ML19308D575

Tech Spec Change Request 10a Re Tech Specs 3.4 & 4.5, Incorporating Surveillance Requirements for Throttle Valves Used to Obtain Required Flow Distribution in Hpis & LPIS Per NRC 770725 Request

ML19308D575
Person / Time
Site:	Crystal River
Issue date:	10/11/1977
From:	FLORIDA POWER CORP.
To:
Shared Package
ML19308D574	List: ML19308D573 ML19308D575
References
NUDOCS 8003040814
Download: ML19308D575 (5)

Text

_.

0. ~.

Technical Specification Change Request No.10a Replace pages 3/4 5-4, 3/4 5-5, and B 3/4 b-2 with the replacement pages 3/4 5-4', 3/4 5-5, and B 3/4 5-2 and B 3/4 5-3.

Reason for Proposed Change The NRC, in their letter of July 25, 1977, requested Florida Power Corporation to determine if-throttle valves are used to obtain the required flow distribution in the HPI and LPI Systems at Crystal River Unit 3. If throttle valves are used at CR#3, the NRC requested FPC to propose chances to the CR#3 Technical Specifications to incorporate the surveillance requirements given in the enclosure of their July 25, 1977, letter.

Since throttle valves are used at CR#3 to obtain the required flow distribution in the HPI and LPI Systems, we are submitting the attached proposed changes to the CR#3 Technical Specifications in accordance with the Commission's letter of July 25, 1977.

Safety Analysis Justifying Procosed Chanae The throttle valves are utilized to: (1) prevent total pump flow from exceeding runout conditions when the HPI or LPI System is in its minimum resistance configuration; (2) provide a prcper ficw split between injection points in accordance with the assumptions used in the ECCS-LOCA analyses, and (3) provide an acceptable level of total ECCS flow to all injection points equal to or above that assumeti in the ECCS-LOCA analyses. In view of the safety function associated with the proper setting of valves used to throttle flow in the HPI and LPI Systems, periodic verification of -the correct position of.each electrical and/or mechanical position stop for these throttle valves is justified. None of the requirements applicable to the safety analysis are diminished by the proposed surveillance requirements and no unreviewed safety i question is involved.

1 ECS: hic 2/15a 1

1 8008040

,s -- - .

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4 . 5 . 7. Each ECCS subsystem shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power operated or automatic) in the flow path tnat is not locked, sealed or otherwise secured in po-sition, is in its correct position.

b. By a visual inspection which verifies that no loose debris (rags, trash, clothing, etc.) is present in the containment which could be transported to the containment sump and cause restriction of the pump suction during LOCA conditions. This visual inspection shall be performed:

1. For all accessible areas of the containment prior to establishing CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY, and

2. Of the areas affected within containment at the

- completion of each containment entry *when CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY is established. '

c. By verifying the correct position of each mechanical position stop for the following swing check valves prior to placing the system back in service following inservice inspection or maintenance on the valves when the HPI System is re-quired to be operable.

HPI System - MUV-2, MUV-6, fiUV-10

d. By verifying that the flow switches for the following throttle valves operate properly prior to placint the system back in service following inservice inspection l or maintenance on the valves when the LPI System is

. required to be operable.

I LPI System - DHV-110, DHV-lli

e. At least once per 18 months by:

i

1. Verifying automatic isolation and interlock action of the DHR System from the Reactor Coolant System when the Reactor Coolant System pressure is > 284 psig.

2. Verifying the correct position of each mechanical position stop for each of the swing cneck valves listed in Specification 4.5.2.c.

3. Verifying that the flow switches for the throttle i

valves listed in Specification 4.5.2.d operate properly.

I CRYSTAL RTVER - UNIT 3 3/4 5-4 7

c-- y, www

o -

EMERGEf4CY CORE C00LIflG SYSTEMS SURVEILLAtlCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

4. A visual inspection of the containment emergency sump which l verifies that the subsystem suction inlets are not restricted by debris and that the sump components (trash racks, screens, etc.) show no evidence of structural distress or corrosion.

5.. Verifying a total leak rate < 6 gallons per hour for the LPI system at:

a) Normal operating pressure or hydrostatic test pressure

> 150 psig for those parts of the system downstream of the pump suction isolation valve, and b) > 55 psig for the piping from the containment emergency sump isolation valve to the pump suction isolation valve. I

f. At least once per 18 months, during shutdown, by l

1. V'erifying that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position on a high pressure or ,

!, low pressure safety injection test signal, as appropriate. )

2. Verifying that each HPI and LPI pump test starts auto-matically upon receipt of a high pi _;sure or low pressure l safety injection test signal, as appropriate.

g. A flow balance test shall be performed during shutdown to confirm the following minimum injection flow rates following completion of HPI or LPI System modifications that alter system flow characteristics.

HPI System - Single Pump LPI System - Single Pump

1. Injection Leg A >250gpm 0600psig 1. Injection Leg A >2800gpm Injection Leg A 7250gpm 0600psig

2. Injection Leg B >250gpm 0600psig 2. Injection Leg B >2800gpm Injection Leg B T250gpm 0600psig CRYSTAL RIVER - UNIT 3 3/4 5-5

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS I BASES 3/4.5.2 and 3/4.5.3 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS The OPERABILITY of two independent ECCS subsystems with RCS average temperature >280 0 F ensures that sufficient emergency core cooling i capability wTil be available in the event of a LOCA assuming the loss of one subsystem through any single failure consideration. Either subsystem operating in conjunction with the core flooding tanks is capable of

supplying sufficient core cooling to maintain the peak cladding tempera-i tures within acceptable limits for all postulated break sizes ranging from the double ended break of the largest RCS cold leg pipe downward.

i In addition, each ECCS subsystem provides long term core cooling capability

+ in -the recirculation mode during the accident recovery period.

i With the RCS temperature below 2800F, one OPERABLE ECCS subsystem

! is acceptable without single failure consideration on the basis of the

, stable reactivity condition of the reactor and the limited core cooling

,i requirements.

ji The Surveillance Requirements provided to ensure OPERABILITY of

?

l each component ensures, that, at a minimum, the assumptions used in the

!j safety analyses The decay heat are met system removal and thatleak subsystem OPERABILITY rate surveillance is maintained.

requirements assure il*thattheleakageratesassumedforthesystemduringtherecirculation l phase of the low pressure injection will not be exceeded.

'j The purpose of these surveillance requirements is to provide assurance that i ; proper ECCS flows will be maintained in the event of a LOCA. Maintenance il of proper flow resistance and pressure drop in the piping system to each

{ ; injection point is necessary to: (1) prevent total pump flow from exceeding 1 ! runout conditions when the system is'in its minimum resistance configuration, i ! (2) provide the proper flow split between injection points in accordance jwiththeassumptionsusedintheECCS-LOCAanalyses,and(3)providean

acceptable level of total ECCS flow to all injection points equal to or

,' above that assumed in the ECCS-LOCA' analyses.

ii 3/4.5.4 B0 RATED WATER STORAGE TANK i !

The OPERABILITY of the borated water storage tank (BWST) as part of the ECCS ensures that a sufficient supply of borated water is availabh for injection by the ECCS in the event of a LOCA. The limits on BWST

, minimum volume and boren concentration ensure that 1) sufficent water

is available within containment to permit recirculation cooling flow to

! the core, and 2)-the reactor will remain subcritical in the cold condi-l tion .following mixing of the BWST and the RCS water volumes with all j control rods inserted except for the most reactive control assembly.

These assumptions'are co sistent with the LOCA analyses.

f CRYSTAL RIVER - UNIT 3 B 3/4 5-2

l EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS BASES (Continued)

The contained water volume limit includes an allowance for water not usable because of tank discharge line location or other physical characteristics.

The limits on contained water volume, and baron concentration ensure a pH valua of between 7.2 and 11.0 of the solution sprayed within containment after a design basis accident. The pH band minimizes the evolution of iodine and minimizes the effect of chloride and caustic stress corrosion cracking on mechanical systems and components.

l 1

i l

l l

l l

CRYSTAL RIVER - UNIT 3 8 3/4 5-3 l

._ _ _ ~ - _ _- .