05000348/LER-1979-012-03, /03L-0 on 790214:review of Solid State Protective Sys Train A/B Operability Test Indicated That Portion of Program Did Not Verify Spray Test Actuation Logic.Caused by Sys Train Design Change.Procedure Modified

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/03L-0 on 790214:review of Solid State Protective Sys Train A/B Operability Test Indicated That Portion of Program Did Not Verify Spray Test Actuation Logic.Caused by Sys Train Design Change.Procedure Modified
ML19282C176
Person / Time
Site: Farley Southern Nuclear icon.png
Issue date: 03/16/1979
From: Hairston W
ALABAMA POWER CO.
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML19282C172 List:
References
LER-79-012-03L, LER-79-12-3L, NUDOCS 7903210139
Download: ML19282C176 (3)


LER-1979-012, /03L-0 on 790214:review of Solid State Protective Sys Train A/B Operability Test Indicated That Portion of Program Did Not Verify Spray Test Actuation Logic.Caused by Sys Train Design Change.Procedure Modified
Event date:
Report date:
3481979012R03 - NRC Website

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~15 HEPORT DATE 80 EVEN T DESCRIPTION AND PROBADLE CONSEQUENCES h El L0n _2._i4-79. a review or FxP-1-sTP-33.0 (soi ta state Prot. system Train A/n Op. Test) i TXJ l indicated tnat a portion of the STP (performed between 9/78 and 2/79) did not verify l fj] [ cont. spray test actuation logic as required by Tech. Spec. 4.3.2.1.1.

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3/16/79 Event Date:

2/14/79 Identification of Event on 2-14-79, a review of FNP-1-SIP-33.0 (Solid State Prot. System Train A/B Op. Test) indicated that a portion of the STP (performed between 9/78 and 2/?9) did not verify cont. spray test actuation logic as required by Tech. Spec. 4.3.2.1.1.

Conditions Prior to Event

The unit was in mode 1 at 98% power.

Description of Event

on 2-14-79, a review of FNP-1-STP-33.0 (Solid State ProL. System Train A/B Op. Test) indicated that a portion of the STP (performed between 9/78 and 2/79) did not verify cont. spray test actuation logic as required by Tech. Spec. 4.3.2.1.1.

A retest on 2-14-79 verified that the cont. spray test actuation logic was operable.

Analy.cis of Event A review on 2-14-79 by the Operations Superintendent revealed that the acceptance criteria for containment spray SSPS input relay testing had not been met for 4 months due to the " sign-off"/ acceptance criteria requirements in step 5.8.2 of FNP-1-STP-33.0 being unclear.

Temporary jumpers were used to activate the containment spray test circuitry and verify operability of the contcinment spray instrument channels on both train A and B of SSPS. SSPS wiring was checked and it was verified that the operability of protective circuits was not affected.

Due to design error, the SSPS containment spray test feature had inadvertently been made. inoperable when a design change on the SSPS was implemented.during the September Turbine Outage.

In that the protective functions of the instrument channels were not eliminated by the design change, the health and safety of the public were not affected.