05000254/LER-1980-027-01, /01T-0:on 801015,during IE Bulletin 79-14 Reanalysis of safety-related Piping,Ten Pipes Failed to Meet Operability Criteria.Caused by Improper Const.Pipes Will Be Modified to Meet Requirements Prior to Startup

/01T-0:on 801015,during IE Bulletin 79-14 Reanalysis of safety-related Piping,Ten Pipes Failed to Meet Operability Criteria.Caused by Improper Const.Pipes Will Be Modified to Meet Requirements Prior to Startup

ML19339B903
Person / Time
Site:	Quad Cities
Issue date:	10/29/1980
From:	Kopacz J COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
Shared Package
ML19339B900	List: 05000254/LER-1980-027, Forwards LER 80-027/01T-0 05000254/LER-1980-027-01, /01T-0:on 801015,during IE Bulletin 79-14 Reanalysis of safety-related Piping,Ten Pipes Failed to Meet Operability Criteria.Caused by Improper Const.Pipes Will Be Modified to Meet Requirements Prior to Startup
References
IEB-79-14, LER-80-027-01T-02, LER-80-27-1T-2, NUDOCS 8011100406
Download: ML19339B903 (3)

LER-1980-027, /01T-0:on 801015,during IE Bulletin 79-14 Reanalysis of safety-related Piping,Ten Pipes Failed to Meet Operability Criteria.Caused by Improper Const.Pipes Will Be Modified to Meet Requirements Prior to Startup

Event date:
Report date:
2541980027R01 - NRC Website

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6 60 61 DOCK ET NUMBER 64 69 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPOR T DATE 80 EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROSABLE CCNSEQUENCES O'o 10 l 21 l While performing a re-analysis of sarety related p'iping as required by lE Bulletin l

m j 79-14 the following pipes were found not to meet the operability criteria g

g ; estahlished by Commonwealth Edison Company:

1-4858A & B 4", 1-3747-8", 1-3769-8" 1-0201A & B 22", 1-1033A & B 3", 1-1067-3", and 1-4309-3".

The probable io,,,,

consequences of the possible failure of each pipe are analyzed in the submitted g

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1. ,1 l spring load d sway b' race / stabilizers. All'of the listed piping will meet the l

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LER NUMBER: LER/R0 80-27/0lT-0 11.

LICENSEE NAME: Commonwealth Edison Comoany quad-Cities Nuclear Power Station Ill.

FACILITY NAME: Unit One IV.

DOCKET NUMBER: 050-254 V.

EVENT DESCRIPTION

As required by NRC IE Bulletin 79-14, re-analysis of all safety related piping began after extensive piping walkdowns to verify as-built condi-tions.

In June, the work scope changed to focus the analysis on the inaccessible areas of Unit One.

In October, the results disclosed that the scope of wcrk was approximately two times greater tnan initially estimated. When scheduling problems arose further study was done to determine critical supports in order to establish a priority list.

On October 15, it was determined that operability problems existed on the following pipes:

1 1,858A & B-4" - RHRS Service Water Relief Valve lines on the RHR heat exchangers 1-3747-8"

- Discharge of Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water from the Drywell at the penetration 1-3769-8"

- Supply of Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water to the Drywell at the-penetration 1-0201A & B-

- Recirculation System Discharge ring header 22" l-1033A & B-3" - A & B RHR discharge pipe drains 1-1067-3"

- RHR crosstie fill line from Condensate Storage 1-4309-3"

- Clean Demineralized water at the Drywell penetration VI.

PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE OCCURRENCE:

i Each line will be addressed separately as to probable consequences upon failure. Those systems addressed in the FSAR will not be further analyzed in this report.

Line (1-4858A & B-4"):

Failure of this line would result in a partial loss of service cooling water to the RHR heat exchanger. The RHR primary coolant boundary would have remained unaffected. Redundant RHR service water pumps in each loop would mitigate the partial loss of flow.

i i

Lines (1-3747-8", 1-3769-8", 1-4309-3"): The RBCCW system 'in the dry-I well is a closed internal loop. Loss of. RBCCW in the drywell would cause loss of the recirculation pumps. However, these pumps trip during a postulated LOCA, and such tripping is analyzed in the FSAR.

i Recirc pump trips under other circur. stances are Ilkewise analyzed.

The RBCCW lines can be isolated external and internal to the drywell.

i Loss of clean demin water to the drywell poses no safety concern.

The line is valved out during normal plant operation both inside and outside the drywell.

Line (1-0201 A & B-22"): This line has been evaluated in the FSAR as to probable consequences upon failure.

In' addition, the calculated OBE stresses, although above the operability limit, were only 60 per-cent of material ultimate strength and failure during an OBE would not be expected.

Line (1-1033A & B-3"):

A failure of either of these lines would result in the partial loss of RHR cooling flow from the A and B RHRS pumps.

The C and D RHRS pumps discharge flow is not affected.

Based on the large volume of flow produced by the LPCI Mode of RHRS and the 33 percent excess system capacity, loss of these lines would not render.

LPCI completely incapable of performing its function.

Line (1-1067-3"): A failure of this line would reduce the capacity of the LPCI Mode of RHR. The relatively small size of this line as compared to the large LPCI flow volume and the 33 percent excess system capacity would not result in serious LPCI flow deterioration.

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Vil. CAUSE:

The preliminary design of the systems involved was sufficient to meet the. analysis as provided in the FSAR. Orioinal construction was not to the requirements as given by Bulletin 79-14.

Vill. CORRECTIVE ACTION:

Prior to the Unit startup, all lines listed will be supported 4.

sufficiently to meet the operability requirements of. !E Bulletin 79-14.