ML19309C571
| ML19309C571 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 05/01/1967 |
| From: | JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT CO., METROPOLITAN EDISON CO. |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8004080809 | |
| Download: ML19309C571 (1) | |
Text
I Dockst 50-289 Supplsmint No. 4 December 22, 1967 Supple =ent No. 4 Emergency Core Ocoling System Changes have been made to the emergency core cooling system to provide independence between the subsystems. These changes are presented sche-matically in Figures 6-1, 9-8, and 9-10.
The changes may be st=z=arized as follows:
1.
Two 100 percent capacity low pressure injection pumps (3000 gym each) are used to inject and recirculate coolant after an accident through each of two decay heat coolers and into two separate reactor vessel nozzles.
2.
A separate sump suction line is provided to each of two low pressure pumps. These lines are jacketed from the reactor building out through the sump isolation valve.
3.
Three 100 percent capacity high pressure injection pumps are providec to assure subsystem independence following an accident. Each of these pu=ps is capable of pu= ping 500 gpm at a total developed head of 1h00 feet. Each emergency core cooling subsystem vill contain one of these pumps. Either the third pu=p or one of the two emer-gency pu=ps may be used to supply seal water flov and reactor coolan*.
system makeup during normal plant operation. The four injection lines are brought individually outside the reactor building with separate remotely operated isolation valves.
h.
The decay heat cooler outlet can be cross connected to the high pressure pu=p suction to provide high pressure injection after enter-ing the recirculation mode should the reactor coolant pressure be above the maximum discharge pressure of the core flooding tanks and low pressure pumps.
5.
To provide independence between the reactor building cooling system and the core cooling syste=s, the cooling water for these two functions has been completely separated. This has been accom-plished by installing a separate set of pumps to circulate river wate directly through the reactor building coolers. Additional pumps and coolers are included to provide separate open and closed loop cooling systems for the decay heat coolers.
6.
The criterion for separation of the system is as follows:
Each sub-system vill be arranged and physically separated to permit detection and isolation of leakage from a given subsystem. Leakage detection vill be proviN by separate auxiliary su=p level detectors. Wall or equipment sh.4
'.ds will assure that leakage from a given subsystem vil reach the ar repriate sump.
The indepradence that is described above is reflected throughout the auxiliar* systems and extends to the ulti= ate heat sink.
8 004 0so 3D 0004 115 t
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DOCKET 50-2E O
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LETROPOLITAN EDISON COMPAN l
THREE MILE ISLAND NUCLEAR STATION 0
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l PRELIMINARY SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT 1
AMENDMENT NO.8 0004 116 O
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Docket No. 50-289 February 23, 1968 O
AMENDMENT NO. 8 METROPOLITMI EDISON CCMPANY THREE MILE ISLAND NUCLEAR STATION Amendment NO. 8 to the Metropolitan Edison Capany's Preliminary Safety Analysis Report consists of Supplement No. 5 Supplement No. 5 should be placed directly behind Supplement No. k in Volume k.
Also included are four copies of the Table of Contents, page vii. One of these revised pages should be placed in each of the four volumes.
i I
i l
0004 117 O.
i 1
l iA
TABLE OF APPENDICES O
Autendix 1A TECHNICAL QUALIFICATIONS.
..... Volume 3... Tab 1A 2A ENGINEERING GEOLOGY AND FOUNDATION CONSIDERATIONS.
. Volume 3... Tab 2A 23 SEISMOLOGY AND METEOROLOGY.
. Volume 3... Tab 23 2C GROUND *4ATER HYDROLOGY.
. Volume 3... Tab 2C 2D GEOLCGY
. Volume 3... Tab 2D SA STRUCTURAL DESIGN BASES.
. Volume 3... Tab 5A 53 DESIGN PROGRAM FOR REACTOR BUILDING.. Volume 3... Tab 53 5C DESIGN CRITERIA FOR REACTOR BUILDING. Volume 3... Tab SC 5D QUALITY CONTROL.
. Volume 3... Tab 5D 5E LINER PLATE SPECIFICATION
. Volume 3... Tab SE 5F REACTOR BUILDING INSTRUENTATION.
. Volume 3... Tab 5F Suunlement 1.
. Volume h.. Supplement No.1 2.
. Volume 4
. Supplement No. 2 3.................... Volum..
. supplement Ho. 3 4
. Volume h.. Supplement No k 5.................... Volume h.. Supplement No. 5 0004 118 O
vii (Revised 2-23-68)
~
~}
TABLE OF APPENDICES O
Annendix 1A TECHNICAL QUALIFICATIONS.
. Volume 3... Tab 1A 2A ENGINEERI:iG GEOLOGY AND.nuNDATION CONSIDERATIONS.
. Volume 3... Tab 2A 23 SEISMOLCGY AND METEOROLOGY,
olume 3... Tab 23 2C GROUND WATER HYDROLCGY.
volume 3... Tab 2C 2D GEOLOGY
. Volume 3... Tab 2D 5A STRUCTURAL DESIGN BASES.
. Volume 3... Tab 5A 5B DESIGN PROGRAM FOR REACTOR BUILDING.. Volume 3... Tab 53 SC DESIGN CRITERIA FOR REACTOR BUILDING. Volume 3... Tab SC SD QUALITY CONTROL.
. Volume 3... Tab 5D SE LINER PLATE SPECIFICATION
. Volu=e 3... Tab 5E 5F REACTOR BUILDING INSTRLMENTATION.
. Volume 3... Tab 5F Sunnlement 1.
. Volume h.. Supplement No.1 2.
. Volume k.. Supple =ent No. 2 0
3 ve1=e'-
s=>>1 e== se 3 h.
. Volume h.. Supplement No. h 5.................... Volume h.. Supplement No. 5 0004 119 O
vii (Revised 2-23-68)
TABLE OF APPENDICES O
Aurendix 1A
- ECHNICAL QUALIFICt':2ONS.
. Volume 3... Tab 1A 2A ENGINEERING GEOLOG_Y AND FOUNDATION CONSIDERATIONS.
. Volume 3... Tab 2A 23 SEISMOLOGY AND METEOROLOGY,
. Volume 3... Tab 2B 2C GROUND-WATER HYDROLOGY.
. Volume 3... Tab 2C 2D GEOLOGY
. Volume 3... Tab 2D 5A STRUCTURAL DESIGN BASES.
. Volume 3... Tab SA 5B DESIGN PROGRAM FOR REACTOR BUILDING.. Volume 3... Tab.53 5C DESIGN CRITERIA FOR REACTOR BUILDING. Volume 3... Tab SC SD QUALITY CONTROL..
..... Volume 3... Tab SD SE LINER PLATE SPECIFICATION
. Volume 3... Tab 5E 5F REACTOR BUILDING INS 3UMENTATION.
. Volume 3... Tab 5F Sunnlement 1.
. Volume h.. Supplement No. 1 2.
. Volume h.. Supp1ement No. 2 O
3................
. ve1 me h.. S >>1eme
- Ne. 3 h.
. Volume h.. Supplement No. h 5.................... Volume h.. Supplement No. 5
'l 0004 120 O
i vii (Revised 2-2 3-68)
..l
TABLE OF APPENDICES O
Appendix 1A TECHNICAL QUALIFICATIONS.
. Volume 3... Tab 1A 2A ENGINEERING GEOLOGY AND FOUNDATION CONSIDERATIONS.
. Volume 3... Tab 2A 23 SEISMOLOGY AND METEOROLOGY.
. Volume 3... Tab 23 2C GROUND-WATER HYDROLOGY.
. Volu=e 3... Tab 2C 2D GEOLOGY
. Volume 3... Tab 2D 5A STRUCTURAL DESIGN BASES.
. Volume 3... Tab 5A 53 DESIGN PROGRAM FOR REACTOR EUILDING.. Volume 3... Tab 53 5C DESIGN CRITERIA FOR REACTOR BUILDING. Volu=e 3... Tab SC 5D QUALITY CONTROL.
. Volume 3... Tab 3D SE LINER PLATE SPECIFICATION
. Volu=e 3... Tab 5E 5F REACTOR BUILDING INSTRLHEUTATION.
. Volu=e 3... Tab 5F Surelement 1.................... Volume h.. Supplement No. 1.
2..
. Volume h.. Supplement No. 2 3.................... Volume h.. Supplement No. 3 h.................... Volume h.. Supplement No. k 5.................... Volume h.. Supplement No. 5 0004 121 o
vii (Revised 2-23-68)
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p-Docket No. 50-289 Supplement No. 5 February 23, 1968
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SUPPLEMENT NO. 5 The following information is submitted in response to an oral
" inquiry by the AEC regulatory staff regarding what possibility there is for an airplane hitting the Three Mile Island station while arriving or departing from Olmsted State Airport and re-garding the capability of the station,to safely withstand such an unlikely event.
Section A presents a discussion of the probability of such an event and concludes that there is less than about one chance in one million per year that it could occur.
~
Section B presents a discussion of the capability of vital areas of the station to safely withstand a hypothetical ai. craft inci-dent.
SECTION A - PROBABILITY OF AN AIRPLANE STRIKE The Three Mile Island Station is two and one-half miles (straight line distance) from the eastern end of the single runway of Olmsted State Airport.
The station is about one and one-half miles to the southwest of the extended cunway center line.
The respective location of the station and the airport and its r'un-way ar2 shown in Figure 2-2 of the pSAR, which is also included as Figure A-1 of this supplement.-
Air traffic in the site area is discussed briefly in Section 2.2.3 of the pSAR and flight patterns in and out of Olmsted Airport are described in Supplement 1 (dated October 2, 1967) in answer to the AEC Staff's question numbered 2.6.3.
Those responsible for planning and operations for the Olmsted Airport, formerly the Olmsted Air Force Base, have indicated that there are no plans for additional runways and that present flight patterns are well established.
The probability of crashes into the plant by aircraf t arriving or departing Olmsted has been approximated by examining 10 years of records in the S. air carrier accidents gggual statistical summaries of U.
and individual aircraf t accident reports i
Il}U.
S.
Air Carrier Accidents, Statistical Review and Resume of Accidents; annual edition, 1956-65, inclusive; Civil Aero-nautics Board, Bureau of Safety.
i A-1
.i.
available from the Bureau of Safety of the Civil Aeronautics Board.
These records cover about eighty million aircraft move-ments (landings plus take-of f s).
The accident occurrences related to them are summarized in Tables A-1, A-2, A-3 and Figure A-2.
Using these data as a basis and the approximations described below, it is estimated that for each aircraft movement (landing and take off) at Olmsted there is about one chance in 5 x 1010 of a crash into the plant.
This is egggvalent to a recurrence interval of about one strike in 5 x 10 years for each aircraft movement per year.
If it is assumed that there are about eighty thousand aircraft movements per year at Olmsted, (about four times the present movement rate) the chance of a crash into the plant in any one year is less than one in a million (i.e.,
is equivalent to a strike recurrence interval of once in more than a million years).
The types of air carrier aircraft which now use Olmsted airport in terms of approximate percent of total air carrier movements are:
Convair 580 67%
DC-9 10 Fairchild F-27 10 Boeing 707 3
Other 10 100 Because it is served primarily by local service carriers and by shorter flights of trunk carriers, there is a higher portion of smaller aircraf t than at major airports and this relative pattern will probably continue in the future.
In addition to air carrier movements there are small civilian and executive aircraft flights (probably less than 10% of total flights), some Air National Guard flights from a unit stationed at Olmsted (probably less than 10% of total flights and using C-121 type aircraft) and some small percentage of transient military flights including helicopters.
Of all of the aircraf t presently using the airport, the Boeing 707 is the largest type.
As indicated above, most of the aircraft movements at Olmsted are of the air carrier type.
This proportion is likely to in-crease in the future, particularly if traf f 'c increases to about four times the present rate as has been assumed in the proba-bility analysis.
Therefore, the use of air carrier accident O
statistics is appropriate.
0004 123 A-2
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()
As indicated in Section B, hereto, protection is afforded in the plant against a crash by an airplane of about 300,000 lb.
weight (which is typical of the Boeing 707 class or against the worst missile likely to result therefrom).
Presently, about three percent of movements at Olmsted involve this class of airplane.
If this ratio is maintained for the projected 80,000 movements per year and if it is assumed that crash frequency for 300,000 lb. class airplanes is the same as for all those considered, the chance of such an airplane hitting the plant would be about one in 30 million per year.
There are aircraft which may be used in the future which are larger than the 300,000 lb. c lass (e. g., the Boeing 747. )
If, as seems reasonable, they do not comprise more than 1 to 10%
of air traffic at Olmsted and if they have similar crash frequencies as present air carrier aircraft, the chances of their hitting the plant should be less than one in 10 to one in 100 million per year, assuming there are about 80,000 movements per year.
The estimated chance of a crash into the plant (i.e. about one chance in a million per year) is in the order of a hundred times less likely than other types of extreme environmental ef fects (i.e.,
from tornadoes and floods) for which the plant is designed
()
Aircraft Accident Statistics The Bureau of Safety of the Civil Aeronautics Board publishes annual statistical reports on U. S. Air Carrier accidents.
Ta ble 1 summarizes data contained in these reports for the period 1956 through 1965, inc lusive, based on about 80 million aircraft movements.
Individual accident reports were examined to determine the portion of the total f atal accidents (roughly comparable to high energy accidents) which occurred in the proximity of airports (i.e., within a 5 mile radius of the end of the runway being used).
The results are summarized in Table A-2 for operations -
in Continental U.
S.
The types of aircraft involved in these accidents are, listed in Table A-3.
Probability of Airplane Strikes on Three Mile Is la n'd In order to get an approximation of the probability of an air-plane crash into the plant, the geographical distribution of crash impact locations with respect to the runway being used I
was plotted for all fatal crashes listed in Tables A-2 and A-3 for the chosen-ten-year period.
Then the relative location af the plant and the ends of the Olmsted runway were sumperimposed A-3 0004 124 i
O on a plot.
The results are given in Figure A-2 for both arrival and departure crashes.
Examination of Figure A-2 indicates that 15 of the 17 landing accidents were within + one-half mile of the extended runway centerline.
Only two of them were outside the + one-half mile runway width.
Thus, it is clear that there is not an equal probability of a landing accident strike in the area near an airport.
To provide some adjustment for this situation, it is assumed for purposes of estimation that 15 of the arrival acci-dents strike within + one-half mile of the runway centerline and that the other two have an equal probability of striking anywhere else within a four mile radius circle.
Thus, there are two crashes which have some probability of being superim-posed on the station location.
The fatal departure accidents numbered 10 over the 10 year perio<
and 5 of them were within a 1 mile radius of the end of a runway To provide for the non-uniform probability of takeof f accidents striking in the vicinity of the airport, it is assumed that 50%
of them strike within a 1 mile radius of the end of the runway and the other 50% have an equal probability of striking anywhere else within a 4 mile radius.
All accident locations plotted in Figure A-2 are assumed to be within the 4 mile radius even thougl one departure accident lies slightly outside this radius.
- Thus, there are 5 crashes which would have some probability of being s
superimposed on the station location.
During the 10 year period of record there were approximately 40 million aircraf t arrivals and 40 million departures.
Thgrefore, the applicable accident frequency (f) is about 5/40 x 10 or 1.25 x 10-7 per departure and 2/40 x 106 or 5 x 10-8 per landing Using these numbers, the probability of a crash on the station for any one landing or takeoff was taken to be the applicable accident frequency times the ratio of the " target area" of the plant to the " total area" in which the applicable accidents are assumed to happen with random distribution.
These areas were estimated as follows:
(1)
The " target area" for arrival (landing) accidents was assumed to be approximately the horizontal area (on the ground) which would be covered by the plant plus the shadow cast by the largest vertical cross section of the pinnt (excluding cooling towers) assuming light rays emanate from the plane as it approaches the plant along a line inclined 100 above the horizontal.
This I ()
^-4 0004 125
O angle was chosen as being a typical descent line for airplanes crashing on landing.
(If the angle were greater, the area would be less and the probability of a strike would be less).
The area of the shadow so obtained was increased by 50% to account for airplanes which might crash in front of the plant and slide into it.
The resulting target ' area for arrival accidents (here called A,) is about 0.0225 square miles.
(2)
The " target area" for departure (take-off) accidents was similarly estimated using a 450 approach angle believed typical of departure crashes.
This area (here called A ) was estimated to be 0.0066 square d
miles.
(3)
The " total area" for random distributign of degarture accidents.(here called A is
'7 (4)
"'(1) or Sima1Nr)ly,
47.1 square miles.
the "totgl area" for arrival accidents (Ata) is about
""(4) -lx8 = 42.2 square miles.
For any one. arrival, the probability (p ) of hitting the plant is:
8 0'
- 2.66x10-11 P
~f A /A 5 x 10 x
_q2.
a a
a ta Similarly, for any one departure, the probability of hitting the plant is:
- 1. 25 x 10-x 0.0066/47.1 7 1. 75x10-ll pd"fAdd td A
=
and for both departures and arrivals the average probability is
- 7 Fd
- 2.2 x 10-11 A
This is equivalent to a recu5rence interval of one strike every 4.5 x 1010 (or, say, 5x 101
) yo,,,p.,,1,c,,ft moy,,,nt p
year.
If it is assumed that there are about 80,000 aircraft movements a year at Olmsted and that half of the take-of f s (20,000) and half the landings (20,000) are from the end of the runway nearest-the plant and therefore could affect it, the chance for the plant being hit is:
.88x10-6 p = 20,000 (pa+pd)
=
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0004 126 A -o.
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This is equivalent to a recurrence interval for a crash on the plant of about once in 1.13 million years and indicates that there is less than cne chance in a million that an airplane j
will crash into the plant in any one year.
0004 127 I
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O TABLE A-1
SUMMARY
OF U. S. AIR CARRIER ACCIDENTS (1,2)
ALL OPERATIONS Year Total hccidents Fatal Accidents ( )
1956 107 9
1957 113 14 1958 90 15 1959 102 18 1960 90 17 1961 84 11 1962 70 10 1963 77 13 O
1964 79 13 1965 83 9
l (1)
From U. S. Air Carrier Accidents, Statistical Review and Resume oI Accidents, annual editions 1956-65, Civil Aeronautics Board, Bureau of Safety.
(2)
A "U. S. Air Carrier" is defined in the referenced report as "those operators who have been issued a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity by the - Civil Aeronautics Board."
(3)
Fatal accidents are those in which one or more human fatalities occurred.
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0004 128 A_7 1
TABLE A-2 FATAL. ACCIDENTS IN THE PROXIMITY OF AIRPORTS (
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CONTINENTAL U. S.
NUMBER Year Total Arriving Departure 1956 1
0 1
1957 3
2 1
1958 3
2 1
1959 4
3 1
1960 2
0 2
1961 2
1 1
1962 3
2 1
1963 4
3 1
1964 3
2 1
1965 2
2 0
27 17 10 0
TABLE A-3 TYPES OF AIRCRAFT INVOLVED IN THE FATAL ACCIDENTS LISTED IN TABLE A-2 Year Aircraft 1956 Martin 404 1957 Convair, DC6, DC3 1958 DC7, Convair, Viscount 1959 Electra, DC3, M202, L1049 1960 Electra, C46 1961 Electra, LO49 1962 B707, DC7, L1049 1963 Viscount, L1049, Martin 404, DC3 1964 DC4, DC3, L1049 1965 B727, B727-(1)
Source:
Aircraft Accident Reports, National Trans-s portation Safety Board, Department of Transportation.
(2)
Within a five-mile radius of the end of the runway being used.
A8 0004 129
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Supp. No.5 2/23/68 l
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Island Station Location s
4 miles 4 miles CDh Arriving (17)
Departing (10) h APPROXIMATE CRASII LOCATIONS OF FATAL ACCIDENTS OF U.
S. AIR CARRIERS, j
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WITHIN CONTINENTAL U.
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IN PROXIMITY OF AIRPORT, IN TAKEOFF AND LANDING OPERATIONS
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ti TEN YEARS:
1956 - 65 e
i Note:
7 Locations are relative to l
Dockst 50-289 Supplemant No. 5 February 23, 1968 HYPOTHETICAL AIRCRAFT INCIDENT Section B - Design Objective Capability to Withstand Air Strike Although the probability of an aircraft incident at the Three Mile Islan4 Nuclear Station is extremely remote, the principle structures and component of the plant, set forth below, vill have the capability of withstanding hyI thetical aircraft strike related loadings such u :
Case Item Weight Velocity Effective /
A Object 6,000 lbs.
200 knots 5 ft. diame B
Object h,000 lbs.
200 knots 3 ft, diame C
Total Aircraft 300.000 lbs.*
200 knots 16 ft. diame D
Total Aircraft 200,000 lbs.
200 knots 19 ft. diame i
and thereby preclude the occurrence of any accident condition not previousi-evaluated.
These loadings are typical of those which may be associated O
with an incident involving commercial, multi-engine, jet aircraft traveling at a =v hum speed of 200 knots or 334 ft/sec. Other loadings such as the consequences of an exploding fuel tank will be considered if such an accide:
is found to be possible. Collateral effects of the loadings, such as the generation of secondary missiles, fire, and pressure and temperature effect:
vill be considere'd to assure the capability of bringing the plant to a safe shutdown condition.
1.
Reactor Building - The impact of the loadings described as Cases A, B, C, and D vill be evaluated on the apex of the dome and at a sign:
ficant location on the cylinder to assure that the hypothetical objects are prevented fra penetrating the external reactor contain-ment structure or causing it to collapse. The interior structures and major components are supported from the base mat independent of the containment shell. Consequently their response due to the hypothetical aircraft strike is mini ni (i.e. less than that asso-ciated with the seismic disturbance). The only other significant items attached to the containment shell include the polar crane and the spray header piping. The trolley and trucks of the crane
- The analytical check on the basis of this loading considered a high unifor:t collapse resistance of the fuselage, which further investigation indicated was not conservative.
Because of the extremely remote probability of such an aircraft impacting at the most unfavorable location and altitude, the structures of the plant vill be designed to have the capability; of with-standing a hypothetical strike of a 300,000 lb aircraft with the load-time description described in Appendix 3.
0004 132 E-1 (Revised 3-28-68) t
i l
i vill be tied down during plant operation to ensure no over-turning or sliding vill occur due to the most severe disturbance l
resulting from either the maximum seismic load or the hypothetical aircraft strike. The spray header piping vill similarly be checked to ensure collapse vill not occur.
It can therefore be concluded that loss-of-coolant accident will not occur due to the disturbance associated with the hypothetical aircraft strike and there vill be no release of radioactive material to the environment.
2.
Control Building - The impact of the aforementionea loadings on the roof at approximately Elevation 385'-0" and side valls vill be evaluated. The area to be protected is depicted on Figure B-1.
This check will be with the objectives of ensuring that:
a.
No penetration or collapse of the structure vill occur, b.
Instrumentation and controls necessary to shut down the reacte plant and maintain it in a safe condition vill be available.
c.
Access provisions v.nd ventilation systems are designed to prevent ingress of aircraft fuel, fire, smoke, or pieces of the aircraft which could cause unacceptable damage-d.
The Control Room remains habitable during and after the incident.
O 0004 133 i
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- t. a 3-la (Revised 3-28-68)
J
3.
Fuel Handling Building - The i= pact of the aforementioned loadings the roof and side valls vill be evaluated with the objective of sa+
l fying Items "a" and "c" listed under parsgraph "2" above. The openings for railroad entrance vill be siced and located such that the possible trajectories would not include one which would
)
result in the objects falling into the Spent Fuel Pool. The roof and valls of the structure vill afford protection against missile impingement. This is depicted on Figure B-1 and provides protectic 1
of the Spent Fuel Fool.
h.
Auxiliary Building - The i= pact of the aforementioned loadings on the roof and side valls will be evaluated with the objective of satisfying Ite=s "a" and "c" listed under paragraph "2" above.
The floors of the structure at Elevation 329'-0" or 305'-0" depen-ding upon the location vill afford missile protection for equipment located below these elevations. This is depicted on Figure B-1 and provides protection of critical items of the radioactive vaste treatment systems.
5 Intermediate Building - The impact of the aforementioned loadings o an enclosure surrounding the main steam lines to a location downstr of the isolation valves and surrounding the emergency feedvater pumps vill be evaluated with the objective of providing protection below the floor at approximately Elevation 3ho'-0".
This is depict on Figure B-1.
C.
Summary of Studies A preliminamy study was made to determine if a containment vessel of essentially'the same! geometry and design used for the Three Mile Island Nuclear Station provides protection against the impingement of those mis-siles described as Cases "A" and "B" (i.e. the 6,000 lb. and h,000 lb.
objects traveling at 200 knots). This study which is described more ecmpletely in Appendix A, indicates that the upper bound of displacement due to a direct central issile impingement on the spherical dome does not correspond to a condition of collapse." The study further indicates that penetration vill not occur due to local material failure.
- This preliminary analysis is ad=ittedly grossly conservative and assumes plastic response which the dynamic elastic analyses described hereafter indicates will not occur.
g) 000413f l
B-2 (Revised 3-23-oc)
I
A study of Case "C" vas made to determine the response due to the direct central impingement of a 300,000 lb aircraft on the deme. This study, which was a dynamic elastic analysis more completely described in Appendix B, indicates that the impingement of the total aircraft should not jeopardize the integrity of the dczne. It was assumed for this analysis that the impinging aircraft vould have a constant load time curve as shown in Figure 1 of Appendix 3.
This analysis considered a high collapse resist-ance of the fusela6e which further investigation indicates is not cen-servative.
A second study was made to determine the response due to a direct central impingement of a 200,000 lb aircraft on the dome. This was also a dynamic elastic solution as described in Appendix 3.
The results of this analysis indicate that the impingement of the 200,000 lb aircraft should not jeopardize the structural integrity of the deme. The load time curve for this aircraft is the result of a more intensive investigation of the phenc=ena associated with an airplane crash. The results of this investigation and a plot of the lead time curve is in Appendix C.
The potential pressure increase external to the critical structures caused by the rapid ccmbustion of the jet fuel is anticipated to pose no problem in that all critical structures consist of significant thickness of structural concrete and no confining space exists to produce hi h 6
local pressures. Aircraft crash fire experience has not indicated that O
0004 G
.r
- p. j i U ',
4 g
l 3-2a (Revised 3-23-c8) l k
Os the vapor cicuds release coincident with the deceleration of' an aircraft will produce serious blast hazards. The vapor clouds that can be formed by the bulk release of fuel from aircraft tanks can and do
- create large balls of fire, but since these release into open air where there is no confinement problem, no blast damages are anticipated. Nevertheless, a study win be made including use of the same analytical technique used to determine primary cavity pressure due to primary coolant breaks, as reported in the answer to Question 5.8 contained in Supplement No. 1 to the PSAR. Conservative assumptions on confining volume and vent area vill provide data as to credible over-pressure conditions.
The numbers of openings to the outside, from within areas housing vital components or systems required for the shutdown and maintaining the reactor plant in a safe condition, will be held to a minimum and essentially will be only those required for operator access and ventil-ation. A more complete study regarding capability to be provided for fire detection and protection following the hypothetical aircraft strike is included in Appendix "D".
Shielding win be provided for critical openings to prevent direct aircraft strikes upon the openings. Examples of use of both fixed and movable shields are shown in Appendix D, Figures 1 and 2.
The concrete structures will also be designed taking into consideration the development of secondary missiles and potential loss of structural capability due to scabbing or spalling of concrete.
Where objectionable secondary missiles may occur due to the scouring action of the reflected shock wave in the impact face or the scabbing effect of the propagated wave in the opposite face special systems of reinforcement vill be used to provide the needed tensile strength. This reinforcement win consist of either rebar trustes or anti-scabbing plates. The containment liner win of course provide this reinforcement.
The extension of all buildings designed to withstand the hypothetical aircraft strike vill be constructed of reinforced or prestressed concrete.
The valls and roofs of these buildings vill be of significant concrete thickness as required for radiation, missile, and/cr aircraft protection.
The =ild steel reinforcement for these buildings will have a concrete cover of 2 in. or more. The tendon conduit for the reactor building win have a minimum cover of 6 in. as specified in the answer to question 7.12.1 in Supplement #1.
Slabs and valls with 2 in. of concrete cover for the reinforcement and a thickness of 6 in. has a 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> fire rating.1 The two hour fire rating indicates that the 6 in. slab or van vin support its design 2
load while exposed to temperatures up to 1850 F for two hours. However, two hours is considered adequate time to extinguish any fire produced by an aircraft crash at this plant.
'pi
(, ;, ; ; [
3-3 (Revised 3-28-cS)
Spalling of concrete is considered to be of two types.1 The " explosive" spalling is produced when there is high relative humidity in the concrete and the free moisture changes to steam producing small pockets of pressure. This spalling starts at the surface exposed to the high temperatures and ";ropagates inward.
In the unlikely event that the necessary ingredients are present (high relative humidity and high temperatures) it is possible that some of the concrete could be spalled off. The only structural members that would be exposed to high tem-perature vould be the valls. The protective structures are designed such that a fuel fire vould not occur inside the structure. Burning fuel could be puddled on the roof slabs, however the concrete would not be exposed to high temperatures because the flame would be burning on the top of the slab and also on top of the fuel. There vould be no damage due to spal1%g of roof slabs. The valls could be exposed to flames and possible high temperatures in which under the ideal condition one could expect to lose concrete due to spalling. However, the valls are sized for radiation, missile, and/or aircraft protection and from a structural consideration; a loss of 2 in. of concrete would not jeopardize the structural integrity of the building.
The " sloughing off" type of spalling is produced when high temperatures tend to shrink the cement paste and at the same time expand the aggregate.
The sloughing spalling is experienced when aggregates containing more than 30 p-rcent free silica are used. Concrete using this type of aggregate is given a reduced fire endurance rating by The National Board of Fire Underwriters.1 The aggregate used in all vital structures for this plant is a limestone aggregate containing little or no fire silica or other ingredients that would ccuse sloughing.
D.
System Studies The plant layout provides significant physical separation between the off-site and emergency power supply of approximately 500 feet and located at opposite corners of the main building conplex as shown on Figure B-2.
This separation is considered to be sufficient to ensure that one of the power supplies vill t i
available following a hypothetical aircraft incident.
If; however, the situ-ation is postulated that both power sources are lost the expected results vill be as analyzed in section 14.1.2.8.3 and the answer to Question h.10.
In the unlikely event that the emergency diesel generators are temporarily removed from service due to a deficiency of oxygen caused by aircraft related fires simultaneously surrounding the diesels and filling the intermediate building, the statien batteries vill enable the plant to remain in a safe condition until the situation is corrected.
The emergency feedvater supply can be obtained from either one of the two con-densate storage tanks or the condenser hot vell.
In addition to the redundant dispersed water supplies, an e=ergency river make-up pump will also be pro-vided, as shown on Figure 9-8 to pump directly from the nuclear services l
cooling. water system to the suction of the emergency feed pumps. Protection v11fIIae:provided>to ensure operability of the emergency feedvater pumps 0004 137 E-3a (Revised 3-28-68)
including the energy sources for driving power. The emergency feedvater pump arrangement vill be modified so that one 5 percent capacity steam-driven pump and two 2-1/2 percent capacity motor-driven pumps will be provided in lieu of the two 5 percent capacity steam-driven pumps original' described elsewhere in the PSAR. With this arrangement the plant can expez ience the complete loss of all main steam lines uld still retain the capaci to deliver feedvater to the steam generators. The plant layout provides 1Symposium en Fire Resistance of Concrete - American Concrete Institute -
Publication SP-5.-
0004 138 O
l 1
I o,,..
B-3b (Revised 3-28-68)
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significant physical separation between the various feedvater sources as shown on Figure B-2.
This separation is considered to be sufficient to ensure that at least one feedvater source vill be available following a hypothetical aircraft incident.
The fire protection features vill include redundant dispersed water supplies, automatic fire pumps and a piping system to supply yard hydrants, interior fire hose stations, various automatic deluge water spray syste=s (including coverage of emergency diesel generators and station transformers). Activation of transformer fire protection systems vould cause, at the most, a brief interruption of off-site power.
In addition appropriate portable fire extinguishers vill also be included. All win be in accordance with recognized standards.
E=ployees win be trained to handle fire e=ergencies.
E.
Blowdown of @t_
eam Generators L
6' 6. y u The simultaneous rupture of four steam lines and the subsequent blevdown of both steam generators will cause the reactor syste= coolant temperature to decrease to about 515 degrees F in less than 20 seconds.
Immediately fonoving the blevdown, the reactor system coolant win heat up because decay heat generation is greater than emergency feedvater heat removal capacity. Reactor trip is initic.ted by the low primary system pressure caused by the initial cooldown.
The tripping of the reactor results in tripping of the turbine. This causes the main feedvater isolation and control valves to close, thereby stopping normal feedvater flow. The abnormally low pressure in both steam lines also causes the feedvater startup isolation valves to close, l
thereby stopping feedvater flow through the startup control valve. One l
of the two motor-driven emergency feedvater pumps, vill be started to supply feedvater. The turbine trip also causes the steam line icolation j
valves to close, thereby preventing further flow of steam from the steam generators to the atmosphere through the broken line. These valves are in an area protected from aircraft impingement and, therefore, vill not be affected by an aircraft accident. After the stesm line isolation valves have been closed, the primary system vin heat up to the nomal Sko degrees F shutdown temperature as a result of the decay heat being generated in the reactor. Thereafter, this temperature vill be maintained by removal of steam frcm the steam generator through the turbine bypass valve which is also located in the protected area. The secondary l
relief valves provide an alternate means for removing steam from the l
steam generator by discharging directly to the atmosphere.
In the event that one of the steam line isolation valves fails to close, feedvater to that steam generator would be stopped as a result of the differential pressure between the steam generators.
Further decay heat removal vould be threagh the isolated steam generator.
To demonstrate that the consequences of the accident are not sensitive to the operation of the isolation valves, an analysis was carried out in which both steam generators continue to discharge steam to the atmosphere through the ruptured lines. The initial cooldown vill cause the pressure in the reactor coolant system to drop to approxi=ately 800 psig. This is below the setpoint.
0004 139 3-h (Revised 3-28-66)
J
For actuation of the high pressure injection system, therefore, at the time of the accident, one high pressure injection pump will begin adding borated O
water to the reactor coolant system.
Subsequent decrease of the reactor system coolant temperature due to the addition of the colder borated high pressure injection water and removal of heat by the steam generators vill reduce the reactor system pressure to 600 psi. This results in the actuation of the core flooding tanks. The borated water added is more than sufficient to compensate for the reactivity added by cooldown of the reactor coolant.
The reactor vill remain suberitical throughout the transient, even for the case of having a 1 percent shutdown margin at Sh0 degrees F vith one rod stuck out of the core.
The doses which result from the rupture of a steam line have been presented in section 1h.1.2.9 of the Three Mils Island Nuclear Station PSAR.
In that analysis, it was assumed that the plant had been operating with steam generator tube leakage and 1 percent failed fuel. The total integrated doses at the site boundary were 0.88 rem thyroid and 0.00h rem whole body.
Rupture of all four steam lines vill not change these doses.
0004 140 O
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e Anvendix A O
1.
GENERAL A preliminary study was made to determine if a containment vessel of essentially the same geometry and dosis:n used for the Three Mile Island Nuclear Station provides protection against prescribed missiles resulting from a hypothetical aircraft impingement.
In this study the hn othetical missiles were defined as having the following properties:
Case Weight Velocity Impact Surface A
6,000 lb.
200 knots 5 ft. diameter B
h,000 lb.
200 knots 3 ft. diameter This preliminary study consisted of an investigation of the overall structs response due to central impact of the missile on a spherical dome as well a the resistance to penetration due to a local material failure.
2.
STRUCTURAL RESPONSE A.
Introduction An upper bound of permanent displacements was determined resulting from direct central aircraft impingement on a spherical dome. The
)
basic tool used was the displacement bound theorem for rigid-plastic d
continua.(1) The initial velocity distribution is determined on the basis of an inelastic collision between the missile and the structure.
3.
Limit Analysis for Ring Icads First we considered a simply supported spherical cap under a ring load (See Figure 1).
The intensity of the load is "P" per unit length (i.e. the total load = 2 wPa). A lower bound on the limiting value of "P" is found by determining a stress field which satisfies equilibrf condition and which nowhere violates the yieli m ndition.
To obtain a lower bound, ve assumed that for r 1 a N4 = 0, M,
=M o where "Me" is the fully plastic moment per unit length. On this basis l
it can be then determined that htrMo sin a 1
2xPa
=
y i
cos9_
in (1+sina) (1-sin?,)
(1+sini) (1-sinal 0004 143 vhere "2 x Pa" is the total ring lead.
O V
(1)J.IMartin,." Impulsive Loading Theorem for Rigid-Plastic Continua,"
J. Engineering Mechs. Div., ASCE, m5, October 196k, pp. 27 h2.
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For this condition where B approaches zero.
= 1.81s C.
Determination of the Initial '/elocity Field From the elastic solution f.sr a concentrated load at the apex of a shell investigators have f.eter=ined that "r " the length over which e
the initial velocity distribution is #
vhere "h" is the shell thickness.(2) (e t is approximately 2VhR 3
Therefore the initial velocity is sensibly zero for r =
r,.
The initial velocity distribution is considered proportional to the elastic static deflection due to a concentrated load at the apex.
Because it is difficult to determine these deflections in closed form for a spherical shell it was necessary to approximate the deflection by several functions each one of which were used to determine AM vhich is the fraction of the resronding dome = ass attaining the same velocity as the =issile immediately after contact.
"'hese functions included the following:
1.
Linear variation 2.
Simple triegonemetric variation 3.
Variation suggested by a simuly sutported circular plate under a central concentrated load.
d.
Variation suggested by a clamped circular plate under a central concentrated load.
For these cases the numerical values of " A ", v and T are as shown o
o on the attached Table 1.
where A
= fraction of responding dome mass as described before V
= velocity of AM i= mediately after contact o
T
= initial kinetic energy of the dome o
D.
Application of the Displacement Bound Theorem Using the displacement bound theorem it can be shown that:
U.B.
To y
l.81NMo U
where Wo.B.
is the upper bound of the deflection at r = 0.
(2)K. Forsberg and W. Flugge, " Point Load on a Shallov Elliptic Parabaloid,"
(,,g to appear in Journal of Applied Mechanics.
a 5 t
-(,0!+
(3)A. Kalnins and P. M. Naghdi, " Propagation of Axisy==etric Waves in an Unlimited Elastic Shell," Journal of Applied Mechanics, E, 1960, pp.
690-695.
0004 l44 u_2 j
. /
O "M ", the totally plastic sc=ent per unit length, is conservatively o
developed considering that at plastic collapse the tendons are not carryin.'s any load and that only the 3/8" steel liner acts as rein-forcemnt with a yield strength of 30,000 psi. Therefore Mo = 393,000 lb. ft/ft which results in a conservative lower bound.
Considering
/
the previous cases for distribution of initial velocity, the upper bout of displacements are therefore as shown on the attached Table 2.
The average value of 0.97 inches for W U.B. is considered to be a o
reasonable and representative number for an upper bound deflection.
It should be noted that this analysis provides only an order of mag-nitude determination of the upper bound of displacement and based upon comparison with actual displacement of a flat circular plate with "a/R = 0", that is a concentrated in lieu of a ring load, the upper bound errs on the high side.
The conclusion can be drawn on the basis of this analysis that the structural response of the dome does not produce a condition of collapse. This solution does not consider the problem of local material failures which could lead to a = ore serious proble's than the overall structural response.
3.
LOCAL MATERIAL FAILUR' A study was made of the problem of local penetration = akin 6 use of the modified Petry formula, wherein:
D = k Ap V' where D = depth (in feet) of penetration k = experi=entally obtained material's coefficient for penetration Ap = sectional pressure obtained by dividing the weight of the missile by its maximum cross-sectional area (expressed as pounds per square foot)
V2
'" = velocity factor expressed as legio (1 +
~
215,000 if'
(' ' l I';
i where "V" represents the ter=inal or striking i
velocity in feet per second.
On the basis of "k" of 0.0023 the penetrations are as follows Case A D = 0.128' 1.5h"
=
2.65" 0004 145 Case B D = 0.237'
=
both of which are less than the limit established for valid use of this equation.
lA-3 i
A r = 37. 0 '
l e
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o A
(rps)
(ft-lbs) 6 Case 1 0.1667 5.8 0.182 x 10 6
i Case 2 0.172 5.6 0.172 x 10 6
Case 3 0.228 h.3 0.133 x 10 6
Case h 0.130 7.h 0.23 x 10 i
-e 4
TABLE 2 r, = 37.0' II w.B.
i Case (in0hes) 1 0.995 2
0.925 3
0.715 I
h 1.2h5 Average 0.97 0004 146' 8
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APPENDIX A FIGC
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1 Appendix 3 O
The stability of the reactor containment structure vill be verified by means of dynamic elastic analyses for the impingement of the total aircraft.
Fcr the initial dynamic elastic analysis, it is considered that the most un-favorable area of i= pact is centered around the apex of the deme. Consequently the effect of a large aircraft impingement against the apex of the reinforced concrete dome is being studied by calculating the dynamic response of an elasti solid of revolution to time-dependent forces acting on the area of impact, as shown in Figure 1..
The magnitude and duration of the impact forces are determined according to the mass, structural characteristics, and vertical com-ponent of the velocity of the aircraft. The grid for the finite-element ideal-ization of the dome is given in Figure 2.
Based on virtual work, the equilibri equations for the entire structure are formulated as follows:
n (m)d + a (k) + 2S(m) d + (k) d = f where:
(m) = mass matrix a(k) + 2S(m) = damping matrix (k) = stiffness = atrix i
d
= displacement vector I
Dots indicate time derivatives. These equations are integrated by means of a Predictor-Corrector method with a Runge-Kutta-Gill starting procedure using a computer program developed at Franklin Institute Research Laboratories.
FIRL is acting as Consultant to GAI in connection with this problem.
Evaluation of the results, in conjunction with a procedure previously proposed by Dr. Steven Batterman and utilized in the study decribed in Appendix "B" to calculate limit (final) displacements in a rigid-perfectly plastic shell vill lead to safe estimates of the size and velocity of the largest aircraft that
=ay impinge upon the containment building without jeopardising its structural t
integrity.
An analysis was performed considering the following loading condition (Refer to Figure 1 of Appendix B for acunenclature):
~
200 psi E
Pn 0004 da
=
= 0 i
t1
>0.16 sec.
t
= t 2
3 The diameter of the impact area was considered to be 16 feet. In order j
to obtain a preliminary indication of displacements, this analysis was
~'
performed on the basis of the conservative assumption of no internal damping. Also to simpliP/ the solution, the steel liner was not considered.
Yb
13-1 (Revised 3-6-68) l E
9
"'ha equivalent dia=eter of the fuselage of the 3707 type aircraft is i
approxi=ately 13.3 ft.
The assined i= pact area is considered to be reasonably indicative of the impact area of such an aircraft considering the significant distortion which vill occur to the fuselage as well as the lead distribution afforded by the concrete to the =iddle surface of the dc=e.
The loading pressure of the 300,000 lb aircraft without i= pact would be 10.h psi. Therefore the loading considered represents a constant deceleration of the i=pacting aircraft of 20g. That means that the entire aircraft re=ains intact and all elements decelerate at 20g. This represents an equivalent load on the fuselage of the aircraft of 5,800,000 lb, which it is esti=ated would result in gross collapse of the aircraft. Therefore, this analysis is considered to be based upon a conservative evaluation of the hypothetical loading.
The analysis indicates that the =axi=u= displace =ents and stresses both of which occur at the center of i= pact (i.e. the apex of the do=e) are as follows:
Distlace=ent (in.)
Stress (psi)
-226h Maxi =u=
-0.98
+ 35h
-1832 Static
-0.66
+ 3h6 The displace =ent at the apex of the do=e as a function of time is depicted on Figure 3.
This graphical representation of displacements indicates that the most severe duration of the loading is equal to or greater than 0.16 seconds. The static displace =ent is that produced by the 200 psi loading applied for an infinite period. Figure h depicts the displace =ents and stresses which occur at time 0.16 seconds after i= pact which is the instant of =ax1=um displace =ent at the do=e apex.
The loading considered in this analysis represents the case where the air-craft with all its engines, fuel tanks, and vings remains intact and the total resulting load is applied on the nose of the aircraft.
It has been concluded that the resultant load due to one or both vings shearing off the fuselage and i=pacting against the do=e vill result in a less critical con-dition than that previously considered. The static displacement of the dome at the point of i= pact of one engine is approxi=ately 0.1 inches.
3.e displace =ent results frc= a loading equivalent to a 200g deceleration lll applied for 'an fnfinite period. The physical separation of engines is sufficien! to produce only a =ini=al increase in displace =ents due to the i= pact of multiple engines. This conclusion is further reinforced by the fact that the vings or engines upon separation fro = the re=ainder of the 1
aircraft vould be traveling at a significantly reduced speed. A further i
analysis will be perfor=ed to deter =ine the dynamic response due to the i= pact of =ultiple objects representing the engines to confir= the foregoing conclusion.
.]
0004 149 13-2 (F.evised 3-26-68)
]
r The conclusion can thsrefore ba safely drawn that the dome vill not cellapse-9 due to the conservatively established loading even if no consideration is given to the significant damping which would obviously occur.
0004 150 h
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SP ATIAL AND TIME DISTRIBl.
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AIRCRAFT IMPINGEMENT ON DOME j
152' 9 ENDIX 5 FIGURE 2
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