ML19326B147

Responds to Cleveland'S Motion to Reopen Discovery. Recommends Denial.Certificate of Svc Encl

ML19326B147
Person / Time
Site:	Davis Besse, Perry
Issue date:	06/30/1976
From:	Reynolds W CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING CO., SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE, TOLEDO EDISON CO.
To:	Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
References
NUDOCS 8003060946
Download: ML19326B147 (22)

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

"' d NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION JUd 3 0 yyy Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board In the Matter of )

)

THE TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY and )

THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING ) Docket No. 0-3 6 COMPANY )

(Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, )

Unit 1) )

)

THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING )

COMPANY, ET AL. ) Docket Nos. 50-440A (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, ) 50-441A Units 1 and 2) )

)

THE TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY, ET AL. )

(Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, ) Docket Nos. 50-500A Units 2 and 3) ) 50-501A APPLICANTS' RESPONSE TO THE MOTION OF THE CITY OF CLEVELAND TO REOPEN DISCOVERY

1. The latest attempt by the City of Cleveland

(";3.ty") to reopen discovery in this proceeding was filed on June 23, 1976, literally on the eve of the conclusion of this seven-month antitrust hearing. No legitimate purpose can now be served by affording the City further discovery. Indeed, the City has completed its rebuttal case except for a limited reservation to respond to the testimony of Francis Gaul as reflected in Mr.'Gaul's Affi -

davit marked as Applicants' Exhibit 213 (see Tr. 12,081-82);

the City's present: discovery is not germane to that matter,

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and thus no use can be made in this proceeding of the documents being sought. Rather, the City's request is, quite clearly, nothing more than a transparent attempt to fish through yet more documents of The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company ("CEI") in the hope that it might find indirectly documents to use in other pro-ceedings, notwithstanding that the door to discovery has been closed there also.

2. There is no absolute right to discovery.

The Commission's Rules of Practice provide that discovery may be " limited by order," or may "not be had," or even "may be had only by a method of discovery other than that selected by the party seeking discovery." 10 C.F.R.

SS 2.740(a), (b) and (c). In the present proceeding, the Board has afforded the City, and indeed all the parties opposing Applicants, great latitude with respect to con-ducting discovery of Applicants' files. CEI has not only been required to open its files to the City here, it has also had its papers examined separately by the City onder sweeping discovery requests in the civil antitrust case in Cleveland, as well as subjecting its file-materials to separate scrutiny by the Department of Justice under a broad Civil Investigative Demand (as to which the City was the indirect benefactor). It is thus inconceivable that l

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a further search of CEI's files will disclose any new in-formation that might have a material bearing on the issues in controversy in this proceeding. But for subjecting CEI to additional harassment, inconvenience and expense, the City's present motion will accomplish nothing. It is not designed to obtain, and clearly will not produce, -hat w might arguably be characterized as evidence crucial to the City's case, and in the absence of a showing by tne City that " crucial evidence" will be forthcoming there is every reason for the Board to deny the request outright.

See Northern Indiana Public Service Company (Bailly Gen-erating Station, Nuclear Unit No. 1) , ALAB-303, NRCI - 75/12, 858, 869-870 (December 17, 1975), citing Eli Lilly & Co.

v. Generix Drug Sales, Inc., 460 F.2d 1096, 1105 (5th Cir.

1972).

3. Moreover, the City's request is on its face contrary to the Ccmmission's Rules of Practice. Section 2.740 (b) (1) explicitly provides:

In [a proceeding on an application for a construction permit or an .

operating license] no discovery shall be had after the beginning of the prehearing conference held pursuant to S2.752 except upon leave of the presiding officer upon good cause shown.

The Section 2.752 prehearing conference in this proceeding ,

was held on September 18, 1975. The City has made no serious attempt to show " good cause" for now ignoring that cut-off date. In these circumstances, a reopening of discovery more than 9 months later finds no support in the Commission's own rules. See Commonwealth Edison Company (Zion Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-196, 7 AEC 457, 463 (April 25, 1974) (" subpoena or discovery requests filed outside time period . . . are to be regarded as prima facie unreasonable"). Indeed, the general rule ap-pears to be that discovery requests such as this one --

which come well after the commencement of a trial -- are to be treated with disfavor. See, e.g., United States v.

Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center, Inc.,

27 F.R.D. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (rejecting government's claim that discovery necessary for rebuttal case); United States v. E. I. duPont deNemours & Co., 14 F.R.D. 341 (N.D. Ill. 1953) (same). An examination of the City's arguments in support of its present motion makes it abun-dantly clear that the instant discovery request is en-titled to no different treatment.

4. The City's first ground for reopening dis-covery is based on a repetition of its threadbare argu-ments contesting CEI's sustained claims of attorney-client privilege (City Motion at 2-4). In point of fact, these

arguments should not even be raised in connection with the present motion; rather, they are nat92s which (if they are to be heard at all) should be set forth in a challenge to

the rulings of the Special Master upholding CEI's privi-lege claims. It is, however, too late in the day for the City to resurrect that collateral issue before this Board.

There is no basis whatsoever for the Board now to enter-tain interlocutory review of the Special Master's rulings under the inartful guise of a discovery request, especially in light of the fact that the City previously sought un-successfully to have this Board review the very same rulings on privilege and the issue presented by that request is now before the United States Court of Appeals for the Dis-tr_ct of Columbia on the City's petition.b!

5. We would note in passing, however, that the City's argument for invading CEI's privilege suffers from the same sort of faulty legal analysis that has plagued the City throughout this proceeding. It is asserted in sweeping terms that the attorney-client privilege must give 1/ To the extent that the City's present motion seeks a further ruling from this Board on the claims of attorney-client privilege, Applicants believe that this Board is l without jurisdiction to order such relief while the City's appeal is before the Court of Appeals. Applicants incorpo- I rate by reference the arguments they advanced on this ques-tion in the " Response Of The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company To' City Of Cleveland's Motion For Review Of The Special Master's Rulings On The Privileged Document Claims" (14, at p.5, filed January 12, 1976).

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a way under the general axiom "that a client's communication to his attorney in pursuit of a criminal or fraudulent act yet to be performed is not privileged in any judicial proceeding." In re Sawyer's Petition, 229 F.2d 805, 809 (7th Cir. 1956) (emphasis added); United States v. Friedman, 445 F.2d 1076, 1087 (9th Cir. 1971). CEI does not dispute the validity of the general rule. However, there is no basis whatsoever to assume that this proposition has any application here. In the first place, the City's leap from this Board's alleged disposition that there existed a prima facie conspiracy among Applicants, on the one hand, to the supposition that counsel for Applicants were involved in and parties to this so-called " conspiracy", on the other hand, staggers the imagination. Moreover, neither the Board's evidentiary ruling under Section 105c of the Rules of Evidence, nor its denial of Applicants' dismissal motions, can properly be used by the City to bootstrap itself into a showing that Applicants were somehow engaged in, or in-tended to engage in, "a criminal or fraudulent act." Fur-thermore, the City's strained argument ignores entirely the established rule that advice obtained from legal counsel in aid of a legitimate defense is privileged, irrespective of whether or not the client is ultimately shown to be guilty j of any wrongdoing. See McCormick, Evidence S95, at 199-200 1

i and n.49 (2d ed. 1972); 8 Wigmore, Evidence S2298, at 573 (McNaughton rev. 1961) ; Annot. , 16 A.L.R. 3d 1029 (1967).

6. Nothing of record in this proceeding so j much as suggests that counsel for Applicants were engaged in anything other than preparing a legitimate defense to the charges levelled against their clients. Nor is there any basis for concluding that the clients approached legal counsel for some untoward purpose. The standard that the City now seeks to apply requires at the very minimum a showing that the legal advice sought by the client was for the performance of a knowingly unlawful act -- that is, that the client knew, or reasonably should have known, that the activity it was about to engage in on advice of counsel was criminal or fraudulent. See McCormick, Evidence 595, at 200 and n.48 (2d ed. 1972); 8 Wigmore, Evidence 52298, at 573, 577 (McNaughton rev. 1961). And see Proposed Rule of Evidence 503 (d) (1) as recommended by the Supreme Court of the United States, which provided an exception to the attorney-client privilege in those situations where "the services of the lawyer were sought or obtained to enable or aid anyone to commit or plan to commit what the client knew or reasonably should have known to be a crime or fraud" (emphasis added) .2/

2/ The advisory committee notes to this Proposed Rule point out that the requirement that the client knew or (Cont'd p. 8)

7. The City has introduced no evidence to sustain such a contention; nor, for that matter, has any other party opposing Applicants. In short, the j -

record does not even begin to suggest such a possibility.

Accordingly, the City's latest effort to make an "end-run" around the Special Master's clearly correct determination to protect CEI's privileged documents -- even assuming that this Board could entertain such a contention in the context of a request to reopen discovery -- must fail.  ;

8. Indeed, the City's own cases undercut its position. In United States v. Rosenstein, 474 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1975), the defendants had established a dummy Liechtenstein corporation for the purpose of receiving commission payments and thereby avoiding federal taxes.

Two Liechtenstin attorneys were designated as recipients 2/ Cont'd from p. 7 reasonably should have known of the criminal or fraudulent nature of the act to be performed is " designed to protect the client who is erroneously advised that a proposed action is within the law." See also 2 Weinstein, Evidence 1503 (d) (1) [01] at 503-59. The relevance of these obser-vations to the present motion cannot be lightly dismissed.

As adopted by Congress, Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence directs that the question of privilege "shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted-by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience." While the specific and uniform rules promulgated by the Supreme Court were not adopted by Congress, to the extent that those provisions restated the' law currently applied in the federal courts --

l as clearly was the case with respect to Proposed Rule 503 (d) (1) -- they are reflective of "the common law . . .

interpreted . . . in the light of reason and experience,"

and can provide an appropriate. benchmark for decis. ion here.

See 2 Weinstein, Evidence 1501[02), at 501-20 (1975).

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of the commission payments. The defendants argued that communications with the attorneys and documents in the attorneys' possession were privileged under the attorney-client rule. The court found that the attorneys were operating exclusively as businessmen who were mere puppets of the defendants. Id. at 714. There was no consultation between defendants and the attorneys for legal assistance.

The attorneys were thus found to be part of the fraud, acting as a go-between in what the defendant-clients knew or had reason to know would be criminal activity. Of a similar nature is United States v. Billingsley, 440 F.2d 823 (7th Cir.1971) , where the indictment charged that defendants had caused an attorney to mail a package to one of the defendants for the purpose of executing a fraud-ulent scheme. And in United States v. Shewfelt, 455 F.2d 836 (9th Cir. 1972), defendants had retained attorneys for the purpose of filing complaints seeking to quiet title in certain land for the purpose of fraudulently attempting to secure title to that land. The court there found that the defendants had retained counsel to insure the success of their mendacious l scheme, not to secure legal ad-

! vice. . . . [T]he attorneys did not unwittingly lead their I

clients down the road of crime.

l In this case, the clients acted i as engineers who sent out their workmen to remove any existing impediments. Id. at 839.

9. No similar factual pattern has emerged in the present proceeding. To the contrary, the evidence of record will not support a finding that CEI, or any of the other Applicants, has in the past engaged, is at present engaging, or intends in the future to engage, in any criminal or fraudulent activity, let alone that any or all of them ever retained legal counsel in the pur-suit of such conduct. The Rosenstein, Billingsley and Shewfelt decisions therefore do nothing to advance the City's discovery motion.

10. Another ground asserted by the City as a reason for reopening discovery is the alleged failure of the City to obtain discovery as to certain document re-quests initially propounded to the Applicants but not answered pursuant to the Licensing Board's October 11, 1974 Order sustaining Applicants' objections thereto. The ,

l difficulty with this aspect of the City's motion is that )

it utterly fails to demonstrate good cause for altering I the Board's prior disposition of these original' document requests.

11. For example, the City now asks for discovery to be reopened as to document requests 72 and 74 which relate to materials pertaining to certain bond ordinances passed by City Council of the City of Cleveland. We would 1

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first point out that the Licensing Board in its October 11, 1974 Order actually permitted discovery in this area with

! respect to any contacts which CEI representatives may have i

had with the City's bond counsel (see Board Order of October 11, 1974, 141 and 42, at p.19). The City does not tell us what further discovery it believes to be necessary or desirable in this connection. In any event, any ad-ditional materials that might conceivably be sought under document requests 72 and 74 plainly can have no bearing on the matters in controversy here in view of this Board's ruling during the evidentiary hearing striking testimony by the City relevant to bond ordinance matters as being outside the scope of the City's September 5, 1975 filing (Tr. 7499). Certainly, Applicants' introduction into evi-dence of various reports prepared by the City's own inde-pendent consultants -- i.e., the Cresap Report (Applicants' Exhibit 207 (CEI)), the two Kohrman and Jackson Reports (Applicants' Exhibits 208 and 209 (CEI)), the Glaus, Pyle

Report (Applicants' Exhibit 210 (CEI)) and the Ernst and Ernst Report (Applicants' Exhibit 211 (CEI)) -- provide no basis for initiating another round of discovery at this late date under document requests 72 and 74. 'These reports l

are not in any logical way tied to the City's requests for bond l

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ordinance materials. Nor can it fairly be said that the City Council resolution and ordinance (Applicants' Ex-hibits 203 and 204 (CEI)), the report of the Public Utilities Committee (Applicants' Exhibit 136 (CEI)) or the Gaul Affidavit (Applicants' Exhibit 213) have any connection to the request for materials concerning the drafting, amendment or passage of the City's bond ordi-nances. If discovery can be reopened at~the eleventh hour on so flimsy a pretext, it is doubtful that this hear-ing will ever end.

12. Certainly, no end is in sight if the City's motion is successful as to document request 82. No ob-jection was ever registeredly Applicants with respect to that particular request and the City had full discovery of the materials originally called for therein. Whether the inclusion of document request 82 in the present motion is simply due to carelessness, or is an intentional effort to get "a second bite at the apple," there is plainly no good cause to grant further discovery in this area.

! 13. Nor is there any better basis for permitting l

the City to rummage once again through CEI's files for discovery materials responsive to document requests 85 and 86, which seek information dealing with CEI's campaign

contributions and political participation. Applicants l

continue to believe that such information is totally ir-relevant to the issues in controversy in this proceeding; i

i in additon, the material being sought is precisely the sort of documentation protected from disclosure under First Amendment principles embraced within the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. The City has not made the necessary particularized showing that would warrant a reopening of discovery in this area. This Board has read the various exhibits introduced by Applicants to which the City's

! motion refers -- and to which reference is made in para-graph 11 above; it has also heard Applicants' offers of proof associated with those exhibits. It is difficult to believe that the City can in good conscience seriously represent to this Board that those exhibits somehow (and, not surprisingly, the City neglects to explain how) justify l a broadside investigation into the everyday political l

l activities of the officers, directors and employees of

.CEI.S/ The Board has already properly closed the door to general discovery in this area. No legitimate reason has been offered to open it at this late date.

l 3/ This Board has already signed a~ subpoena duces tecum to Francis E. Gaul at the request of the Department of Justice. Whatever additional discovery the City needs with respect to the Gaul Affidavit ~is more than covered by the Department's subpoena.

14. Turning to the City's reference to Appli-cants' Exhibit 204 (CEI) -- the City Council Ordinance introduced in May 1976 - ,it also furnishes no basis for renewing the discovery process. While the Board has indicated that it intends to take evidence on conduct as of the date that the record closes (Tr. 9768), that statement clearly was not an indication that document discovery was to be an ongoing process throughout the hearing. The Commission's Rules very clearly discourage such a procedure. 10 C.F.R.. S 2.74 0 (b) (1) . In any event, the fact that the Ordinance in question was introduced in City Council in May, 1976 is not a cause, let alone good cause, to reopen discovery. Here we are talking about an action which.was undertaken by the City itself, and thus the City plainly has it within its own means to ob-tain information relevant to Applicants' Exhibit 204 (CEI).

To permit the City to use this document as a ruse to launch yet another unproductive fishing expedition of CEI's files is unwarranted.

i 15. This leaves only that part of the City's motion which makes reference to initial document requests l

l 16(d), 16 (f' , 16 (g) , 18(a), 58, 59, 70, 81, 87 and 88.

l l These requests were the subject of an earlier unsuccessful -

motion by the City to reopen discovery which resulted in this Board's " Order and Memorandum Ruling on Cleveland's Motion to Reopen Discovery," issued on November 18, 1975.

Even if we were to assume for a moment that there is some substance to the City's claim for this material -- which in point of fact is not the case -- a reading of the November 18 Order makes it clear that the City has sat too long on its discovery request and should no longer be permitted to reopen discovery into these matters. The Board's Order states clearly that "(a]t the point in the proceedings at which the Board is satisfied that the City has made a prima facie showing of the necessity for CEI transmission, the Board will reconsider its permitting the requested discovery" (November 18 Order, at pp. 5-6).

It is the City's position that it amply demonstrated such a need through the testimony of Messrs. Hinchee and Mayben (City's Motion, at p. 5) , which was completed on March 31, 1976. No renewed request was made for discovery at that time, nor, indeed, was there any such motion filed during the ensuing 3 months. Rather, the City has carefully waited in silence until almost the close of Applicants' direct. case, and even until after it has put on essentially its entire rebuttal case,to come forward and ask for another o

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round of document discovery. No longer can the Board properly say that delay from further discovery in this area, if permitted, would be chargeable to Applicants, as it had expressed in its November 18 Order. Any delay at this stage of the hearing that might now be traced to the reopening of discovery must rest on the shoulders of the City. It is the City who, for some inexplicable reason, frittered away 3 months without making any effort whatso-ever to avail itself of the procedure suggested by the Board to obtain additional discovery.

17. This should weigh heavily in the Board's consideration of the present motion. There can be no doubt that if the City's present motion is granted, the resultant delay will cause Applicants considerable prejudice. The schedules for Davis-Besse Unit 1 and Perry Units 1 and 2, while heretofore subject to some slippage, cannot be cava-lierly disregarded. The late Fall of 1976, or at the latest early 1977, now appear to be firm deadlines. This Board should not permit itself to be taken in by the City's not-too-subtle attempt to prolong needlessly this proceeding so that it becomes impossible to conclude the hearing and render an Initial Decision prior to the scheduled start-up of Davis-Besse Unit 1.or the planned commencement of major construction of Perry Units 1 and 2.

18. The City's present discovery request must be measured in this light. Plainly, it is untimely as to the document requests referred to in paragraph 15 above, and no good cause has been given for the inexcusable delay.

Moreover, the City has made no effort to demonstrate how the material requested is relevant to testimony it is being sought to rebut. Nor has the City made any attempt in its renewed request to cure the deficiencies found by this Board to exist originally.

19. Thus, document requests 87 and 88,'which seek general-and overly broad information on political activities of CEI, and document requests 58 and 59 which seek similar information with regard to CEI's public re-lations campaigns, bear not even the slightest relationship

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to Mr. Caruso's testimony or to the alleged activities of CEI designed to prevent the City from constructing trans-mission lines. Applicants' objection to document request 81,

which seeks certain weekly reports submitted to Mr. Howley, was sustained not on grounds of relevance but because the j l

request-was overly broad (October 11, 1974 Order, 147, at ,

21). That is certainly still true today and the filing of Mr. Caruso's testimony does nothing to alter that earlier l

ruling of the Board. Document request 70 relating to ac- l tivities of CEI prior to 1965 was objected to on the ground l

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of remoteness, and the Board sustained that objection based on its September 1,1965 cut-off date for discovery (Oct.

11, 1974 Order, 141, at 18-19). Again, the filing of the Caruso testimony does not impact on that conclusion. With respect to document requests 16 (d) , 16(f), 16(g) and 18(a),

the City did obtain discovery under document request 16(g) relating to litigation in opposition to constructing com-peting generation or transmission facilities (Oct. 11, 1974 Order, 17, at 8). Of those listed, that request is plainly the one most relevant to Mr. Caruso's testimony. As to the other three document requests, 16 (d) and 18 (a) bear only the slightest relevance to Mr. Caruso's testimony, while 16(f) bears no distinguishable relevance whatsoever.

19. In light of the limited value of any docu-ments that might be obtained pursuant to the City's belated effort to reopen discovery, and given the imprecise nature of its present request, not to mention the burden and time that inevitably would be involved if the instant motion were now to be granted, no legitimate reason exists for requiring CEI at this late date to open its files once again to the City for purposes of a general examination of docu-ments. The City has failed miserably to make the kind of .

showing required under the Commission's Rules to sustain any other conclusion.  !

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WHEREFORE, Applicants submit that the Motion of the City of Cleveland to Reopen Discovery should be denied.

Respectfully submitted, SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE m

By: b. 3 E' -

C_C Wm. Bradford Reynolds i Robert E. Zahler Counsel for Applicants Dated: June 30, 1976.

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board In the Matter of )

)

THE TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY and )

THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING ) Docket No. 50-346A COMPANY )

(Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, )

Unit 1) )

)

THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING )

COMPANY, ET AI.. ) Docket Nos. 50-440A (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, ) 50-441A Units 1 and 2) )

)

THE TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY, ET AL. ) ,

(Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, ) Docket Nos. 50-500A Units 2 and 3) ) 50-501A CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of the foregoing "Ap-plicants' Response To The Motion Of The City Of Cleveland To Reopen Discovery" have been served upon each of the persons liste:d on the attached Service List, by hand de-livering a copy to those persons in the Washington, D. C.

area and by mailing a copy, postage prepaid, to all others, all on this 30th day of June, 1976.

SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE e J c

[ .% . 'Ds ^m~kL By: C- .S Wm. Bradford Reynolds \ '

Counsel for Applice.nts

l UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board In the Matter of )

)

THE TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY and )

THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING ) Docket No. 50-346A COMPANY )

(Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, )

Unit 1) )

. }

THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING )

COAPANY, ET AL. ) Docket Nos. 50-440A (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, ) 50-441A -

Units 1 and 2) )

) l THE TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY, ET AL. ) 1 (Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, ) Docket Nos. 50-500A l Units 2 and 3) ) 50-501A SERVICE LIST Douglas V. Rigler, Esq. Docketing & Service Section Chairman, Atomic Safety and Office of the Secretary Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Foley, Lardner, Hollabaugh Washington, D. C. 20555 and Jacobs Chanin Building - Suite 206 Esq.

815 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.

Joseph,Rutberg,ler, Benjamin H. Vog Esq.

Roy P. Lessy, Jr., Esq.

Washington, D. C. 20006 Jack R. Goldberg, Esq.

Office of the Executive Legal Director Ivan W. Smith, Esq. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Washington, D. C. 20555 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 Joseph J. Saunders, Esq.

Antitrust Division John M. Frysiak, Esq. Department of Justice Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Washington, D. C. 20530 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 Steven M. Charno, Esq.

Melvin G. Berger, Esq.

Atomic Safety and Licensing Janet R. Urban, Esq.

Board Panel Antitrust Division U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Department of Justice Washington, D. C. 20555 P. O. Box 7513 Washington, D. C. 20044 t

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Reuben Goldberg, Esq. Thomas J. Munsch, Esq.

David C. Hjelmfelt, Esq. General Attorney Michael D. Oldak, Esq. Duquesne Light Company Goldberg, Fieldman & Hjelmfelt 435 Sixth Avenue Suite 550 Pittsburgh, PA 15219 1700 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.

Washington; D. C. 20006  ;

David McNeil Olds, Esc.

• Vincent C. Campanella, Esq. Reed Smith Shaw & McClay Director of' Law Union Trust Building Robert D. Hart, Esq. Box 2009 1st Assistant Director of Law Pittsburgh, PA 15230 City of Cleveland 213 City Hall Lee A. Rau, Esq.

Cleveland, Ohio 44114 Joseph A. Rieser, Jr., Esq.

Reed Smith Shaw & McClay Frank R. Clokey, Esq. Suite 900 Special Assistant 1150 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.

Attorney General Washington, D. C. 20036 Room 219 Towne House Apartments Edward A. Matto, Esq.

Harrisburg, PA 17105 Richard M. Firestone, Esq.

Karen H. Adkins, Esq.

Of$$hN*b$ee$siabef'Jr.,Esq.

9 .

Antitrust Section William J. Kerner, Esq 30 E. Broad Street, 15th Floor The Cleveland Electric Columbus, Ohio 43215 Illuminating Company 55 Public Square Christopher R. Schraff, Esq.

Cleveland, Ohio 44101 Assistant Attorney General

' Environmental Law Section 361 E. Broad Street, 8th Floor Michael M. Briley, Esq. Columbus, Ohio 43215 Roger P. Klee, Esq.

Paul M. Smart, Esq. James R. Edgerly, Esq.

Fuller, Henry, Hodge & Snyder Secretary and General Counsel P. O. Box 2088 Pennsylvania Power Company Toledo, Ohio 43603 One East Washington Street New Castle, PA 16103 Russell J. Spetrino, Esq.

Thomas A. Kayuha, Esq. John Lansdale, Esq.

Ohio Edison Company Cox, Langford & Brown 47 North Main Street 21 Dupont Circle, N.W.

Akron, Ohio 44308 Washington, D. C. 20036 Terence H. Benbow, Esq. Alan P. Buchmann, Esq.

A. Edward Grashof, Esq. Squire, Sanders & Dempsey Steven A. Berger, Esq. 1800 Union Commerce Building Steven B. Peri, Esq. Cleveland, Ohio 44115 Winthrop, Stimson, Putnam

& Roberts .

40 Wall Street New York, New York 10005

.