ML19289E703
| ML19289E703 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oyster Creek |
| Issue date: | 05/03/1979 |
| From: | Ahearne J, Bradford P, Gilinsky V, Hendrie J, Kennedy R NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| REF-10CFR9.7 NUDOCS 7905290003 | |
| Download: ML19289E703 (49) | |
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NU C1.E AR REGUL ATO RY COMMISSIO N i
IN THE MATTER OF:
PUBLIC MEETING STAFF BRIEFING ON OYSTER CREEK
(
Place.
Washington, D. C.
Date.
Thursday, 3 May 1979 Pages 1 - 45 7905290003 gy*gy,;
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS,INC.
OfficialReporters r-066 444 North Ccpitel Street Wcshington, D.C. 20001 NATIONWIDE COVERAGE. DAILY
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p DISCLA m ER-This is. an unofficial transcript of a meeting of the United States Thursday, 3 May 1979 in the Nuclear Regulatry' Commission held on Commission's offices at 1717 H Street, H. W., Washir.gr.on, O. C.
The meeting was open to public attendance and observation.
inis transcript has not been reviewed, corrected, or edited, and i't may contain inaccuracies-
. The traascript is intended solely for general informa'tional purposes.
. As provided by 10 CFR 9.103, it is not part of the femal or informal record of decision of the matters discussed.
Expressions of opinion in this transcript do not necessarily reflect final detaminations or beliefs.
- io pleading or other paper may be filed with the Commission in any proceeding as the result of or addressed to any state'::a.nt or arg.: ment contained herein, except as the Commission may authorize.
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 1
3 I
4 PUBLIC MEETING 3l STAFF BRIEFING ON OYSTER CREEK i
7 Rocm 1130 8
1717 H Street, N.
W.
Washington, D.
C.
9 i Thursday, 3 May 1979 10 The Commission met, pursuant to notice, at 5:10 p.m.
11 BEFORE:
12 DR. JOSEPH M.
HENDRIE, Chairman 13 VICTOR GILINSKY, Commissioner i
14 RICHARD T.
KENNEDY, Commissioner 15 PETER A.
BRADFORD, Commissioner 16 JOHN F. AHEARNE, Commissioner 17 ALSO PRESENT:
Messrs. Denton, Davis, Gossick, Jordan, Moseley, Case, g
Bickwit, Eisenhut, Thomas, and Congressman Maguire.
21 22 23
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2 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
If we can come to order, the I
3 first order of business this afternoon I will ask, since we l
I 4
have not had an opportunity to schedule this briefing a week 5
beforehand, my first action will be to ask my colleagues to l
6 join me in voting to hold a short-notice of the Commission 7
to hear a briefing from the staff on some occurrences at the 8
Jersey Central Power & Light's Oyster Creek facility.
l l
9 Those in favor?
10 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Aye.
11 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Aye.
12 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Aye.
13 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Aye.
i 14 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
So ordered.
i t
15 Having announced the subject, Lee, go ahead.
16 MR. GOSSICK:
Okay, Mr. Chairman.
We did send a 17 PN down this morning that gave what we had at that point.
I 18 Mr. Davis is here with Mr. Jordan and Mr. Moseley to bring 10 you up to the point of our current knowledge on the event 20 up there.
21 John, why don't you go ahead.
22 MR. DAVIS:
Okay.
As Lee said, what we will do 23 this afternoon is bring you an update of information on the l
l 24 event of yesterday at Oyster Creek Reactor which consists of l
t=-rwww neemn. is i
25 an indication of low-water level in the reactor itself.
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i 1
This has been initially reported to you by PNO79-100 2
which was issued about noon today.
As you are aware, there 3
is concern that at some point in time in this event that the 4
core may have been partially uncovered.
l 5
As you will find as we present the information l
6l today, there is much we still do not know about this event.
7 However, enere are two things we do know.
8 First, the reactor has been in cold shutdown 9
since about 10:20 last evening.
We have an IL, an "immediate 10 action letter" from Region I to the licensee in which there i
11 is an agreement that the licensee will not start up until 12 NRC agrees to that startup.
13 The second thing that we do know at this point l
14 is we know of no conclusive evidence now of core lamage.
15 IE has had personnel on-site since about 3:00 o' clock this 16 morning, and this person was joined by additional people --
17 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Is there even inconclusive 18 evidence of core damage?
10 MR. GOSSICK:
We don't use one without the other.
20 MR. DAVIS:
We are very careful on how we use 21 "no evidence."
22 (Laughter.)
23 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
I appreciate that.
24 MR. DAVIS:
IE has had personnel on-site since WFeceral Reporters, Inc.
25 about 3:00 a.m.
this morning.
This individual -- one of our 7045 069.
24-3 jwb 5
i I
inspectors was joined later this morning by addit. onal IE 2
personnel, and this afternoon a team from NRR also hes 3
arrived.
t 4
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Can you tell us how many 5
people 7 6
MR. DAVIS:
I believe there are 15 people from 7
NRC at the site now.
8 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
And this is a wide range of 9
disciplines?
10 MR. DAVIS:
It is -- our regional director from II Region I, Operations-type inspectors, and then people from 12 NRR who are competent to evaluate this particular occurrence, 13 and an HP.
I4 For the presentation this afternoon, Ed Jordan, 15 who is the Assistant Director for Technical Prograns in the 16 IE Division of Reactor Operations and Inspection will describe l 17 the system and will describe our understanding now of the i
18 sequence of events.
I' Norm Moseley then will describe what we are doing i
20 l up trere and what we need to do, where our evaluation now I
21 l stands, and how it will proceed.
22 We do have in the audience another member of the f
l 23 IE staff, Vince Thomas, who is an instrument specialist, who l
24 can answer the detailed questions of instrumentation, and of Acs-Federes Reporte,s, Inc.
I 25 course NRR has Ed Case and Darrell Eisenhut down who are
^04 n70 i
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I F
1 cordially invited to participate at any point.
2 One other point before I turn this over to Ed.
3 There is a similar reactor at Nine Mile Point, and Nine Mile 4
Point currently is down and is scheduled to be down for some 5
additional nozzle repair work for an additional month.
6 Ed, if you will go through what happened as far 7'
as we know.
MR. JORDAN:
Certainly.
8 9
First of all, I would like to give a brief 10 description of the reactor systems.
I have a very general 11 schematic as slide one.
May I have the first slide, please?
12 (Slide.)
13 This is a General Electric Boiling Water Reactor.
14 Tnis is a relatively old plant.
It was initially critical in 15 1969.
16 The systems that we are primarily interested in 17 in this discussion -- the systems we are primarily interested 18 in in this event, once again, are feed pumps.
We also have to received a turbine trip.
The reactor system, once again, we 20 are concerned with water level as in the Three Mile Island 21 event.
22 This plant -- this schematic is for a jet-pump type 23 operation.
This particular plant, Oyster Creek, is not jet i
24 pump; it is force pumps, entirely.
Ac.4.a.,. neconm. inc.
The event was initiated when the technician 71 25 9043 0
24-5 jwb 7
1 doing a routine surveillance test of isolation condenser of 2
pressure transducers.
The operator in this particular case, 3
the technician, tias conducting a surveillance test.
He valved 4
a portion of that system in for his pressure test and l
induced a spurious high-pressure signal which then gave a 6
high-pressure-trip-type signal.
7 The resultant signal then caused the unit to go i
0 into trip condition.
The auxiliary transformer, which is 9
normally feeding the feedwater pumps via the main plant 10 generator transferred to the startup transformer.
The startup 11 transformer in this case was not available; was cut of service.
12 Therefore, the feedwater pumps -- two feedwater pumps --
13 COMPISSIONER KENNEDY:
Why was it out of service?
14 MR. JORDAN:
The transformer was inoperable.
15 And upon the trip of the turbine, the electrical 16 power was transferred from the auxiliary transformer to the 17 startup transformer.
And we don't knew why the transformer 18 was out of service.
10 MR. MOSELEY:
That is allowed to be out by the I
'O j
tech specs.
They are allowed to have one out in accordance i
21 with the tech specs, one startup transformer.
22 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Is it one, or two, that 23 were out?
24 MR. MOSELEY:
One.
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25 MR. JORDAN:
One.
The alternate feed pump -- two r
24-6 jwb 8
i I
of the feed pumps fed up to one startup transformer.
The 2
other feed pump that fed off of the other transformer was out i
3 of service due to a lube oil pump problem.
So it was not 4
operable -- had not been operating at the time -- so they l
5 lost trip of both operating feed pumps.
6 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Is that allowed in the tech 7
specs, to nave the transformer that would be running two of 8
them, out, and have the third pump out?
9 MR. JORDAN:
Yes, it is.
10 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
So it's within tech specs II to have them all inoperacle?
I2 MR. MOSELEY:
I'm not sure that we have checked 13 that in its totality, Commissioner, as far as tech spec I#
allowance is ccncerned.
i MR. JORDAU:
At the time of the event, the plant 16 was operating at about 95 percent of power.
Four out of five I7 of the recirculation pumps were operating, which is allowable.
18 This was a normal condition.
end #24 One pump was out of service, and one control rod 20 beg #25 pump, one control rod drive system was operating, which was 21 supplying water to the reactor.
22 The initiating event occurred at 1:51 p.m.
23 yesterday, May the 2nd, and as we said, it was a false scram due to surveillance testing.
Am-Federst Reporters, Inc.
23 The recirculation pumps -- the four recirc pumps
^04; 073 l
25-7 jwb 9
e I
that were operable at that point, and the feedwater pumps, 2
all tripped essentially at the time of the initiating event.
3 The turbine trip occurred, we understand, ten seconds after 4
the initiating event at 1:51.
5 The reactor received a low-level alarm -- I'd like 6
to have slide three, please.
i 7
(Slide.)
l 8
We have marked quite heavily, and I understand 9
this is an expanded view of a section of the reactor vessel.
10 The dome shape indicates a pcsition of some 5 feet over the II fuel.
The active level of the fuel is indicated at zero on 12 the scale.
So an indicated low-level alarm was received, 13 which is some 11-1/2 feet of water over the fuel.
Id This is just below the operating range.
15 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
That was received?
16 MR. JORDAN:
Yes, at about 13-1/2 seconds, which 17 would be a routine occurrence following this trip, following, 18 you know, shortly after the initiating scram.
I Then at 25 seconds, in i proper fashion, the diesel 20 generators went to a fast start anc one emergency bus was 21 energized.
The operator started the second control rod drive 22 pump, which gives you the total of probably 130 gpm into the 23 reactor at about 43 seconds after the event started.
24 Also, the main steam isolation valves were l
xc.4.on. n.conen, Inc.
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25 manually closed beginning at 43 seconds and were fully closed
'045 074
25-8 jwb 10 I
on the order of 50 seconds.
The operators also at 72 seconds 2
initiated operation of the isolation condenser.
This was 3
manually actuated and has been controlled thereafter.
4 The isolation condenser furnishes the cooling for 5
the reactor in this particular mode where you have gone --
6 where you've had a trip, where you go into an isolation 7
without feed pumps.
I 8
So this would be a normal mode manually initiated f
9 in this case.
10 At about 90 seconds, the reactor annulus low-level i
II alarm reset.
At 172 seconds --
l I
I2 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Pardon ce?
It " reset"?
I3 MR. JORDAN:
Yes.
This meant that the -- the I
l Id indicated level was increasing at that point.
15 At 172 seconds is the first receipt of an indicated 16 problem, and the one that we're down discussing now, of a I7 triple low level.
And this is an indicated level of 4 feet I3 8 inches above the active fuel.
So at that point there was a I'
signal that we had water level below that point --
20 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Wasn't there a low-level 2I l alarm at some earlier point?
22 MR. JORDAN:
Yes, but it was way up in the operating 23 level.
This was quite early, at the 13-1/2 seconds.
2#
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
I see.
sc.J ewei Reponen. Inc.
25 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
And then that had reset?
f 2043 075
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MR. JORDAN:
Yes.
2 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Indicating the water was 1
3 back up to that level, presumably.
l 4
MR. JORDAN:
Yes.
i 5
COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Is there a low low-alarm?
6 MR. JORDAN:
The low low-level that is indicated, 7
7 feet 6 inches, was not received.
And it in important to 8
understand that the level sensors are manifolded differently 9
for the different levels.
10 So that --
Il COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Are these level sensors 12 unique to the BWRs?
Presumably there wasn't one at Three l
l 13 Mile Island.
Id tiR. JORDAN:
It's the same type sensor used in 15 steam generators, for instance.
16 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
But not on the reactor 17 itself in a PWR?
i 18 MR. JORDAN:
No.
It would be similar to the l'
pressurizer level sensor.
20 So that at this 172 reconds into the event, we had 21 this indicated triple low level.
The minimum reactor pressure 22 that was noted during this event was 835 psi, which was at 23 270 seconds after the initial event.
24 At some 32 minutes into the event, the recire pump Acs-Federst Recor ers, Inc.
25 C was restarted, or attempted, and the operators noted a 2045 076 :
25-10 jyb 12 I
decrease in water level in the annulus level again.
So at 2
that point, they tripped the recirc pump off again.
3 At 36-1/2 minutes, one feed pump was restored and l
4 this was the feed pump that had the lube-oil pump that was 5
out of service, t
6 At 39 minutes, one recirc pump was restored, and 7
then from there on the incident returned to normalcy insofar 8
as reactor water levels and pressures were involved.
l And at 10:20 p.m.,
the plant was in the cold 9
end 25 10 shutdown at 180 degrees and depressurized.
11 1
12 13 14 l
15 i
16 l
i l
17 18 t
10 20 21
~
22 23 t
24 km-Federet Reporters, Inc.
25,
7045 077
13 i
1 T 26 mm1 I COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Getting back to the pressure l
l 2
again, what were the levels?
\\
l 3
.MR. JORDAN:
Beg your pardon?
f I
d COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
The pressure levels?
5 MR. JORDAN:
The minimum pressure was 835 psi. That 6
was the minimum.
7 The maximum, we have information indicating 1061, 8'
which is very close to the relief valve set point.
The 9
information we have is that no relief valve operation has been i
l 10 noted.
l i
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Why did you think some 12 l fuel may have been uncovered?
13 MR. JORDAN:
That is conjecture.
What we do have is instrumentation that says that i
15 triple low-level, we went below triple low level, which is 16 unusual.
That is the safety limit in the technical specifica-I7 tion so that the licensee. may not resume operations until 18 this low -- this occurrence has been analyzed.
19 '
l c.OMMISSIONER GILINSKY: How long did we get that 20 !
reading?
2I MR. JORDAN:
It was a transient reading.
22 We don't have the durations because you get an 23 alarm at that point.
5 24 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
And you don't know whether
.c.. Federal Recorters, Inc.,
I that was a true reading or not?
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a
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mm2 I
MR. JORDAN:
No.
And I must say through this 2
occurrence the licensee has an event recorder that identifies I
3l major significant events on a rapid chart speed. And this i
4 event recorder was apparently turned off at about the time the 5
triple low level was first received.
6!
And this may hamper our recovery of information.
l 7l COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Manually?
i 8;
MR. JORDAN:
Yes.
9 i
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: Why?
I 10 l MR. JORDAN:
I can only conjecture that the 1
11 l operators felt that the transient, the event was well controlled' 12 l and there was no need for continued event recording.
13 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: Does it have to be turned on I#
i manually?
15 I
MR. JORDAN: No, it starts on trip, so it is normally 16 !
i running at a very slow chart speed and then switches to a fast i
I7 f chart speed.
IO CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
How much time is there available i
19 '
l at the fast chart speed?
20 MR. JORDAN:
I don't know, l
21 !
Vince, would you have any idea?
22 MR. THOMAS:
How much time for the chart?
l 23 l MR. JORDAN :
How much time is available on the 24 recorder on fast chart?
3 Ace-Federat Reoorters, Inc.
25 {
MR. THOMAS:
It would be one inch per hour and six
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15 I
mm3 j
inches per second.
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: For how long will it run?
l 2
MR. THOMAS:
It will certainly run for 36 minutes.
3 I
4 I think it got three weeks chart. speed Et one inch per hour.
l l
COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
But as you pointed out, at l
5 l
l 90 seconds fd: low-level reset --
6:
l MR. JORDAN: Yes.
7 MR. DAVIS:
Not for low, low level.
g MR. JORDAN: We don't know when the triple low level 9
i 10 ;
reset.
11 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
If it starts on scram on 12 trip and then at 90 seconds the low level resets, they could I
i have somewhere after that --
g3 i
ja MR. JORDAN:
I think the point that is of interest I
15 ;
to us is that these different level sensors are different types l
16 of devices and they have different taps on the vessel.
So lwewanttomakesurethattheindicationstheyhavearerealor 17 ;!
not real.
18
- 9 j MR. "HOMAS
Ed, also the point is that on a recordr e i
20 f the lowest level reached was this 30-inch -- if you want to i
21 ! talk aboat that, which is a foot above the low" low level at the 7.6 inch mark.
22 I
23 There is some more level information he is going to I
24 tell you about, I guess.
Ace-Federai Reoorters, Inc. i 25 ;
The minimum water level recorded was 30 inches.
2043 080
16 i
i mm4 1
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
On the recorder?
l 2l MR. JORDAN: On one system, that's right.
On the one-l i
I 3'
level indication system, the lowest indicated level was 8 1/2 f
I I
4 feet above the core.
s 5
(Slide) l 6
Obviously we have conflicting information between thei i
7 different level instruments.
Right now we are investigating j
8 the one that gives us the lowest level.
9 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
And you don't know when the i
l l
10 !
triple low came back on?
Il MR. EISENHUT: Maybe I can just add a couple of 12 pieces of information.
i 13 I just got off the phone with the site a couple of i
14 seconds ago.
You need to keep in mind when you are talking 15 about the low and the low low as reading outside, that is outside 16 '
of the shroud. The triple low level is reading inside the shroud.
17 Those two levels can be different.
18 The indications we have right now say they were 19 '
reading different.
The reason they may well have been reading l
20 l dif ferent at the point, that I assume you just overlooked, was 21 that in fact also another significant thing in the sequence is l
22 l it appears that all fise recirculaticn loops, the pumps tripped 23 off and the discharge valves were closed.
24 l Right?
nce-Federal looorters, Inc.
25 MR. JORDAN:
Yes.
n 3 08i i
- l
17 i
i i
mm5 1
MR. EISENHUT: What that really means is you have l
2 had the coolant loop through the turbine, the feedwater system i
I l
3i closed. There also is an indication that a]l five recire l
I i
4 loops were closed. That is, the discharge valves were closed, 5
the pumps had tripped off.
l 6
So we are now going through an analysis to see what l 7
the different water levels inside and outside the shroud may I
be because we could well have had a situation where the water 8l 9
level inside the shroud over the core is lower than the water 10 '
level in the annulus.
The indications were that the water levels 11 in the annulus, as Mr. Jordan pointed out, were about eight I
12 feet or so.
13 The inside, in the core region there-were four--
i 14 instruments. All four instruments -- they checked the recorders '
15 and all four recorders did, in fact, record triple low level.
16 There is indications they may have been reading that 17l for on the order of about 30 minutes.
Perhaps intermittently 18 but it was -- the alarms were cleared at about a half hour, 19 1 very roughly.
l 20 l COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
How fast can the water go I
21 down in there?
22 How fast was it going down during the period it got i
23 1 from low to triple low?
I 24 '
MR. EISENHUT:
That's a question we really don't have tcs-Federa6 Fleoorters, Inc.
25 j an answer to. We are doing calculations to figure out, do a
'045 082
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18 1
mm6 mass inventory balance as to where the water would be s2ing and how it wauld be flowing through the system.
2 3l We are pretty sure there was no loss of wate-in i
l 4l the system. It was basically a transfer of water throughout, in !
I different parts of the system -- I'm sorry, within the confines l 5
of the plant.
Some of the water could be transferred out 6;
i l
through the MSIVs to the condensor.
Some could be circulated 7
through the isolation condensors, which automatically would i
8, l
9l actuate if the pressure would rise to 1060.
S therefore, there is at least some recorders 10 '
reading now -- I understand the highest pressuro was also 11 1040 something, 1043 at 7 1/2 minutes, which would indicab that ;
12
-y u really didn' t get high _ enough in pressure in this transient:,
13 I
as the transient situation wasn' t severe enough to pop the l
ja relief valves, it wasn' t severe enough to actuate the isolation 15 condensor automatically, it wasn't severe enough to do a number 16 of things. For example, to hit a high-pressure scram signal j7 at was real.
18 I think as Ed mentioned, it was believed to be a 39 )
I surveillance scram, false scram from the test of maintenance
,0 !
4 i
gl operation.
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
It sounded as though it was g
1 just in tne what?
A matter of a few minutes to go from 12 feet g
24 i down to 4 feet 8 inches.
Ace Federna Recorurs. Inc. '
MR.EISENHUT:
Again, you have got to 1cok at the 25 ;
70k
19 i
mm71 two different water levels.
I'm not sure what the real water 2 l level would be inside the shroud going up through the steam 3
separators on the boiler.
i 4
But on the outside, certainly the water level would 5
be up a number of feet.
6 And then also, the minute the reactor scrams, you 7
collapse some boiling reactors -- you collapse some bubbles, 8
so the real water level would fall rapidly at some point.
9; I should also point out that the licenree has three different i
10 '
people independently doing mass inventory calculations to see 11 if they can predict exactly what did happen.
12 l Exxon is doing calculations, I understand GE is i
13 doing calculations, and~ Energy Corporation is doing calculations 14 ( for the licensee.
15 And the staff, also, I should say, the headquarters 16 staff here is independently doing calculations based on input 17 l that the people at the site are giving us.
18,
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: So this is relatively unique i
19 compared to what you have seen before?
20 MR. EISENHUT: Yes, I think it is a safe statement 21 l to say that the situation with all the feedwater off and with 22 ;
all recirculation valves closed on all the recirculation loops l
23 l is not a situation that we normally evaluate in the licensing 24 L approach.
Ace-Federet Rooorters, Inc.,
25 :
I have to go back and doublecheck that, but it 2043 084
l 20 i
I mm8 appears to be a situation that we normally do not, certainly, 1
2!
analyze.
I I
3 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: When the discharge valves closed,
~
i
- l is that a manual operation or an automatic operation?
l S
i MR. JORDAN:
It was probably a manual operation, and.
I I
6 l the operators were planning to restart the recire pumps.
That I
i i
would be my conjecture.
l 7
8!
MR. EISENHUT:
I think that is right.
I 9{
I think the data just a little while ago confirmed 10 that.
In fact it probably is a record that two were manually II closed, one was out of service.
So, that would account for i
I 12 '
three of the five.
I
~
I3
~~
'~~~
MR. DAVIS:
Any more comments on the scenario?
i Id COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Any radiation release 15 measurements there in the building?
16 l MR. JORDAN:
The off-gas monitor and the stack I7 l monitor were all reading normal.
18 They had taken primary coolant samples, and the I9 activity in the primary coolant was normal.
The same as normal 20 operations.
i 2I h COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
No indication as far as the 1
22 coolant sample goes of any fuel damage or anything?
23 MR. JORDAN: No.
2#
MR. DAVIS:
Norm Mosely will now talk a little bit ac..r.ceral Rooorters, Inc.,
about what we don't know, but wish we did and need to know.
9045 085
21 l
I 1
MR. MOSELEY:
I think, obviously, we need to know thet mm9 2
cause or causes of this event. We think w e know what initiated f
3 it, but we need to know more about what other things that i
i 4'
initiation may have caused; what other variouseventsresultedl i
5l from the things that were being done as part of this l
6j surveillance test.
j l
7 Darrell mentioned the water level inventory on a time-8 history basis, where it was and what the balance was over time. '
9, It is certainly a very important element in under-1 10 '
standing the event.
The licensee, as Darrell has said, is l
Il i working on it with several different groups, as are we.
12 And, in a related matter we need to know more about f
13 the instrumentation.
As I have indicated, we need to know how i
i 14 the instrumentation feedback that may have occurred might have 15 affected other instruments, and we need to verify some of the 16 locations and height of instrument taps and these kinds of 17 things, which is ongoing.
18 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Could I ask you about the 19 l sequence of notification, unless you have more to say en the l
20 technical aspects?
21 MR. MOSELEY:
I will answer any questions I can, 22 Commissioner.
23 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: I wasn't sure that I interrupted 24 !
you or not, whether you had finished.
Ace-Federal Rooorters. Inc, o
25 l MR. MOSELEY:
No.
l
22 l
L10 1
I 1
CCMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Could you tell something 2
about the sequence of notification -- the licensee informed i
3 the regional office, and how it carried from there?
I i
4 MR. MOSELEY: The licensee reported the event to the 5
regional office at 3:20 p.m. yesterday.
6 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: This was an hour and 30 minutes I
7 after the event?
8 MR. MOSELEY:
Approximately, that's right.
9 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
What is it in this event that 10 I would trigger a report to the NRC?
II MR. MOSELEY:
It was originally believed to be a 12 spurious signal by the licensee, and they proceeded then to 13 analyze it.
l 14 Once they concluded that it may be -- may have been 1
15 '
true that the triple low level was reached, then it became a 16 safety limit that had been exceeded, and which does require a 17 prompt notification. But, every transient does not require a 18 notification to us.
19 I COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: So it's the possibility that l
20 in fact it was a correct signal --
21 MR. MOSELEY:
That's correct.
22 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
-- is what triggered the 23 I call?
I 24 '
MR. MOSELEY: That's right, that's what triggered them sc.4.eers neoorms. in:.,
25 l to call.
i L
7043 087
23 I
mmll l
1 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Can you take it from there.
2 MR. MOSELEY:
The regional office notified the 3
licensing project manager -- I think Darrell can pick up this, 4'
I don't have that piece in my puzzle here.
i l
Si MR. EISENHUT: Region 1 notified -- attempted to 6
notify the project manager yesterday af ternoon about 4:45.
l 7
They apparently did notify the branch chief involved at about-3 8
5:00 o' clock last night. The information at that time was very 9
preliminary saying that there was a scram situation at the plant 10 !
and that they were following up, looking at what was going on.
11 The licensee notified the projects people also at 12 about 5:30 last night.
I 13 The project manager notified --
14 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
That is something that they 15 would not normally have had to do, is that right?
16 I MR. EISENHUT:
Not necessarily.
If they thought it 17 was just a spurious scram of lesser significance, that's true.
18 The licensee, as I said, notified the project 19 1 manager at around 5:30.
20{
The project manager called me at home at about 7:00 21 o' clock last night.
I instructed him to go back and continue i
22 through the evening to follow the progress as information 23 !
develops on the situation, and when he learned any details other, I
24 l than the plant had scrammed out, to get back in touch with sc.4.ow i neoonen. inc. ;
25 !
me.
i
{
'043 088
24 I
mm12 1
He did that at around 11: 40 last night, and it was 2
at that point I asked him to call Norm Moseley
- be sure that l
l 3;
we had some infermation as to what was going.
Eceryone was 4
cluded in.
5 I understand he did call you, Norm, at very nearly 6
midnight.
l 7
MR. CASE:
I think it was at that point that he 8
mentioned the triple low --
9 MR. SI3ENHUT:
I think that is correct.
l 10 '
MR. CASE:
at the 11:30 conversatien with you.
Il MR. EISENHUT:
He did at that point have some 12 information that said this was clearly an off-normal situation l
13 and we did, in fact --
i 14 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
"He" being?
15 MR. EISENHUT:
"He" being the project manager who 16 l called me at home last night.
I asked him to do two things.
l 17 l One was to contact I&E to make sure the loop was 18 closed, to make sure that all the communications channels 19 I were working; and I asked him, the second thing, to get a 20 l group of systems people and specialists on boiling water 21 reactors together at 8:00 a.m.
in the morning, this morning, 22 in my office.
23 The only other piece that we did was, after 24 l assembling the staff this morning and getting what sketchy ice-Federal Reoorters, Inc.,
25 l information we have, I asked four members of my staff to I
^045 089
JWB 25 27-1 fols mm12 I
leave for the Oyster Creek site.
2 They left at about -- something about 9:30 this end #27 3
morning.
4 beg #28 MR. MOSELEY:
Okay, on the IE side, the Region I 5
section chief notified his duty officer at the close of 6
business when the duty officer took up his duties, that there 7
may be a problem at Syster Creek and he would be -- the 8
section chief would be back in touch with the licensee and 9
would so inform, what the results of that would be told to l
10 the duty officer.
I r
II In the meanwhile, at about 10:00 o' clock last 12 night, several calls were received from Public Affairs people i
13 in our IE -- by our IE duty officer.
i The IE duty officer contacted the section chief 15 and --
16 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
The IE duty officer here?
I7 Or at Region I?
18 MR. MOSELEY:
Here.
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Here.
20 '
MR. MOSELEY:
Right.
l 21' He contacted the Region I duty officer, who 22 contacted the section chief to get additional information.
23 And there were several telephone calls, and Darrell has 24 indicated that I got a call about midnight last night.
And I ace-Federet Reporters, Inc.
25 called our IE duty officer here to find out mopp gon on,
o i
28-2 jwb 26 I
it at that time.
And he gave me what he knew, and I felt 2
compelled to get some additional information.
3 So I called the section chief, and he subsequently I
called the licensee's plant superintendent to get more l
4 5
information.
He called me back and, based on this information, l
6 I decided that we should send an inspector to the site, and 7
he was dispatched and arrived on-site about 3:00 or 3:30.
8 CEAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Other questions?
9 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Yes.
l 10 Could either Ed, or Darrell -- I realize it's j
i still very preliminary -- could you, for someone like myself l
II 12 who is a non-reactor expert, go through what you think the sequence was as far as, you know, just when the trip occurred? l I3 Id At that stage, both the feedwater pumps went off and the circulation pumps?
l 15 0
MR. JORDAN:
Yes.
The recirc pumps and the 17 feedwater pumps all tripped.
18 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
That's automatic?
MR. JORDAN:
At the same time.
Yes.
20 MR. EISENHUT:
21 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
That stage, ordinarily what 22 would next -- what automatically would next happen?
23 MR '. JORDAN:
Okay, the turbine trip and those 24 trips of the circ pumps and feedwater pumps were all in Ace-Federal Reporters. Inc.
25 essential coincidence --
2045 091
28-3 jwb 27 1
I COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Right.
2 MR. JORDAN:
-- on the false high pressure signal.
3 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Right.
4 MR. JORDAN:
And --
5 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Which is normal.
That's 6l what they ought to do.
i 7
MR. JORDAN:
That's correct.
l l
8 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Yes.
So then now what's l
9 the next automatic thing that would happen?
l t
10 MR. JORDAN:
Okay, the next automatic thing would i
l II be a main steam isolation valve -- if the pressure increased --l 12 would be on at that particular step point, which the operator 13 took the manual operation and isolated it.
i 14 I
Since he had no feed pumps, then he wanted to 15 bottle up the system.
16 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
But he wouldn't have feed 17 pumps anyway, you're saying?
If they automatically are i
18 tripped off?
MR. JORDAN:
Okay, then the feed pumps in this case 1
20 were lost because of the problem in the lineup in the switch-21 yard.
That is, the startup transformer being unavailable, l
22 and the shift from the eux transformer to the startup l
23 transformer.
So I misled you with the feed pumps.
i 24 The feed pumps should have stayed on -- would have i
Aa Federal Reporters, Inc.,
25 '
normally stayed on.
904,3 092 i
28-4 jwb 28 t
i I
COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
They would have normally 2l stayed
.:?
3 MR. JORDAN:
Yes, they would have stayed on.
4 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
They would not have S
normally tripped off?
6 MR. JORDAN:
That's right.
7 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
All right.
So they went f
8 off because of a problem of two being on a down transformer, i
9 and one being down?
10 MR. JORDAN:
Being -- having a lube oil pump out, Il right.
Yes.
12 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
So normally at that stage l
i 13 in the process the feed pumps would have stayed on and would I
14 have been providing water --
15 MR. JORDAN:
Supplied water, yes.
16 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
In this particular case, I7 they were not -- could not stay on, and at that stage that's 18 when the operator manually isolated?
l' MR. JORDAN:
Yes.
He anticipated.
20 MR. CASE:
Manually closed the main steam isolation 21 valves.
l 22 MR. JORDAN:
Which is good operator action.
23 MR. CASE:
Right.
24 MR. EISENHUT:
Normally, at about 50 percent power Ace Federst Rooorters, Inc.
25 the transition goes from what we call " house load" or " hotel
'045 093 i
i
28,_5 jwb 29 I
load" to off-site power to the startup transformers.
2 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Okay.
Now during all this 1
3 time, the circulation pumps are off.
Is that correct?
4 MR. JORDAN:
Yes.
5 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Would they be expected to l
6 be off and stay off?
7 MR. JORDAN:
They received a trip.
8 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
And you would not expect l
9 the operator to restart them?
10 MR. JORDAN:
No.
In this casa since he had the I
II feed pumps down, his interest is in getting a water supply.
12 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
All right.
Now the ECCS 13 system did not initiate?
Is that right?
i MR. JORDAN:
There was no automatic initiation of l
Id 15 core spray; that's right.
And he manually initiated the 16 isolation condenser, which is the counterpart of reactor I7
..re isolation cooling pumps in other PWRs.
18 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
What would have initiated to the core spray?
20 MR. JORDAN:
So this would be a low low-level 21 a high containment pressure.
22 MR. EISENHUT:
Coincidence.
You need both, i
23 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
You need both -- what?
The 24 triple low --
Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 MR. JORDAN:
Double low.
9045 094
28-6 jwb 30 l
I MR. EISENHUT:
Double low.
2 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Double low, plus --
3 MR. JORDAN:
I think that's an R.
The pumps won't 4
pump because of head differences.
T 5
I MR. EISENHUT:
This says you need -- various l
1 6
things happen.
Low level gives you a reactor scram.
Low-low 7
gives you -- can give you a core spray.
Low-low can give you 8
isolation condenser actuation.
Low-low can give you MSIB.
9 Low-low plus high drywall pressure of 2 psi can give you 10 primary containment isolation.
II MR. THOMAS:
That's the triple low, not the double 1
12
- tow, 13 MR. EISENHUT:
Triple low plus high drywall pressure Id 2 psi.
15 MR. THOMAS:
In answer to his question, it's an 16 R circuit.
I think low-low water level would cause the core I7 spray by itself.
There's no way coincident with it.
I8 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
But the low-low is --
10 MR. THOMAS:
Low-low in the reactor vessel went 20 7.6 2I COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
So that's outside the shroud?
MR. THOMAS:
Yes, that's the outside --
23 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
So there 's no -- there 's 24 nothing inside the shroud -- the triple low itself doesn't Ace-Federst Rooorters. Inc.
2' end #28 do that?
'045 095
CR 4619 Meltzer.t29 31 jl-1 I
MR. EISENHUT:
ir!.ple low needs a high drywall l
2 pressure of 2 psi.
It gives you an automatic depressurization 3
which can give you core spray.
4 MR. JORDAN :
Which enables core spray.
5 MR. EISENHUT:
Which in effect enables core spray.
0 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
So that at least as far as 7
you naw see the sequence, there were no instruments or functions, 8
per se, that did not perform as you would have expected them to i 9
perform; is that correct?
10 MR. JORCAN:
From the information we have, I think i
11 i
we can say that.
12 MR. EISENHUT:
I wouldn't have expected all the 13 discharge valves on all the recirculation units to be off.
Id MR. JORDAN:
But that was a manual action rather 15 than an instrument -~
I0 MR. EISENHUT:
At least on two of them.
Apparently 17 it could have been an error in closing the discharge valves.
I 18 would have expected the pumps to trip, but not the discharge 10 valves to close.
20 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
But the discharge valves were 21 closed manually.
22 MR. CASE:
At least two we have a record of.
It's 23 not clear why the othe two were closed, yet -,whether 24 automatically or manually.
==.rews amomn. ine.
20 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Why wouldn't you have expected all of them to be closed?
045 096
.' j l a 32 MR. EISENHUT:
In this configuration, I think it's 1
just something that we would have expected from various 2
different situations you can get in.
You would have reactor 3
coolant -- recirculation pump trips, but you would not have i
4 expected to isolate all five valves.
5 MR. CASE:
Because that path is used for decay heat 6
removal from the isolation condensors, so if you isolate the 7
valves, you interfere with decay heat.
8 MR. EISENHUT:
By natural recirculation; you've got 9
to remember the isolation condensor is, in fact, natural 10 recirculation paths.
l 11 And they've got redundant isolation condensors.
12 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
But would you hvre expected I
13 to manually close any of them?
I l
14 MR. EISENHUT:
I think the procedure calls for him l
15 to close two.
16 MR. JORDAN :
And, once again, this is for restarting 17 those pumps.
18 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE :
Okay.
Thank you.
10 Two questions:
One, when you talk about the various 20 things that would come as you go through the different signals,
21 is it possible that they could have been activated without 22 receiving the low, low signals?
That is, would the reading out 23 of the signal be independent of the activating of the spray?
2 bkup 24 Or is it inconceivable that you would get one without the Ms-Fedwet Rooorters, Inc.
25 other?
043 097 i
jl.3 33
)
MR. JORDAN :
There are special level indications, 2
initiating pressure tranducers for differential pressure 3
transducers, if that's what you mean.
So it would be poss'ble to either have spurious or actual signal on one and that 4
an ther didn't apparently see for some reason.
5 And there are two separate and parallel systems for 6
level indication and the level set point.
So they have i
7 re ndancy.
8 In the GE reactor, there are two sets; and there are 9
in coincidence two sensors in each of the two sets.
10 11 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD :
Come back to the beginning 12 again for a minute, if you would.
13 What event is it that tells the operator after he 14 has had the triple low signal that everything is all right, 1
15 everything seems to be al right?
i 16 MR. JORDAN:
Well, if the operator gets a triple l
17 low level signal, that's an indication everything is not all i
18 right.
lo COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
I understand.
20 But in this case, what is it that told him that, in fact -- the water level was adequate?
21 MR. JORDAN:
I understand he was looking at other 22 23 level indications which were telling him that water level 24 appeared to be all right.
ac F.o.rW Reoorters, Inc.
25 MR. CASE:
And the pressure vasn't going up.
I 0045 098 i
31'.4 34 1
MR. THOMAS :
The relief valves hadn't lifted.
2 MR. CASE:
His reactor pressure was under control.
3 He was controlling it with the isolation condensor, and 4
apparently'ne had it under control.
i 5
MR. EISENHUT:
If the pressure had come up and it 6
would have hit a low, low level, he would have gotten ECCS 7
actuation.
He didn ' t get that situation.
8 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
So as far as you know at 9
the moment, there is no radiation release, no tuel damage.
He 10 is required to stay in cold shutdown, because he is past the j
i II safely limit?_
l 12 MR. JORDAN:
- Yes, i
13 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE :
So until you can understand j
i 14 what is happening, why it happened --
15 MR. MOSELEY:
And we also have the IAL, which is 16 documents that he will not start up until we are satisfied, 17 even if he were to conclude that the safety limit were not 18 exceeded.
I' COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Yes.
20 What steps do you now go through?
21 MR. MOSELEY:
We are going through the steps that I
-22 23 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
You ran down what you have 24 to find out, but you will go through that set of questions --
AaJederat Reporters, Inc.
25 you and NRR do the analysis?
2045 099 1
jl 5 35 1
MR. MOSELEY:
The Licensee will do his analysis, and 2
we will do ours, and check his.
And if we all conclude that 3
everything is okay to restart, then that's what we will so 4
indicate.
If we do not, then he will have to stay down until 5
we are. satisfied.
6 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
I see.
7 And whose decision is it?
Is it John's?
8 MR. MOSELEY: I think it's a joint decision.
John 9
will have to speak for himself.
10 MR. DAVIS:
Right now this is still under IE, with 11 NRR participation.
And this is the way we would handle it.
12 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
So it would be yours?
13 MR. DAVIS:
Yes, if everything works out all right.
i 14 If everything does not work out all right, then we may be 15 transferring it.
16
( Laughte r. )
17 COMM.~.SSIONER KENNEDY :
I noticed how happy Darrell 18 was when you said that.
10 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Is this the PJM power pool 20 again?
21 MR. DAVIS:
Yes.
22 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
It's GPU's subsidiary again?
23 Do you know anything about reserve margins?
24 MR. DAVIS:
No, sir.
I know nothing about those at ace.F.ome seconm, Inc.
25 this point.
,043 100 1
I
jl 6' 36 1
COMMISSIONER HENDRIE :
I have had a request from 2
Congressman Andy Maguire, who has come down for the briefing 3
this afternoon.
He has asked if he can ask the Staff and 4
the Commission a couple of questions.
5 Why don't you grab a microphone so that it is --
6 MR. MAGUIRE:
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
7 I did leave the debate on the House floor.
8 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:
Well, I hope they don't go 9
and vote something that you --
1 10 MR. MAGUIRE:
I hope not.
I 11 But my feeling was that this was more important by 12 far, and I wanted to be here to hear the report.
13 I have listened as carefully as I could.
Let me see l
14 if I have a proper understanding, in summary, of what the and 29 15 Commission has been told by the Staff.
16 17 18 L
20 21 22 23 24 204510t l
CR4619 430&31
,MIMI/pv 37 1
As I heard it, it sounds like a most serious incident,.
2 one in which equipment was out of service, pumps were not work-3 ing that needed to be working or should have been working; valves 4
were closed which shouldn't have been closed.
The reactor did l
I 5
go into a SCAM.
A triple low water level inside the reactor was l
6 reached which, as I understood the description, is at the limit; 7
of the safe range.
Monitoring equipment showed diifferent read-8 ings.
The event recorder was turned off, and during this l
9 critical period of time there was no accurate record kept on 10 that event recorder which is there for the purpose of recording 11 an accurate record.
I gather we still don't have, even now, 12 more than a day after the incident took place, full information I
13 about what exactly cccurred except that it was at the limit of l
14 the safety range.
i 15 And I also gather that the staff here in Washington, i
16 of the NRC, did not learn about the triple low until a phone 17 call at 11:30 p.m.
last night, which came more than 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> i
18 after the triple low was :eached.
19 Gentlemen, is my understanding of the facts correct 20 so far?
21 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Well, I will have to ask -- let usl 22 deal with the matter in parts with regard to tripping of the 23 triple low.
I assume since that is what would have triggered l
24 '
the call to the region, I assume we knew that --
sc s. owe secon.n, inc.
25 MR. MOSELEY:
Well, that was about 3:20.
'045 102
pv2 38 1
MR. MAGUIRE:
The region knew that, but I take it no 2
one in Washington knew that until 11:30.
Is that correct?
r 3
MR. MOSELEY:
No, that is not correct.
The project 4
manager knew around 5:00.
5 Darrell?
6 MR. EISENHUT:
Well, the project manager had very l
7 preliminary information that some event had occurred at 7:00 f
8 when he called me.
He really didn't know of any real details 9
on the plant.
I 10 MR. MAGUIRE:
Didn't I understand you to say you heard l
11 about the triple low for the first time at 11:30' l
12 MR. EISENHUT:
I believe that's about right.
11:40.
13 MR. MAGUIRE:
It either is or isn't right.
You did 14 not hear about it until after 11:30 p.m.?
15 MR. EISENHUT:
That's right.
16 MR. MAGUIRE:
And it occurred, as I understand it, i
17 less than three minutes after the event began at 1:51 p.m.
The l I
la triple low was recorded as 172 seconds; is that correct?
i 19 MR. EISENHUT:
Yes, sir.
20 MR. MAGUIRE:
I wonder if it's adequate, in the judg-21 ment of the Commission and staff, to have information more than i
22 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> after the safety limit in this reactor was reached, if 23 not surpassed.
24 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
You assume, Mr. Maguire, that
&csJocerW Reconen, Inc.
25 Darrell Eisenhut constitutes the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
'045103j i
pv3 f
39 1
I will point out that the regional staff got a call as soon as 2
the licensee, so far as we know at the moment, at any rate, as 3
soon as the licensee thought he had tripped that thing.
Or, I s
4 guess what --
l l
5 MR. MOSELEY:
They knew that they had had this alarm l
i 6
earlier.
They thought it was a spurious alarm and that it was 7
only after that they believed that maybe there was something to '
8 it.
9 MR. MAGUIRE:
What grounds did they have for believing 10 it was spurious?
l l
11 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
So they would have called the l
12 regional office at what, 3:00 something or another?
l l
l 13 MR. MOSELEY:
3:20.
l 14 CHAIRMIN HENDRIE:
So that the cognizant inspection 15 office knew that at that time.
16 MR. MAGUIRE:
Mr. Chairman, though, the question therei l
17 would be whether the regional office is empowered to take 18 actions relative to the crisis that apparently was very nearly I
l d
19 upon us, once again, or do they have to check with Washington 20 could act?
21 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
The regional office vill take what-22 ever actions seems appropriate in the circumstances, Mr. Maguire, 1
23 andIamnotsurethatIwouldagreewith" crisis"asacharac-l l
24 terization here.
i Ace Federet Reco,ters, Inc.
25 MR. MAGUIRE:
Well, it did achieve the triple low 7045104; I
i 40 l
1 figure there, was that not correct, inside the shroud.
To the 2
best of our knowledge, there were four instruments, I understand, f
3 that recorded that triple low.
\\
l 4
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
You have heard it as I have here i
i 5
this afternoon.
i 6
MR. MAGUIRE:
Well, it would seem to me that under 7
those circumstances and given what we have just been through i
I 8
with Three Mile Island, that the Commissioners of the NRC ought, i
9 to have known about this triple low within minutes, or, certainly, 10 within an hour after somebody there knew about it.
And appar- ;
Il ently, that was not the case.
l' 12 It would seem as if policy matters were involved, 13 gentlemen.
I would respectfully submit, I wonder if other i
l 14 Commissioners don't feel so.
You must be very frustrated sit- !
15 ting here today learning about all of these events that occurred 16 yesterday and you didn't even know about them.
l 17 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Well, Congressman, I will say i
18 that one item, though, that probably is more critically important 19 is that the plant went into cold shutdown around 10:00 at night.
20 MR. MAGUIRE:
And you heard about the triple low after 21 that 10-hour period had elapsed.
22 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Congressman, the really critical l
23 point was that the planc did go into cold shutdown.
24 MR. MAGUIRE:
I think it's very fortunate that it went Am-Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 into cold shutdown.
But I am not confident that everybody had 1
'045 105'
pv5
~
~~ ~
~
-~
~~
41 i
I the information they needed or that it was possible to make the 2
decisions that were necessary to be made to protect people dur-i 3
ing that 10-hour period.
I see no evidence that that was the i
end#30 4
case.
I st.431 5
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
I am afraid I differ with you.
I 6
don't propose to argue with you.
Would you have other questions?
7 MR. MAGUIRE:
I did ask for permission to ask a j
t 8
couple of questions.
Let me ask one more.
l t
9 There was a distinction made between the water level i
10 inside and outside the shroud,during the discussion.
There was; I
11 a suggestion that the lowest indicated level of 8'6" was outside, 12 the shroud.
There was also an indication that the triple low 13 was recorded inside the shroud by four different instruments.
14 My question is:
What is the present level of the 15 water inside the shroud, and how do we know that?
16 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Do we have --
l 17 MR. EISENHUT:
I think all indications we have is i
18 that some 30 minutes into it the low-level signals were all 19 removed, meaning that the water levels filled up back past those i
20 where the instrument would stop reading the low level.
All 21 indications are that the reactor filled back up to its normal 22 level.
The reactor is being maintained at 180 degrees F., and l 23 it has already been depressurized.
And that occurred last night 1
24 already at about 10:20.
== Jew i nmorwn. w.
25 So, from a practical standpoint, this plant had been,;
I "043 106 i
pv6 42 l
I from minutes after this transient, began a cooldown process all 2
the way from the thousand psi range of several hundred degrees 3
F.
It had already cooled down to 180 degrees F.,
and the de-d pressurized mode at 10:20.
5 MR. MAGUIRE:
And the water level was back up both I
6 inside and outside the shroud?
l 7
MR. EISENHUT:
Yes, sir.
8 MR. MAGUIRE:
Do we know what prevented the water l
l 9
level going lower, beyond the triple low, or 4'8"?
What mechani:-
10 cal or human action resulted in the reversal of that water l
II level?
12 MR. JORDAN:
There was no apparent loss of water level I3 during the event.
There was no line break so that there was 14 perhaps displacement of water from within the core shroud to 15 the rest of the reactor vessel.
I0 MR. MAGUIRE:
Okay.
But presumably, nobody wanted 17 the water level to go that low.
I am just wondering, since it i
18 did go to the safety limit, what it was that allowed us to I9 avert the uncovering of the reactor core?
Does anybody know?
i I
20 l Or are we just fortunate that it went back up?
What is it that.
21 actually caused it to go back up?
22 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Well, the plant is built, after all, I
23 l to keep water in the primary system.
And, as far as we know, 24 l l
it seems to have functioned in that fashion.
t=4ensRummri,ine.l l
25 '
MR. MAGUIRE:
So if I can summarize:
Fortunately,
,g45 107
pv7 43 I
something happened which is difficult to specify, which got the !
2 water back where it should have been.
Is that it?
3 MR. EISENHUT:
I think that is a little bit of a l
1 4
mischaracteri 4
^<
~'
5 You see, the system is a closed system.
You can 6
depress the water level in the enre, but the water physically 7
has got to go somewhere.
I think what caused the water le el l
8 not to go any lower may well have been a law of physics.
There' I
9' was no operator who turned on a pump, opened a valve, or did 10 anything that may have caused the water level to turn around.
11 It may have reached its theoretical low limit to where the water I
i 12 ;
had been displaced, and for this situation,with the feedwater i
13 train turned off, with the MSIVs closed, with the recirculation 14 i loops closed, it's a bottled-up system.
The water level cannot, i
15 be decreasing without there being any place for the water to go 16 MR. MAGUIRE.
But on that argument, it never should 17 have gotten that low,in the first place, if it's a closed system.
18 Right?
19 MR. EISENHUT:
Not necessarily.
The volume of water 20 level in a boiling-water reactor contains many bubbles.
That's 21 '
why it's called a " boiling-water reactor."
The bubbles go up, i
22 and then they collapse.
23 MR. MAGUIRE:
One final question:
If there had been j 24 a release into the atmosphere of the built-up pressure, would i
Aa-Fwww neomn. im.
25 that have include
- any radioactivity?
i 0 0 A'3 \\b l
pv8 i
44 i
1 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
I think what he is asking is:
2 Does the normal coolant water in a boiling-water reactor in its :
3 normal mode of operation have any radioactivity in it?
I 4
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
But not just that.
Because I
5l the release from the vessel doesn't necessarily get into the 6
atmosphere.
i 7
VOICE:
There is a dry wall down to the suppres-i 8
sion pump.
l 9
MR. MAGUIRE:
If these valves had worked, and there 10 had been a release of the pressure that had built up, it i
i 11 would not have involved radioactivity; is that correct?
l t
12 MR. MOSELEY:
The release -- had the safety valves j
13 and relief valves opened, it would have relieved inside the 14 containment itself.
I 15 MR. MAGUIRE:
Okay.
Thank you very much, gentlemen, l
l' 16,
for your forebearance.
17 I hope, Mr. Chairman, that you or members of your I
18 staff can keep in touch with me and with Congressman Bill Hughes, 19 who represents this area, and with the governor of the State of 20 New Jersey, on this very important matter.
21 CHAIRMM HENDRIE:
We will be glad to, i
i 22 MR. MAGUIRE:
Thank you.
l 23 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Thank you, Mr. Maguire.
l 24 Other questions?
Ace-Federst Rooo,ters. Inc.
25 (No response.)
qD" i
pv9 45 l
r I
1 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Thank you very much.
2 (Whereupon, at 6:05 p.m.,
the hearing was adjourned.)
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