ML19290E708
| ML19290E708 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05000574 |
| Issue date: | 01/29/1980 |
| From: | Cummings W AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19290E706 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8003140418 | |
| Download: ML19290E708 (15) | |
Text
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AFFIDAVIT OE WILLIAM LINDSLEY CUEJINGS I, the undersiEned, William Lindsley Cummings being first duly sworn do depose and say :
My name is William Lindsley Cummings. I am a resident of Oran60 County, North Carolina. My address is Rura.1 Route 8, 3or 142, Chapel Hill.
I am a practising ecologist special) ing in the human uso of tropical ecocystems. For a considerable portion of my career bodi my research and professional experiences have involved the application of ecological principles to problems of international economic devel-orment. I have extensive experience in the Philippines itself includinC close association with the Philippine Eovernment aEencies responsible for economic development and environmental protection. I have also secycd in that nation officially as an Environmental Speciclist with the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). My percon 1 interests and qualifications to comment on the issuer of the vs f e dsets .
prorm ud Westinghouse export are further detailed in -t - ac-cc ,-...Ong i which contains my earlier affidavit on the Philippine case (Brief of Intervenor/ Petitioner, Friends of the Filipino People; HliC Docket No. 110-0495).
I am a member of Friends of the Filipinp People, whose national office is located at 110 Maryland Avenue N.E., 'dashington D.C. . The concerns and interests of Friends of the Filipino are detailed in 44x-se+ 9+4.4soas b + s's $
ir;^"l Of 'h'_c ;f..J-< ir. These comments on the proposed destind houso exports to the Philippines are made both individually and on behalf of C
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-2 the Friends of the Filipino People.
For reasons described fully in our earlier arguments presented to the Commis; ion ( :; 1.;,;cli..) and others to be presented here in we ' remain of the position that the export license sought by the Westin6 house Corporation must be denied. We maintain our conviction that fundamental reasons for such denial exist, and continue to believe thpt the Nuclear ReEulatory Commission has the authority and obligation to examine them. Of most basic importance is the Erave and direct threat posed by the proposed exports to the public health, safe-ty, and environment of the Philippine people. This threat exists not solely in the many Generic problems of nuclear technoloEy and its exports, but, in addition and most siEnificantly, as a result of its employment in the contemporary national context of the Philippines itself.
Central features of this national context within which the Westinghouse exports must be considered are, first, the conditions obtainin6 under the present martial law regime of the Marcos family; and, second, the particular relation of the re61me to the United States and its place in the international economic order. As we have de-tailed :
- 1. The health and saf ety of the Philippine people is not a principal concern of the Marcos reElme;
- 2. The project was secured through bribes and corrupt practices;
- 3. The WestinEhouse reactor is unsafe, hiE h profit technoloE7 dumped on the Philippines to revive the dyin6 U.S.
nuclear industry;
- 4. The Westinghouse nuclear reactor export represents a distortion of Philippine national development;
- 5. U.S. sovernment executive branch support for the project has been a product of expediency in an election year, has ignored the public health and saf ety of the Philippine people, neElected the long term mutaal security Jnterests :
of the Philippine and American peoples, and demonstrated great fiscal irresponsibility at the expense of U.S.
taxpay ers.
From its inception until the present the WestinEhouse reactor project has escaped any riSorous review and coherent comphrehensive scrutiny of its design, sitins, projected operation, impacts, security, and waste removal and stora5e plans. Political and commercial exped-1ency on the part of the United States and the Westinghouse Corpora-tion in conjunction with Philippine conditions under the martial law Marcos dictatorship, most notably rampant corruption at its hiEhest .
levels and its severe represcion of the Philippine people, have led to a consistent and ne6115ent disregard ~of health, safety, and environ-mental issues surrounding the project.
It is not reasonable to assume therefore that the reactor can or will be operated either safely or with the proper concern and vig-ilance to the public welfare demanded by the great potential dangers inherent in nuclear fission technologies. In fact,61ven the evidence to date the opposite is suSEested. The reactor site was selected without proper study, scientific deliberation, or consideration of alternatives. Construction was begun prior to a detailed evaluation
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of either the hazards particular to the site or the projected envircnmental impacts of the project. From the outset the Marcos regime has acted to supress leEitimate public concerns and pro-hibit open discussion of the project. As the Commission is aware ,
cubsequent reviews and assessments by independent and governmental bodies have indicated that the Bataan site has seismic and volcanic characteristics which present extreme and unique hazards. Furthermore the proposed reactor as designed, in the opinion of a wide range of experts, may be without protection and saf eEuards adequate or appro-priate to the severity of hazards now recognized.
'ihen
. considered in conjunction with reports from observors at the site that quality control in construction has been cub standard, and defective materials employed it becomes hard to escape the the conclusion that the Westinghouse export represents the most deficient case for grantin6 an export permit that has ever come before the Commission. If 'these circumstances of the Philippine reactor are insufficient Erounds for denial of the Westinghouse applications it is difficult to conceive what would be sufficient for a worse or more threatening case is hard to imaEine.
In light of the historic character of Philippine-American relations and the conditions of the Marcos dictatorship the inter-pretation of national sovereignity, in the Feb. 8 '80 order of the Commission, which appears to shield the many problems in the Philip-pine project from its direct consideration is inappropriate,.
ill-premised, and an abroEation of the responsibility en rusted in the Commission by the American people and that to be reasonably expected by the world community.
The sovereignity of the Philippine nation cannot be divorced from or truly respected separate from the lif e, health, and welfare of its people. Legitimate def erence to national sovereignity in the matters before the Commission implicitly presumes that the Philippine government, through an existing democratic process, is not only fully aware of the associated health and saf ety risks, but, also, diat because of its dependence upon its people for support, that the Philippine Eovernment will be properly and sufficiently protective of the health and safety of its citizenry reEardinE the proposed nuclear export.
We hold that the above presumption is unjustiflod in the Philippine case where the present Eovernment is a martial law dic-tatorship widely considered by both Philippine and international jurists and leEal scholars as illegitimately representative of the Philippine people; where said government has been found by the U.S.
State Department and other respected international bodies to deny its citizens the most basic democratic rights and to maintain itself ir .,
power throuEh force and electoral fraud; whcre said government has suppressed opposition to the proposed nuclear facility; where the health and safety risks are so obviously apparent; and where the the U.S. corporation seeking favorable action by the Conniccien subsidized and supported by the U.S. government has engaged in cor:upt.
unethical, and illegal practicea in conjunction .iith said government in order to carry out the project and benefit at the expense and to the extreme disadvantage of the Philippine people.
The true threats to Philippine sovereiEnity reside in the
'.lestinEh ouse effort to construct the reactor without adequate concern
for its many danSers to the Philippine people; in the miscovernment and illegitimacy of the Marcos dictatorship which places its own self-aEErandizement and the profits and convenience of foreign cor-porations above the interesta and welfare of the Philippine people; and in the long and continued history of 'U.S. intervention both co-vort and overt which har. supported the corruption and repression of the Marcos regime. For these reasons denial of an export license to the Westinghouse Corporation by the Commission would serve not to infringe upon Philippine sovereignity but rather to preserve and strenEtlen it.
With respect to consideration of the proposed expert'c impact we chare Commissioner Bradford's concern with a policy deciclon on the part of the Commission thLt would extraordinarily rank the export's impact upon fish in international waters ahead of those more immedi-ately presented to the health and cafety of the ciseable concentrations of U.S. citizens residing in close proximity to the proposed roactor itself. More deeply we note the tra6 c1 and disheartening fact that under such a policy the health, caf ty, and environment of the people of the Philippines themselves are accorded even less respect and ranked of lessor importance than not just those of U.S. citizens but those of floh in the sea.
With regard to the actual health, saf ety, and environmental effects the proposed exports may have upon the global commons and territory of the United States it is our belief that whether or not the Commission grants that health, naf ety, and environmental impacts and aspects of the export internal to the Philippines are appropriate grounds for licence denial it cust never-the-leca rarefully consider
be said that the portion of the Gl obal commons surrounding the Philippines is placed in direct nuclear jeopardy by the probable misoperation of the Philippine reactor. For beyond the expectable incidence of nuclear accidents inherent in even the normal and ctandard operation of the reactor the potential for dicasters is Ereatly increased by the very nature of the Marcos regime, itc lack of popular support, and instability. This will be a reactor and a technology essentially out'of control with respect to internationally recognized standards of caution and concern ap;;ropriate to the gravity of risk and danger involved. This 'real,possibili,ty of Qnleashing what in effect would constitute a reneEade reactor must be considered.
The Commission must face une chillinE prospect that the Marcos dic-tatorship may simply not care about these issues.of saf ety and re-sponsibility.
An intanEible but important consequence of the reactor export would be the psychic infrinEement upon the global commons associated with the fact that within the region no one with knowledEe of the circumstances of the Philippine reactor will have reason to feel safe. That is, on the evidence availabe, one cannot be reasonably assured that the Marcos reEime will act on or recognize any but its narrow and short-sighted self-interests, or be.. confident that their saf ety and well ceing were.beins actively and vigilantly protected.
'dhile it is impossible to predict the specific health, safety, and environmental impacts of a major nuclear accident at the proposed Philippine reactor upon_a reS i nn as complex as that portion of the biospere surrcundinE the Philippines shared as El obal commons, it can be stated that immediate loss of human life,1cn6er term increases in
7 and examine those factors, the internal conditions under the Marcos dictatorship, and their international implications in order to fully and completely understand and assess potential impacts upon the global commons and U.S. territory.
Of paramount siEnificance are the major unresolved safety problems associated with reactor design and sitin6 defects. The Philippine reactor in operation will be an assembla6e of accidents waiting to happen; many of which can neither be prevented nor con-tained under present circumstances of the export placing not just the Philippines but the entire southeast asian re61on at risk. To date as demonstrated by its consistent intransigence to domestic and international public concern, its unwillingness to address these problems or submit to _an impartial and comprehensive scientific review of the project, its coercive repression of opposition to the project, and its general and systematic violation of internationally res,.ected human rights includin6 the suppression of free speech, free press, the.riE ht of assembly, and other democratic rights, the Marcos dictatorship has failed in every respect to exercise or exhibit due care and responsibility. This blatant and1 reprehensible disregard of safety, given a scientific capability to do so, can only be con-strued to represent a complete lack of political will or desire on the part of the Marcos reEime to do so.
The actions taken_ thus.far_byJthe Marcos government in the reactor export have exhibited a concern for public relations greater than that for public~ bafety. In consideration of the inadequacies of international inspection, monitorinE, and safecuards as evidenced in the history of reactor exports to the Third World generally it can
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cancer and genetic damage, celected lone-lasting contanination of marine and terrestrial environments across a very wide area could realt from the release.of radioactive materials were such an accident to occur. Similar dangers would be associated with potantial accident that could occur in the transport and storage of nuclear wastes from the reactor. One can speculate a vide variety of possible and credible consequences arising from such accidents; ranging from 'the contamination of internationally exploited fishinE Erounds adjacent to the Philippines or contamination of commercially impor-tant miEratory species poisoned in Philippine waters a nd harvested elsewhere in the global commons to atmospheric pollution and dis-persal of a driftinE cloud of radioactive particles over adjacent nations, Pacific posser sions and territorities of the United States, and global shipping in the area. In ea ch cans, sf course, it is likely that millions of Filipinos would have been affected in even more serious ways. Innumerable scenarios can be Eenerated according to the type of accident and the incredibly complex interplay of air and ocean currents which occur in the Philippiner. ' shat is most illuminating about such speculation is the realization that the immense number of variables and the complexity of their interaction that must be considered, the variety of expertise required to do so, defy present abilities to seriously outline the potential impacts of reactor accidents, let alone analyze or predict their probability.
It remains inescapable, however, that issues of grave and life-threateninE import to the E obal l commons are raised.
It is our position that until such abilitiec are developed, the requisite methodoloEi es and expertises ascembled; and until
cuch analyses and accecaments of the ran6e and scope of probable impacts can be'underthkon and evaluated by all parties affected, that the Commission is obligated to deny the Westinghouse licence to protect the healtb, safety, and environment of the global commons and U.S. territory and to minimize the risks of as yet unforeseen or analyzed consequences.
We note with the greatest concern that the region in question threatened by the. Westinghouse export is a major Elobal center of biological specien richnecc. EcoloCically the southeact asian tropical 11 vine systems are amonE the most complex, diverce, and hiEhly organized on our planet. Ac some of the oldect continu-only entant livin; ccctea on earth they embody the noct advanced _,
statements and fullect expressions of biological evolution we possess.
These living treasures are biosbheric recevoirs of Genetic informa-tion accumulated and preserved over milli;ns of years. They belong to all of us, or more properly we belong to them, for thece ecologi-cal cyeems are the very living fabric of the global commons.
While the direct danger to the unique genetic recources of of the southeast asian tropics is not great it does exist and must be considbred. Ecologists recoEnize that prese..t scientific under-standings of these systems and their potential contribution to human well beinc is imperfect and only in its infancy. he do not really know how many of these systems really work. Many impacts associated with the proposed export and possibly the most signi-ficant of them thus elude our present ability. .to understand them.
Ecological research has indicated that it 13 precisely tis structural and functional complexity and high orEanization that
is most damaEed in ecosystems subjected to the ionizing radiation anticipated if a sizeable nuclear contamination were to occur. It is also clear that tropical ecosystems by virtue of their rapid uptake and internal cycling of resources possess characteristics which make them more susceptible to the uptake and concentration-of radioactive materials. This suEsests a potentially more acute dam-aEe to them and a Ereater risk in their human use than would be the case in temperate zone ecosystems.
We note that there remain rare and undiscovered species in tropical southeast asia whose usefulness to humankind and the bio-shore itself is as yet unknown. We note that only two years aEo the world learned of the hitherto unknown existence of a Philippine people and culture discovered in a remote and undeveloped frontier .
reElon of that country. Slightly earlier the discovery of the Eentle Tasaday, a tiny group of less than 30 persons, electrified and Eave hope to a troubled world. We urEe the Commission to recoEnize that such links to the human past andvthe conson heritage of Elobal humanity are, too, a treasure of the Elobal commons to be protected. It is conceivable that a major nuclear accident could precipate the extinc-tion of such a still to be discovered Eroup that would pass unnoticed and unlamented by an unknowing world.
Beyond these biological and cultural impacts upon the El obal concons raised by the WestinEh ouse reactor export we draw the Commission's attention to the multiplicity of impacts upon those political $nd economic structures, markets, and transactions of the global commons shared by and which link the nations of the world.
To depict only one: aEricultural resources and product flows within and from the southeast asian region affected are critical components
of the international food system which if disrupted by radioactive contamination could produce immense social and economic dislocation and hardship which would not be contained within the region alone.
Beyond the operation of the reactor itself the Commiscion must also consider the impacts upon the global commons and U.S. territory of its associated fuel cycle. Uranium mining and fuel production 1. .a increace the prescures upon and exploitation of native peoples in the United States, Canada, and Australia while alco increacing their exposure to radioactive health hazards. Transport of nuclear materiale edanatinE from the United States entail's additional rick t~o U.S. '
citizens add to the Elobal commons and fore 1En citizens in pro::inity to its chipment. Thus far discussions of nuclear waste disposal from the Philippine plant have cuEEested either Pacific deep sea bed disposal or shipment to an island facility in that region. In bot 2 ases it is probable that U.S. posc essions or territories will be affected.
As no safe means for containing or disposing these wastes now exists serious long term threats can be expected to U.S. and territorial citizens whom the U.S. 10 mandated to protect. It is lil:ely that the ri; hts of self-determination of Pacific peoples may be threatened by actions taken aEainct their will or bect interest in order to sccure a dicpocal cite.
We remind the Commission of the totally ineffective inter-national safeEuards which though designed to prevent nuclear pro-liferation and diversion of weapons material from the fuel cycle have led to runaway production and divercion of plutonium. This~ threat to the global commons can not be underestimated. We believe that the inclination to and the possibility for the subversion of safe-guards and diversion of materialc into weapons production definitely
exists in the Philippines given the ambitions of the Philippine military establishmen,t within the authoritarian and militarily maintained Marcos dictatorship.
For the reasons outlined above and those ennumerated in our earlier brief (see Appendix) we believe that the present inability to assure reasonable protection from the procpect. of deleterious and damaging impacts upon the Elobal commons and U.S.
territory provide in themselves - suf ficient crounds to deny the Westinchouse export license. Such action is clearly within the authority of the Commission and is demanded in the present case.
In addition to these grounds we further submit that the comaon def ense and security of the United States is threatened by the proposed export. This threat exists not only because the ulti-mate common defense and security of the United States is heavily dependent on the maintenance of Eood relations and friendshiu of the peoples of other countries. The substantial danEers to the.
Philippine people poseu by U.S. support of the Westinghouse reactor under the conditions of martial law as described can only jeopar-dise the good will between the peoples of the Philippines and the United Statec. Furthermore the.close identification of the United States Eovernment with this reactor stakes the reputation and international prest 1Ee not just of U.S. industry but of the American nation itself upon the success of a project that is seemingly guaranteed to fail. In a major accident with the impacts possible upon adjacent states and the global commons the United States is likely to be held responsible by those affected. 'le believe that such responsibility does belong to the United States;if not in a strict legal sense iny a more compelling moral
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-lj-one.'. This responsibility. dictates that the common defense and security of this country can best be protected and preserved, and enhanced by'the' forthright denial of'th'e Westinghouse expott license which is required of the Commission when, as here, the proposed export is inlaics.1.to them.
We implore the Commission to carefully consider the issues and ar6uments raised here in; to undertake the further assessment, investigation, andannalyeis necessary to verify them; hd to act accordin[1'y in the only cou. r e which protects the Philip-pine people, the interest.s of the global commons, the health, safety, and environs;nt of U.S. territories affected, and the U.S. national occurity: the denail of the WestinE house application.
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In the Matter of ) Docket No. 110-0495
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WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION ) Application No. XR-120
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(Exports to the Philippines ) Application No. XCOM-0013
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of the Comments and Argument of Intervenor/ Petitioner Friends of the Filipino People Pursuant to February 8,1980 Commission Order were served upon the following per-sons by deposit in the United States Mail (First Class), postage pre-paid, this 29th day of February, 1980:
Samuel J. Chilk Ronald J. Bettauer, Esquire U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commiz, sion Assistant Legal Adviser for Washington, D.C. 20555 Nuclear Affairs U.S. Department of State Chase R. Stephens, Chief Washington, D.C. 20520 Docketing and Service Section U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Thomas R. Asher, Esquire Washington, D.C. 20555 Matthew B. Bogin, Esquire 1232 Seventeenth Streu., N.W.
Howard K. Shapar, Esquire Washington, D.C. 20036 Joanna Becker, Esquire Office of Executive Legal Director Earl Nicholas Selby, Esquire U.S. Nuclear Reg'alatory Commission 2361 Columbia Street kushington, D.C. 20555 Palo Alto, California 94306 Carlton R. Stoibar, Esquire Barton Z. Cowan, Esquire Office of the General Counsel John R. Kenrick, Esquire U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Eckert, Seamans, Cherin & Mellott Washington, D.C. 20555 42nd Floor, 600 Grant Street Pittsburgh, PA 15219 Peter Tarnoff, Execu~.ive Secretary U.S. Department of State Washington, D.C. 20520 w+s [-
sJamdp E. Drew Counsel for Friends of the Filipino People
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