ML19326B030

Proposed Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law.Applicant'S Technical & Design Info Incomplete & R & D Program Inadequate.Plant May Endanger Public Health & Safety. Proposed Form of ASLB Order & Certificate of Svc Encl

ML19326B030
Person / Time
Site:	Davis Besse
Issue date:	03/04/1971
From:	Baron R BRANNON, TICKTIN, BARON & MANCINI
To:
References
NUDOCS 8003060808
Download: ML19326B030 (13)

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 3 %?'Q*7 'bg g -

ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION \  !

In the M'atter of ) Docket No. 50-346 I

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THE TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY ) PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT and THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC )

i ILLUMINATING COMPANY ) AND -

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2 Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Plant) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

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) C0ALITION FOR SAFE NUCLEAR POWER I l 1

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE l I hereby certify that copies of Coclition's Proposed Findings and Conclusions in this proceeding were served upon the I

following by deposit in the United States Mail this day of March, 1971.

I Walter T. Shallerup, Jr., Esq. Mr. Stanley T. Robinson, Jr.

j Chairman Chief, Public Proceedings i Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Branch 4 1155 Crest Lane Office of the Secretary McLean, Virginia 22101 U. S. Atomic Energy Commission Washington, D. C. 20545 Dr. Walter H. Jordan

!P.O. Box Xl Oak Ridge National Laboratory Mr. Thomas F. Engelhardt

' Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37830 Office of the General Counsel j U. S. Atomic Energy Commission I

Dr. Charles E. Winters Washington, D. C. 20545 8800 Fernwood Road Bethesda, Maryland 20034 Mr. Glenn H. Lau I

Route 1, Box 126 Oak Harbor, Ohio 43449 i ,

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Beatrice K. Bleicher

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'*<Cou sel for The/ C alition for Safe l 1 14u ear Power l l 930 Keith Building Cleveland, Ohio 44115 I 216-781-3858 l  !

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?l I. Preface l

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1. The record of this hearing contains pages of dis- l g ,

cussion pertaining to requests and objections thereto of Inter-l 9 venors for continuances so as to better enable them to prepare s

[ their cases. Although continuances and extensions of time were ii j afforded by the Board, none were sufficient to allow Intervenors 4 sufficient time to review the entire PSAR and the exhibits, nor to obtain the assistance of qualified witnesses, nor to afford i I

fsuchwitnesseswhowereavailablesufficienttimewithinwhich '

to fam?.liarize themselves with the specifications and technical

': i data pertaining to the proposed plant.

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,, 2. Pursuant to Section 50.35 (a) of Title 10 CFR, the !j i li i Commission may issue a provisional construction permit to an ll I

y: Applicant if certain requirements set forth in said Subsection l 4

!, are met. It was to satisfy the Licensing Board that these re-I hquirementshavebeenmet by Applicant that the hearing was con- l h

t' ducted. Since the Intervenors had little funds and were not i

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I! granted sufficient time within which to take issue with the 0

application, nor to thoroughly cross-examine the Applicant's

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, witnesses, the responsibility placed upon.the Board to make a proper decision in light of all of the testimony and evidence, jisthatmuchgreater. l

3. Adding to the Board's responsbility in this hearing I

I i is the existence nationwide of a recently aroused and concerned f

f public consisting of adults, youngsters, ecologists, environmen-i i talists and humanists, voicing concern on a worldwide basis about I{pollutionofallforms. The burgeoning use of nuclear energy

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_ _7 J for electrical power production; the diminution of other sources l of fuel; the development of new uses of nuclear power; and the recent decision of the government to have a thorough re-examina-tion of radiation guidelines, all require careful analysis of the proposed plant and careful deliberation by this Board as to l

whether this plant will fit properly and safely into the society present day man hopes to enjoy in the decades ahead.

4. Despite limitations in funds, time, and skilled technical assistance, the Coalition for Safe Nuclear Power has endeavored to raise as many issues as possible upon which to urge  !

l this Board that the construction permit should not be issued.

They are posed hereinafter as Findings of Fact and have been  !

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gleaned from not only the Record of this Hearing but also from various exhibits and documents entered therein. It is hoped that the Board will thoroughly examine the entire record and to see to it that Applicant gives it the reasonable assurances required of it.

i II. Proposed Findings of Fact A. Too many aspects of the plant's safety have been left for future resolution, as shown throughout the many pages of the Safety Evaluation Report of the Division of Reactor Licensi ng dated November 2, 1970, and by the report of the Atomic Commissior for Reactor Safeguards dated August 20, 1970.

(a) Supporting analyses and data to assure that core can be operated safely at higher power level. page 2 (b) Environmental monitoring program to establish the type, number, frequency, l and methods of analyzing samples. page 10 lo (c) ACRS recommends establishment of formal l N

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procedure to assure prior notice of changes in use of Camp Perry, Erie Testing Grounds, and in training flights, and of planned ordinance activity on the sites. page 12 (d) Topical Report covering detailed design and analysis of nozzle supported reactor vessel, page 17 (e) Confirmatory vibration testing. page 17 (f) Sensitivities of the leak detection systems.

page 21 (g) Description of the seismic instrumentation and proposeu plans for its utilization. page 25 (h) Meant for the control of hydrogen concen-trations within the containment building.

(Applicants have acknowledged that there is a potential for hydrogen concentration in the containment vessel to reach flama-bility limits) page 34 (i) Protection of motor isolatien valves on ECCS. page 37 (j) Is ECCS capable of limiting core temperatures to acceptable levels? (A commitment to perform  !

is not enough upon which to issue license.) page 38 i l

(k) Diverse ECCS Initiation Signals: - l the high containment pressure signal should also initiate reactor trip. Applicants have agreed to provide...page 45 (1) Operating procedures and hydraulic and thermal analyses for one and two loop operation, page 46 (m) Common Mode Failure in ractor protection system. (Noted by ACRS also) page 53 (n) Technical specifications on the primary I and secondary system radioactivity con-centrations. page 63 1

(o) Radiological emergency plan. page 71 l (p) Core stability and power distribution monitoring. page 76 (q) Fuel Rod Clad failure.

Waiting for report on experiments dealing with brittle failure, page 77 5-en mN l- g

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(Still experimenting) page 77 (s) "further info still to come on the capability of the emergency core cooling system to function as designed.

page 79 (t) Once - Through Steam Generator "We are reviewing...further justification will be required before can accept...

Tests substantiate the design. page 79 (u) Control Rod Test Drive "Several areas... identified...

where more details...should be addressed." page 79 (v) Core Thermal and Hydraulic Design "Still reviewing program for heat transfer and fluid flow to assure...

sufficient safety margin...page 80 (w) B. S W. is reanalyzing the LOCA and ECCS capability, page 81 B. Little experience exists with the operation of large power reactors to ascertain how frequently out-of-core detectors should be recalibrated. More information is needed to show that sufficient information can be derived from external detectors.

Page 76 Safety Analysis Report.

C. Activities such as duck hunting, wildlife refuges, sport fishing will be affected by the installation. Safety Evaluation Report, Appendix F, page 105.

D. Loss of a significant number of acquatic organisms into the intake system will occur. Safety Analysis Report, App. F 1, page 117. Environmental Report, App. E. page 1418, App. J. page A32.

E. The engineered safety features and favorable site characteristics for distance of the plant are not good substitutes for the siting guidelines of 10 CFR 100.

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.. . A A F. Inadequate proof has been given to support the contention that the testing of munitions, the use of military aircraft for firing exercise, and the use of the adjacent sites i

by any entity, contractor or governmental agency for testing armaments, will be properly controlled. TR. 757-758; 1638-1643; 1909-1913, Appendix B, Safety Analysis Report, page 91, Staff ,

l Environmental Report, Appendix D, page A14.

l G. Possible failure of motor driven valves used to '

isolate core flooding tanks. Safety Analysis Report, page 37, 4th paragraph.

H. Unreliability of predictions of the thermal-hydraulic response of a reactor core during blowdown following a large cold-leg rupture using present analytical methods. Safety Analysis Report, page 38, 2nd paragraph.

I. A high containment pressure signal or another diverse signal is necessary to initiate reactor trip. Safety Analysis Report, page 45, Section 7.2.1.

J. There is insufficient design for the prevention of Common Mode Failure. Safety Analysis Report, page 53. Section 7.7.

K. The Borated water and primary water tanks are not protected against tornadoes and earthquakes. Safety Analysis Report, pages 55-58.

L. The Applicant has not obtained a certificate from the State of Ohio certifying that it has met the requirements and Standards of the Water Pollution Control Board of Ohio.

Staff Environmental Report, page 15.

M. The plume emanating from the Cooling Tower stack will create a hazard for shipping and aircraft navigation.

Staff Environmental. Report, App. C; page A2, App. F. page A20. '

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m n N. Estimates of the radioactive liquid waste concentratier.s are not adequately documented. Concentrations will be consider-ably higher and the Applicant has not presented new design infor-mation to support the lower estimated discharges. Environmental Report, Appendix D, oage A7, Appendix E, page A17.

O. The environmental impact statement fails to include annual volumes of radionuclide concentrations and the manner of their disposal. Also it fails to include a comprehensive examina-tion of total radiation buildup from all sources in the plant vicinity and discharge area. Environmental Report, Appendix E, i

page A16. '

P. Estimates not given of doses received by public from routine discharges of gaseous and liquid wastes so that proper evaluation of the environmental impact of the facility operation i

can be made, and to assist in the development of surveillance l programs. Environmental Report, Appendix C, page A2, Appendix D, page A 11.

Q. No procedure developed or described which abate and  ;

eliminate the problem of reconcentrations of radionuclides in the food chains. TR. 775-796, 799-803, 1227-1313, 1324-1328, 1336-1399, 1414-1457. l R. Emergency Plan fails to include specific guidance for the notification and evaluation of incidents involving the gunnery ranges in the restricted areas. Environmental Report Appendix D page A14.

S. A complete review of the scientific basis of its own guides has been started by the Federal Radiation Council which will take two years. Much is unknown as to what effect SST, 8-

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n cosmic rays , peacful. nuclear explosions , etc. , will have on radiation exposure guides. TR. 1797-1804.

T. The views of Sternglass are not considered to be wrong merely unproven by the data he has employed. TR. 1821-1853, 1870.

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. -o III. Conclusions of Law

1. Although many aspects of the Total Application for the Construction permit went unchallenged by the intervenors, the Applicant is still charged with the responsibility of satisfying the Board that all of the issues coming under Section 50.35 (a) have been answered in such fashion that it is clear that there will be no undue risk to the health and safety of the public.

2. Too many crucial aspects of the total implications of the proposed plant have been left for future resolution so as to make it impossible for the Board to conclude that it has been given reasonable assurance that the plant will not create undue risk to the health and safety of the public.

3. Assurances and commitments from Applicant to supply information and complete certain aspects of the total plan are insufficient assurances of the public health and safety in light of current attitudes among the public and the government.

4. The statement of Applicant that its present research I

and development programs "should lead to acccptable designs" (pgs. 29.32 Summary of Licenses) is insufficient reasonable assurance so as to protect health and safety of the public.

. 5. Substitution of engineered safeguards are experimental and untried and as such create inimical danger to the health and safety of the public.

6. The existence of all of the comments and objections from the various governmental bodies, as reflected by the Findings of Fact, makes it clear that to issue a construction permit at a

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the present time would create undue risk to th of the public. e health and safety BRANNON, TICKTIN, BARON & MANCINI

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,/Co nselPopdr Nu lear for fhe Coalition for Safe 930 Keith Building Cleveland, Ohio 44115 216-781-3858 i

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. a UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

, ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION In the Matter of ) Docket No. 50-346

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THE TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY )

J and THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ) PROPOSED FORM OF ORDER ILLUMINATING COMPANY )

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(Davis-Besse Nuclear Power )

Plant) )

Pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act and the Commission's l regulations, IT IS ORDERED that the Director 6qf Regulation is not i

authorized to issue a construction permit to the Toledo Edison j 3

i_ . Company and the Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company for the  !

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construction of the proposed Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station.

This decision is based upon the Board's finding that (1) Applicant has not shown that certain technical and design information necessary to complete the l safety analysis can reasonably be left for later consideration; (2) Applicant has not shown that it has a reasonably designed research and development program; (3) Applicant has failed to give reasonable assurance that the proposed facility can be construct'ed and operated at the proposed location without undue ,

1 risk to the health and safety of the public..

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED in accordance with Sections 2.760 and 2.762 of the Commissions Rules of Practice that this Initial Decision shall constitute the final decision of the Commission 30 days after the date of issuance subject to review thereof 9

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and further decision of the Commission upon its own motion or upon exceptions filed pursuant to the cited rules.

Chairman, Atomic Safety and Licensing Board s

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