ML19325F159
| ML19325F159 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 05/21/1986 |
| From: | Carlson D, Withee C NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS) |
| To: | Hyder J LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL LABORATORY |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19325C113 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-88-451 NUDOCS 8911140318 | |
| Download: ML19325F159 (15) | |
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I DCarson Mr. James E. Pyder DKasun Hail Stop K557 i
Los Alanos National Laboratory les Alamos. New Mexico 87545 t
Dear Jin:
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Per Bill 'ierwekh's request of March 18. 1986, we destroyed toe preliminary report for thn Honpower Reactor Sabotage Study.
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Q-6-85-CI-1000 49-1-1-RD, dated October 9,1985, classificatior de: ret.
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j transferredonLANLreceiptnumberA-018400) was shredded on lay 12. 1986 Sincerely, l
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Carl J. Withee Safeguards Reactor and Transportation l
Licensing Branch i
Division of Safeguards MSS
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Donald M. Carlson Safeguards Reactor and Transportation i
Licensing Branch Division of Safeguards. MS$
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$TATEMENT OF WORK CON $t00tNCES OF SAB0TAGE AT NONPOWER REACTORS f
f FIN N0: A7153 ItAR N0: 50-19-02 00 i
1.0 Ba ckg round l
in 1979 Los Alamos $cientific Laboratory conducted a stuoy on the con.
Sequences of sabotage at nonpower reactors. It was concluded that, within the constraints of this study, only one nonpower reactor had any potential for the celease of significant amounts of fission product materials in the event of sabotage. Because of terrorist activities in other parts of the world, concerns by the ACRS about manipulation of re. actor control systems, and concerns by a public interest group ebout the effects of incendiary devices on reactor componer.ts, staff believes that it would be prudent to supplement this study with further technical infomstion to l
assure that the margin of safety provided to the public is maintained.
2.0 Work Required i
Los Alamos National Laboratory shall determine and evaluate the risks and potential consequences of both a loss of coolant incident and the direct fuel damage which would be produced b (4) blast effects from various quantities and types of explosives, (y:b) the production of heat from incendiary devices, and (c) the unauthorized manipulation of reactor controls and fuels at nonpower (NPRs) operating at 20 MW,10 MW, 5 MW and l
2 MW; and, for (4) and (b), at NPR$ operating below 2 MW, Specifically designed mathematical models or other appropriate methods shall bt used to i
determine the potential consequences of the events associated witt (a),
(b), and (c) above. Assessments shall include the consequences associated with core meltdown, partial core meltdown, and disintegration and/or crushing of the core and shall be compared against 10 CFR Parts 20 anet i
100 standards. Where applicable, the extent of fission product release shall be based upon NRC's re evaluation of source tem assumptions and fi ndings.
Facilities shall be grouped by contnon design feature and analysis of a representative from each group shall be performed in the sequence of descending power.
7 Licensee Docket No. Power Level Reactor Type
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National Bureau of Standards 50-184 20 MW Tank University of Missoari 50-186 10 MW Tant Georgia Institute of Technology 50-160 5 MW Tank Massachusetts Institute of Technology 50-20 5 MW Ta nk Union Carbide 50-54 5 MW Pool Rhode Island Atomic Energy Conenission 50-193 2 MW Pool State University of New York 50-57 2 MW Pool University of Michigan 50-2 2 MW Pool University of Virginia 50-62 2 MW Pool 5
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I Los Altaes Nati nel Laboratory shall perform the following tasks:
2.1 Task No. 1 A review of existing infomation in available sources such as the NRC docket files augmented by site-specific infcrmation provided by NRC staff and on site inspection visits shall be conducted to:
(a) familiarize task pertonnel with characteristics peculiar to each reactor, and (b) obtain i
infomation necessary to aid in the calculation of the radiological consequences for each of the NPRs listed above, as appropriate.
2.2 Task No. 2 Mathematical models and/or other appropriate methods, such as a master-logic diagram fault-tree approach similar to those used in other safety studies by LANL, shall be developed and/or used to:
l a.
calculate the radiological release resulting from a total core melt-down, partial core meltdown core, disintegration and/or crushing, or other means which could severely damage the fuel in the reactor core.
Since the key consideration is the fission product release associated with such incidents, the effects of using low enriched uranium versus high enriched uranium on the fission product release shall be evaluated, b.
detemine, as a function of distance from the reactor, the total l
radiation dose (rem) to the whole body and the radiation dose (rem) to i
the thyroid from iodine exposure, and identify any facility which could i
exceed 10 CFR Parts 20 and 100 standards', and c.
Determine the characteristics of the event that would limit it to less than Parts 20 and 100 standards.
Certain other parameters and assumptions should be considered when per-feming this task. These include, and are limited to the following except as may be approved by the NMSS Project Manager (PM) in the future:
a.
The models or methods used to calculate the damage and the releases shall assume that the reactor has been operating at the maximum power level authorized by NRC license and that equilibrium of fission prodycts was attained prior to the incident. Note:
If significant damage to the core or subsequent release is calculated to occur after a period of reactor shutdown, this shall also be evaluated, i
b.
In those cases in which the fission product inventory of the NPR is deternir)ed to be insufficient to create a risk to the public health and safety, or those in which the fuel configuration or composition, and/or the reactor construction or other factors is such as to limit the fuel damage and fission product release to a level that is insuf.
ficient to create a risk to the public health and safety, the study for that facility shall be terminated, and the basis for the conclusion documented.
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c.
No assumptions are made regarding the saboteurs' capacilities nor is there any design basis threat associated with this task, d.
For baseline considerations, it should be assumed that all reactor safety features fail upon initiation of the incident, and e.
The mean meteorological conditions at the site and the surrounding area should be considered when calculating the atmospheric dispersion of a release.
2.3 Task No. 3 Af ter Tasks No.1 and 2 have been accomplished, mathematical models or other appropriate methods shall be developed to calculate the amount of explosives and the amount of incendiary material needed to cause the maximum etwf the limittet eventidescribed in Task No. 2 above. Calcula.
tions shall be made for the placement of explosives and incendiary devices attached to reactor components and outside the structure containing the rea ctor.
Certain parameters and assumptions should be considered in those calcula-tions. These include, and are limited to the following except as may be approved by the NMSS PM in the future:
a.
The type of explosives and incendiary devices used to cause an event are assumed to be easily obtainable, b.
Two opposing conditions shall be considered in.perfoming Task 3:
1.
The adversary shall have access to all reactor components in carrying out the sabotage event.
- 11. Safeguards credit shall be given for all physical barriers interposed between the explosives / incendiaries and the reactor fuel, and 2.4 Task No. 4 Upon completion of Task No. 3, for those cases in which the fission product release and estimated doses exceed 10 CFR Parts 20 and 100 'stan-dards, calculate the amount of explosives and the amount of incendiary material needed to cause the release. The calculations shall be made for placement of explosives and incendiary devices attached to reactor compo.
nents and outside the structure containing the reactor.
The parameters and assumptions employed in Task No. 3 shall be utilized in this task.
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n 2.5 Task No. 5 Upon completion of Task No. 3, a review and evaluation of reactor control systems and fuels shall be made to determine whether an unauthorized manipulation of such controls could cause any detrimental effects that may
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be identified in Task No. 2.
Only credible scenarios and analytical assumptions shall be used and shall be reviewed and approved by the NMS$ PM before the analyses are made.
2.6 Task No. 6 Upon completion of Task No. 3 calculate the mitigating effe' cts of full and partial operation of existing safety features associated with the operation of the reactor (these features are ignored under Task 3 to i
determine maximum consequences).
Identify additional safety measures and modifications as well as administrative procedures and practices which could l
be adopted and determine the degree to which these additional considera.
i tions would mitigate the consequences. Exclude specific safeguards measures from consideration in this task.
3.0 Reparting Requirements
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3.1 Monthly Letter Status Report l
i' A monthly report shall be given which sumarizes the progress of the tasks being perforwed including:
o The work performed during the previous month.
I o Personnel time expenditures during the previous month.
o Problems encountered and the proposed solutions.
l o Activities planned for the ensuing two months.
o Costs generated against the work effort during the previous month
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(including direct salaries, materials and servicec, ADP support, subcontracts, travel, general or other related items).
o Current obligation status information i
The first monthly report shall provide the initial projections or indicate
- no change in the cost and uncosted obligation projection." The report shall be due by the 15th of each month with distribution as follows:
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Donald M. Carlson, SG, NMSS. one copy Office of the Director, NMSS ( ATTN: Program Support). one copy i
3.2 Interim Reports A draft interim report shall be furnished to the NMSS PM upon completion of each major task (i.e., Tasks Nos. 2, 3, 4 and 5). After review by appropriate l
NRC personnel, the PM will provide comments on the draft report to LANL within sixty (60) days of receipt of each report. A revised interim report shall be submitted if deemed necessary by the NMSS PM.
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i 3.3 Final Repor'ts LANL shall furnish two copies of draft final reports to the NMSS PM by June 30, 1966. The format of these documents shall be as specified for femal technical reports in NRC Manual Chapter 1102 and will provide:
a.
The on-site and off-site fission product release and dosage calcula-tions associated with a total loss of coolant, b.
The quantities of explosives and incendiary material or description of acts necessary to cause a limiting case incident, c.
The placement of erplosives and incendiary materials in relation to the reactor, d.
The description of unauthorized manipulation of reactor controls and fuel to cause a limiting case incident, e.
The resulting consequences, and f.
Appropriate alternative measures which can be implemented to mitigate a significant event (e.g., reactor facility modifications.
administrative proceduras, etc.).
After review by appropriate NRC personnel the PM will provide coments on the draft reports to LANL within 60 days of receipt of each report.
The perfoming organization shall revise the draft reports based on the PM's coments and submit the camera-ready copy of each final report to the Document Management Branch, Technical Infomation and Document Control, NRC to be published as NUREG/CR series reports, and a duplicate to the NMS$ PM.
All draft reports, as well as final reports, shall be screened for Clas-sified Infomation and appropriately marked in accordance with "NRC l
Classification Guide for Infomation Dealing with the Release and Dis-persion of Radioactive Material (NRC-RDRM-1)," dated Septenber 1982 and NPC Manual Chapter 1102.
3.4 Program Plan Within one month after initiation of task orders, LANL shall provide a detailed work plan which identifies study milestones and their projected date of accomplis'iment. Upon NRC review and approval of this plan, it will then become the operating schedule for the overall task.
4.0 Meetings LANL representative (s) shall meet with the MSS Project Manager two to four times a year. Upon completion of the draft final report LANL representa-tives, upon request of the NMSS PM, shall brief WS$ staff in Washington, DC.
All travel requires approval of the NMSS Project Manager.
5.0 NRC Furnished Material None, except information in available sources such as NRC docket files.
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4 6-6.0 Level of E'f fort it is expected that approximately three and one half staff years of tech-nical support will be required to satisfy the provisions of the Statement of Work.
7.0 Period of Performance Perfornance for the overall task shall consnence on the effective date of this agreement and continue throu)h September 30, 1986.,
8.0 Quality Assur_ance For all draft and final technical reports delivered under this agreement, the LANL shall assure that an independent review and verification of all numerical computations and mathematical equations and deviations are performed by qualified contractor personnel other than the original author (s) of the reports. If the LANL proposes to verify / check less than 100 percent of all computations and mathematical equations and derivations in the report (s), (such as might be the case when there are a large number of routine, repetitive calculations), the LANL must first obtain written approval from the WS$ PM.
Computer-generated calculations will not require verification where the computer program has already been verified, in addition, for all reports, including those which do not contain numeri-cal analyses, a management review shall be conducted prior to submission to the NRC.
9.0 Technical Direction Mr. Donald M. Carlson (FTS 427-4712) is designated the NMS$ Project Manager for the purpose of assuring that the services required under this Statement of Work are delivered in accordance herewith. All technical instructions i
to the performing organization shall be issued through the NMS$ PM. As used herein, technical instructions are those which provide details, suggest possible lines of inquiry, or otherwise complete the general scope of work set forth herein. Technical instructions shall not constitute new assignments or work or changes of such nature as to justify an adjustment i
in cost or petod of performance. Directions for changes in cost or period i
of performance will be provided after receipt of an appropriate Standard Order for Work ($0W) (NRC Form 173) from the Director of the Office of t
Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards (NMSS).
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10.0 Disposal of Property
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Prior to close out of this project, a reconciled report shall be developed by DOE to record available equipment and material purchased with NRC (Jnds. This report should be developed as soon as 09:$1ble after project completion or termination decision has been made, 'out :sor later than 60 days after the termination date. The report should be se;eitted to the NRC n; vision of Facilities and Operations Support, AC ' and the IN$$
Projte: Manager.
11.0 00r Acquired Material Th. performing organization must notify the NMSS Project Manager prior to acquisition of any capital, ADP, or word processing equiptent.
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PROJECT DESCRIPTIVE
SUMMARY
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.0FFICE:
& :CT TITLE:
" Consequences of Sabotage at Nonpower Reactors" 9IN NO.:
A 7153-4 L
TYPE OF CONTRACT:
DOE 1
CONTRACTOR:
LANL FY BUDGET ($K):1 FY83 FYBA,,
FY85 FY86 FY87 PRIOR:
0
'163'
,Y OPERATING:_
180 FOLLOW-ON:
100 0
SCOPE OF WORK:
LANL will determine and evaluate the onsite and offsite con-sequences of both a total loss of coolant incident and direct fuel damage which would be produced by blast effects from explosives, the production of thermal heat from incendiary devices and the unauthorized manipulation of reactor centrols and fuels at nonpower reactors (NPRs) operating at 20 MWc 10 MW., 5 MW, and 2 MW.
On a generic basis the contractor will determine and evaluate blast effects frc.n explosives and thermal heat from incendiary devices, at NPRs operating below 2 MW.
Since a key consideration is the fission product release associated with such incidents, the effects of using low enriched uranium (nominally 20%) versus high enriched uranium (90-93%)
shall be evaluated.
Specifically designed mathematical models or other appropriate methods shall be used to determine the quantities of explosives and incendiary material necessary to cause limiting case' incidents and the resulting consequences.
Assessment of the limiting case incic'ents shall include the consequences associated with core meltdown, partial core melt-down, and disintegration of the core.
USER NEED:
Terrorist activities in other parts of the world indicate that it would be prudent to supplement available information on the consequences of sabotage at nonpower reactors to assure that the margin of safety provided to the public is maintained.
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i PRODUCTS:
1 A report will be provided for NPRs detailing therediological t
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releases and total radiation dose to the whole body and the thyroid resulting from explosives, incendiaries and igroper t
manipulation of controls and fuel.
The reports will also identify the quantities of explosives and incendiary material necessary to cause the maximum and limiting case incidents and resulting consequences.
CONTINUATION None OF PROJECTS:
JUSTIFICATION 10R SOURCE LANL was selected for this project on the basis of the extensive' SELICTED AND experience that laboratory personnel have with NPRs and their associated characteristics.
i determining the effects of explosive and incendiary devic DISCUSSION OF ALTERNATIVES:
devices.upon a reactor core because of the physics associated with the$
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