ML19322A708
| ML19322A708 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 08/31/1972 |
| From: | Kelley W, Moseley N, Murphy C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19322A703 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-269-72-07, 50-269-72-7, 50-270-72-06, 50-270-72-6, 50-287-72-04, NUDOCS 7911210752 | |
| Download: ML19322A708 (25) | |
See also: IR 05000269/1972007
Text
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UNITED STATES
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ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
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DIVISION OF COMPLIANCE
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AT L A NT A. GEORGI A 30303
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RO Report Nos.
50-269/72-7, 50-270/72-6, 50-287/72-4
Duke Power Company
'
Oconee 1, 2, 3
Docket Nos. 50-259, 50-270, 50-287
,
Oconee County, South Carolina
License Nos.
CPPR-33, 34, 35
Category: A3/B1, A3/B1 and A2
Type of Licensee: PWR 2452 Mw(t), each B&W
Type of Inspection: Routine, announced
Dates of Inspection: June 27, 1972, and July 18-21, 1972
Dates of Previous Inspection: June 1 , 1972
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Principal Inspector:
f
C. E. Murph% Regtorpp ctor
- Bati
Reactor Tes'
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ch
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Accompanying Inspectors:
a
,
s
'el. D. Kelley,'Reactognspector
~ 'Dat&'
Reactor Constructionteranch
Other Accompanying Personnel:
M. S. Kidd, Reactor Inspector
Reactor Test and Startup Branch
1
Reviewed By: d [
f/'df//fb
N. C. Mos{1e% Chgf /
I Da'te
Reactor Test and Startup Branch
_
Proprietary Information: None
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79112107 M
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RO Rp t. Nos. 50-269/72-7
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50-270/72-6 and 50-287/72-4
SECTION I
Enforcement Action
A.
Noncompliance Items
Criterion VI of Appendix B to 10 CFR 50-Failure to assure that revisions
to procedures and drawings are approved for release by authorized
personnel.
(See Section II, paragraph 4.)
B.
Nonconformance Items
None
C.
Safety Items
None
Licensee Action on Previously Identified Enforcement Matters
Corrective action has not been completed on welding items identified in
RO Report No. 50-269/71-11 and Investigation Report No. 50-269/72-1.
Acceptable responses have been received in answer to other enforcement
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action.
(See Section II, paragraph 3.)
Unresolved Items
1.
Duties of SLO during fuel loading.
(See Section II, paragraph 8.)
,
2.
Reactor coolant flow in excess of FSAR values.
(See Section II,
paragraph 10.)
3.
Use of snubbers in RC flow transducer lines.
(See Section II, para-
graph 10.)
4.
Fuel inspection prior to loading.
(See Management Interview.)
5.
Public address system for assembly of personnel prior to evacuation of
the facility.
(See Section II, paragraph 12.)
6.
Operating plant QA organization.
(See Section II, paragraph 2.)
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RO Rpt. No.
50-269/72-7
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and 50-270/72-6 and 50-287/72-4
Status of Previously Identified Unresolved Items
See Section II, paragraph 3.
Unusual occurrences
None
Persons Contacted
- A. C. Thies - Senior Vice President, Production and Transmission
- J.
E. Smith - Plant Superintendent
- D.
G. Beam - Construction Manager
- J. R. Wells - Manager of Construction Services, DPC
- K. S. Canady - Nuclear Engineer, DPC
- C. B. Aycock - Senior Field Engineer
- L. E. Summerlin - Staf f Engineer, Oconee
- R. M. Koehler - Technical Support Engineer
M. D. McIntosh - Operating Engineer
O. S. Bradham - Instrumentation Control Engineer
C. L. Thames - H.P. Supervisor
H. Thielsch - Consultant
S. Blackley - Principal Mechanical Engineer, DPC
R. E. Blaisdell - Field Engineer (Welding and NDT)
L. R. Barnes - Assistant Field Engineer (Welding and NDT)
E. D. Brown - Maintenance Supervisor
M. Ray - Staff Welding Engineer - DPC
J. M. Curtis - Senior Designer (QA)
L. R. Davison - Associate Field Engineer
R. S. Templeton - Associate Field Engineer
- Thies at meeting on June 26, 1972, only.
- Attended Management Interview on July 21, 1972.
Management Interview
1.
Failure to Use Properly Approved Revisions to Procedures
Murphy stated that during the review of the welding and NDT program,
he had observed that some of QC functions were being accomplished by
memoranda rather than by using approved procedures; for example,
Mechanical Memorandum 8-72 dated April 4,1972, relating to control
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RO Rpt. Nos.
50-269/72-7,
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and 50-270/72-6 and 50-287/72-4
of isometric and a memorandum from Blaisdell dated January 4,1972,
relating to attachment welds specified procedural steps to be followed.
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Applicabic procedures should have been revised to incorporate these
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steps. Failure to properly document the procedure changes appears to be
in noncompliance with Criterion VI of Appendix B to 10 CFR 50.
Murphy
stated that it was his understanding that as a part of the upgrading
of the welding and NDT programs, the requirements detailed in such
memoranda will be incorporated into approved procedures. Beam stated
'
that he would do all he could to keep the use of the memoranda to a mini-
mum and would expedite incorporating these memoranda into approved
procedures.
2.
QA Organization for Oconee Af ter Orsrsting License Issued
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Murphy advised Smith that DPC would be expected to comply with the
requirements of Appendix B to 10 CFR 50 in developing the site QA
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program. RO:II would not consider the site QA organization to meet
these criteria unless it were independent of the line organization.
Smith stated that he disagreed with this position.
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3.
Reactor Building Spray Pumps
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Murphy . expressed cohcern with the vibration problem experienced with
the reactor building spray pumps. Smith stated that he was also
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concerned with this problem. Canady and Beam agreed to follow up on
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this item to expedite the correction of the cause of the vibration.
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4.
Tendon Surveillance
Murphy reminded Smith that the first tendon surveillance inspection
was required at appro.*1mately the same time that DPC was planning to
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load fuel. Smith stated that he was presently trying to schedule the
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equipment for this work.
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5.
Staffing for Fuel Loading
Murphy advised Smith that RO:II considers that the SRO mus t be assigned
to the containment building and directly supervise the fuel handlers
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when work _ is being performed that could affect the reactivity of the
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reactor. Smith stated that he disagreed with this position but would
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attempt to get a resolution of this question through his management.
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RO Rp t. Nos . 50-269/72-7,
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and 50-270/72-6 and 50-287/72-4
6.
Fuel Inspection
Smi~h confirmed the inspector's understanding that the fuel for Unit I
will be inspected prior te core loading.
/.
Control of Lif ted Leads and Jumpers
Murphy expressed concerns that proposed painting of electrical terminals
by DPC could result in paint entering between contact areas and isolated
sections of the circuitory.
He also stated that he would need to be
by lif ted lead and jumpers. reassured prior to fuel loading that test resul
a list of tests to be performed to assure that this did not happ
Murphy reminded Smith that such tests are rarely designed to be a
complete functional test.
rapidly as possible.
He urged Smith to complete the list as
8.
Reactor Coolant Loop Flow Data Test Evaluation
Murphy discussed che results of his review of DPC's evaluation of the
RC Loop Flow Data Test TP-200-5B.
He stated that there were numerous
small errors in making revisions to the test and in performing the
that were not discussed in the DPC evaluation.
test
The B&W
evaluation of the test data indicated that the flow through the
core would be on the order of 2-3% higher than had been anticipated.
In that
analysis, if measurements made with the core installed
rate, then DPC should be prepared to justify the higher flow rate and
to revise the FSAR to reflect actual conditions. Murphy also stated
that DPC should plan to repeat this test or perform a similar test
after fuel loading.
Smith advised that flow measurements tests
would be made af ter fuel loading.
Canady and Smith also indicated
that more information was expected from B&W on this matter.
has recommended that snubbers be used in the instrumentation
Murphy expressed concern about this proposal in that:
Snubbers could affect
a.
the response time of the instrumentation.
b.
The snubbers could be prone to plugging.
During such operations as
venting, particulate matter could be introduced into the snubbers
that could restrict delta pressure changes and cause the trans-
ducers to give incorrect cutputs.
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R0 Rpt. Nos.
50-269/72-7
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and 50-270/72-6 and 50-287/72-4
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B&W's recommendation is not supported by discussion in their evalu-
c.
ation. From the information presented in the evaluation, one could
just as easily conclude that the indicated fluctuations in flow
were indeed loop flow fluctuations.
In this case, the snubbers would
be masking true values. Koehler stated that the planned periodic
instrumentation calibration checks would reveal plugged snubbers.
He also advised the inspectors that B&W's report would address
the inspector's concerns.
9.
High Pressure Injection System Functional Test - TP-202-7
The inspectors stated that Section 12.3.1 of this test had not been
accomplished although DPC had considered the test to be completed.
McIntosh stated that this section of the test had been written when
DPC had planned to use a backwash type of filter. This type filter
probably will not be used. McIntosh will advise the inspectors of
the resolution of this problem during the next inspection.
10. Welding Procedures
DPC was informed that the RO inspector had reviewed the welding
procedures that had been revised in accordance with the instructions
from their consultant and these did meet the ASME Code, Section
IX, requirements; however, all procedures had not as yet been revised
by DPC or audited by their consultant. Since work was continuing
on revising the remaining procedures as a part of DPC's program to
upgrade their welding, the inspectot will reviaw the procedures during
the next inspection.
11. Welding Program
DPC was informed that the RO inspector had discussed with their
consultant (Thielsch) the DPC program for review of NDT procedures,
welding procedures, welding procedure requalification, weldor re-
qualification, and documentation of NDT results, mill certification,
and isometric drawings.
It is RO's understanding that Thielsch will
perform audits of the reradiography, requalification of welding pro-
cedures and weldors, and correction of documentation af ter the DPC
review is completed. Beam confirmed this understanding. DPC was
informed that after their consultant's audits, RO would perform its
own audits.
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R0 Rp t. Nos . 50-269/72-7,
-7-
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and 50-270/72-6 and 50-287/72-4
SECTION II
Prepared by:
C. E. Murphy, Reactor
Inspector
Reactor Test and Startup
Branch
ADDITIONALSUBJECTSINSPECTED,NOTIbENTIFIEDINSECTIONI,WHERENO
DEFICIENCIES OR UNRESOLVED ITEMS WERE FOUND
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1.
Oconee Operations Quality Assurance Program
4 of his staff on
The principal inspector met with Thies and member:
June 26, 1972, to discuss the makeup of the quality assurance program
for Oconee operation. The necessity for building the program around
the requirements of Appendix B to 20 CFR 50 was emphasized by the
inspector. Thies advised the inspector that DPC planned to use task
groups to perform such functions as making audits and reviewing logs.
The operation of these task groups would be governed by approved pro-
cedures and the groups would report and be responsible to the General
Office Review Committee (GORC). The committee would have the respon-
sibilities assigned to it in the Technical Specifications.
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2.
DPC Evaluaticu of the Following Tests Results
TP-600-13, RC System Instrumentation Functional Test
TP-600-24, Reactor Vessel and Steam Generator Support Flange _ Temperatures
DETAILS OF SUBJECIS DISCUSSED IN SECTION I
3.
Resolution of Previously Identified Enforcement Matters and Unresolved
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Items
!
The following items were discussed with Canady and are now cnnsidered
resolved.
a.
In-core Detector Availability
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Now included in Technical Specification Section 3.5.4.
b.
Measurements of Flow and Temperature During Initial Operation
DPC plans to conduct a series of tests after fuel loading to verify
the accuracy of the FSAR values for flow and temperature.
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RO Rpt. Nos. 50-269/72-7.
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and 50-2 70/72-6 and 50-287/72-4
c.
Data Durina Startup for Single Loop, Two Pumps , Operation
Technical Specificattun Section 3.1.8. permits single loop operation
only for test purposes and requires Licensing notification prior to
start of tests.
d.
High Pressure and Low Pressure Injection System Startup Times
and Valves Operating Times
Information supplied to Licensing in FSAR Revision 21 revises the
times previously given in the FSAR.
e.
Failure to Document Equipment Failures
The work order system for documenting equipment failures is now
in effect and it appears that all failures are now being documented,
f.
Steam Generator Skirt Adapter Indicators
Oconee baseline inspection report discusses these indications and
concludes that the indications do not exceed code limits.
g.
Management Audits of Construction
Curtis advised the inspector that three audits had been made of the
construction activities. The inspector will review the results
of these audits during future inspections.
h.
Deficiencies in Preoperational Testing
The licensee has revised the "Oconee Guide for the Conduct of
Preoperational Tests." These revisions should preclude deficiencies
of the type observed.
1.
Failure of GORC to Conduct Audits Using Detailed Procedures
Thies has agreed that task groups reporting to GORC and using written
procedures will conduct all future audits.
.
j. Drawing and Document Control for Ooerations
An administrative procedure has been developed and implemented to
control documents.
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RO Rpt. Nos. 50-269/72-7
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and 50-270/72-6 and 50-287/72-4
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k.
LP Injection System Tests
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The LP injection system has now been tested using all flow paths.
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1.
Test to Include FSAR Requirements
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The licensee has reviewed tests previously conducted to assure
that FSAR requirements have been met.
Future tests will include
the FSAR requirements in the acceptance criteria. Test procedures
and test results are also being reviewed and audited to eliminate
errors.
m.
Instrument Air Test
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The licensee has prepared a test procedure to determine the effects
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of the loss of instrument air.
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n.
Revision to Oconee Guide for Conducting Preoperational Tests
This guide is now being revised to conform to the FSAR and
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Appendix B requirements.
o.
Plant Security
.
The weaknesses previously observed in plant security have been
corrected.
p.
Tests to be Repeated as a Result of Reactor Coolant System Damage
A list of tests that the licensee plans to repeat is given in
Exhibit A.
q.
Shif t Supervisor's Log
Statica Order No. 8 now defines the minimum information to be included
in this log. No deficiencies were observed in the requirements.
4.
Failure to Use Properly Approved Proc cires
During discussions with Blaisdell of the actions taken by DPC to
upgrade the Oconee welding and NDT programs, the inspectors questioned
Blaisdell about the administrative procedures used in centrolling the
actions of the quality control inspectors. Blaisdell ad=itted that
his group had issued memoranda to the inspectors rather than attempt
to revise existing procedures and obtain approval of these revisions.
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R0 Rpt. Nos.
50-269/72-7,
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and 50-270/72-6 and 50-287/72-4
The inspectors reviewed a memorandum signed by Blaisdell and dated
January 4,1972, titled " Procedure for Identification and Control of
Field Fabricated Pipe (Attachment Welds) ." The last sentence of this
memorandum stated, "This memo will be incorporated into a future
revision of (Duke Power Company) Procedure El."
The memorandum was
approved by D. L. Freeze, Principal Field Engineer, Procedure El
requires the approval of R. L. Dick, Vice President, Cons truction.
A second memorandum signed by Barnes, dated April 4,1972, entitled
" Control of Piping Isometrics QR-27, Mechanical Memorandum 8-72,"
outlined the steps to be followed in revising isometric drawings.
Control of documents is governed by DPC Procedure G.
This document
requires that implementing procedures for document control be approved
by authorized personnel. This memorandum had not been signed as
approved.
Murphy discussed the use of these and similar memoranda with Elsisdell
and Beam. Both admitted that many other similar memoranda were in use.
Murphy advised them that the failure to use properly approved procedures
(including revisions) appeared to be contrary to the requirements of
Appendix B to 10 CFR 50.
Beam said that he would, as a part of the
DPC program to upgrade welding and NDT, have all such memoranda in-
corporated into approved procedures.
5.
QA Organization for Oconee Af ter Operating License
Koehler advised the inspector that DPC was unc_rtain as to whether to
set up a QA organization at the site or to have individuals from the
various units be assigned QA responsibilities. The inspector advised
Koehler that the QA functions must be performed by the licensee and
RO could not dictate the organizational structure but that RO would
need to be convinced that the QA organization he separate,
i.e.,
independent of the line organization since this was required by Appendix
3 to 10 CFR 50. This item was discussed in the management interview
with Smith. Smith disgreed with the inspector's position and the
question was not resolven at this time.
6.
Reactor Building Sorav Psmos
Murphy discussed tae vibration problems experienced with the reactor
building spray pumps with Brown. Brown advised the inspector that
DPC was still uncertain as to the course of action to be taken with
these pumps. Proposed fixes include stiffening the pump bases,
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R0 Rpt. Nos. 50-269/72-7,
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and 50-270/72-6 and 50-287/72-4
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motor-pump coupling, and installing
installing a different type
He stated
flexible piping on the intake and discharge of the pumps.
that neither the pump manufacturer nor the motor manuf acturer had
been able to provide help in determining the cause of the vibration.
Murphy discussed this item in the management interview.
7.
Tendon Surveillance
In discussions with Smith and Beam regarding the surveillance inspection
1 containment building tendons, the inspector was advised
of the Unit
that since the Unit 3 tendons were being installed and stressed, the
equipment was not presently available for the surveillance inspection
Smith was advised by the inspector that RO would
of Unit 1 tendons.
expect the Unit 1 tendons to be inspected as scheduled.
8.
Staffing for Fuel Loading
The inspector reminded McIntosh and Koehler that RO:II must still
review DPC's fuel handling procedure, the zero power physics test
procedures, and the power ascension test procedures prior to fuel
McIntosh said that the fuel handling procedure had been
loading.
completed but not approved. The zero power physics test procedure
was expected to be completed during the month. During the ensuring
discussion, Murphy advised McIntosh that RO:II considered that the
SRO supervising the loading operations should be assigned to the
containment building. McIntosh advised the inspector that he would
have to obtain Smith's concurrence before he could make this com-
When this matter was discussed with Smith, he stated that
ad tmen t .
he could not agree with this restriction. He agreed, however, to
discuss this matter with his management.
9.
Lif ted Leads and Jumpers
Murphy discussed the progress in developing a procedure for the
control of lif ted leads and jumpers with Aycock. During the course
of the discussion, Aycock snowed the inspector a removable link-type
terminal block of the type used at Oconee. The threads of the
terminal screws and the link clamping screw had been painted. Aycock
stated that DPC proposed to seal paint all screws in this manner to
prevent circuits frot being opened by unauthorized personnel, Murphy
pointed out the danger inherent in this method of detecting changes.
Loosening the nuts on the terminal screws would wipe the paint from
the threads. This paint could easily become lodged between contacts
or between the wires and terminals and insulate the joint.
The inspector's concerns were discussed in the management interview.
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RO Rpt. No.
50-269/72-7
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and 50-270/72-6 and 50-287/72-4
12. Plant Evacuation Alarm System
The inspector asked Smith and Thames if it would possible to witness
a test of the plant evacuation aiarm. Thames advised the inspector
that DPC had not been able to get the plant PA system to function
properly. The DPC emergency plan requires that this system be used
.
to assemble plant personnel at specified points if evacuation is
anticipated. Murphy advised Smith and Thames that the operation of
this system must be demonstrated under adverse noise conditions
prior to fuel loading. Agreement was reached to test the system
during hot functional test.ing.
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R0 Rp t. Nos.
50-269/72-7,
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4
and 50-270/72-6 and 50-287/72-4
SECTION III
Prepared by:
W. D. Kelley , Reactor
Inspector
Reactor Construction
Branch
ADDITIONAL SUBJECTS INSPECTED, NOT IDENTIFIED IN SECTION I, WHERE NO
DEFICIENCIES OR UNRESOLVED ITEMS WERE FOUND
1.
Implementation of Welding and Welding NDT Program
Because of the extensive deficiencies that had been previously
identified to DPC in their welding and NDT programs by the RO:II
inspectors and because of the alterations that had been made to
radiographs, DPC has implemented p majer review to identify and
correct all such deficiencies. 1
An' outside consultant has been
retained and DPC is taking corrective action based upon his findings
and recommendations. After all corrective actions have been com-
pleted, DPC is to supply RO:II with detailed reports of the con-
sultant's findings and the cor-active actions taken. A separate
report describing the actions taken by DPC as a result of their
investigation of the alterations will be submitted to RO:HQ by
DPC. The inspector's review of the status of the DPC effort
indicated that the status of the program is as described below.
a.
Documentation of Unit 1 Pining Systems
A consultant (Thielsch) has been employed by DPC to advise
DPC management what corrective action is nccessary for the
documentation of Unit 1 piping system installations to meet
ASME and ANSI Codes that are referenced in the Oconee FSAR.
Af ter the Oconee personnel complete reviewing and correcting
the documentation, the consultant (Thielsch) will perform an
audit. The consultant is responsible to DPC's Senior Vice
President, Engineering and Construction (W. S. Lee) and onsite
reports his findings to the project manager (Beam).
A review of the installed piping was mcde and compared with
the isometric drawings by DPC Oconee operations personnel. The
results of this review were not acceptable to Thielsch. A
recheck was made by DPC Oconee Construction QC-Welding personnel
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and they also verified that the correct weld identification
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number was carked beside, each veld. Any incorrect numbers
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were removed. The recheck was acceptable to Thielsch.
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1/ RO Report No.
50-269/72-6
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R0 Rpt. Nos.
50-269/72-7,
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and 50-270/72-6 and 50-287/72-4
All radiographs of Unit 1 piping and containment have been
reviewed for artifacts (pencil marks) in accordance with
" Procedure for Examination of Radiograph Film for Artifacts
on Penetrameters." None of the radiographs of the containment
liner contained artifacts. The critical piping on Unit 1
contains 1,575 buttwelds which required 4,175 radiographs.
Of the 1,575 buttwelds, 641 had one or more radiographs that
contained artifacts. Over 3,000 radiographs contained artifacts.
The pipes containing 141 of the 641 buttwelds are 10 inch or
larger in diameter. All of these buttwelds will be reradio-
graphed in their entirety. Of the balance of the buttwelds,
52 have been selected at random for reradiography and the
results will be used as a basis of an engineering evaluation
for acceptance of the balance or enlarging the number of
buttwelds that most be reradiographed.
. ! radiographs on Unit 1 have been rereviewed by Level II
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radiographers for acceptability, completeness of film overlop,
proper identification, and meeting code requirements. The
radiographer questioned the radiographs of 164 buttwelds and
Thielsch required 47 to be reradiographed completely. Twenty-
two of these have been reradiographed and 20 have been accepted
without repair by Thielsch. However, two buttwelds made to
a valve are to be cut out and the valve-end repaired for
apparent slag due to shop repair welding.
The radiographic film storage envelopes and radiographic reports
are te be reviewed by DPC personnel for incorrect or misleading
inforsc; ion and unresolved questions such as corrected identi-
fication, interpretation, notations on penetrameters which have
teen noted by reviewers.
Records indicate that the archerized inspector for Hartford
reviewed some radiographs prior to acceptance by DPC's radiog-
rapher. He will be required to recheck the radiographs to show
that this approval and the date of his acceptance of these
radiographs was af ter the DPC radiographic interpretation.
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RO Rpt. Nos.
50-269/72-7,
-16-
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and 50-270/72-6 and 50-287/72-4
b.
Welding Program Changes (1969-1972)
The DPC welding engineer (Blaisdell) issued a cemorandum
(July 20, 1972) which sunmarized the significant changes that
have been made in the Oconee welding program since January 1,
1970. These chan;es were for the most part, due to RO enforce-
ment action or discussion with RO inspectors.
The memorandum stated in part the following:
The program in 1969 consisted of welding procedures prepared
by design division and designated by numbers prefixed by "0WPS."
Other procedures were qualified at the jobsite and were pre-
fixed with numbers "DP."
During December of 1969, various
additional qualification were noted to be required.
In December 1969 and January of 1970, a system of test memoranda
was started to define welding procedura qualification requirements
in detail. A review of these test memoranda indicated that
more testing requirements were defined than had been previously
defined in the "0WPS" welding procedures.
In April of 1970, a complete new nudbering system for welding
procedures was assigned. The purpose of this new numbering
system was to differentiate between procedures qualified and
prepared in the field from those prepared by other departments
<
within the company. At this time, the new numbering system
was devised and all references to the "0W:3" procedures were
dropped.
In June of 1970, the approval routing of piping system isometrics
was revised to include welding engineering personnel. Welding
procedure numbers were added to the isometrics such that both
,
craf t personnel and inspectors were formally notified of the
detailed procedure that applied to a given area of a piping
system. This practice has been conducted through the current
date.
Approximately April 1971, books of welding procedures were formally
issued to all welding inspectors and craf t supervisors down
through the foreman level. These books were assigned numbers
and have been placed under a document centrol funcilon.
The
holder of each book is defined in a master set of welding procedures.
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R0 Rpt. Nos. 50-269/72-7,
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and 50-270/72-6 and 50-287/72-4
In November or December of 1971, quality assurance conferences
and training sessions were started with the welding superintendent
These conferences covered detailed talks
and general foremen.
on filler metal control, welding procedure applications, and
Six or eight such conferences have
NDT inspection requireuents.
been held since that time.
In November and December of 1971, Hollins and Blaisdell did a
complete detailed review and rewrite of all welding procedures
qualified to that time. This work was promoted by various RO
meetings , comments and enforcement actions.
During the early part of 1972, a practice was started within the
craft organization requiring that weldors must read a weldingThe
procedure prior to completing the tests for that procedure.
documentation that the man has accomplished the required reading
is maintained by the craf t organization under the supervision
of Blair.
In April of 1972, another review of all welding procedures was
accomplished by Ray. This action was accomplished to provide
a technical backup for the field prepared and qualified
procedures.
The December of 1971, a complete revision to the manner in which
control weld records are complied was issued. The
current
The field weld card
system now includes mandatory hold points.
now acts as a traveler-type system.
In July 1971, a new procedure for the issue of filler metal
These controls include locked issue stations,
was implemented.
filler metal issue slips to each weldor, and a return of unused
filler metal to the station required.
inspection methods for filler metal were
Early 1972, receipt
A locked control receipt point has been established.
changed.
f
Released from the locked area was allowed only by welding
engineering personnel.
Bend spec'imens for velder qualification have been changed to
allow a smaller tolerance on specimen width.
Isometric routing has been changed. After an isometric is
f
drawn, it must receive approval of the mechanical group prior
j
to being assigned welding procedures, NDT requirements, etc.
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RO Rpt. Nos.
50-269/72-7,
-18-
and 50-270/72-6 and 50-287/72-4
.c.
Organization for Unit 1
Unit 1 is under the control of the DPC Steam Production Department,
for testing and startup. Any construction work that is to be
done on shared systems must be done on a shutdown request from
the Construction Department that must be approved by the Steam
Production Department. Presently, the review of the radiographs
and radiographic records is under the supervision of the DPC
Charlotte, senior designer (Curtis); the review of welding pro-
cedures, weldor qualifications, NDT procedures, NDT personnel
qualifications, and welding filler metal certification are under
the supervision of DPC Charlotte manager of construction services
(Wells); the verification of the correctness of the piping
isometrics is under the supervision of the DPC Oconee principal
field engineer (Freeze); the development of the program is the
responsibility of the consultant (Thielsh); and the onsite
coordination of the program is under the project manager (Beam).
Thielsch is to make an organizational chart for the above work
and prepare job descriptions. He is to be onsite on Saturday,
July 22, 1972, and meet with Beam and Wells to select the DPC
personnel for the positions on the organizational chart.
The welding engineer (Blaisdell) has been relieved of all
responsibilities for the work of Unit 1 and assigned to Units
2 and 3 welding. However, he submitted his resignation from
DPC to be effective August 1, 1972. The DPC organization for
quality control snd technical support will be changed upon his
leaving the site. The welding will be under an associate
field engineer (A. R. Hollins) reporting to Freeze. The position
of field engineer, welding and NDT, has been eliminated. The
mechanical supervisor, technical-welding (Moore) and the mechanical
supervisor, technical NDT (L. Burton, who replaced A. R. Thorton)
report to an associate field engineer (L. R. Davison). The
RO inspector asked Beam if there would be any changes to the
quality control organization for Units 2 and 3 based on Thielsch's
recommendations for Unit 1, and he stated there would not.
d.
Welding Procedures
The 26 welding procedures that have been used for the erection of
the structural steel and piping at the Oconee Station Units
1, 2 and 3 and their procedure qualification test were reviewed
by Hollins after April 1972. Twenty-two welding procedures have
been revised and where necessary requalified. Four of the pro-
cedures were not revised because they would not be used (S-1,
4, 7 and 8) on subsequent work. The qualification of procedure
for MIG (S-7) was not complete and MIG welding will not be used on
the Oconee project.
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R0 Rpt. Nos. 50-269/72-7,
-19-
and 50-270/72-6 and 50-287/72-4
The 22 welding procedures and procedure qualifications have
been corrected for typographical errors, clarification of
wording and technical terms, and reference to applicable
codes. The procedures requiring corrections were marked
as revisions.
Welding Procedure P-17 for the gas tungsten arc welding of
stainless steel to carbon steel is being revised to permit
a higher shield gas flow. Since this is an essential
variable and the increased gas flow exceeds the AMSE
Code,Section IX, limitation, it is being requalified.
Welding Procedure P-5 has been broken into two procedures,
P5A for shielded metal arc welding rf carbon steel pipe
(open butt) and PSB for shielded metal are welding of carbon
steel pipe (backing ring) . Each procedure permits welding
of material with and without postweld heat treatment. The
use of postweld heat treatment is a B31.1 and B31.7 code
requirement if the thickness is greater than three-fourths
of an inch. The welding foreman and the welding inspector
determine if postweld heat treatment is to be performed by
reviewing the isometric drawing which has the material thick-
ness listed in the bill of material. The revised procedures
meet ASME Code, Section IX-1969 Edition, requirements.
-
e.
Weldor Qualifications
A task force under the direction of Hollins ..as reviewed the
weldor qualifications and corrected the errors. The errors
consisted of wrong thickness range and full identification of
electrodes. The qualification bend test coupons were inspected
and those weldors whose coupons did not meet ASME Code, Section
IX, dimensions were requalified. A number of weldors have
left the site and DPC will review : heir records and determine
which of these weldors may have welded Classes I and II piping.
f.
Filler Metal Certification
j
On Unit 1, there are both typical and actual filler metal mill
i
certifications. Prior to July 1,1971, the mill heat number
was not available at the weld location. Prior to December 1971,
the mill heat number was recorded on DPC QC Form 36 by the
welding inspector. Af ter December 1971, the weldor recorded the
mill heat number on the QC form 36.
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20 Rpt. Nos.
50-269/72-7,
-20-
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s
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and 50-270/72-6 and 50-28//72-4
A 100% audit was performed by a task force under the direction
of Wells at the reco=nendation of Thielsch. The audit revealed
approximately 15 mill neat numbers recorded on the QC Form 36
The
that could not be traced to onsite mill test reports.
electrode and filler wire manuf acturer's plant QA representatives
were contacted by Blaisdell by telephone and requested to verify
if they had manufactured filler metal by these heat numbers.
Hollins also visited their supplier, Industrial Welding Supply,
These
in Greenville, South Carolina, and reviewed their records.
heat numbers could not be verified. DPC has not determined
their program for resolving this item.
On Units 2 and 3, the QC Form 36 is routed to a special group,
not yet of ficially on the organizational chart, who daily review
It
the information including the fillc r material heat number.
,
is compared with the heat number of the purchased filler metal.
,
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g.
NDT Procedures
DPC has seperate corporate QA manuals for their design and
The Oconee site receives copies of
construction departments.
these documents which are approved by the Vice President,
Construction (Dick) . A memorandun dated February 16, 1972,
!
lists the procedure applicable to the Oconee Nuclear Station.
The only NDT procedures on this list are the two magnetic
,
particle procedures , L-2.1 and L-2.2, approved December 16,
l
1971. The procedure method was qualified by DPC's SNI-TC-1A
Level III examiner (Grier).
The radiographic procedure was revised in November 1971, by the
Level III examiner (Blaisdell) . The revision basically consisted
of editorial changes and addition of pipe shooting sketches.
This procedure did require management approval. Technique shots
were taken in accordance with the shooting sketches and approved
by Grier on June 28, 1972.
(This 'a five days after the R0
inspection of June 23, 1972.)
The liquid penetrant procedure PT-1, was revise'd on December 8,
1970, by Grier and the revision approved on the same date by the
project manager (J. C. Rogers) . The procedure was qualified on
June 26,1972, and the qualification was signed by Level III
examiner (Grier).
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RO Rpt. Nos. 50-269/72-7,
-21-
( .'
and 50-270/72-6 and 50-287/72-4
The ultrasonic examination procedure, UT-2, was prepared by a
Level II UT technician (C. H. Craig) on January 29, 1970, and
approved by the project manager (Rogers) on March 27, 1970.
The procedure was qualified on June 26,197?; by Grier.
The above nondestructive testing procedures were requalified at
the recommendation of Thielsch.
h.
NDT Personnel Qualification
Prior to July 1970, B&W Construction Company was training,
examining, and certifying the Level I and Level II radiographers,
magnetic particle, liquid penetrant, and ultrasonic technicians
for DPC. DPC certified Grier as a Level III for magner'c
particle and liquid penetrant inspection in October 19'/0, and
Blaisdell as a Level III for radiography, magnetic particle
and liquid penetrant examination in November 1971.
DPC began NDT training of selected technicians in early 1970.
B&W Construction Company continued the examination and certi-
fication of these DPC trained persons until the DPC certified
Grier and Blaisdell as Level III examiners. After these men
were certified as Level III they assumed the responsibility of
training, examining and certifying the NDT technicians.
There is a jacket for each NDT technician that contains his
daily quizes, final exam, eye exam, and certification signed
by the Level III examiner.
1.
NDI Records and Material Certifications
Grier prepared a procedure for the " Identification and Control
of Field Fabricated Pipe," E 1.0, which was approved by the
project manager (Beam) on April 7,1970.
The procedure requires a Field Weld Check-off List QC Form 36
which is an IBM card to be prepared for each weld. The weld
can be for either DPC fabrication or the weld made by D?C
joining spool pieces fabricated by a vendor. The procedure
describes how the card is to be filled out and what information
is to be recorded. The card is punched by a clerk assigaed to
the associate field engineer (Davison). The information is
taken directly from the isometric drawing prepared onsite by
the draftsman under the supervision of the field engineer,
mechanical. The information is also printed at the top of
the IBM card and includes the system number, isometric drawing
number, pipe size and thickness, piping =aterial and nondestruc-
tive code number.
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RO Rpt. Nos.
50-369/72-7,
-22-
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and 50-270/72-6 and 50-287/72-4
The QC Form 36 is issued to the powerhouse mechanic general
foreman. F in turn distributes the QC Form 36 and the isometric
to the foreman. The pipe fitter assigned the work, is given
the card which he places in the ncw joint section of a card
box located in his work area. After the welding inspector
reviews the cleanliness, fitup, and inserts the pipe mill certi-
fication heat number (this is a mandatory hold point), he signs
off the QC Form 36.
The inspector records the mill certification
heat number of the pipe or fitting on each side of the weld
on the back of the QC Form 36 then places it on the ready to
weld box. At this time, the welding inspector enters the weld
procedure number that is to be used on the QC Form 36.
The root
pass is inspected, the welding process on the balance of the
weld is observed, and the final weld inspected by the welding
inspector. After the welding is complete, the weldor stencils
his identification number on the pipe adjacent to the weld and
notes his name, identification number, and filler material
heat numbers on the QC Form 36.
The filler material is withdrawn, stored and issued in acco-dance
,
'
with DPC procedure D2.0 which was prepared by Grier and approved
by Beam on April 7, 1970. The filler material is issued to
the weldor on QC Form 55 and he is responsible for accounting for
'
its use or the return of the balance at the end of the shift.
The welding stochroom clerk can issue filler material only to
an individual with a signed filler metal issue slip. A log of
the filler metal issued to each weldor is kept on QC Form 57.
Once each week, all filler material issue slips QC Form 55 and
the log, QC Form 57, are turned into the Qd department for audit.
Af ter the welding is complete and inspected, the QC Forms 36
are returned to the field engineer, welding and NDT, where they
'
are sorted according to NUI code numbers by the IBM sorter and
a scheduling computer printout made. When the nondestructive
testing is complete, the QC Forr 36 is signed by the Level II
inspector who performs the evaluation.
A separate isometric drawing is kept by the field engineer,
mechanical, on which the weld is identified by weld number and the
material heat number is recorded. A cross-check is made of each
QC Form 36 of the material heat number recorded in the field
with the heat number recorded on the isometric drawing.
Attachment :
Exhibit A
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E R'O C'E D'U R E
INDEX
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Responsibili tv-
T'ese Coordinator.
Procedure #
Name
L EcIntosh
G'.. Chge:
TP/1/B/600/1
Controlling Procedure for Hot
Functional Testing
K. EcIntosh.
- E.McCbunell'
TI'/1/B/200/5 -
Reactor Coolant Pump Initial
Operation Test Procedure
,
L Koehler
E.. Mc11Ahorr.
TP/1/A/200/12
Reactor Coolant Pump Flow Test
L Dehler
K.. McMah'orr.
TP/1/A/200/13
Reactor Coolant Flow Coastdown Tc
L Lehler
E.. Frink
TP/1/B/200/1d
Reactor Internals and Vibration
"
L EcIntosh.
R.. McMahorr.
TP/1/A/203/5
Low Pressure Injection Functional
Test (w/ major change)
.
.
E McTrrtosit
R..ErinE:
TP/1/A/230/5
Soluble Poison Control Operationa
Test
.
E EcIntosh
E.McConscil'
TP/1/B/230/10
Quench Tank Operational Test
E
iehIcr
E.Barr
TP/1/B/270/32
Main Steam Stcp Valve Leak Rate
' Test
.
E McIntosh
E.McCbnnell".
TP/1/B/270/33
Main Steam R'elief Valve Test.
'
L KoehIer
E..McDonouglL
TP/1/A/330il
Control Rod Drive System Inte-
grated Test
E..McD nough'.
TP/1/A/330/3A
Control Rod Drive Rod Drop Time
L Dehler
o
Test
-
L Koehler
F. McDbncugli
TP/1/B/330/2D
CRD Syctem Patching Schc=c & Func
Cabling & Patching
L Kochler
W..Erown.
TP/1/B/600/4
Chemical Addition and Sampling
System Operational Test
.
L LehIer
W'. Chlt
TP/1/B/600/5
Reactor Coolant System Chemistry
Test
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.
R. Kochler
W.. Ottlk
TP/1/B/600/6
Steam Generator Chemistry Test
L DehIce
E. Barre
TP/1/3/600/8
Compenent Cooling System Oper-
ation.11 Test
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M. ..cIntosh
E. Secrgakos
TP/1/A/6C.0/10
Reactot Coolant System !!ct 1.e..
j
Test
,
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R. Ecchier
R. Ecufic3d
TP/1/E/600/12
Pressuri::cr Operational Test.
EXHIBIT A
_ _ __ - ____
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Restionsibili ty,
Test Coordinator
Procedure 0
Name
.-
s
E. Brown
J. Sig=an
TP/1/A/600/14
Pipe & Componeret Hanger Hot
Deflection & Inspection. Test
M. McIntosh
T. McConnell
TP/.1/B/600/21
Reactor Coolant System. Hyd' ogen.
r
Additica Test
H. McIntosh
T. Mccennell
TP/1/B/600/22
' Degassification Test
H. McIntosh
'T. McConnell
TP/1/A/600/23
Eccrgency Operatio.I of the
Nuc1 car Stean SuppIy- Systen.
.
.
.
R. Koehler
TP/1/C/600/25
OTSG Shell Surface Ten:p-st,ww
Test (FOAK)
~
1. ,J..l u
. C:111 .,
T"/1/J./'O^/26
l 00 ?:I; "'? ?r::;;;; I M. ..
"
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. .v
" ~ ~~ > c *~ 71ri T
c.
.
R. Koehler
R. Frink
TP/1/ /203/61.
Lou Pressure Infection.500 Es1'g
"
Engineered Safeguard' Test
.
R. Koehler
O. Bradham
TP/1/A/600/18
RPS Functional Test
R. Kochler
R. Benfield
Loose Parts Ecnitoring;
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Ltr to Duke Power Company
dti 8/30/72
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DISTRIBUTICL
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J. G. Keppler, RO
u-'
J. B. Henderson, RO
RO Office of Operations Etaluation
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RO AD for Inspection & Enforcement
L. DD for Reactor Projects
RO Files
t
DR Central Files
,
- PDR
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- Local PDR
- NSIC
- DTIE
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- To be dispatched with licensee response.
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