ML19332C812

Entry & Decontamination of Reactor Containment Bldg at TMI-2,Highlights of Planning Study, Presented at 790813 Briefings

ML19332C812
Person / Time
Site:	Crane
Issue date:	08/27/1979
From:	BECHTEL GROUP, INC.
To:
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ML19331A080	List: ML19331A077 ML19331A082 ML19331A083 ML19331A089 ML19331A096 ML19332B420 ML19332C777 ML19332C783 ML19332C787 ML19332C790 ML19332C812
References
FOIA-89-446 NUDOCS 8911290033
Download: ML19332C812 (12)

Text

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1. RdPORT' T

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p TOLTMELraET-ED CorafaUNITY n

ENTRY.AND DECONTAMINATION OF THE REACTOR CONTAINMENT BUILDING AT THREE MILE ISLAND' UNIT 2

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f Highlights of a " Planning Study"

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conducted by

.i BECHTEL POWER CORPORATION

' for GPU SERVICE CORPORATION, INC.

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Presented at Brie 5'ngs i

August-13, 1979 3 'J

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g' Metropolitan Idison Comperry

Reading, Pennsylvanio August 27, 1979

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Report Number Four 4

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- 8911290033 891121 P-

' PDR FDIA DEKDKO9-446 PDR

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- Dear Ne ighbor. -

Here _ isiinfomation that will' help you to understand some aspects of that n

will be involved in the recovery of Three Mile Island Unit 2 as a result of-the

' accident of March 28, 1979.

t r

h What is presented' here is a summary of a planning study conducted for us.by the t

Bechtel ?over Corporation.

The plan is really'a preliminary study designed to r

help us' prepare for_ entry into the Reactor Containment Building and the decont amination.of the f acility.

It must be recognized that this.is a preliminary.

t study and that further investigation and planning vill be required before action is taken.

We sincerely hope that this 'information vill help build a greater understanding, s

Met-Ed wants to be responsive and we urge you to write to let us know of your

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special interests. ~ We plan to continue this series of reports to the community snd vc can assure you that Met-Ed vill maka every ef fort to address your concerns in future communications.

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Sincerely.

Hktropolitan Edison Company e

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J [i TA31.E OF CONTENTS

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Ectter to the Community, 1

Metropolitan Edison Company The Plan: A Preliminary ?tudy 3

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' Note 4

Cos ts 'and Schedule

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Initial Human Entry of the Containment Building 5

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Decontaminating th& Air.

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Decontamin'ation Before Human Entry 8

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!!anual Decontamination 2

Opening of Reactor Head and Removal of Fuel Co(e i

Semoval, and Transport at ion of Radioact ive-Was te From 9

Three Mile Island

' Caleviating Radi ation kvels in the Containment Building 10 s

New and Modified: Facilities Planned for Safe and Ef fective 11 Dec ont amina t ion' 12 Employment and Other local Impacts

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THE PLAh!

A PRILIMINIARY STl'DY yo'Joving the March 28 accident The Bechtel study also outline:

Three Mile Island (TMI' ;'n i t 2,'

in a separate assessment a preliminary estimate of costs and a schedule

-a:cpl' Service Corporation (GPL'SC) retained 3echtel Power Corporation,. a leading related to the recovery ef fort.

They e n g'i n e e r i n g and cons t ruc t ion firc caution that since no entry has been in the nucle ar power indus:ry, to made into the Cont ainment Building the cost estimate is highly speculative, prepare recovery plans for the re-entry and d econt amination of t he Unit 2 The scope of the estimate includes efforts related to re-entering and containment building.

A top priority in developing the cicaning up of the containment, in-re acte r plan was to analyze, without benefit cluding vaste disposal; removing and of building entry, the radioactive disposing of the fuel; refurbishing or replacing in-containment systems.

content in the water on the building structures and components, and preparing water), in the air floor (the sump inside the building, and on the various the unit for restart.

surfaces. Tnis analysis was required to A copy of the July 16 New Release plan for the decohtamina' tion of the announcing the Bechtel Study (included prerequisite in this information kit) outlines cost building and aquipment, a

to the eventual recovery of the plant,

parameters.

The Sechtel study also describes:

• An assessment of the p h y s i c a '.

condition of the containmen:

' uilding and the degree of damage.

preliminary plans for entering

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he containment b u i '. d i n g for

he first time since the acciden:

and co=pieting i;s decon: aninat ion.

Import ant Note:

Conceptual design for new systems and mod i fic a t ions to existing Bechtel and CPUSC caution that systecs that vill be needed for since the containment building has not been entered since the accident, there re-ent ry and dec ont aminat ion,

uncertainties about levels of d e c on t a:i n a t ion are votk vill be directed by engineers radiation and the condition of the The re-entry anc facilities within structure.

As know-and technicians, who have been appro-priately trained in decontamination and ledge of these f actors improves, changes-in the practices that are essential to undoubtedly will be made in'the preli-protect the public, t hem s elve s and minary planning.

New studies already l in process and still others will be are those working with them, The Bechtel study does not speci-made.for these reasons, CPUSC and Bechtel '

fically addre s s-seve ral, are as related to l'n i t 2 recovery e f fort s such as identify the study as preliminary and 6

recoval of the water in the cont ainmen:

recognize that further investigation and building, disposal of contaminated planning must precede initial entry.

materials or removal 'of the fuel frem j

the reactor vessel.

These and other areas are or will be the subjects of c:har studies and evaluatiens.

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the ex ent we may know the oreliminary I

7 '. a n s, soec of these areas are cove red in t..ese se=ary highlight s.

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COSTS AND SCHEDt!!,E u

O le:htel eitimates t h'at ;decontamin-5.

Re-entry of-work personnel into.-

t i.- n ind react ivat ion of TM1-2 vill the RCB, followed bi: hand-on'

..e : at out f our ye ar s, but that this decontamination work in RCB.

o edule could vary by as much. as-six Spring 1980 atns.-

.The Bechtel study estimates that 6.

Reactor vessel opened. head

. e decont aminat ion and react ivation removed, fuel' damage assessed.~

the plant =will cost about $320 Spring 1981 r

f-illion.=

This figure includes. a con-

ingency. fund' of $80 million.

7.

Fuel core removed.

Fall'1981' i

The Bechtel estimate does not s

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inc lude. the cos t of replacing the 8.

Reactor coolant' system deconta-

.reccior core. CPUSC's investment in'the mination completed.

Summer 1982 Jare at the time of; the' accident vas

'neut $35 million.

With increases of ~

9.

Component Sy s t ems - inspacted, uranium, e nr ic hme n t and fabrication analyzeJ and-prepared for requal-

.; rices, aLnew core vil.1 cost between ification.

Fall 1982 HO aillion and $80 million.

Additionally,- GPUSC has added

10. Eva l u a t io n - c omple t e d on the C5 eillion ' to the Bechtel estimate to f easibility/ advisability of

ive r pos sible f urther unforeseen return to commercial. operation.

ntingencies..

This brings the esti-Fall 1982

'-ated ecst o.f decentaminating and

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a s t art irg T/.1-2 'to about $400 million.

This schedule does not include l

Tne - schedule of major milestones in consideration for a number of potential

. r. e TMI-2 recovery :f fort. is dif ficult delaying fat. rs.

Among the more

es:imate be'cause of uncert ainties in important are extraordinary legal or-

7.c J timing of regulatory approvals and political hindrances, major changes in tecause. information or development s in existing regulations, or vide variations tn ! earlier ef fort may ef fect ' the plan-from anticipated conditions in the'

.inF f or~ subsequent. e f fort s.

The containment building or reactor coolant f:13.oving generalized schedule should be system.

Any of these or other f actors

n s'ide red in that context and may,be.

could significantly increase the time tabject to significant later changes:

and budget requirements for safe cleanup and recovery.

1.

Back up reactor decay heat For planning purposes, Unit 2

r c'm o v a 1 systems and other restart, if approved, is schedule for safe shutdown mechanisms in mid-1983.

place.

Summer 1979 2.

Auxiliaryf Building vater, treated and building decontamination

-co=pleted.

Fall 1979 3.-

Reactor containment' building (RCB) water removed from RCB and :reated.

Winter 1980 Remote deontamination of RCB and RCB equipment completed.

Spring 1980.

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z INITI AL El'P.AN ENTRY OF THE CONTAllOENT BUILDING L*s in; :he Bechtel plan, human ent ry

. The re-entry team would have two into the containeent building would be basic assignments; to map the radiation a: tempted only af ter remote decontamin-levels and " hot spots" in as much of the a:lon, receval of radioactive gases from building as practical under the condi-the air and draining of the water from tions they find; and to assess the physical condition of the inside of the the flocr, During the entry, worker safety containment building and its contents.

Bechtel also considers the use of

. precautions must be taken and release of airborne radiation and contamination to robots if radiation levels are found to the control and service building must be be too high for human entry.

The report a

states that robots - would be capable of minimized.

To accomplish'this, temporary contamination control envelope making the 'ent ry and performing radia-would Ue built around the existing tion surveys, dose rate ' as sessment personnel airlock through which the evalutions and observations of the be cade This would general condition of the containment init i al ent ry would, 's, a r oun.

elose off the are d the entry building at the point of entry, llow-point ' with two or more barriers.

Each ever, a robot would not be as mobile, control zone vould be vented t o t em-flexible or " intelligent" as a human porary filters to remove any escaped

team, GPUSC is also considering the c ent amina: ion.

specially The initial entry would be cade by a possibility of sending a team of three wel'. : rained engineers and equipped and trained man into the t echnicians who would knew what to look containment building before remote for once inside, what to do and how to decont amination or removal of the sump aard :h emse!"e s froe over-doses of water. This re-entry, using essentially radiation.

A s:andby team of three the same techniques 'as proposed by s

o:her pa'ified workers would be ready Bechtel, would be made through the same outside the airlo:k in case of emergency airlock recommended by the Bechtel

need, report.

The goal of such an early entry Those inside the cont ainment building would be to obtain more detailed data on would be in constant radio commun ic a-conditions within the building before tions vi:h their supervisors. in the deciding on the various decont amination planning subsequent c ontain ent service building, techniques or Tne initial re-entry personnel would recovery e f fort s, wear several layers of protective clothing, including hard hat s, three to five laye rs of full anticontamination clothing with sy gical caps, hoods, rubber boot s, out er laye r. plas tic suits and full rain gear, including hat and coat.

The ge ar the y vo,ul d c a r r y woul d include breathing apparatus, devices f or measuring gamma and beta radiation, air and gas s am pl e r s, explosive gas meters. heam flashlights and two-way r adios.

The '.cngth of time the re metry team ruld spend in t he cont ainment building w>uld fe:ch3 upcn the icvel of radia-

en. ::: could oc as l'e n t as an hour. '

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I-DECONTAMINATING THE AIR exceed 0.14 millirems of gamma radiation The air in the. cont ainment. building

+tains high levels of radioactive and 14.8 millirems of beta radiation at

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- :s t be reduced to minimize exposure of distance f r om t he site increases.

In

,,, e s, particulates and iodine that the site boundary and would be less as

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.3rkers curing t he ' decont amina t ion both cases, the emissions would be

.re; ram.

.The principal contaminants, within t echnic al s pec i fic at ions, legal i t emming f rom the-reactor cooling limit s and Federal guidelines for

-system water that-spilled into the normal plant operation.

Nnt ainment building, are miscellaneous The study also points out that ' the fission' products, noble gases, iodine, filtration and purge method can meet gesium'end tritium, all of which must any of f-site dose objective other than

n bo disposed of in a manner that vill absolute zero, it is simply a matter l'

not jeopardize the public health, of reducing the purge rate to comply purging of the containment building with the goal.

Existing meteorological I

atmosphere would be done af ter the conditions -(wind speed, etc.) wo'.ld. be

'remot e dec on t aminat ion sequence, but taken into consideration to Iurther before human entry.

The basic objec-minimize dosages.

-tives would be:

Three other methods are also being To minimize the impact on public evaluated:

Compression and storage of the health and safety of containment bui; ding clean-up, cont aminated air in t anks.

• To assure the lowest reasonable

• Cooling the air to very low (cryo-possible exposure of workers to genic) temperatures at wh ic h the radioac t ive gases liquify.and r ad io ac t ivi ty,

• To a s sure that there is no danger can be separated from the air and to the health or safety of the stored.

public, by keeping any releases

• Absorption of the radioactive gases

well within all applicable Federal as they are passed through a char-

limits, coal bed at very low temperatures.

Several. techniques for decont amina-While-preliminary evaluations indi-tirig the cont ainc ent building atmosphere cate the filtration and purge method were surveyed by Betchel.

One, kn own a s is the best all around alternative, the filtration and purge method, GPUSC is conducting further studies involves

irculating the contaminated to determine the safest and most effac-l air-through filters to remove radio-tive way of handling the contaminated ac t ive particulate matter and through air in the containment building.

This

horcoal to remove iodine.

The air work includes:

vould then be exhausted in controlled

• A more thorough investigation of amount s-into the atmosphere through a the filtration and purge system.

nnt stack af ter goiTrg through a second Work already completed in this area filter and charcoal sequence.

Some shows that Bechtel's estimates radioactive gases, mainly krypton, would of the amount of radiation that oc -released, but in c onc ent r at ions would be released into the atmos-within Federal discharge limits.

phere and the resulting dose rates The Bechtel study indicates this are correct and, therefore, would

. recess vould take about $1 days, qualify under Federal regulations.

fter which the air in the cont ainment

• The feasibility of each of the

.: ding should be breathable in accor-alternate methods is being studied

a e with Federal standards.

in depth.

Ecchtel esticates that at the end of No final decision has been made at

.m 51 days, the total off-site dose this date as to wh ich of the available u

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cdioactive gases from the methods of disposing of the radioact ive i

m.tratier and ourge process would not gases in the containment building vill be used.

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DECO?;TAMINATIO:! BEFORE HL' MAN E';TPJ

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'! remote ' dec ont a:nina t ion" 7.

Again evaluate e f'fec t ive ne s s of 9 'g:.t:encant building 'is, planned Steps 5-and 6 and repeat if k

,: re entry-Di a'ot ers: to, complete t he e f fect ive or proceed to St ep E.

.,...:y.-an.41 cetnoos.

~ne precedure is 8.

Use of chemicals.- beginning :with

...,t e, e( to reduce human exposure t o.

those chemicals least likely

=radist i:n ;during initial entry and to be harmful to equipment within

.an:u-e n decont acinat ion.

Se:htel has the containment building, p i c'-

identified four basic remote decontamin-ceeding to stronger chemicals as q

-at ion t ech'niques :-

required.

The use of chemicals L

will be followed by a 250,000

- 1.. Flushing with clean water.

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gallon flush with clean water.

2.

Use of steam to induce conden-When it is-determined that the sation on surface.

radiation-levels are suf ficiently

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_3.

Flushing with detergent solutions.

Iow for human entry, there will

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Flushing with chemic al. solutions,

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follow a 200,000 gallon flush

-with water containing corrosion-Each of.these would use the. cont ain-i inhibitors.

This water would eent building spray system, wh ic h was remain in the c o n t.a i nme n t built into the cont ain=ent. building fo r building sump during the initial emergen:y use to remove iodine from the-L air _in the event of an accident.

periods of manual decontamination.

to minimize airborne tritium and he sequence of remote de : ont ami n-help _ shield workers from radi' ation ' events as described by Sechtel is ation c a u s e'd by contaminants as fo l l ows : -

remaining on the floor.

1.. A flush with some 250,000 gallons This sequence of flushes ~should of clean water, reduce the cont amination on those areas

'2.

• ajection of a small s t ee - flow -

and equipcent directly contacted by the.

while d r aining the flush wate r various sprays to a ' level one hundredth from the floor to prevent chemi-or less-of current levels.

However, l

_ cals. now dissolved in the water some areas not directly sprayed will.be 1

'l from precipitating and adherin8 less thoroughly cleaned and will require

o drained-surfaces.

greater care during manual clean-up.

3.

Multiple steam cycles to hel P Bechtel identified about 10 chemicals remove contamination clinging to that might be used in the remote walls, ceilings and unfloodable dec ont amina t ion process without harming surfaces.

compone'nt s o f t he cont ainment building, 4

Evaluation of the e f fec t ivenes s but these and even stronger chemicals of the water and multiple steam would only be used as a last resort flushes.

JL these have been in the event the earlier remote decon-e f fec t ive, the recommendation is tamination steps failed to ; achieve' the to repeat _the water flush.

Since desired results.

the steam flush already vill have GPUSC agrees that t he wa te r and s t e am i

been repeated several t ime s, it flushes should be used and that chevi-1-

need not be done again.

If cals would be used only if radioactive neither the water nor steam levels are fo6nd to be too high for f;ushes have been ef fect ive, the safe human entry for manual decon-picposal is to proceed te, Step 5.

tamination, and then only if we are A flush with 250,000 gal;ons of a assured that the chemicals will not harm cetergent solution.

the nuclear steam supply system.

4.

A flush with 250,000 gallons of

can wc ter.

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f 1, ll' PANUAL DECONTAMINATION OPENING OF, REACTOR HEAD

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& REMOVAL OF FUEL CORE i

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{:anual decont amination - will be the-Following decontamination of the

rai step in the TM I'- 2 ' c l e a n - u p.

containment building, the reactor a

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.e plan generally calls for starting coolant system will-be flushed and

.l' t.e clean-up at the entry hatch and remotely d ec on t am i n a t ed.

The overhead ~

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.trking outvard until ~ the ent ire build-polar' crane will be placed into service-

?:b.it.ghasbeencleaned.

able condition = and the refueling cavity he job falls roughly in two parts:

around the reactor flooded to cover the i

1 general ' overall decontamination and reactor vessel and permit the removal of-14 -fecontamination of specific hard-to-the reactor head with minimal' recon-ret-at areas that-may contain " hot tamination of the surrounding area.

spo:s."

Bec au se we expect there. is signi-l:

'"he overall a' rea decont amination will ficant core damage, the fuel will i

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ac com pli s hed by flushing with be removed using specially designed oe I

eater - the detergent solutions applied tools and eventually shipped to a

.wi t h ' s pr ay apparatus.

Fire hoses processing / storage depository in spent' and portable eanks with spray attach-fuel easks.

The fuel will-be t em po r-cents will be used, arily held in TMI-2's spent. fuel pool, t

5 team cleaning will be used on which will be modified for the oper :

s e:ific ares c ont ami na t ion.

Hard-to-ation.

For planning purposes we are i

rea:h " hot spots" will be scrubbed assuming that at least half (about 600 nan;4'.ly with detergents.

of the fuel assemblies have been

?retecticn of the technicians working damaged.

in 't h e. c on t ainme n t building vill Following removal of the fuel assem-J-

ce cf paramount importance.

Before they blies, the balance of the reactor b e g i_n-t h e i r job, general area and coolant system will be decontaminated.

. airborne radiation monitors must be GPUSC assumes that some fuel pellets installed to alert the workers when and other core debris have been distri-ianger of over-exposure exists, buted to other parts of the system.

Workers will wear breathing-apparatus Because of this, it will be necessary to and. ant i-cont aminat ion clothing sile remove the reactor vessel's l o we r i

pe r forming canual c lean-up work.

internal. part s end cleanup the bottom, Allowable work periods will be remove the pumps, inspect and repair if a

' dictated by existing radiation levels.

necessary the steam generator tubing, in no case will wo rke r s be allowed and chemically decontaminate the Reactor te get radiation doses exceeding legal Coolant System.

limits as set forth in Federal stan-derds.

As will' be the case in the remote i

decontamination procedures, special

are will be taken in manual decon-tanination to protect the nuclear steam supply 'sys tem because of it s ' import ance tc future operation of the plant.

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l II M.".*A:. d T?.'.':3 ?CRTAT C T OF RAC10 ACTIVE k'ASTE FROM THREE MILE l$1MD S

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!t.e re :va. a n; :: a r.s ;o r t a t i c n of-considered _ conservative.

Radiatfon

a::.ve vastss !: o: "ni: 2 a:

' readings for the first shipment were

:te M.;e :s'.a:d.has begun, vi:h refuse subs t antially lowe r than the pe rmissible

. in;'

y :ra::: -::si;er units t: the maximums.

For example, readings'six

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.i.e s e r v a : i : n in the s t a:4 of feet from the trailer were 1.5 millirems j per hour in contrast with a percitted

'iss.!.;:2..

clean-v; and level of 10.0.

l he, Auxi;iary Liidin; decant aminatic: of wa:e r will result Vnen each sh ipme n t is dispatched,_

in-abou: CD shipcent s over a four year designated of ficials in states along l pericd.

tech:e; has _ prcjec:ed that the itinerary are notified of the route, d e c an t t:i n a t ior.

cf--the Co n:a inme nt contents and ' es t imated time of arrival' [

Buildin; and ?.e a c : c r Coeling System in that state.

may r ec,ai:e i t.

he range of 2,000 to Shipaents of somewhat higher level !

2,50C siip :ent s.

radioactive wastes will begin.

Some Te r ;r : t ec :i:r. cf the public health of these may require somewhat lengthier and s af t:y, a s e ries cf rou:ine but routing because of the extra weight-rig:raus i r.s p+ : : i o r.s pre:edes dispatch of containers used.

Routing is a resul:

o f e ac: shiptent.

Te ecs f r ce two of piecing together in sequence, fedtr al agen:ies, o.e Pennsylva:ia state states in which necessary permits fo r apercy, and nuttr:cs o;tr ating uni:s of overweight shipment s can be procured.

Me tte;o;i: ar Idis :n Cce;a.y are i.v:lved The heavy casks to be used for these i, :h. ; ::es s'.: checkir.g and eer:ify-shipment s will contain a d ewat e:ed in; a ih.;:er:

in c: p'.ian:e with resin used in

a. chemical process for-s : 4 7.i a r : s ic :

tdia:i:n :on:r:1 and absorbing radioactive materials now p'r v a i : a '. :end i t ie n of :he vehic '.e.and dispersed in the water held captive i:s c ar;;.

since the accident in March.

he rt.: s h i p:e..: s cens is:. of 150 to After the reactor vessel is opened 16 0 ' ::< tl 5 5 ra '.1:n trues cen:aining and the fuel removed, CPUSC expect s dry, :c pa::ed 3:.id ref u se f rco Unit 2 to ship the fuel to a depository of f-c ; e a n - t. :

cpe ra:io.s.

lac lud e d - are site in spent fuel casks s pec i fic ally r a d i c a :: iv e '. y c:r:anina:ed work c:oth-designed for such purposes.

i r. g, sh:e covers, s= a ' 1 tools, rags, The-number and type of shipment s pa;tr, and other debri s.

Sone 600 required to remove c ont amina t ed cate-dr u:1 : ad s 7.n ac:stula:<d w.an. ship:ents rials from the Island will depend on the be pn c:..u iu s t

, 1971.

In addi: ion, nature of the decontamination system the:e are' a nu::e: of veaden bcxe s,

used at each stage and the amount of

'y eigh: fcet, radioactive materials.

An ' e s t ica t e o f I

at eu: f o.r by four

e n:a ini.g non-c::pa:t itle debris.

such shipments will be made prior to 1

"o s:t e seg=en:s ef the p t: b 1 i c,

the initiation of each decentamination was:e f:c: 'hrgA Mile Island has a effort.

spe:ia; stigma, cgardless cf the reu:ine level :f radiation.

A: cord-in g ' y,

~M: ca na;ere a.t has undert aken a sp e:i al pub'.ic af fairs p r og r et.

State a f f i:i a'. i along :he shipping itineraries ve rt in::.:iual'., briefed, and co:pany re;teset: t:ives are a::::panyi.; the iri:ia' a n i::e r.: s :: hani;4 p..

i r.e u i -

riil.

. 47 i; ;O terti :4i radia*io-1eveIs i

n :e t: :e ric; Of : :.e shiptent are

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x-CALCULATING RADIAT10N,1.EVELS IN' THE CONTAINMENT ' BUILDING-e 3

One' of. the ; first 1 s teps that must be The Bechtel report haa estimated-taken before ;re-entry and~ decont amin-general area radiation levels for

')

December 1979 and assumes that the water 24 tion work can begin is' to determine how euch ; r ad io.a c t ivi t yi exi s t s in the on the floor of the building: has been-cont ainment building.:

k'h ll e levels removed, but That no rttempt at' remotely

. cannot ': be determined exac tly ' until

. decontaminating the building has been.

made.

On this basis, general area-re-entry has been accomplished, Bechtel

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radiation le,ve l e s t ima t e s ' wi t hin 'the has.made a range of calculations based on. exist'ingcdata.

k'h a t is presently containment building, measured. in. terms known'is derived from samples ofi the of gamma dose rates, range from 6.7 rems

. reactor cooling water, ' sample s-o f air per hour at ~

floor 23 feet above L the a

from the centainment building and bottom of the containment of 2400 r' ems -

radiation measurement's made by detectors per hour it -a higher floor (about 66-feet above the bottom of the contain-both inside>and outside.the building, Tour major sources of radiation are ment).

Rems are a measure of the biological effect of r a d i~a t io n dose-

-involvedi

• . Gene r al-are a l'e'v e l s f'r om radio-absorbed in human tissue, a

. ac t ivit y deposited on'valls and Due to the location of the existing airlocks, re-entry Jis planned at a floor 23 feet above the bottom of the-floors.

• Airborne sources.

Concentrations in the sump water, containment, where the r adiat ion dose which is about seven feet deep on rate estimates prior-to cleanup range from 6.7 to 46 rems per hour.

the building's floor,

• Local areas of heavy contamination The Bechtel radiation estimates are believed to be the best currently iknown as " hot spots".

available and are based on sophisticated Using available measurements from techniques for calculating radiation-these' sources, Bechtel esticates a range levels vi th' the presently ' available t of three probable radiation levels--the data.

lowest, the~ median and the highest.

Final decisions avait direct. measure-Bechtel's ' airborne radiation esti-ments that can be made by inserting mates range from 0.73 to 'l.3 cierocuries per cubic' centimeter. A microcurie is a probes into the containment building measure.of the rate of disintegration atmosphere and by obtaining samples of of radioact ive material.

The major sump water f rom the floor of the build-

. contributor to this airborne radiation ing.

Engineers are now working on is krypton' 85, one of the radioactive procedures to execute these me asure-cents.

gaseous fission product s.

.Radioact.ive content of the sump water ranges- 'from 222 to 961 microcuries pe r c ub ic c e n t im~e n t, largely due to barium 137m and cesium 137 in the water.

Bechtel estimates that the sump water also contains 0.5 to 1. 5 mic rocuries per-cubic ~c e n t ime t e r ' o f tritium, a radioactive form of hydrogen that cannot be readily removed from the water by cocmereially available techniques.

Tritium has a relatively seall biolog-ical ef fect which can be f urther reduced by dilution.

10 -

4

NEW AND MODIFIED FACll.171ES Pt.ANNED FOR SAFE AND EFFECTIVE DECONT t

for the containment building and breath-Co nt empl a.t ed by Sec h t e l, be f o re and decontamination of the ing air systems for workers inside the A

r e -e n t r y'nt building, vill be instal-building.

The latter vill ccnsist of c ont ainme

[

lation of a number of new facilities, self-contained treathing apparatus equipment and systems, as well as carried by the workers and tir from codifications to existing facilities, compressed air tanks provided through hoses to masks worn by the operators, The largest single ' addition recom-aended by Bechtel is a containment A visual communications system vill serv,.ce building and associated f ac il-be available to ' allow workers to ities to be~ erected outside but conti-see the actual work area and existing conditions before entering for their guous with the containment building,

!=

This building'will be designed to assignments.

F limit.the eseape of radicactivity This sy's t em along vith a two-way audio control vill augment supervision during the decontamination process, The service building also villt and monitoring or work inside the

• Pr ov id e personnel access to and

' containment building, L

from the containment building Other new equipment will include a during all phases of decont. min-commercial s t e am generator capable of providing steam at 300 pounds per

ation,

• Allov passage of large pieces of square inch for decont aminat ion pur-equipment and removal of bulk poses, a water supply and water recycling radioactive vaste without opening system, and several large industrial the. cont ainment building directly strength vacuum cleaners, Use of steam is expected to be one of to the ateosphere.

the major tools in reducing contam-

• . erve as a staging area to deconta-t minate and package c ont ami na t ed inat ion within the cont ainment building.

equipoent recoved f rom the cont ain-The water treatment system vill decon-taminate water already in the contain-

. ment building,

• Serve as an area for holding of rne nt bu.ilding for re-use in the decon-high-level radioactive vaste for tamination process, supply and purify shipment to off-site storage.

any new water that may be required

• provide space for a dry cleaning and continually recycle the water used In t he decont amination e f fort.

This f acility for contaminated clothing.

procedure vill greatly reduce the amount Since as many as 100 people per shift cry be working on the dec ont amina t ion of water used in the clean-up.

project, the service facility will house Key facilities for decontcmination ef a " health physics" office, which will the c ont ainment building before human serve as a control point for personnel entry vill be the existing spray and cntry. and processing of radiation work ventilat, ion systems.

The use of these two systems is discussed elsewhere permits.

The service building vill be equi,pped in this, report.

with radiation monitors and alarms as a further. protection for workers and the. general public.

The service building vill also be equipped to filter all incoming air to remove dust and outgoing air to recove particulate radioactive material.

Other new equipent to be ' pr'ovided for the de:ont aninat ion project vill include. t empor ary lighting.and pove r'.

TOJWE HF n c uvmTVTTTwm: mmc

,,,' r,y I

2

• _,, j e

{ q', 7,.d c:AsnCT ow.p.c. ms:

y October 1,'1979 c, t r*. E o f Dd i

(cew Q4Cnt A

• The H[norable Gary 5a rt,.Chai rman Subioscittee on Nuclea r'8egulation Com:ittee on Enviroruaent and Public Works United States Senate Washington, D. C.

20510 j

Dear Mr. Chairman:

This responds to a letter dated September 27, 1979 from you and a I

number of your colleagues on the Senate Committee on F.nvironment and Public Works concerning Three Mile Island Unit 2 recovery operations..Your letter dealt with two important aspects of these operati'ons - the contaminated water now scored at the site and the scensee's radiation protection program.

Shortly af ter receipt of your letter, the Commission requested and received a staf f briefing on these issues at a public meeting of the Commission held on September 28.

i Inclosure 1 to this letter' discusses in some detail the current status of the contacinated water at the site and the options for pro:essing and storage now under active consideration.

of principal importance~in this connection is the f act that under no f o res eea ble circumstances do we plan nor will it become necessary to put unprocessed contaminated water into the Susquehanna River.

There continues to be suf ficient waste storage capacity at the Three Mile Island site (including that currently available at both. Units 1 and 2) for about 9 more months, assuming the amount of contaminated water continues to increase at the present Notwithstandirg this extensive storage capacity, there is rate.

a need to begin processing of the contaminated water in order to r e co'.

a nd i nnobili t e the contained radioactivity as soon as a ca ref ul consideration of the related saf ety and environmental considerations by the staff and the Commission will permit.

The staf f has already prepared and issued an environmental assessment of the use of "EPICOR II" to process the contaminated water now cEtained in tanks in the auxiliary buf1 ding.

The pe riod f or public comment on these staff reports has recently expired and the staf f currently plans to make its final recommenda-tions to the Commission later this week concerning the use of this system.

It is important to note that while the potential risk to the.public offsite from continued storage of the contami-nated water cannot be completely discounted, the principal safety conce rn pending processing of this wate r' involves the. increased j

likelihood of worker o'verexposure.

4 4

n_-

z-

, October 1, 1979

' 7he'nonorablo Gary Dort,

,..:'. l..

.., ' ~... '

27 '

with, regard to a related patter, your letter of Septemberin.t correctly points out that the staff has diation protection nur.ber of deficiencies in the licensee's ra

d. As discussed in '

program which, as yet, have not been correcte.

been pursuing the.se.

note detail in enclosure 2, t.be staff hasratters over th ill continue to do so.

i ansion of the Neither they nor the Coc.missioners will perm t exp itably resolved.

recovery progran until these inportant issues are su ii ies is in Again, the principal concern related to these def c enc the site.

.e.

providing adequate protection for the workers on.;,. y.......,..

d I have' beek Please'be assured that my fellow Com:alasioners an d other actively following and will continue to follow these' an Issues related to managenent of the radioactive water at the and are being periodically briefed by the We y111 intervene at any time Three Mike Island site,in writing.

i t in T we or the staf f bo11 eve such action is necessary to ca n a staff, both orally and i

You nay adequate protection for the verkers at tJie facil ty.

d to protect the-also be assured o.f prompt NRC action if neede f

health.and safety of the general public in the vicinity o the Three F.ile Island site.

Sinceroly, h

,. k t Y f b r 4 N Richard 7. Kennedy Acting Chairman Enclosures Staff Report on Contaminated 1.

h'ater at Three Mile Island Site dated Geptember 30, 1979 I

Staff Report on Licensee's 2.

Radiation Protection Program s

at Three Mile Island dated Septenber 30, 197,9 Identical Ictters sent i Note:

J3andolph, DPMoynihan, PVDorner, l

Central file's VStello RTStaf f ord, AKSimpson, and !!E4l Distribution JSnie::ck i

NRR Rdg /

Jr.

OPE CDO Rd V SECY SEP/T:4I Rdg RETYPED IN OFFICE OF COMM OGC

'~

PSD/TMI Rdg MGroff HnDanton GErtter (EDo-7450)

LVGossick Attorney, 6 ELD Tnchm JMullin EGCase JC+1-1-iac D0f e,. rdw t es oct!Wbl ine r ggggggg_ _gggm R. T. Kennedy i

i SV2NAMC>

...) 0 /.1/.7 9..

, Enclosure 1 o

September 30, 1979 I',

CONTAMINATED WATER AT THREE MILE ISLAND SITE

.0

'k Currently there are three major volumes of contaminated waste water resulting i

from the accident at the TMI-2 facility.

They are:

1.

water contained in the lower level of the reactor building, 2.

water contained in the reactor coolant system.

3.

contaminated water contained in the auxiliary building tanks.

This water inventory is summarized in Table 1 and depicted in Figure 1.

l The water in the reactor building is a result of water discharged to the I

lower levels of the building during the accident, as well as the accumula-tion of normal leakage from the reactor coolant system following the accident and sources of uncontaminated secondary water that have mixed with the contaminated water.

The volume of water in the reactor building is about 630,000 callons, which is-a level of about 7-1/2 feet above the basement floor in the reactor buildino.

The current leakage rate, principally of I

water from the primar.y reactor coolant system, results in an increase in volume of about 430 callons per day and a level increase of about 2 inches per month as shown in Table 2.

Since this amount of leakace is to be expected, this source of inleakace will continue.

The principal isotopes and activity level in this water is presented in Table 3.

The reactor coolant system is another volume of contaminated water. The fixed system is composed of the reactor vessel, steam acnerators and associated L

pumps, piping, and valves, and has a volume of about 85,000 gallons. The 8

+

3 t.:

a o

principai isotopes.and activity level in this water is presented in Table 3.

Since it is a fixed system its volume does not increase but there is leatage out of the reactor coolant system into both the reactor building and the auxiliary building.

As leakage occurs from the primary cool.ing system, t

replacement water is added to keep it full at all times, p

The contaminated water in the auxiliary building is contained in tanks having a total capacity of about 415,000 gallons.

Currently 387,000 gallons of I

contaminated water is stored in these tanks; thus, the remaining capacity is about 29.000 gallons.

With the current inleakage rate of about 800-1000 gallons per day, a margin of about 30 days"(from September 29, 1979) remains until these tanks are f'111ed.

The details on the tank volumes and remaining capacities as well as the radioactivity levels in these tanks are given in Tables 4 and 5.

The dominant sources of leakage in the auxiliary building are from the component cooling system, domineralized water system, reactor building evaporator cooling system and from the recirculation of tanks prior to samplina.

Most of this leakage is non-contaminated water but it becomes contaminated while passing through floor drains and sumps which are provided to collect the leakage.

Another source of water, althouoh minor in volume (approximately 10%) is from leakaoe in the reactor purification and makeuo system which is also located in the auxiliary buildino and contains primary coolant water. This leakace is likewise to be expected. and is from oumos and valves.

l In summary the leakace of water from various sources which results in an increase in the amount of contamirlsted water is from normal leakaoe paths.

The current j

l l

I

3-p -

c,3-j inleakage rate to the reactor building poses no threat to the public health and safety. Although the inleakage rate to the auxiliary builditsg is contained in tanks, it does contribute to occupational exposure.

However, since the tank volumes remaining at TMI-2 are limited, a decision regarding which option to be exercised to accomodate water about 30 days hence needs to be made. These g

options are addressed in the following pages.

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3 4

I Options'for Accommodating Leakage of Contaminated Water

~

l' The options available for accommodating the increase in the amount of contam-inated liquids at the Three Mile Island site are basically as follows:

1.

The use of EPICOR-II to decontaminate the water so that it can be LI placed in available tanks; l[

2.

The transfer of contaminated water from TMI-2 into the TMI-1 facility where, tank capacity is available in the auxiliary butiding; 3.

Placement of contaminated water into the rear. tor building; and 4

4.

Construction of new tanks onsite whicli would be capable of storing highly contaminated liquids.

[

EPICOR-II The use of EPICOR-II for the processing of auxiliary building water has been I

evaluated in detail in t5e' staff's environmental assessment, a copy of which is enclosed.

The EPICOR-!! system is a demineralization process which removes

[

radioactive ions from the water stream as it is passed over filters and resins.

This technique is well-proven through many years of use in commercial and military nuclear applications.

The EPICOR-II system was designed and built following the TMI-2 accident for the purpose of processing the contaminated water generated by the accident currently being stored in the auxiliary building.

This design and. construction activity received close review and evaluation by l

the NRC staff, onsite as did the training of operating personnel and in the l

preparation of operating procedures.

The actual use of the system, however, has been deferred pending resolution of objections to use of the EPICOR-II As a system by the City of Lancaster and the Susquehanna Valley Alliance.

result of these objections and cou't actions the Commission directed the staff r

on May 25,1979 to prepare an environmental assessment and allow a period for.

e

for public coments. An approved draft of the environmental assessment was released for public comment on August 20,1979 and 38 public coments were i

t received by the close of the 30-day coment period on September 19, 1979.

Of these 38 coments only three were substantive in nature,,The City of Lancaster and the Susquehanna Valley Alliance were opposed to the use of n

EPICOR-II based on extensive technical and legal coments, which the staff

' currently has under consideration.

The staff does not believe that any

{

of these will alter its previous conclusion concerning the acceptability of using EPICOR-II.

The Comonwealth of Pennsylvania had coments which are j

being incorporated into the environmental, assessment by the staff, the Comonwealth is in agreement with the staff that the EPICOR-II system sho'uld be used to decontaminate the auxiliary buildi'ng water.

A summary of these comments, along wit.h a revised environmental assessment and the staff's a

recommendation, will be presented to the Comission on October 4,1979.

lt is important to note that the use of EPICOR-Il does not involve the discharge

'I of any processed water into the' Susquehanna River.

The use of EPICOR-il, as described in the environmental assessment, is only for the decontamination of the water and does not consider or pennit disposal of the cleaned up water.

The cicaned'up water will be such that it could be discharged under existing federal and state regulations,. but since various options exist for the water disposal, approval is being withheld until the disposal alternatives can be evaluated.

Among the disposal alternatives are evaporation at the site, transport of the decontaminated water off-site, discharge at another location, re-use at the facility, and discharge into the river. As was indicated above.

if the alternative.of discharge into the river wc e to be used, this option would meet all standards, including the confonnance at public drinking intakes to the EPA Safe Drinking Water Act.

To date since the accident, the activity

e e.

in the Susquehanna' River at drinking water inlets has been indistinguishable from normal background levels as measured by a number of Federal and state agencies.

Storage in THI-1 Tanks _

A second option for handling the increase in the amount of contaminated water is the placement of such water in TMI-1 tankage which has been available for

- I con'tingency purposes. The tanks for storage of ifquid in TMI-1 are in the 1

TMI-1 auxiliary building and have generally the same capability and safeguards i

as the current storage of liquid in TMI-2. Currently available storage in TMI-1 is about 225,000 gallons.

However, there are several reasons why the placement of water in T'MI-1 is not considered as the best alternative.

First, putting contaminated water into additional tanks extends the scope of the potentialproblemofexphuresofoperatorsanddoesnotreducethemobility of the contamination.

Further, the placement of contaminated TMI+2 water into TMI-1 tanks may require clarification of the Commission's May 25, 1979 statement which allows continued processiag and discharge of TMI-1 water put prohibits processing and discharge of TMI-2 water.

If TMI-2 uter were to be transferred to the TMI-1 tanks through existing piping interconnections between the two units, it is likely that trace amounts of THI-2 contamination would be deposited on s5fde of the piping used for processing or discharge of THI-1 '

water.

Consequently, subsequent processing and discharge of TMI-1 water under these circumstances could be inconsistent with the Comission's May 25 l

statement.

In addition, public perception might be that TMI-2 water was being processed through the THI-1 facility.

In summary, although the placement of TMI-2 wate'r into TMI-1 tanks af fords 1

i 1

substantial additional capacity and protects the public health and safety, 1

it does not appear to offer a suitable permanent solution to the problem.

l l

t 0

Storag6 of Water in the Reactor Building Storage of water in the reactor building is another option for alleviating the storage' problem. The reactor building currently contains about 630,000 i

gallons of contaminated water and could accommodate additional water.

However, the reactor building conta' ins equipment which is vital to the continued safe shutdown of the damaged TMI-2 rcactor and the addition of water into the I

reactor building would place some of this equipment into a situation whereby I

non-operability would be made more likely.

Storage of wa,ter in the reactor building presents.no undue risk to public health and safety since no paths of l'eakage to the outside have been identified.

Notwithstanding this, the t

licensee has been asked to develop and implement a program whereby groundwater under the TMI-2 reactor building will be sampled for potential radioactive l

contaminants.

We expect _t,his program would heighten assurance that none of the reactor building water is escaping.

4 In summary, the storage of TMI-2 water which is leaking into the auxiliary building, in the basement of the reactor building does not pennaner tly solve the contaminated water problem and would also lessen the contingency available in the reactor building for the protection of vital equipment which might fail if submersed in water.

L Construction of Additional Tanks A third option is the construction of additional tanks.

Tanks for storage of l

radioactive liquids would be required to meet regulatory. requirements that i

provide substantial assurance of long tenn integrity, as well as for the l

3

. detection of possible leakage.

The construction of new tanks at the facility would pose a problem of time as well as location.

As previously discussed, contingency tankage of 110,000 gallens was built af ter the accident in the t

i

1...-

l'..

8-spentUuelpoolwherespacewasavailablebyremovalofthespentfuel storage rack.

However, at this time it would be difficult to find another plant location where tanks would be constructed that would provide that same degree of public environmental protection of the current tanks that are installed in a seismically qualified auxiliary building.

In addition the same drawbacks exist as were discussed for options 2 and 3 that the creation of l

additional storage capacity extends the scope of the potential operator exp'osure problem and does not immobilize the contained radioactivity. There-fore, although this option could provide adequate public-health and safety protection, it would not provide a, permanent solution to the problem.

t t

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UNIT 1 UNIT 2 ~

l 1

Reactor Building Auxiliary Building.

Auxiliary Building Reactor Building f

F rimary Letd6wn &

Letdown i Prima /y (001 ant Make sp dakeup Coolar t Systen S3ystQm 1 ystey Systen 3

1

^

A u

o Tanks anks V

. _ _.. V EPICOR-I-EPICOR-II.

ee Ogg V

SUSQUEHANNA RIVER v., ~ w

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FIGURE 1

4 TABl.E,1 TMI-2 RADIOACTIVE WASTE WATER INVENTORY'

}

Usable Waste Water Remaining Inleakage Capacity Volume Capacity Rate-Sources (gallons)

(gallons)

(gallons)

(gallons per day)

. Remarks Reactor. Building Waste Water.i N/A 630,000 N/A 430 See Tables 2 and 3 for detail Reactor Primary Coolant 85,000 85,000 0

N/A Auxiliary. Building Tanks 415,190' 386,500 29,000 800-1000 See Tables 4 ant 5 for detail Surinary - Remair.ing days prior to filling-all tanks at TMI-2 based ob past seven (7) day average leakage rate are 30 days.

e 9

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-. ~,... -.

.. - -. - -.. ~,

• e TABLE 2 TMI.2 REACTOR BUILDING WASTE WATER INVENTORY _

Total Waste Water Volume 630,000 gallons current Leak Rate

0.3 gallons per minute or 430 gallons per day

, Leak Sources (1)

Reactor Primary r.oolant System (valves, flanges and pumps)

(2) Containment Building Normal Coolers Rate of Level Increase Approximately 2 inches per month Based on Current Leakage Water Activity See Table 3

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i

TABLE 3 RADIOACTIVITY CONCENTRATIONS OF_

t-PRINCIPAL NUCL10ES IN' REACTOR i

BUILDING WASTE WATER.

I (Average Value of Three Samples) l:.:

(pCi/ml)

Cs-137

-176 Cs-134 40 t

H-3 1.0 I-131 0.012 m..

La-140 0.1

- i Sr-89 42

.i-Sr-90 2.8 RADIOACTIVITY CONCENTRATIONS DE

[

l PRINCIPAL NUCL10ES IN REACTOR PRIMARY COOLANT (pCi/ml) 1-131

<0.4

^

'Cs-134 16

~

Cs-137 78 Sr-89 201 Sr-90 15.8 Ba-140 1.2

'O.22 H-3 e

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TABLE'4 1

TMI-2 AUXILIARY BUILDING _ WASTE WATER INVENTORY

\\

Maximum Waste Remaining Activity Tanks Capacity Volume Capacity _

Conceritration (gallons)

(gallons)

(gallons)-

-(vCi/ab).

1.

Reactor Coolant Bleed Tan "A"

77,250 77,250 0

,- Table 5 2.

Reactor Coolant Bleed Tank "B" 77,250

-77,250 0

Table 5 d

3.

Reac'or Coolant Bleed Tank "C" 77,250 77,250

- 0 Table 5 4.

Miscellaneous Waste Holdup Tank 19,600 9,200 10,400

<0.1 1

5.

Concentrated Waste Tank 9,000 9,000 0

<0.1 6.

Neutralizer Tank "A" 8,780 8,780 0

. Table 5 7.

Neutralizer Tank "B" 8,780 8,780 0

Table'5-2 8.

Auxiliary Building Sump 7,000 3,000 4,000

<0.1 4

9 Auxiliary Building Sump Tank 3,20()

2,600 600

<0.1 4

10.

Miscellaneous Waste Storage Tank - TMI 18,500 18,470 0

7.0 11.

Tank Farm Upper 60,000 53,700 6,300 Lower.

50,000 41,700 8,300 TOTAL 415,190 386,500 29,000 4

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1 TABLE 5

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RADI0 ACTIVITY CONCENTRATIONS OF PRINCIPAL ij

[

NUCLIDES IN REACTOR BLEED TANKS I

(pCi/ml)

I-131 0.011 i

i Cs-134 7.8 l

.j-l Cs-137 37 RADIOACTIVITY CONCENTRATIONS OF PRINCIPAL HUCLIDES IN NEUIRALIZER TANKS r

(pCi/ml) l-131 0.002 4

l

" Cs-134 1.5 Cs-137 7.0 P

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l, LICENSEE'S RADIATION PROTECTION PROGRAM I-

'AT THREE Mite ISLAND l

i Subsequent to the March 28, 1979 accident, the licensee's radiation protection program has been unable to respond in a consistently adequate manner to the many unique radiation protection problems which the

[

recovery operations present.

Onsite, daily inspection and monitoring e

l 'l by the NRC have identified discrepancies and areas where improvements were'needed to assure a greater degree of plant worker protection.

Six

!.l.

major areas were identified which required remedial action:

I I

• Delineation of Radiation Protection Organization and Responsibilities Establishment of an augmented Quality Assurance Program

. Control of High Radiation Areas Evaluation of Airborne Activity Implementation ~bf an Effective Bioassay Program

• - Development of an Upgraded Respiratory Protection program i

During the period February 26 through March 2,1979, at the request of 1

Metropolitan Edison, the NUS Corporation conducted a review of the I

radiation protection program at Three Mile Island (TMI).

The report of'this review was obtained by the NRC staff on June 20, 1979.

This report is critical of certain portions of the TMI radiation protection program and addresses the same general problem are's which had been i.

identified by the NRC staff.

NRC efforts to resolve the past and current problems and obtain adequate corrective action by the licensee have been continuous.

The onsite NRC l

l I

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staff has met frequently with various representatives of licensee manage.

ment to identify spec ~ific concerns and obtain commitments for corrective i

action by the licensee.

These meetings culminated on July 13, 1979

?

when the NRC staff discussed its intent to issue an Immediate Action Letter.(IAL)toMetropolitanEdison;thisdiscussionwasheldwith i

1 i

Mr. R. Arnold, Vice Pres'ident-Generation, General Public Utilities l'

Service Company / Manager, TMI Site Operations and Mr. J. Herbein, Vice i

President-Generation, Metropolitan Edison Company, and members of t

their staffs.

At that meeting the licensee agreed to take action on all of the issues identified by the NRC and in a letter dated July'18

' confirmed the actions which would be taken and specified expected completion dates; therefore the IAL was not issued.

F e.*r Since July 18 the licensee has submitted reports (in letters dated August 6, 13,16 and September 10) of the actions taken in followup of the commitments.

Continuing NRC observations and inspections have shown, however, that improvements in the program have been and continue to be slow.

The following discussion identifies the six major programmatic areas which required remedial action and summarizes the deficiencies and current status of corrective actions.

+

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f.'

l DEllNEATION OF P.ADIATION PROTECTION ORGANIZATION AND RESPONSIBILITIES I

In the imediate post-accident period, y

• uelineation of specific areas of responsibility for radiation protection activities were not i

sufficiently definitive'to assure that all matters important to worker I

protection were adequately managed and implemented.

The licensee has

~'

subsequently. better defined and assigned the responsibilities associated wit'h matters important to worker protection.

The adequacy of implementation of the assigned responsibilities is being monitored and evaluated by onsite HRC personnel on a continuing basis.

The staff is not yet completely satisfied with the overall-coordi. nation of the total worker protection program at the site.

The licensee was to establish a means for overall coordination of worker protection and delineate the specifics in its Radiation Protection Plan which was submitted for NRC review and approval on September 28.

The staff has not yet completed its evaluation of the Plan.

ESTABLISHMENT OF AN AUGMENTED QUAllTY ASSURANCE PROGRAM The magnitiTdi of the radiation protection challenge during the recovery operations required that the licensee institute an augmented Quality Assurance Program which would provide a comprehensive overview of 4

-m

1 4.

'I 4

C i

the effectiveness of the radiation protection program and verify that

)

t i

necessary corrective measures are implemented.

The new Quality Assurance Program was instituted by the licensee on September 10.

The program is i

being implemented by licensee and, contractor personnel who are not responsible for the conduct of the day-to-day radiation. protection Li

- I I

~ activities.

Audit results from the program are not yet available for I

NRC review.

As soon as they become available, they will be reviewed i

i by the NRC onsite staff.

CONTROL OF HIGH RADI ATION AREAS _

The accident produced many high radiation areas within the plant, t

Identification of these areas and control of worker access to these

' areas-during the recoy,ery operations was and continues to be an item which demands continuous licensee attention.

On September 10, the l

licensee completed development of procedures for identification and-control of high radiation areas.

NRC has reviewed and approved the procedures.

Our overview indicates a lack of effectiveness of the licensee's implementation of the procedures; there are still some problems in implementing the'" key control" aspects of controlling worker accgis to high radiatioir areas in Unit 2, and the procedures have not yet been implemented in Unit 1.

The NRC onsite staff is interfacing with the licensee to resolve this problem.

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!.I EVALUATION OF AIRBORNE ACTIVITY The isotopic distribution of airborne radioactivity within the plant and the changing nature of this distribution during the recovery operation was not fully appreciated.

Consequently, the procedures and methods utilized for determining the concentration of airborne,

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radioactivity within the plant were not always correct.

On September 4 P

the licensee issued temporary procedures for evaluation of air samples.

The NRC e.ntite staff has reviewed the procedures and found them to be L

I adequate.

Our onsite staff is monitoring the liccuee's implementation

.i of the temporary procedures.

The licensee is scheduled to issue

~se6tanent procedures for evaluation of air samples by October 7.

The

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NRC will review the procedures for adequacy.

. IMPLEMENTATION OF AN EFFECTIVE B10 ASSAY PROGRAM i

Subsequent to the accident, the bionssay program in effect at the plant was found to be inadequate,especially as related to the deter-mination of suspected acute and chronic exposures to isotopes that are not expected to exist at nuclear power plants in normal operations (e.g.,Sr-89andSr-90).

The NRC onsite staff reviewed the licensee's l-revised procedures for the bioassay program on August 17, and was not

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.l satisfied that they were adequate.

The licensee was provided with,

l conrnents from our onsite staff and is scheduled to have new procedures submitted for NRC review by October 10.

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c DEVELOPMENT OF AN UPGRADED RESPIRATORY PROTECTION PROGRAM The levels of airborne activity experienced in the auxiliary building subsequent to the accident and the potential for airborne activity during recovery operations dictated the need for an upgraded respiratory The need was identified for action levels for g

l prote'ction program.

' r-89 and Sr-90 analysis, for improved "staytime" calculation S

procedures, and improved procedures for the testing, use and cleaning The necessary procedure, improvements were completed of respirators.

The and found acceptable by the NRC onsite staff on September 24.

licensee is presently training personnel regarding the use of the The revised program is scheduled for full implementation procedures.

The effectiveness of the implementation will be menitored by October 7.

I by the NRC cnsite staff.

SUMMARY

The licensee has upgraded and continues to upgrade and improve the I

radiat'io'n protection progran, but these improvements have been and

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Our onsite inspectors have been and will continue continue to be slow.

to monitor the progress of the licensee in meeting his conmitments for The improvements in'the operational aspects of worker protection.

August 21 report from Messrs. Neely and White demonstrates the diligenc of our inspectors in accomplishing this function.

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'The radiation protection program that presently exists at Three Mile Island, in conjunction with the NRC health physics overview, is adequate to provide for protection of the general public and for worker protection at the present level of recovery activity. As the j

licensee undertakes additional operations (e.g., processing of the

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.. highly radioactive Unit 2 water, entry into the Unit 2 containment, and possible defueling of Unit 1), we will need to continue to be l'

.i vigilant to assure that the, radiation protection program is imple-s-

-mented in a manner that provides for continued worker protection.

To provide additional assurance tha.t both the licensee and the NRC have considered all facets of the radiation protection challenge that

' exist during the recovery operations, a five member " Blue Ribbon" panel will be convened by the NRC staff to perform an independent assessment of the potential radiation protection problems that may be experienced during the recovery operations.

A majority of the panel, including the Chairman, will. be composed of experienced health physicists from outside the NRC.

A report to the NRC of their assessment is expected to be completed within one to two months.

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