ML19262A988
| ML19262A988 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05000574 |
| Issue date: | 11/19/1979 |
| From: | Zarsky L AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED, CONCERNED CITIZENS REACTOR EXPORT REVIEW BOARD |
| To: | NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19262A978 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7912110383 | |
| Download: ML19262A988 (132) | |
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION N -pb . .['
-a f 7- In the matter of Docket No. 11-0495 WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORP. Application No. XR-12C Application No. XCOM-0013
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(Exports to the Philippines) )
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BP,IEF OF INTERVENOR/PETITIOhTR CONCERNED CITIZENS REACTOR EXPORT REVIEW BOARD c/o Lyuba Zarsky 1523 A Josephine Berkeley CA 94703 (415) 849-1174 1528 316 7912,110 3
INDEX Identification of Pettitoner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 I. REACTOR EXP0 HTS TO LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES (LDCs)
A. Export to LDCs Raises Unprecedented Concerns. . . .2 B. The Recipient Country Must Have Sufficient Expertite and Experience . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 C. Review by an Experienced, Independent Body Should Be Mandatory . . . . . . . . .. . .. . . . 3 D. U.S. Bank Loans as an Additional Special Case . . 4 E. NRC's Legal Authority . . . . . .. . . . . ... 4 II. THE PHILIPPINE REACTOR EXPORT A. The NRC Should Conduct a Thorough Investigation of the Philippine Reactor . . . . . .. . . ... 6
- 3. U.S. State Department Considers Philippine Gover. ment Expertise Adequate . . . . . . .. . .6 C. Inadequacy of Philippine Reactor Review . .. . . .7
- 9. State Department is Not Sufficiently Versed in Health and Safety Issues . . . . . . . .. . . 7 III. ADDITIONAL ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE COMMISSION A. Impact of the Three Mile Island Accident on Reactor Exports . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . 9 B. Improper Behavior by Westinghouse International Projects Company . . . . . . . . . . 9 C. Absence of Stable Geologic Formations for Waste Disposal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 IV. CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Attachments:
- 1. Z. Khalizad, " Nuclear Power and Economic Development, Seven Cases: Brazil, India, Iran, Pakistan, The Philippines,
-South Korea, and Turkey," Pacheuristics Report 78-832-11, report to the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmanent Agency, 1978.
- 2. Westinghouse International Projects Company, "Bataan Plant Wastes Smal: "v Comparison, Westinghouse Says," Press Release, Manila, July v, 1979.
- 3. Westinghouse International Projecer Company, "Bataan Plant Will Be Safe and Stable Westinghouse Says, Press Release, Manila, July 10, 1979.
1528 517
IDENTIFICATION OF PETITIONER The Concerned Citizens Reactor Export Review Board (hereafter called the Board) was formed in June 1979 in order to contribute relevant information to the Philippine Commission on Nuclear Power Plants concerning the potential hazards of operating the Westinghouse-Bataan reactor.
Additionally, the Board petitioned the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to present information to a public hearing on the export license.
The Board encompasses the expertise of scientists, lawyers and university-affiliated resource and development specialists, as well as labor, environmental and religous observers.
The members of the Board are:
Dr. John Gofman --
health physicist and radiation specialist Prof. Leonard Ross- --
Boalt Law School, U.C. Berkeley Paul Gersber -- Chairman, Conservation and Resource Studies, U.C.B.
Dr. Alan Miller -- Conservation and Resource Studies, U.C.B.
Prof. Don Dahlsten -- Conservation of Natural Resources, U.C.B.
Asso. Prof. Claudia Carr -- Conservation of Resource Studies, U.C'B. .
Prof. J.B. Neiland --
Department of Bio-Chemistry, U.C.B.
David Jenkins -- International Longshoremen and Workers Union David Brower -- President, criends of the Earth International Rev. Lloyd Wake -- Chairman, Pacific Center for Theology and Strategies (Berkeley); Minister, Glide Memorial Methodist Church (San Francisco)
Elizabeth Walker -- American Friends Service Committee Carol Ruth-Silver -- Supervisor, City of San Francisco Dr. Walden Bello -- Conservation and Resource Studies, U.C.B.:
Friends of the Filipino People Lyuba Zarsky -- Nautilus: Coordinator, Campaign for a Nuclear Free Philippines.
Resource person available in a consultant capacity to the Board include:
Prof. Frank Von Hippel -- Center for Energy and Environmental Studies, Princeton University Dr. Dan Pollard -- Union of Concerned Scientists, Wash. D.C.
Jacob Sherr -- Natural Resources Defense Council, Wash. D.C.
g) 1528 318
Due to the brevity of ri'me allotted for preparing testimony for this hearing, this brief was prepared without thorough consultation of all the members of the Board. It should not be u'derstood, therefore, to represent the professional t ca.-lon of any individual. It is rather, a summary of the issues which necessitate a full NRC health and safety review and of the intent of the Board to participate in such hearings.
I. REACTOR EXPORTS TO LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES (LDCs)
A. Exoort to LDCs Raises Unorecedent;d Concerns The export of a Westinghouse reactor to the Philippines raises questions and concerns regarding the suitabili'ty of nuclear technology for less developed countries that are unprecedented in the history of the nuclear industry.
Foremost of these '- the ability of the recipient country to adequately deal with the many complex health, safety and environmental issues that it faces in siting, construction, operation and decommissioning of a nuclear power plant.
To this end the recipient country must establish a vast regulatory and industrial infrastructure, usually at considerable cost to its economy, to ensure the safe operation of the plant, including safe disposal of its radioactive waste products, and to ensure orderly and swift response in the event of a nuclear accident.
B. The Recipient Country Must Have Sufficient Exoertise and Exoerience For any nuclear regulatory body to properly perform its duty of protecting the public, it must first acquire the 1528 il9 (2)
necessary expertise and experience. A country in the darly stages of its nuclear developrant can hardly be expected to possess such knowledge. Even the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission is not beyond the learning stage, as evidenced by the recent Three Mile Island accident. Furthermore, as regards seismic and geologic siting of nuclear power plants, the NRC admits that guidelines for design criteria are minimal. In the case of siting on or near volcanoes, such criteria are virtually nonexistant.
Oftentimes and in the case of the Philippine reactor, the siting of nuclear plants in LDCs requires even m' ore stringent design criteria than in the U.S. due to the absence or paucity of suitable terrain. To place the bt'.rden for the ,
development of such criteria on an inexperienced recipient country must be considered incommensurate with the desire to provide benefits to that country which may be derived from nuclear power (see attachment 1).
C. Review by an Exoerienced, Independent Body Should be Mandatory It is evident, therefore, that in those cases in which a recipient country of a nuclear power plant has little or no experience, some experienced body should carry out a health, safety and environmental investigation to ensure that all possible precautions to minimize the risk of a nuclear accident have been taken.
Certainly the nuclear industry cannot be relied upon for such an undertaking, as has been amply demonstrated through experience accumulated in the U.S. Furthermore, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), while it does have access to experienced independent individuals, is not a suitable body 1528 ;20 (3)
- because it is empowered only to make recommendations to the recipient country and then only when requested to do so.
It cannot instigate a thorough health and safety investigation of its own and has no veto power over the continuation of a project.
Only the USNRC has the requisite experience and veto rights to qualify as a suitable agency to undertake such an investigation.
Such an investigation must be at least as thorough as any performed for domestic reactors. The NRC should not hesitate to enlist the services of the U.S. Geological Survey as it does in domestic cases when seismic and geologic siting questions arise.
D. U.S. Bank Loans as an Additional Special Case Of special concern should be those countries which receive financial backing from the U.S., such as loans from the p Export-Import Bank. In this case the U.S. taxpayer has an interest that his money be used responsibly and that it not. -
cause undue harm and hardship to a foreign country. It should be remembered that the loss of a nuclear power plant in an LDC due to an accident similar to TMI would cause much greater hardship as a result of the loss of electricity, since a single nuclear power plant produces a larger percentage of the total electrical use. Additionally, LDCs have a proportionally lesser capability to absorb the costs of evacuating large numbers of impoverished rural inhabitants. Therefore great care is required in LDCs to prevent an accident from occuring. It is demonstrably obvious that such care has not been excercised on the Philippine reactor.
E. NRC's Legal Authority
}$28 j21 Should the USNRC decide that it does not now possess proper legal authority to carry out extensive investigations of health and safety issues surrounding reactors exported tv LDCs, it should
. secure such authority from the Congress of the United States.
However, ample evidence already exists to demonstrate that the review of health, s;fety and environmental aspects of reactor transfers are within the legal jurisdiction of the NRC.
The Atomic Energy Act states that the Commission may not issue licennes which it determines are " inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public."
(42 U.S.C. S 2133, subd. (d).) The proximity of two strategic military installations near the site of the Philippine
, reactor is a particularly compelling example of possible threats to U.S. " common defense and security." Further, any nuclear power plant involves a risk of major accident, a scenario which could threaten the good relations between reciptent countries and the U.S. which are the basis of " common defense and secur'i ty. "
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act states that it is policy of the United States to " cooperate with foreign natio'ns- in identifying . . . suitable technologies for energy production and
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. . . alternative i,s; . . . to nuclear power . . . consistent with environmental protection. " (27 U.S.C. S 3201, subd. (d).)
The clear intent of this r avision is to provide protection for the environments of foreign nations, as well as the global environment . This provision, coupled with the one mentioned above, provdie legal authority for the NRC to examine health, safety and environmental issues of all reactor exports on their own merits, and not simply as they are connected to the
' common defense and security"of the United States.
Additionally, legal precedent has been set giving the NRC such authority as a result of the recent suit filed by Westinghouse against the NRC. The Department of Jusitce ruled that the Commission could consider health and safety issues in foreign 1528 322 (5)
. countries and summarily dismissed the case. The Justice Department argued that such issues: (i) could harm U.S. relations with a recipient country: (ii) affect U.S. citizens living abroad:
and (iii) jeopardize U.S. security and defense interests.
II. THE PHILIPPINE REACTOR EXPORT A. The NRC Should Conduct a Thorough Investigation of
_the Philiopine Reactor Regarding the WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORP. export of a nuclear reactor to the Philippines, we perceive that the Philippine government and its agencies, including the Philippine Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) lack the expertise necessary to adequately regulate nuclear technology. The U.S. Embassy in the Philippines voiced this concern to the State Department in 1976:
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"The PAEC is the local counterpart agency to the NRC and has ,
a regulatory responsibilities for the nuclear power project. '
As this is the first nuclear power plant in the Philippines, .
the PAEC does not have the depdth of technical expertise nor breadth of experience the GOP [ Government of the Philippines]
would like to see applied to this regulatory function." 1 A thorough review of all health, safety and environmental issues must and should, therefore, be conducted by the USNRC.
B. U.S. Department of State Considers Philippine Government Exnertise Aceauate Cor.trary to our perception of inexperience on the part of the Philippine Government, the U.S. State Department concluded in its recommendation for export of the reactor that: "The Philippine Government's actions with respect to evaluation of the site-safety issue . . . are considered to provide adequate assurances (ofsafety in accordance with internationally accepted standards . . .
If this were so we would agree that there is no need for furhter investigations by the NRC.
1528 223 1/ Telegram R-01209127. September 1976. American Embassy in Manila to Seeretary of State, Washington D.C.
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C. Inadequacy of Philionine Reactor Review The Philippine Commission on Nuclear Power Plants, held in Manila from June-Sepr. ember 1979, proved inadequate to review health and safety issues on two counts: first, important testimony from plant oppositors was denied, including testimony from local seismic specialists and plant workers who have evidence of the use of substandard construction materials: second, the Commission itself was not able to evaluate the testimony which was submitted but called instead for the help of international expertise.
The denial of the opportunity to present testimony to public hearings resulted in the walk-out of the oppositors, a dramatization of the repressive climate of the martial-law -
regime.
The offer of technical assistance by the Board in the early stages of the Commision's hearings was not accepted. '
D.. State Department Is Not Sufficiently Versed in Health -
and Safety Issues Our view is that the State Department is itself not sufficiently experienced in health, safety and environmental issues to decide, one way or the other, whether anyone else is competent in these matters. Indeed, the State Department tried without success to enlist the services of the U.S. Geological Survey to evaluate both an IAEA critical report of an Ebasco Overseas, Inc. study of seismic and volcanic siting hazards of the Philippine reactor and the PAEC's reponse to the IAEA report. The USGS refused to cooperate because of the lack of a clear mandate. It did, however, orally affirm the IAEA concerns and the suspected inadequacy of the PAEC response.
In addition, the State Department hired Kelleher Consultants and, on the basis of their report, presumably concluded in a Concise Environmental Review of the Philiopine Nuclear Power Plant that " seismic activity and volcanic history of the site region is not well known or understood," and that ". . . additional information and evaluation is neede4to determine if the 0.4g 1528 s24 (7)
. design level is adequate for the Safe Shutdown Earthquake."
Fu;;hermore, while the State Depatment is apparently reassured by the Philippine Government's request for help from the IAEA and the appointment of two " internationally recognized seismological and geotechnical experts to review the available information on the site characteristics " (State Department), we, frankly, find such a request distressing. To us it indicates that the Philippine Government does not possess, of its own, the expurtise necessary for the safe use of nuclear technology.
This notwithstanding, we also believe that the "available informatic gathered by Ecasco Overseas, Inc. on the seismic and geologic characteristics of the site may be inadequate for a valid seismic safety analysis. This neertainty also renders the proposed investigation by two international experts of doubtful validity.
Already Philippine scientist Adres O. Hizon, Chairman of the National Society for Seismology and Earthquake Engineering of the Philippines, has testified before the Philippine Commission investigating the project that Ebasco used " inaccurate, unreliable and biased" methods in its analysis. He has presented computations showing that the Safe Shutdown Earthquake should be double the value determined by Ebasco.
Finally, we know of no " internationally accepted standards" for siting nuclear power plants on volcanoes and very few for siting them near earthquake faits. We would be grateful to the State Department if they could show them to us.
Contrary to the Department of State, we do not think that the PAEC has demonstrated that it can adequately cope with the site-safety issue. We note that the burden placed on it is indeed enormous and unique. According to an IAEA Safety Mission report, the Philippine reactor is " unique to the nuclear industry insofar as the threat from volcanic hazards. . . is concerned. It stated that the eruption of the" dormant" volcano, Mt. Natib, on whose slope the reactor is being constructed, must be considered a " credible event" and recommended that the reactor be designed to i528 25 (8)
withstand 22 feet of hot ash fall, missile ejecta, glowing avalanches, poisonous gas accumulation, laharic mudflows and filter clogging.
In addition, the Philippine Commission on Volcanology stated that it " believes that eruption from any of the volcanic complexes it. the area is possible, not only from the presently observed cratars and vents, but virtually from any point in the peninsula. ..
The same IAEA report also sharply criticized the " approach and judgment" used by Ebasco Overseas, Inc. to determine the Safe Shutdown Earthquake. Finally, after over 20% of the reactor has been completed, there still exists controversy over the location and magnitude of several earthquake faults near the site.
With all this in mind, we are forced to conlude that the Deprtment of State overstepped its realm of expertise in ruling as it dB on the Philippine reactor export.
III. ADDITIONAL ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE COMMISSION Should the Commission agree with Board's presented position that it ought to conduct a thorough investigation into the Philippine reactor export, there are certain other issues besides seismic, volcanic and other geological issues pertaining to the site which the Commission should consider.
A. Tenact of the Three Mile Island Accident on Reactor Exoorts In testimony under oath before special hearings ordered by Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos to investigate the safety of the Philippine reactor following the Three Mile Island accident, Westinghouse offical R.J. Sero stated that ". . . the features already incorporated into the Philippine Nuclear Power Plant design. ..
will make an accident like the one at TMI impossible."
We believe that a moratorium in effect on licensing of any new nuclear power plants in the U.S. should also apply to the issuance of any new reactor export licenses until Mr. Sero's statement can be verified to apply to all nuclear reactor designs, including the one for the Philippine reactor.
B. Imorocer Behavior by Westinehouse International Proiects Comoany We enclose copies of two press releases issued by Westinghouse International Projects Company in the Philippines which demonstrate 1528 26 (9)
flagrant disregard for the health and safety of the Filipino people and a deliberate attempt to mislead the public (see attachments 2 and 3). The NRC should investigate how extensive such attempts huve been.
C. Absence of Stable Geologic Formations for Waste Disposal No license should be granted to export a nuclear reactor to the Philippines until the problem of waste disposal has been resolved.
We observe that there are probably no stable geological rock formations for disposal of such waste and it is thus likely that such waste will have to be shipped to some (presently nonexistant) international disposal site or else to the U.S. It is imperative that these issues be resolved before the reactor is allowed to operate.
IV. CONCLUSION In conclusion, based on the arguments presented above and especially on the Philippine Government's inexperience relating to matters of complex nuclear technology, we urge the NRC to conduct an extensive investigation into health, safety and environmental issues of the WESTINGHOUSE export to the Philippines.
Such an investigation would be in the interest of the
- Filipino people as well as the U.S. citizens whose tax money is financing the reactor through a loan from the Export-Import Bank, the Americans liing in the Philippines, and even the nuclear industry whose future depends on the safe use of nuclear power.
The information to-date made available to citizen participants by the NRC, State Department, Westinghouse, Philippine Government and Philippine agencies does not permit competent technical evaluation and resolution of the many controversial issues.
Consequently, the rights of citizens to particip, ate in matters affecting their interests have been arbitrarily curtailed in the U.S. and in the Philippines. The NRC should redress this situation by holding full public hearir.gs with full access to all technical information and including the rights of intervenors to question all officials making assertions and to receive a reply from the NRC and other employees of the American people.
We will place the full technical resources of the Concerned Citizens Reactor Export Review Board at the disposal of the NRC in the eventuality of open democratic hearings. At this stage, however, limitations of available information severely handicap our dbility 1528 327 to do so.
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PAN Paper 78-832-11 1RiCLEAR POWER A!O ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, SEVEN CASES: BRAZIL, INDIA, IRMI, PAKISTAN, THE PHILIPPINES, SOUI"d KOREA, AND TURKEY Zalmay Khalil:ad Prepared for-U.S. ARMS CONTROL At1D DISARMAMEiji AGEilCY Prepared by:
Pan Heuristics 1801 Avenue of the Stars Suite 1221 Los Angeles, California 90067 1528 '128
AC7NC106 NUCLEAR POWER AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, SEVEN CASES:
BRAZIL, INDIA, IRAN, PAKISTAN, THE PHILIPPINES, SOUTH KOREA, AND TURKEY 4
TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction . . . . . . . . . . .... ... .... .. ..... 1 Projections of Nuclear Power in the LICs . ............. 12 Nuclear Power and Economic Development . . ....... ..... . 25 Capital Costs . . . . . . . ..... ....... ...... 27 Interest Ruring Construction .... ..... .......40 The Suitability cf Nuclear Power for the LICs ..... . ..... 83 Nuclear Power and Energy Independence:
North-South Conflict . . . . . . .......... ... ..... 95 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . .......... .. . . . . . 110 1528 529
AC7NC106 INTRODUCTION The introduction of large numbers of nuclear reactors in the Less Industrial Countries (LICs) has been hoped, debated, and predicted many ,
times, by governments of both industrial and less industrial countries, international organizations, and many students of nuclear electricity sLace Hiroshima.* After the detonation of the wcrld's first nuclear bomb, the United.. States seeking international control over worldwide nuclear ac-tivities, otticially was euphoric about the potential civilian contribu-tions'of the atom. This official euphoria was reflected in a large num-ber of nongovernmental publications including those representing differ-ent ideological groups.
In the Challenue of Atomic Energy: A Resource Unit and Discussion Guide for Teachers and Group Leaders, published in 1948, the authors saw
- nucleer energy as the panacea for world problems:
Internationally cooperation and trust should replace competition and fear. In an age of economic abundance the rivalries for raw materials would seem likely to give way to trade competition in which " backward" colonial peoples will no longer be suppressed and exploited hnt will be sought as consu=ers at_an ever increasing standard of living. In an age of abundance, consumption, not pro- ,
duction will be the problem.**
- The scientists working in Eckart Hall at the University of Chicago, had discussed the long-term civilian use of nuclear energy in 1944, p. 21, Albert Wohlstetter, The Scread of Nuclear Bombs: Predictions. Premises, Policies, ERDA-PH-77-04-370-23, Report to Energy Research and Develop-ment Administration,1977. Also the report of the committee headed by A. Jeffries, called "A Prospect of Nucleonics," had presented a quali-fied view of potential contributions of nuclear electricity. Submitted to A. H. Compton, November 18, 1944. Reprinted in Alice Kimball Smith's, A Peril and a Hope (Cnicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), pp.
539-559.
An even'more qualified view of the prospect for atcmic power was presented in the Tolman Report. It stated "the development of fission piles solely for the production of power for ordinary commercial use does not appear economically sound, nor advisable from the point of view of preserving national resources." Interim Committee and Scien-tific Panel, Manhattan Engineering District, Top Secret Documents of Special Interest to General Groves, 1942-1946, Box 12, Folder 3, De-cember 28, 1944, p. 8.
- Crany et al., The Challence of Ate =ic Enerev: A Resource Unit and Dis-cussion Guide for Teachers and Group Leaders (1948), p. 46.
. 1 1528 i30
AC7NC106 The expectations of scoe lef tist authors f rom the atom was not dif-ferent. 'evenstein of the League for Industrial Democracy for example wrote:
In the atom age, we have the potential to lift the oppressed ,
to their feet without losing our own footing and to feed the hungry without forfeiting a mor sel of our own.*
The Soviets have claimed that even back in 1922, one of their Academi-cians, V. I. Vernandsky, had predicted: "The time is not far off when man will get hold of nuclear energy as a source of power which will en-able him to build up his life as he thinks fit,"** In Germany, the Pre-amble of the Socialist Party (SPD), "Godesberger Progra=m," read:
It is the hope of our age, that man will improve -his living conditions in the atomic age, become free of verries and cre-ate prosperity for all, if only he uses his constantly growing .
power over nature of peaceful purposes.***
In the United States some authors thoug'ht the utilization of atomic energy was the evidence of the success of the American social system; others believed that "the atom" made socialism inevitable and even a greater number, including a large number of physical scientists, argued that world government was a cecessary consequence of the atomic age.
Statements such as "we have split the a:cm, now we cust hasten to unite the world," "one world or none,"**** can be found in various phrasing in an everwhelming number of writings on the subject in the period. Norman Cousins, in a widely circulated editorial in the Saturday Review of Lit-erature on August 13, 1945, gave the following advice to those who con-sidered world government as i= practical:
There is no need to discuss the historical reasons pointing to and arguing for world government. There is no need to talk of the difficulties in the way of world government. There is need
- Aaron Levenstein, The Atomic Age: Suicide, Slavery or Social Plan-ning? (League for Industrial Democracy), p.15; J. A. Teegan in an article: " Atomic Energy in the Service of Mankind," in Beama Journal, June 1948, argued that atomic energy offers almost unlimited possi-bilities for aiding humanity.
- V. S. Emelyanov, " Nuclear Power in Peace and War," the Eulletin of the Atomic Scientist, March 1976, p. 18.
- Der Sciecel, November 21, 1977, p. 22. I am grateful to C. Benard for translating the "Godesberger Program" from German.
- Albert Wohlstetter, " Technology, Disorder and Prediction," The Van-derbilt Law Review, Vol. 17, no. 1 (December 1970), p. 6.
2 4
1528 331
AC7NC106 only to ask whether we can afford to do without it. All other considerations become either secondary or inconsequential.*
Besides the euphoria and the apocalyptic view of the atom in the is-mediate post-Hiroshima period, there were individual. such as the econo-mist Jacob Marschak who argued that the potential benefits of nuclear electricity could not be as great as same had suggested ** and that the political risks from widecpread dependence on nuclear power may be great-er than the foreseen benefits.*** There were a nu=ber of others in England and in the United States who had views similar to those of Mar-schak. The British government itself was apprehensive about the world-vide transfer of nuclear energy because of potential political risks in-volved. Co=menting on the Acheson-Lilienthal (Buruch) plan, it said:
To transfer development activities to an international authority =
would mean in practice that atomic energy plants would be built in all the principal countries with the advance and assistance of other nations. Whether the advantage of such a scheme would justify the inherent risk depended on political judgment, and certainly on such schene could succeed except in an at=osphere of confidence. There were, however, such wide dif ferences of opinion and outlook on policy between the great powers that there was little prospect for general acceptance of the ideal of su~er-p .
national authority whose behest would automatically override sovereignty.****
The original euphoria about nuclear power was combined with a belief that the world had two mutually exclusive choices: " cataclysm or paradise."
Cat:clysm was equated with the spread and use of nuclear weapons and para-dise with peaceful application of nuclear power. Many believed that the spread of civilian nuclear power would decrease the likelihood of the spread of nuclear weapons.
- The Saturday Review of Literature, August IS,1945.
- Jacob Marschak, "The Economic Aspects of Atomic Power," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist, Vol. 2, nos. 5 and 6 (September 1946), p. 9; M.H.L. Pryce, " Atomic Power: What Are the Prospects?" Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (August 1948).
- P. F. Harrod in England reached conclusions similar to those of Jacob Marschak, P. F. Harrod, "The Economic Consequence of Atomic Energy," Sir Halley Stewart Lectures, The Atomic Ace, London:
George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1949, p. 52ff.
- Margaret Gowing, Indeoendence and Deterrence: Br. rain and Atomic Energy, 1945-1952, Vol. I (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1974), p.
89.
3 1528 532
AC7NC106 In 1946, while outlining the American proposal for international control of atomic energy, Bernard Baruch, President Truman's appointee to the United Nations Atomic Energy Cocmission, stated that "We are here to make a choice between quick and dead . . . . We must elect World _
Peace or World Destruction . . . .*
This dualistic view of the atom was not limited to the Americans alone. Joseph Paul-Boncour, who represented Fr nce during dC.iberations of the United Naticns Commission to deal with tne problem raised by atomic energy said:
Man, for the first time, has discovered how to release atomic energy at his will and for his own purposes. There are two ways open to us, the way of destriction and terror, . . . , or the way of boundless hope for humanity from the use of this discovery for peaceful ends.**
The earliest public international discussion of the civilian impor-tance of nuclear electricity not only for the industrial world but the rest of the world as well, took place during the meeting of President Truman of the United States, Prime Minister Attlee of the United Kingdom, .
and Prime Minister Mackenzie King of Canada in November, 1945. The three argued that a commission be set up by the United Nations to deal with the atom. One of the objectives of the Co= mission was defined as the promotion of the utilization of Atom 4c Energy for peaceful and human-itarian ends worldwide. It was believed that the benefit from such utilization was to be considerable.***
The original reactions of most LICs to the Western, especially
- American, announcements about the enormous civilian potential of the atom, and the offer of aid to "non-atom" world at the United Nations was one of disbelief, high hopes and gratitude. Several LICc, considered the American-British-Canadian offer "as an act of selflessness," in
" sharing the secrets of the atom with others"; a secret on which the
- William Epstein, The Last Chance (New York: Free Press, 1976, p. 9.
- United Nations Official Records of the First Part of the 1st Session of the General Assembly, Plenery Meeting of the General Assembly, Verbatim Record,10 January-14 February 1946 (London: Central West Hall, Westminister).
- In the LICs, according to Indian sources in March 1944, Dr. H. Bha-bha, the country's Atomic Energy Co==ission chief, had foreseen pro-duction of nuclear power "in say, a couple of decades from now."
M.G.K. Menon, "Hemi Jehangir Bhabha," Proceedings of the Royal In-stitution of Great Britain, Vol. 4, no. 191, 1967, p. 426.
1528 433
AC7NC106 United States had spent two billion dollars.* Thus they voted unani-mously in favor of the proposal.
Between 1945 and 1953, President Eisenhower's Ato=s for Peace Speech, the LICs were generally reacting to western or Soviet suggestions regard-ing peaceful applications of the atom in their part of the world. They generally favored the western proposals on the dissemination of nuclear information and international control of nuclear weapons. Thus they over-whelmingly voted in favor of the American plan (the Baruch plan) in 1943 **
However, there was little progress in the direction of nuclear arms con-trol and the worldwide dissemination of civilian nuclear technology, be-cause of the absence of any reconciliation between USSR and American points of view. During this period, the dominant view in the U.S. AEC was that the era of cheap nuclear power was likely to be far off, compli-cated and difficult.*** Others, such as P. Blackett, the British Nobel '
physicist, advanced the view that civilian nuclear energy was likely to be of particular importance to the Soviet Union and the LICs.****
President Eisenhower's December 8,1953 speech delivered to the United Nations General Assembly reflected much of the euphoria of and fear about the atom.the had characteri:cd most of the discussion about the future of nucleonics immediately af ter the nuclear attack against
- Japan. According to President Eisenhower: -
- U.N. Official Records of the First Part of the First Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations Plenary Meetings of the General Assembly, Verbatim Record,10 January-14 February 1946 (London: Cen-tral Hall Westminster). The American-British-Canadian proposal also called for the control of atomic energy to the extent necessary to ensure its use only for peaceful purposes. During the same year, the United States passed the McMahon Act which stipulated that "until Congress declares by joint resolution that effective and enforceable international safeguards against the use of Atomic Energy for destruc-tive purposes have been established, there shall be no exchange of information with other nations with respect to the use of atomic energy for industrial purposes."
- The discussion of the American proposal and the counterproposal of the Soviets continued for two years (1946-1948). The adoption of the American plan led to little practical progress in the nuclear arms control because of the absence of re:onciliation between the Soviets and the U.S. point of view.
In 1949, the Soviets succeeded in exploding an atom device of its own. Great Britain exploded its first nuclear device in 1952. A=er-ica's first hydrogen bomb was exploded in November 1952, and was fol-loved by a similar explosion by the USSR in August 1953.
- A. Wohlstetter, The Spread of Nuclear Bombs, p. 31.
- P.M.S. Blackett, Militarv and Political Consecuences of Atomic Energy (London: Tunstile Press, 1948), p. 99.
5 1528 '34
AC7NC106 The United States knows that if the fearful trend of atemic military buildup can be reversed, this greatest force can be developed into a great boon, for the benefit of all mankind.
The United States knows that peaceful power from atomic energy is no dream of the future. That capability already proved, is here--now--todav. Who can doubt, if the entire body of the world's scientists and engineers had adequate amounts of fis-sionable material with which to develop their ideas, that this capability would be rapidly transformed into universal, effi-cient, and economic usage.* (emphasis added)
Eisenhower's dualism was reflected in statements by the representa-tives of other industriali:ed countries. The French delegate to the de-bate on IAEA statutes, for example posed the same drastic choice of extre=es:
Will it [ atomic energy] mean terror for the people of the ,
world, or happiness . . . ? On one side, there is annihila-tion, ruin and mourning. Our people want none of that. On the other side there is the possibility of giving life, a life which is worth living. Such is the choice that con-fronts us.** - -- -
Eisenhower reco== ended the establishment of an international Atomic Energy Agency to be set up under the aegis of the United Nations. This agency, he said, "could be mad . responsible for the i= pounding, storage,
- and protection of the contributed fissionable and other materials." As far as the LICs are concerned, President Eisenhower said, "A special purpose (of the Atomic Energy Agency) would be to provide abundant elec-trical energy in the power-starved areas of the world. Thus, the con-tributing powers would be dedicating some of their strength to serve the needs rathec than the fears of mankind.***
The industrial countries celebrated Eisenhower's speech in expec-tation of the coming age and were moved by their own generosity toward the LICs. According to Sir Pierson Dixon cf the United Kingdom there was "no parallel example in the world's history where a handful of countries have shown thers 'ves to ready to puc their store of know-
- Quoted in Epstein, The Last Chance, p. 14.
- IAEA, Conference on the Statutes, LAEA/CS/OR 13, October 2, 1956,
- p. 22.
- IAEA, Conference on the Statutes, 1956, p. 2.
6 1528 GS
AC7NC106 ledge--acquired at i= sense effort and cost--at the disposal of their fellow people."*
America's " Atoms for Peace" proposal had a profound impact in the ,
IICs. Statements by their political leaders and representative to the bnited Nations Conference on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, and during the debate on the Inestnational Atcmic Energy Agency statutes were unanimous in their tribute to President Eisenhower and in their cuphoria about the prospect of nuclear power in their countries. Tbts was the reaction that President Eisenhower had hoped for. Most statements by LIC leaders about the implications of civilian nuclear power reflected sentiments similar to those of the leaders of ICs. Ambassador King of Liberia said, "The day President Eisenhower delivered his ' Atoms for Peace' speech will be remembered as the day when man transfor=ed his greatest discovery from a death-dealing to a life-giving instrument."**
The Agency to be created as a result of Eisenhower's proposal, he said, "will terminate the terror of the atom bomb. It will accent the good inherent in atomic energy, applying constructively what had threatened him with extinction."***
- Ibid. T.n order to implement this new development in the U.S. policy, the 1946 Atomic Energy Act was changed. The ner Atomic Energy Act was approved by Congress in 1954. The 1954 Act authorized the U.S.
government "to encourage widespread participation in the development and utilization of atomic energy for peaceful purposes to the maxi-cum extent consistent with the common defense and security and with the health and safety of the public." The Act also empowered the United States Atomic Energy Commission to negotiate nuclear coopera-tion agreement with other nations without Senate approval. It also authorized the private ownership of major nuclear facilities and the possession under license of special fissionable =aterials by private industry. The Act opened the door for the growth and development of the nuclear industry in the United States. Furthermore, in order to make the proposal a tuccess, the United States declassified 10,000 Atomic Energy Commission documents in 1954, to help in the worldwide dissemination of nuclear knowhow.
In 1955, the United States also established an International School of Nuclear Science to train foreign nationals in implementing Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace program. This school was to supple =ent the effort, already undertaken by the Argonne National Laboratory.
Jesse Parkinson, Jr., "U.S. Trainir.g of Foreign Nationals," in Peace-ful Applications of Atomic Energy (Geneva: The United Nations, 1958).
- IAEA, Conference on the Statutcy,, IAEA/CS/OR 5, September 25, 1957,
- p. 37.
- Ibid. .
7 1528 s36
AC7NC106 India's Bhabha welcomed Eisenhower's speech and called it worthy of respect. The representative of Iran to the conference on IAEA statutes, Abdoh, paid tribute to President Ei;'.nhower for his "Atocs for Peace" proposal and expressed the dualistic expectation from the atom that had characterized much of the nuclear discussion in the United States. He said that the world was at a critical crossroad, "either we will see international cooperation established in this field to promote the wel-fare of mankind, or the stem will bring about the total annihilation of our planet. The people of the world expect us to lay the foundati.on of II.EA whose operations will accelerate progress and prosperity."*
Pakistan's delegate, M. Ahmed, called the Eisenhower speech memor-able and said that to Pakistan his program appeared to have two great obj ectives:
One was to promote the cause of peace by asking the countries which had bu'.lt up stockpiles of normal uranium and fissionable materials to make voluntary contributions of some of these ma-terials to a co= mon pool, to be used exclusively for pescaful purposes. The other objective was that the bulk of the materials ,
thus contributed should be used to " provide abundant electrical energy in the power-starved areas of the world," and that, "ex-perts would be mobilized to apply atomic energy to the needs of agriculture, medicine, and other peaceful activities." The sec-ond objective, if I may be permitted to point out, appears to us to relate especially to the needs of the underdeveloped countries.**
Israel's A. Eban argued that dependence on nuclear power would bring energy independence and equality among nations. According to Eban, nuc-lear power "will bring about radical changes in the pattern of fuel eco-nomics. When the new compact fuels are more readily available, nations hitherto dependent on transportation of oil over vast distances by land and by sea, will no longer be exposed to excessive dependence on those who through the accident of geography are in the position to obstruct the passage of vital supplies. Thus a genuine equality of nations, un-known in an era of coal and oil, will then becoce possible, replacing some of the present tensions between the suppliers of vital fuels and those dependent on their supplies."***
There was some discussion among the industrial coun tries whether the peaceful application cf atomic energy would have a similar or greater impact than industrial revolution in facilitating worldwide
- IAEA, Conference on Statutes, September 25, 1956, pp. 26-33.
- Ibid., September 26, 1956, p. 26.
- IAEA, Confsvence on the Statutes, IAEA/CS/OR 12, October 1956, p. 56.
3 1528 '37
AC7NC106 progress.* The LICs, such as Pakistan, prognosticated that the discovery and peaceful applications of the atom was more important than the indus-trial revolution for the less industrial world, and that LICs with the help of atomic energy could condense decades of progress into a few years:
In the race against time and our anxiety to take our rightful place among the nations of the world, the realization of the important role which peaceful application of atomic energy can play, has a deep significance for us.**
Ironically, many LICs such as India and Pakistan argued that the civilian use of nuclear energy was likely to become more important in LICs than in the industrial countries. Nehru, for example, has been quotea as saying:
The use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes is far more im-portant for a country like India than it =ay be for the ad-vanced countries. It is important for a power-starved, power hungry country like India, or other countries of Asia and Africa.***
I. H. Usmani of Pakistan referred to the paradox of the accmic age:
The paradox is that nuclear power technology is at present confined to those countries which do act need nuclear power as much as those where the knowhow is absent.****
After the 1953 announcement of the Atoms for Peace, it was argued that nuclear power is likely to be especially suited for LICs. There were numerous discussions about how in a few years small nuclear plants would be competitive with similar capacity diesel plants in many less industrial countries. This expectation was based on the installation of small reactors for sub=arines in industrial countries and the discus-sions concerning the possibility of small reactors for lococctives and
- D. da==arskjold, the U.N. Secretary General, compared the peaceful application of the atom to the Industrial Revolution. The British delegate thought that the peaceful application was more important than the Industrial Revolution. IAEA, Conference on the Statutes, IAEA/CS/OR, 1956, pp. 2-5.
- Ibid . , p . 38. Many LIC delegates also expressed gratitude to the U.S. offer of 40,000 kg of fissionable fuel to benefit many mil-lions of people around the world. The offer was of special signifi-cance to LICs as 20,000 kgs were to be reserved for countries which did not produce fissionable materials.
- Quoted by Bhabha,. in his statements on the Conference of the Statutes, IAEA/CS/OR 7, p. 43.
- IAEA Bulletin, Vol. 5, no. 1, January 1963, p. 9.
1528 s38
AC7NC106 airplanes. In fact, it was believed that very small reactors would pro-vide possible _avings when compared to alternatives because they would not require " supplementary investments" such as in roads, in transporta-tion of fuel and in foreign exchange. There was also the expectation of the production of a large number of small standardized reactors that nould " fit perfectly" the decentralized electrical grid of many LICs.*
The LIC leaders hoping to improve the economic situa tion of their countries, and persuaded thar economic development necessitated the avtilability of cheap electricity, were enthusiastic about the civilian promise of the atom as expressed by the scientific and political leader-ship of industrial countries such as the United States. This explains the faith of many LICs in the atom technology. This faith was so strong that the transfer of nuclear technology to the nonnuclear countries was later called the transfer of " atoms for development."** Many believed that atonic energy would provide safe, cheap and clean power which would revolutionize the way of life in the poor countries.***
Because of the high hopes placed in the transfer of the " peaceful atom," the LICs unani=ously endorsed the creation of IAEA, whose statu-tory objective was to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world.**** A num-ber of LICs also signed nuclear cooperation agreements with countries such as the United States, Britain, and Canada and the USSR for nuclear cooperation, established nuclear cocsission, purchased nuclear research reactors, initiated the training of nuclear scientists and engineers, etc. , aiming at the eventual introduction of nuclear power reactors.
India, for example, established its Atomic Energy Commission in 1954.
Turkey, Iran, South Korea, Brazil and the Philippines signed nuclear
- U.N. Conference on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energv, 1955.
This is the name that some countries such as Pakistan and institu-tions such as the ISEA gave to President Eisenhower's " Atoms for Peace" program. I. H. Usmani, "Atems for Development in Pakistan,"
Nuclear Engineering International, September 1971, p. 763.
- Ibid.
- Statute, IAEA, as amended up to June 1973 (Vienna: 1973), p. 5.
The IAEA has in areas of nuclear power:
- a. sponsored power reactor survey and siting missions;
- b. conducted feasibility studies;
- c. organized technical meetings;
- d. published reports on small and medium power reactors;
- e. awarded fellowships for training in nuclear power and tech-nology.
1528 339 10
AC7NC106 cooperation agreements with the United States in the 1950s. India and Pakistan signed similar agreements with Canada.*
Nuclear power raised the hope of LICs that the gap between them and the industrial countries would be reduced if not altogether eliminated in a short time. Nuclear power provided them with vision of a new world based on abundance and social justice.
This study will examine the controversy over the transfer of nuclear electricity to LICs by reviewing the history of nuclear development in seven countries: Brasil, India, Iran, Pakistan, the Philippines, South Korea and Turkey. While these seven countries cannot be taken as repre-sentative for all LICs, many of the variables considered are characteris-tics of LICs, and the case studies generate conclusions that are appli-cable beyond the seven countries alone. The study will have three main themes. First, it will examine the extent to which the expectations re-garding nuclear power in the LICs have been realized and will document the changing policies, predictions and expectations. Second, it will analyze the varied and often contradictory political, economic, and social goals and interests pursued by the concerned parties and their effect on the transfer of nuclear technology frem ICs to LICs Finally, it will identify factors that are relevant for the discussion of the transfer of other complex technologies as well.
Both bestuse of the central significance of energy and because of the possible military ramifications of nuclear power, the study of this deci-sionmakers controversy also sheds light on the situation of the less in-dustrialized ccuntries vis-A-vis ICs, the other actors of their region, and their domestic rivals. It de=onstrates that_Ac_ce" M4 fon:iation is [.
a,golitical resource as unequally distributed as other power fac. tors in the. internal system. Decision =akers in the LICs find chemselves in the '$
- tl position of makiEg very lasting and farreaching decisions on the basis of ' '
inadequate and foreign supplied._information constrained in their imple-mentativu- tiy-deydhdence on foreign powers in a financial, military and diplomatic regard, and subject to sudden shif ts and reversals originating in the policies and evaluation of ICs.
- The United States, for example, has bilateral nuclear cooperation agree-ments with the following LICs: Argentina, Brazil, the Republic of China, Colombia, Greece, India, Indonesia, Iran, South Korea, the Phil-ippines, Thailand, Turkey, and Venezuela. U.S. , Cengress , House, Com-mittee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. Foreien Policy and the Export of Nuclear Technology to the Middle East, 93rd Cong., 2nd session, 1974, p. 7.
i528 540 11
AC7NC106 PROJECTIONS OF NUCLEAR POWER IN THE LICs The euphoria about the potential civilian contribution of nuclear energy in the 1940s and 1950s led to a number of predictions about future spread of nuclear power plants in the LICs. These predictions have been far from accurate. One of the earliest estimates of the projection of nuclear power in the less industrial countries took place in Pakistan.
Pakistan, which had the installed generating capacity of 5 MWe of elec-tricity at the time of its independence, projected in 1955, that by 1970 it would have an electricity gap of 667 MWe between the de=and and the generating capacity available domestically. This gap was to increase to 1,077 MWe in 1975, 1,304 MWe by 1980, 1,969 MWe by 1985, 2,824 MWe by 1990, and 3,914 MWe by 1995, and 5,294 MWe by the year 2000.* These power gaps were to be met by nuclear plants to be installed in the country. ,
In 1958, the above figures were repeated once again.** In order to realize the potential goal of importing nuclear power plants, Pakistan initiated negotiations with a nu=ber of countries. In 1962, it uas seek-ing assistance from the Federal Republic of Germany for the installation of two power reactors.*** In 1965, Pakistan signed a contract for the construction of 125 MWe, of the CANDU**** type reactor near Karachi. In 1969, a ten jear nuclear power program predicted the installation of a
- " Energy Requirements of Pakistan for the Next Twenty Years and the Need for Nuclear Power"; Paper presented to the UN Conference en Peaceful Uses of Ato=ic Energy, 1955, Proceedings of the Interna-tional Conferences, Vol. I, p. 218. The gap for West Pakistan was estimated at 1970: 354 MWe, 1975: 629 MWe, 1980: 622 MWe, 1985:
1127 MWe,1990: 1697 MWe, 1995: 2427, 2000: 3347 MWe.
- A.A.M. Ahmad, "The future of Nuciear Power in Pakistan," United Na-tions, Proceedings on the Second UN International Confere:.ne on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Enercy, 1 September to 13 Sectember 1958 (Geneva, 1958), pp. 172-175.
- Nuclear Engineering, February, 1962, p. 47. In the meantime, it was reported that a number of Pakistani scientists are to study in West Germany's nuclear reactor center.
In July 1963, Pakistan signed a nuclear cooperation agreement for peaceful uses of Atomic Energy with Belgium. Nuclear Engineer-13 , July 1963, p. 3.
I 12 1528 341
AC7NC106 400 MWe in West Pakistan which was considerably less than what was pre-dicted in 1955 and 1958.* Given that on the average it takes eight years to install a power plant in a less industrial country, it is i=-
possible for Pakistan to build another reactor before 1985. ,
In 1971, the former United States Acomic Energy Commission esti-mated that Pakistan would add a 200 MWe reactor and a 300 MWe reactor in 1978 and 1980 respectively to its power generating capacity, an estimate that was lower than the latest Pakistani one. However, both projects are unlikely to materialize by the expected dates since no contracts have been signed as of yet.
In 1974, IAEA Market Survey for Nuclear Power in Developing Coun-tries estimated the installation of eight nuclear power plants in Paki-stan between 1980 and 1990. In 1975, Pakistani Atomic Energy Cocsission published a power generating plan that predicts the installation of a 600 MWe reactor in .1980 and ten more reactors, each having a capacity of 600 MWe or more, by 1990. There has been a paradox in the past predic-tions about the number and capacity of nuclear power plants in Pakistan:
as :he previous estimates have failed to materialice, the subsequent estimates have generally predicted even higher nuclear capacity. For example, the 1955 esti=ates predicted the installation of 629 MWe of nuclear capacity in 1975, and 1127 MWe of nuclear capacity in 1985. While the 1975 estimate was not realized (Pakistan had then a 125 MWe reactor near Karachi), the 1975 estimate for 1985 is more than double the 1955 estimate for the same year. The case of Pakistan shows how uncertain long range forecasts dealing with nuclear power installations are. The Pakistani case is not, however, a peculiar one. -
Turkey, which signed a bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement with the United States in July 1955, has changed its estimates of auclea.r capacity =any ti=es. In the early 1960s, the Turkish Atomic Energy Com-mission (TAEC), established in 1956, was predicting the installation of a nuclear power reactor in the Istanbul area by 1970. TAEC argued that there was no urgent need for nuclear power until 1970, because of Tur-key's large conventional sources of energy, especially hydroelectricity.
By 1967, as it was becoming clear that the 1962 projection was unlikely to be realized, o new nuclear feasibility study was carried out by the Nuclear Energy Institute of the Technology University of Istanbul.
Based on this study, the TAEC predicted a more rapid introduction of natural uranium reactors with the first reactor beco=ing operational in 1977.**
- The plan included a prcject for f abrication of fuel elements, uranium refining and processing of irradiated fuels. Nucleer Engineering International _, March 1964, p. 171.
- Report on the Activities of the Turkish Atomic Energy Commission. 1962 (Ankara, 1962), p. 18, 13 1528 341
AC7NC106 Between 1968 and 1969, TAEC carried another feasibility study for the installation of nuclear power plants. The result was the prediction of a natural uranium reactor of 300-400 MWe capacity by 1076 or 1977, and two 600 MWe reactors between 1982 and 1987.* In a 1972 study of the, expected energy demand by N. Aybers of the Institute for Nuclear Energy of the Technical University of Istanbul and S. Kakac, of the Middle East University, it was predicted that "it would be necessary to introduce nuclear power with a capacity of 1000 MWe up to by 1987."** In 1974, the IAEA proj ected the installation of 1200 MWe of nuclear capacity by 1985 and 5000 MWe by 1990.*** Turkey's latest official Electricity Master Plan, published in October 1976, however, calls for the installation of one 600 MWe reactor between 1977 and 1999.
- Prediction of nuclear capacity in Iran follows a similar trend. In 1955, the Iranian government indicated that "Another source of energy will have to be foreseen for the future generations, all the more so that we export petroleum products and our own demands are also steadily increasing. Otherwise, a shortage is possible, even before the end of 50 years.**** The shortages were expected to be met from the "new source of energy," the ata=.
Between 1955 and 1969, there is little discussion of plans for the introduction of nuclear electricity in Iran. The Ministry of Power in a 1969 study, predicted the installation of a 500 MWe plant by 1980.*****
In 1972, the Iranian government announced its intent to acquire nuc3 ear power plants within ten years. In 1974, the IAEA =ade the following estimate of the installation of power reactors in Tran:
Table 1 The 1974 IAEA Estimate of Nuclear Power in Iran Schedule of Nuclear Capacity Addition, 1981-1990 (MWe)
Country 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 Iran 600 600 600 800 800 800 800 1000 2x1000 2x1000 Total: 10,000 Source: Market Survey for Nuclear Power in Develcoine Countries, 1974 Edition (Vienna: IAEa, 1974), p. 21.
- LAEA Bulletin, Vol. 2, no. 6, 1969, p. 28.
- N. Aybers and S. Kakac, " Growth of Demand for Energy and Projected Role of NucJaar Power in Turkey," Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, Vol. 1 (Vienna: IAEA, 1972), pp. 227-240.
- Market Survev for Nuclear Power in Develooine Countries, 1974 Edi-tion (Vienna: IAEA, 1974), p. 21.
- " Power and Heat Requirements in Iran," UN Conference on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, Vol. 1, 1955, p. 260.
- Ministry of Power, A Survey of Nuclear Power Stations in Iran (Tehran, 1969), p. 3.
14 1528 :i43
AC7NC106 Iran itself, in 1974, esti=ated the installation of about 23,000 MWe of electrical generating capacity from nuclear sources in 20 years.
Iran's projection differed not only from its previous estimates but also from those of the IAEA:
Table 2 The 1974 Iran Atemic Energy Organization (IAEO)
Estimate of Nuclear Power for Iran Year to Be in Operation Quantity and Size MWe 1981 2 x 600 1982 1 x 900 1983 1 x 900 1984 1 x 900 1985 1 x 900 1986 1 x 900 1987 1 x 900 1988 2 x 1200 1990 2 x 1200 1991 2 x 1200 1993 3 x 1200 Total 22,200 Sources: 1. Kayhan International, February 28, 1976.
- 2. Ahmad Sotoodehnia, " Implementation of Nuclear Energy in Iran," Paper presented to the Shiraz Conference on Transfer of Nuclear Technology, Apri'. 10-14, 1977, Shiraz, Iran.
Later this plan was changed to a larger one because of the assurance frem the Ministry of Power that Iran's grid would be large enough to facili-tate the efficient accommodation of 1200 MWe reactors by 1981:
O 15
AC7NC106 Table 3 The 1976 IAE0 Revised Estimate of Nuclear Power for Iran Year to Ee_in Operation Ouantity and Size MWe 1981 2 x 1200 1982 1 x 900 1983 1 x 900 1984 1 x 1200 1985 1 x 1200 1986 1 x 1200 1987 1 x 1200 1988 2 x 1200 1989 2 x 1200 1990 2 x 1200 1991 2 x 1200 1992 2 x 1200 1993 3 x 1200 Total 24,600 Sources: 1. Kavhan International, March 6, 1976, p. 3.
- 2. A. Sotoodehnia, " Implementation," p. 4.
In th: su=mer of 1978, when Iran was faced with serious domestic political and economic problems, a major revision of the nuclear program was announced. According the Shah's latest plan, Iran was to complete the building of the two German and the two French reactors under construc-tion until 1993. Plans to construct more reactors was postponed indef-initely. The post-Shah governnent has further changed the country's nuclear program and it is not clear now whether even the two German re-actors are to be completed in the 1980s.
Large projections of nuclear electricity in the future and uncer-tainty in such estimates are not confined to the Northern Tier countries alone; a number of other LICs have similar plans. South Korea has had a number of plans for the introduction of large numbers of reacters in the country. In 1972 the govern =ent had the following two alternative nucicar power programs:*
- IAEA, Market Survey for Nuclear Power in Develoning Countries, Korea. ,
Republic of (Vienna, 1973), p. 10, 6
1528 ;45
AC7NC106 Table 4 Tentative Plans for Nuclear Power Develcoment in South Korea, 1973 .
Plan I Plan II
~
New Unit Cumulative New Unit Ju=ulative Year (MW) (MW) (MW) (MW) 1976 600 600 600 600 1979 600 1200 1980 600 1200 1981 800 2000 1983 800 2000 800 2800 1985 800 2300 1000 3800 1986 1000 4800 1987 1000 3800 1000 5800 In 1973, the IAEA projected the introduction of 9800 MWe of nuclear capacity by 1990 in South Korea.* The U.S. AEC in 1974 estimated a nuc-
~.eer capacity of 4100 MWe during the same period.** The country's 1976 est. mates were more modest than the IAEA and AEC proj ections. The latest plan calls for the construction of 4 reactors with a total generating capacity of 3000 FGie until the end of the 1980s.*** However, Korea's 1978 estinates call for the installation of a large number of reactors (44) by the end of the century.
In the case of the Philippines, the IAEA has estimated a-total of installed electrical capacity of 9600 MWe by 3 990. Nuclear electricity was esti=ated to constitute 4800 MWe, 50 percent of the total capacity.****
In a memorandum for President Ferdinand Marcos by the National Power Cor-poration in September 1973, the introduction of four 600 MWe reactors was predicted in the country's largest grid, the Lu=on grid, during the 1980s.***** As of 1979, only one 600 MWe reactor is under construction (construction is presently suspended) which is expected to go into opera-tien in 1982. The 1977 Philippine plan calls for the installation of 1860 MWe****** of nuclear capacity in the country by the early 1990s.
This figure is less than 50 percent of the 1973 IAEA projections, and will constitute 25 percent of the country's total generating capacity.
- IAEA, Market Survey . . . (Vienna, 1973), pp. 32-34
- AEC, WASH-ll39(74), Appendix A, Worldwide Energy and Capacity Data, February 1974, p. 8.
- Nucleonics Week, July 1, 1976, p. 6.
- IAEA, Market Survey . . . , pp. 32-34.
- National Power Corporation, Memorandum for His Excellency President Ferdinand E. Marcos,.*anila, September 10, 1973, p. 3.
- Nucleonics Week, December 29, 1977, p. 5.
17 1528 A6
AC7NC106 There have been several estimates predicting large nuclear power capacity for Brazil and India. The IAEA in 1973 predicted that by 1990 t'ase two countries would have greater ins.alled total electrical power than other LICs. India's electrical capacity was expected to expand to ,
more than 100,000 MWe and Brazil's to 63,700 MWe. Nuclear power was ancicipated to provide 31,400 MWe of power 4.n India and 11,400 MWe in Brazil.*
The U.S. AEC in 1974 estimated that Brazil's installed electrical capacity would reach 79,730 MWe by 1990 of which 15,000 MWe was to be nuclear.** In the case of india, the U.S. AEC predicted the expansion of the country installed capacity to 115,300 MWe by 1990 of which 25,000 MWe was nuclear.***
The Brazilian Govern =ent's 1975 electricity plan calls for installa-tion of 10,600 MWe nuclear capacity of 1990. A 600 MWe p' ant was ex-pected to become operational in the country in 1976. The date of opera-tion of this reactor was later delayed to the end of 1978. Subsequently, it was announced that this reactor might become operational toward the end of 1979. Because of increased costs, as well as other problems (which will be dealt with subsequently), it is doubtful that the goal of 10,600 MWe nuclear capacity by 1990 will be realized.
Table 5 Official Brazilian Forecast of Total Electrical Installed Capacity .We),
1975 Year Total Nuclear Hydro -
1976 22.3 0 20 1980 33.8 .6 1985 51.5 3.1 1990 31.0 10.6 1995 125.0 28.2 2000 185.0 75.0 90 India has eight nuclear reactors in operation, under construction, or on order:
- IAEA, Market Survey, pp. 32-34.
- AEC, WASH 1139(74), p. 8.
- Ibid.
i 18 1528 547
AC7NC106 Table 6 India's Power Reactors Under Construction (19771 Construction Reactor Stage %
Reactor Net MWe Sucolier December 31, 1977 Tarapur 1 190 GE (USA) 100 Tarapur 2 200 GE (USA) 100 RAPS 1 200 CGE (Canada) 100 RAPS 2 200 L and T (India) 98.5 MAPP 1 220 L and T (India) 80 MAPP 2 220 L and T (India) 60 Narora 1 220 WIL (India) 25 Narora 2 220 R and D (India) 15 Data about the history of the nuclear program of the seven LICs demonstrate that historical predictions about the diffusion of nuclear power have been highly uncertain. Whether present estimates of the fu-ture spread of nuclear power, as well as other cocplex technologies, will be realized is not only a function of technical feasibility, but also of complex econcmic political, and security considerations. The inclusion of these "non-technological" factors increases the uncertainty about the future diffusion of technology.
Predicting the future of technology is a hazardous, though tempting, undertaking. Many predictions about the future of technology, even by excellent scientists, has been inaccurate. As Albert Wohlstetter has re-corded, Simon Newcomb's demonstration, published a few years after the Wright Brothers flew at Kittyhawk, stated that "no possible co=bination of known substances, known forms of machine, and known forms of force can be united in a practicable machine by which men shall fly long dis-tances through the air."* A comprehensive and ambitious attempt to pre-dict the next 10 to 25 years of American technical future in 1935, missed things such as nuclear energy, antibiotics, radar and jet propulsion.**
While some technologists have ignored considerations such as costs concerning technologice.1 applications, some economists, sociologists and political scientists have not at times been fully cognizant of societal impacts of technological developments. For example, Ricardo, Mill and
- Simon Newcomb, "The Outlook for Flying Machines," Sideli2 hts on Astron-omy (n.p. ,1906), p. 345, cuoted in A. Wohlstetter, " Technology, Fredic-tion, and Disorder," The Vanderbilt Law Review, Vol.17, no.1 (Dece=-
ber 1963), p. 3.
- Ibid., p. 4.
19 i528 a48
AC7NC106 a number of other nineteenth century social science leaders " argued that agriculture was not amenable to technological developments, and expected diminishing returns in that sector to be offset by technological ad-vances in manufacturing. Yet during the last 30 years in the United States, productivity has apparently advanced faster in agriculture than in manufacturing."*
Technological predictions can be political acts, aimed at control-ling or changing things in a particular direction, and influencing the direction of not only scientific research but also of technological ap-plications, market demand, international voting behavior and relations.
Predictions of particular technological applic_ tion in the future may, more specifically, be a foreign policy instrument by one or a group of nations in the global political context. A number of predictions of immediate and widespread applications of nuclear electricity in less industrial countries were perhaps partially motivated by considerations other than genuine feasibility.
After the Second World War, the United States, in order to gain international support for the nuclear weapons control policy, felt the necessity of dramatizing the peaceful application of atomic energy world-wide. In the 1950s, with Eisenhower's " Atoms for Peace" program and the emergence of a nuclear industry, the desirability (predictions) of world-wide spread of nuclear electricity were to a large extent based on in-ternational political considerations such as competition with the USSR (and 3ritain), technologically reinforcing U.S. political leadership, which implied the dependence of other countries on U.S. technology, as well as the desire for creating a potential market for its e=erging nuclear industry. Several U.S. analysts and political leaders, including members of the Congressional Joint Committee on Atomic Energy assumed that nuclear energy had to become an instrument of U.S. foreign policy, as it was an indication of the technological supremacy of the United States. The absence of worldwide U.S. dissemination of nuclear power would, it was believed, inevitably lead to worldwide doubt about U.S.
technological competence,** causing Amerf.aa to lose the " race f or nuc-lear power."*** Walter Reuth+r perhaps reflected the expectations of many at the time when he wrota in the New York Ti=es, September 21, 1955:
- Cary Becker, Economic Theory (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1971), p. 127.
- For the discussions of domestic as well as worldwide applications of nuclear energy by the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (JCAE) see the hearing before the Committee pursuant to section 202 of the 1954 Atomic Energy Act. U.S. Congress, JCAE, Development, Growth, and State of the Atomic Energy Industry, 1956.
- Ibid.
20 1528 349
AC7NC106 The first country that gives an atomic reactor to an under- c developed country in Asia or Africa will win a psychological b [ u..
advantage that has as much power as the H-bomb.
America's National Planning Association in 1959 recommended the installa-tion of small and "mederate sized nuclear power plants in these areas, not 5 or 10 years hence, but right now."*
The desire in the United States to predict a large market for nuc-lear power in less industrial countries continued into the 1970s. For example, it strongly supported the IAEA market survey for nuclear pcwer in developing countries in 1972-1973. This study was originally in-tended to be carried out in 23 LICs. Fourteen countries were finally studied. The objectives of the study were as follows:
4
- a. To examine the potential role of nuclear power in interested developing countries over the next five to fifteen years as a means of defining the site and timing of the installation of nuclear power plants in this period;
- b. To identify the specific markets for small and medium power reactors;
- c. To estimate the financial requirements for selected power sys-te=s expansion programs in each country.**
The inclusion of small reactors was insisted upon (by the United States ***) in order to show a relatively larger =arjet for nuclear power in less industrial countries because of the smallness of the electr1e grid in most LICs. (More will be said about this in the following chap-ter.) The United States was one of the two countries to provide cash support for the project:
- , Quoted'.in Develorment, Growth, and the State of the Atomic Energy Industry, 1959, p. 154.
- Interview with IAEA officials in Vienna, Austria, December 1978.
21 y528 .550
AC7NC106 Table 7
- Support for IAEA Market Survey for Nuclear Power in LICs Federal Republic of Germany U.S. dollars 25,000 Inter-American Development Bank 25,000 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 50,000 U.S. Export-Import Bank 75,000 U.S. Agency for International Development 25,000 Atomic Energy Commission 9,950 Total 209,950 Thejresults of the survey were intended for the nuclear industry and related institutions so they would realize the potential for large nuclear power markets in *be LICs. The LAEA estimate for the number of nuclear power plants in tu.; '.ICs has for=ed the basis for the nuclear power programs of a number of these countries.
International projections of the number of nuclear power plants in a particular country are often based on esti=ating the demand for elec-tricity in the future (in the case of the IAEA's Market Survey 1981-1990) and subsequently determining the most cost-efficient means for meeting the projected demand. The second step aims at identifying how the pro-jected electricity is to be produced. Thus choice enters in determining how to produce electricity, from a variety of techniques (or some com-bination) such as hydro, thermal, nuclear, etc. From the economic point of view, prices (comparative costs and benefits) cetermine which tech-nique for production of electricity may be selected.
One of the reasons for inaccuracies of past predictions about the spread of nuclear power plants to LICs has been the weaknesses of esti-mating future demand for electricity. Estimating future demand for elec-tricity is important because planning and constructing power planta as well as transmission and distribution facilities may take as long as
- en years.
. There may also be a need for eaternal financing arrangemants which will require time. The method used by IAEA in the market survey to predict future electric demand in the fourteen LICs is the so-called Aoki method.** This method assumes a high correlation between electricity consumption per capita and the GNP per capito. This assumption was drawn
- Ibid., p. v.
- H. Aoki, New Method of Long Range or Very Long Range Demand Forecast of Energy, Including Electricity. Viewed from a Worldwide Standpoint, Electric Power Development Co., Ltd., Tokyo, 1974.
~~
1528 3
AC7NC106 from the plotting of electricity generation per capita and GNP per capita for 11 countries. The Aoki method suffers from several weaknesses.
First, while there was in 1970 almost a 2:1 difference between India's and Pakistan's GNP per capita (India 91, Pakistan 162--IAEA data) there ,
was no significant difference in the per capita consumption of cocmercial L,0'[,. Q y energy (India 112 kwh per capira, Pakistan 116 kwh per capita) .* The case of India and Pakistan is not unique; the sa=e is true if one looks at other "'
. .t.
countries such as Spain and Argentina, Yugoslavia and Mexico, Brazil and Taiwan, etc. A similar phenomenon can be observed in the industrial coun-tries. While, for example, che American per capita consumption of energy is twice as much as that of Sweden, its GNP per capita is less than that ,
of Sweden.** 1 l -) , \ \
Second, the projected rates of growth in GNP and populations them- Y,,h selves may be questionable. The GNP of different countries in the LICs g include components that a e more " energy intensive" than others (the phrase energy intensive refers to co=mercial energy and does not include labor).
For example, agriculture generally and especially in the LICs is less
" energy intensive" than other industry. Obviously among industries so=e use more energy per dollar of final output than others. ,y s..
Third, IAEA's comparison of per capita consumption of energy is e based on the consumption of " commercial energy" alone. LICs use signi-ficant quantities of "non-co==ercial energy" which do not enter the mar-ket survey calculations. The "non-commercial" sources used include wood fuel, shrubs, cow and sheep dung. In India, for example, in 1968, it has been observed that anywhere from 32 to 77 percent of energy consumed was provided by cow dung alone.*** T. L. Sankar has claimed that to most In-dians the role of commercial energy is peripheral.**** In 1952, in Pakistan, non-cocmercial sources of energy provided 150.5 GWh electricity equiva-lent out of a total energy consumption of 180 GWh of electricity equiva-lent. In Iran during the same year nonco=mercial sources constituted 144.5 GWh of a total 188.6 GWh equivalent consumed. In Turkey, "non-coc=ercial" consu=ption was 37.5 GWh equivalent wherces total energy con-su=ed was 86.6 GWh equivalent.***** The contribution of nonce ==ercial energy sources to national energy supply increasingly becomes a small pro-
- Market Survev for Nuclear Power in Developine Countries, 1974 edition, oo. cit., pp. 13-15.
- Der Sciecel, March 28, 1977, p. 52.
- Joel Darmstadter, et al., Energy in the World Economy (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971), p. 5.
- T. L. Sankar has claimed that the larger portion of energy consump-tion and of the majority of people living in Ine ; is nracoc=ercial.
" Alternative Development Strategies with a Low Energy Profile for a Low GNP per Capita energy for Country: The Case of India," L. N.
Lindberg, ed. , The Enercy Syndrome (Lexington Books,1974), p. 55.
- U.N. Department of Economics and Social Af fairs, " Worldwide Energy Requirements," Paper to U.N. Conference on Peaceful Uses (Geneva, 1955), p. 20.
23 1528 352
AC7NC106 portion of the total energy consumed by many LICs. However, they still play a major role in meeting energy demands.
Fourth, the methods used by th ' IAEA assume a fixed relationship ;
between GNP per capita and electricity consumption per capita and are insensitive to the question of price elasticity. This relationship is likely to respond to price changes. Given the large increases in price of fossil fuel and nuclear power, less-energy-consuming technologies may take the place of the current ones, more conservation measures may be taken, and increasing emphasis may be put on less energy intensive sectors of the economy.
The criticism of the methods such as the Aoki method used by elec-tricity projecting organizations such as IAEA, doe not =can that the demand for electricity in LICs is not likely to 1_ crease; however, estimating the rate of increase and how the increased demand is best met requires identifying the causes for the increase and the compara-tive costs and benefits of different electricity generating systems.
While a variety of factors such as increased industriali=ation (direct or vicarious), the rising aspiration regarding a modern technological standard of living reinforced by increased population makes the in-crease in demand for energy in the LICs likely, these countries have the option of choosing from a variety of energy forms including electricity.
These choices include labor intensive rather than electricity inter-sive projects, using fossil fuels, biogas, solar heat, etc. for space and water heating and cooking rather than using electricity for these purposes. ,
24 1528 353
AC7NC106 NUCLEAR POWER AND ECONOMIC DEELOPMENT In the 1940s and 50c one of the main expectations f rom the civilian application of nuclear power in th LICs was that it would provide a cheap alternative to existing energy sources and contribute significantly to their economic development. In the LICs themselves, nuclear power has been expected to make a substantial contribution in generating the needed energy for economic avelopment. It is eften asserted that LIC dependence on atomic energy would lead to the conservation of irreplace-able fossil resources; production of abundant, safe, cheap, and clean power. It has been considered so important for the economic development of the LICs that in 1971 the Director General of IAEA has called the ex-port of nuclear reactors to LICs " Atoms for Develop =ent."* In more than 3 ' decades of discussion about the econcmic benefits of acomic electricity, as of the end of 1978 only four LICs--Argentina, India, South Korea, and Pakistan--had operational nuclear power plants. The economics of nuclear power is st_i_ll_ dubious. Not only has it failed to become the " cheap al-ternative"_ but also it is even questionable whether it compares f avor-ably with " expensive" imported oil.
Determining whether investment in nuclear pcwer is economical or not for a particular LIC is i=portant because of the large amounts of capital investment required. If investment in nuclear power is not economical it would be difficult to claim that it would contribute to economic de-velopment and efficient use of resources.
The basic concept for analyzing-whetEer'a s t uj eer-is- economically desirable or_.notis a simple _one_. A decision has to be made whether the rate of return calculated frem..the_henefits and costs _of_ the.projec_t will excesd'the potential rate of return in the next best alternative. The
~
problei becohis a lot = ore _ complicated once the measure =ent 6f'tHe~ costs and benefits has begun. For example, in the case of a public project that may have societal i=plications, the choice of who is to make the decision is itself complicated. Should the judges be the individuals who are to be affected by the project? What would the affected individuals be asked?
Would he or she be willing to pay to acquire the benefits or avoid the costs? Some have considered the social justice ef fects of a project as an i=portant element of a cost-benefit analysis, i.e., how would the project ef fect income distribution and welf are of the diff erent elements of society? The choice of a particular power system is also af fected by the character of the political system and the relative political strength of the various interested groups.
The choice of large-scale and continuous increase in dependence on electric forms of energy in the LICs is subject to considerations such
- Nuclear Engineerinz International, September 1971, p. 745.
25 1528 354
AC7NC106 as the character of the political leadership, the type of economic de-velopment followed, the export and project financing policies of the industrial countries, the apparent comparative costs of alternative en-ergy systems, and the constraints i= posed by the type of information ,
available to the decisionmakers of the particular LICs. The development strategies and programs followed by many LICs were derived from the ex-perience of the industrial countries. Since their development had been characterized by " cheap energy," these strategies have emphasized capital and energy intensive heavy industry, etc. Little attention has been given to the energy implications of different development strategies on the part of the leadership of many LICs.
Among the many available forms of energy, many LICs have chocen capital intensive electrical power facilities, a policy which has also been followed by the aid programs of ICs and international organizations.
For example, for many years almost all of the World Bank loans were re-stricted to electricity production and distribution, generally ignoring other forms of energy including the development of conventional energy sources such as oil and gas.
The inaccuracy of past predictiono regarding widespread dependence on nuclear power in the LICs has resulted not only from a failure to accurately project future power de= ands but also from the failure to foresee the economic, technical and political problems of nuclear power in less industrial countries. It is to the consideration of these is-sues ,that we now turn.
It is impossible to evaluate the economic benefits that would be provided by nuclear power plants without first esti=ating the ccst of producing electricity from such plants with investments in alternative projects. In principle the rate of return of investment in nuclear plants should be compared with the rate of return of alternative investments of similar risk in energy proj -- as well as in other projects. This is the purpose of using what is k x s the " opportunity cost of capital," a minimum rate of return to represent what capital would earn in alterna-tive marginal uses. If a project is expected to yield less than this minimum, then it would not be undertaken, for there are presumably scre productive uses for capital elsewhere. A more limited approach would be to compare che costs and benefits of generating electricity fron alternative sources.
The cost esti=ates for producing electricity from both nuclear and alternative sources require an evaluation of several separate cost ele-ments that differ from country to country and are at times subject to varying degrees of uncertainty. These cost estimates include those of 1 5 2 8 ~5 fits
AC7NC106 capital costs, absorption costs, fuel costs and operation and mainten-ance costs.*
CAPITAL COSTS m
The capital cost of a power station is the total cost of building a power station and bringing it into operation. Although the costs and benefits of nuclear power have been debated for several decades, esti-mates of what a nuclear power plant would cost are still far from cer-tain. Various interested groups, governments, international organiza-tions, nuclear vendors and private research firms have cil published widely divccging estimates for various elements of the nuclear system.
The arith = etic of these estimates is significantly influenced by Irior noneconomic decisions or values.
Dramatic reduction in the costs of nuclear power plants, including the capital cost, have been predicted many times since the mid-1950s.
These reductions were often predicted by the nuclear industry officials on sany occasions, including in testimonies to the United States Con-gress.** The nuclear industry wanted even more govern =ent aid and sub-sidy in achieving the lowering of the cost of producing nuclear reactors and making nuclear power competitive with alternative =- One purpose of the establishment of the American Congressional Joint Co=mittee on Ato=ic
- The method used in this chapter is si= ply to operationalize the follow-ing equation in each country:
E where UEC = unit energy cost in mills per kilowatt hour of electricity produced CI = capital costs AC = absorption costs OM = operation and maintenance costs FC = fuel cost E = amount of energy generated Assuming in year (t) a country is faced with a choice of buying a certain a=ount of electricity for 30 years. In making a choice on economic grounds, the different cost streams for different alternatives have to be valued to the same year. In this study, 1977 has been selected as the base year.
- For statements by nuclear manufacturers, see U.S. House, JCAE, Develop-ment, Growth, and State of Atomic Energy Industry, 1955-1965.
27 1528 356 s
e AC7NC106 Energy was to bring into existence competitive electricity from atomic fission. In the United States, until the end of 1963, more than 7.5 bil-lion dollars were spent by the government aimed at achieving the goal of competitiveness.* The Federal Republic of Germany spent $5 billion for the same purpose until 1976.
In a 1955 study, known as the McKinney Report, carried out jointly by U.S. AEC, Babcock and Wilcox, New England Electric Systems, Westing-house and General Electric, it was estimated that the capita-1 costs of nuclear power plants were likely to decrease rapidly between 1960 and 1980.** On the optinistic side, it was esti=ated that capital costs will decrease from $200 per kilowatt of generating capacity in 1960 (1956 U.S.
dollars) to less than $160 per kilowatt in 1975, and to less than $150 per kilowatt in 1980. On the pessimistic side, the decreases were pro-jected from $240 per kilowatt in 1960 to $180 per kilowatt in 1975, and to less than $170 per kilowatt in 1980.***
e These expected reductions in cost of nuclear power were to take place for both ICs and LICs. The reduction for LICs was based on the hope that The leading industrial countries (will) make available the neces-sary equipment and techniques to underdeveloped countries, and also that they will supply nuclear fuel at a price not higher than those charged to domestic utilities.****
- U.S., House, JCAE, Develcoment, Growth, and State of the Atomic Energy Industry, 88th Cong., 1st sess., 1963, p. 250. -
- U.S., House, JCAE, Development, Growth and State of the Atomic Energy Industry, 84th Cong., 1956, p. 10.
- Ibid., p. 11. The implicit price deflators for GNP used here and sab-sequently have been drawn from Economic Report of the President, The An-nual Report of the Council of Economic Advisors, Washington, D.C. USGPO, 1977. The early projections of drastic decrease in cost (mainly by the nuclear industry) were criticized in 1957, by Thomas Murray of the U.S.
AEC as being based on "too =uch salesmanship and not enough engineer-ing." Based on actual construction experience, he argued, costs were considerably higher than originally projected by the industry. For ex-ample, while in 1954 it was projected that construction portion of the costs of the Shippingport reactor would be approximately $37 million (1955 U.S. dollars), the best estimate in 1955 was $55 million, an in-crease of almost 50 percent. The same was true of =any other nuclear proj ec t s. These increases took place at a time that several manufacturers that supplied certain parts of the reactor suffered financial losses. If rather than eelling at a loss, thase businesses had sold the componencs at a profit, the cost for the utilities would have increased even further.
- U.N. Conference on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy (Geneva , 1955) ,
- p. 66.
28 1528 357
AC7NC106 In fact, except in the early 1960%* capital costs have been increas-ing dr---tically. While in 1967, the capital cost of a 1000 MWe nuclear plant was estimated at $280 million or $280 per kW (1977 dollars), in 1976 and 1977 it had reached more than $1,300 per kW (1977 dollars) for 600 MWe and larger plants. The $1,300 per kW has been drawn from 1976-78 contracts signed for sale of 600 MWe and larger reactors.**
This dramatic increase (to more than $1,300 per kW installed) in nuclear power capital cost has been due to a variety of reasons, includ-ing:
- 1. A more complete definition cf the price of materials and scope of work than had been included in early cost estimates;
- 2. Requirements for higher quality of equipment, materials and worknanship;
- 3. Higher unit costs for equipment, caterials, labor;
- 4. The addition of supplementary systems to enhance safety;
- 5. Increased engineering costs due to added features, higher quality standards, more detailed licensing procedures, longer construction schedules, and increases in design and in manage-ment salaries;
- 6. Inflationary economies of producing countries leading to larger cost escalations during construction.*** -
- Even the reductions in the early 1960s have been variously described as the industry's attempt to generate demand 'W. E. Hoehn, Economics of Nuclear Reactors for Power and Desaltine), the change of the nuc-lear market from a buyer's market to a seller's =arket, and the mistake of producers in esti=ating manufacturing costs.
- In 1975, the cost of per/kW of nuclear power for Brazil as a result of a contract with Germany was estimated at $1,135 (1975 dollars). Nor-can Gall, " Atoms for Brazil, Danger for All," Foreizn Poliev, No. 23, Su=mer 1976.
- In the case of European reactors such as the German LWR, cost increases have also been due to installation of additional safety systems for easier plant operation and stricter environmental requirements when compared to standard American LWR. Salih Gunty, " Investigation of the Unit Generation Costs of the M clear Power Plants," International Con-ference on Nuclear Power and Its Fuel Cvele, Salzburg, May 2-13, 1977,
- p. 2.
1528 358
AC7NC106 These increases refer co the case of the United States and Europe and are equally applicable to their customers from the less industrial-ized countries. However, the LICs have so=e special circumstances that seriously affect capital costs. A number of authoritative organizations including the IAEA believed for some time that because of cheaper labor costs in the LICs, the capital costs of construction a nuclear reactor there would be lower than in the industrial countries. For example, the IAEA estimated in 1973 and 1975 that it would cost 20 percent less to build a reactor in the LICs than in the industrialized countries. A number of authors including Yager and Steinberg, however, argued that while the costs of power plants built in the LICs are likely to differ from country to country, on the whole they would be more expensive than those built in the United States.* Problems such as transportation and insurance increase the costs of equipment for importing LICs. The LICs also suffer from higher engineering and construction costs because many field services are provided by foreign experts.
The dramatic capital cost increases are reflected in the contracts that have already been signed and those that are being negotiated be-tween the LICs and Western reactor vendors. The case of Iran which has already signed a series of contracts for large nuclear power platts is instructive.
Table 8**
Iran-Germany Nuclear Contract 1976 Type of contract Turnkey -
Producing Company Kraftwerk Union (West Germany)
Type of Reactor Pressurized Water Reactor Number of Reactors Two Net Generating Capacity 1,200 MWe each Fuel Slightly-enriched uranium (2.5%
Location Halileh on the Persian Gulf Capital Cost 2.8 billion dollars In June of the same year, another contract for two reactors was signed with France:
- J. Yager and E. Steinberg, Energy and U.S. Foreign Policy (Cambridge, 1974, p. 467.
3o 459 1528
AC7NC106 Table 9*
Iran-France Nuclear Contract Type of Contract Turnkey Producing Company Framatome Type of Reactor Pressurized Water Reactor Number of Reactors Two Net Generating Capacity 900 MWe each Fuel Slightly-enriched uranium (3%)
Location Karun River Cost Estimates vary between 2.2 and 2.8 billion dollars The capital cost of about $1166 per kW in the case of the Kraftwerk Union and $1222 for Framatome reactors is substantially higher than the cost estimate that formed the basis for IAEA projection of reactor markets in less industrial countries.
In the case of the Philippines and Westinghouse the per kW capacity capital cost of a 600 MWe reactor has been estimated at more than $1800.**
While in 1974 Westinghouse was quoting a price of $300 million for two 600 MWe reactors tc be constructed in the Philippines, the cost of'one had reached $1.1 bi' lion in 1977.*** While part of this increase has been claimed to be due to the "Lockheed syndrome" and the seismic condi-tions in the country, the dramatic cost increase to a large extent fits the pattern elsewhere in the LICs.
The contract between Brazil c.nd the Kraftwerk Union (KWU) #or two large reactors in 1975 shows a similar increase in the kW capacity ini-tial capital investment when compared to LAEA's estimates in 1973.
While in 1573 IAEA estimated that on the average the capital cost per kW of capacity for LICs such as Brazil would be $550 (1977 dollars)
- Kavan International, June 2, 1976, and Wall street Journal, October 8, 1976, claimed the cost to be $2.8 billion for a per kW cost of
$1500. The Middle East Macasine in August 1977, claimed the cost to be $2.2 billion. According to French reports, the initial capital cost of nuclear plants was FF 9.6 billion (at the exchange of FF4 to one dollar this becoaes $2.4 billion). In this case the per kW cost becomes $1333.3.
The contract signed between Iran and the Kraftwerk Union nas for
$4 billion of which $2.8 billion was to cover the cost of the reac-tors and $1.2 billion was intended for enrichcd uranium for te reactors.
- The New York Times, January 14, 1978, p. I.
- Ibid.
31 1528 360
AC7NC106 increasing at an annual rate of 4 percent, the Ger=an-Brazilian deal of 1975 shows a capital cost of more than $1250 per kW capacity (1977 dollars) for the two 1300 MWe reactors.* The 1978 esti=ates put the capital cost of these plants at more than $1570 per kW.** ;
In 1974, the South Korean Atomic Energy Institute esti=ated a
$1050/kWe capital investment for nuclear plants of 900 MWe capacity to be ccmpleted in 1984.*** Civen the diseconomies of scale for a 600 MWe reactor and the increase in the capital cost of nuclear plants since 1974, a $1333/kWe capacity cost is likely to be on the low side.
Pakistan built its first power reactor, a 137 MWe CANDU type which became operational in 1971, on turnkey basis. The Pakistan Atomic En-ergy Commission has annoucned its intention to retain in future projects "overall manage =ent control with PAEC and to rely on local engineering knowhow and industrial capabilities to the maximum possible."**** The degree of national participation is not known, but it is clear that Pakistan intends its next power plant to be built on non-turnkey basis.
The country's Atomic Energy Commission has given various estimates of the expected capital costs, of the 600 MWe reactor at Chashma,1,160 km in-land from the port of Karachi. While IAEA estimates in the market sur-vey for Pakistan in 1973 were based on capital costs of $550 per kW (1977 dollars), requiring a totc1 capital investment of $330 million in April 1976, Pakistan after preliminary negotiations with France esti=ated a capital cost of $940 per kWe****? (. total capital investment of $564 million, 1977 dollars). This was almost twice the IAEA estimate which assumed a 4 percent annual increase in power plant capital costs.
- Norman Gall, " Atoms for Brazil, Danger for All," Foreizn Poliev, Summer 1976.
- Nucleonics Week, November, 1978.
- Korean Atomic Energy Institute (KAERI), Research Recort on Electrical System Planning and Site Identification for Nuclear Power Plant Construction in Korea, 31 December 1974, p. 96.
- M. Shaftique and M. Ahmad, " Development of a National Nuclear Power Program, Constraints Likely to Influence Timing and Introduction,"
Paper presented to International Conference on Nuclear Power and Its Fuel Cvele, Salzburg, Austria, May 2-13, 1977.
- Pakistan Times, April 25, 1976, p. 7.
1528 361
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AC7NC106 In 1977, M. Shafique, the Project Manager of the new plant, esti-mated that the capital costs of the plant would be core than a billion dollars (in foreign exchange) .* Assuming this estimate is correct, the per kWe capital investment would be $1,600 per kwe. In the case of India it has become largely self-sufficient in the design and construction of nuclear power plants. Therefore, the cost of power plants purchased by other LICs from the industrial countries does not apply to the case of India.
Estimates of capital costs for the 600 MWe nuclear plant at Turkey's Akkuyu,*' have increased from $720 million (1977 dollars) in 1975 to $800 million in 1977 (1977 dollars). This cost increase brings the capital costs per kw for a 600 MWe reactor to more than $1,300 per kwe. Turkish elec-tricity authorities have invited t -ders from reactor vendors for the nuclear steam supply system (NSSS) an1 turbine generator. These bids will include construction and testing of the reactor but exclude civil works.
The bids will also include initial fuel core.
The capital costs of conventional alternatives while like nuclear plants uncer in but nevertheless are much lower. In 1977 the capital costs of al lants of 600 MWe or_largat_have been estimated at $530 per kw (1977 d 1 Tars).*** In the case of,Wi7eiheplants, the cost, based on a contract signed between Iran and t1Mrman companies for generating 1760 MYe of electricity in 1976 was estimated at $407 per kw.**** IAEA, which is not distinguished by a particularly critical attitude toward nuclear energy, in 1977 estimated the capital costs of oil-fired plants in sizes comparable to nuclear plants at $350 per kwa===* (19e/ dollars).
In the case of hydro plants, there are serious differences in capital costs depending on site conditions. For Turkey which is estimated to have an almost 17,000 MWe hydro-potential, the capital cost on the average is estimated at $560 per kw. The most recent hydro-agro plant in Turkey is the Karskya dam and power plant, the second stage of the develop =ent of the Euphrates river basin. The Karakya dam is 180 meters high, with a crest length of 394 meters. The effective storage of the reservoir will be 5,580 aillion meters. The power plant will consist of six generating
- M. Shafique, M. Ahmad, " Development of a National Nuclear Power Program, Constraints Likely to Influence Timing and Introduction,"
- p. 5.
- Mua=mer Cetelincelik, " Turkey Looks to Nuclear Energy to Keep Pace with Demand," Energy International, September 1977, p. 30.
- Energy International, March 1977, p. 31.
- The total capital cost of the project was estimated at $715 million, Iran Economic News, Vol. 2, No. 6, June 1976, p. 3.
- J. A. Lane, et al. , " Nuclear Power in Developing Countries," paper to the Salzburg Conference on Nuclear Power and Its Fuel Cycle, May 2-13, 1977. ,-3 33 /
1529 001
AC7NC106 units, each rated at 300 MWe. With a total installed capacity of 1800 MWe.
The estimated cost of the Karskya project is 20 billion Turkish Lira (in 1977, 15 Lira = one dollar). Even if the cost of the agro-section of the project is not subtracted from the electrical part, the per kW capital investment will be considerably lower than nuclear plants. Another important advantage of the hydro plant is its comparativ2 advantage in saving foreign currency. While a 600 MWe nuclear plant requires a foreign currency expenditure of more than one-half a Illlion dollars,* the Karakya project includes $208 million in foreign payment.
In 1972, Turkey was utilizing only about 5 percent of its hydro-potential.** In 1987, when the first nuclear plant is expected to have already gone into operation, according to present estimates, 28,900 GWh of hydro-electricity are expected to be generated; this would consti-tute less than 40 percent of the presently known hydropotential. The added advantages of hydro-projects are that a number of such projects could be multipurpose, and contribute to the country's agriculture.
Besides, hydro-projects have a plant lif e of 60 years or more, which is more than twice that of nuclear plants.
Iran, which has been estimated to have 14 GWe hydro-potential, was at the end of 1977 utilizing 1.8 GW of this source (less than 20 per-cent).*** The capital costs of the most expensive hydro plant under construction in Iran, the Reza Shah Kabir, are estimated at 1.5 billion Rials (1 dollar = 71. 5 Rs) . **** The project includes a large dam with a 2.9 billion cubic meter capacity and is exoected to irrigate 6,200 hectares at firat and later 41,000 hectares and will also produce 1000 MWe of electricity.***** If the cost of the project is not divided into its irrigation and electric potential, the per kw capital cost will be
$209 (1977 dollars).****** Even if the present estimate of large
- Energy International, Vol. 14, No. 1, January 1977, p. 30.
- N. Aybers and S. Kakuc, " Growth of Demand f or Enerry and Pro-jected Role of Nuclear Power in Turkey," Peaceful Uses o# Atomic Energy, Vol. I, IAEA, 1972, p. 231.
- " Energy Profile of Iran," Ener2y International, September 1977,
- p. 39.
- Energy International, September 1977, p. 40.
- Others have estimated the cost at $1 billion with kw cost of (1000. The average cost estimate is $604 per kw.
- M. Shafique and M. Ahmad," Development of a National Nuclear Power Program, Constraints Likely to Influence Timing and Introduction,"
- p. 2.
34 1529 002
AC7NC106 hydro potential is correct, this alone cannot meet the electricity de=and which is expected to require a generating capacity of 60,000 MWe by 1993.
Pakistan is esti=ated to have a total hydro-capacity of between -
30 GWe* and 40 GWe.** The capital cost of constructing a hydro-plant based on past experience and future estimates is $500 per kw. For ex-ample, the Tarbela project, which includes the world's largest rock and earth-filled dam in the w6rld, is 900 feet long and 470 feet high and has a hydroelectric potential capacity of 2100 MWe. The cost of the project is estimated at $1 billion *** (1976 dollars). The plant was expected to begin operation in 1978. Assuming even no cost for the agriculture contribution of the project, the per kilowatt cost of Tarbela electricity is $475, less than half of the proposed nuclear plant at Chashma. Hydro-projects are, hcwever, tied down to fixed lo-cation. In the case of Pakistan most of the hydroelectric potential of the country is located in the northern parts of the country, far away from large consumption centers such as Karachi. The Pakistani Atomic Energy Commission has argued that this factor provides a justi-fication for the intreduction 7f nuclear plants in the country. Para-doxically, however, it plans a 600 MWe reactor to be located in the north-central parts of the country, very close to the hydro-rich re-gions As in the case of Turkey, Pakistan's hydro-agro proj ects when com-pared to nuclear plants not only involved smaller per kw capital in-vest ==nt but also a much smaller amount of foreign exchange. For ex-ample, the Gomal Dam which stores 2.5 million cubic feet of water, controls floods, and provides 135 FGi of electricity required a capital investment of Rs 383.6 millionor 40.5 million (one dollar = 9.47 Rs) . The foreign exchange component of the project was Rs 100 million ($10.6 million).**** The foreign exchange cost of the Karachi Nuclear Power Project (KANUPP) which is ultimately expected to procuce 137 MW of electricity was $50.6 million.*****
- Ibid.
- Imitiaz Ali Qazilbash, " Pakistan's Power Potential," The Pakistan Times (Sunday Magazine), June 22, 1975, p. I.
- U.S. Congress, House, South Asia, 1976, 94th Congress, 2nd Session, p. 6.
- Pakistan Year Book, (Karachi: East and West Publishing Company, 1973),
- p. 300.
- C nada subsidized the export of the reactor to Pakistan by granting an interest-free loan of $124 million and another loan of $23 million at low interest rates (less than 4 percent while the market rate is likely to have been higher than 10 percent for Pakistan). News Review on South Asia, Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis (India), December 1972, p. 137.
35 1529 003
AC7NC106 Brazil's hydro-potential has been estimated at about 120,000 to 140,000 MWe. Less than 20 percent of this potential was utilized in 1977 (20,000 MWe).* According to Brazilian Atomic Energy Cocnission about 50,000 FMe of the country's hydro-potential is located in the a Amazonian Region, some 1500-2000 km from the southeastern region which is the economic and industrial center of Brazil and accounts for soue 75 percent of the electricity consumption in the entire country.** It is generally agreed that the per kw capacity cost of producing hydro-electricity is lowe.r tnan nuclear electricity in Brazil. An alternative to transporting hydropower to the southeastern region, the development of cheap power of Amazon, may attract electricity intensive projects to the region.*** Transporting e.ectricity from remote areas to the consumption centers in the LICs has been considered by some as prohibitive enough to make nuclear power competitive with hydroelectricity. The situation is likely to differ from country to country. During the past ten years the economics of long distance transmission has changed considerably. The present technology for transmitting electricity over longer than 400 mile distances, the High Voltage Direct Current Transmission Lines (HVDC) is less expensive than the more conventional =ethod, the High Voltage Alter-nating Current Lines.
Brazil and Paraguay have agreed to use HVDC transmission systems for transporting power from the huge Itaipu Central Hydro-electric Project with a 10,000 MRe capacity **** The cost of building the hydro project as well as the transmission lines has been estimated at $10 billion. This brings the capital cost of the project to $1000 per kW of capacity.
~ ~
The Philippines' hydro-potential has been estimated at 19,595 GWh.
As of 1976, almost 2500 GWh of hydroelectricity was produced in Luzon and 8477 GWh in Mindanao.***** According to a 1973 IAEA study the cost of constructing a 300 MWe hydroplant was around,$146_per kW (1977 dollars).
- C. Syllus, M. Pinto, et al., " Organization and Development of the Brazilian Nuclear Progra=me," Paper presented to the International Conference on Nuclear Power and Its Fuel Cycle, Salzburg, May 2-13, 1977. According to the Brazilian Ministry of Mines and Energy, the country's hydro-potential is well over 150,000 MW. Federative Re-public of Brazil Ministry of Mines and Energy, National Energy Balance, 1976, p. 9.
- Ibid.
- Ibid., p. 4.
- Ibid., p. 2.
~
~*****a) The Philippine National Power Corporation, "Long Tern Genera-tion-Expansion Program for Luzon Grid," Report to his Excellency President Marcos, November 1973. b) IAEA, Market Survev... ,
Philippines , 1973.
36 1529 004 8-q..,
AC7NC106 There aus no firm estimates about the total hydroelectric poten-tial of South Korea. The IAEA in 1973 mmde a rough estimate of 2000 MWe gross.* This potential is concentrated in four major river systems:
Han, Naktong , Kum, and Su=jin. As of 1973 only 302.7 ,
MWe of hydro-potential was utilized. The per kW cost of hydro plants under construction--Soyangsang, 200 MWe and Antong, 900 MWe--has been estimated at less than $750 per kW (1977 U.S. dollars).**
In India the basis for much of hydroelectricity potential esti-mates is a survey carried ot t between 1953-60 by the Central Water and Power Consission. The method used was to examine each potential site in detail, and to estimate the firm power potential that it was felt could be provided at a cost which would be low enough to be competi-ttve with other sources of power. The calculations were made on the basis of prevailing techniques of hydro construction and utilization, and the constraints believed to be imposed by topographical and hydro-logical conditions and by other demands on available water. The aggre-gate total esti=ated for the country as a whole was more than 40 mil-lion kW at a load factor of 60 percent.***
To some extent the availability of hydro power in dif ferent parts of India redresses the problems arising from the uneven regional distribution of coal reserves. The major coal producing states of Bihar and West Bengal are not well favored with respect to hydro-potential and states in the south and northwest, which have no coal reserves and are far from the coal producing areas, are either well endowed with or have relatively simple access to hydro-electric potential. These include Haryana, 'Jammu and Kashmir, Karnataka, ~
Kerala and Punjab.****
Only a small part of the 41 million kW hydro-potential has been used. The 41 million kW at 60 percent load factor is equiv-alent to an annual output of 216 TWh. As of 1974 only 26 TWh, or 1/8, of the hydro-potential of the country was being utilized.*****
- IAEA, Market Survev... , Korea, Vienna, 1973, p. 11.
- Ibid., p. 13.
- P. D. Henderson, India: The Enercy Sector, Washington, D.C.:
World Bank, 1975, p. 15.
- Henderson, India: The Ener;y Sector, op. cit., p. 17.
- Ibid.
1529 005 37
AC7NC106 Table 10 Es1 ;cd Shares of Hydro-Potential Bv States and Regions, River Systems. and Types of Project (India)
(percentages) ,
States and Regions River Systems Types of Project Andhra Pradesh 6.0 1. Southern India 1. Storage or run-of-Karnataka 8.2 (a) West flowing river Kerala 3.7 river 10.4 (a) Run-of-river 25.0 Tamil Nadu 1.7 (b) East flowing (b) Storage Southern Region 19.7 rivers 21.0 proieces 75.0 Total 31.4 Total 100.0 Gujarat 1.6 Madhya Pradesh 11.2 2. Rivers of Central Maharashtra 4.6 India 10.4 Western Region 17.4 Bihar 1.5 Orissa 5.0 West Bengal 0.1 Eastern Region 6.5 Himachal Pradesh 4.5 2. By height of head Jammu & Kashmir 8.7 3. Ganga Basin 11.4 (a) High head 33.1 Punjba & Haryana 3.3 (b) Medium head 58.0 Rajasthan 0.4 4. Indus Basin 16.0 (c) Low head 8.9 Uttar Pradesh 9.1 Northern Region 26.1 l
Assam 28.2 Manipur 2.1 North Eastern 5. Brahmaputra Region 30.3 Basin & neigh-boring drainage areas 30.3 Total 100.0 Total 100.0
- 1. Including Meghalaya, Nagaland and Mizoram.
Source: Government of India, Report of the Enercy Survey of India Com-mit tee,, New Delhi, 1965.
38 1529 006 4
AC7NC106 Based on a 1971 Indian government survey of the Indus basin alone, the total hydro-potential of the country has been estimated at 50 mil-lion kW.* P. D. Henderson of the World Bank has estimated that India's hydro-potential is closer to 100 million kW.** There are no fir = cost .
- igures for hydro projects in India. Given the similarity of the geo-sconomic conditions of India and Pakistan, they may be assumed to be similar to those of Pakistan ($500 per kW of capacity). The existing known hydro-potential can be judged to make a substantial contribution to total power generation needs of the country in the future.
Based on the available data, it appears that nuclear power plants still arc more capital intensive per unit of installed capacity than alternatives. In most cases, the initial capital investment of a nuclear power station would be more than 100 percent higher than equivalent con-ventional alternative. The difference in initial investment between a nuclear plant and a conventional pewer production facil?ty could be as high as $500 million dollars. The purchase of a nuclear power plant would, therefore, require a quantom jump in the investment needs of the LICs conte = plating such a project.
- Government of India, Ministry of Irrigation and Power, Report of Pouer Economy Committee, New Delhi, March 1971, Chapter 2.
The 1960 estimate of the country's hydro-potential is likely to be an underesti= ate because of the following reasons:
- 1. The 1960 estimates were limited to sites which could provide power at a cost that was competitive to other alternatives. Since 1960, there has been dramatic increase in the cost of nuclear and fos-sil power plants. These increases are likely to =akc the development of sites that were less than coepetitive with alternatives in 1960, competitive at present.
- 2. The estimates of the firm power potential were made on the basis of the minimum average flows that could be expected to be avail _
able with a probability of 90 percent taking into account the regula-tion afforded by the storage envisaged. Hence no account was taken of the energy that could be produced on a secondary basis corresponding to inflows higher than " dependable" flows, nor of the energy that could be supplied on a seasonal basis.
- 3. It was known that in the light of further survey work the estimates of the hydro-potential of the Hi=alayan rivers might be revised upward. ~
- 4. No account was taken of the possible effects of improvements in the technology of hydro-design, construction and operation.
- Hendersen, India: The Energy Section, op. cit. For the cost estimates of nonconventional alternatives see Appendix A.
39
(: ; . .
1
-7 7'
( '
AC7NC106 _-
S*=l
- i l _ t, ' ' ' 'r-t i x- _- -
' I ~ ",
INTEREST DURING CONSTRUCTION _.,
'5: t r_, - 2 Almost all capital investment in power plants is incurred prior to the operation of the plant. Because of the time displacement of the expenditure during the construction period, they cannot simply be added together. Due to inflation and opportunity cost of capital "the rational economic person" would not hesitate over a choice between a dollar paid in 1979 and a dollar paid in 1986. The dollac paid in 1979 can be productively employed such as putting in a savints account for the seven year period increase in value.
For example, at an_B_pgreejat ~ ~ -
nominal~~~ interest
~
rate the 1979 dollar would
- ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ '
be worth $1.63
- =~
in 1986.*~
In order to make a fair comparison in terms of capitsl cost between nuclear power plants and alternatives which have different expenditure patterns over time, all cash outflows need to be adjusted to their value at a common base year and a discount rate determined. In estimating discount rates, inflation rates have to be taken into account. The con-sideration of inflation rate is important because in an environment where prices are expected to rise at a significant rate, the nominal interest rate would increase in crder to provide some protection to the real rate of return.
The level of discount rate is obviously important in comparative economic cost-benefit analyses of power plants, because the higher the discount rate, the worse the position of plants such as nuclear reactors which require large initial capital outlay and take a long time to con-struct. What interest rate to assume has become a najor area of contention ,
- There is a censnicuaus_ abs _ence of detailed price list for nuclear pcwer plants that would be considered representative. The price and. cost estimates are prepared in detail by manufacturers 'far Eidding purposes, and results are considered p_roPriety. In the cost figure given after the selection of a bidder it is no't clear whether costs _such _as . interest during. :enatru tion are~~ included ~
or .not.' Thus af ter a variety of cost Estimates are given for ths saEe~ project. Under a turnkey contract, the reactor vendor is responsible for the complete construction of a nuclear plant. Under alternative contract arrange =ents such as a nuclear steam Lapply contract, the vendor may supply only the nuclear boiler, and the utility or commission makes alternative arrangements for turbine genera-tors and construction and architect-engineer services, etc.
1529 40 .
AC7NC106 between the proponents and opponents of increased diffusion atomic electricity around the world. Estimates have varied between 4.5 percent and 25 percent.
Some nuclear enthusiasts including members of nuclear power bureaucracies in the LICs such as Dr. H. Bhubha of India, have recommended a rate of 4.5 percent.* The International Atomic Energy Agency in its 1973 Market Survev for Nuclear Power in Developing Countries ** assumed a rate of 8 percent.
Critics such as Albert Wohlstetter and the Barber Associates who have been concerned about the military implications of nuclear electricity have reco= mended rates of 20 to 25 percent.***
Therretically, the rate of interest should reflect the overall rate of return which has been established to insure the efficient allocation of capital resources. Determining the rate for each country, however, is a difficult process. The general approach has been to assume the cost of capital to decrease with increased economic development and larger stocks of capital investment. Based on this assumption it is often recommended that planners in LICs esti= ate capital costs for their country by taking the capital cost figures used in industrialized countries and adjusting for their countries' icwer level of economic development and greater scarcity of capital **** (i.e., increasing the rate).
Many LICs may in fact have serious difficulties raising the necessary capital for purchasing a nuclear power plant. This difficulty is largely due to accumulating debts. The American magazine, Business Week, has esti=ated that the total debt owed by LICs to national govern =ents, international agencies and commercial banks was $130 billion in 1976.
Other estimates range between $200 and $250 billion.***** Thus the debt
- H. J. Bhabha, "The Need for Atomic Energy in Undeveloped Countries,"
pp. 395-407.
- IAEA, Market Survey for Nuclear Power in Develooing Countries, p. KI.
- Richard Barber and Associates, p. 32..
- Ibid.
- Business Week, March 1, 1976, p. 54, David O. Beim, " Rescuing the LDCs," Foreign Affairs, July 1977, p. 717.
1529 009 41
AC7NC106 service of LICs alone runs into hundreds of millions of dollars each year.
Bhny have chronic balance of payment deficits. The annual oalance c_ pay-ment deficit of LICs increased from $9 billion in 1973, to $28 billion in 1974 and $38 billion in 1975.* The Chase Manhattan Bank has estimated
- hat $150 billion would be needed to cover LIC deficits between 1976 and 180 alone.** Thus, it is argued that the prospect for default in a number or LICs seems real.
However, all LICs do not suffer from the same degree of capital scarcity. There are significant differences between Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, India, Brazil, Philippines, and South Korea. For example, among the Northern Tier countries, while Pakistan and Turkey have serious balance of payment difficulties and suffer from serious capital shortages, Iran has been much better off.
Pakistan is a country heavily indebted to the rest of the world.
Outstanding external indebtedness stood at $3,000 million on December 31, 1969.*** This figure increased to $5,730 million by June 30, 1976
($7,541 million including portions still undisbursed).. Thus from 1973 onward, the annual borrowing has more than doubled in money terms com-pared to the period 1965-1970. Servicing the debt alone is likely to have a serious negative impact on the country's future development. !.s of 1976-77 debt-servicing claimed 18 percent of the country's export earnings. An expenditure of 20 percent is often considered critical.****
There is serious doubt about Pakistan's continued ability to service it debts. Pakistan has financed its chronic balance of payment deficit mainly by foreign loans on government account. There has been very little inflow of capital in the form of direct private investment over the past few years. Given Pakistan's international financial situation,
- Cheryl Payer, " Third b*orld Debt Problem," Monthly Review, September 1976, p. 5.
- Euromonev, December 1975, p. 14.
- The figure includes (East Pakistan) Bengladesh as well.
- United Nations Economic and Social Council, E/ESCA/DP.2/LS, November 5, 1977, p. 2'.
1529 010 42
AC7NC106 Table 11 The Loans Contracted and Grant Assistance Agreements Cicned by Pakistan ($ million)*
1965-70 1971- 1972- 1973- 1974- 1975- 76 July to Average 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 77 March I. Consortium 402.5 109.6 340.8 408.5 366.8 478.2 367.2
- a. Bilateral of which U.S. 205.2 71.2 206.5 125.1 97.8 178.8 166.2
- b. Multi-lateral 79.3 5.3 148.3 218.7 249.6 307.1 267.2 II. Non-Consortium 41.1 --
32.0 17.5 223.6 15.0 4.4 III. Moslem Countries -- -- -
610.0 315.8 104.5 215.2 IV. Indus.
Tarbela 64.4 33.9 16.4 13.3 11.6 14.7 18.0 Total Assist-ance of which: 448.7 87.3 488.7 1199.2 1066.5 830.0 744.2 Table 12 Pakistan's Debt Service ** ($ million)
Year Excort Earnings Debt Service Ratio
~
1972-73 1,066 193 18.1 1973-74 1,390 197 14.2 l974-75 1,519 259 17.1 1975-76 1,814 274 15.1 1976-77 1,878 339 18.0
- Government of Pakistan, Pakistan Economic Survey, 1976-77, Islamabaci:
1977.
- Ibid.
1529 Oli 43
4 AC7NC106 the rate at which it can borrow large amounts of capital on a competitive basis, i.e. a rate that would reflect the true scarcity of capital in the country from the world financial markets, is likely to be higher than the rate of return expected in the industrial countries. In the United States the Office of Management and Budget has determined a 10 percent (without inflation) figure for capital cost to be used for economic cost b:nefit analysis. In the private sector investments are expected to either equal or exceed the Federal rate of return. The French and British electricity authorities use a 9-10 percent rate in their calculation. For Pakistan 2 ming a minimum of 15 percent rate of return will not be too high.
Turkey's situation is not better than Pakistan'r; by the end of 1978 the country's foreign debt totaled at more than $10,000 million.* Turkey's foreign exchange reserves have dwindled to $500 million, enough to cover its imports for six weeks. The country's balance of payment had a deficit of $1,360 million in 1975 and $1,751 million in 1976.** The deficit was financed by the depreciation of $112 million in Turkey's foreign exchange reserves, an IMF loan of $149 million and short-term capital inflow amounting to $1,520 million.*** At the same time the remittances from Turkish workers abroad have been declining. In 1976, workers' remittances dropped by
$329.6 million (25 percent) in comparison with 1975, to $982.7 million, while the relative 1975 level had shown a decline by $114 million (8 percent) to $1,312.3 million.**** An analysis of Turkeys's private capital account reveals a similar trend. Comparing the years 1975 and 1976 shows that the inflow of foreign private capital dropped from $153 million to $27 million.
Servicing the debt incurred would cost Turkey $3 billion in the next decade. Debt servicing in 1976 claimed 15 percent of the country's export earnings (1,960.2 million in 1976) . The situation was already almost critical during the summer of 1977 as leading international banks refused to finance Turkey's exports and imports because of that country's inability to pay for its current bills (it was estimated that Turkey owed $500 million in overdue letters of credit) .***** It was also speculated that Turkey would not be able to pay interest on its short term loans amounting to
$3000 million that the country cwes to American, German and Swiss banks.******
- The Pulse, No. 3548, Wednesday, August 31, 1977, p. 3.
- Economic Research Department, General Economic Conditions in Turkev, 1976 (Ankara: TISA Mathaacilik Sanayil, 1977), pp. 1-6.
- General Economic Conditions in Turkev, 1976, op. cit.
- Ibid.
- Hoyt Price, Turkev--Current Situation and Prosoects, Report for Continental Bank in Chicago, 1977, p. 2
- Quoted in Pulse, No. 3548, August 31, 1977, p. 2. According to a December 30, 1978 report Turkey's current account deficit is estimated at $3.4 billion. Current budget deficit is $2.7 billion (5.6 percent of GOP), The Economist, December 30, 1978, p. 58.
1529 04
AC7NC106 Turkey's international financial situation is very similar to Paki-stan's. The rate at which it would te able to borrow capital, would be higher than in coantries where capital scarcity is not as high. If assumed rates of return in countries such as the U.S. are between 10 and 15 percent then given Turkey's financial situation, a minimum of 15 percent would reflect the true scafeity of capital for the country.
Iran's case is very different from that of the other two countries.
Since the beginning of the 1970s until 1979, the country's balance of trade has been positive.
Table 13 Iran Exports and Imoorts (Billion of Rials at Current Prices)
EXPORTS IMPORTS Year Oil and Gas Others Total 1970-71 184.9 26.1 211.0 158.4 1971-72 279 37.2 317.0 199.3 1972-73 236.4 41.4 277.8 251.1 1973-74 559.7 58.7 618.4 345.6 1974-75 1,383.1 65.1 1,448.2 673.6 1975-76 1,299 76.3 1,375.8 1,127.3 Source: Government of Iran, Ecotmmic Trends in Iran, 4th Edition (Tehran:
Plan and Budget Organization, Information Division, 1977), p. 10.
Iran's increased oil revenues have considerably boosted its foreign exchange which rose by 90 percent in 1973 74 and by 246 percent in 1974-75.
Table 14 Foreign Exchange Reserves (Billions of Rials) 1970-71 1971-72 1972-73 1973-74 1974-75 1975-76 Foreign Exchange 20.9 56.5 80.0 152.7 528.6 536.7 Source: Banki Markazi, Iran, Annual Report and Balance Sheet 1354 (Tert.an:
1355), p. 54.
Government revenues exceeded expenditures after 1974.
529 0t3 45
~'!U \
l
AC7NClo6 Tt.ble 15 Iran: Government Revenues and Expenditures (Billions of Rials) 1970-71 1971-72 1972-73 1973-74 1974-75 1975-76 Revenue 172.3 258.3 302.1 464.8 1,394.4 1,582.1 (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.o) (100.0) (100.o)
From oil and jas 84.7 155.3 178.2 311.3 1,205.2 1,246.8 (49.2) (60.1) (99.0) (67.0) (86.4) (78.8)
Expenditures 268.9 284.4 359.1 478.0 1,876.5 1,447.7 Surplus -96.0 -26.1 -57.0 -13.2 317.7 134.4 Source: United Nations Economic and Social Council, E/ESCAP/DP 2/L.8, No-vember 8, 1977. Figures in parentheses are percentages shares.
Although during the crisis of 1978-79 Iran faced major cash-flow prob-lems with budget deficits of several billion dollars, because of Iran's availability of considerable quantities of a variety of resources, the country's economic situation is likely to be considerably better than in most other developing countries. Thus a rate of 10 percent has been as-suced in the case of Iran.
Because all of the countries considered suffer fr m high rates of inflation, the nominal interest rate would increase fc r them in order to provide some protection to the real rate of return. In its 1972-73 Market Survey for Nuclear Power in Developing Countries,.IAEA assumed a 4 percent rate of inflation. The IAEA has described its assuded rate co "a compro-mise between the much higher values recorded by most countries in the past and the somewhat lower targets set by their governments for the future."*
Many countries considered in this 9tudyssuffer from high rates of infla-tion. For example, between 1969 and 1976 Pakistan, on the average, has had an inflation rate of 15.9 percent.** Turkey's 1977 inflation rate was 25 percent.*** Iran's inflation rate for 1976-77 was 1" percent.****
i In this study, the nominal interes1 assumed for Iran and South Korea 1 is 10 percent, similar to the United States. For Pakistan and Turkey, as 2 > rell as the remaining countries, a 15 percent rate is assumed because of
, sk greater scarcity of capital and economic prcblems in each country.
- LAra, ' eke t Survey. . . , General Report, op. cit., p. D2.
- U.N. .. -anic and Social Council, E/ESCAP/DP, November 1977.
- Hoy furkey: Current Situation, op. cit., p. 3.
- Unii ras Economic and Social Council, E/ESCAP/DP 2/L.8, Novem-ber 9, cai/.
46 1529 014
AC7NC106 In order to determine the total discount rate at the time that the power plant goes into operation, the number of years required for power plant construction has to be determined. It is generally assumed that on the average _it_ rakes eight vears to construct _a nuclear power plant in a
.less industrial countri.es. IAEA assumed a construction period of ieUEn ~
and a !alf years. A great deal of the difference between countries de- $f pends on the type of contract and suppliers. According to the German Kraftwerk Union, it requires only five years to construct a nuclear re-actor on a turnkey basis.*
Iranians expect the KWU reactors to be constructed in 5 years and the Framata=e in 7 years. The Pakistanis and Turks have estimated a 6-year construction period. The construction of the Bataan reactor in the Philip-pines is exassted to take 6 years. A similar time estimate has been as-suced for constructing reactors in' Brazil, South Korea and India. As-suming these estimates are correct (t. hey are likely to be underesti=ates),
an average estimate of 6 years is still longer than the time required for the construction of fossil plants which is assumed to take four and a half years.**
Ance all capital expenditures do not take place prior to the ini-tiation of the construction of the alternative power plants, interest calculation has to take account of the capital expenditure schedule for different plants. For example, if_a nuclear plant required capital in-
, vestment of $1200 sillion, and takes o years to construct, different amounts are likely to be spent in dillerent years. cor the purpot i of j comparative cost-benefit calculation, a similar expenditure pattern for each has been assumed. -
Fuel Cvele Cost and Availability The persistent disadvantage of nuclear power plants in terms of capital cost has focused hope on the cost of the nuclear fuel cycle to give the nuclear plant the necessary advantage to become competitive with conventional power generating alternatives. For example, the McKinney Panel assumed large reductions in nuclear fuel costs:
The pessimistic estimate starts at 8.95 mills (1976 dollar) per kilowatt hour (kWh) decreasing in 20 years to 3.36. The opti-mistic estimate starts at three decreasing to one. F.eviewed in the light of present knowledge, the consensus of the conferees
- H. Frewer and W. Altvater, " Technology Transfer by Industry for the Con-struction of Nuclear Pcwer Plants," paper presented to the Shiraz Con-
. ference on Transfer of Nuclear Technology, April 10-14, 1977, p. 4.
- IAEA, Market Survey..., :p. cit., 1977, General Report.
47
AC7NC106 was that nuclear fuel costs would probably reach about 4.4 mills per kWh by 1965, decreasing to 3.36 by 1980.*
It is no wonder then that there have been numerous cost estimates of nuc-lear fuel cycle ever since the 1950s. The elements of fuel cycle costs depend upon the type of the reactor and the nuclear policy of the particu-lar countries. In the case of most LICs, the reactors to be predomi-nantly relied on, in the 1980s, are the lignt water reactors (LWRs) . The fuel cycle of LWRs begins with uranium ore, a natural resource that is mined and processed into a concentrate called uranium oxide (U30 8 ) of yellowcake. Natural uranium as mined cannot itself be used directly as fuel in the LWR, because while the concentration of uranium-235 is 0.7 percent in natural uranium, LWR fuel requires a concentration of about 3 percent. The process for increasing uranium-235 concentration is called uranium enrichment. In order to increase uranium-235 concentration (or enrich uranium-235) in natural uranium, U 038 is converted to e. gas called uranium hexafluoride (UF6). This gas is subsequently pushed through an enrichrnnt plant for the purpose of increasing uranium-235 concentration.
U' ct.ium er.richment is followed by fuel fabrication which includes conversion to uranium dioxide (UO2), pelletization, encapsulation in tubes and assembling the uranium dioxide tubes into fuel elements. These ele-ments are loaded into reactors, which use the heat from nuclear f*ssion to produce steam to drive turbines and generators to produce electricity.
Other cost elements of the LWR fuel cycle costs include fuel trans-portation fron the fabrication facility to the power plant, and nuclear waste storage. Most studies of the nuclear fuel cycle include the costs of nuclear waste (spent fuel) reprocessing and credit from the sale of re-covered plutonium (PU) . There have been considerable worldwide discus-sions about the economics, advisability and political-security implica-tions of reprocessing. Some have argued that the economics of reprocess-ing does not appear promising. This position has been questioned in Europe and Japan as based not only on economic considerations, but also in regard to nuclear waste management, breeder research and commercial-ization, and technological competition. The economics of reprocessing for LICs will be considered separately later in this study.
The nuclear fuel cycle costs to be considered here include the yel-lowcake, conversion, enrich =ent, fabrication, transportation and storage.
Natural uranium is found in different parts of the world. As of 1977, however, nearly 80 percent of the non-communist world's cheap uranium re-sources were in the United States, Canada and South Africa (Table 16) .
In the LICs under consideration in this study, all have uranium explora-tion programs. The Turkish and Pakistani Governments initiated such
- U.S. Congress, JCAE, Develooment, Growth, and State of Atomic Energy, 1956, p. 135.
48 1529 016
AC7NC106 i b Table 16 l World Uranium Resources and Production--$50/:.3 U 033 (Excluces Eastern Bloc Countries) -
Thousand Tons U33 0 Production Reasonably Estissted Planned Assured Additional 1973 Country 1,090 2,240 33 North A.eries 22 840 1,370 U.S. 10 237 853 Canada 0 8 11 Greenland (Den = ark) .25 6 3 itexico 740 260 la Africa 'll 452 94 South and SU Africa 69 2.6 Niger 203 36 65 Algeria 26 13 Gabon ,
10 10 C.A.E. 4 So=alia S 2 2 Zaire 0 3 t'.ada g ascar 380 60 .90 Australis 500 120 3.-
Eurnee
- O Sweden 391 67 57 2.6 Trance .13 11 1 Portugal 40 9 11 Spain 0
.3 27 Yugosisvia 0 10 U.K. 5 .30 Germany 3 ,
2 1 0 Italy 2 0 Austris 4 0 Finisnd 60 31 Asis 39 31 India 10 0 .035 Japan 5 0 Turkey 4 0 Kores 80 20 South Ameries 0 .li Ar;:entins 54 24 11 Brazil 7 Chile 0 2,800 2,700 Totsi (Rounded)
SOURCE: The fir.at two columns wer'e taken from Uranium: Re-sources, Production and Demand, OECD/NEA and the IAEA, December 1977. Differences between .his table and Table II of the text relate to the different price cut-off used and more up to date infor::u tion. The third column was taken from Uranium: Resc urces, Production and Demand, OECD/NEA and the IAEA, I ecember 1975. Se-cause of recent discoveries, these figures in the case p 7 of a number of countries,especially Australia and South C o s Africa, are likely to be underestima:es.
1529 017 49
AC7NC106 programs in the 1960s. In the case of Pakistan, several promising areas in various parts of the country have been i?entified. One such area is in the Siwalik Sandstone outcropping over a distance of 120 miles. With the help of the United Nationc Development Program studies are being car -
ried out* through intensive drilling to estimate ore resources. Pakistan has also accelerated uranium prospecting through aero-radio-metric sut-veys in addition to the carbon surveying.
In Turkey, geol;gical investigation in Salihli-Kopru basin, Tashar-man and Kasar areas hove indicated the existing of uranium reserves esti-mated at about 2400 tons of uranium oxide equivalent. About three-quar-ters of these reserves have been esticated to have an avercge U 0g3 content of 0.045 percent; the remainder has a lower average grade, in the region of 0.02 percent. Investigaticn in other parts of Turkey such as Cure, Sebinkavahisar and Ayvacik hava shown uranium reserves of 800 tons equivalent.**
Iran, under the Shah, initiated a ten year uranium prospecting pro-gram with an annual budget of $30 million.*** Although the Iranian Atemic Energy Cc= mission has estimated major uranium discoveries, so far no larde reserves have been identified.
In South Korea a number of uranium exploration surveys have been carried ou~t since 1955. The 3-year long Geological Survey of Korea waa carried out between 1970-73. Carborne radioactive surveys have been cen-ducted over metasediment stratn of the Olechor Series around Taejon. "Jhe surveyed area was about 2,620 km2 . In 1969, uranium deposits were found in this region. The most important nuclear resources reported in Korea are Monazite plocer deposits, mainly composed of thorium. Pogmatite and graphite containing uranium in small quantities are also found, but have been considered unsuitable for economic extraction of uranium. The men-azite found in 22 areas contains about 0.03-0.08 percenN of Th02 ****
Philippine uranium reserves have been estimated to be 500,000 tons of ore containing 0.04 percent of U 38 0 , i.e., 200 tons of U3 0 8 total or only 100 tons at 50 percent recovery.*****
According to the 1975 German-Brazilian nuclear agreement, uranium prospecting is to increase in the country. A joint venture company, Nucle-bras Auxiliar de Mineria cao S.A.-Nuclam, has been formed with the German Urangesellschaf t as 40 percent partner of the Brazilian Nuclebras. NUC/AM
- IAEA, Nuclear Power Planning for Pakistan, 1975, p. 22.
- IAEA, Market Survev..., Turkey, p. 26.
- Iran Times , February,1977, p. 3 (in Persian) .
- IAEA, Market Survey... Korea, op. cit., p. 16.
- IAEA, Market Survey for Nuclear Power in Develooing Countries, Phil-ippines (Vienna, 1973), p. 24.
5 1529 OW
AC7NC106 i
is responsible for 10 percent of the prospecting activities in Brazil, in areas previously agreed to with Nuclebras. The remaining 90 percent are the responsibility of Nuclebras.* Several areas in Brazil are presently being prospected for uranium and the annual budget for this activity is -
around $27 million.**
India's nuclear fuel resources consist of uranium and thorium. Uran-ium is already being ur;d in the country's CANDU-type heavy water reactors.
The main concentration of uranium, where uranium is being actively mined, is in the Singhbhum district of Bihar. There are minor deposits near Udaipur in Rajasthan. The Indian Atomic Energy Commission is carrying out prospecting and exploratio'n work for uranium in a number of dif ferent re-gions of the country. The existing proved minable ore reserves (at 1975 price or uranium) in Bihar was estimated at 3.5 million ones. The grade of ore is believed to average 0.060 to 0.065 (i.e., 2/3 of one-tenth of one percent) . With this concentration, the known reserves in Bihar would yield some 22,000 tons of U38 0 ***
In order to increase the available resources of nuclear fuel, India, as a number of other LICs, is planning the installation of breeder re-actors. India is especially hopeful about the breeders because they would open up the prospects of using thorium, of which India has very large re-serves. The thorium would be converted in the breeder reactors into fis-sile material uranium-233 which itself can be used in them; and by produc-ing more plutonium than they would themselves burn, they would increase the total resources of nuclear fuel that could be developed from a given amount of uranium. Although India as well as many other countries are investing a great deal of money and effort en the development'of fast breeder reactors, the economic payoff from these activities is very =uch uncertain.
Internationally, uranium prices have risen from $6-8 per pound in the early seventies to $40 per pound in 1976.**** The IAEA had assumed a cost of $7 per pound in its market study. There has been considerable debate about the future course of uranium prices. Some have argued that in the future, prices are likely to decrease, and have predicted a uranium glut *****; others have predicted even higher prices in ae future.******
- C. Syllus, M. Pinto, et al., Organization and Develooment of the Brazilian Nuclear proercm, co. cit., p. 9.
- Ibid.
- P. D. Henderson, India: The Enerav Sector, on. cit. , p. 20.
- Nuclear Fuel, April 4, 1977, p. 3.
- Nuclear Fuel, July 25, 1977, pp. 5-9.
- K.E.A. Effat et al., " Future Fuel Cycle Requirements and Radioac-tive Waste Management Plans for Egypt's Nuclear Power Program,"
paper presented to the Salzburg Conference, 1977, p. I.
51 1529 019 a .
AC7NC106 A 600 W Lk2 plant with a fuel burnup rate of 30,000 WD/Mt (a favora' ale estimate today) and thermal efficiency of 33 percent and ini-tir 'l enrichment of 3 percent is estimated to require 140 tons of U3 08 annually at the cost of about $12.3 million.* This is the amount for one-third of the fuel elements that have to be replaced each year in Lk2s.
However, since yellowcake has to be converted to UF6 before enrich-ment, the cost of this process has been esti=ated at $3.5 per kg uranium.
For r ("O We LWR reactor, this will mean a cost of $455,000 annually for a total cost of $15 million during the life of the plant- The Lk2 which the LICs are planning to purchase requires the enrichment '" uranium. A 600 We Lk2 requires 72,000 SWU annually. The cost of separaung units has increased from $32/SWUkg in 1373 (1973 dollars) to $78 in 1977 (1977 dollars). The annual cost of enriching uranium for a 600 We plant is
$5,616,000. The total enrichment during the life of the plant is esti-mated at about $170 million.
The cost of fuel fabrication after uranium enrichment has been esti-mated at $100/kg uranium. A 600 We reactor is estimated to require 17 tons of fabricated fuel annually at the cost of $1,700,000. The cost during the encire life of the plant is established at $51 million. For a 1200 We reactor the total cost of fuel fabrication will be S102 mil-lion during the life of the plant. Fuel transportation and interim stor-age of nuclear waste has been est_22ted at $50/kg uranium. A 600 We plant is estimated to produce 16.3 tons of nuclear waste annually. Thus, the total storage cost is about $815,000 per year for a total of $24.A million during the life of the plant. Storing nuclear waste has to cun-tinue long after the power plant hss been decommissioned. Plutonium, one of the elements in nuclear waste has a half life of 24,000 years.
What the actual cost of long term storage is likely to be is not known.
The cost of $815,000 per year may continue almost indefinitely.
Adding the costs of the different parts of the fuel cycle together,. '
the total fuel cost for a 600 We reactor is estimated at $20.9 million per year. Since the expenditure on nuclear fuel takes place over a 30 l year period in uniform series, the present worth of the fuel expendi-ture for a 600 We reactor for this period at 10 percent discount rate would be $212.80 milJion. For a 900 W e plant, the fuel cost would be
$319.23 million and $352.00 for a 1200 MWe plant. At a 15 percent dis-count rate the fuel cycle cost for a 600 We, 900 We and 1200 We re-actor during their lifetime would be $141.87 million, $212.29 million and
$283.69 million, respectively.**
- Ibid.
- The present worth calculations have been carried out based on the fol-loving formula: g gn,y 1(1 + i)"
where: PkT = present worth factor of investment in fuel purchase; n =
the number of years; and i = interest rate on invest =ent.
52 1529 020
AC7NC106 Fuel Costs of Alternatives As in the case of nuclear fuel cycle, there is a great deal of un-certainty about the cost of the conventional fuel cycle except in the case of hydroelectricity which does not have; any apparent costs. The prices of fossil fuels differ from country to country, depending on factors such as production costs, taxes, import policies, transportation costs, export policies, etc. As far as oil-fired plants are concerned, it is esti-mated that a 600 MWe plant at 68 percent availability factor would re- f quire about 780,000 tons of heavy fuel annually for a total of 23,400,000 [
tons of oil during the 30 year life of the plant.
The situation differs significantly relative to availability and cost of fuel among the LICs under study, between Iran on the one hand and the remaining countries on the other. To the non-OPEC LICs, the past increases in the prices of petroleum have created serious economic prob-lems. These increased costs have at times resulted in delays or even reversals of th d.r economic and social development programs. They have also bee- forces to borrow for payment of imported oil increasing their debt to other countries.
Iran is an oil-rich country. Its oil reserves have been estimated between 60 and 100 billion barrels.* The Iranians themselves have in 1975 claimed a known reserve of 76 billion barrels.** The Chemical Bank during the same year estimated Iran's known reserves at 70 billion bar-ries--considerably more than a tenth of the world total.*** Iran, along with Saudi Arabia, have been the two dominant oil exporters within the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). This organization has been dominated by the two not only relative to reserve and production but also in terms of influence on pricing policies. Together they have controlled almost 50 percent of OPEC's production and reserves. OPEC in many ways is a duopoly rather than a cartel. This factor may explain the organization's longevity.
- The most common reason given for Iran's purchase of reactors has been that it wants to conserve its oil reserves for future use in petro-chemical industries and avoid early depletion. The first part of this argument assumes that the future economic recurn to Iran from using oil in petrochemical industries will be higher than that from using oil for power production purposes at home. However, although the Shah's Govern-ment talked abo 2t conserving oil, it wanted to sell more oil. To increase export of Iranian oil, the government pushed for a number of barter agreements with European countries exchanging oil with weapons and other
- U.S. Government Serials and Periodicals 817, 1973.
- OPEC Review, Vol. I, no. 4, April 1977, p. 1.7.
- Chemical Bank, International Economic Survev. Iran, N.Y., 1975, p. 3.
53 1529 021
AC7NC106 goods. The demand for Irrrian oil was evidently below what the country wanted to sell. The Sha'..".ould not sell the remaining oil without the risk of lowering OPEC prices. Iran would profit more from keeping incre-mental amounts of oil beyond current production in the ground if it thioks that in the future--for example, 1997--the price of oil will rise more rapidly than the appropriate interest rate on its investment. Supposing 3 discount rate of 20 percent and compounding it for 20 years, the real price of oil (constant dollsrs) would have to approach $181 a barrel in order to make keeping the oil underground more economical than selling it at present prices. Iran, however, cannot produce large increments og oil above its 1977 production (6.5 million barrels a day) without lowering its profits on all of its oil exports. But this concern should not be a barrier to produce oil domestically for generating power.
The other reason for Iran's purchase of reactors has been that given its known reserves of crude oil and its rate of production, it would run out of oil in 25* to 30** years. Such a belief is questionable in several respects, the most important of which is that it assumes a fixed quantity of oi] reserves, regardless of the price of oil and does not take account of the changing technology in prospecting for oil. The Iranian "known" reserves, at present, are simply those unich have been estimated based on current prices and surveys.
Ever since the first world war, there have been numerous speculations about the world's imminent depletion of oil resources. In fact, the stock of known oil reserves in the world has steadily increased ever since oil has been used as a major source of energy.
Table 17 Evolution of Proven Reserves of Oil for Selected Areas, 1939-1968 (in 10 V bbls)
Country 1939 1944 1950 1955 1960 1965 1968 United States 14 20.06 24.649 39.56 93.5 34.49 37.54 Middle East 5 15 32.75 97.45 181.4 212.18 245.2 World 30.9 50.68 72.03 157.54 157.54 341.27 414.34 So.rce: Matheron (1969).
- Alvin J. Cottrell, Iran: Diolomacy in a Regional and Global Content, n.p. ,
Washington, D.C., 1975, p. 10.
- OPEC Review, April 1977, p. 17.
1529 022 54
A'C7NC106 Table 18 OPEC Crude Oil and Natural Gas Reserves, 1976 Crude Oil Ratio Natural Cas Country Million Barrels Reserves / Production Billion Cubic iteters Algeria 6,800 17 3,564 Ecuador 1,700 25 340 Cabon 2,125 26 71 Indonesia 10,500 19 680 Iran 63,000 29 9,343 Iraq 34,000 38 764 Kuwait 67,400 86 898 Libyan A.P.S.A. 25,500 36 731 Nigeria 19,500 26 1,246 Qatar 5,700 31 779 Saudi Arabia 150,000 48 1,785 United Arab Republic 30,530 43 636 Venezuela 18,266 22 1,190 Neutral Zone 6,300 7J[ 142 OPEC 441,321 39 22,174 World 652,000 31 63,195 Percent CFEC 67.7 35.1 SOL'RCES: International Petroleum Encyclopedia 1977; 3P Statistical Review of the World Oil :ndustry 1976; Cedigas' La Situation du Gaz Natural dans le Monde en 1)76.
Note: The figures given for Iraq and Saudi Arabia in respect of crude oil re-serves are quoted from the undermentioned unofficial sources. Other pub-lications place reserves, in the case of Iraq, much higher; while the figure for Saudi Arabia varies f rom source to source.
53 1529 023
AC7MC106 In the case of Iran itself, while in 1954, its known oil reserves were estimated at 15 billion barrels,* at the end of 1976 this figure had gone to more than a fourfold increase.**' Obviously, production from the exist-ing stock depletes reserves. Production, however, also generates profits.
that are partially reinvested in further exploration after leading to its maintenance or increase. At the same time the state of the art in petr:-
leum exploration has improved significantly in the past two decades.
However, given the enormous increase in international consumption of oil (including in OPEC and non-OPEC LICs), future discoveries of oil may not be as great as its consumption. Such a situation will lead to in-creases in price of oil.
A cajor pro *ulem in comparing the economics of nuclear power with oil-fired plants is the choice of a price for oil in Iran, as well as in other countries. Pricing oil is frought with difficulties, because of a number of considerations such as the variety of oils available, the significant difference in production costs between different parts of the world, the environmental considerationc especially in the industrial countries that could restrict significantly the sulphur emission from oil plants. The variety of oil products obtained from refining includes gasoline, kero-sene, naphtha, light fuel oil and heavy fuel oil. They are obtained from the single input, crude oil, and are priced differently according to mar-ket condition to maximize total profits.
In 1978, it cost Iran less than a dollar to produce a ton of heavy oil. Yet it is able to sell at more than $80 per ton (1 ton of heavy oil = 6.8 barrels). At this price, the fuel cost of a 600 MWe plant will be $64.8 million per year. The present worth of the total cost of heavy fuel for a 600 MWe power plant for 30 years for Iran would be about
$622.5 million; in the case of a 900 MWe plant, about $933.78 million; and about $1245 million for a 1200 MWe plant.
As far as oil supplies are concerned, the situation of Turkey, Pakis-tan, India, South Korea, the Philippines and Brazil is quite different from that of Iran. At 1972 prices, the Turkish oil reserves were esti-mated at about 70 million tons. Domestic production of crude oil was 5.8 million tons in 1972 and imports were estimated at 5.92 million tons.
In 1975-76, the country produced 9333 tons of oil a day, =eeting about one-fifth of the domestic demand of 38,888 tons and Turkey's oil reserves were esti=ated at 107.1 million barrels.***
- U.S. Congress, JCAE, Development, Growth, and State of Atomic Energy Industry, 1956, p. 82.
- OPEC Review, April 1977, p. 17.
- International Petroleum Encyclooedia (Tulsa: The Petroleum Publish-ing Company, 1977), p. 80.
56 1529 024
AC7NC106 Turkey has been supplied by Libya and the Gulf States through bi-lateral agree =ents. Under an April 1977 agreement with Iraq, Turkey will receive 6 million tons of crude oil a year. The transport charges for use of pipeline will be paid in Turkish currency which will mean a saving of foreign currency.* Libya has a standing agreement with Turkey' to deliver 3 million tons of oil a year. For political reasons including strengthening Turkey's ties with the Muslim world, Libya sells this oil to Turkey at 8 percent less than the world prices.** In 1978, t a cost of heavy fuel oil for Turkey was about $84 per ton, $81 for the oil (F0B) and $3 for transportation. At this prico, the fuel cost of a 600 MWe plant will be $65.3 million per year. The present worth of the total fuc1 cost of a 600 MWe plant for 30 years at 15 percent discount rate is about $419 million.
Like Turkey, Pakistan is a net oil importer. As of 1973, domestic oil production met only 13 percent of its total requirements. In 1974, Pakistan spent $385 million in i= ported oil. In the future, oil i= ports are expected to reach 5550 million between 1979 and 1980. To reduce for-eign oil i= ports, the govern =ent has signed a series of agreements with various oil companies for petroleum explorations in offshore and inland area.***
Determining the fue? cost of a large oil-fired plant for Pakistan is a difficult task. Because of its strategic location near the entrance of the Persian Gulf, Pakistan plays a potentially i=portant role in the security of the Gulf. It has participated in the training of armed forces of many oil producing Arab States including Saudi Arabia. Pakis-ten is an i=portant Moslim country and has good relations v.4th al=ost all oil producing Moslim countries. As a result of these political con-siderations, the OPEC oil producers heavily subsidize their oil exports to Pakistan.
- The Pulse, No. 3452, April 13, 1977, p. 3.
- Ibid., No. 3549, September 1, 1977, p. 2.
- The Pakistan Year Book 1973 (Karachi: National Publication House, 1974). In 1972-73, a contract was signed with Marathon International Oil Company of the United States, AMOCO, Pakistan Exploration Company and Total of Pakistan, a subsidiary of CEP in France. According to Usif Khattak, Pakistan's former Minister of Fuel, Power and Jttural resources, 68,300 square miles of petroleum concessions had been granted by 1975. Based on preliminary findings, the Pakistan Govern-ment predicts that 40 percent of the country's oil needs will be satisfied domestically by 1978. Dawn Overseas Weekiv, October 19, 1975, p. I.
57 1529 025
AC7NC106 The subsidization has taken two focms: First, selling Pakistan oil at rates below the international prices; second, granting Pakistan sub-stantial loans at reduced rates. Prior to the 1973 increase in price of oil, aid from the Middle Eastern countries was relatively scant. In .
1974-75, Pakistan received $580 million in grants and loans. Between 1974 and 1977, Iran alone was planning to provide $580 million.* Their loans have been either interest-free or at low interest rates, such as 2.5 percent in the case of Iran.** By providing loans at little or no interest, the OPEC countries are in effect subsidizing their oil export to Pakistan. However, it is not clear how long these subsidies will continue.
The application of international prices of oil in the case of both Turkey and Pakistan are overestimates, at least in the short run. Given the price of $81 per ton of heavy fuel oil, and trans17ttation of $2 per ton to Karachi (1973 estimate),*** the fuel cost of a 600 MWe plant will be $64.5 million per year. The present worth of the total fuel cost of a 600 MWe plant for 30 years is estimated at about $415 million.
India's situation is similar to Pakistan's. The demand for oil has grown at an average rate of some 8.6 percent between 1953-54 to 1970-71.
The rise in consumption of petroleum products in the country has increased the degree of the country's depen ience on imports in relation to the total demand for energy.
Table 18 Crude Petroleum: Proved and Indicated Reserves and Domestic Production, 1966-73--India _
(million tons)
Year Reserves Production Ratio of Reserves to Production (Duration Period) 1966 153.0 4.65 32.9 1967 154.3 5.67 27.3 1968 141.0 5.85 24.1 1969 132.3 6.72 19.7 1970 127.8 6.81 18.8 1971 113.8 7.19 25.8 1972 125.2 7.37 17.0 1973 n.a. 7.20 n.a.
Source: Government of India, Ministry of Petroleum and Chemicals. Indian Petroleum and Chemicals Statistics. 1972 (New Delhi, 1973), p. 33.
- Comptroller General of.the U.S., U.S. Assistance to Pakistan Should Be Reassessed (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, February 1976), pp. 10-25.
- Ibid.
- IAEA, Market Survev... Pakistan. 1529 026 58
AC7NC106 Crude oil is produced by three organizations in India: The Assam Oil Company, Oil India Limited, and the Oil and Natural Gas Co= mission ONGS). The ONGS has been also involved in jeint exploration and procuc-tion undertakings in the oil producing Middle Eastern countries such as Iran and Iraq. After decreased dependence on foreiSn oil in the 1960s (as compared to the 1950s), Indian imports have been increasing. The main source of imported crude oil in 1973 was Iran, which supplied about 70 percent of the country's total import, one quarter came from Saudi Arabia and 5 percent from Iraq.
The price of petroleum products including heavy fuel has been con-siderably below the internaticaally posted prices. Until 1973, generally speaking, the price of domestically produced crude petroleum was deter-mined on the basis of parity with imported crude. After the dramatic price increases at the end of 1973, this method was abandoned. In August of 1974 the price of domestic crude was $4.58 per barrel, well under half of the price of imported fuel.
The Middle Eastern oil exporters have sold petroleum products at a rate lower than those posted.
Table 19 Iranian Licht F.O.B. Prices and Tax Paid Costs
($ per barrel)
Posted Prices Paid Tax Paid Gross Price by India Cost Margin October 1972 2.48 1.S5 1.55 0.30 January 1973 2.58 1.92 1.62 0.30 April 1973 2.72 2.25 1,72 0.53 July 1973 2.94 2.55 1.84 0.71 October 1973 5.34 3.82 3.29 0.53 11.87__ 8.35 7.25 1.10 yary-19M--
Source: I.P. Henderson, India: The Enerev Sector.
In 1974 agreement between India and Iraq, the latter agreed to sell India urspecified quantities of oil at 93 percent of posted prices. This would i= ply an F.O.B. price oi $48.36/ ton of heavy fuel. At the posted price of $81/ ton and the average tratsportation and related costs to the port of entry in India of $4.42 per ton, the fuel cost for a 600 MWe plant will be $62.8 million per year. The present worth of the total fuel cost of a 600 inha plant for 30 years is esti=ated at about $420.7 million (1977 dollars).
59 1529 027
k
'.\ -
,' AC7NC106 1
V Brazil's domestic known reserves were estimated at 779 million bar-rels in 1974* (315 million tons of heavy fuel). This quantity is suffi-cient to fuel five 600 MWe plants for 30 years. However, given the demand for petroleum products in Brazil and expected growth in electricity con -
su=ption, Brazil will have to import large quantities of oil from abroad.
Although Brazil has long been considered to have the potential for be-coming a major oil producing country, extensive exploration to date has not resulted in major discoveries. As of 1977, the country produced about 15 percent of its daily requirements.** Given the price of $81 per ton of heavy fuel,the transportation and related costs of $7.5/ ton,*** the fuel cost for a 600 MWe plant will be $68.8 million per year.
South Korea and the Philippines produce very little oil domestically.
So far as generating electricity from oil fired plants is concerned they woulo have to depend on foreign imports. At $a2_p.er.. ton of heavy fuel and a transportation _c_os_t of $3/ ton (the Philippipes) and $4 (South Korea),****
the fuel cost for a 600 MWe plant will~be $65.'9 million and $66.8 million
/ , per-year,--respectively. The present worth of the total fuel l6sE'for a 600'MWe plant for:30_ysars ter Korea (at 10 percent discount rate) is es-timated at about $641.l~5Eillion, and 422.2 million for the Philippines
~~ ~ '-
(at 1_5__ __
percent discount rate).
As far as n2tural gas is concerned, there is similar difference 1=ong the countries under study. Iran's natural gas reserves have been esti-mated at well in excess of 330 trillion cubic feet, second only to those of the USSR in the world.***** This was the estimate in 1975. Since then, there have been several reports about the discovery of new gas reserves that could put Iran's total reserves well above those of the USSR. For example, in June 1976, Iran announced the discovery of new natural gas deposits estimated at 200 trillion f3 near the port of Bushehr.******
Further discoveries were announced in January 1977, putting th.e country's total known reserves at 600 million cubic feet.******* While Iran has abundant quantities of natural gas, as of now cost of the natural gas is wasted and its domestic use, although growing, is still relatively limited.
- World Bank, Energy and Petroleum in Non-OPEC Developine Countries, 1974-1980, Working Paper, No. 229 (Washington, D.C., 1976, pp. 1-25.
- James S_reet, "The International Frontier and Technological Progress in Latin America," p.'46.
- IAEA estimate of transportation cost for Argentina in 1973. It has been assumed that given the distances involved, the same rate is applicable in the case of Brazil.
- IAEA, Market Survey...The Philipoines, p. 3-10.
- Oil and Gas Journal, December 8, 1975, p. 46.
- Iran Economic News, Vol. 2, no. 6, June 1976, p. 3.
- Iran Economia News, Vol. 3, no. 1, January 1977, p. 3.
1529 028 60
AC7NC106 While a 600 MWe power plant operating for 6000 hours0.0694 days <br />1.667 hours <br />0.00992 weeks <br />0.00228 months <br /> a year on the average requires about 43 billion cubic feet (ft3) of natural gas per year, iran has flared (wasted) in the past decade on the average some 800 billion cubic feet of natural gas annually.* This means that between 1967 and 1977 Iran has flared 8000 billion ft3 of natural gas, enough fuel to power more than 190 power plants of 1000 MWe capacity for a year, or more than 30 times the total number of nuclear power plants (less than 5000 MWe) that Iran planned to put into operation in the 1930s (or enough fuel for 5,000 MWe) of power plants for more than 30 years. Al-though in terms of percentage of gas produced, the utilization rate has itereased the total amount of gas flared each year has increased cen-t:.nuously. For example, in 1967-68 Iran produced 802 billion cubic feet of natural gas. Less than 7 percent of the gas produced was marketed,**
?.he retainder was flared. In 1973-74, Iran produced 1,697 billion cubic feet but marketed only 41 percent, the remainder more than 1000 cubic feet of gas was flared.*** The amount flared was still more than tFc amount utilized in 1976. The same is true of a number of other LICa.
The national Iranian Gas Company has attempted to increase domestic utilization and foreign export of Iran's gas, but domestic consumption of gas in 1976 was 141.1 billion cubic feet, well belcw 5 percent of the total amount of gas produced.**** Less than 3 million Iranian households (2.7 million) used natural gas for some domestic purposes in 1976. By 1981, when Iran's first nuclear power plant is expected to be in opera-tion, Iran's tocal domestic gas consu=ption is expected to reach 700 bil-lion cubic feet.
Iran has been exporting natural gas to the Soviet Union since 1970.
At present, natural gas exports to the Soviet Union are about 353 nillion cubic feet. The amount of gas exported to the USSR is expected to in-crease by 600 billion cubic feet in 1981. According to present plans, 14 billion cubic =eters of the newly exported gas will be furnished to Western Europe, primarily West Germany and the Soviets would keep the remaining 3 billion cubic meters as its transit f ee.*****
The cost of using the flared natural gas for power generation is diff. cult to deter =ine. But it is likely to be less than the sale price of gas in Iran. In 1975, Iran exported natural gas to the Soviet Union
- lt the cost of $0.57 per 1,000 cubic feet. This price was 85 percent nigher than what the Soviets were paying earlier.****** At this rate the
- Che=ical Bank, International Economic Survey. Iran, pp. 3-6.
- Ibid.
- Ibid.
- Iran Economic News, Vol. 3, no. 3, March 1977, p. 3.
- Chemical Bank, International Economic Survey Iran, p. 6.
- Ibid.
61 1529 02o
AC7NC106 Table 20 OPEC Production and Utilization of Natural Cas, 1976 (Billion Cubic Meters) ,
Country Production Reinj ection Utilization Flared Algeria 24.4 3.9 9.9 10 6 Ecuador 0.3 --- 0.3 Gabon 1.8 0.2 --- 1.6 Indonesia 8.7 1.0 2.5 5.2 Iran 50.3 --- 22.5 27.8 Iraq 13.3 0.1 2.0 11.2 Kuweic 11.2 1.3 5.6 4.3 Libyan A.P.S.A. 17.9 8.5 5.8 3.6 NLgeria 22.1 --- 0.6 21.5 Qatar 4.7 --- 1.5 3.2 Saudi Arabia 47.1 9.7 37.4 United Arab Emirates 15.4 --- 1.1 14.3 Venezuela 37.1 20.5 13.6 3.0 Total OPE 254.3 35.5 74.8 144.0 Percent 100.0 14.0 29.4 56.6 Source: OPEC Review, December 1977, p. 55.
annual cost of fuel for a 600 MWe gas fired plant is $14.7 million a year. The_present worth of the total cost of a 600 MWe natural gas _ fired plant for_30_yanrs will be'$141:21 million. In the case of a 900 MWe plant the total cost would be about $211.6 million, and $282.2 million for a 1200 MWe power plant. Assuming a higher rate such as $1 per 1000 cubic feet, the fuel cost for a 600 MWe plant will be $25.7 million per year. The present worth of the total cost for a 600 MWe plant would be $247.5 million, $371.2 million for a 900 MWe plant, and $495 million for a 1200 MWe plant. At $2 per 1000 cubic feet the present worth of the total fuel cost for a 600 MWa plant would be $493.6 million.
Turkey has no significant natural gas of its own. It could import natural gas from Iran as the Soviet Union does. Iran's major gas trunk-line extends close to the Turkish territory (Figure 1). Assuming Iran sells natural gas to Turkey at the same rate as to the USSR, the fuel cost for a 600 MWe plant would be $14.7 million annually. At a higher rate, such as $1 ocr 1000 cubic feet, the fuel cost for a 600 MWe plant will be $25.7 million per year. At this rate the present worth of the fuel cost for a 600 MWe plant would be $164.9 million. At $2 per 1000 cubic feet the cost would be about $329.8 million.
62 1529 030
D^r o G , gg ~ ,
c AC7NC106 i "
' J L ahu 1j 23 Figure 1 Iranian Cas Trunkline_
Turke'!
J.-....
- w. . .
i \T,\ a -
":Su4-
..=
O_ h
>r...... ,
a......... ,
g ..w...... ...
SOURCE: Afshan and Bakeshloo, on. cit., p. 626. -
Unlike Turkey, Pakistan has a nu=ber of natural gas fields. Its total estimated proven reserves are about 16.74 trillion cubic feet. If this a=ount was produced over 20 years, it would be at the rate of 800 x 1012 cubic feet per year. This amount is equal to about 150 mil-lien barrels of oil per year, worth about $1.6 billion. As of 1971, about 0.664 x 1012 cubic feet of natural gas were produced from Sui, Mari and Dhalian gas fields.* In 1974-75 Sui alone produced 424 million cubic feet. From 1955 to 1972, between 29 percent and 50 percent of the natural gas produced was sold to Pakistan's domestic industrial power consumers annually.** Besides using dcmestic natural gas for power production, like Turkey, Pakistan could import natural gas from Iran in the 1980s.
This import could be in the form of gas through pipelines or liquified and transported by tankers to Karachi. Iran with foreign help is plan-ning a large liquification facility for operation in the early 1980s.
- Pakistan Year Book. 1971, p. 259.
- IAEA, Recort on Nuclear Power Planning for Pakistan (Vienna: 1973),
- p. 21, 63 }$29 OM
AC7NC106 Table 21 Gas Fields and Reserves in Pakistan 2
Gas Field Reserves (10 ft3) Total Energy (10 Stu)
Sui 8.62 7790.25 Mari 3.94 2848.62 Uch 2.50 770.0 Khandkot 0.41 345.22 Mazarani 0.09 87.84 Khairpur 1.00 130.0 Zin 0.10 48.4 Dhulian 1.70 1870.00 Sari 0.029 24.82 Hundi 0.05 41.50 Total 18.439 13956.65 The cost of domestic natural gas in Pakistan is less than $1 per 1000 cubic feet. Iran's natural gas export prices are below $1/1000 cubic feet. At the price of $1/1000 cubic feet, the cost of fuel for a 600 MWe plant will be $25.7 million per year. At $2/1000 cubic feet the present worth of total fuel cost for a 600 MWe plant would be $329.8 million.
In India natural gas is found both alone and in association with crude oil; but most of the output comes from associated. India's known natural gas reserves are more limited than Pakistan's.
Table 22 Indian Natural Gas: Reserves, Production and Utilization, 1965-73 Reserves
(. billion Production Utilization Flared Gas Ratio of cubic Utilization Year meters) ----
(million cubic meters) ------ to Production (%)
1965 737 346 391 47 1966 63.15 803 373 431 46 1967 67.25 1,221 465 756 38 1968 63.34 1,317 604 712 46 1969 65.60 1,384 730 654 53 1970 62.48 1,424 676 748 47 1971 62.29 1,509 761 748 50 1972 62.41 1,565 927 638 59 1973 n.a. 1,674 913 761 55 Source: World Bank, Energy and Petroleum in Non-OPEC Developing Countries, 1974-1980, p. 1-15.
64 1529 032
AC7NC106 India flares considerable quantities of natural gas. The price of gas is less than $1/1000 cubic feet in the country. At this price, the cost of fuel for a 600 MWe plant will be $25.7 million. In the future India as well as sote of the other countries in the region may be able to import natural gas from Iran at co=petitive prices.
Brazil produced 1.5 billion cubic meters of natural gas in 1974.*
It flares considerably more natural gas than it markets. For exa=ple, in 1973 it flared more than 33,000 million cubic feet (it marketed only 8,300 million cubic feet) of natural gas, enough to fuel a 500 MWe plant for a year. Brazil's natural gas reserves have been esti=ated at 927 billion cubic f eet.** The country's reserves are sufficient to fuel three 600 MWc plants for more than eight years. Obviously, the domestic gas resources alone are not sufficient to meet the country's future en-ergy and electricity demand. In the future, Brazil may be able to i=-
port natural gas from Venezuela at prices competitive to alternatives.
Venezuela natural gas reserves have been esti=ated at more than 100 trillion cubic feet.
Philippines natural gas reserves have been estimated at 25 trillion cubic feet.*** If the a=ount was produced over a 20 year period, it would be at a rate of 1.25 trillion cubic feet a year. This a=ount is equal to about 234 million barrels of oil a year, worth about $2.5 bil-lion. At $1/1 00 cubic feet of natural gas the fuel cost for a 600 MWe plant will be $25.7 million per year. At $2/1000 cubic feet the present worth of fuel for a 600 MWe plant will be $329.8 million.
In the case of South Korea, the IAEA has reported that the country has no significant reserves of natural gas. Although giving no produc-tion cost, a 1973 U.S. government s evey estimated the country's ulti-mately recoverable reserves at betw..ct. 10 to 100 trillion cubic feet.****
Another conventional power generating alternative is coal fired plants. While the economics of generating power from coal has received considerable attention in LICs such as India and Turkey and some atten-tion in others such as Pakistan, it has almost been ignored in Iran.
Iran, besides being rich in oil and natural gas, has i=pressive coal resources, concentrated in four areas, Alborz, Kerman, Khorasan, and the Kushan and Central Iran areas. The Alborz area has numerous coal fields which lie along southern and northern parts of the Alborz coun-tains. The depth of the deposit has been estimated at between 3 and 11
- Ibid.
- Ibid.
- IAEA, Market Survev. 1973.
- USGS, Professional Paper 817.
1529 033 65
AC7NC106 meters.* The southern side of Alborz has five fields, Sha=shak, Gajira, Nasa, Germabedar and Lalum. The northern side has four--Elika, Zyraab, Golandrood, and Polisafid. Preliminary studies have estimated the total amount of coal in the fields to be around 100 million tons.** ;
The Kerman area has three important coal fields--Budamaniyya, Itaj -
tak and Astkher. The coal reserves have been estimated at more than 100 million tons. Four new coal deposits with reserves of some 100 million tons were discovered in the Kerman region in 1973-74.*** The Korasan area has four fields--Aagterband, Chashmaghul, Aaber and Buzghal. No coal esti=stes are available for this area. It is in the Southern Koshan and central Iran section of the country where the country's largest known reserves are located. The Iranians have not yet attempted to exploit these coal fields, the most important of which are Torig Khashan, Sham-saabad, Zarjan, Jamahdam, Gazvin, Maraghah, Damaghan and Samanaan. In May of 1977 the discovery of a major coal field. Early studies estimated the field's coal at more than 900 million tons.**** As of now, Iran coal consu=ption is very limited. The Aryamehr Steel Plant near Isfahan, built with Soviet help, is the only Iranian plant which utilizes coal.*****
Total coal consumption in the country was 600,000 tons in 1971. Recently only e::perimentally in Zarand two small power plants have been set up to use coal for electricity generation.
A 1000 MWe power plant operating at 68 percent availability will use about 2 million tons of coal a year. The price of coal in Tehran, where more than half of the country's electricity is consumed, was less than
$20 per ton in 197'. At this price a 600 MWe plant would use $24 million worth of_ coal a year. The present worth. of the total cost of 'ccal uuting
~
the life of the' plant for 30 years (at 10 percent discount rate) would
~
be about $230 million.
~
For a 900 MWe plant the present worth of the total cost is estimated at about $345.6 million and for a 1200 MWe plant, the total cost would be about $460.8 million.
In Pakistan all provinces contain coal in varying quantities.
- Syrovs Naysari, Kulliyati-Juchrafiyyavi Iran (in Persian) (Tehran:
Paad, 1971), p. 415.
- Ibid.
- The Echo of Iran, Iran Almanac 1974, p. 231.
- Iran Economic News, Vol. 3, no. 5, May 1977, p. 2.
- Ibid.
^
'N 66
'l' 1529 034
AC7NC106 Table 23 Pakistan Coal Reserves Name and Location Reserves Calorific Value of Coal Field (>106 tons) (Stu/lb) 2c Baluchistan 32 3 Sor Range Deghari 22-52 9000-11000 Mach 15 9200-10300 Sharigh 40 8500-12400 Punj ab Makarwal 19 9550-11850 Salt Range 70-75 7100-11110 Sind 2" Jhimpir 28 7400-9800 Larkhra 130-240 7010-7600 26 y r-Souren: IAEA, Nuclear Power Planning Study for Pakis,.a, 1975, p. 19. j-The counery's total known coal reserves in 1974 were estimated at 482 million tans, which correspond to about 3 billion TEC (tons equivalent :0 coal).* The country's largest coal field, Larkhra, has been estimated ,,
to have sufficiently high quality coal to support a 750 MWe plant during
its entire life. Power plants built near Larkhra could provide the fu-turn power needs of large population centers such as Karachi which is closer to Larkhra than the proposed site of the future nuclear plant Aa Chashma. Some of Pakistan's coal reserves have high moisture, ash and sulphur content. These reserves are usually non-coking and susceptible ,,
to spontaneous combustion. Thus, they cannot be transported for power generation economically. However, the Pakistanis could build generat- -
ing plants near the coal cines, if this arrangement, especially trans-mission costs, were proved economical. The share of coal in Pakistan's /9 power generating system is limited. As of 1975 there was only one 15 MWe coal fired plant consuming some 60,000 tons of coal a year.** The cost of coal in Pakistan is estimated at less than $25/ ton. A 600 MWe i I*~
plant is esti=ated to require 1.2 million tons of coal. At this price, the annual fuel cost of a 600 MWe plant will be $30 .,illion. For 30 /j years, the estimated life of the plant; the present worth of the total r es fuel cost of coal for a 600 MWe plant would be abeat $192 million. ,
E'
- LAEA, Nuclear Power Planning Study for Pakistan, 1973, p. 14.
(One TEC = 72.5 million coal) -
- IAEA, Nuclear Power Plannine Study for Pakistan. 1975, p. 20. [
67 3q7o nTC -
AC7NC106 Turkey ha.a impressive coal reserves. The country's total coal re-serves have been estimated at more than 1.3 billion tons.* In 1969, 12.4 million tons of coal were produced, 41.5 percent of this coal was used by industries such as iron and steel and railways, and 18 percent of bituminous coal was used for production of electricity.** The cost of producing coal as esti=ated for 1976 was 303.76 Turkish lira per ton
($ = 16 TL) or less than $20 per ton. Turkey operated two coal fired electrical plants: Catalagzi (129 MWe) and Silahtar (122 MWe). At these prices a 600 MWe plant would use $24 million worth of coal a year.
The present worth of the total fuel cost of a 600 MWe coal plant for 30 years is estimated at about $153.6 million.
Besides having coal, Turkey is one of the world's leading lignite producers. As of 1972 it has had 45 lignite basins spread all over the country. At 1972 prices, total lignite reserves of the country were esti-mated at 556 million tons.*** In 1971, 6.5 million tons of lignite were produced in the country. The lignite produced came from four major areas: Soma, Tunebilek, Seyitomer and Elbistan. The costs of producing a ton of lignite in Soma has been estimated at $6.1 (mined under grcund) and $3.7 (mined at open pit). In the Tuncbilek area the cost of produc-tion per ton it. estimated at $8 (mined under ground) and $3.6 (at open pit). The production cost of Seyitomer lignite is $1 per ton and $1.8 in Elbistan. Thr. cost of producing a tone of lignite is on the average less than half for coal. Thus, it is even cheaper to produce power from lig-nice fired plants than coal fired ones. Turkey has had two lignite fired plants, Soma (44 MWe) and Tuncbilek (130 MWe), for some time. An electrical plant with two units of 150 MWe each ucing lignite is under construction at the Seyitomer basin. At $10 per ton a 600 MWe lignite plant would require about $12 million worth of fuel each year. The present worth of the total cost during the life of the plant is estimated at $76.7 million.
India has 1crge and extensive coal reserves. Published estimates of their amount have varied considerably.
- N. Aybers and S. Kakuc, "Grovth of De=and for Energy and Projected Role of Nuclear Power in 'furkey," in Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, Vol. I (AEA, 1972), p. 229.
- Ibid.
- Ibid.
r 1529 036 68
AC7NC106 Table 24 Estimated Coal Reserves in India (million tons)
Proved Other Reserves Total Reserves Indicated Inferred Reserves Prime coking coal 3,650 1,540 460 5,650 Medium coking coal 3,850 4,310 1,270 9,430 Seni and weakly 1,520 2,600 910 5,030 coking coal Total coking coal 9,020 8,450 2,650 20,120 Non-coking coal 12.340 22,310 26,180 60.830 Total coal reserves 21,360 30,760 28,830 80,950 S O'*RCE : Geological Survey of India, G.S.I. News, April 1972. The figures are based on data supplied by the G.S.I. itself and by the for-mer National Coal Development Corporation.
Indian exploitation of coal for production of energy almost doubled from 1953-54 to 1971-72 The price of coal on the average in India is less than $20 per ton (1977 estimate). Sir.ce a 600 MWe plant. is esti-mated to require 1.2 million tons of cual per year the fuel cost would be cbout $24 million annually. The present worth of the total cost of coal for a 600 MWe plant for 30 years is estimated at $153.6 million.
In South Korea, total coal reserves have been estimated at 1450 mil-lion tons. According to the IAEA, of this amount about 545 million tons are economically minable. ' However, the IAEA esti= ate was cade in 1973 since the price of alternatives have increased significantly, the quantity of economically recoverable coal is likely to have increased.
Besides indigenous coal, the Koreans could import coal from Australia.
The esti=ated current price of Australian non-coking coal is $27 per ton.
Bulk shireing to South Korea will add ano' her $7/ ton. Thus the cost of Australian coal for Korea would be $34/ ton (1977 dollars).
- IAEA, Market Survev, Korea (Vienna: 1973), p. 15.
1529 037 69
.4 r
, AC7NC106 Table 25
,.ejF Korean Coal Reserves by Area or Site Total Reserves Economically Minable
?r Field (106 t) (106 c)
Samchok** 417.3 203.0 Chongson 396.8 53.1 Pyongchang 101.4 33.2 Yongwol 10.8 7.5 Tanyang 77.4 31.0 Kangnung 62.8 41.3 Mungyong 70.5 40.5 Chungnam 135.7 73.1 Hwasun 48.0 30.7 Others 130.0 31'.4 Total 1450.7 544.8 Source: IAEA Market Survey . . . Korea, op. cit.
Since a 600 MWe plant requires 1.2 million tons of coal a year, the fuel cost for such a plant would be about $40.8 million annually. The present worth of the total coal cost for a 600 MWe plant for 30 years would be about $391.60 million.
The Philippines has limited indigenous coal reserves.
Table 26 Philippines--Coal Production
~
Year t Year t 1946 48,427 1960 147,857 1947 73,732 1961 152,328 1948 87,748 1962 162,978 1949 123,336 1963 156,535 1950 158,822 1964 114,936 1951 150,691 1965 94,541 1952 139,440 1966 75,324 1953 154,905 1967 69,753 1954 119,627 1968 32,150 1955 130,243 1969 53,341 1956 151,708 1970 42,401 1957 191,151 1971 40,024 1958 107,779 1972 38,989 1959 139,853 Source: IAEA Market Survev . . . Philiocines, op. cit.
- Includes Hambaek coal field. 70 3
AC7NC106 As in the case of Korea, the Philippines can import coal from Australia at costs similar to Korea's.
Brazil's coal reserras have been estimated at 3,256 megatons. Ac-cording to a 1976 World Bank study 1,790 megatons are economically recov-erable.* The country itself provides 60 percent of its domestic coal needs; the remainder is imported from the United States.** Eastern U.S.
coal has an f.o.b. price of about $20/ ton. Assuming a transport charge of no more than $10/ ton (the U.S. Depart =ent of the Interior estimates that current freight rates from the United States to Japan are about $10 to $12***), the rate to Brasil, given considerably shorter distance, is likely to be considerably less. Thus the 10 percent assu=ption is likely to be considerably less. Thus the 10 percent assumption is likely to be an overestimate. At $30/ ton the fuel cost of a 600 MWe plant will be
$36 million annually (1977 dollars). The present worth of the total fuel cost for 600 MWe during the life of the plant will be $230.4 million.
Operation and Maintenance Costs Personnel training for operating and maintenance of nuclear power plants and related fields have received considerable attention in the LICs ever since the initiation of the " Atoms for Peace Program." In or-dar to speed the transfer of nuclear technology to the "nonnuclear" coun-tries the United States established an International School of Nuclear Science to train foreign nationals. This university was to supple =ent the effort already undertaken by the Argonne National Laboratory.**** For ex-ample, between 1970 and 1975 the United States alone had trained 1489 for-eign personnel in reactor technology, plutonium recycling and reprocessing, uranium enrich =ent and related fields in AEC/ERDA facilitie.s.***** Parti-cipation of foreigners in AEC general research had numbered 10,513 between 1955-1974.
LICs hava not only sent their personnel for training to the United States, but also to other industrialized countries including France, Great Britain, Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, Austria, USSR, Pol-and, Canada, etc. The International Atomic Energy Agency has provided
- World Bank, Energy and Petroleum in Non-CPEC Developing Countries, pp. 1-115.
- James Street,"The Internal Frontier and Technological Progress in Latin America," Latin American Studies, Fall 1974, p. 112.
- U.S. Department of Interior, Bureau of Mines, Internptional Coal Trade, Various Issuas, 1975-76.
- J. Parkinson, Jr. , "U.S. Training of Foreign Nationals," Peaceful Aeolication of Atomic Energy (Geneva: U.N., 1958), pp. 321-323.
- Clarence D. Long, " Nuclear Proliferation: Can Congress Act in Ti=e?"
International Security, Vol. I, no. 4, Spring 1977, p. 60.
71 , e vs q73 1529 039
AC7"C106 training courses and facilities for a number of students from LICs an-
.nually. reveral LICs have also developed indigenous institutions for such training.
Many LICs initiated pertonnel training pros;ams long before the ini-tlation of a nuclear power program. In the Northern Tier, for example, Turkey and Pakistan initiated the training of personnel in nuclear re-lated fields in the 1950s. By September 1962 the Turkish Atonic Energy Commission (TAEC) had already trained a nu=ber of personnel in r.uclear related fields. The TAEC has provided a number of scholarships for both graduate and undergraduate students for studying auclear related subjects.
The money for these scholarships had been provided by the Turkish National Bank.* A number of fellevships have also been provided by NATO, IAEA, the United States, Israel, and CENTO. In 1974, 118 Turks had fellowships to study in nuclear related subjects abroad, sixteen f ellowships were pro-vided by the IAEA. In 1975 the number of IAEA fellowships for Turkish students had increased to 31.
I.t present Turkey trains most of its own nuclear scientists and en-gineers at home. The different departments of Ankara University train students in nuclear physics, radiation chemistry, neutron activation, research in rare Turkish minerals, reactor physics and nuclear engineer-ing. At the Istanbul Institute for Nuclear Energy, students receive training in the field of nuclear engineering. This department also helps the Turkish Government in developing its nuclear energy policy.
Pakistan has also had an extensive domestic and international train-ing program for personnel training. As of 1972, Pakistan had trained more than 350 in nuclear science and engineering.** According to present Pakistani estinates, the country would require 1500 trained personnel in nuclear related fields ***by 1985. Besides depending on IAEA and indus-trial countries, it has initiated nuclear training programs at home as well. The Pakistani Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology offers graduate degrees in nuclear engineering.**** A nuclear training center has also been initiated at the country's nuclear power station near Karachi (KANUPP) in order to train engineers and technicians for opera-tion and maintenance of the nuclear plants.***** Pakistan fears that it would increasingly lose a large number of its nuclear scientists and engineers to the oil rich Middl Eastern countries with nu;1 ear power
- Bas Bakunlik Atom Enerjisi Komisyonu: Report on the Activities of the Turkish Atomic Enerzy Commission (Ankara: 1962), p. 7.
- Pak-Accm, April 1972, p. I.
- M. Shafigue and M. Ahmad, " Development of a National Nuclear Power Program," p. 6.
- Ibid.
- Ibid.
72 1529 040 m .
s i
AC7hC106 Table 27 Partietoation of Non-Soviet Blo: Aliens in AEC Research Durinz Fer ed 1955 to D.te d .
7 Afghanistan 3 Jordan 2
Argentina 192 Kenya Korea 195 Australia 164 2
Austria 179 Kuwait 176 Lebanon 31 Belgium 3 Bolivia 14 Libya 2
Brazil 133 Liechtenstein Luxembourg 6 Burma 14 1 Malaysia 16 Cameroon 104 Canada 539 Mexico 2
Ceylen 12 Monaco 2
Chile 70 Morocco 713 Netherlands 216 China 101 Colombia 86 Norway 8 Pakistata 120 Congo 14 Costa Rica 11 Pana=a 23 Paraguay 11 Cuba 41 Cyprus 10 Peru Philippines 118 Den-ark 96 Portugal 26 Oononican Republic 33 3
Ecuador 13 Saudi Arabia Benegal 1 El Salvador 12 1
Ethiopia 7 Sierra Leone Singapore 3 Finland 41 South e.frica 83 France 471 833 Spain 139 Cer any 10 Sweden ISO Chana 229 creece 159 Switzerland 3
Custemala 16 Tanzania Thailand 70 Cyuana 5 6
Haiti 11 Trinidad !
Tunisia 3 Ponduras 1 59 Turkey 108 Hong Kong 1 Icelard 9 Uganda 1.104 United Kingdcm 1.186 India 22 Indonesia 34 Uruguay venezuela 59 Iran 73 Vietna= 23 Iraq 24 Yugoslavia 106 Ireland 32 3
Israel 250 2ambia United Arab Republic 103 Italy 693 Jamaica 15 Total 10,513 Japan 833 SOURCE: Dixie Lee Ray. " Multinational Nuclear Power--Peaceful Uses or Inter-national Terrer?" Pan Am Clierer Mara:ine_, October,1974.
73
AC7NC106 Table 28 The Subjects of Foreign Tellowships Granted to Turkish 'Nelear Scientists ,
Up to September 1962 CE'ITO IAEA ICA Total Subject PC UG PC UC PC UC PC UC Theoretical Physics 2 2 4 Experimental Physics 4 2 4 2 6 14 4 Electronics 1 1 1 1 Electrical Engineering 1 1 Electronic Co=puting Applied Mathematics Radio-Chemistry 1 1 2 1 7 1 10 3 Radiobiology 1 4 5 Medicine 1 1 4 13 4 9 14 Health Physics 1 1 Veterinary 1 1 1 2 1 Zoology Agriculture 2 1 1 3 2 5 4 Metallurgy 1 1 1 1 Minerology Ceophysics Mechanical Engineering '
Reactor Engineering 2 2 5 2 7 Reactor Operation 4 4 Architecture Civil Engineering Law and Management 2 2 Total 11 6 17 24 37 3 65 33 UC: Undergraduate; PG: Postgraduate Source: Turkish Atomic Energy Commission, Report on the Ac-tivities of the Turkish Atomic Energy Commission.
1960-1962, Ankara, n.p., 1962, p. ll.
1529 042 74
AC7NC106 Table 29 The Numbers of Scholarships and Fellowships Granted by TAEC in Various Turkish Universities Technical University Ataturk EGE University Istanbul of University University of Istanbul University Ankara Total -
Subject PG UC PG UG PG UG PG UC PG UC PG UG 6 5 3 5 9 Theereti:al Physics Experimental Physics Electronics 3 5 3 5 Electrical Engin.--ring Electronic Co:puting 2 1 3 Applial Mathe:atics 2 6 5 3 7 9 Radio-Che istry 2 2 Radiobiology 2 3 1
Medicine Health Physics 4 3 4 3 Veterinary 1 1 Zoology 3 3 5 4 Agriculture 1 2 5 2 Metallurgy 5 Minerology 1 1 Geophysics 6 2 - 6 2 Mechanical Engineering Reactor Engineering Reactor Operation 2 2 Architecture 1 2 1 2 Civil Engineering Law and Managenent 15 13 4 14 22 14 41 43 Total 1 1 UG: Undergraduate; PG: Postgraduate Scurce: Turkish Atomic Energy Commission, Report on the Activities of the Turkish Atomic Energy Commission, 1960-1962, Ankara, n.p.,
1962, p. 19.
_5 1
1529 043
AC7NC106 programs of their own and much higher salaries. Some such movecer?. frem India, Bangladesh and Pakistan to Iran has already taken place.
Personnel training in Iran in the past has been rather limited even when compared to its two other Northern Tier neighbors. However, the Shah's government planned to train 10,000 Iranians in nuclear power related fields by 1981.* In 1977 some 1200 Iranians were in foreign countries including England, France, West Germanyt the United States, and Austria for training in nuclect related fields.** In 1977, Iren predicted trained personnel shortages in the future. According to A. Etemad, former Presi-dent of Iran Atomic Energy Cocaission "since each nuclear plant is main-tained and operated by 300 people, even if all Iranians studying abroad return, there still would be a shortage. This shortage is expected to continue for 10 years. We have to hits foreign personnel."*** In 1978, foreign employees working in nuclear related fields ran into the hundreds.
Besides South Asians, they included Europeans as well as Latin Americans, especially Argentinians, including the former president of the Atomic En-ergy Cotmission, Rear Admiral Oscar Armando Quihillat. In constructing the two power plants near Bushehr, Iran is depending her rtly on foreign personnel. In 1978 there were c.lmost 1600 German technicians and engineers in Bushehr.**** There were also a number of British engineers who are hired as consultants to Iran Atomic Energy Co= mission.***** The recent reductions in planned dependence on nuclear cover is also likely to be reflected in training programs as well.
India has extensive training faci.ities of its own (Appendix II),
not only for training Indians but foreigners as well. For example, India has agreed to train Iranian personnel in nuclear related fields. The training of a significant number of scier.tists and engineers in nuclear related fields with the expectation of introducing nuclear power plants produces an important group with powerfu.'. incentive to push for the early acquisition of nuclear power plants. Thas opening the doors of American and other industrial countries' schools for training of nuclear physicists and engineers from LICs was perhaps partially motivated by the desire to create such groups in the LICs. As these groups would subsequently in-crease the likelihood of power plant purchases from the industrialized world. These nuclear scientists and engineers besides working at the universities often have an independent government department of their own, an atomic energy co= mission. The main objective of these co= mis-sions are the introduction of nuclear electricity in their countries.
In their publications these organizations generally underestimate capital costs, interest rates, and absorption costs and overestimate the potential power plant output.
- Kavhan International, Air Mail Edition, February 4, 1976, p. 6.
- Iran Economic News, Vol. 3, no. 1, January 1977, p. 3.
- Iran Times, February 28, 1977, p. 3.
- " Energy Profile of Iran," Enerav Internscional, September 1977, p. 38.
- Ibid. g i 76 1529 044
AC7NC106 Although a number of LICs spend considerable amounts of resources on personnel trr.ining long before the initiation of a nuclear power plant program, according to a Korean official, in many cases the LICs contem-plating the introduction of reactors have a core group of trained nuc .
lear physicists for creating a scientific research base but lack techni-cians with practical experience.* Some nuclear vendors, such as Fra=a-tome of France, have suggested the establishment of a central workshop or nuclear testing center in LICs contemplating reactor purchases, where practical training can be given to reactor operators, scientists, manag-ers, technicians, procurement people, quality assurance personnel, etc.**
Pakistan has already established such an institute and Iran under the Shah was planning to establish a similar center near Isfahan at the cost of
$500 million.
There is disagreement about the number of people required for the operation and maintenance of a nuclear plant. It is generally estimated that a single plant would require 35 to 50 people in the owners' head-quartera, and plant operating staff will usually fall in the range of 150 to 200 people.*** According to the President of the Iranian Atomic Energy Com=ission, the operation and management of each power plant would require 300 people.**** This nu=ber is more than twice the number of peo-ple required for a large hydro-plant (140), larger than lignite station (269), almost the same as oil-fired plants (300-320), and less than coal stations (430).***** On the average it can be assumed that the wages of those working in the . clear plant is expected to be higher than those working in hydro, oil fired, gas fired or coal fired plants. This dif-ference is due to the greater training required in the case of nuclear plaat operators and the shortage of such personnel in the LICs. The cost of hiring foreign personnel which Iran was planning to partially depend on in the coming decade is even higher.
The International Atomic Energy Agency has estimated that the opera-tion and maintenance costs of nuclear plants are expected to be higher than conventional alternatives.
- H. Lee'["" Nuclear Power Program in Korea," Paper presented to the Con-ference on the Nuclear Development and the Fuel Cycle, Hinsdale, 1976, p. 78.
- C. Pierre, et al. , "Some Reflections on Problems Associated with the Use of Nuclear Energy by Developing Countries," World Nuclear Energy:
A Status Report, Trans-American Nuclear Society, 24, 1976, p. 367.
- J. S. Chewning (ERDA), et al. , Meeting the Manpower Challenge in the Transfer of Nuclear Power to Developing Countries," Paper to the In-ternarfonal Conference on Nuclear Power . .. , op. cit., Salzburg, May 19 7.
- Iran Times, February 28, 1977, p. 3.
- IAEA, Market Survey for Nuclear Power in Developing Countries. Turkev, op. cit., p. 42.
77 1529 04c
AC7NC106 Table 30 Fixed Ooeration and Maintenance Costs (S per kw per month) ,
MW 600 800 1,000 Nuclear plant 0.32 0.27 0.23 011 fired plant 0.20 0.20 0.20 IAEA assumed that gas fired plants would have the same operating and main-tenance costs as oil fired plants. Coal fired plants were assu=ed to be 7 percent higher and lignite fired plants 10 perecnt higher than oil fired plants.* Based on the experience of Turkey it can be estimated that the operating and maintenance costs of hydro plants is almost Salf of that of thermal plants.** Since these data are based on IAEA stucies, they are unlikely to be biased against nuclear power.
Power Plant Output Another important factor influencing the economics of nuclear power when compared to alternatives is the availability factor, also referred to as the utilization factor or power plant output. Availability factor can be defined as the proportion of the plant output relative to capa-city at any particular time. A plant operating 6,000 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> in one year (8,760 hours0.0088 days <br />0.211 hours <br />0.00126 weeks <br />2.8918e-4 months <br />), at 100 percent of capacity would have an availability fac-tor of 68 percent. Alternatively a plant may operate 8,760 hours0.0088 days <br />0.211 hours <br />0.00126 weeks <br />2.8918e-4 months <br /> a year at 68 percent of capacity all the time. -
There has been some dispute over the choice of availability factors for nuclear power plants operating in the LICs. Nuclear enthusiasts such as the Atomic Energy Commission, the IAEA, and the nuclear industry have often assumed high availability factors. The IAEA has assumed availability faccors of between 65 and 72 percent.*** Others have assumed even higher rates (80 percent by Associated Nuclear Services **** and H. Bhabha of India *****). Several critics have charged that these estimates are based
- IAEA, Nuclear Power Planning for Pakistan, op. cit., 1975, p. 60.
- IAEA, Market Survey for Nuclear Power in Developing Countries, Tur-k2y, p. 45.
- IAEA, Market Survey for Nuclear Power in Developing Countries, Gen-cral Report, 1973.
- L. Cave, "The Purchaser's Point of View," Nuclear Engineering Inter-national, August 197C, p. 627.
- H. Bhabha, "The Need for Atomic Energy in the Underdeveloped Coun-tries, pp. 395-402.
1529 04ii
AC7NC106 more on engineering goals than on actual experience in the LICs.* Oper-ational experience to date confirms the critics point of view. The three 200 MW reactors in India have had on the average until the end of 1976 an availability factor of 45 percent. Pakistan's 137 MW reactor had an availability factor of 56 percent in 1975 and 61 percent in 1977.**
For the purpose of comparative cost analysis in this chapter, an availability factor of 68 percent has been assumed not only for nuclear plants but also for oil fired, gas fired and coal fired plants as well.
A 50 percent availability factor has been assumed for hydro plants. This assumption favors nuclear plants, especially in the light of experience in the LICs and because availability factors of more than 80 percent for natural gas and oil fired plants, 68 percent for lignite plants and 70 percent for coal fired plants have often been assumed even by nuclear ad-vocates such as IAEA*** as well as others.**** Thus, calculation based on 68 percent availability f actor positively affects the comparative cc.-
nemics of nuclear power vis-a-vis conventional alternatives.
At 68 percent availability factor a 600 MWe plant would produce 3,574 GWh of electricity a year. A 900 MWe reactor would generate 5,362 GWh of power annually and a 1200 MWs plant would produce about 7,148 GWh.
During the 30 years operation period a 600 MWe plant would generate 107,220 GWh, a 900 MWe plant would produce about 160,860 GWh, and a 1200 MWe plant would generate 214,440 GWh of electricity.
It appears that even under favorable assumptions such as similar time requirement for construction, and 68 percent availability factor for nuclear power plants and alternatives, at present price producing elec- '
tricity from nuclear plants will be more costly than alternatives. The poorer the country, the worse the comparative economics of nuclear power will be for it.
- A. Wohlstetter, et al., Movine Toward Life in a Nuclear Ar=ed Crewd?
- p. 86.
- Nucleonics Week, February 24, 1977, p. 13.
- IAEA, Marget Survev for Nuclesr Power in Developing Countries. Turkev, 1973, oo. cit., p. 55.
- Project Independence Report, USGPO, Washington, D.C., Nove=ber 1974, Table U-24, p. 286.
79 1529 047
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AC7NC106
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Su=marv of Cost for a 600 MWe Nuclear Plant and Alternatives for Turkey in 1977 Dollars f- ? .r ; , ;
Type of Plant Nuclear Hydro 011 Gas Coal Lignite Capital Cost in $ millions 780 336 210 244 318 318 Interast during Construc-536 229 144 166 217 217 tion (rate 15%)
Total Fuel Cost for 30 year (discounted at 15%) 141.8 0 415 329.8 76.7 38.3 Operation and Maintenance No firm estimates but unfavorable Cost to nuclear plants.
Absorption No firm estimates but unfavorable to nuclear plants.
Total 1457.8 565 769 739.8 611.7 573.3 Table 32 Summary of Cest for a 600MWe buclear Plant and Alternatives for South Korea in 1977 Dollars Tvoe of Plant Nuclear Hydro 011 Cas Coal _ Licnite Capital Cost in $ millions 630 0 210 0 318 Interest during Construc-tion (rate 10%) 288.6 0 96 0 217 Total Fuel Cost for 30 391.6 year (discounted at 10%) 212.8 0 641.1 0 Operation and Maintenance No firm estimates but unfavorable Cost. to nuclear plants.
Absorption No firm estimates but unfavorable to nuclear plants.
Total 1131.4 0 947.1 355 926.6 80 1529 048
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Table 33 Sur: mary of Cort for a 600 We Nuclear Power Plant and Alternatives for Pakistan in 1977 Dollars .
Type of Plant Nuclear Hydro Oil Gas Coal Capital Cost in $ millions 564 960 300 210 244 318 Interest during Construc-tion (rate 15%) 387 660 310 144 166 217 Total Fuel Cost for 30 years (discounted at 15%) 141.8 141.8 610 415 329.8 192 Operation and Maintenance No firm estimates but unfavorable Cost to nuclear plants.
Absorption No firm estimates but unfavorable to nuclear plants.
Total 1092.8 1761.8 1220 769 739.8 727 Table 34 Summary of Cost for 600 and 1200 We Nuclear Power Plants and .<lternatives f or Bra::il 600 Nuclear 1200 600 600 600 Type of Plant Estimates Vary Nuclear Hydro Oil Gas Coal between Capital Cost in $ millions 750 942 1500 1884 600 210 244 313 Interest during Con-struction (rate 15%) 516 648 1032 1296 373 144 166 217 Total Fuel Cost for 30 years (discounted at 15%) 141.8 141.8 283.6 283.6 0 442.3 329.8 230.4 Operation and Main- No firm estimates but unfavorable tenance Cost to nuclear plants.
Absorption No firm estimates but unfavorable to nuclear plants.
Total 1407.8 1731.8 2315.6 3463.6 973 796.3 739.8 765.4 81 1529 049
AC7NC106 Table 35 Summary of Cost for a 600, 900, and 1200 MWe Nuclear Plant and Alternatives for Iran in 1977 Dollars .
Type of Plant Nuclear Nuclear Nuclear 600 600 600 600 600 900 1200 Hydro 011 Cas Coal Capital Cost 699.6 1049.4 1399.2 362 210 244 318 in $ millions Interest during Con-struction (rate 10%) 321 481.5 642 150 96 111 217 Total Fuel Cost for 30 years (discounted at 10%) 212.8 319.2 352 0 622 493.6 230 Operation and Main- No firm estimates but unfavorable tenance Cost to nuclear plants.
Absorption No firm estimates but unfavorable to nuclear plants.
Total 1233.4 1850.1 2393.2 512 928 848.6 765 Table 36 Su==ary of Cost for a 600 MWe Nuclear Power Plant and Alternatives for the Philipoines in 1977 Dollars Type of Plant Nuclear Hydro 011 Gas Coal Capital Cost in #
$ millions / 1080 0 210 244 318 hr Interest during Construc-C ' ' tion (rate 15%) "
742.6 0 144 166 217 c Total Fuel Cost for @ -
,; ' 30 years (discounted at 15%) 141.87 0 422.2 329.8 261 Operation and Maintenance No firm estimates but unfavorable Cost to nuclear plants.
Absorption No firm esti=ates but unfavorable to nuclear plants.
Total 1964.4 0 776.1 739.8 796 i
~ ' 82 1529 050
AC7NC106 THE SUITABILITY OF NUCLEAR POWER FOR THE LICs Another major disparity between expectation and reality has occurred in the area of power plant scale, where the original belief was that nuc-lear energy was particularly suited for a decentralized electrical system and thus carried special benefits for the largely village economics of LICs.
In the 1950s, many analysts argued that s=all nuclear plants would become competitive with alternative power generating systems, and that little if any supplementary costs would be required to absorb them into existing syste=s. Reality has been quite different. Rather than s=all eactors, atomic power plants with ever larger capacities have been pro-duced because of the economics of scale. Large reactors cannot be effi-ciently absorbed in the existing electrical network of cost LICs. Unlike what was expected in the 1950s, the integration of reactors offered on the international market, require substantial absorption costs.
Already, in the late 1950s, some had argued that only reactors larger than 100 MW capacity were likely to become competitive. However, the total electricity consumption in almost all LICs was either too small or, even if considerable, was dispersed throughout the country around a few consump-tion areas without being interconnected. Thus, the large concentrated electrical load needed for efficient integration of a nuclear plant was absent.*
The " Capacity Paradox" for LICs, i.e., the fact that the cost of nuc-lear plants per unit of production decreases with size increases, and the relative s=allness of most LIC grids for efficicct and stable integration of a nuclear plant have continued into the 1960s and 1970s. In 1958, a 100 MWe reactor was considered too large for LICs, at present, while discus-sions and hopes about the marketing af small reactors continue,** the
- W. E. Hoehn, The Economics of Nuclear Reactors for Power and Desalting, RM-5227-1-PR-ISA (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation), November 1967,
- p. 149. In 1955, Pakistan, for example, had an electrical capacity of 200 MWe.
- IAEA, Draft Catalogue of Small and Medium Power Reactor Desian Char-acteristics, 1975. There has been speculation about the marketing of small reactors by France, Germany, and Germany and India together.
Many LICs have long pushed for the design manufacturing of small re-actors because of appropriate capacity of these reactors for their grid. An IAEA 1974 carket survey showed that the potential market for reactors ranging from 150 to 500 MWe during 1980-1989 amounted to 45,000 MWe capacity. A number of papers at the IAEA Interna-tional Conference on nuclear power and its fuel cycle in Sal.' burg during 1977, reemphasized the desire for the =anufacturing sad =ar-keting of s=all and medium size reactors for LICs.
83 m
1529 05i
AC7NC106 smallest reactors offered on the international market have 600 MWe capa-city. In a recent IAEA study, it has been argued that reactors with cap.;ity greater than 900 MWe may be economically competitive with alter-natives.* LICs continue to have integrated total systems that are gen .
erally too small for the introduction of large nuclear plants without substantial risks.
In accordance with nuclear industry practice, the IAEA has given the following estimates on the limits for the maximum size of any single power plant which an electrical system can accoccodate and still main-tain reliable service if the largest unit fails:
Table Grid Size and Efficient Absorption of New Plants Installed Capacity To Accommodate a Percentage of Must Be at Least (MW) Size Plant of (MW) Peak Demand 250 50 20.0 400 75 19.0 550 100 18.2 700 125 17.8 850 150 17.6 1,500 200 13.3 2,000 250 12.5 2,500 300 12.0 3,700 400 10.8 5,400 500 9.3 7,000 600 8.6 9,600 700 7.3 12,000 800 -
6.7 17,000 1,000 5.9 22,000 1,200 5.5 30,000 1,500 5.0 Source: 1AEA, Market Survey for Nuclear Power in Developing Countries (Vienna: IAEA, 1974), p. 18.
These figures assume that the installed capacity is all intercon-nected. If a country's electrical. system is composed of several grids, then the maximum unit size would be deter =ined by the si c of each in-dividual grid. Given that they integrate their national electrical grid by 1980 and carry out present electricity expansion programs, very few
- G. Woite, Capital Investment Cost of Nuclear Power Plants, Third Draft (Vienna: LAEA, 1978).
84 1529 051.
AC7NC106 LICs have tne total installed capacity to efficiently absorb the s=allest reactors that are being offered com=ercially at the present time (600 MWe).
The risks from introducing a large unit in a reall grid are asso-ciated with the outage of the larger unit. The outage can be of twc types: (a) planned outage for purposes of maintenance or for refuel-ing and (b) forced outages caused by the trips of the turbine genara-tors on the nuclear reactors. The former is planned by the utility and its frequency depends on the type of reactor design or whether refue: -
ing can be done while the plant is in operation (such as the heavy water reactors of the CANDU type) or cease operation (such as the Light Water Reactors), the specific heat output of the fuel and the burnlr.g it can sustain, and the a=ount of standby plant provided in the auxi-11ary system.* Forced outages on the other hand, depend largel, -n statistical variations, assuming that the plant has been engineered ac-cording to standards. In the case of an outage of one unit, other units and/or i= ports of energy power from neighboring systems when available, should meet the load.
- A. Dayal, " Integration of Nuclear Power Stations in Power Networks with Special Reference to the Developing Countries," Paper to the U.N. Con-ference on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Enerav (Geneva: 1964), p. 179.
As far as forced outages are concerned, an analysis can be done on the basis of probability theory relative to the chance of failure at the ti=e of peakload, assuming that at other times generating capacity avail-able in the system could come on line (this may be questionable in some areas). If n is the total nu=ter of units in the system in service, and p the force outage prcbability for each unit, the probability p of a number of machines remaining in service can be given by the following expression: ,
P= m!(n - m)! (P) , (1 - P)
This gives the probability of (n - m) units undergoing a si=ultane-ous outage. The frequency with which failures in excess of the spinning reserve might be permitted can be chosen on the basis of the reliability of the service to be offered.
A typical forced outage is often assumed about once every six months. Thus, in a system containing 25 units, our probability equa-tion gives the following results:
Nu=ber of Machines Out Expected Number of Days SLmultaneousiv Between Occurrances 1 8 2 126 3 2,990 4 98,510 85 1529 053
AC7NC106 Therefore, the size of power plants introduced into a power generating system is limited by the size of the integrated electrical grid. The in-troduction of too large a power plant when compared to the grid, as in the case of the Indian nuclear plant,* would result in the collapse of the grid in case the reactor suffers a forced outage, if the reactor is oper-ated at the maximum availability factor. Under such circumstances (i.e.,
the introduction of a large power plant in a s=all grid) the utility in order to avoid large load sheddings, it vould have to make provisions for a prolonged outage by strengthening transmission links with adjacent utilities, i.e., expending the grid by integrating it with others, or, pro-viding large standby capacity, both of which require additional costs.
In the case of Iran, by 1981 (when its first nuclear power plant, Iran I, was expected to go into operation), Iran wat to have a total elec-tric generatin5 capacity of 10,097 MWe.** Assuming that the electrical system is integrated by 1981, Iran would be able to efficiently absorb a 600 MWe reactor. Iran's preliminary nuclear plan called for the installa-tion of two 600 MWe stations in 1981. However, subsequently it was de-cided to install two 1200 MWe reactors by 1981 because they are "= ore ad-vantageous economically."*** In order to absorb efficiently the 1200 MWe reactors, Iran's installed capacity would have to be 22,000 MWe, a figure that will not be attained in the 1980s if nuclear power capacity additions are not :.onsidered.
In the case of Turkey, its first 600 MWe reactor would come into operation accordirg to present plans in 1985, when its total inetalled capacity would be 7,317 MWe. Assuming that the country's electrical grids are interconnected, Turkey would not suffer the penalty of introducing a large power unit in a relatively small grid. The same is true of Brazil and India as well.
The Philippines case is different than that of Turkey. The 600 MWe undar construction in Bataan is expected to go into operation in 1982. However, in 1982 Luzon grid wil] have an' installed capacity of 2,993 MW, substantially below the 7000 MW integrated installed capacity require.d for efficient absorption of 600 MWe reactors.
- In the case of India it happened many times. Nuclear Engineering In-ternational, May 1975, p. 271.
IAEA, 1973), pp. 16-27.
- Ahmad Sotoodehnia, " Implementation of Nuclear Energy in Irau," co.
cit., p. 7.
86 1529 054 o
AC7NC106 The Pakistani and Phil:.ppino nuclear progrs=s suffer from shortages similar to those of Iran. T'akistan's electrical system consists of five major grids (Figures 33 and 34 show the Pakistani electrical grids):
(1) the Northern grids feeding the provinces of Punjab and Northwest '
Frontier; (2) The Baluchistan grid with its load center in Quetta; (3) the Upper Sind grid with its power at Guddu; (4) the Lower Sind grid; and (5) the Karachi grid. Some of these grids such as the upper and lower Sinds and Karachi have been interconnected through a 132-KV transmission. Plans are underway for interconnecting other grids in a similar manner.* Pakistan's most recent plan calls for a 500-TV in-terconnection of Northern and Karachi grids by 1980.**
While between 1947 and 1974, Pakistan's electrical generating ca-pacity has grown rapidly, increasing some nineteen times, often the installed capacity has lagged behind demand for electricity and load shedding has been practiced many times. In 1974, the country's gener-ating capacity reached 2236 MWe,*** divided between th2 five grids.
This is far from the 7000 inna interconnected grid required for the efficient absorption of the smallest reactor available.
Pakistan is planning to install a 600 MWe reactor by 1983. The efficient absorption of this reactor by the electrical syste= vould re-quire more than a tripling of the existing generating capacity within nine years (a growth rate of more than 20 percent a year over a nine year period). The 1973 =arket survey f or nuclear power in Pakistan carried out by the IAEA estinated that Pakistan's total generating capacity would reach 7000 MW in 1985.**** Assuming that IAEA's esti-mates are correct (although they seem too optimistic) the installation of a 600 MUe reactor before 1985 would pose risks such as large load sheddings, grid collapse, operation at partial capacity, and mainten-ance of a large reserve capacity.
Unlike present nuclear power plants, alternative generating systems, such as coal, oil and gas fired plants, do not suffer from the same prob-lec, as they are offered in the market in capacities that generally can fit s=all or large grids. Small alternative plants would not necessitate the expenses required for interconnecti..g grids in order to absorb a large plant such as a 600 MW nuclear plant. Given a s=all grid, nuclear power plants at present can be introduced only at the risk of costly penalties.
This disadvantage negatively affects the economics of r.uclear power com-pared to alternatives.
- IAEA, Nuclear Power Planning Studv for Pakistan, p. 25.
- I, bid., p. 3.
- IAEA, Market Survev for Nuclear Power in Develcoinz Countries, Pakistan, p. 45.
- Ibid.
1529 055 87
AC7NC106 Supplementarv Investments: Site Selection Related Costs It is generally believed that the basic considerations in siting conventional thermal power stations also apply to siting nuclear sta-tions.* The latter, however, involves special evaluation of the site in relation to the design and sate operation of nuclear plants. Foun- '
dation and seismic conditions of the siting area are = ore critical for a nuclear reactor than for conventional plants.** The basic considera-ti.as that are assumed to apply to both are: location rel. ive to load centers and transmission networks, availability of cooling water; accessibility and transport; soil conditions, elevations, terraf.n and flood levels; and availability of labor and caterial.***
However, even in the basic consideration category, there are spe-cial problems with nuclear power that negatively effects its compara-tive economics, especially in less industrial countries. For exa=ple ,
the transport of nuc3 ear plant components in Pakistan from the Karachi port to Chashma, the site of Pakistan' first 600 MWe reactor, more than 1100 miles inland, is already recognized to pose special prob-lems. Present loading facilities at Karachi port are inadequate for transporting a typical 600 MWe pressure vessel. Pakistan would have to acquire heavy lift facilities for such items. The ccuntry's " rail-way clearance would not be adequate" for transporting the pressure ves-sel either.**** The Pakistan Atomic Energy Cc= mission has decided to transport by road but even this method would require considerably costs in preparing parts of the road, some of the bridges for the trans-portation of voluminous and heavy equipment.*****
In the case of Iran, the installation of the first two reactors are to take place in Halileh, on the Persian Gulf 30 km sauch of the
, Port of Bushir. In order to facilitate the transportation of the pres-sure vessels for the reactors the expansion of the port of Bushir, the installation of heavy equipment lifts, and the ccnstruction cf 30 km highway to Halileh were required.****** Infrastructural costs of the two Kraf twerk Union plants in Iran has been estimated at more than S900 million.
Transporting the components of Iran's future reactors to sites such as those near Isfahan, face problems and involve costs stsilar to the case of Pakistan.
- LAEA, Siting of Nuclear Facilities (Vienna: IAEA, 1975), p. 15.
- L. Venkatesh and T. P. Sarma, " Siting of Nuclear Power Stations in India," in Siring of Nuclear Facilities, p. 87.
- M. Nasim, and S. A. Hasnain, " Siting Considerations for Nuclear Facilities in Pakistan,. ibid., p. 158.
- tbid. A single piece of a large reactor (more than 500 MW) =ay weight more than 280 tons. L. Venkatech and T. Sarma, " Siting of Nuclear Power Stations in India," p. 93.
- Ibid.
- It is said that the contract with kW included the above require-ments as well.
88
0
= .
AC7NC106 Another f actor generally considered to be basically cecmon be-tween thermal and nuclear plants is water requirement for cooling.
However, nuclear plants use about 15 percent more cooling water than thermal systems, so that the difference may be regarded as a crucial '
one, especially in countries that lack a lot of water. A station of about 1000 MWe capacity requires s steady and continuous supply of about 2,500 cubic feet of water per second for keeping the tempera-ture rise in the condensers at about 8* Centigrade
- This requirement necessitates the siting of large stations on the sea coast or on large reservoirs or on perennial canals of large capacity. However, the areas with adequate water capacity may be far from load centers and transmission networks, which.may require considerably expenditure to connect to the plant. For exa=ple, Halileh, located on the Persian Gulf is several hundred miles frcm Iran's electricity load centers such as Tehran, Isfahan, and the future petrochemical plants. Thus, part of the Iran nuclear program is the possible construction of a 400 KV transmission line linking Halileh to Shiras, Isfahan, Bandar Abbar and Tehran.**-
An alternative to usage of large a=ounts of water is the erection of dry air cooling towers. Both Iran and Pakistan have considered us-ing these teuers in reactors that are to be located in areas where sufficient quantities of water are lacking. These towers are said to add considerably to the cost of the plants.
In the case of coastal sites, other proble=s related are littoral drift, accretion or erosion phenomena, seabed characteristics, tidal and nontidal currents, storms and waves, etc. have also to .be studied in detail.
Although estimates of cost for infrastructural changes required for the implemen:ation of a nuclear power program for each of the LICs under consideration is not available, it is clear, however, that they are greater than those of ther=al alternatives, although they may be in a fraction of the cases similar to hydroplants, especially relative to transmission cos ts.
Fouadation Conditions It is generally recognized that geological stability, the seismic sta-bility and tectonic features of the site are extremely important in locat-ing a nuclear plant. The Northern Tier region as well as India and the Phil-ippines are prone to seismic disturbances. The continued integrity of
- Venkatesh and Sar=a, " Siting of Nuclear Power Stations in India," p. 88.
- Energy International, September 1977, p. 34.
89
AC7NC106
& o .s Figure 2 Iran's Potential Transmission Systems 7
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)
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Source: " Energy Profile or Iran," _E_ner2"r International, Septe.r.ber 1977,
- p. 34.
1529 058
AC7NC106 the reactor ccatainment structure without the probability of the de-velopment of cracks and release of radioactive materials, to a great extent depends on reactor foundation conditions. In order to deter-mine adequate foundation design, the geological conditions of the po-tential site such as the depth of the bedrock, li hology, thickness of "
formations, presence of shears and faults, engineering properties of the substrate, presence of dykes, any structural deformities or miner-alogical alternations,* etc. have to be investigated.
The nature of the subsoil, and the groundwater levels, also have consicetable influence on the design of reactor foundations, especially in seismic zones. The geotechnical examination of potential sites are necessary because of the large potential hazard to population and en-viren=ent as a result of a reactor contairment failure. However, ad-verse f oundation conditions, such as sites in seismic zones, require design modification which in turn add to plant costs, although the exact amount is likely to differ from case to case.
For example, in the case of the two Iranian reactors to be con-strue:cd in Halileh and the other two near the Karun River, although the exact figures have not been released, but part of the more than
$1500 per kW costs have been claimed by the suppliers to be for adapt-ing the reactor design "to withstand earthquakes and to prevent corre-sion by sea water."** The Halileh reactors are protected against earthquake accelerations of up to 0.5 by "si= ply incorperating a five meter thick, reinforced concrete foundation raft. The turbine house is built to resist 0.1 g."***
~
The cost effects of siting reactors in seismic scnes, according to industry sources, have been even more dramatic in the case of the Philippines planned 600 MWe reactor at Bataan. According to Westing-house's response to the query that $1.1 billion for a 600 MWe reactor might be overpriced:
" Based on W tin 3h ouse project experience, the cost of the Philippine nuclear plant will be in line with the cost of other nuclear plants of the same vintage and of similar size when plant scope, site and seismic considerations are equated."****
- Venkatesh and Sar=a, " Siting of Nuclear Facilities in India," p. 91.
- The Mildle East, August 1977, No. 34, p. 25.
- Nuclear Engineering International, March 1977, pp. 31-33.
- 1he Wall Street Journal, January 16, 1978.
1529 059 91
AC7NC106 Most of the Philippines archipelago consists of areas with vol-canic origin.* The Bataan plint is reportedly surrounded by five vol-canoes. One of the active ones is Mt. Natib, located 10 miles from the nuclear plant site. The outer edge of the huge mudflow that resulted a from the last eruption of this volcano is claimed to be fewer than two miles from the plant site.** In an internal 1977 memorandum concern-ing the plant site in the Philippines, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Com-mission concluded that "all volcanic hazards should be considered pos-sible at the site."*** Congressman Clarence D. Long, Chairman of the Appropriation Subcommittee, has announced his opposition to the con-struction of the Bataan plant. One of the reasons advanced by Long has been the problems related to the plant site: " Environmental and safety problems are particularly acute in the Philippines, where earth-quakes occur once every two days."****
Turkey's first reactor is to be sited at Akkuyu on the Southern cost of Turkey, an area that suffers from high seismic activity, the main fault extending along northern Anatolia to the west passing through the Marmara Sea. According to Nuclear Engineering International:
"A great part of the shores lie in the first and second grade earthquake regions. This implies that the local soil condi-tions have to be studied carefully. Extensive seismic tests have to be performed. Tsunamic waves, generated by the earth-quakes on the sea depths dictate a minimum of elevation of 8 to 10 meters above sea level. Considering that a great part of the Black Sea and the Southern Marmara Sea shores consist of steep rocks or alluvial river banks, the selection of the appropriate sites become extremely difficult."*****
There have been reports of serious siting problems for the Brazilian reactors as well. The Itaorna Beach, where Brazil's first two power re-actors are under construction and a third one is planned, is about 15 miles from a geological fault and intense tropical rains produce large landslides, and t'ne turbo-generator building rests on reconstituted earth.****** For the foundation of Angra II, Brazil's second power
- N. Vreeland et al. , Area Handbook for the Philippines, Second Edi-tion, 1976.
- Washington Post, February 8,.1978.
- Ibid.
- L. D. Long's letter to Joseph Hendrie, Chairman of NRC, January 14, 1978, p. 2.
- Nuclear Engineering International, March 1977, p. 39.
- Norman Gall, " Nuclear Setbacks," FORBES, November 27, 1978.
t 92
AC7NC106 plant, reinforced concrete pile was used for the foundation. Now there are chances that the piles are defective. The Angra III site is said to be threatened by encroachment of a mountain located above the beach. Ex-cavation at the site has found slides in the nearby hillside and has therefore been stopped.* Because of these problems a new site may have to be found for Angra III. All these problems and changes will seriously affect cost.
The consideration of foundation while extremely important in the case of hydroplants is not regarded to be as icportant in the case of coal, or gas and oil fired plants and as a result would negatively ef-feet the co=parative economics of nuclear power in many LICs. The IAEA in 1975 estimated the cost of protecting power plants against seismic conditions between twelve and fifty million dollars.**
Role and Cost of Consultants It is a co=non practice in many LICs to have resource to consult-ants in the precess of constructing a nuclear power plant. This is not usually the case with thernal plants, as the utilities concerned have considerable experience regarding these plants. The reasons for the recourse to consultants are the administrative, financial and tech-nical complexities inherent in a nuclear project. Acquiring skills to deal with a variety of fields related to the establishment of a single nuclear plant, as in the case of Turkey, is of ten considered unreason-able,*** because of the costs a.d the time that such an undertaking
~
would involve.
A consultant's assignment to utilities considering i=ple=enting a nuclear program varies considerably from country to country, and may involve issues such as plant =anagement methods, financing plant pur-chase, inspection procedures, bid evaluations, soil evaluations, as-sess=ent of radioactivity doses to be received by the population as a result of the operation of the nuclear plant or as a result of an ac-cident, safety codes, contract preparation, feasibility studies, etc.
- Nucleonics Week, Nove=ber 2, 1978, pp. 11-13.
- Protection against floods was estimated at between $8 to $12 million dollars and against aircraft crash at $35 million. IAEA, Nuclear Power Planninz Studv for Pakistan, 197 5, p . 128.
- J. Naigeon and A. Kutukcuoglu, " Role and Assign =ents of a Consultant for the Evaluation and the Construction of a Nuclear Power Plant, Application to a Project in Turkey," Paper presented to International Conference on Nuclear Power and its Fuel Cvele (Salzburg: IAEA, May 2-13, 1977), p. 2.
93 1529 061
AC7NC106 In September of 1975, Turkey, for example, hired a consortium of consultants formed by three Swiss firms (Swiselectra, Emchet Berger, Easter et Hofmann), and a French firm, Groupement ocur les Activites Atemicues et Avancies. These firms are expected to provide the fol- -
louing services for Turkey during the three phases of the project to construct a 600 MWe reactor at the southern coast of Turkey. During the first phase of the Contract, lasting 33 months consultants are ex-pected to participate in:
- 1. studies dealing with " site, safety criteria, assessment of possible types of reactors and vendors, cost estimates, fuel cycle, local industry"; - -
- 2. " preparation of plot plans and layout drawings; proposals f or breaking down the plant into several contracts";
- 3. " construction schedule," detailed programming of the initial phase;
- 4. preparing " official documents, entire writing of the tech-nical specifications";
S. providing assistance to Turkey for evaluation of the bids;
- 6. preparing "the complete plant project on the basis of vendors finally selected";
- 7. preparation of "the PSAR and its presentation to th'e safety authorities for approval";
- 8. training Turkish staff "on the consultant 's premises through-out the period."*
During the second phase of the contract, the consultants are ex-pected to provide builder's supervision, prepare for testing, train staf f and assist in project management.** This phase is expected to last 72 months. In the third phase which is expected to last twelve
=onths, the consultants are expected to conduct plant tests and startups.
The consultants fees vary considerably or the type of services provid ed . It has been estimated that they may be as high as 37 percent of the total plant cost.*** Actual figures for fees in the case of the countries under study are not unfortunately, however, available.
- Ibid., p. 7.
- Ibid., p. 6.
- The Middle East, August 1977, No. 34, p. 25.
94 I529 062
AC7NC106 NUCLEAR POWER AND ENERGY INDEPENDENCE:
NORTH-SOUTH CONFLICT For many years among the many great expectations from nuclear power, one has been that dependence on nuclear power would bring about energy independence. Dependence, however, on nuclear power for most LICs will lead to a very real dependence on other countrier. As discussed in the previous chapter, most of the power reactors sold to the LICs use slightly enriched uranium (3-4 percent). Natural uranium as mined cannot itself be used directly in these reactors as fuel because of low concentration cf uranium-235. The process for increasing uranium-235 concentration is called enrichment.
The three methode currently in use for uranium enrichment are gaseous diffusion, gaseous centrifuge and the Becker or j et noscle. Given the state of the art at the present time, an ef ficiently operating gaseous diffusion plant requires a large facility. The construction of such a plant is a major industrial and financial undertaking. A gaseous diffusion plant consumes large a=ounts of electricity. The U.S. gaseous diffusion co=-
plex, for example, requires 6000 >M of electricity for its three facilities when operated at full capacity. The enormous cost in constructing such a plant and the amount of power required for operating it, creates serious problems for the construction of such plants in LICs because of capital scarcity and limited electrical networks in these countries.
An alternative to diffusion separation is the cantrifuge separation.
The United States, the trilateral agreement countries of Urenco/Centec consisting of Great Britain, the Federal Republic of Ger=any and the Netherlands, and in Japan are working on the development of this technology.
The centrifuge separation method requires considerably less power per unit.
of SUU than the diffusion plant (almost 6 times) but is considerably more nuclear-weapons-proliferation prone.
A third alternative being developed in Karlsruhe, Federal Republic of Germany and probably in South Africa is the no::le system. Enough progress has been =ade that pilot production plants are under construc-tion. The disadvantage of this process is that it uses more electricity than the gaseous diffusion and at least 10 times the power of an equiva-lent centrifuge plant. The first enrich =ent plant to be constructed in an LIC, 3razil, is of the Becker nozzle system. The plant which will have a capacity of 18,000 SWU per year is expected to go into operation in 1979. This plant alone, if operating in ~u ll capacity, will provide enough enriched uranium for two 600 >Se reactors annually. According to the latest Brazilian government plans the country's installed nuclear 95 1529 063
AC7NC106 capacity is expected to reach 3100 Inie by 1985 and 10,600 MWe by 1990.*
Thus during the coming decade, assuming that the country's nuclear program is carried out, even with the construction of the enrichment plant, Brazil will be dependent on foreign suppliers of enriched uranium for most of its reactors. Because of the international controversy created as a re-sult of the Federal Republic of Germany's decision to export reprocessing and enrichment technology to Brazil, it is unlikely that enrichment facili-ties based on present technologies would be exported to other LICs in the near future. The development of these technologies by LICs themselves in the coming decade is likely to be not only expensive but also very difficult and thus very unlikely to be achieved.
The assumption that dependence on nuclear power would decrease depen-dence on foreign sources of energy is invalid in the case of LICs that are planning to install LURs. This type of dependence on a few suppliers can lead to the formation of cartels making buyers vulnerable to price as well as political manipulation. In the case of countries with large domestic alternatives, energy independence is substituted with energy dependence, and the importers of fossil fuel will in this case be diversifying en-ergy dependence.** However, attempts are being made at the suggestion of the United States to provide for reliable supply of fuel at nondis-criminatory prices to several international forums. The most important one of these is the ongoing INFCE.
During 1976 and 1977, the nuclear suppliers held several meetings in London to regulate the supply of nuclear technology. The countries participating in these meetings included the United States, Canada, Bri-tain, France, Japan, FRG, Italy, Sweden, Swit:ctland, Belgium, USSR, Netherlands, the GDR, Poland and Czechoslovakia. The London meetings have come under attack from several LICs including Iran. According to A. Etemad, Chairman of the Iran Atomic Energy Commission, the London club is imposing "ever increasing stringent and distortive terms for the transfer of this important technology."*** He further accused the sup-
- Some Brazilian scientists such as Jose Goldemberg, have criticized the importation of the Becker no::le enrichment system to Brazil because this technology has not been testad in other parts of the world and will not lead to electricity independence of the country.
- Nuclear Fuel, June 27, 1977. Already the U.S. Congress has made public papers containing information about a Canadian Government sponsored uranium cartel (club) . The cove to organize the club was initiated in 1971 by first getting the Canadian uranium producers together. Later the Gulf oil company (Gulf Minerals) with considerable investment in uranium prospecting and mining also joined the cartel. In 1972 the uranium producing companies held a secret meeting in Paris. The cartel set floor prices for different parts of the world and planned to block the Australians from starting uranium productions. The club was dis-mantled in 1975.
- Energv Daily, April 12, 1977.
96 1529 065
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97 1529 065
AC7NC106 pliers of club diplomacy of unilaterally defining guidelines and policies for "the transfer or rather nontransfer of so-called sensitive nuclear technology."*
The reason for the enrichment controversy is the paradox that given present technologies, the ability to produce fuel for Light Water Reactors (LWRs) also provides the capability to produce nuclear weapons material (highly enriched uranium).** However, the decision by nuclear suppliers not to export enrichment facilities to other countries in the i=nediate future has strained North-South relations, which the transfer of nuclear technology was expected to improve.
Countries that want to acquire enrichment facilities of their own argue that they aim at assuring fuel autonomy "to protect against external dependencies and possible cutoffs of enriched uranium supplies."*** For countries such as Brazil, South Korea, Pakistan and Iran, which have large nuclear power plans (there is serious question whether these projacts will be realized), the dependence on the West for reactor fuel is a source of worry. Assurances of continued supply on a bilateral basis, for example, by the United States, are not considered completely convincing as "they are susceptible to reversal by the American Congress, which is notoriously sensitive to determined partisan of special interest pressure."**** The suppliers may also be tempted to use their leverage in this area for other goals Because many LICs believe that bilateral assurances are not reli-able, they feel justified in demanding enrichment facilities of their own 1". order to reduce dependencies on other states and avoid giving another country a veto on their electricity generating systems. The decision not to export a complete fuel cycle is charged to be partially aimed at gain-ing such a leverage. This view acquires greater evidence because of the encouragement of LURs by the governments of ICs through export subsidies for these reactors. The problems of the nuclear fuel cycle have acquired increasing international importance and may cause greater international confrontation in the future as more countries depend on LWRs.
Besides enrichment, there is even greater international controversy about the transfer of reprocessing plants from supplying countries to buyers. Reprocessing facilities separate plutonium and uranium, which are contained in the spent fuel of power reactors. Buyer countries, such as Pakistan and Brazil, have argued that once these ele =ents are separated
- Ibid.
- The French have reported research on a chemical process for which this would not be true. However, no production or pilot plants have yet been built.
- Shahram Chubin, Paper presented to the Conference on " Managing in a Proliferation Prone Uorld," December 1977.
- Ibid.
98 1529 066 r
AC7NC106 from the spent fuel they ca9 be used as fuel in power reactors. As a re-sult, one of the major arguuants in favor of reprocessing by LICs has been that it would help in assuring security of fuel supplies.
Although the recovered elements in the spent fuel of LWRs provide .
only 20 percent of the fissile material in a corresponding amount of fresh fue], and thus do not lead to nuclear energy independence, it has been argued that reprocessing will help to assure security of fuel supplies, will be needed for safe disposal of nuclear wastes, and will be needed as a prerequisite to introduction of plutonium breeders.
In regard to the economics of reprocessing, esti=ated costs of re-processing have increased from $30 per kilogram in 1974 to $280 in mid-1976 (constant dollar).* In negotiations between COGEMA and JAPCO, the price of separating a kilogram has been reported to range up to $700 and as high as $400 in constant 1977 dollars.** Several studies show on lower estimates the future costs of plutonium fuel still exceed those of fresh uranium. Even under the most optimistic assumptions, it cannot sub-stantially help kWh costs of produced power from the nuclear plants.
Several studies have shown that reprocessing even on a large scale, such as the one which was under construction at Barnwell, with a capacity of 1500 MTU per year was uneconomic. It will be even = ore uneconomic in the smaller units as required in the developing countries such as Brazil, South Korea, the Philippines, Iran, Turkey and Pakistan in the 1980s.
For example, the Indians have built two separation plants that are considerably smaller than the Barnwell (a 100 LEU per year plant at Trot-bay and at Tarapur at 150 MTU per year). Even this capacity far exceeds that required to handle the spent fuel from the reactors that they will have in operation for many years.
In the case of Pakistan which has a 125 MWe heavy reactor reactor, there is even less serious economic justification for reprocessing. Re-cycling plutenium in the CANDU reactor in Pakistan (as well as in India) is unlikely to be cost effective because:
First, the percentage of uraniu=-235 in CANDU spent fuel is far less than in natural uranium; thus there is no value to the uranium that might be recovered by reprocessing.
- California Seminar on Arms Control and Foreign Policy, Albert Wohl-stetter, Proof of Evidence on Behalf of Friends of the Earth, September 5-6, 1977, p. 8.
- Evidence presented by British Nuclear Fuels Limited, ibid.
99 1529 067
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ABBTEVIATIO:!S to kg ICI = kg of heavy metal (uranium, plutonium, and other transuranics).
kg U = kg of natural uraniun n.ctal.
3 LE II R" C of ucoverd uranium metal. ,
StlU = separative work unit.
x = final disposal charge per kg uranium spent fuel.
y - final dispossi charge for vastes from reprocessing and plutonium fabrication, per kg cf fuel reprocessed.
- !!. J. Cholister, et al., !!uclear Fuel Cycle Closure Alternatives, Allied-CencraI Muclear Ser-vices (uainwell, South Carolina), April 1976. Values used are those for the base case, sum-sr.arized in Table 1, p. 3. I hcre costs ucre assumed to increase over the 20 year time period p of the study, the average value uas used. O b
M O.
t- S. Stoller, et al. , "Iteport on Reprocessing and Recycle of Plutonium and Uranium," 30 December n 1975, Appendix VI of I:uclear Fueln Supply, ISlison 1:lectric Institute (t:ew York, N.Y.),tiarch O 1976. Data a re f rom Table 9, p. Si and r,upport ing text, pp. 77-93. C' 11cnefit.Analysilof__hpracc3_ngjtnd__.Rc_gycljnpJght 1 tJater Re,3ctor Fuel, U.S. Energy Research and Development Administration, II:1)A 7b-121, December 1976, Table 2, p. 5, and Figure 2, p. 6.
d F;nal Cencric Fnvironmental Statement on tbc Use of Reevele Plutonium in itixed-Oxide Fuel in 1;irbt Water Conled Hentors (GISIM), U.S. I:ucle. r Rep,ulatory Commission, til'ItEG-0002, August ,
1976, Vol. 4, Chapter XI, and T.:ble VIII-5, p. % III -20 h h
- 1975 dollar values increased by 8% to give values in 1976 dollars, and FY 1977 values decreased (' 9 by 6% to give values in 1976 dollars.
" f Values used here are previously repon ted in Is Plutoniun Really Nocessary? by Vince Taylor of Pan lleuristI.s in .i paper presented to the Cumberland I.odr,c Conference PEy 26-28, 1976. {J h N _
o & ed '
CT-f) ,
72 b
b f
REPROCESSINGFkCII.ITIESIN1.TCs Country Facility Fuel Type Design Capacity Status Argentina Ezeira Hetal (research 1.ab-scale Shut-down reactor fuef)
Brazil UO y 2-3 te/yr Planned as part of package deal with Federal Republic of Cermany India Trombay tie t al 100 te/yr In operation since 1965 Tarapur itetal and U0 2 150 tc/yr Being cold tested Pakistan Unnamed UO 2-3 te/yr estimate Planned for construction under an 2
agreement with France Yugoslavia Boris Kidric .
Metal I.ab-scale Shut-down Institute 0
g O d.
" O H
SollRCES: Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Facts on Nuclear Prolfferation, U.S. Senate O Consnit tee on Covernment Operat tuns (U.S. Cnversunent Printing Office, Washle.gton,DIC.), December
- 1975; " Reports on Nuclear Programs arounJ the World," Imclear News, mid-February 1976, pp. 47-51, and August 1977, p. 56; t!uc. Eng d ternat., February 1976, pp. 21-27, April / Hay 1976, pp. 20-21, and July 1977, p. 36; Nucleonics Weekly, December 27, 1977, p. 6; and Nuclear Fuel, September 19, 1977, p. 5.
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AC7NC106 Second, a large part of the cost of reprocessing cust be justified by the value of the recovered plutonium, but CANDU spent fuel irradiated to a typical icvel of 7500 MWD /MT contains only 2.7 grams of fissile plu-tonium per kg compared to about 7 grams in light water reactors. ;
Third, because the fuel in CANDU reactors uses natural uranium and is relatively easy to fabricate, fuel costs without plutonium recycle are much lower compared to LWRs. The 1977 fabrication costs were estimated at
$35 per kg.
Fourth, Canada, which is the exporter of CANDU reactors, has not yet operated even pilot plants for reprocessing spent fuel. The 1977 esti-mates at subsidized rates in Canada, were that reprocessing CANDU fuel vould cost $80 per kg. If the experience of the industrialized countries applies to CANDU reactors in LICs, actual costs are likely to be several times the initial proj ections. Given the small size of the Inde-Pakistan program, the scale at which reprocessing is conte = plated by the two coun-tries, the costs are likely to be even higher.
Even depending on the 1977 Canadian estimates, however, reprocessing and recyling do not appear profitable. In the Canadian "model" recycling program that doubles electricity generation, 5.5 grams of fissile plutonium are added to 1 kg of natural uranium. Two kgs of spent fuel (at 2.7 grams fissile plutonium per kg would need to be reprocessed to obtain this plu-tonium at a total cost of $160 ($80 per kg). Adding excess fabricaticn cost of $35 per kg brings the total extra cost for mixed oxide fuel to
$195. Even at a U 03 3 price of $40 per lb., conventional CANDU fuel would cost only $139 per kg. A 100 percent increase in effectiveness at a cost penalty of 140 percent makes no economic sense.* This assessment is based on the assumptions of the Canadian model, the actual economic penalty under the particular conditions in Pakistan is likely to be much higher. Thus a delay in reprocessing spent fuel by Pakistan in the 1980s will have a positive effect on the country's economy rather than causing economic hardship.
The other LICs considered in this study are planning the installa- "'
tion of light water reactors that use slightly enriched uraniu= as fuel.
The economics of reprocessing LWR spent fuel while better than the CANDU reactor (for exa=ple, a kg of the spent fuel of LWRs has 7 grams of plu-tonium) are suhject to a great deal of uncertainty and confusion.
- Ibid.
1529 071 103
AC7NC106 According to a 1976 study based on the cost estimates and prices in the United States. Vince Taylor concluded that " reprocessing and recycling is a more expensive = cans for obtaining fuel than U-235 enrichment."*
Since Taylor's study there has been considerable increase in the cost of reprocessing. Reprocessing for countries such as South Korea, the Philip-pines, Turkey, Brazil and Iran is likely to be even more expensive because their reprocessing facilities, if constructed, will necessarily be small.
In a favorable case, considering a reprocessing facility wich 1 ton per day design capacity, operating 260 days in a year, would require the out-put of 8,500 >M of installed light water reactors. Even Iran and Brazil which were to have some of the largest civilian nuclear programs in the world will not have (and are not planning to have) installed capacity of that magnitude by 1985. (Brazil is planning the installation of 3100 MWe nuclear capacity by 1985, Iran was to have an installed nuclear capacity of 4200 MWe by 1985.) Even in programs of this size, 1 ton / day, based on 1976 prices, the cost of obtaining fuel from reprocessing and recycling is likely to be 3 times more than UO2 fuel without considering waste dis-posal and safeguards.** Eowever, among the LICs with LWR programs, Brazil has concluded an agreement with Germany for a reprocessing plant. This plant is considerably smaller (2-3 tons / year) than our assumed favorable case. In this case, the cost of reprocessing and recycling per kg of plutonium and the fuel obtained from it will be even more expensive com-pared to UO2 than the previous case. Thus, in Brazil, South Korea, the Philippines, and Turkey, as in the case of Pakistan, deferring reprocess-ing on economic grounds will be in their national interest.***
- Ibid. , p . 100.
- Ibid.
- Honry Rowen and Gregory Jones, " Influencing the Nuclear Technology Choices of Other Countries: The Key Role of Fuel Recycling in the United States, PH76-08-637-15 (Los Angeles: Pan Heuristics),1976, p.10. A major argu-ment in favor of reprocessing advanced more forcefully in Europe and Japan than in the United States and in the LICs, has been that it will reduce the problems related to the final storage of radioactive wastes. Waste storage has also become an important political issue in a number of countries such as Germany that are planning increased dependence on nuclear power. The citizen opposition groups in Europe have focused attention on unsolved prob-lems associated witn vaste storage. The population of ar as where storage facilities are envisaged have generally been opposed to the construction of such facilities in their regions. In terms of costs, there is considerable scarcity of reliable data on the costs of various medium-to-long-term stor-age alternatives. According to a Pan Heuristics study, "there are reasons for believing that mixed-oxide (M0X) wastes might present additional stcr-age problems. Each kilogram of spent MOX fuel will require at least three to four times as much high-level storage as spent UO2 fuel. High-level waste-storage requirements (in terms of numbers of containers) are essen-tially proportional to the head output of the waste, which is in turn di-rectly related to the radioactivity of the waste. M0X is more radioactive than UO2 waste and this means greater storage requirements. Some countries have not considered reprocessing as an essential part of final storage of waste. Canada is storing nuclear waste indefinitely without reprocessing.
" 1529 072
AC7NC106 Another argument in favor of immediate commitment to reprocessing has been breeders. For many years, consideraole hope has been p3 ced on the co=mercialization and spread of breeder reactors. These hopes and expectations mirror thcae placed in the 1950s on the nuclear power in general. It expected that breeders wculd provide cheap amd abundant electricity, provide an important alternative to the " expected" scarcity of fuel for conventional reactors, and bring about energy independence.
Like the early estimates about the spread of conventional nuclear power plants, recent estimates have been generally enthusiastic about the extent of breeder spread in the world. In the LICs, the U.S. AEC in 1974 estimated that India vill have an installed fast breeder capacity of 500 MWe by 1985 and Brazil vill be the second LIC with a 300 MWe breeder re-actor in 1990.* Three LICs--Brtzil, India, and possibly Iraq--have breeder programs. These plans are tentative and some are unlikely to be carried out. The only breeder under construction in the LICs is in India with a capacity of cnly 15 MWe, The assumptions on which the expected spread of breeders are based are dubious, at least for the coming decade. First, the assumption that low cost uranium will be exhausted shortly has been challenged by a number of studies, including the Edison Electric Institute,** Pan Heuristics ***
and even in a recent IAEA stedy (Report on the International Uranium F.esources Evaluation Project, Phase I, June 1978). According to Edison Electric Institute, the most probable scenario for uranium development, uranium prices in 1990, based on estimated supply costs, will be only
$2C/lb U 03 8'(1975 dollars). Vince Taylor of Pan Heuristics has argued that " uranium needs in this century appear capable of being met from re-sources producible at less than $20 per pound, and prices under $10 per pound in the first quarter of the twenty-first century seem at least a reasonable possibility."****
Second, at present it appears that the capital costs of breeder plants will be even higher than the LWRs. The capital costs of LWRs without for-Among the arguments advanced for reprocessing in the LICs, the need for reprocessing as a necessary step for safe disposal of waste is the 1 erst emphasized. The arcu=ent referred to more frequently and more forecefully is the importance of reprocessing in preparation for the commercial intro-duction of breeders in the LICs.
- AEC, WASH-ll39, 1974, p. 8.
- Vince Taylor, The Myth of Uranium Scarcity (Los Angeles: Pan Heur-istics, April 25, 1977).
- Ibid., p. 3.
1529 073 105
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Breeder Projects in LICs oo o . . a Country, Year of II.ime of Reactor Power Criti-(i.oca t ion) Type of Reactor Status capacity cality Comments Brazil Cobra Experimental fast Planned Part of agreement signed with France breeder power 4 July 1975; design expected to be reactor similar to Rapsodie and Phenix
- India Purnima Fast reaearch In opera- 1972 Used to provide data on the use of reactor tion plutonium in' fast breeder reactors FBTR (Fast Breeder Experimental fast Under con- 151% 1980 Design basically similar to Rapsodie Test Reactor) breeder power struction but modified for power generation; (Kalpakkam) reactor French Atomic Energy Coimaission assist-ing in design and construction; will p in particular be used in research on O g
O the breeding of fissile material in $
O thorium H o
15 21 ,
Unnamed Liquid-metal fast Planned Bilateral agreement with France signed (not selected) breedec power in tiovember 1975 includes the eventual reactor construction of an IJtFnR similar to the Phenix, after construction of a PWR plant SOURCES: World Armaments and Disarmaments SIPRI Yearbook 1976; tinclear Engineering International, April September, and October 1977, and July 1976; thiclear !!cus, April, 1977; and An Assessment of International Poltetes
- on BreeIer Reactors, December 1971, Appendix F, prepared by International Energy Associates 1.td.; IAEA Directory of thiclear Reactors, Vol. IX.
N *The fast research reactor Rapsodie (40 ItWt) and the prototype IJtFBR Phenix (233 ffWe) are part of the French 4 breehr program. Respectively, they became critical in 1967 and 1973. The Rapsodie core contains 40 kg of plutonium and 94 kg of highly-enriched uranium (85%). The Phenix core contains 840 kg of plutonium.
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AC7NC106 cign subsidies are generally. regarded as prohibitively high for non-OPEC LICs. This will even cost = ore so in the case of breeders. The OPEC countries have a less expensive alterna*.ive to nuclear power generally in the near future. ,
Third, the capacities of the breeders that are likely to be offered in the market are even greater than the large LWRs. Because of the small-ness of their integrated grids, =ost LICs will not be able to absorb effi-ciently a 600 MWe reactor in the 1980s. It is i= probable that any LIC will have a large enough integrated grid in the 1980s to absorb plants of 1500 MWe capacity or = ore.*
Although a number of industrialiced countries and some LICs such as India have put great deal of money and effort into the development of breeders, it is questionable whether the production of power and fissile materials through breeders will ever becc=e economical, due to uncertainties such as capital costs, future technical develop =ents, the cost of irradiated fuel, the price of uranium, and the greuth rate in demand for power, to name only some of the factors. It appears that in the industrial world, breeders are unlikely to becc=e economical bef ore the turn of the century.
In the case of LICs, it is likely to be later, if ever. Even if breeders become economical for some LICs so=cti=e in the next century, it is likely - .
that they will be imported frca abroad. If an international =arket develops for breeders in the future, a market will probably also develop for plu-tonium. This = cans that LICs will be able to import Pu from abroad once they have i= ported breeders. LICs will not need to construct reprocessing facilities in the i= mediate future in order to have a breeder program in the future. Even if domestic reprocessing were desirable, in order to acquire some degree of fuel independence for their breeder reactors, the construction of the reprocessing plant could be delayed without =uch econo-mic cost until the construction of fast breedars has begun. Since it takes almost.10 years to build a breeder and about f '.ve years to construct a re-processing plant, the simultaneous construction of both would provide the LICs with considerable time for stockpiling plutonium.
At present, given the relatively poor economics of reprocessing and the uncertainty about breeders, deferring reprocessing for the coming dec-ade while atte= pts at developing alternative (cheaper and safer) energy systems are being developed, will not have negative consequences for the LICs. In fact, because deferment is likely to prevent co=mitment to an unecencmic proj ect, it would help rather than hinder economic development.
But economic considerations only explain part of the reprocessing controversy. The suppliers are reluctant to export reprocessing facilities
- Under the most optimistic assu=ptions, only 3 LICs may have installed integrated pcwer capacities of 30,030 MWe or more by the 1990s.
107 1529 075
AC7NC106 abroad not because they are worried that the buying LICs such as Pakistan would be investing in an uneconomic facility, but rather the belief that with reprocessing a non-weapon state could come very close, almost within hours, of a military nuclear capability, i.e. the manufacture of nuclear bombs.* While enrichment facilities based on present technologies would provide access to enriched uranium, one weapon material, reprocessing will provide access to plutonium, the otner material usable in nuclear explosives.
The present international agreements do not forbid work on nonnuclear parts of nuclear devices. Thus, non-weapon states with enrichment and reprocessing facilities of their own could work simultaneously on testing and construction of the nonnuclear parts of nuclear devices and accumula-tion of plutonium without violating any international safeguards. Thus, theoretically much of the distance toward the capability of manufacturing nuclear bombs would be traversed without diversion, which the safeguards are intended to detect.
The case of Pakistan, as well as South Korea, indicates that the fear of suppliers that buyers might e=phasize the civilian rationale for f acil-ities such as reprocessing hoping to conceal a desire for production of nuclear weapons. Reportedly, former Pakistani Prime Minister has admitted that his purpose in purchasing a reprocessing plant from France was to acquire a nuclear weapon capability. According to Bhutto, Pakistan was "on the threshold of a full nuclear capability" when his government was overthrown in 1977.**
LICs question the right of ICs to unilaterally decide what to export.
They are concerned that imposition of such restriction would in effect be influencing the economic development of their countries. Some, such as Cyrus Manzoor of the IAEO, have argued that the unbounded flow of tech-nology to LICs was a sine qua non for successful industriali:ation.***
Technology is regarded as the vehicle of development. Thus, the manipu-lation of technology results in the manipulation of the development of the LICs. According to Mannoor, It is precisely through this manipulative capability that tech-nological nations have historically controlled the geographical diffusion of development and, thus, have evolved and maintained their relative hegemony and the existing world regime.****
- Thomas Schelling, "Who Will Have the Bcab," International Security, Vol. I, no. 1, 1976.
- London Times, October 10, 1978.
- Cyrus Man:oor, "The Politics of Technology Transfer," Paper presented to the Shiraz Conference on Nuclear Technology, p. 3.
- Ibid.
c 1529 076
AC7NC106 The accusation that technological societies have used the medium of technology diffusion to promote and sustain thefr global hege=ony has es-calated even to the point where LICs such as Pakistan and India have charged industrial countries with technological aparthied and neocoloni-alism. This is a far cry from the statements by the IC and LIC represen-tatives after President Eisenhower's " Atoms for Peace" speech. While in the late 1940s and early 1950s LIC representatives were "greatful" to ICs, especially to the United States, for their desire to spread the
" peaceful atom" around, now they are very critical not only of what is not transferred but also of what has been transferred.
For example, the emphasis in the industrial world on LWRs which use slightly enriched uranium as fuel produced only in the West (including the USSR) is one such point. Some in the LICs have charged that while natural uranium reactors are both technologically and economically competitive to the LWRs, the e=phasis on LWRs (especially for export to LICs) is a po-litically =otivated decision which has taken a technological cast.* As LWRs use slightly enriched uranium as fuel, it is charged that the indus-trialized countries emphasize LWRs in order to assure themselves of " con-tinued dependence of other countries on supply of enriched uranium of which they are the only suppliers."**
- Jose Goldemberg, "The NPT and the Third World," Paper to the Conference on Managing in a Proliferation-Prone World, December 1977. Canada has exported a number of natural uranium reactors to LICs, including Paki-stan, Brazil and India. However, the LWRs constitute a much larger share of the market. Reportedlj, Japan is planning to produce natural urani-um reactors.
- Ibid.
109 1529 077
AC7NC106 CONCLUSION After the detonation of the world's first nuclear bomb, the United States government was euphoric about the potential civilian contribution of the atom. This euphoria was reflected in the statements to the United Nations in the 1940s when the international cocaunity was seeking ways for possible international control of nuclear activities, and later in the 1950s when proposing the International Atomic Energy Agency. Many American civilian analysts produced volumes supporting the predominant governmental view: that the spread of the civilian atom around the globe would also bring about the " age of abundance" and would eliminate poverty and economic underdevelopment.
The 1974-74 oil crisis led to apocalyptic fears that wi.hout in-creased dependence on nuclear power the world would face enormous eco-nomic, social and political problems. Many students of energy systems argued that generating electricity from nuclear reactors was likely to be significantly cheaper than from oil generating plants and, thus, more and more countries were likely to depend increasingly on the former.
At present, however, given the capital costs of nuclear power plants and conventional alternatives, the scarcity of capital, the ir.flation rates, the cost of fue., and the operation and =aintenance costs, nuclear power does not appear to be a cheap alternative to conventional power plants for the LICs. Each country has alternatives that either indivi-dually or in combination would meet its projected demand for electricity at less cost that the planned nuclear plants. The hope of cheap nuclear electricity (cheap as fresh air, or cheap enough to warrant mass usage for thawing ice on sidewalks on cold days) as expressed by nuclear en-thusiasts in the 1950s has not yet been realized. While most past pro-jections about the cost of nuclear plants had predicted dramatic reduc-tisns, except for a short time in the 1960s, costs have in fact gone dramatically in the opposite direction, especially during the last four years.
Nuclear power has a number of characteristics that negatively af-
'fect is comparative economics for the less industrialized countries.
For example, many LICs do not have large enough integrated electrical grids to efficiently absorb the smallest nuclear power plants offered in the market today. The introduction of a large unit in a small grid in-creases the risk of large load shedding, grid collapse, operation at par-tial capacity, and maintenance of a large reserve.
The purchase of a nuclear power plant would also require a quantum jump in the investment needs of non-OPEC less industrial countries (LICs).
The need is especially severe in terms of foreign exchange which for=s a large portion of the capital costs of a nuclear plant.
110 1529 078
AC7NC106 Many LIC leaders have argued that importing technology from abroad is vital for their countries' economic development:
What the developed countries have and the underdeveloped lack -
is =odern science and an economy based on modern science and technology. The pro'olem of developing and the underdeveloped countries is therefore the problem of establishing modern science in them and transforming their economy to one based on modern science and technology.*
India's Bhabha, Pakistan's Us=ani, and Iran's Manzoor have considered nuclear technology as the most important technological vehicle for "de-veloping the underdeveloped countries." However, whether nuclear power would speed up economic development or not depends largely on its com-parative economics vis-A-vis alternatives. Given the present cost struc-ture of nuclear power and its alternatives, investment in nuclear power by
=any LICs are likely to slow economic develepment because of inefficient use of resources. Dependence on nuclear power also involves greater ex-penditure relative to infrastructural changes, necessitates centralization of power production and requires larger security measures. All these factors negatively affect the comparative economics of nuclear power.
Historical predictions about the diffusion of nuclear power have been far from accurate. Whether present estimates of the future spread of nuclear power, as well as other technolegies, will be realized is not only a function of technical feasibility, but also of co= plex economic, poli-tical and security considerations. Because of dramatic increases in the cost of nuclear power p.isnts, the projected nuclear capacity of Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Brazil is unlikely to be realized.
It is of ten assumed that reliance on nuclear power would decrease de-pendence on foreign sources of energy. For the LICs, nuclear power would mean increased dependence on foreign suppliers. Iran, which is a net energy exporter at present, would become energy interdependent with sup-pliers of nuclear fuel such as the United States and France. Turkey, Pakistan, Brazil, South Korea and the Philippines would not only remain dependent on the oil producers but would also become so on the indus-trialized countries with enrichment facilities. A number of LICs such as Turkej and Pakistan, for a variety of reasons, have had no interruption of energy supplies from the Middle East. In fact, the OPEC producers have suisidized their oil exports to a number of LICs.
- Quoted it[~ William R. Van Cleave and Harold W. Rood, "A Technological Comparison of Two Potential Nuclear Powers: India and Japan," Asian Survey, VII, No. 7 (July 1967), p. 483.
111
AC7NC106 Much of the official discussicn in the Northern Tier countries about the positive economic implications of dependence on nuclear power is based largely on information provided by the nuclear vendors and the Interna-tional Atomic Energy Agency, which is not known for a particularly critical attitude toward nuclear power. When Iran, for example, initiated its large nuclear program in 1974, it had not carried out a feasibility study of its own on comparative economics of nuclear power. Reportedly, "when Iran first approached France for reactors in 1974, for example, capital costs were understood to be about $200 per kilowatt installed."* The capital cost of $1200 per kWe or more in the cast of the contract signed between Iran and France and Iran and Germany in 1976, without taking into account interest during construction, is more than six times the cost estimate that formed the basis for the Iran Atomic Energy Organization's 1974 expansion plan. It is likely that an objective study, without sole dependence on data from European nuclear salesmen, would have shown that an extensive nuclear power network would not have appeared economical for Iran in the 1980s. The case of nuclear power points to the dependence of LICs on information about the cost, performance, and i=portance of complex technological products on manufacturers, governments of the ICs and international organizations.
In the 1940s and'the 1950s political uses of the civilian application of nuclear energy were almost the exclusive monopoly of the inoustrial world, with almost no contentious demands from the LICs except in areas such as safeguards. Political consideration such as the Cold War, compe-tition for global leadership and influence over uncommitted nations, and the resolution of some regional conflicts positively affected the nuclear export policies of the United States. The LICs were generally pleased with and grateful to the nuclear suppliers. While two decades ago the export of nuclear technology to the LICs was seen almost universally as an instrument of international understanding and cooperation, at present it has become one of the major areas of confrontation between the less industrial and the industrial countries. The conflict over " civilian" nuclear energy between ICs and LICs centers not only on what is trans-ferred, but also on which technology is developed in the industrial world itself, and on whether any genuine transfer has taken place.
It has been argued that the emphasis in the industrial world on Light-Water Reactors (LWRs), which use as fuel slightly enriched uranium pro-duced only in the industrial world, was a politically motivated decision which took a technological cast. The emphasis on L%Rs was due to political reasons, the argument goes, because natural uranium reactors, which do not use enriched uranium and are both technologicelly and economically
- Bijan Mossavar-Rahmani, "Non-Proliferation Strategies: The Vicw from the Third World," Paper to the conference on Nuclear Proliferation and Arms Control in the 1980s, Bellagio, Italy, May 1978.
1529 080
AC7NC106 feasible and competitive, have not received as much attention. Dependence on LWRs will make LICs dependent on_ supplying industrial countries. For countries such as Pakistan and Iran whic'n have announced nians to generate more than half of their electricity from LWRs (there is a serious question whether such an ambitious plan will be realized, especially in the case of Pakistan), the dependence on the West for reactor fuel is a source of worry. There is fear that the industrial countries with enrichment tech-nologies may be tempted to use their leverage in this area for other goals.
However, one of the paradoxes of the nuclear age is the fact tha t ,
given present technologies, the ability to produce fuel for LWRs also provides the capability to produce nuclear weapons material: highly en-riched uranium. Because of proliferation of nuclear weapons considera-tions, it is unlikely that during the couing decade present enrichment technologies will be exported to LICs except perhaps to Brazil, which signed an agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany for the importa-tion of a jet nozzle enrichment plant.
A moratorium on the export of enrichment technology without dealing with problems associated with dependence on a few countries for fuel is likely to be increasingly crzticized by the importers of LWRs. To expect the LICs to accept dependence for fuel on ICs without seeking fuel inde-pendence, while the latter states regard dependence on foreign fuel sup-plies as threatening to their econcmic, political and security well-being, would appear to the LICs to be yet another manifestation of the international double standard.
1529 081 113
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BATAAN l'LAUT WASTES SMALL BY COMPAillS0il, llESTINGUGUSE SAYS 0 0 MANILA, July 10 -- Compared to other types of power generating plsnts, wastes produced by the Bataan nuclear plant will be very small in
- olume, Westinghouse Electric Corp. experts said today.
A coal plant in Western Pennsy1. aia consisting of three 825 megawatt. units should produce 200 million tons of sludge in 20 to 25 years, according to Westinghouse calculations. This sludge will be deposited in a valley , behind an embankment to a depth of 350 feet above the natural floor of the valley. The waste from a typical coal-fired plant would fill an average fooLL>all :.todium to the top every five months.
By comparison, the Bataan nuclear plant will generate about 16 tons of spent fuel udstes a year. When reprocessed and compacted, this high-level radioactive waste would have a volume of one cubic meter. Intermediate end low level radioactive wastes would be less than 330 tons each year.
A coal fired plant with the same electrical generating capacity as the Bataan ruclear Plant would produce 315 pounds of carbon dioxide per second -- as much nitrogen oxides as 126,000 cars -- and would cause 15 fatalities, many cases of re:,piratory disease and $15 million in' property damage per year.
Westinghouse officials have pointe <t out that nuclear plants produce no air pollution and tha t no men ber of the public hcs ever hem killed or injured due to the operation of a cermerr.ial nuclear puuer gen-erating plant.
-. 1529 082 h %ah
- e Coal-fired plants in the United States produce 320 pounds of ash per year for every person living in the U.S., Westinghouse calculations indicate. Most of this ash, which is radioactive due to the natural presence of radon in the coal burned in the power plants, is dumped in land fills or sold for use in roadbed construction. ,
Geothermal power plants, Westinghouse pointed out, can discharge up to three billion gallons a year of water containing 10,000 tons of solids.
This water must be carefully disposed of in a non-polluting manner or re-injected deep into the tarth.
TM volume of wastes produced by the Bataan Nuclear Plant, Westinghouse off.'cials told the Conmission on Nuclear Reactor Plants hearing today, will be quite small by comparison with other power generating technologies.
According to documents submitted by Westinghouse, the technology for safely disposing of high-leyel nuclear wastes has been understood for many years. A substantial body of evidence indicates that the high-level wastes generated by nuclear power plants can be stored satisfactorily in deep geo-logical formations.
Reference:
Mike Marabut 897993/898247 1529 083
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$ ' =y%#, . N liATA AN l)LANT WILL BE SAFE A ND STAlli,E WESTINGIIOLISE SAYS M ANILA', J uly 10--- All nuclear reacto rs -- including the plant at 134taan--are inherently stable and have physical featu res that automatically cont rol " runaway react ions".
In a material subn itted to the Commission on Nuclear Reactor Plants hea ring, the company showed that " runaway reactions" in power reactor cu nes were not possible because powe r is rednced automatically in reacto es by smhlen inc reases in temperatu re.
Technically known as negative tempe ratu re coefficient, the phenomenon is a natural feedback mechanism within the reactor that keeps reacto rs stable shculd normhl t antrols be lost, Westinghouse senior engineer Dave Fe rg said.
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"No safeguards a.e necessa ry to stop the so-called 't unaway reaction' ilue to t he inhe rently stable natu re of a light w.ite r nuclea r reac+o r like the Dat aan Nuclea r I'lant, " D r. Ferg said.
D r. Perg gave this technical explanation of the phenom eno n :wi t hin tiid reacto r core, i ni t ia ll y, an inc reased neut ron population causes an ineteas: in the numbe r of fission reactions ocu rring pe r unit tiene. The increased fission rate releases additional I cat. Thi s heat causes an inc rea se in wal.: r tern pe ratu re withir 'he reacto r co re (sia.cc coolant flow ret o ai n s c on st a nt ).
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Reference:
hi.'ke Ma rabut 8')7')93/3')8217 1529 085
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