05000348/LER-1980-037-01, /01T-0:on 800613,Westinghouse Notified Util of Potential for Damage to Centrifugal Charging Pumps Due to Inadequate Flow Following Secondary Side High Energy Line Rupture.Caused by Inadequate Consideration During Design

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/01T-0:on 800613,Westinghouse Notified Util of Potential for Damage to Centrifugal Charging Pumps Due to Inadequate Flow Following Secondary Side High Energy Line Rupture.Caused by Inadequate Consideration During Design
ML19318C379
Person / Time
Site: Farley Southern Nuclear icon.png
Issue date: 06/27/1980
From: Hairston W
ALABAMA POWER CO.
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML19318C373 List:
References
LER-80-037-01T, LER-80-37-1T, NUDOCS 8007010412
Download: ML19318C379 (3)


LER-1980-037, /01T-0:on 800613,Westinghouse Notified Util of Potential for Damage to Centrifugal Charging Pumps Due to Inadequate Flow Following Secondary Side High Energy Line Rupture.Caused by Inadequate Consideration During Design
Event date:
Report date:
3481980037R01 - NRC Website

text

{{#Wiki_filter:_ ad FORM :"a3 - 'U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 17 778 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT CONTROL BLOCK: l l l l l l lh (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION) 1 o la j il l A l L l J l M l F l 1 l@l 0 l0 l-10 l0 l0 l0 l0 l -l 0l 0l@l 4l 1{ 1l ll 1l@l l l@ 7 4 J L6CENSEE CODE 34 b LtCENSE Nu'.tdsR 20 26 LICENSE FYPE JJ bl Lei $3 COffT lo!il {-{0"7 l L !@l 0 l 5 l 0 l 0 l 0 l 3 l 4 l 8 @l 0 l 6 ' ll l 3 l 8 l 0 '@l0 16 l2 l718 l0 l@ ,c 7 3 60 61 DOcetET NL'.tsEM t>d 63 EV ENT DATE 16 a REP 34 T CATE 60 EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROB ABLE CONSEQUENCES h jol:l l Westinghouse notified Alabama Power Company of the potential for damage to one or more centrifugal charging pumps due to inadequate flow throt.:;h the pump (s) following ,g,3, a e,econdary side high energy line rupture. A plant specific review for FNP resulted ; ,o ;, j g in a determination on 6/13/80 that this information is reportable under y ,,,3; Tech. Spec. 6.9.1.8.1. g

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hlABA'!A POWER CD'9ANY JOSEPH M. FARLEY MUCLEAR PLANT DOCKET NO. 50-3*8 /sTTACHMENT TO LER 80-037/01T-0 Facility: Joseph M. Farley Unit 1 Report Date: 6-27-80 Event Date: 6-13-80 Identification of Event: Westinghouse notified Alabama Power Company of the potential for. damage to one or more centrifugal charging pumps due to inadequate flow through the pump (s) following a secondary side high energy line rupture.

Conditions Prior to Event

The unit was in Mode 1 at the time of notification.

Description of Event

Westinghouse notified Alabama Power Company of the potential for damage to one or more centrifugal charging pumps due to inadequate flow through the pump (s) following a secondary side high energy line rupture. A pisnt specific -~~ r review for FNP resulted in a determination on 6/13/80 that this information is reportable under Tech. Spec. 6.9.1.8.1. Designation of Aonarent Cause: The above concerns were not adequately considered during engineering design and review of the High Head Safety Injection System.

Analysis of Event

A review by Westinghouse indicated the potential for the occurrence of the following scenario: Foll'owing a secondary side high energy line rupture and associated reactor trip, Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure and temperature initially decrease. Safety injection is actuated and the centrifugal charging pumps (CCP) start to increase RCS inventory. As a result of RCS.heatup and inventory increase the RCS pressure could rise to the pressurizer safety valve setpoint of 2500 psia (pressurizer power-operated re?ief valves (PORV's) actuation cannot be considered since they are i not safety-related).within approximately 200 seconds and renain at that pressure until transient " turnaround". Transient 1

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"turnarouad" can occur between 1800 and 4200 seconds depending on operator action and available equipment. During the initial portion of this transient, the SI' termination criteria may not be satisfied. Consequently, the RCS pressure can reach the pressurizer safety valve relief pressure before CCP operation is terminated. During this period, the minimum ficw required for CCP operation must be satisfied -by flow to the 7.C3 since the CCP miniflow isolation valves are automaticali; closed on safety injection initiation. This ' requires that the CCPs be able to deliver their minimum required flow to the RCS at the safety valve setpoint pressure. The results of the conservative caluelations show that with two charging pumps operating in parallel the maximum RCS pressure at which 60 GPM flowrate is maintained through the "ueakest" CCP at FNP is less than the safety valve pressure setpoint of 2500 PSIC. The calcula: ions indicate that the 60 GPM minimum cannot be guaranteed if the pump miniflow valves are closed in the above accident scenario. Ef fect on Plant This occurrence had no ef fect on plant operation.

Corrective Action

Alabama Power Company is evaluating interim corrective action proposed by Uestinghouse and will submit followup reports as necessary. Long term corrective action will be initiated af ter additional studies and analyses are performed by Westinghouse and Alabama Power Company. Failure Dsta None 9 }}