ML19332D327

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Proposed Tech Spec Figure 3.2.3-2 Re Flow Correction Factor, Correcting Error in Amend 42,Tech Spec 3.2.4 Re Designation of Fuel Bundle Types & Tech Spec 4.2.3.1 Re Ref of New Figures
ML19332D327
Person / Time
Site: Fermi DTE Energy icon.png
Issue date: 11/16/1989
From:
DETROIT EDISON CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML19332D325 List:
References
NUDOCS 8912010017
Download: ML19332D327 (17)


Text

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8912010017 891116 1

PDR ADOCK 05000341 P:

PDC a-.

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. N d

mwd /t kW/ft s

0 12.02 1000 12.14 g

5000 12.93 s8 14 8000 13.28 10000 13.34 N

12500 13.33 s

13 15000 13.02

['

25000 11.75 12'..'. : ~."

45888 8 85 50000 6.64 MAXIMUM 11 MERAGE PLAMAR 10 U

LINEAR HEAT PERMISSABLE GENERATICN g REGION OF

^

RATE OPERATION (kW/ft) 8 7

6 5

O 5

10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55' IN THOUSANDS (000) k MERAGE PLANAR EXPOSURE (mwd /t) o I

MAXIMUM MERAGE PLANAR LINEAR HEAT n

GENERATION RATE (MAPLHGR) VERSUS MERAGE PLANAR EXPOSURE RELOAD FUEL TYPE BC318D A

FIGURE 3.2.1-3

a 4

d b

mwd /t kW/ft 8

O 11.99 1000' 12.10 5000 12.79 8

14 8000 13.15 N

...e*

10000 13.34 13 15000 13.02 25000 11.75 12 A,*,,,

45000 9.04 50000 6.63 MAXIMUM 11 MERAGE PLANAR 10 R

LINEAR HEAT PERMISSABLE GENERATION g REGION OF w

RATE OPERATION (kW/f t) 8 7

~

6 5

O 5

10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 k

IN THOUSANDS (003)

MERAGE PLANAR EXPOSURE (mwd /t) a" MAXIMUM MERAGE PLANAR LINEAR HEAT 5

GENERATION RATE (MAPLHOR) VERSUS MERAGE PLANAR EXPOSURE Q

RELOAD FUEL TYPE BC318E FIGURE 3.2.1-4 i

n l

O 4

' POWER DISTRI WTION LIMITS

~

SUWEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS i

4.2.3.1 MCPR,with:

.i l

a.

t = 1.0 prior to perfomance of the initial scram time measurements for the cycle in accordance with Specification 4.1.3.2, or b.

t as defined in Specification 3.2.3 used to determine the limit within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> of the conclusion of each scram time surveillance test required by Specification 4.1.3.2, shall be determined to be equal to or greater than the applicable MCPR limit r

I eistemined from Figures 3.2.3-1And 3.2.3-2:

+

er. A 3 2 3 /#

i a.

At least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, b.

Within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> after completion of a THERMAL POWER increase of at least 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER, and Initially and at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> when the reactor is c.

operating with a LIMITING CONTROL R0D PATTERN for MCPR.

d.

The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable.

4.2.3.2 Prior to the use of Curve A and whenever Surveillance Requirement 4.2.3.1 is performed while using Curve A of Figures 3.2.3-1 tnrough 3.2.3-18, 3

verify that all non-CCC control rods are fully withdrawn from the core.

Non CCC control rods are all control rods excluding A2 rods Al shallow rods i

inserted less than or equal to notch position 36, all peripheral rods, and rods inserted to position 46. Normal control rod operability checks, coupling checks, scram time testing, and friction testine of non-CCC control rods does not require the utilization of the more restrictive non-CCC operational mode MCPR limits.

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FERMI - UNIT 2 3/4 2-7 Amendment No. #

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6 CURVE A

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1.25 1.26' i

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1.2 1.2 i

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1.15 1.16 0 0.10.20.30.40.60,60.70.80.91.0 L

TAU t

CURVE A

  • WCPR limit for CCC opeteticast mode with both turbine bypees er'd moleture espeteter rehester in eetylce.

CURVE B WCPR limit tot men *CCC opetellemet mode with both tutblee bypees sad meisture espetetet tehoster in eetyles.

l CURVE C + WCPR limit for both CCC et monaCCC opetellemal modes with either turblee bypote et meleture esperator tehoster out of service.

CURVE D - WCPR limit for both CCC and mon *CCC opetellemet medes with both turblee bypees sad moletute separator rehester out of servlee.

BOC TO 12,700 MWD /ST MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR) VERSUS TAU AT RATED FLOW FIGURE 3.2.3-1 r

FIRMI - UNIT 2 3/4 2-B Amendment No. 77,4)

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CURyt A 1.26 1.26 i

1.2 1.2 1*10 1.16*O 0.10.20.30.40.60.60.70.80.91.0 i

TAU CURVE A - WCPR limit for CCC operational mode with both turbine bypese and meleture esperator rehester in eetylce.

CURVE 9

  • WCPR limit for non.CCC operstlenal mode with both tutbine bypees and meletute esperator tehoster in eetylce.

CURVE C

  • WCPR limit for both CCC or non CCC opetettonal medes with either turbine bypese or mefeture coperator tehoster out of servlee.

f CURVE D

  • WCPR limit for both CCC et non CCC opetellonel modes with both turbine bypees and meistute esperator r

i teheeler out of service.

12,700 MWD /8T TO 13.700 MWD /8T MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR) VERSUS TAU AT RATED FLOW FIGURE 3.2.3-1A FERMI - UNIT 2 3/4 2-8a Amendment No. U t

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1.15 1.15 0 0.10.20.30.40.60.60.70.60.91.0 ii' TAU 1

CURVE A

  • WCPR limit let CCC opetellonel mode with both turbine bypese and melslute separator reheeler in ettvice.

CURVE B = WCPR limit let men *CCC opetellonel mode with both j

turbine bypees and moleture esperator rehester in servlee.

CURVE C

  • WCPR limit for both CCC and men *CCC opetellonel modes with either turbine typees et meletute espeteter tehoster out et eetylee.

CURVE D = WCPR limit for both CCC et een CCC operstlemal modes with both turbine bypese and meisture steerster tehostet out of eetylee.

i 13.700 MWD /8T TO EOC MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER R ATIO VERSUS TAU AT RATED FLOW FIGURE 3.2.3-1B FERMI - UNIT 2 3/4 2-8b Amendment No. O

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3 AUTOMATIC FLOW CONTROL-l L

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K f

i MANUAL FLOW CONTROL 1.1 SCOOP TUBE SCTPOINT CAllBRATiON POSITIONED SUCH THAT FLOWMAX = 102,57.

= 107.0f; 112.0T.

... -.. =. 1 17.07,

. 4... _

=

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i O9 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 CORE FLOW (%)

FLOW CORRECTION (K,) FACTOR FIGURE 3.2.3-2 FERMI - Unit 2 3/4 2-9 Amendment No. U f

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  • I f911ER3111419H10N1M115 f

3/4.2,4 LINEAR M AT GENERATION RATE LIMITING COEITION FOR OPERATION bundle types SCR143 and 8CR233 er 14.4 kw/ft for bundle types SC3186 a/ft f 3.2.4 The LINEAR MEAT GENERATION RATE (LNGR) shall not exceed 13.4 tw nd BC318E.

APPL:CABI,1TY: OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1, when THERNAL POWER is greater than or eque' to aan of RATED THERNAL POWER.

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With the LNGR of affy fuel fod exceedin0 the limit, initiate corrective action

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within 15 minutes and restore the LNGR to within the limit within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> or veduce THERNAL POWER to less than 25% of RATED THERNAL POWER within the next 4

4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.

i

$URVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS s-i 4.2.4 LHGR's shall be determined to be equal to or less than the limit:

i a.

At least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, l

b.

Within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> after completion of a THERMAL POWER increase of at i.

least 15% of RATED THERNAL POWER, and l

c.

Initially and at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> when the rea: tor is

)

operating on a LIMITING CONTROL R00 PATTERN FOR LNGR.

j d.

The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable.

l P

FERMI - UNIT 2 3/4 2-10 AmendmentNo.4f 1

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2.1 SAFETY LIMI($

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f 8ASES l

I

2.0 INTRODUCTION

.The fuel cladding, reactor pressure vessel and primary system piping are the principal barriers to the release of radioactive materials to the i

environs. Safety Limits are established to protect the integrity of these t.

barriers during normal plant operations and anticipated transients. The fuel cladding integrity Safety Limit is set such that no fuei damage is calculated to occur if the limit is not violated. Because fuel damage is not directly observable, a step-back approach is used to establish afety Limit,: 9 th t /h j

th: "CP* " n:t 1::: that '. M.

MCPR greater than epresents"a conR r- ' J g I i

vative margin relative to the conditions required to maintain fuel cladding U^U L

integrity. The fuel cladding is one of the physical barriers which separate l

the radioactive materials from the environs. The integrity of this cladding barrier is related to its relative freedom from perforations or cracking, j

Although some corrosion or use related cracking may occur during the life of the cladding, fission product migration from this source is incrementally cumulative and continuously measurable.

Fuel cladding perforations, however, can result from thermal stresses which occur from reactor operation signifi-1 cantly above design conditions and the Limiting Safety System Settings. While fission product migration from cladding perforation is just as measurable as i

that from use related cracking, the thermally caused cladding perforations signal a threshold beyond which still greater thermal stresses may cause gross rather than incremental cladding deterioration. Therefore, the fuel cladding Safety Limit is defined with a margin to the conditions which would produce l

l onset of transition boiling, MCPR of 1.0.

These conditions represent a signi-r ficant departure from the condition intended by design fer planned operation.

2.1.1 THERMAL POWER. Low Pressure or low Flow apptwed ca.tNeu t penew The use of the GE4L correlation is not valid for all critical power calculations at pressures below 785 psig or core flows less than 10% of rated l

flow. Therefore, the fuel cladding integrity Safety Limit is established by i

i l

other means. This is done by estatslishing a limiting condition on core THERMAL POWER with the following basis. Eince the pressure drop in the bypass region I.

is essentially all elevation head, the core pressure drop at low power and flows will always be greater than 4.5 psi. Analyses show that with a bundle flow of 28 x 10s 1bs/hr, bundle pressure drop is nearly independent of bundle power and has a value of 3.5 psi. Thus, the bundle flow with a 4.5 psi driving head will be greater than 28 x 108 lbs/hr. Full scale ATLAS test data taken at pressures from 14.7 psia to 800 psia indicate that the fuel assembly criti-cal power at this flow is approximately 3.35 MWt. With the design peaking factors, this corresponds to a THERMAL POWER of more than 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER. Thus, a THERMAL POWER limit of 25% of RATED THERMAL POWER for reactor pressure below 785 psig is conservative.

4 FERMI - UNIT 2 B 2-1

l

+

4 d

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS l

(

i BASES f

3/4.1.3 CONTROL R005 The specifications of this section ensure that (1) the minimum SHUTOOWN MARGIN is maintained. (2) the control rod insertion times are consistent with i

those used in the safety analyses, and (3) limit the potential effects of the rod drop accident. The ACTION statements permit variations from the basic requirements but at the same time impose more restrictive criteria for continued operation. A limitation on inoperable rods is set such that the resultant effect on total rod worth and scram shape will be kept to a minimum. The requirements l

for the various scram time measurements ensure that any indication of systematic problems with rod drives will be investigated on a timely basis.

Damage within the control rod drive mechanism could be a generic problem, therefore with a control rod immovable because of excessive friction or l

mechanical interference, operation of the reactor is limited to e time period which is reasonable to determine the cause of the inoperability and at the same time prevent operation with a large number of inoperable control rods.

Control rods that are inoperable for other reasons are pereitted to be taken out of service provided that those in the nonfully inserted position are consistent with the SHUTOOWN MARGIN requirements.

The number of control rods permitted to be inoperable could be more than I

the eight allowed by the specification, but the occurrence of eight inoperable rods could be indicative of a generic problem and the reactor must be shut down for investigation and reso'ution of th blem The control rod system is designeG o ring the reactor hubcritical at a P

rate fast enough to prevent the MCPR fr )m becoming less than %M-during the limiting power transient analyzed in 0!R 5 159 Of t % 9 R.

This analysis shows that the negative reactivity rates resulting from the scram with the average response of all the drives as given in the specifications, provide the g*

~

required protection and MCPR remains greater than 4,MF The oiic'Orrenci of-Mth scram times longer then those specified should be viewed as an indication of a L'm(f systematic problem with the rod drives and therefore the surveillance interval is reduced in order to prevent operation of the reactor for long periods of sqc pg time with a potentially serious problem.

L The scram discharge volume is required to be OPERABLE 50 that it will be l

l available when needed to accept discharge water from the control rods during a reactor scram and will isolate the reactor coolant system from the containment when required.

Control rods with inoperable accumulators are declared inoperable and Specification 3.1.3.1 then applies.

This prevents a pattern of inoperable I

accumulators that would result in less reactivity insertion on a scram than

(

has been analyzed even though control rods with inoperable accumulators may i_

still be inserted with normal drive water pressure. Operability of the j~

accumulator ensures that there is a means available to insert the control rods even under the most unfavorable depressurization of the reactor.

FERMI - UNIT 2 B 3/4 1-2 l

4

i 6

POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS BASES 3/4.2.3 MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO The required operating limiting MCPRs at steady-state operiiting conditions as specified in Specification 3.2.3 are derived from the established fuel clad-ding integrity Safety Limit MCPR, and an analysis of abnormal operational tran-sients.

For any abnormal operating transients analysis evaltation with the initial condition of the reactor being at the steady state operating limit, it is required that the resulting MCPR does not decrease below the Safety Limit MCPR at any time during the transient assuming instrument trip setting given in Specification 2.2.

To assure that the fuel cladding integrity Safety Limit is not exceeded during any anticipated abnormal operational transient, the most limiting tran-sients have been analyzed to determine which result in the largest reduction in CRITICAL POWER RATIO (CPR).

The type of transients evaluated were loss of flow, increase in pressure and power, positive reactivity insertion, and coolant tem-perature decrease. The limiting transient yields the largest delta MCPR.

When added to the Safety Limit MCPR, the required minimum operating limiting MCPR of Specification 3.2.3 is obtained and presented in Figures 3.2.3-1, 3.2.3-1A, and 3.2.3-18.

I The MCPR curves illustrated in Figures 3.2.3-1 thru 3.2.3-1B were derived as described above for the following assumed operating conditions:

Curve A - MCPR limit with turbine bypass system, moistare separator reheater systems in service and CCC (Control Cell Core) operational mode (A2 rods, Al shallows inserted less than or equal to notch posi-i tion 36, all peripheral rods, and all rods inserted to position 46 bi..rt d ?- i t :: n.

The operating domain includes the 100%

power / flow region and extended load line-region with 100%

power and reduced flow.

Curve B - MCPR limit with the turbine bypass system, moisture separator reheater systems in service and non-CCC operational mode (any /)pn.4ct.

control rod inserted in the core).

The operating domain includes the 100% power / flow region and the extended load line region with 100% power and reduced flow.

Curve C - MCPR limit for either CCC or non-CCC operational modes with either the main turbine bypass system inoperative and the mois-ture separator reheator system available or the main turbine bypass system available and the moisture separator reheater sys-tem inoperable.

The operating domain includes the 100%

power / flow region and the extended load line region with 100%

power with reduced flow.

Curve D - MCPR limit for either CCC or non-CCC operational modes with the main turbine bypars system inoperative and the moisture separator reheater system inoperable.

The operating domain includes the FERMI - UNIT 2 B 3/4 2-4 Amendment No. M, M r

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POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS SASES 3/4.2.3 MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (Continued) bypass system or the moisture separator reheater be inoperable as 25 percent i

RATED THERMAL POWER is exceeded, the MCPR check must be completed within one l

A0ur.

The evaluation of a given transient begins with the system initial parameters shown in UFSAR Table 15.0.1 that are input to a GE-core dynamic behavior transient computer program.

The codes used to evaluate transients are described in GESTAR II. The principal result of this. evaluation is the reduction in MCPR caused by the transient.

factor of Figure 3.2.3-2 is to define operating The purpose of the Kg limits at other than ratec core flow conditions.

At less then 100% of factor.

The rated flow the required MCPR is.the product of the MCPR and the Kf K, factors assure that the Safety Limit MCPR will not be violated during a flow ihcrease transient resulting from a motor-generator speed control failure.

The K factors may be spplied to both manual and automatic flow control modes.

g The K factor values shown in Figure 3.2.3-2 were developed generically andareaphlicabletoallBWR/2,BWR/3,andBWR/4 reactors. The K, factors were derived using the flow control line corresponding to RATED THERMAL POWER at rated core flow, although they are applicable for the exten g operating region.

For the manual flow control mode, the K factors were calculated such that f

for the maximum flow rate, as limited by the pump scoop tube setpoint and the corresponding THERMAL POWER along the rated flow control line, the limiting bundle's relative power was adjusted until the MCPR changes with different core flows.

The ratio of the MCPR calculated at a given point of core flow, divided by the operating limit MCPR, determines the K.

g FERMI - UNIT 2 B 3/4 2-4b Amendment No. D, Y

g.

BASES TABLE B 3.2.1-1 SIGNIFICANT INPUT PARAMETERS TO THE LOSS-OF-COOLANT ACCIDENT ANALYSIS l

Plant Parameters:

i Core THERMAL P0WER...............

3430 Wt* which corresponds to 105% of rated steam flow Vessel Steam Output..............

14.86 x 105 lbm/hr which

+

corresponds to 105% of rated steam flow l

Vessel Steam Dome Pressure.......

1055 psia l

Design Basis Recirculation Line j

Break Area for:

a.

Large Breaks 4.1 ft2 b.

Small Breaks 0.1 ft 4

Fuel Parameters:

7 PEAK TECHNICAL INITIAL SPECIFICATION DESIGN MINIMUM LINEAR HEAT AXIAL CRITICAL FUEL BUNDLE GENERATION RATE PEAKING POWER FUEL TYPE GEOMETRY (kW/ft)

FACTOR RATIO

[

Initial Core 8x8 13.4 1.4 1.18 First Relcad 8x8 14.4 1.4 1.18 i

l

'A more detailed listing of input of each model and its source is presented in Section II of Reference 1 and subsection 6.3 of the FSAR.

  • This power level meets the Appendix K requirement of 102%.

The core heatup calculation assumes a bundle power consistent with operation of the highest powered rod at 102% of its Technical Specification LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE limit.

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8f Alecteer faergy t

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November 10,1989 cc: J. L. Casillas t

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0. 8. Doyle 4GJ:09 288-H. L. Hubeny*
8. E. Kremer-W. F. Mietti l

J. L. Rash

8. E. Smith

'with attachment l

Mr. A. D. Smart l

General Supervisor, Nuclear Fuel Enrico Fermi Unit 2, 135F2 TAC l

Detroit Edison Company 6400 North Dixie Highway i

Newport, Michigan 48166

SUBJECT:

Fermi t. Flow Dependent Multiplier for MCPR

Dear Mr.-Smart:

Attached is the Flow Dependent Multiplier for MCPR, K in equation form..

This is the K, that should be used for Cycle I at Fermi 2.I,It is appropriate to use the eq6ations and a graphic represent

  • tion of the equations in your Technical Specifications for Cycle 2.

l The graphic representation sent to you in uw February 17,1989 letter number GGJ:89 052 is a schematic approximation of the equation form i

transmitted by this letter.

l-The process computer uses a linear representation of the equation Where the equations are non linear below 40%

transmitted by this letter.

flow, the process computer uses a' linear representation that yields i

conservative K when compared to the true equation form.

f Sincerely, G.6/Jone Senie Fuel project Manager

~

Fermi M/C174,(408)9251516 4GJ:mg.6 Attachment L

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E(f) Flow Dependent Multiplier for MCPR zwazoo Fanur a crCLs s With anxL PLUS MOFa 00ma:LATION Mora(f). OLMcPR

  • E(f) where OLMOPR = MCPR Operating Limit at Rated Conditions E(f) = Plow dependent OLMCPR Multiplier DegadebtonPlowControl84ttingand Me anical 8000p Tube SetPoint E(f)..A + B
  • WT/100 where WT. Core Flow (Peroent of mated Flow) and A and B are constar.te which' depend on the Flow Control setting ana the oore flow rate as noted below.

For 40% <

WT 4 100%,

E(f). ItAIII.O. A+3*1rT/100)

WT <.

40%.

E(f) =

l A+B'WT/100] *.; 1. 0+0. 0058'(40-WT))

8000P TUBE l

SETPOINT A-a MANUAL FLOW I

102.6%

i 1.5508 I -0.441 1 00NTROL i

107.05 i

1.8598 l -0.441 I i

119.0%

i 1.8795 1 -0.441 1 1

117.0%

1 1.4055 1 -0.441 1 l

00NTROL i

1.4410.I -0.441 1 i

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