ML19275A727
| ML19275A727 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | North Anna  |
| Issue date: | 08/30/1979 |
| From: | Kellogg P, Kidd M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19275A726 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-338-79-33, 50-339-79-43, NUDOCS 7910190037 | |
| Download: ML19275A727 (11) | |
See also: IR 05000338/1979033
Text
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UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION ll
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101 MARIETTA ST
N.W., sulTE 3100
ATLANTA GEORGIA 303o3
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Report Nos. 50-338/79-33 and 50-339/79-43
Licensee: Virginia Electric and Power Company
P. O. Box 26666
Richmond, Virginia 23261
Facility Name: North Anna Units 1 and 2
Docket Nos. 50-338 and 50-339
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License Nos. NPF-4 and C!SR-78
Inspected at North Anna Site near Mineral Virginia
Inspected by:
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8'N/77
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M. S. Kidd, Rpirident Inspecto
Date Signed
Approved by:
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P.J.KellogfSectionChief,)tDNSBranch
Date' Signed
SUMMARY
Inspected on July 23 - August 10, 1979
Unit 1 Areas Inspected
This routine inspection by the resident inspector involved 25 manhours onsite of
previously identified enforcement matters, unresolved items and open items; licensee
event reports; controls for maintenance of the control room complex emergency venti-
lation pressure boundary; and plant tours.
Unit 1 Findings
Within the areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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Unit 2 Areas Inspected
This routine inspection by the resident inspector involved 25 manhours onsite
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of previously identified enforcement matters, unresolved items and open items;
reports per 10 CFR 50.55(e) and 10 CFR 21; plant tours; plant readiness for
ini+.ial fuel loading; and fuel storage.
Unit 2 Findings
Within the areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were
identified.
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DETAILS
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1.
Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees
D. L. Benson, Supervisor Nuclear Operations
W. R. Cartwright, Station Manager
S. L. Harvey, Operating Supervisor
- J. R. Harper, Instrument Supervisor
- J. D. Kellams, Superintendent of Operations
E. G. Lifrage, Project Engineer - Unit 2
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- V. R. Hadision, NRC Coordinator
P. A. Slatter, Resident QA Engineer - Construction
- E. H. Smith, Superintendent of Technical Services
Other licensee employees contacted included two engineers, and three office
personnel.
- Attended one or more exit interviews.
2.
Exit Interview
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on July 27 and August 3,
and 10, 1979 for those persons denoted in paragraph 1.
All subjects in
these Details were discussed.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings
(Closed) Infractica (338/78-42-01)-
Turbine Generator Auto Stop Oil
Functional Test.
Corrective measures described in the licensee's response of January 26,
1979, were verified to be complete.
Operating procedures 1-0P-1.5 and
1-0P-1.6 were revised January 31 and January 22, 1979, respectively.
This matter is closed.
(Closed) Infraction (338/78-42-02):
Procedure Deviation Reviews by
Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee (SNSOC).
Corrective measures discussed in the licensee's response of January 26,
1979 were verified to be c)mplete.
Additionally, the minutes of some
twenty five SNSOC meetings held in 1979 were reviawed. No instances of
procedure deviations being received later than required were observed.
This matter is closed.
(0 pen) Infraction (339/19-28-09):
Untimely Review of a Potentially
Reportable Item.
Corrective measures discussed in the licensee's response of July 17,
1
1979 (letter co. 532) were reviewed and diJ ussed with station and corpo-
rate personnel.
Item 1.1 states that con. ruction personnel have been
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reinstructed op phe proepdures for initiqtriRS 9 TeViFW of P0fF9fi 11
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reportable items.
Discussions revealed this statement to be misleading
in that only two individuals had been reinstructed.
Libensee: personnel
were informed that broader corrective and preventive measures should be
taken particularly in view of a similar delay in notification of Power
Station Engineering of a potentially reportable matter discussed in IE
Report 50-339/79-35-02 (apparent Infraction 79-35-02). A licensee repre-
sentative stated that the response would be amended to clarify actions
previously taken and more closely define further actions planned. This
item remains open.
Followup of corrective actions involving equipment
is discussed in paragraph 5.d.
(Closed) Unresolved Items (338/78-37-04 and 339/78-32-03): Class I Structures
Settlement honitoring.
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Theae unresolved items were initiated to determine whether the Unit 1 Techni-
cal Specifications surveillance requirements would be met in light of lack of
baseline data for certain points and resetting of other points after baseline
establishment. For Unit 2, a review by licensee personnel to assure that
proposed Specifications could be met was inferred. The general problem was
addressed by EPC0 in letters to NRR dated November 22 and December 6,1978,
and May 17, 1979. This was preceded by a letter of June 13, 1978 (no. 329)
which requested an amendment to the Unit 1 Specifications with regard to
settlement of the service water pump house (SWPH).
Other inspections of the settlement monitoring program for Unit I were documented
in IE Reports 50-338/78-44 and 50-339/79-13. These reports discuss reviews of
the methods used to reconstruct or estimate settlement values for points reset or
not surveyed because of inaccessibility.
On June 28, 1979, Amendment 12 to the Unit 1 Technical Specifications was issued
by NRR. This amendment revised baseline dates for certain settlement points in
Table 3.7-5 revised allowable total or differential settelement values for certain
points, and provided a mechanism for estimating settlement of inaccessible points
based on nearby points in the Bases for Specification 3/4.7.12. The Amendment
also requires monitoring of additional points namely on the Units I and 2 casing
cooling tanks and two pipe hangers in the service water reservoir and the calcula-
tion of out-of plane distortion for the SWPH floor. Review of 1-PT-112, Category
I Structures - Settlement Monitoring, completed July 25, 1979, based on surveys
performed May 7-29, 1979 and other site calculations revealed that all limits of
Table 3.7-5, including the new points were met. Also, calculation of out-of place
distortion on July 10, 1979 showed this to be in compliance with the new limit.
A revision to' 1-PT-112 to incorporate the new survey points was approved July 30,
1979. A new procedure,1-PT-113, Service Water Pumphouse Settlement Monitoring,
was also approved July 30, 1979 and will cover all settlement calculations for
the SWPH including the out-of plane distortion calculations.
Table 3.75 of the Unit 2 Proof and Reviev (proposed) Technical Specifications was
revised May 30, 1979 to clarify baseline dates for certain survey points. A review
of previous data on file at the station sonfirmed that the required data exists. A
new procedure, 2-PT-112, will be used to compute settlement valves for Unit 2 survey
points to be required by Technical Specifications. This procedure was in draft form
at the conclusion of the inspection period.
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Another aspect of the unresolved items involved significant delays in analysis of
survey data by station personnel after surveys were made. The ingpector observed
that for the May 7-30 surveys, data was received from the surveyor in a timely
fashion and analyzed by mid June,1979, representing a significant improvement in
this area.
Licensee personnel were informed that since it appeared that the Unit 1 Specifi-
cations as amended, could be met and that data exists to allow calculations to
be made as required by Unit 2 Specifications, these unresolved items (338/78-37-
-04 and 339/78-32-03) were considered closed.
4.
Unresolved Items
Unresolved items are natters about which more information is required to determine
whether they are acceptable or may involve noncompliance or deviations. One new
unresolved item identified during this inspection is discussed in paragraph 9.
5.
Followup on Previously Identified Open Items
Records Storage Facility (338/77-57-04)
a.
This item concerned VEPCO's commitment in its Topical Report, Quality
Assurance Program, Operations Phase (VEP-1-3A) to provide a records
storage facility meeting the reluirements of ANSI N45.2.9,1974 by June
of 1978. This commitment was ameided by letter no. 260 of May 5, 1978
to the NRC stating that the facility would be built by July of 1979.
On July 26, 1979, VEPC0 submitted lettar no. 250A stating that due to
certain construction delays, the facility would not be completed until
about September 15, 1979. Item 338/77-57-04 remains open.
b.
Onsite and Offsite Organizations (338/79-01-02 and 339/79-01-01)
These open items concerned differences in FSAR and other organization
charts and that of proposed Technical Specification change no. 14. As
noted in Report nos. 50-338/79-31 and 50-339/79-39, FSAR Figures 13.1.2-1
and 13.1.2-2 were then in agreement with Technical Specification Figures
6-2 and 6-3 as given in Amendment 11. Station Administrative Procedure
(ADM) 1.0, Station Organization and Responsibility, was revised July 20,
1979 to define responsibilities in accordance with revised section 13.1.2
of the FSAR. ADM 2.0, Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee, was
also revised July 10, 1979. This revision was effected to implement the
new membership and quorum requirements of Amendment 11 of the Technical
Specification. A further review of Figure 1.1 of the Nuclear Power Station
Quality Assurance Manual revealed that no revision of it was needed. These
open items are considered closed.
3.
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c.
Operation of Reactor Coolant Pumps (338/79-07-02)
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This item concerned the laci< of reference by an operating procedure to the
requirement for having all ree reactor coolant pumps in operation prior to
entering e. ode 2 (critical) . zocedures 1-0P-1.5 and 1-CP-1.6, dated June 4,
and March 14, 1979, were each observed to contain an initial condition
requiring that three pumps be operating prior tc Mode 2 operation. This
implements Operating License condition 2.D.(3).c.
Item 338/79-07-02 is
closed.
d.
Diesel Generator Exhaust Duct Braces (338/79-20-04 and 339/79-28-09)
Unit 1 Licensee Event Report (LER) 79-062/01T-0 discussed the discovery of
temporary iron braces used for fitup during construction found left in the
diesel generator exhaust ducts. Review of the shift supervisor's log for
the time frame involved and completed Maintenance Reports N1-7905030800 and
N1-7905031625 confirmed removal of the braces as described in the LER.
Removal was independently confirmed by in place observation of the ducts
by the inspector. Item 338/79-20-04 is closed.
This problem was also reported per 10 CFR 50.55(e) and 10 CFR 21 for Unit 2
by letter no. 336 dated May 23, 1979. Review of associated documentation
and inspection of the ducts confirmed removal of the braces in Unit 2 also.
The apparent Ir.'raction associated with lack of timely review of the problem
for reportability on Unit 2 is discusred in paragraph 2 of these Details.
Item 339/79-28-09 remains open.
6.
Process / Protection System Integrated Circuit Card Failures
During the inspection period, licensce personnel discovered two mechanisms for
potential generic failure of certain types of process cards in the Westinghouse
7300 series Process / Protection System. These discoveries were reported per
Unit 1 Technical Specifications,10 CFR 50.55(e), and 10 CFR 21 as noted below:
Heat Sink Shorting Failure (Unit 1 LER 79-089)
a.
As noted in the LER, station Instrument Department personnel discovered
that a heat sink on card types NMB, NVP, and NCB could short to rack card
guides, causing a change in output of the cards. Certain of these cards
could fail non-conservatively. An investigation was made to determine
where the cards were used and plans formulated for replacing them, starting
with those which would fail non-conservatively. Replacement cards had been
ordered at the conclusion of the inspection period. They will be replaced
with a newer design card, on which the heat sink has been moved such that
potential for shorting no longer exists. This problem was also reported
per 10 CFR 21 and per 10 CFR 50.55(e) per letter 638 on August 3,1979, for
Unit 2, which utilizes similar cards. The investigation and corrective
actions will be reviewed in more detail during a subsequent inspection
(open items 338/79-33-01 and 339/79-43-01).
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b.
Type NAL Card Transistor Failure (Unit 1 LER 79-091) ,
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During a detailed review of process card failures following discovery of the
problem discussed in paragraph 6.1, station personnel discovered a number of
failures ot type NAL cards due to failure of an output transistor. This was
reported as LER '9-091 for Unit 1, also per 10 CFR 21 per letter nr. 632
dated August 6,1979, for Unit I and per 10 CFR 21 and 50.55(e) f:,r Unit 2 by
letter.no. 637 dated August 3,1979. The review conclu:':' that all failures
had been associated with an older integrated circuit, which had been replaced
by Westinghouse as new parts were ordered.
A program was initiated to determine where the NAL cards were used and if
the transistors involved (component W-104) were defective, and's'phedule
replacement of them accordingly. It was noted that all failures or sus-
pected failures had been discovered during surveillance test. This problem
will be reviewed further during a subsequent inspection (open items
338/79-
33-02 and 339/79-43-02).
7.
IE Bulletin 79-13 - Cracking in Feec. water System Piping
Although not specifically required, the licensee's response to this IEB, letter
no. 530 dated July 13, 1979, covered North Anna 2 as well as VEPCO's other
nuclear units. This response was observed to be accurate in item 5.a. , implying
that more examinations had been performed on Unit 2 than actually conducted.
This was discussed with station management on August 2,1979. Management was
aware of the discrepancy and had initiated measures to correct it. A supplement
response, via letter no. 530A, was submitted August 8,1979. In an unrelated
manner, VEPCO decided to perform all examinations required of operating plants
by this IEB on Unit 2, starting August 10, 1979. Results will be reviewed by IE
Region II personnel.
8.
IE Bulletin 79-06C - Nuclear Incident at Three Mile Island - Supplement
The immediate requirements of this IEB, tripping of all reactor coolant pumps
(RCP) upon initiation of high pressure injection, and providing a second licensed
operator in the central room to trip the RCP's, were telephoned to VEPCO manage-
ment by IE:II on July 26, 1979. On July 27, 1979, the inspector confirmed that
at least two licensed operators, not including the shift supervisor, were being
stationed in the central room at all times. This was also confirmed by subsequent
visits and the central room during the inspection period. An entry was made in
the Shift Order Book July 27, implementing the requirements of the IEB and a
copy of the IEB was placed in the required reading file for operators. The
inspector had no questions regarding immediate implementation of the Bulletin.
Other aspects of it will be reviewed following the licensee's response.
9.
Plant Tours
Tours of selected plant areas were conducted on July 26, 1979, and other dates
during the inspection period in conjunction with other inspection activities.
During the tours, the following items, as available, were observed:
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a.
Fire Equipment
Operability and evidence of periodic inspection of fire suppression equipment.
b.
Housekeeping
Minimal accumulations of debris and maintenance of required cleanliness levels
in systems under or following testing.
c.
Equipment Preservation
Maintenance of special preservative measures for installed equipment as
applicable.
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d.
Component Tagging
Implementation and observance of equipment tagging for safety or equipment
protection.
e.
Communication
Effectiveness of public address system in all areas toured.
f.
Equipment Controls
Effectiveness of jurisdictional controls in precluding unauthorized work on
systems turned over for initial operations or preoperational testing.
g.
Maintenance of controls to assure systems which have been cleaned and flushed
are not reopened to admit foreign material.
h.
Security
Implementation of security provisions for both Units.
Within the above areas, no items of noncompliance or deviations were observed when
compared to the applicable station programs and procedures.
During the tour of July 26, during Unit I full power operation, the inspector
observed a door from the Unit 2 emergency switchgear room to the turbine building
to be open with hoses running through it (fire door S 54-11). The immediate
area appeared to be isolated effectively from the Unit 1 switchgear room fire
protection-wise, but the door also serves as part of the Units 1 and 2 centrol
room pressure boundary envelop. Integrity of the envelop is required to assure
operability of the control room emergency bottled air pressurization system as
required by Unit 1 Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.7.1.
The TS does not speci-
fically require that envelop penetrations be maintained in a closed position,
but requires that the emergency habitability systems, including bottled air, be
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operable during modes 1, 2, 3 and 4.
Thus, compliance with the action statement
of TS 3.7.7.1 could only be determined by performance of a ' functional test of
the bottled air system. In this case, the door was closed upon notification of
operating personnel by the inspector.
During discussions on this matter in an exit interview on July 27, 1979, the
inspector was informed that operator logs 1-LDG-6C and 2-LOG-6c were being
revised to r.equire checks of the doors in the pressure envelop every four hours.
The revised logs, approved July 30, 1979, were in final typing at the conclusion
of the inspection period. Also on July 27, the inspector informed licensee
personnel that TS coverage of pressure boundary penetration <, would be identified
as an unresolved item (338/79-33-03) and would be discussed with other NRC
offices to determine whether modifications to existing TS or creationgof a new
TS is needed to assure habitability of the control room.
10.
New Fuel Storage
New fuel for Unit 2 initial loading and a portion of the new fuel for Unit I
second cycle were in storage in the Units 1 and 2 fuel building during a tour of
the building on July 27, 1979, to verify that provisions for physical security
and environmental protection of the fuel were in agreement with those of the
application for the Unit 2 Special Nuclear Materials (SNM) License dated October 3,
1977 (serial no. 148).
Security measures were found to be equal to or greater than the commitments of
the SNM application and the Station Security Plan. Protection of the fuel from
dust, debris and physical damage ess also found to be adequate. Observation of
fire extinguishers in the area revealed them to have recent inspection dates.
Housekeeping was in order.
Within the areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were iden-
tified.
11.
Unit 2 Status - Readiness for Operation
At the conclusion of the inspection period, construction of Unit 2 was reported
to be complete. Licensee personnel estimated that it would be ready for initial
fuel loading in early September 1979, not considering any additional activities
or modifications required by NRC as a result of the Three Mile Island incident.
IE Report 50-339/79-28, Details paragraph 8 listed activities to be completed
and problems to be resolved prior to IE:II making a finding that Unit 2 would be
ready for an operating license. A revised listing is given below including
certain new problems. Resolution of certain old items was discussed in IE
Report Nos. 50-339/79-33, 35, 39, and 40. Items remaining to be completed or
otherwise resolved are categorized below by milestone:
Items to be Resolved Prior to Fuel Loading
a.
1). Completion of preoperational testing and satisfactory resolution of
test deficiencies. As of August 9,1979, 95 of 103 tests had been
completed and the results of 70 approved.
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2). Station Nuclear Safety Operating Committee review and develop schedule
to resolve significant preoperational test deficiencieg and master defi-
ciency list items acceptable to Region II.
3).
Complete development of operational procedures recommended by R.G.1.33.
(Three procedures not approved.)
4).
Complete implementaiton of industrial security program in accordance
with the North Anna Modified Amended Security Plan.
5). Resolve Quality assurance program outstanding items (IE Report 339/79-11).
b.
Item to be Resolved Prior to Two Unit Operation in Modes 4 of Above
1).
Modify the electrical transfer buses to eliminate overloading during
two unit operation (LER 79-57/01T-0 for Unit 1; Unit 2 open item
79-28-10).
Items to be Resolved Prior to Initial Criticality
c.
1). Verify that no mechanical interferences exist between incore guide
tubes or modified insulation supports and the reactor vessel lower
head insulation due to themal growth during precritical testing
(78-24-02).
2). Visual verification of hydraulic snubber operability at operating
temperature (79-26-02).
3). Revise operating procedures and system drawings to assure electrical
independence between redundant subsystems for control room air
conditioning (79-12-02).
4). Resolve lack of seis:nic supports and missile protection for the
emergency diesel generator exhausts and mufflers (79-12-02).
5). Demonstrate operability of safety related AC and DC solenoid valves
which may have parts missing (79-21-02).
6).
Complete modifications to control room air conditioner chillers
required as a result of the increase in projected service water
temperature which resulted from reevaluation of the spray pond
efficiency (79-21-01).
7). Verify adequate seismic stress analysis of safety related piping per
IE Bulletin 79-07 (79-28-07).
8).
Complete installation of reactor vessel shielding to prevent excessive
radiation levels in containment (78-12-02).
9). Verify adequacy of service water and component cooling water pipe
supports to resist thermal loadings over service water temperature
range (78-36-01).
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10). Verify service water flow to charging pump coolers is sufficient
(79-12-01).
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11). Determine if atypical weld material used in the reactor vessel seam
12). Verify that piping and support loads are within limits for systems
where erroneous Velan check valve weights were used (79-21-03; also
sie lE Bulletin 79-04).
13). Resolve error found in DNBR analysis for single dropped control rod.
14). Resolveinsiderecirculationspraypumpmotorbearingfaifuredue
to shaf t seizure (79-38-03).
15). Verify that pipe support base plates using concrete expansion anchor
bolts are adequate in accordance with IE Bulletin 79-02 (79-28-06).
16). Resolution of potential non-conservative failure of type NAL Process /
Protection signal comparator cards due to failure of W-104 transistors
(79-43-02).
d.
Items to be Resolved Prior to Exceeding 25% Power
1). Develop surveillance program for fiberglass spray pond piping and
supports (R.G.1.72) .
2).
Complete environmental qualification testing and resolve any defici-
encies identified for electrical ecmponents inside containment (IE
Circular 78-08/78-28-01 and IE Bulletin 79-01).
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