05000321/LER-1980-122-01, /01T-0:on 801219,QC Insp of Cable Spreading Room & Control Bldg Sprinkler Hangers Installed in 1978 Revealed Deficiencies Which Jeopardize Seismic Qualification of Sprinkler Sys.Caused by Improper Installation

/01T-0:on 801219,QC Insp of Cable Spreading Room & Control Bldg Sprinkler Hangers Installed in 1978 Revealed Deficiencies Which Jeopardize Seismic Qualification of Sprinkler Sys.Caused by Improper Installation

ML19340E176
Person / Time
Site:	Hatch
Issue date:	12/30/1980
From:	Coggin C GEORGIA POWER CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML19340E170	List: 05000321/LER-1980-122, Forwards LER 80-122/01T-0 05000321/LER-1980-122-01, /01T-0:on 801219,QC Insp of Cable Spreading Room & Control Bldg Sprinkler Hangers Installed in 1978 Revealed Deficiencies Which Jeopardize Seismic Qualification of Sprinkler Sys.Caused by Improper Installation
References
LER-80-122-01T, NUDOCS 8101060593
Download: ML19340E176 (3)

LER-1980-122, /01T-0:on 801219,QC Insp of Cable Spreading Room & Control Bldg Sprinkler Hangers Installed in 1978 Revealed Deficiencies Which Jeopardize Seismic Qualification of Sprinkler Sys.Caused by Improper Installation

Event date:
Report date:
3211980122R01 - NRC Website

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NRC FORM 36G U. S. NUCLEAR REGO' ATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT CCNTTYL BLOCK: l I

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8 tra di DOCK ET NUMBER 68 60 EVENT CATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80 EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROB ABLE CONSEQUENCES h 10121 10n 12-19-80, at 1300 CST a OC inspection of cable soreadinq room and I

lo 131 I control building sprinkler hangers installed in 1978 revealed deficien _j lo 141 I cies which jeopardize the seismic qualification of the sprinkler sys-1 l

10181 Items.

Unit 2 was in refuel and Unit I was operating at 77% power.

I lo is i I There were no ef fects on public health or safety.

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CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 11 10 I IThe cause of this event is apparently improper installation of hangers l

11 11 1 linstalled under the original fire protection contract.

A 100% OC in-l ii i :i i ispection of hangers in safety-related areas was begun and anchor bolts I

lij,1]are being replaced.

The hangers will be modified prior to Unit 2 start-1 Ii14 I l up.

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C. L. Coqqin, Supt. Plt. Eno. Serv.

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NAVE OF PREPAREH

i LER #:

50-321/1980-122 O

ticensee:

Ceeraia rewer Cemganx Facility Name:

Edwin I.

Hatch Docket #:

50-321 Narrativt Report for LER 50-321/1980-122 Modifications to fire protection sprinkler systems required by IER 50-321/80-02 and 50-366/80-02 were in progress when QA/QC inspections of unmodified portions revealed numerous improper anchor bolt installations.

These fire protection hangers were installed under the original 1978 contract.

The problems discovered in the cable spreading room and control building '

corridor sprinkler systems were of such a nature that could affect the seismic qualification of these systems.

• Based on the preliminary results of the inspections, a

100%

QC inspection of fire protection hangers in. safety-related areas was begun.

All sprinkler zeystems in areas requiring seismic design will be inspected for similar problems and repairs made as necessary to assure the full design factor of safety.

At the time of discovery Unit I was operating at 80% power, and Unit 2 was in cold shutdown for refueling.

Both units are affected due to the cable spreading room being a common area.

An evaluation of the consequences of existing conditions in 1

these systems was performed by the AE.

In the event that a failure of the piping was to occur in the cable spreading room, it was felt that the conduit and cable tray systems in the area should support the pipe and that cable failure of redundant systems in this area is highly improbable.

Damage l

Lo the cable, conduit, and cable tray systems would be minimal for the following reasons:

l 1.

The impact load would be small because the pipe in question does not normally contain water and is small bore pipe most of which is 2 1/2" and less in diameter.

Also, the maximum distance the pipe should fall is expected to be 1 to 2 feet because of the many obstructions within the cable spreading room.

2.

The accelerations of the-pipe should be small because simultaneous failure of all hangers is unlikely.

Also, it 1

is felt that the pipe will not break, thus providing some self-support from adequate hangers and obstructions.

3.

The conduit and cable tray systems should not collapse due to this additional load because of conservatisms used in the support system design.

Initial analysis assumed that j

cable trays and conduit were filled, and the worst case support loading was examined.

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4.

Cable damage is also unlikely because most of the cables are contained within rigid aluminum conduits or rigid cable trays, many of which have covers.

5.

The low probability of a severe seismic event during the period required for repeirs and the ability to provide additional control functions for cold shutdown equipment through the remote and shutdown panels provide additional safety margin.

Prior to startup of Unit 2 from the present refueling outage all deficiencies within the scope of this finding will be corrected.

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