifically, the NRC Staff's concern was that although the motor insulation system and other motor components are Qualified for a radiation environment in excess of the calculated normal plus accident radiation environment, the Motorette testing did not include exposure to a steam environment following expcsure to radiation.
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Page 5 Revision 0 Non-Proprietary Duke Power Company has reviewed the design and testing of these fan motors.
We have concluded that since these motors are totally enclosed, air over motors and not exposed to the direct eft'ects of a steam environment, the separate effects testing for radiation and steam environment is acceptable.
Note 7 Separate effects radiation testing was performed en the McGuire electrical penetrations. The only effects of the irradiation were a slight increase in the hardness of the elastomeric gromets that provide the environmental seal in the plug and cable assemblies and a color change in the epoxy fiberglass insulators. These effects produced no measureable change in the electrical or mechanical performance of the penetration assemblies; therefore, separate effects testing for radiation is considered acceptable.
C - Complies with Duke Power Company position on NUREG-0588 as outlined in.
N/A - Not applicable.
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ATTACHMENT 6
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COMPARISON OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF CLASS 1E EQUIPMENT LOCATED OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT AND EXPOSED TO HELB ENVIRONMENT i
TO THE DUKE POSITION ON THE CATEGORY II GUIDELINES OF NUREG 0588 i
e MCGulRE NUCLEAR STAT 1000 - tagli i Page I COMPAAISON OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF CLASS It EQUlPMENT Revision 0 LOCATED OUTSIDE CONTAlesetNT AND EXPOSED TO HELB (NVIRONMENT TO THE DORE P05til001 ON THE CAf tGORY ll GUIDEL18stl 0F IApafG 0508 fQuarpNut CONT. SPRAY RHA PtmP 5 0 PtmP CENT. CMG NSW PtmP Gh4 Simp COMP. COOL SAT Ptper ela PtmP totutif star gose Pune MOToe5 M0f0R5 MOT 0a5 PtmP MOTORS MOT 0A L PtmP MOToe5 PtmP pet 0A5 pe0Y0a5
_ nogoog NUstG 0588 ltem 2.0.le N/A N/A C
C C
N/A C
N/A 1C/A 2.l.Ib g
C N/A N/A N/A C
N/A C
C 2,3,2 N/A N/A C
C C
N/A C
N/A N/A 2.1.)
N/A N/A C
C C
N/A C
N/A N/A 2.1.je N/A N/A C
C C
N/A C
F/A N/A 2.1.)b N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 2.1.)c C
C N/A N/A N/A C
N/A C
C 2.9.4 C
C N/A N/A N/A C
N/A C
C 2.2.1 N/A N/A C
C gC N/A C
N/A N/A 2.2.2 C
C C
C C
C C
C C
2.2.)
N/A N/A C
C C
N/A C
N/A N/A I
2.2.4 N/A N/A II/A N/A N/A II/A 11 / 4 N/A N/A 2.2.5 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 2.2.6 N/A N/A C
C C
N/A C
N/A N/A 2.2.5 N/A N/A C
C C
N/A C
N/A N/A 2.2.8 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 2.2.9 N/A N/A C
C C
N/A C
N/A N/A.
2.2.10 N/A N/A C
C C
N/A C
N/A N/A 2.2.18 C
C C
C C
C C
C C
2.2.12 (1)
(3)
(1)
(1)
(3)
(1)
(1)
(1)
(t) 2.3.8 N/A N/A C
C C
N/A C
N/A N/A 2.3.2 N/A N/A C
C C
N/A C
N/A N/A 2.).)
N/A N/A C
C C
N/A C
N/A N/A 2.3.4 N/A N/A C
C C
N/A C
N/A N/A 2.4 N/A N/A C
C C
N/A C
N/A N/A
).I N/A N/A C
C C
N/A C
N/A N/A 3.2 N/A N/A C
C C
ll/A C
N/A N/A
).)
N/A N/A C
C C
N/A C
ge/A N/A
).be N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A i
3.84 N/A N/A C
C C
N/A C
N/A N/A
%.I N/A Is/A N/A N/A N/A gl/A 11 / 4 N/A N/A
. 4.2 N/A N/A C
C C
N/A C
N/A N/A 5.8 C
C C
C C
C C
C C
5.2 N/A N/A C
C C
N/A C
N/A N/A i
t Page 2 ItCGulRE NUCLEAR STAT 1001 - Willi i sevistoa O COMPAAl50N OF THE ENVIRONMNTAL QUALIFICAll0st OF CLASS IE EQUIPfeENT CDCAff D OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT AII0 EXPOSED TO MELS ENvlRONMENT TO THE cure POSITION 081 iME CATEGOA is/ATC C$nPONENT eU55nAsl FUSESLOCKS EqulPntNT 5F COOLING RHA A880 *5 FP AHU 10/ATC C004P000ENT TP/ATC COMPONENT (2008. }792. 3819.
IS/ATC COMP 088 TNT a
lorufIF otaf toes mmP M0f 0a5_
Apu. M0fons M0f0a5 SuhGE SUPPaE55045 SL TEsse steCK5 4419. AsM)
C-N SE TATS (021. 026)
Item 2.1.le C
N/A C
C C
C C
NamlG 0588 I
2.1.lb N/A C
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 2.1.2 C
N/A C
C C
C C
2.l.)
C N/A C
C C
C C
2.1.js C
N/A C
C C
C C
2.l.1b N/A N/A N/A C
C C
C C
2.8.)c N/A C
N/A C
C C
2.I.4 N/A C
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 2.2.9 C
N/A C
C C
C C
2.2.2 C
C C
C C
C C
2.2.)
C N/A C
C C
C C
2.2.4 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 2.2.5 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 2.2.6 C
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A C
2.2.7 C
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A C
2.2.8 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 2.2.9 C
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A C
2.2.40 C
N/A C
N/A N/A N/A C
2.2.88 C
C C
C C
C C
2.2.12 (1)
(t)
(l)
(1)
(l)
(l)
(t) 2.3.9 C
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A C
2.3.2 C
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A C
2.3.)
C N/A N/A C
C C
C 2.3.4 C
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A C
2.4 C
N/A C
C C
C C
3.1 C
N/A N/A C
C C
C
).2 C
N/A N/A C
C C
C
).)
C N/A N/A N/A N/A st/A C
3.be N/A N/A N/A C
C C
C 3.bb C
N/A N/A C
C C
C 4.1 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A b.2 C
M/A C
C C
C C
5.8 C
C C
C C
C C
5.2 C
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A C
1 4
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McCulat NUCLEAR stall 04 = UNif l movision 0 COMPAABSON OF THE ENVBS00setNTAL QUALIFICAil04 0F CLAS$ If EQulPNENT infATED OUT5105 CONTAIIstf ui AND EXP05fD TO NELS ENWlR0094(NT 10 THE DUET P051f1081 ON INE CAttGOAT 11 CulD(LINES OF NUREG 05#
IS/ATC COnPONENT (QUIPnfut C-H SW & IMO LIGNY5 TS/Att ConPONENT
&&l*?? COMPONENT AMU OlFF FlatSTAT PleL/CAO COMPONENT ADFEF.CP AGFIF-FlRE f pp0T if t( AT100s.
(f t9.110. 802501)
A8 eat 0C OP 150L So REtavi PAES$ $W TEMP SW w tf/tunAtui ALAsyl I A 6 le _
Pa0T PAntt NURfC 0588 Ilee 2.8.le C
C C
N/A 5/4 C
N/A N/A 2.1.lb N/A N/A N/A C
C N/A C
C 2.1.2 C
C C
N/A N/A I
N/A N/A 3.1.)
C C
C N/A N/A C
N/A N/A 2.1.js C
C C
N/A N/A C
sol.1 N/A 2.1.)b C
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A II/A 934 2.1.)c C
N/A N/A C
C N/A C
C 2.1.4 N/A N/A N/A C
C N/A C
C 2.2.1 C
C C
N/A N/A C
N/A N/A t.2.2 C
C C
C C
C C
C 2.2.)
C C
C N/A N/A C
N/A N/A 2.1.4 h #A
' A/A N/A M/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 2.2.5 N/w N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 2.2,6 C
N/A C
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 2.2.7 C
N/A C
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 2.2.8 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 2.2.9 C
N/A C
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A l
2.2.10 C
N/A C
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 2.2.11 C
C C
C C
C C
C 2.2.12 (I)
(l)
(1)
(I)
(I)
(I)
(I)
(t) 2.3.8 C
N/A C
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 2.3.2 C
N/A C
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 2.3.)
C C
C N/A N/A C
N/A N/A 2.).4 C
N/A C
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 2.4 C
C C
N/A N/A C
N/A N/A
).I C
C C
N/A N/A C
N/A N/A 3.2 C
C C
ll/A N/A C
N/A N/A 9.)
C N/A C
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 3.be C
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 3.4b C
C C
N/A N/A C
N/A N/A 4.1 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A m/A II/A N/A 4.2 C
C C
N/A N/A C
N/A N/A 5.5 C
C C
C C
C C
C
$.2 C
N/A C
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
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Page 5 Revision 0 MCGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION - UNIT 1 COMPARISON OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF CLASS 1E EQUIPMENT LOCATED OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT AND EXPOSED TO THE HELB ENVIRONMENT TO THE DUKE POSITION ON THE CATEGORY II GUIDELI OF NUREG 0588 4
I 3
Note 1
.i The radiation qualification information required in response to NUREG 0588 and f
Item 2.1.6.b of NUREG 0578 will be provided in later submittal scheduled for' September.1980.
t,i j V!
Note 2 Rotork Test Report TR-3025 shows that when the qualified temperature for these valves is exceeded, the torque switches may fail on the next operation of the valve.
Since at least one additional operation is available after the valve's temperature qualification has been exceeded, the valve can be relied upon to move to its safety position.
C - Complies with Duke Power Company position on NUREG-0588 as outlined in.
N/A - Not applicable.
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ATTACHMENT 7 COMPARISON OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF CLASS lE EQU LOCATED OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT AND EXPOSED TO THE POST-LOCA RECIRCULATION RADIATION ENVIRONMENT TO THE DUKE POSITION ON THE CATEGORY II GUIDELINES OF NUREG 0588 e
n (This infonnation is scheduled to be submitted in September,1980.)
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