ML19309F464

LER 80-030/03L-0:on 800327,visual Insp of More than 6,000 Electrical Fire Seals Revealed 350 Seals Missing or Requiring Resealing.Caused by Initial Installation Being Missed in Most Cases.New Seals Were Installed

ML19309F464
Person / Time
Site:	FitzPatrick
Issue date:	04/25/1980
From:	W. Verne Childs POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (NEW YORK
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML19309F457	List: ML19309F456 ML19309F464
References
LER-80-030-03L, LER-80-30-3L, NUDOCS 8004290482
Download: ML19309F464 (2)

Text

NRC FORM 3G6 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 8004200 CONTROL BLOCK: l l l l l l h (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION) lo l1l 7 8 9 lN lY lJ l A lF l1 l@l0l0l-10 l0l0l0l-l0l0l0l@l4l1lIl1lIl@l LICENSEE COOE 14 15 LICENSE NuY8ER 26 26 LICENSE TYPE JO l

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? 8 60 61 68 69 EV ENT OATE REPCRT OATE COCK ET NUMBER EVENT OESCRIPTION AND PROSABLE CONSEQUENCES h ,

lo 121 l Visual inspection of more than 6000 electrical fire seals reanired hv TR l lo lal j 4.12.F revealed 350 seals missing on requi rina resealino. No sianificant 1 10141 l hazard existed. See attachment for details. I l

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43 44 47 CAUSE DESCR6PTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS liloIlInitial installation missino in most Cases. Fire watch was stationed until l lilii Inew seals were installed. No addition.al action recuired. See ar ru%n e I ti12; Ifor details. I I

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l i 141 1 7 8 9 90 ST S  % POWER OTHER STATUS IS O RY DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION li 15 l l E l@ l0 l 719 l@l NA l lBl@l Surveillance Test l ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED OF RELEASE AVOUNT OF ACTIVITY LOCATION OF RELEASE li I61 d h dh!

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• l POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT DOCKET N0. 50-333 ATTACHMENT TO LER 80-030/03L-0 Page 1 of 1 During normal operation while conducting operations surveillance test F-ST-76L, titled " Electrical Fire Barrier Penetration Seals Visual Inspection,"

to satisfy the requirements of Technical Specifications Paragraph 4.12.F, 350 fire barrier penetration seals were found to be either missing or requiring resealing. The actual inspection of the more than 6000 penetrations and corrective action extended over a period of several weeks. In each case, as the need for resealing of a penetration was identified, the personnel performing the inspection acted as the fire watch required by Technical Specifications, until the corrective action was complete. The event did not represent a significant hazard to the public health and safety.

A review of documentation related to the requirements for sealing of electrical penetrations indicates that sealing was not required by the NRC at the time the operating license was issued. Subsequent to the issue of the operating license, and following the 1975 fire at the Browns Ferry Plant, a procedure for sealing penetrations was developed and implemented.

It is believed that during this post-construction installation, the above noted missing seals were not properly installed. In most cases the missing seals were not located directly at the fire barrier (wall or floor) but were located a number of feet from the penetration at the end of an electrical conduit which penetrates the fire barrier and travels some distance beyond to a termination adjacent to a cable tray. This physical separation probably resulted in the installation error. Since the inspection is now complete and the seals installed, no additional corrective action is required.

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