ML19326A625
| ML19326A625 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Davis Besse, Perry  |
| Issue date: | 05/28/1976 |
| From: | Campanella V, Goldberg R, Hjelmfelt D CLEVELAND, OH, GOLDBERG, FIELDMAN & HJELMFELT |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8002250933 | |
| Download: ML19326A625 (19) | |
Text
.
. '. r UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board s\w%
In the Matter of )
The Toledo Edison Company and ) Docket Nos. 50-346A /
The Cleveland Electric Illuminating ) 50-500A Company ) 50-501A (Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station )
Units 1, 2 and 3) )
)
The Cleveland Electric Illuminating ) Docket Nos. 50-440A Company, et al. ) 50-441A (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, )
Units 1 and 2) )
ANSWER OF THE CITY OF CLEVELAND TO APPLICANTS' MOTION FOR AN ORDER DISMISSING ALL ALLEGATIONS
! On April 20, Applicants filed their motion for an ord$r dismissing all allegations made by the NRC Staff, Department of Justice and the City of Cleveland. The thrust of Applicants' argument is that there is insufficient evidence of conspiracy or joint action, that anything Applicants did is merely reasonable business conduct and in any event the opposing parties, i. e. ,
Staff, Department, and City, have failed to prove nexus. The City opposes Applicants' motion.
Although Applicants delayed filing their motion until the eve of resumption of hearings in a transparent effort to burden the opposing parties at a time when they must also prepare cross-examination of Applicants' 8002250 9 3) q
1 witnesses, a reading of Applicants' motion in light of the subsequent crosseaxamination indicates that Applicants, in the words of Miss Frances McGovern, " outsmarted" themselves. Certain statements made by Appli-cants in their motion can at best be described as disingenuous. For example, at page 34 of their motion Applicants argue that although Mr.
McCabe characterized Duquesne's response to Pitcairn's request to join CAPCO as a " turndown,"
Applicants do not believe there is any basis for such a characterization.
Fortunately for this Board which must rule on the motions, it is now clear how misleading Applicants' argument is, for Mr. Fleger, who authored Duquesne's response to Pitcairn, has testified (Tr. 8624):
Q. Mr. Fleger, your counsel made references to the January 2,1968 letter that you wrote to the solicitor of the Borough of Pitcairn.
Would you characterize that answer as a negative to -- pardon me, as a refusal to allow Pitcairn into CAPCO?
A. It was intended as such.
It cannot be argued that Applicants were surprised by Mr. Fleger's answer because Duquesne's own counsel, in referring to NRC-6, asked Mr. Fleger to explain the basis for that " negative response. " (Tr. 8623) i
, _ _ . . . . _ . _ ,, - . . . . , , .....-..w. , _ . .. - - . . _ _ _ -
we ,
It can only be concluded that the Board must examine Applicants' arguments.with great care. O Applicants' argument that the opposing parties have failed to prove a conspiracy or joint action is largely a rehash of the arguments made with respect to Applicants' rule 105 motion which the Board has already denied.
Nevertheless, the posture in which it is now agaiu presented requires the City to respond.
The evidence of conspiracy can only be characterized as overwhelming.
A starting point is the deposition of Mr. Lindseth (DJ-568, pp. 26-28). Mr.
Lindseth, who took part in all of the discussions considerlag the formation of the present CAPCO, testified (Tr. 27, lines 16-25; Tr. 26, lines 1-9):
Q. Was the possible inclusion of municipal systems discussed at any of these meetings ?
A. If you mean by the phrase of municipal systems bror. fly noncorporate type utilities, there was dis-cucsion of, I believe, a group of cooperatively owned systems at one or even possibly more than one of these meetings.
Q. Now what was the nature of these discussions ?
A. Whether the nature of the CAPCO arrangement was such that other than utility companies should be membe rs.
_1j Unfortunately time does not permit the City to make a thorough review of all of Applicants' arguments. The scheduling of witnesses has been constantly in a state of flux. The 10 day rule with regard to scheduling witnesses has been disregarded and the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> rule on designation of documents frequently has not been complied with, l
t l
t I
Q. And what was the conclusion ? .
i A. The conclusion was that that did not conform to the concept of CAPCO, and they were not invited as I recall to participate.
Q. If you recall, on what basis was that decision reached ?
A. Well, I do not remember the details of the dis-cussion or consideration, but CAPCO was an organ-ization of utility companies, and hence should be an organization of utility companies.
Applicants attempt to explain away Mr. Lindseth's testimog by saying that it only states that municipals were not " invited" to join CAPCO (Motion, p. 20) and that the cooperatives were excluded because they were already involved in the Buckeye agreement (Etion, p. 21). The defect in Applicants' argument is that Mr. Lindseth clearly said more than that.
Mr. Lindseth testified that the reason cooperatives and municipal systems were not invited to join was because CAPCO was to be an organization limited to investor owned utilities. Moreover, when specifically asked to state the reason for excluding ble cooperatives, Mr. Lindseth made no 1
mention of the cooperatives' participation in Buckeye but instead gave the reason that CAPCO was limited to investor owned utilities. When the wit-ness has specifically stated reasons for an action, there is no room for the fertile mind of counsel to offer other reasons.
Is there a reasonable business justification for limiting CAPCO to
. investor owned utilities ? _ Applicants' expert witness on power pooling did
- not think so ,(Tr. 9053, 9156).- Mr. Slemmer was aware of viable pools which included both investor owned and public power systems (Tr. 9108).
l i
Additional evidence of conspiracy and joint action is found in the adoption and method of use of the CAPCO allocation formula. The formula which was devised for the CAPCO pool was not adopted until after the parties had studied its effect on a small system modeled after the City of Cleveland (C-46). The results of that study demonstrated that for a municipal system 1
to join CAPCO, it would face an inordinately high reserve burden -- an economic disincentive to join the pool.
Once having adopted the P/N formula, the CAPCO members did not undertake to utilize that formula amongst themselves. Instead, the first CAPCO allocations were made arbitrarily (C-49, p.10). The purpose of the arbitrary approach was to reduce the impact of the formula on the companies (C-49, pp. 10-11). The first four units were not allocated on the basis of P/N because each company came into CAPCO with different amounts of capacity and different reserve levels. A period of time was needed for an equalization of the systems (Tr. 8602-8603). Although it was recognized that for the original CAPCO members to come into CAPCO a transition period was needed, it was also recognized that a formula should be adopted for the pool in dealings with municipal systems such as the City of Cleveland so that the companies could insist on applying a formula, i. e. ,
not permit a transition period (C-48, p. 7).
The formula devised, P/N, was adopted for use by CAPCO after a transition period with full knowledge of the burden it would place on small systems. Even when adopted the formula utilized the pro rata method of
,- e . , ,,,.--w.g., -y - w, , - , , , - , , , , ,
.m representing units, which permitted a company with large units to carry less reserves than it would without a pro rata approach (Tr. 8590-8592).
In 1972, Duquesne Light Company circulated its Proposal #2 recommending a change in the method of representing units in the P/N calculations (C-57).
Among the reasons assigned for changing the method of representing units was that use of the pro rata method would be too favorable to new members joining CAPCO (C-57, p. 5). In July 1973, after the City had written to CEI requesting membership in CAPCO and after the other CAPCO members had been notified of enat request, CAPCO adopted a modified form of Premise #2 which removed the benefits to new members of pro rata calculations (DJ-372).
Again a transition period was allowed before discarding the pro rata method j of representing units (Tr. 8612). By the time pro rata was discarded, it was expected that the results for the existing members under Premise #2 would nearly match pro rata (Tr. 8612, lines 10-13).
Thus, pro rata was to be discarded since it was more favorable to new members and the investment method applied under circumstances in which it was expected that for the existing CAPCO members the results 1 1
I would be about the same.
l Applicants attempt to justify the P/N formulation on the basis that it results in fundamental equity. Witness Firestone, who was presented as an expert on P/N, admitted that fundamental equity was whatever the parties agreed it was at the time (Tr. 9429-9430). Thus, the results of l
the P/N formula may vary depending upon how the units are represented l 1
l
)
(Tr. 9428-9429). Nevertheless, the results will produce fundamental equity if the parties agree that they do (Tr. 9429-9430). Accordingly, if the parties agree that equal percent of peak load produces fundamental equity, that method, like the P/N method, produces fundamental equity.
Obviously, the so-called fundamental equity theory provides no justification for the P/N method.
f It should also be noted that Mr. Firestone admitted that, as the CAPCO members jointly install more units, the P/N method as applied to j l
them will begin to yield results similar to equal percent of peak load (Tr. 9282-9283). I Despite their unwillingness to apply P/N to themselves unless it is l modified for a transition period or will, as among themselves, approach equal percent of peak load reserves, Applicants insist that it be rigidly applied to new members. Applicants are well aware that its rigid applica-tion is a disincentive to pool membership -- it was such a disincentive that they were unwilling to apply it to themselves.
Further evidence of Applicants' conspiracy or joint action to exclude small systems from the benefits of coordinated operation and development is found in minutes of the meetings leading to the formation of CAFCO. For example, on August 20, 1967, the CAPCO Chief Executives engaged in lengthy discussion regarding possible municipal intervention before the FPC to seek to join the pool (C-49, p. 7). On that occasion Mr. Besse of CEI noted that "his company was on notice that the City of
- 6 t
Cleveland will ask us for an interconnection. " At that same meeting, Mr. Mansfield of Ohio Edison and Penn Power stated that the municipalities of Hiram, Oberlin and Cleveland might file objections to the CAPCO arrange-ment before the FPC and try to get into the pool (C-50, p. 4).
Applicants attempt to dismiss C-49, first, as being evidence only against Duquesne, although the Board has ruled otherwise, 2/ and, second, that the concern was not that municipals should join but that they might delay FPC action approving the pool. Once again, Applicants' attempt to 1
explain away the facts fails. Duquesne wanted the pool agreement signed or not signed prior to October 25, 1967, the last date upon which it could cancel the 800 mW nuclear unit it had ordered (see attachment to C-50).
Duquesne did not insist upon FPC approval prior to October 25. In fact, the CAPCO companies did not even arrange to meet with the FPC until November 1,1967 (C-52), after the critical date. Moreover, were it not for a desire to exclude municipal systems, intervention of those systems before the FPC would create no problem. ;
Furthermore, if it were not the intent of Applicants to exclude municipal systems from membership in CAPCO, why was it necessary for
~
I the Chief Executives of CAPCO to meet on October 22, 1975, to formulate a joint explanation as to why public power bodies were excluded (C-52)? It l would have been simple enough for Applicants to have said that time did not l
permit inviting others to join in the original pool negotiations (although such 2_/ In any event, C-50, Mr. Firestone's notes of the same meeting, provide,
' even under Applicants' theory, evidence against Ohio Edison and Penn Power.
(.
9 a statement would be contrary to Mr. Lindseth's statement of the reason for their exclusion) and that public power bodies were welcome to join at a later date. Instead Applicants agreed to advance rationale which looked 4
towards future as well as present exclusion of municipal systems.
Applicants ignore the clear inferences to be drawn from C-55 in )
l which Mr. Greenslade urges that the CAPCO members make efforts to avoid having CAPCO become an " entity."
Mr. Greenslade suggested (C-55, p. 3): 1 l
Increasing attempts are being made by municipalities to become " pool" members and to participate in joint units. The FPC is seemingly sympathetic with these efforts, but its legal powers in the area are limited.
Adoption of the " entity" concept by the municipalities in a Section 202(b) proceeding could be the answer for
~
the Commission. l If further evidence of Applicants' intent to deny municipal systems the benefits of coordinated operations and development were needed, one need'look only at Applicants' conduct as compared to their purported reason for excluding public power bodies. (It has been shown, supra, that no legitimate business reason exists to exclude public power bodies simply because they are public power. ) Applicants agreed to tell the FPC that the exclusion of public power bodies was premised on the idea chat such groups could more appropriately participate through purchases of capacity and energy from Applicants (C-52).
In addition to the prior showing that that rationale is a sham, it should be noted that at that very time, Duquesne was refusing to sell power at wholesale to Pitcairn and.did not intend to make such sales in the future l l
_ _ _ _ _ _i
(NRC-13, dated January 23, 1968). Indeed, Duquesne has argued in this very proceeding that such sales would not only have been unlawful but $1d have been criminal violations of Pennsylvania law. 3/-
Duquesne refused to make such sales until it recognized that it would probably be ordered to do so by the FPC.
At the same time that CEI was telling the FPC that municipals should participate through purchases from Applicants, it was refusing even to interconnect with the Cities of Cleveland and Painesville without price fixing (C-99, C-111, C-128, C-132, Tr. 2569, 3152-3153).
Toledo Edison also refused to sell wholesale power to a municipal system which it hoped to acquire (DJ- 504, 506).
If, indeed, Applicants had valid business reasons for excluding municipal systems, why did they only put forth transparently false reasons ?
Applicants' conduct in refusing to admit Pitcairn and Cleveland to CAPCO further evidences their intent to exclude municipal systems from the benefits of coordinated operations. The City has shown above that, despite Applicants' claims to the contrary, Mr. Fleger refused to permit
' Pitcairn to join CAPCO. Nor can there be any doubt that the City was denied membership. Mr. Hauser's notes of a meeting with the City on Decembe r 13, 1973, following the December 7,1973, special meeting of the CAPCO Executives to discuss the City's request for CAPCO member-ship, show that Mr. Goldberg, one of the attorneys for the City, "was 3 / See Duquesne's Motion to Dismiss, filed April 20, 1976, at p. 17.
-I
4 .
advised that membership in CAPCO was definitely out" (DJ-291). The response given to the City at tb u Oscember 13, 1973, meeting was, accord-ing to Mr. Rudolph, Chief Executive Officer of CEI, a position formulated by CAPCO (DJ-558, p. 245).
Applicants attempt to excuse their refusal to permit Cleveland to join CAPCO on grounds of reasonable business ju4 ment. Mr. Slemmer, Applicants' expert witness on pooling, testified that he could not imagine Applicants turning down a request for pool membership without first study-ing the matter (Tr. 9122). Nonetheless, Duquesne said "no" to Cleveland's request for membership without making a study. Nor did Ohio Edison make any engineering economic study before responding to the City's request (testimony of John White).
The response to Pitcairn's request was based, at least in part, upon totally false rationale. Pitcairn was informed by Duquesne that it would have to interconnect at 345 KV. Pitcairn's system was too small to justify interconnection on that basis. At the same time that Pitcairn was being told that it could not join CAPCO.because it lacked interconnections at 345 KV, Duquesne itself had no 345 KV. In fact, it was not until two years later that Duquesne had its first 345 KV line (Tr. 8785-8786).
There is no engineering reason for requiring Pitcairn to interconnect
. at 345 KV (Tr. 8787) and there is nothing in any CAPCO agreements which would require interconnection at 345 KV (Tr. 8793, 8794, 8796). A further indication of the unreality of the 345 KV justification for refusing to permit
Pitcairn to join CAPCO is found in Mr. Dempler's testimony. Mr. Dempler testified that even today, Duquesne has no 345 KV step-up transformers (Tr. 8850). From its own generators located on Duquesne's system, Duquesne is not able to put any power into the CAPCO 345 KV network (Tr.
8851). With regard to these units Duquesne does not even plan tu install 345 KV step-up transformers (Tr. 8853). Although Duquesne cannot put power from those units into the CAPCO transmission grid, Duquesne does get credit for those units in CAPCO (Tr. 8856). If Duquesne had valid business reasons for denying CAPCO membership to Pitcairn, why did it give such a clearly unsupportable reason?
Another reason given for denying Pitcairn membership was that Pitcairn's generating units were too small. Pitcairn, it was said, could contribute no useful benefit t.o CAPCO because as a practical matter its contribution would not be measurable (Tr. 8805). To have any affect on the plans or commitment of the CAPCO members with respect to reserve capacity, a unit would have to be around 10 mW in size (Tr. 8857).
Apparently different rules apply to CAPCO members because Ohio Edison gets credited for contributing a 2-1/2 mW unit (Tr. 8856) and Duquesne gets credit for a 5 mW unit which is only available in the winter (Tr. 8782-8783).
There is much evidence in the record to show that the CAPCO com-panies formulated a joint position regarding their response to Pitcairn just as they did in responding to Cleveland. Pitcairn's request to jain CAPCO i
I
- - . . . . ~ __ _ _ . . u _ . - - _
l was discussed at meetings of both the CAPCO drafting representatives on Decembe r 11, 1967, and the CAPCO Engineering and Operating Task Force meeting on December 15,1967 (C-34). Toledo Edison and CEI circulated j to Duquesne drafts of their responses to Pitcairn (DJ-237). Although Mr.
White testified that he did nr t know the position taken by the other CAPCO e
members prior to formulation of his response (which was formulated just prior to sending it to Pitcairn), he obviously forgot that CEI had mailed to Mr. Mansfield many days previous 1/ a copy of its response to Pitcairn (DJ-218) as did Toledo Edison (DJ-232) and Duquesne (NRC-53, NRC-54, NRC-55). Moreover, when Mr. McCabe requested a meeting with each of the companies to discuss Pitcairn's request to join CAPCO, the CAPCO members formulated a joint position (NRC-12). The CAPCO company respon.ses to Mr. McCabe's follow-up letter are so similar in format as to demonstrate that a joint position was taken (NRC-12, DJ-221, DJ-228, DJ-234). Mr. McCabe then wrote to each CAPCO company requesting a ,
j l
copy of the CAPCO agreement. Again each company responded in the same i fashion (DJ-217, DJ-223, DJ-230, DJ-235). Although Applicants have offered some testimonial evidence to show that each company acted indepen-1 dently, they have not undertaken to rebut or explain the massive documentary evidence to the contrary even when the documents contradicted the offered testimony. As a result, the Board is faced with the task of weighing the credibility of Applicants' witnesses.
l l
l
..__ _ _ _ . _ , _ ,__ _ _ , . -_ __ . ..__ ,._,4
Applicants in' their motion (p. 32) argue that there is no basis for concluding that there was any concerted action with respect to Ohio Edison's negotiations with WCOE or CEI's negotiations with the Cities of Painesville l l
and Cleveland. If it were true that those negotiations which concern pro- l grams for joint ownership of generating facilities were totally independent I without consultation with other CAPCO members, then it is clear that those negotiations were not conducted in good faith. Under the CAPCO arrangement a member could not engage in joint ownership of generating i
units without approval of other CAPCO members (Tr. 8557).
The evidence now shows, contrary to the assertions in Applicants' motion, that Applicants other than Ohio Edison were advised of Ohio Edison's ,
negotiations with WC-OE (see testimony of Mr. White, May 14, 1976).
Similarly, the record discloses t'.at CEI's offers of access to the Cities of Cleveland and Painesville were conducted with knowledge of the other Applicants (C-62, C-64, C-65, C-66). Indeed, C-65 shows that the negotiations were conducted not merely with full knowledge of the other Applicants but also in accordance with a course of action authorized by the CAPCO Chief Executives on December 7,1973. Not only did the other '
Applicants know of and authorize the negotiations, but they actually had an input in the terms of the negotiations (C-66).
CEI argues at page 38 of its motion that there is no evidence that any company other than Duquesne notified CEI of the position it would assert with regard to Cleveland's request for CAPCO membership. Obviously, Applicants overlooked C-61, written by Mr. Mansfield, which states:
9
-s Following the meeting of the CAPCO Executive Com-mittee on December 7,1973, I informed Mr. Rudolph that Ohio Edison and Penn Power were opposed to granting the request of the Cleveland Municipal Elec-tric Light Plant (MELP) as stated in its letter dated August 3,1973 to Mr. Rudolph from Mr. Whiting. .
Mr. White corroborated C-61 during his testimony in these proceedings.
(See also DJ-558, p. 245. )
At page 40 of their motion Applicants make the following statement:
Following the December 13, 1973 meeting, CEI and the City have been continually negotiating the City's request (DJ Exhibits 189-92, 315; Applicants' Exhi-bits 63-86, 94-98). Not once during this time has there been any indication that CEI is acting in concert i with anybody.
It is simply not true that Cleveland and CEI have been negotiating with regard to the City's request to join CAPCO. While negotiations have been conducted, they have not dealt with admission to CAPCO. Nor is it true
. that there is no evidence of concerted action (C-62, C-64, C-65, C-66).
l l
It is unnecessary to deal with each and every argument put forth by l
1 Applicants in their motion to demcastrate that evidence of a conspiracy to 1 deny to municipalities access to benefits of coordinated operations and development is overwhelming.
It would serve no purpose to respond once more to Applicants' argument that nexus cannot be determined on the basis of " bundling" various acts together. This Board has repeatedly ruled that the nexus requirement applies to the situation inconsistent with the antitrust laws rather than to any individual act. l i
\
. , < , , ~ . . ~ , _ . ~m .- ~...-- ,
.m Small utilities in the CCCT cannot participate in nuclear power plants without access to coordinated operations and development. Applicants have conspired to deny to small utilities access to the necessary coordinated operations and development. Applicants' actions are inconsistent with the antitrust laws. Licensing these units without attaching conditions eliminating the situation inconsistent with the antitrust laws will maintain the present situation inconsistent with the antitrust laws. Nexus cannot be in doubt.
WHEREFORE, the City of Cleveland prays that Applicants' motion to dismiss be denied.
Respectfully submitted, MMC Reuben Goldberg David C. Hjelmfelt Goldberg, Fieldman 8e Hjelmfelt 1700 Pennsylvania Avenue, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20006 Telephone (202) 659-2333 Vincent C. Campanella Director of Law Robert D. Hart First Assistant Director of Law City of Cleveland ,
213 City Hall Cleveland, Ohio 44114 Telephone (216) 694-2737 Attorneys for City of Cleveland May 28,1976 l
l
.m CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that service of the foregoing Answer of the City of Cleveland to Applicants' Motion for an Order Dismissing All Allegations has been made on the following parties listed on the attachment hereto this 28th day of May,1976, by depositing copies thereof in the United States mail, first class postage prepaid, or by hand delivery.
+%JcMAdf David C. Hjelmfgn [
Attachment S
l l
l
~ - . , - - - _ . . _ , , . . - - . . . . . _ . - - . . . _ . - __ _,
_ .m ~
ATTACHMENT Douglas V. Rigler, Esq. , Chairman Ivan W. Smith, Esq.
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board John M. Frysiak, Esq.
Foley, Lardner, Hollabaugh and Jacobs Atomic Safety and Licensing Board 815 Connecticut Avenue, N. W. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20006 Washington, D. C. 20555 Alan S. Rosenthal, Chairman Elizabeth S. Bowers, Chairman Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeals Board Edward Luton U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Thomas W. Reilly Washington, D. C. 20555 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Richard S. Salzman Washington, D. C. 20555 Jerome E. Shariman Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeals Board Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Board Panel Washington, D. C. 20555 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 Howard K. Shapar, Esq.
Executive Legal Director Joseph Rutberg, Esq.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Jack R. Goldberg,. Esq.
Washington, D. C. 20555 Office of the Executive Legal Director U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mr. Frank W. Karas, Chief Was,hington, D. C. 20555 Public Proceedings Branch Office of the Secretary Benjamin H. Vogler, Esq.
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Robert J. Verdisco, Esq.
Washington, D. C. - 20 555 Roy P. Lessy, Jr. , Esq.
Office of the General Counsel Abraham Braitman, Esq. Regulation Office of Antitrust and Indemnity U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 Washington, D. C. 20555 Melvin G. Berger, Esq.
Frank R. C1okey, Esq. Joseph J. Saunders, Esq.
Special Assistant Attorney General Steven M. Charno, Esq.
Towne House Apartments, Room 219 David A. Leckie, Esq.
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17105 Janet R. Urban, Esq.
Antitrust Division Edward A. Matto, Esq. Department of Justice Assistant Attorney General Post Office Box 7513 Chief, Antitrust Section Washington, D. C. 20044 30 East Broad Street, 15th floor Columbus, Ohio 43215
, Karen H. Adkins, Esq.
Christopher R. Schraff, Esq. Richard M. Firestone, Esq.
Assistant Attorney General Assistant Attorneys General Environmental Law Section Antitrust Section 361 East Broad Street, 8th floor 30 East Broad Street, 15th floor Columbus, Ohio 43215 Columbus, Ohio 43215
s c., .. .m .
.Page 2 ATTACHMENT (Continued) l Russell J. Spetrino, Esq. Leslie Henry, Esq.
Thomas A. Kayuha, Esq. Michael M. Briley, Esq. j Ohio Edison Company Roger P. Klee, Esq. l 47 North Main Street Fuller, Henry, Hodge & Snyder 1 Akron, Ohio 44308 Post Office Box 2088 l Toledo, Ohio 43604 John Lanadale, Jr. , Esq.
Cox, . Langford & Brown James R. Edgerly, Esq.
Secretary and General Counsel !
21 Dupont Circle, N. W. .
. Washington, D. C. 20036 Pennsylvania Power Company One East Washington Street Richard A. Miller, Esq. _
New Castle, Pennsylvania 16103 Vice President and General Counsel The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. Donald H. H.wser, Esq.
Post Office Box 5000 Victor A. Greenslade, Jr. , Esq.
Cleveland, Ohio' 44101 The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co.
Post Office Box 5000 Gerald Charnoff, Esq. Cleveland, Ohio 44101 Wm. Bradford Reynolds, Esq.
Robert E. Zahler, Esq. Thomas J.. Munsch, Jr. , Esq. ,
, Jay H. Bernstein, Esq.- General Attorney Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge Duquesne Light Company 1800 M Street, N. W. 435 Sixth Avenue I Washington, D. C. 20036 Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15219
! David McNeill Olds, Esq. Joseph A. Rieser, Esq.
William S. Lerach, Esq. Reed, Smith, Shaw & McClay Reed, Smith, Shaw & McClay 1155 Fifteenth Street, . N. W. l Post Office Box 2009 Washington, D. C. 20005 Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15230 John C. Engle, President Terrence H. Benbow, Esq. AMP-O, Inc.
i Steven B. Peri, Esq. 20 High Street Winthrop, Stimson, Putnam & Roberts Hamilton, Ohio 45012 40 Wall Street New York, New York 10005 Michael R. Gallagher, Esq.
630 Bulkley Building Alan P. Buchmann, Esq. 1501 Euclid 1 Squire, Sanders & Dempsey Cleveland, Ohio 44115 1800 Union Commerce Building
~ * <
Cleveland, Ohio 44115 Docketing and Service Section l Office of the Secretary
. Atomic Safety and Licensing. Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission _)
, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555
-Washington, D. C. 20555 !
. \
_ _ _ __ _