ML19323H481
| ML19323H481 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Point Beach  |
| Issue date: | 09/30/1979 |
| From: | Debby Hackett EG&G, INC. |
| To: | NRC |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19323H479 | List: |
| References | |
| CON-FIN-A-0231, CON-FIN-A-231 EGG-1183-4139, TAC-44877, TAC-44878, UCRL-15106, NUDOCS 8006130040 | |
| Download: ML19323H481 (16) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:-__-__ _ _ _ _ _ - _ __ - _ _ _ _ _ _ -. -- _ __ _ _ __ _ ._ L' EGG 1183 4139
, n--
- r: - .
-- ~ ----- - -
UCRL-15106 E ...
. , Energy Measurements Group
.... . .. . . . . . . . T , ...cs.-.........
. ..: .. m ...... ,'..
y
. . . . . . . . . : s. .
. , . . ,. n :_. g... .
. . , a .a w. .
w._. r.w.-.; m .:.n: m;
~
u . . :.m . .- . . - . ,
.'.e.. s n.%.s .ex . . .m'; * * ~D.*; M.
.. s- .t -
. , ... .. - . . - . . . . s. . . , ., . ..
s
. . s.. .1 . . ._
... n...
. .) *:.t;t.t.p.: ....u.. ...... 1 -
. s..*.. ?,:.
x,~.n. . w.
. .. ..A. . . - ,,
.. - ~.
.e. .
, m , ,,.
. . .. .. . .e_ .... .
w .. T.E..C.H. N.I.C A...L. . EVA.L. U A..T..IO. N. _O F TH. E E E CT,R ICAL.:,.,~~. m y . . . . . ._... .
~ . . .
~
19.e%
.m ,7 V INST..R
. ... .~..1 ~~w. .
.% U..Mm.m.A...T.
~.
ENT
.%- IO N 7, A.,N, ,
.e D_ r v~CO NTR .O..L .
IG - D - .: ESe N AS.P..EC.T.5..i w.
. . . ~ -
t.~
. . . .w. ~Jw. w.e.&. w . . x.,.,.sArw,a. ...J....O. .F. ~a. m.~. ..a -..~:-- w. . ....r....- .+.. . . : -.n. w . .-. . ~ . . . . .=. . .
. ..~..~m.m....
.. - . . . .v . =.. . . . . . - .
1.v'.THE
....u. OVERRIDE OF CONTAIN. .,. .. . u. .MENT . -. . ... PURGE .. . VALVE ISOLATION, AND . . . . . . . . , ,
- .J. .-~ . J.1
+
""...~- , . .. .OTHER .. ... .. ... ENGIN..E.ERED S AFETY FEATURE SIGN --AL5- T. ..W.= ..M.. ...y. M
-. .. :n. :n. . . .yo
. ~ ...-...~. .
_ .. .n,.. . ~ .. . -
~.v ; > .::-- ...
.:. .......THE POINT BEACH NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNITS.1 AND.2. .,. .
a : . ..
. ,..: -s:...
(Dor. c :ke..t Nos. 50-266 and 50 301) ..-. ... . .
.N,. . . .. . . .
;.. .a. .. .-. .. . . .. ..
. . - . .. .c. . .
- - ~-
n'
-~- " "J.~
.N.. - ^.. SEPTEMBER ,
..1979 . v. <. :.
w -. - . .. ~ P..
.... ....:. . . -._s.,,..so. ,
; o.
. _ . ...s .
a
.....s- . . .lo.s.A., ". U .s . a. .Qe.1 er *. .. . .. . m!. J. i.;/. , . . . . . . I.p'ie 4:~: L J . . - . . .. . . '. ,. . . .. .*
*.**.F=.+.'e..
an . .
. . . ., .1~s.. , . ..re....,.....
. . .. .. .s..... a.
g .u,
. l
. l
.r -.. ...e .< r; . ,n
- 4r . ,,,T..
.;6..
.... ;, . : . .. : I
., ,-- u. .1 ff~ .;. 'r_. g.. ,* ,. .;p
,. .as .*
,,, . =.~ ;
- p. * . 4 . ; . ., : .
..; d. .
.. . .;f ,., , , ..
. ^" .'
.'. . 9:. .
s' .
- - .rn:. ,.., ...
.-he : .v - y. . : m e . .- . .- - - - - : .. .. .;
.c : :: .. -. . r..,, . : . g ... A .a. u .- .- .. . ;
. .....2
- es
.. 3 ,. .. .,u. .
. . .m. ; .. g. . .. w . .. : g . . . . . . . . . .. . , .g,....
c.- v.. ". y .~1.-r..n:v g-~r.; . ; p .c;n~4.*c ..;~* -
- m. 1 . ~ ' . - . ..g 4 . v ~ :-.
. , , . , . . .e ... . , , . . .- . . .
. .c. .. -- .,..: . . . . .~ .e. x. . ,..s
.3 . n,:v..,.
.y m. . . ,. .
- a. a .... ..... . . . .: . . .._
.. ..~ .- .
-: s. .a *.d .H..: -w .
_,\ r s. 1. ~ :. .. %. . p. . .W. .. : . .:.
. . .. . .. .... ... .. .n. .,
~.... . . . ... ... ...-.
. ;.,, 9..,.n:..
=,... . . .
. . . x
.<.s . . .: 2 . . - ,,
..- .W. ,., . . ...~. .: a. ..
, .,n. . .
.< y. .. .p .*e . t . y. ..'. ., . ,. o- * - .y . s: a ;h,s. .,v. s. . . . .:e. .
. . - - . . ,, *., *;r p s' s-
. p'. .;. f _ s.y,;.t..[y? .e; * ;d;. +.Q;
- Q . ~..;y: sep . ,o t --
cc,.r l- Qg~s. .__s;....s
... . . ., .- ...e . . . .. . . . .
+ . .m- , . . .. .... . e
~ ;. .3,;,c . . - :ja & s . ,. . y; .o-
. f. . . a. , ./ . , .. - .e . . # q . s 4 , .; . . ,,. ,.,.
. r. ; ;* ... * .. . . *r.-
- ....r,.,
.r * ..
,s ,... s,-.:.s......,,,.,.,...-..e,. ..s. .. .*v.n. *.. -.e. P 'h. > . .5.m... .e...
. . 4.,.,,:.4,
.e.. . , a, .,
>....e . i .e.,.;*
.g.. .. -* i .
?.n. ,_. .. .e.L..i, .. , .a .- ..., . . .; . q.. . . .
, .e Q....
., m. .
. . . e e. , . : . f m:e
. --~s e .- * .**. .-. .*:. .:1.~ .:~. #,JT
*A.. e/; m'.,mw,.i ;.
.ref . t,.
,7 ~1ir s.o.mari,.Q:1. ; .4 ss"... f 4=h...r.l. Q?l~;) 4 e . 1.n .W.eaerir..d,ieQ/r.:.4-y is- .,;sy-{MS ...~c(Gaw'u .f 3 : ;rr;r, .N
, .+
v, m z
- e.2.7.,2rt
- a. .
.: . ~~
- c. Ta m.r;., .h. e
.=r-.
.w,. .s - e,<
,,r2 , s,
*s.,4gg+
e. r. 3
, p :: Me . . . w .. w w..:: * .* :rm. --
~4.m : c. :p. . .. y
- -.m cs %p= .e-w w.a
- .-2c-m . . ,. .c u..
g, c. $k,:.
~-
e.~ ~. ,._ .c ... , +~ y n..., w. . e.1. . p u m - u. . ,. . . .- .-u W r- a. w m _s,: ..w ,.. w eg.-..
~
g.o w
.% ,,... .. .n ..
~ . :.:
.+ m . ..
' * :r~;.i,~.if.,5':~b'hi:.').'$*:'1W.sU.w ,.s. >...,.?.u
- -.'.:.H.:;hW8XS . . .. 0?MW +. A%Yah1Etb.ik'
. .. T.. <*.*$=E5 . . . , . *,
...v,.,.v
. . . . . . .. .t ; . -.
?.. .- . .. . y .r. h . * .a: . ;. . a. .
a....... ir;'
..ss.srv. : .,;o...c. .
.-e.s, ..,,, r: ,s ., . .g .
...,,,....s.....' , 'n; .a-. s..;r.;; < - e9. a.*e:o~; 1.v c. ...r, ...<.*
L.n. ,. .~ r .; .
.,,~..
* .L
. . . ..fi m. ss.t. -*n....
=.e. =. ~ ~.m- . . ~..e.....
r:n *y.s 'u- ~. .: .,. .
.s s * .sw .; . e . , ., .,.~ .v. . . , _..:, . h,e.r.u:r v t v -<e.n.v ..w
. .~ y. p ,.,y;, y. .e m. . ? , . .,g,...- .
p rg.. os- ** .* m r* ~ s -- - a sw
.r....a.(s.
+a c.. s.... ..,We.rt.
v e . . '.,sh....... ;b.... = . e. . . .. . , *;-.4 .
..a,
,3,,.,,..,.eg. ... . ,u...
. . . . .. ...,.1. .s ' s*.G, . . M.c: .t.m . . . . . ,.. . . .. . ., ..
,1, L . ...,, . r. ...-.,..c...,.. . , . . . . e.. . ~. .
+ ...., .
. . . g.,,Jr* ). 4....,.-
.s . . . . . . . .
. . . +
i
.c.%.,,
.., t.. . . - . ..
.. l
% ?. *. ;. c ? L . t - ~
- l s '. >' ~ = -r a . . . ,1 r. .'. '. '. . r : ,< ~ .5
...-.f'.;..+.~
;. ' r
..r-..e.. ., ';.c.
1
... ; , - s. .i..e...
v,.g.. . . ...s ..,.. . w .,; .
. . , . - . p . -,... 7, s.. ~a .r
. . ..e.-.
l
... e s *1- . . .- . ...;.
.;.yfp 3 , .. . .
J. .-' ..~'
.
- e .
t
.., .e D. '.'.. **:s".~-{<.
-.,.A. e. ... .. *'. .
#~ 7..
T' : * . .: '
'.".a.L'<a*'.M..:.*,..-;~....... r ;A..
. .-., s. . ., .
- z. ,_ ya -.s ..
s .t - .* . . . . - ..~.o
*ns ... .
1._ , .. .,..
. a.:.;
~
.. .,1. ,
3- .,..- , " . ~ = - .- . r 9; ; , c:~. p .r e . ,.. ._ .
. ... . .u ...u...... -. ,. .. ,. '; .,.,;., ,.,,
.- . ..n . .
. ... 4.., ;.
...... . . p .. . .
.. . s, . ..
Work, Performed fo.r La,wrence Live'rrnoro Laboradry under U.S.Dep artin.enti...f.En.or'gy.$..
.. +. . v ,,
" . .."'11. -?
.....'.r.. . . - . . ..a . .,+ Contract .
No. DE.AC O S-76 N VO 1183. ..s. ,. ., .v.'.,. r .....r.."r..,.-.,. . ..v..,........
. . . . .,....s. .,
t ?a*.' : w <<: ' E. . . . ..a * -2; .n .
.s..."T. . G . . . p ...
. .. . . .;- M.... .
.. . pz .. .. . . . .
- v. ,
et . , . .
, ~~ -1 .
' ~
' .. .s .. -
800613008 .; . g 2-
. - . s. met
@- 64 : . .. . . . . .
- v ^
N J o. .r . Fs .. .
- M
l F . EGG 1183-4139 4 EGh6 UCRL 15106 Enerey mes.u,emesi, a,e,, San Aames Operstgene TECHNICAL EVALUATION OF THE ELECTRICAL, INSTRUMENTATION, AND CONTROL DESIGN ASPECTS OF THE OVERRIDE OF CONTAINMENT PURGE VALVE ISOLATION AND OTHER ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE SIGNALS FOR THE POINT SEACH NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2 (Docket Nos. 50-266 and 50-301) SEPTEMBER 1979 by O. B. Hackett Approved Mr Publication A o- d ~ V Jonn R. Radosevic Electronic Systens Department Manage r This Document is UNCLASS!FIED kr >
' Nicnolas4. 3roderick Department Manager Derivative Classifier Work Performed for Lawrence Livermore Laboratory under U.S. Department of Energy Contract No. DE ACCS-76 NVQ 1183.
SAN RAMON OPERATIONS sect CLo Cecw CANvCN eCAO SAN mAMON. CAki8 Caw.A Sessa
ABSTRACT , This report documents the technical evaluation of the electrical, instrtsnentation, and control design aspects of the override of containment purge valve isolation and other engineered safety feature signals for the Point Beach nuclear power station, Units 1 and 2. The review criteria are based on IEEE Std-279-1971 requirements for the safety signals to all purge and ventilation isolation valves. This report is supplied as part of the Selected Electrical, Instrumentation, and Control Systems Issues Prograrr. being conducted for the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission by Lawrence Li vermore Laboratory. 'l 1 9
- fi -
FOREWORD This report is supplied as part 'of the Selected Electrical , Instrunentation, and Control Systems Issues (SEICSI) P~ . am being con-ducted for the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Division of Operating Reactors, by Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, Field Test Systems Division of the Elec':ronics Engineering Department. The U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission funded the work under an authorization entitled " Electrical, Instrumentation and Control System Support," B&R 20 19 04 031, FIN A-0231. The work was performed by EG8G, Inc., Energy Measurements Group, San Ramon Operations, for Lawrence Livermore Laboratory under U. S. Department of Energy contract number DE-AC08-76NV01183. l l
- fit -
l l
TABLE OF CONTENTS Page
- 1. INTRODUCTION. . . . . . . . . .. . . . 1
,. .s
- 2. EVALUATION OF POINT BEACH NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2.1 Review Criteria . . . . . . . . . . 3 2.2 Containment Ventilatior. Isolation Circuits 1
Design Description . . . . . . . . . 4 2.3 Containment Ventilation Isolation System Design Evaluation. . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2.4 Other Engineered Safety Feature System Circuits . . 8
- 3. CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 REFERENCES. . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . 10 1
1
- iv '-
l I l
TECHNICAL EVALUATION OF THE ELECTRICAL, INSTRUMENTATION, AND CONTROL DESIGN ASPECTS OF THE OVERRIDE OF MNTAINMENT PURGE VALVE ISOLATION AND OTHER ENGINU. RED SAFETY FEATURE SIGNALS
- FOR THE POINT BEACH NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2 (Docket Nos. 50-266 and 50-301)
D. B. Hackett EG&G, Inc., Energy Measurements Group, San Ramon Operations
- 1. INTRODUCTION Several instances have been reported where automatic closure of the containment ventilation / purge valves would not have occurred because the safety actuation signals were either manually overridden or blocked during nomal pl ant operations. These events resulted from procedural inadequacies, design deficiencies, and lack of proper management controls.
These events also brought into question the mechanical operability of the ' containment isolation valves themselves. These events were determined by the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission (NRC) to be an Abnormal Occurrence (#78-5) and were, accordingly, reported to the U. S. Congress. As a follow-up on this Abnormal Occurrence, the NRC staff is reviewing the electrical override aspects and the mechanic.al operability aspects of containment purging for all operating power reactors. On l November 28, 1978, the ,NRC issued a letter entitled " Containment Purging Ouring Nornal Pl ant Operation"I to all boiling water reactor (BWR) and
pressurized water, reactor (PWR) licensees. In a letter dated January 16, 3 1979 and a Licensee Event Report dated April 11, 1979, the Wisconsin Electric Power Company (WEPCO), the licensee for the Point Beach nuclear power station, Units 1 and 2, replied to the NRC generic letter. A plant visit was made on June 5, 1979 by an NRC staff member accompanied by Lawrence Livermore Laboratory and EG&G, Inc. (San Ramon Operations) personnel. This visit was reported in the licensee's monthly report4 dated 5 July 10,1979. In a letter dated July 3,1979 and during a conference call on August 13, 1979, the licensee described the purge value isolation system design changes made to the Point Beach nuclear power station, Units 1 and 2, as described later in this report. This docunent addresses only the electrical, instrumentation, and control (EI&C) design aspects of the containment ventilation isolation (CVI) and other engineered safety features (ESF's). 2 l
- 2. EVALUATION OF POINT BEACH NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2 2.1 REVIEW CRITERIA The primary intent of this evaluation is to determine if the following NRC staff criteria are met for the safety signals to all purge and ventilation isolation valves ~:
(1) Criterion no.1--The overriding of one type of safety actuation signal (e.g., radiation) must not cause the blocking of any other t of safety actuation signal (e.g., pressure) ype to the isolation valves. (2) Criterion no. 2--Sufficient physical features (e.g., key lock switches) are provided to facilitate adequate administrative controls. (3) Criterion no. 3--The system-level annunciation of the overridden status is provided for every safety system impacted when any override is active. Incidental to this review, the following additional NRC staff design criteria were used in the evaluation: (1) Criterion no. 4--Di v e rs e signals should be provided to initiate isolation of the containment ventilation system. Specifically, containment high radiation, safety injection actuation, and containment high pressure should automatically initiate CVI. This is in conformance with Branch Technical Position 6 4 of Section 6.2.4 of the Standard Review Plan.6 (2) Criterion no. 5--The instrumentation and control sys tems provided to initiate CVI should be designed and qualified as safety-grade equipment.
"Tne following definition is given for clarity of use in this evaluation:
Override: The signal is still present, and it is blocked in order to perform a function contrary to the signal. ' t
(3) Criterion no. 6--The overriding or resetting of the isolation actuation signal should not cause the automatic reopening of any isolation / purge valve. 2.2 CONTAINMENT VENTILATION ISOLATION CIRCUITS DESIGN DESCRIPTION Point Beach nuclear power station, Units 1 and 2, each have two ESF trains which can cause isolation of the containment ventilation system. The initating contacts for each train are combined as parallel inputs to form an "0R" gate. These contacts are described below: (1) Automatic Contacts (a) Containment high radiation (two normally-open contacts in parallel from R11 and R12 radiation monitors). (b) Safety inj ection actuation (a normally-open contact). i (2) Manual Contacts (a) Containment isolation pushbuttons (two normally-open contacts in parallel). (b) Containment spray pushbuttons (two normally-open contacts in series). Each train includes the input "0R" gate, a latching relay, and a , slave relay with contacts in the control circuits for the solenoid valves i 1 of the CVI valves. A " reset" switch and a " reset" seal-in relay work in I conjunction with the latching relays. The " reset" switch and its seal-in relay are contacted downstream of all the automatic and manual initiating contacts. The " reset" switch is an unprotected, single, spring-loaded, four-pole pushbutton which has contacts in both CVI trains. l
*Tne following definition is given for clarity of use in this evaluation:
Reset: The signal has come and gone, and the circuit is being cleared in order to return it to the normal condition. When a monitored plant condition (or manual input) calls for isolation, electric power is provided to operate the latching relay (type MG-6 relay) which, in turn, energizes its slave relay (e.g., V10X). Contacts of the slave relay open to remove electric power from the solenoid valves causing the isolation valves to close. When the " reset" switch is operated, the " operate" ccil of the latching relay is de-energized, the " reset" coil of the latching relay is energized, and the " reset" seal-in relay is energized. With the latching relay in the reset condition, the slave relay is de-energized making electric power available to the solenoid-valve circuits. The se'.-in relay will stay energized by power obtained through the contacts of the initiating condition (e.g., high radiation, safety injection). The circuit design does not include provisions to annu iate the
" reset" or overridden status. Valve position lights (i.e., full-open/ full- . closed) are provided.
Outboard ventilation / purge valve CV3212 has two local switches. These are two-position, snap switches that are connected in parallel and bypass the CV3212 33/ao lin.it switch. These limit-switch-bypass switches and the CV3212 air regulator are used for local control of the CV3212 valve position in order to slowly vent containment pressure prior to fully opening the valve. The closing of either of these switches will allow the CV3212 solenoid to energize and will allow the valve to open (provided it has an air supply and no CVI signal). CV3212 is the only ventilation / purge valve with this feature. 2.3 CONTAINMENT VENTILATION ISOLATION SYSTEM DESIGN EVALUA' ION In response to this issue, the containment purge valves at Point Beach nuclear power station, Units 1 and 2, are currently tagged shut on an interim basis and are not being used for purging or venting. All venting and purging is being performed through a two-inch pipe with continuous computer monitoring. The pipe was installed in 1974. 5-
The CVI signal has a " reset" that is more properly termed a bypass or override, as defined in this review. This override, containing a seal-in rel ay, constitutes a system-level override which prevents re-activation of CVI by other input signals as long as an isolation signal , continues uninterrupted. While in this override condition, none of the automatic safety signals nor the manual containment isolation or containment spray pushbuttons can cause the containment ventilation / purge valves to close. When the last isolation signal is interrupted or cleared, the reset seal-in relay will drop out and allow a subsequent isolation input signal to generate a CVI actuation signal and reclose the valves. During this review, we detennined that this override design does not satisfy NRC staff criterion no. 1. The licensee has recently completed system design modifications, however. These system modifications include electrically disabling the coil of the seal-in relay and, in addition, jumperina its contact points in the latching relay circuit. Release of the manual "rsset" button now allcws all CVI signals to cause CVI and, hence, it is now a true reset circuit as defined. The licensee has also changed the connection of the manual inputs to a point downstream of the " reset" switch. Thus, the manual CVI inputs are always active and available to the reactor operator. We conclude that NRC staff criterion no.1 is now satisfied. Tne existing CVI signal override (" reset") function uses a simple, unprotected, spring-loaded pushbutton switch. We determined that this does not meet the NRC staff criterion regarding physical features that facilitate administrative controls. The licensee's recent system modifi-cations included installation of plastic protective covers over the " reset" buttons. This action combined with the disabling of the seal-in relay eliminates the possibility of inadvertent bypassing of a function. We i conclude that NRC staff criterion no. 2 is satisfied. 3-
The presence of an override (" reset") on the CVI signal is not annunciated. We determined that this does not satisfy the NRC staff criterion. The licensee's recent system modification to disable the seal-in relay eliminates the continuous override situation of the old design. That is, if an initiating condition is still present, the valves will respond to that signal as soon as the " reset" button is released. Override or " reset" annunciation is, therefore, no longer deemed necessary as NRC staff criterion no. 3 is no longer applicable. Outboard ventilation / purge valve CV3212 will respond to a CVI signal wit" either or both of the local limit-switch-bypass switches closed. With either of these switches closed, outboard valve CV3212 will automatically open upon clearing of the CVI signal. Hottever, its inocard ventilation / purge isolation valve and all other ventilation / purge valves will remain shut upon clearing of the CVI signal. Incidental to this review, it was determined that CVI trains A and 3 use a single " reset" switch. We concluded that this does not satisfy the NRC staff single-failure criterion. The licensee has recently installed separate " reset" switches for train A and trein B, which does satisfy the NRC staff single-failure criterion. The CVI signal is generated in each train by a safety injection signal (including a containment high-pressure signal) as well as by either of two containment high-radiation signals. Hence, the CVI system design includes diverse actuation signals, and we conclude that NRC staff criterion no. 4 is satisfied. From the information provided by the licensee, it appears that the containment high-radiation signal is not provided by safety-grade equipment. Thus, we conclude that NRC staff criterion no. 5 is not satisfied. Resetting the safety injection signal cannot cause the CVI system i to reset nor will it cause the automatic reopening of the containment ventilation / purge valves. Clearing the CVI signal requires manual
o::eration of the " reset" pushbutton switch (which may cause CV3212 to autcnatically open). Reopening the valves further requires the manual operation of the individual ventilation / purge valve switches. In the " auto" position, none of the valves will remain open with a containment isolation signal present. We conclude that NRC staff criterion no. 6 is satisfied. 2.4 OTHER ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE SYSTEM CIRCUITS The existing system level override (" reset") of the CVI signal does not effect the actuation of the containment isolation signal (for fluid systems) or the safety i nj ecti on signal. In addition, the containment isolation " reset" function c,nly resets the fl uid isolation valves. As part of this review, it was determined that the design of the containment isolation actuation system, the safety inj ection actuation system, and the containment spray actuation system is analogous to the CVI system. The licensee has disabled the seal-in relay from the containment isolation and concainment spray circuits. The " reset" switches for the containment isolation, containment spray, and safety injection systems were split to provide a separate " reset" switch with a protective cover for each train of each system. For the safety injection system, status lights were acded for annunciation of the "resat" condition. Therefore, we conclude that the NRC staff criteria are satisfied.
)
i
- 3. CONCLUSIONS The EI&C design aspects of containment purge valve isolation and other ESF signals for Point Beach nuclear power station, Units 1 and 2, were evaluated using those design criteria stated in Section 2.1 of this report.
We conclude that, with one exception, the CVI system design modifications bring the CVI circuit designs to an acceptable condition. The single exception is that, on the basis of the information provided, the radiation monitoring squipment dues not meet the NRC staff criteria for safety-grade equipment. We recommend that all of the instrumentation and control systems provided to initiate CVI should be designed and qualified as safety-grade equimnent. We also conclude that the other ESF circuit designs discussed are now acceptable. 9
. ~ . . .
REFERENCES
- 1. NRC/00R letter (A. Schwencer) to WEPCO, " Containment Purging During Nomal P1 ant Operation," dated November 28, 1978.
- 2. WEPC0 letter (S. Burstein) to NRC (H. Denton, Attn: A. Schwencer) ,
" Dockets 50-266 and 50-301, Containment Purging During Normal Plant Operations, Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2," dated January 16, 1979.
- 3. WEPC0 event report letter. (S. Burstein) to NRC/I&E (J . Keppl er) ,
"Occkets 50-266 and 50-301, Licensee Event Report No. 79-004/01T-0, Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2," dated April 11, 1979.
- 4. WEPC0 letter (S. Burstein) to NRC (no addressee), " Monthly Operating Reports, Point Beach Nuclear Plant," dated July 10, 1979. .
- 5. 4EPC0 letter (C. Fay) to NRC/I&E (J. Keppler), " Dockets 50-266 and 50-301, Modification of the Reset Circuits in the Safeguards Actuation Circuits , Licensee Event Report 79-010/01T-0, Point Beach Nuclear i Plant, Units 1 and 2," dated July 3,1979.
)
- 6. U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission, Standard Review Plan, " Containment Isolation System," NUREG 75/087, Rev.1, Section 6.2.4. !
i
DISTRIBUTION LI,ST LLL/Livermore EGG /SR0 Lawrence Livermore Laboratory EG&G, Inc. P. O. Box 808 P. O. Box 204 Livermore, California 94550 San Ramon, California 94583 J. D. Attebery, L-255 E. K. Collins (4 copies) L. L. Cleland, L-151 J. H. Cooper W. Gieri , L-154 D. B. Hackett (5 copies) E. A. Lafranchi, L-151 0. H. Laudenbach V. R. Latorre, L-156 B. G. Mayn H. C. Mcdonald, L-161 M. V. Nishimura R. P. Rumble, L-154 (5 copies) B. M. Shindell G. St. Leger-Barter, '.-154 L. M. Spellman N. L. Salmon, L-154 E. J. Tokarz, L-90 R. A. Victor, L-Z2 NRC B. Wilcox, L-53 (3 copies) TID File, L-53 (12 copies) U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 LLL/ Nevada J. T. Beard, MS-416 (2 copies) D. G. Eisenhut, MS-416 Lawrence Livemore Laboratory B. K. Grimes, MS-238 North Las Vegas G. C. Lainas, MS-416 316 Atlas Circle P. C. Shemanski, MS-416 (2 copies) Las Vegas, Nevada 89030 D. Tondi, MS-416 J. G. Ibarra, L-577 L. R. Peterson, L-577 US00E/ TIC W. E. Reeves, L-577 R. E. White, L-577 U. S. Depar+aent of Energy Technical Information Center (27 cps) P. O. Box 62 EG&G/ Idaho Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37830 EG&G, Inc. T. Abernathy (2 copies) P. O. Box 1625 Idaho Falls, Idaho 83401 USDOE/NV00 A. Udy U. S. Department of Energy Nevada Operations Office P. O. Box 14100 Las Vegas, Nevada 89114 J. A. Koch R. R. Loux R. B. Purcell LMS/amr/LMS #6
. a g.}}