ML19259A759
| ML19259A759 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Prairie Island  |
| Issue date: | 01/02/1979 |
| From: | Mayer L NORTHERN STATES POWER CO. |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| TAC-6587, TAC-8730, NUDOCS 7901100268 | |
| Download: ML19259A759 (35) | |
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f NSP NORTHERN STATES POWER COMPANY M I N N E A PO LI S. M I N N E S OTA 55401 January 2, 1979 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U S Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT Docket Nos. 50-282 License Nos. DPR-42 50-306 DPR-60 NRC Staff Evaluation of Fire Protection Program During the week of October 16, 1978, the NRC Staff conducted an on-site inspection of the fire protection program at the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant. The NRC Staff recommendations resulting from the in-spection, as well as additional staff concerns identified following the inspection, were provided to us in a letter dated November 21, 1978 from A Schwencer, Chief, Operating Reactors Branch #1, USNRC.
We have reviewed Enclosures (3), (4), (5) and (6) of Mr Schwencer's letter. Enclosure (3) contains the Staff's understanding of the commit-ments made by NSP at the conclusion of the site inspection. Enclosures (4) and (5) contain a list of concerns which remained open at the con-clusion of the inspection. Enclosure (6) contains new Staff positions which were not discussed during the site visit. The results of our review of these items are attached. As noted in the attachment, several Staff positions remain open pending further investigation and review on Because of the recent refueling outage, the amount of time our our part.
technical staff has been able to devote to this work has been severely limited.
It is our intention to propose actions to resolve all NRC concerns con-tained in Mr Schwencer's letter of November 21, 1978 by March 2, 1979.
We will make every effort to propose resolutions to all remaining open items which will meet with the approval of the NRC Staff.
In the event a mutually agreeable solution cannot be arrived at, we will propose a meeting with the NRC Staff during April, 1979 to resolve any remaining areas of disagreement.
190110 0 2& $
a NORTHERN STATES POWER COMPANY Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Page 2 January 2, 1979 Please contact us if you have any questions related to our proposed plan for addressing the remaining NRC Staff questions related to the Prairie Island Fire Protection Program.
FoA L 0 Mayer, PE Manager of Nuclear Support Services LOM/DMM/deh cc: J G Keppler G Charnoff Attachments
January 2,1978 PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT RESPONSE TO NRC STAFF FIRE PROTECTION POSITIONS Responses are grouped and numbered into two Attachments:
- 1. Response to Original Staff Positions
- 2. Response to New Staff Positions Attachment (1) contains NSP's responses to the NRC Staff positions discussed at the fire protection inspection exit meeting held on October 20, 1978.
At this exit meeting, NSP either agreed to conform to each position, took exception to the position, or agreed to study the position further.
Following the exit meeting, the NRC Staff renumbered the Staff positions, deleting those considered to be resolved. A number of additional Staff positions were developed. These positions, considered unresolved by the NRC Staff, are listed in Enclosures (4) and (6) of Mr Schwencer's le tter of November 21, 1978. The initial NSP response to Enclosures (4) and (6) is contained in Attachment (2).
The NSP responses in Attachment (2) are in many cases incomplete pending further study and evaluation.
By March 2, 1979 we believe we can close out these items and propose corrective actions which will be agreeable to the NRC Staff. A supplement to this report will be made by that date.
Attachment (1) to NSP letter dated January 2,1979 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation RESPONSE TO ORIGINAL STAFF POSITIONS PF Cable Penetration Fire Barrier Test Staf f Concern The electrical cable penetration for fire barriers have not been tested to demonstrate that their fire resistance rating is ade-quate.
Staff Position The cable penetration fire barriers should be tested
-to demonstrate a fire rating equivalent to the rating required for the barrier in which the penetrations are used. The tests should be per-formed or witnessed by a representative of a qualified independent test-ing laboratory, and should include the following:
(1) The tests should be performed in accordance with ASTME-119 and the following conditions.
(2) The cables used in the test should include the cable insulation materials used in the facility.
(3) The test sample should be representative of the worst case config-uration of cable loading, cable tray arrangement, anchoring and penetration fire barrier size and design.
The test sample should also be representative of the cable sizes in the facility.
Test-ing of the penetration fire barrier in the floor configuration will qualify the fire stop for use in the wall configuration also.
(4)
Cable penetrating the fire barrier should extend at least three feet on the unexposed side and at least one foot on the exposed side.
(5) The fire barrier should be tested in both directions unless the fire barrier is symmetrical.
(6) The fire barrier should be tested with a pressure dif ferential across it that is equivalent to the maximue pressure differential a fire barrier in the plant is expected to experience.
(7) Temperature levels of the cable insulation, cable conductor, cable tray or conduit, and fire stop material should be recorded for the unexposed side of the fire barrier.
(8) Acceptance Criteria - the test is successful if:
The cable penetration fire barrier has withstood the fire a.
endurance test without passage of flame or ignition or cables on the unexposed side for a period equal to the re-quired fire rating, and b.
The temperature levels recorded for the unexposed side are analyzed and demonstrate that the maximum temperatures are sufficiently below the cable insulation ignition temperature, and
. c.
The fire barrier remains intact and does not allow pro-jection of water beyond the unexposed surface during the hose stream test.
If the previous tests can be shown to meet the above position, the licensee should provide the results of the tests to show that the above position is met.
Licensee's Response The licensee understands this position was deleted by the staff and appears in a new position PF-ll and will be addressed in new position PF-ll.
PF Smoke Detection System Test Staf f Concern The type and location of ionization smoke detectors may not provide prompt detection of fires in areas where they are used.
Ventilation air flow patterns or detector sensitivity may prevent effec-tive fire detection.
Staff Position In-situ tests should be conducted with a suitable smoke generation device to verify that the products of combustion from a fire would be promptly detected by installed smoke detectors and that venti-lation air flow pattern in the area do not significantly reduce or pre-vent detection response.
Bench tests should be conducted to verify that smoke detectors will provide prompt response and have adequate sen-sitivity to the products of combustion for the combustibles in the area where smoke detectors are installed.
If any fire detection systems are found to be inadequate, appropriate modifications should be made to pro-vide adequate detection system performance.
Licensee's Response Based on the response of April 18, 1978, and infor-mation gathered by the staff during the site visit, the number and place-ment of detectors are adequate.
The plant has received copies of various Technical Bulletins and letters published by Pyrotroi.;cs Engineering Department covering Response of 3/5A and 5B Ionization Detectors to various burning materials. All ma-terials considered of hazardous nature at Prairie Island (oil, solvents, cable, ect.) are included in the response data contained in these reports.
PF Supervision of Fire Doors Staff Concern Fire doors have to be closed to provide an effective barrier against the spread of fires between different areas as well as to contain suppression agents for total flooding suppression systems.
Staff Position Appropriate administrative controls should be provided to assure the effectiveness of fire doors protecting safety-related areas as follows:
i Fire doors should be inspected semi-annually to verify that self-t closing mechanisms and latches are in good working order.
. 2.
Routine supervision of fire doors should consist of one of the following:
a.
Electrical Supervision of the closed position with alarms at a central location.
b.
Locked closed doors should be inspected weekly to verify that the doors are in the closed position. The fire brigade commander should have ready access to keys for all locked doors.
c.
Automatic release =echanism doors should be inspected monthly to verify that doorways are free of obstructions.
d.
Unsupervised and unlocked self-closing fire doors should be inspected daily to verify that they are in the closed position.
3.
Areas protected by automatic total flooding gas suppression systems should have electrically supervised self-closing fire doors. Automatic releace mechanism fire doors should not be used in such areas.
Licensee's Response The licensee understands that our response of April 18, 1978, is acceptable for PF 3.3.
We also understand the staf f is con -
cerned about the present system of fire door inspection and supervision and found during the site visit the door between the control room and the records storage room did not close sufficiently to provide a positive latch, and the door between the control room and the instrucent shop was propped open with a wooden stool.
To this we provide the following re-sponse.
1.
Originally we did not consider the doors in question (i.e. Records and I&C Shop) to be of fire protection significance because (1) the outer doors leading into these rooms were closed and locked and (2) areas were always occupied. Following the NRC inspection and concern, the door closers for these two doors have been adjusted so doors close and latch.
2.
Inspector's observation that 16C shop door was " propped open by a wooden stool" is in error.
Closer investigation has shown that the door closer was positioned in its open " dead spot" holding door open.
As stated above, door closer =echanism has been readjusted so the dead spot is removed and door will always swing closed and latch.
We do not feel a change in our original position is necessary because (1) all doors into safety related areas will be locked or alar =ed (for security), (2) doors on unoccupied areas are closed and latched, and (3) importance of proper door operation is stressed to operators making daily inspection of these areas.
. PF Air Flow Supervision of Battery Room Exhaust Staf f Concern The ventilation system assures that hydrogen gas does not accumulate in the battery rooms. Appropriate measures should be provided to verify that the ventilation system is accomplishing this function.
Staf f Position Air flow supervision of the exhaust from each battery room should be provided to actuate an alarm in the control room.
Licensee's Response We understand the following response was acceptable to the staff.
Exhaust from the four battery rooms flows through two separate fan systems, both of which are in operation at all times.
System I contains two 24000 cfm fans which provide normal exhaust from the bus rooms, battery rooms, and Auxilifary Feedwater & Air Compressor room.
Flow from each battery room is 800 cfm.
Fan operation would be lost on loss of power.
System II consists of four 300 cfm Battery Room Special Exhaust Fans.
One fan exhausts from each room, but a ccmmon suction tie is provided so on a loss of one fan, the second will continue to exhaust air from two rooms.
If loss of a second fan occurs, an alarm in the control room alerts the operator that both fans have failed. These fans are powered from the safe-guard bus and continue operation following power failure.
Operators on their rounds verify fan operation twice per shif t.
PF Smoke Detection - Control Room Air Supply Staff Concern Smoke from fires external to the control room could be introduced into the makeup air supply to the control room. Area smoke detection in the control room does not provide an effective means to identify such a problem.
Staff Position Smoke detection should be provided in the makeup air supply to the control room.
Licensee's Response We understand the following response is acceptable to the staff.
The control room ventilation system consists of two independent air con-ditioning systems, each with its own outside makeup air supply. A fire in an area of the plant where chillers are located would be detected by the installed detection system.
If either system was ieopardized by a fire, the alternate could easily be put into service with the makeup air being supplied from the opposite end of building. With our present system, we do not see a need for additional detectors within the supply ducts.
. PF Post Indicator Valve Barricades Staff Concern There are a number of post indicator valve barricades that are not of adequate height to protect the valves from vehicular traffic.
Staff Position The following barricade posts should be extended in height so that the height of the post is approximately 6 inches above the height of the valve operating assembly:
(1)
FP-35-2 (2)
FP-35-3 Additionally, all other post indicator valve barricade posts should be evaluated to assure that they are not vulnerable to damage from vehicular traffic.
Licensee's Response The licensee agrees to extend height of the specified posts. All other posts will be evaluated.
PF Exterior Fire Hydrant Inspections Staff Concern Fire hydrant barrels may be damaged due to the freezing of water if they are not drained.
Staff Position A periodic inspection schedule should be established to:
(1) Verify that the barrels are drained precceding the winter freezing season.
(2) After the winter freezing season has passed, conduct a hydrostatic test of barrel to verify the pressure integrity.
Licensee's Response The licensee will conduct hydrostatic tests of barrels to verify pressure integrity and will verify that barrels are drained before the winter freezing season.
PF Exterior Fire Hydrant Nozzles Staff Concern There may be certain types of fires for which a straight stream nozzle is needed to effectively fight the fire.
Staff Position A 2 1/2 inch adjustable fog-straight stream nozzle with shutoff capability should be provided at one hydrant hose house on each side of the plant except the north face where the ' ire station transformers are located.
Licensee's. Response Nozzles are capable of closing to a 15* stream.
Staff agreed to delete position at exit meeting.
s PF Hydrant Hose House Equipment Staff Position The following equipment should be provided in each of the eight hydrant hose houses that are in the vincinty of the turbine building, auxiliary building and containment' building compley, (Hydrant Hose Houses 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26).
(1) Two hose gaskets for each hose size used; i
(2) One 2 1/2" x 1 1/2" x 1 1/2" gated wye; and (3) One additional 100-ft length of 1 1/2" hos'e.
Licensee's Response Equipment will be provided.
P F-10 Water Screenhouse - Diesel & Electric-Driven Fire Pumps
\\
ihe electric-driven fire pumps should be pr!ltected,frok Staff Position diesel oil fires originating in the diesel driven fire' pumps or their fuel systems, including their day tanks.
Licensee's Response An engineering study will be initiated and a solution defined which will protect the electric-driven fire pumps from a diesel oil fire originating in the diesel driven fire pumps or their fuel system, including their day tank.
PF-ll Water Screenhouse - Battery Racks for Diesel Driven Fire Purgs__+
Staff Position The wooden covers on the battery racks should be replaced with covers compost.d of a noncorbustible material or pressure-traated fire retardant word.
Licensee's Respoqse The wooden covers will be removed and if peplaced, "
noncombustible materidl will be used.
PF-12 Water Screenhouse - Electric Motor-Driv (n Fire Pump Cables Staff Position Verification should be provided that no power or control cables for the electric motor-driven fire pumps are routed over the area of influence of a diesel fuel fire.
Licensee's Respease Verification will' be made'and cables routed over the area of influenc.: will be re-routed.
PF-13 Water Screenhouse - Diesel' Driven Cooling ' Water Pumps - Floor Drains Staff Position Verification should be provided that fuel leakage from the diesel driven cooling water pumps or their fuel systems cannot spread to other areas of the water screenhouse via the floor drainage systems.
Licensee's Response Verification will be made.
I l
. PF-14 Auxiliary Buildfic, 755 Feet Elevation - Safe Shutdown Requirements Staff Position Verify that the safety-related cables in Fire Area 2 and Fire Area 76 are not required for safe hot or cold shutdown.
Licensce's Response This position will be covered in the response to PF-23.
This position was deleted at the exit meeting.
PF-15 Fire Retardant Wood Staff Position All lumber and wooden items in safety-related areas should be replaced with pressure-treated fire retardant lumber.
Licensee's Response The licensee understands this position was deleted by the staff and appears in a new position, PF-10, and will be addressed in new position PF-10.
PF-16 Containment Fire Hose Standpipe Staff Position The containment fire hose standpipe system should be solidly piped to the fire water supply header outside containment. A valve may be provided on the outside of containment to maintain the fire water piping inside containment dry until needed to suppress a con-tainment fire.
Licensee's Response The licensee understands this position was deleted by the staff and appears in a new position, PF-15, and will be addressed in the response to new position PF-15.
PF-17 Auxiliary Buildine, Fire Zone 60 - Sterace of Wooden Boxes Staff Position The wooden equipment boxes stored on the platform above the entrance to containment should be coated with an acceptable fire re-tardant coating.
Licensee's Response The wooden equipment boxes will be coated with an acceptable fire retardant coating or they will be removed from the plant.
PF-18 Trash Containers Staff Positioa Trash containers in all safety-related areas should be re-placed with metal containers which are provided with metal swing top lids.
Licensee's Response Agree to replace trash containers with metal containers with metal swing top lids in all safety-related areas. Canvas hampers lined with plastic bags will continue to be used for collection of anti-C clothing at stepoff pads.
PF-19 Cable Penetration Seal Qualification Staff Position Demonstrate by test tnat the penetration seals presently installed in the plant have a rating equivalent to the fire severity
. present on either side of the seal using the test criteria and guidance as discussed in PF-1.
Any new penetration seals that are installed in the plant in the future or existing seals which must be replaced should be qualified to the test guidance and criteria of PF-1.
Licensee's Response The licensee understands this position was deleted by the staft and appears in a new position, Pr-ll, and will be addressed in the response to new position PF-ll.
PF-20 Auxiliary Building, Fire Zone 74 - Control of Combustibles Staff Position The storage of combustible materials along the north wall of Fire Zone 74 should be discontinued. No combustible materials should be atored in this fire zone.
Licensee's Response The licensee understands this position was deleted by the staff and appears in a new position, PF-16, and will be addressed in the response to new position PF-16.
PF-21 Diesel Generator Rooms - Curbs Staff Position Curbs or ramps should be provided at the fire door between the two diesel generator rooms and at the door between generator room No. 1 and Fire Zone 27.
Licensee's Response We will provide a ramp between the diesel rooms if it can be confirmed with the door manufacturer that the door can be shortened without reducing its effectiveness.
We do not agree with the recommendation to install ramps or curbs at exit doors (Zone 27). With ramps or curbs, oil leakage with deluge water would flood the room and overflow into Zone 27 anyway. Zone 27 contains no safeguards or equipment necessary for safe shutdown and has a very light fire loading. Zone 27 drains to the turbine building sump.
PF-22 Diesel Generator Rooms - Penetration Seals Staff Position All penetration seals between the diesel generator rooms and tne auxiliary building should have 3-hour fire resistance.
Licensee's Response The licensee understands this position was deleted by the staff and appears in a new position, PF-17, and will be addressed in the response to new position PF-17.
PF-23 Safe Shutdown Equipment Staff Position Provide a list of minimum systems and equipment needed for achieving and maintaining safe hot shutdown and safe cold shutdown follow-ing a severe fire in the plant considering the following shutdown functions:
. (1) Placing the reactor in a subcritical condition and maintaining the reactor subcritical.
(2) Bringing the reactor to safe hot shutdown conditions and maintaining it at hot shutdown for an extended period of time (i.e., loager than 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />) using only on-site power sources and on-site water supplies.
(3) Maintaining the reactor coolant system inventory using only on-site sources of makeup water.
(4) Bringing the reactor to safe cold shutdown conditions within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> using either on-site or off-site power sources.
Hot shutdown should be achievable from the control room or the remote shut-down panels. Where a fire in a given fire zone causes inoperability of hot shutdown equipment from the control room or remote shutdown panels, remote manual operation of valves and breakers is permissible provided it can be shown that there is sufficient time and manpower to accomplish these manual operations. Manual operation of valves and breakers and replacing of cables for achieving and maintaining safe cold shutdown is permissible provided it can be shown that these operations can be done within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
Demonstrate that the plant can be safety shutdown using anyone or combination of the following in the event of a fire in any fire zone:
(1) Redundant systems and equipment are located in separate fire areas.
(Fire areas are defined as areas bounded on all sides by three-hour fire rated boundaries.)
(2)
If redundant systems are located in the same fire area, there is reasonable assurance that redundant systems will not be damaged con-sidering potential exposure fires, flame spread characteristics and fire protection features within the zone.
(NOTE: Sole reliance sheuld not he placed on active, automatic fire suppression sytems.)
(3) An alternate shutdown system will be provided which is independent of the influence of the fire within the fire zone by rerouting cables and relocating equipment.
Licensee's Response The licensee understands this position was deleted by the staff and appears in a new position, PF-12, and will be addressed in the response to new position PF-12.
PF-24 Polyurethane Foam Insulation Staff Position All polyurethane foam insulation used in safety-related areas should be painted with an intumescent coating.
Licensee's Response Agree to paint all polyurethane foam insulation used in safety-related areas with an intumescent coating.
. P F-25 Booster Hose Service for Fire Zones 10, 11, 79, 13, 82, 16 & 17 Staff Position A one inch booster hose with variable gallonage nozzle with shutof f should be provided adjacent to existing hose statione 21, 24, 64 and 70.
Licensee's Response The licensee understands this position was deleted by the staff and appears in a new position, PF-14, and will be addressed in the response to new position PF-14.
PF-26 Records Storage Room, Fire Zone 12 - Electric Range Hood & Ducts Staff Position The hood and ducts above the electric range should be provided with a grease filter.
A periodic cleaning program should be instituted for this filter. A 5-lb dry chemical extinguisher should be provided next to the range.
Licensee's Response Agree to provide the grease filter and will institute a periodic cleaning program. The requested chemical extinguisher is now provided.
PF-27 Smoke Detector Location Marks Staff Position Smoke detectors located in areas that are blocked from view should be provided with remote indicating lamp in the room or locator mark-ings on the floor.
Licensee's Response Agree to provide locator markings on the floor or remote indicating lamps.
PF-28 Control of Combustibles Staff Position Verification should be provided that the wall and ceiling covering in the control room has a flame spread rating of 25 or less. All wooden furniture and lumber should be removed from the control room.
Licensee's Response Wall and ceiling covering is Ovnes-Corning fiberglass 25 All Service Jacket (ASJ).
Fiberglass 25 ASJ has a flame spread rating of 25, classified by UL Number R5583 U8.15 and meets NFPA Code 90A.
All wood is removed.
PF-29 Instrument Room, Fire Zone 83 - Fire Door Staff Position The door between the control room and the instrument room should be adjusted to assure it remains in the closed position when not in use for entry and exit purposes.
Licensee's Response Answered in Staf f Position PF-3.
PF-30 Cable Spreading & Relay Room, Fire Zones 18 & 18A - Alternate Shutdown Staff Position An alternate shutdown capability should be provided inde-
. pendent of the cable spreading and relay room such that the conditions specified for safe shutdown in PF-23 are met.
Licensee's Response The licensee understands this pcsition was deleted by the staff and appears in a new position, PF-13, and will be addressed in the response to new position PF-13.
PF-31 Cable Spreadine & Relay Room - Booster Hose Staff Position A one-inch booster hose with variable gallonage nozzle (10 to 30 gpm range) with shutoff should be provided adjacent to existing hose stations 23 and 69 for use in the cable spreading and relay room.
A cabinet should be provided outside the room with waterproof tarpaulins to protect the relay cabinets from water damage.
Licensee's Response The licensee understands this position was deleted by the staff and appears in a new position, PF-14, and will be addressed in the response to new position PF-14.
PF-32 Cable Spreading and Relay Room - Fire Retardant Coating Staff Position Cables in the cable spreading and relay room should be covered with a qualified fire retardant coating.
Licensee's Response The licensee understands this position was deleted by the staff.
PF-33 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Rooms, Fire Zones 31 & 32 Pipe Trench Staff Position A concrete fire barrier should be placed in the pipe trench that passes through the AFW pump rooms at the boundary between the two rooms. Metal covers consisting of 5/16" thick steel plates should be placed over the portion of the pipe trench which runs through each room and should be fastened to the concrete floors to prevent movement and warpage of the plates due to a postulated fire.
Licensee's Response An engineering evaluation will be initiated which will result in an adequate fire barrier placed in the pipe trench. Metal covers 5/16" thick will be placed over the portion of the pipe trench which runs through each room.
PF-34 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Rooms - Water Damage Staff Position Verification should be provided that operation of the wet pipe sprinkler system in the AFW pump rooms will not damage equipment needed for safe hot shutdown of the plant.
Licensee's Response Agree to conduct an engineering evaluation.
Pi-35 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Room - Hot Shutdown Panels Staff Position Verification should be provided that in the event of fire damage to a hot shutdown panel, safe shutdown can be accomplished using systems and equipment located outside the room.
. Licensee's Response Agree to conduct an engineering evaluation.
PF-36 Turbine Lube Oil Drain Staff Position Verification should be provided that drainage from the lube oil storage tank and lube oil reservoir floor drains cannot back up into other safety-related areas of the plant or areas that pcsc a hazard to safety-related areas.
Licensee's Response Each turbine oil reservoir is counted over a curbed pit which has a capacity of approximately 9500 gallons.
Draining from this pit is by a 6" line at floor level and a 4" line 1-foot above the floor to a concrete enclosed sump which has a capacity of approximately 20,000 gallons. The normal loading of the oil reservoir is approximately 10,000 gallons, so dumping the entire tank would have little ef fect on combined capacities of pit and sump. If the deluge system were actuated, and the pit and sump filled, overflow would be to turbine room floor drains and su=p.
PF-37 Fire Detection System - Emer:,;ncy Power & Supervision Staff Position Verification should be provided that all circuits of the detection system are supplied by the emergency bus and are electrically supervised.
Licensee's Response Fire Indicating Unit (FIU) is powered from AC Panel 116 which is a 208/120V non-interuptable panel.
Panel 116 powered from Instrument Inverter 16 Inverter 16 powered from 125 VDC panel 12 125 VDC Panel 12 is powered from 480 VAC - MCC Bus 2 480 VAC - MCC Bus 2 is powered from Bus 16 Safeguards Failure of 16 inverter would result in automatic transfer of panel 116 to panel 117 which is powered from safeguard Bus 15.
PF-33 Turbine Building - Hydrocen Seal Oil Unit Curbs Staff Position A curb should be provided around each hydrogen seal oil unit of sufficient height to contain the entire contents of the unit plus a margin for fire suppression water.
Licensee's Response The licensee understands this position was deleted by the staff and appears in a new position, PF-18, and will be addressed in the response to new position PF-18.
PF-39 Turbine _ Building - Lube Oil Reservoirs Staff Position Verify that the design density, coverage and nozzle loca-tions are adequate to suppress a fire involving rupture of the turbine lube oil reservoirs.
. Licensea's Responie Pump design, and verified by testi.ng, is 2000 gpm flow at 125 psi with minimum pressure at highest elevation of 60 psi.
Using this basis then:
Pump centerline 672' 125 psi to head in feet 289' 961' Elevation of highest hose station 809 Head diff 152 feet = 65.8 psi Manufacturer's local representative has verbally verified the LE Model Elkhart nozzle will fun' tion as designed down to a nozzle pressure of 50 e
psi with, of course, a decrease in flow and ef fective reach.
Pump delivery rates below the rated 2000 gpm result in significantly higher pressures at the hose station.
PF-25 Hydrant Hose House - Hose Attachment Staf f Concern It is current practice at the plant to attach a 1 1/2 inch hose to the 2-1/2" hose gate valve in the hydrant hose house by use of an adaptor.
This hose arrangement may cause an unacceptable reduction in fire water pressure available at the scene of the fire, particularly if the avail-able pressure at the hydrant is limited to 120 psi.
Staff Position The practice of connecting a 1-1/2 inch hose directly to the hydrant should be discontinued. A 2-1/2 inch hose should be connected to a hydrant outlet gate valve.
Licensee's Response Staff is in error in their review of current practice. Prairie Island hydrants have two outlets, one has a 2-1/2" gate valve with 100 feet of 2-1/2" hose attached. The other is reduced to 1-1/2" with a 1-1/2" gate valve and 100 feet of 1-1/2" hose attached.
Each house also has 100 feet of spare 2-1/2" hose.
PF-9 will add 100 feet of 1-1/2" hose plus the gated Wye.
We believe the above described configurate satisfies NFPA 24.
P F-26 Hot Work Permits Staff Concern The licensee does not utilize a hot work permit systen for the control
. (1) 2 1/2" x 1 1/2" x 1 1/2" gated wye
--one
--one (1) 2 1/2" gate valve
--two (2) forcible entry tools (halligan type)
--two (2) 2 1/2" double female adapters
--two (2) each, 2 1/2" and 1 1/2" universal hose spanners
--two (2) portable radios
--two (2) battery powered portable handlights (7 1/2 volt) spare lengths of 2 1/2" and 1 1/2" hose spare gaskets for 2 1/2" and 1 1/2" hose couplings spare 2 1/2" and 1 1/2" fog nozzles Licensee's Response The licensee understands this position was deleted by the staf f and appears in a new position, PF-8, and will be addressed in the response to new position PF-8.
PF-44 Fire Brigade Practive Sessions Staff Position Practice sessions should be held for fire brigade members on the proper method of fighting various types of fires that could occur in a nuclear power plant considering such factors as the magnitude of the fire, and the complexity and difficulty of fire fighting. These sessions should be designed to provide origade members with experience in actual fire extinguishment and the use of emergency breathing apparatus under strenuous working conditions. The sessions should be in addition to the scheduled fire brigade training sessions and fire drills and should include fire fighting strategies, (i.e., simple plans showing fire fight-ing equipment locaticn ', entry and egress points, ventilation, communica-tions and emergency tisating locations and controls). These practice sessions should be provided at regular intervals, but not exceeding a one year interval for each fire brigade member.
Licensee's Response The licensee will respond to this position by 3-2-79.
PF-45 Fire Protection Program - 0A Audits Staff Position In order to provide an overall assessment of conformance to fire protection program requirements an audit should be performed annually until results show that a biennial audit is sufficient.
Licensee's Response Agree to perform annual audit until results show biennial audit is sufficient.
PF-46 Screening of Fire Brigade Members for Heart and Respiratory Disorders Staff Position All fire brigade members should be periodically screened for heart and respiratory disorders. This program should be developed by a medical doctor and administered by the plant nurse. Fire brigade members who fail this screening test will be given a physical examination by a medical doctor to determine their physical qualifications for continued assignments as fire brigade members.
Licensee's Response Agree to the staff's position on screening.
. water pumps and a diesel driven fire pump.
2.
Fire Zones 25 and 26 each contain an emergency diesel generntor.
The transfer piping for the diesel driven auxiliaries in the screenhouse enters the east wall of the building and runs along the ceiling across the area in which the electric driven fire pump is located.
In the vicin-ity of the diesel driven fire pump tvo of the lines which provide diesel oil for the diesel driven cooling w. :er pumps enter the upper level of the screenhouse and are piped to their respective day tanks. The remain-ing line is piped directly to the diesci driven fire pump day tank.
Diesel oil transfer piping for the emergency diesel generators is buried until it reaches the rooms in which the day tanks are located.
A fire fed by the day tank fuci supply could have serious consequences if provisions are not adequate to automatically or manually stop the transfer of diesel oil from the storage tank to the day tank in the event of a rupture of one of the fuel transfer lines or a fire at the day tank.
This is especially serious in the case of the fire pumps since the day tank for the diesel driven fire pump is located approximately 17 feet from the elec-tric driven fire pump outlined in Item 4 of Enclosure 3, failure to cut-off the supply of diesel oil could result in an aggravated exposure fire.
Staff Position 1.
All diesel oil transfer piping that enters the screenhouse should be replaced with double jacketed pipe along its full length from its point of entry to the building to its termination at each day tank.
2.
A fusible link actuated shutoff valve should be provided in the diesel driven fire pump fuel transfer line at a point as close as possible to where the line enters the diesel driven fire pump day tank.
3.
Pre-fire plan strategies should be developed for all diesel fuel day tank areas to provide for tripping the diesel oil transfer pumps and/
or isolating the fuel supply lines to the day tank in the event of a fire or a piping rupture.
Licensee's Response 1.
Initial review indicates that present piping with additional protection (insulation, retardant coating, ect.) will be sufficient for pipe p'rotection.
We do not intend to replace the three oil supply lines along their en-tire length to the terminations at the day tank.
2.
A study will he made to determine if a fusible link actuated shutoff valve will provide the protection suggested by the staff position.
3.
Agree to add the precautions for isolating oil pumps to the zone fire fighting strategies which are to be developed.
Attachment (2) to NSP letter dated January 2,1979 Director or Nuclear Reactor Regulation RESPONSE TO NEW STAFF POSITIONS PF-6 Fire Brigade Training Staff Concern The fire brigade will not maintain a high level of fire fighting exper-tise unless:
1.
Classroom instructions and fire drills are provided on a more fre-quent schedule than the proposed 6 month interval for classroom instructions and the semi annual fire drills; 2.
Fire brigade members are each evaluated during fire drills to assure their proficiency in fire fighting techniques; 3.
Periodic critiques of the fire brigade are performed by qualified individuals independent of the plant staff to update and correct the existing fire fighting techniques.
Staff Position Regularly planned meetings should be held every 3 months to repeat a.
the initial classroom instruction programs over a two year interval.
b.
During fire drills, an evaluation should be made at each fire brigade member's proficiency in the use of fire fighting procedures.
c.
Fire drills should be critiqued at three year intervals by individuals independent of the plant's staff.
d.
Fire drills should be performed at regular intervals but no? to exceed 3 months for each fire brigade.
Licensee's Response a.
Will response 3-2-79.
b.
Agree with the staff's position, Agree with the staf f's position.
c.
d.
With our six (6) fire brigades, this would require a minimum of 24 drills a year. We consider this excessive and are concerned it could lead to perfunctory performance on the part of those participating in the drills as well as an unwarranted state of confusion for others at the facility. We believe one drill per month (2 drills per brigade) is the maximum.
. PF-7 Fire Brigade Staf f Concern The three man brigade may not provide an adequate response force to control and suppress fires in safety-related areas.
Fires in critical areas of the plant may require the use of systems, components or auxiliaries normally not used for plant shutdown. A Shift Supervisor who is not a member of the fire brigade, may be needed to direct the integrated operation of these systems, components or aux-iliaries during a fire.
Staff Position A fire brigade of not less than five trained members should be maintained on-site at all times.
This five man brigade should be organized with responsibilities assigned responsive to the plant's fire fighting plants.
The assigned responsibilities should include advancing support supplies to the fire scene, command control of the brigade, communication with the control room, fire hose laying, applying the extinguisher to the fira, set up and operation of portable ventilation and smoke removal equipment, relieving fatigued or injured fire fighter, rescue operation, and cesrdi-nation with off-site fire department personnel.
A Shift Supervisor who is not a member of the fire brigade should be present in the control room or other areas if fires occur in certain critical areas of the plant.
Licensee's Response The licensee agrees to increase the support of the 3 man brigade team by the addition of a 2 man Fire Brigade Support Team (FBST).
This team will consist of operators and/or security force personnel and will provide sub-stantial support to fully qualified brigade members. The FBST will receive abbreviate training on a regular basis. The FBST members will be organized with responsibilities assigned responsive to the plants fire fighting needs.
Prairie Island operating crews are supervised by two shift supervisors at all times. The Unit 2 supervisor is the Fire Brigade Chief.
PF-8 Centralized Fire Equipment Storage Location Staf f Concern In order to be prepared to ef fectively fight a fire of the type that could occur at the plant, the fire brigade should have readily available at a central location certain types and quantities of equipment.
, Staff Position Provide a suitabic storage area for fire brigade equipment, at a central location, containing the following equipment:
--10 sets of fire fighting protective clothing consisting of turnout coats with removable liners, thigh length boots, gloves and fire fighter style helmets.
--six (6) complete self-contained breathing units with two spare cylinders for each unit and with the spare cylinders for all other units (or at other strategic locations).
(1) 1 1/2" metering type nozzle with wide and narrow stream options
--one
--one (1) 1-1/2" x 1-1/2" x 1 1/2" gated wye
--one (1) 2-1/2" gate valve
--two (2) forcible entry tools (halligan Type)
--two (2) 2 -1/2" double female adapters
--two (2) each, 2-1/2" and 1-1/2" universal hose spanners
--two (2) portable radios
--two (2) battery powered portable handlights (7 1/2 volt)
--spare lengths of 2-1/2" and 1-1/2" hose
--spare gaskets for 2-1/2" and 1-1/2" hose couplings
--spare 2-1/2" and 1 1/2" fog nozzles Licensee's Response The licensee agrees with the staff position but takes exception to the following specific types and quantities of equipment.
a.
1-1/2" Metering Nozzle with Wide and Narrow Stream We plan to add a nozzle of this type, but to be consistant with all other plant nozzles, it will be ordered with the solid stream feature deleted.
b.
2-1/2" x 1-1/2" x 1-1/2" Cated Wye We fail to see the need or use of this piece of equipment. We have no connection in the building for 2-1/2" hose.
If a 2-1/2" hose were pulled from an exterior hydrant station, a 2-1/2" x 1-1/2" x 1-1/2" wye will be available in each house (refer to old Position PF-9).
c.
2 -1/2" Gate Valve No indication is given as to thread type, pipe, hose or pipe to hose.
Each of the31 hydrant stati ns have a valve (pipe to hose) of this type, so a spare cou:d be obtained if needed.
d.
2-1/2" Double Female Adapters We do not understand why this type of adapter is -39ded.
Consulting the Red Wing Fire Department, they agree that this type adapter in not appropriate for industrial fire brigades. Instead, we propose
, to have the following adapters:
2 1/2" - pipe to hose 1-1/2" - pipe to hose 2-1/2" to 1 1/2" - hose to hose e.
Portable Radios Our present ready location for radios (5) and spare batteries (7) is in the control room shift supervisor's office. When not in use, they are kept in a trickle charge storage unit.
In case of fire, the brigade chief and at least one operator take radios with them when leaving.
After we have the centralized fire brigade equipment loca-tion established, we will review problems associated with radio stor-age outside the control room and make a final decision at that time.
PF-9 Fire Hose Testing Staff Concern Fire hose deteriorates wtih time and use and may fail when needed during a fire.
Staff Position Fire hose should be hydrostatically tested periodically at a pressure 50 psi above the maximum service pressure of the fire water system.
Exterior hoses should be so tested annually' interior hose should be so tested every three years.
Licensee's Response The licensee agrees to the hydrostatic testing at 50 psi above the maxi-mum service pressure every three years for all fire hoses.
PF-10 Fire Retardant Wood Staff Concern A number of safety-related areas contain lumber used for scaffolding, work operations and packaging. This lumber presents a fire hazard enless properly treated.
Staff Position All lumber and wooden items in safety-related areas should be replaced with pressure-treated fire retardant lumber or coated with a penetrating fire retardant that has good abrasion resistance.
, Licensee's Response The licensee agrees with the staf f position.
PF-ll Electrical and Mechanical Penetration Qualification Staf f Concern The NRC staff has taken the position that all electrical and mechanical penetrations in fire barriers surrounding safety-related areas should be sealed by methods demonstrated effective by testing. The licensee has identified typical electrical (cable and trays and conduits) and mechanical (pipes and ventilation ducts) penetration seals that exist at the plant. The licensee haa provided some information concerning the adequacy of seals during the site visit and has stated that test re-sults which demonstrated the effectiveness of the fire stops are not presently available.
Staff Position Demonstrate by test that the penetration seals presently installed in the plant have a rating equivalent to the fire severity present on either side of the seal using the test criteria and guidance as dis-cussed in PF-1.
Any new penetration seals that are installed in the plant in the future or existing seals which must be replaced should be qualified to the test guidance and criteria of PF-1.
Licensee's Response Will respond 3-2-79.
PF-12 Safe Shutdown Requirenents Staff Concern The licensee has submitted a preliminary shutdown analysis. This shut-down analysis did not consider such items as the capability for makeup to the primary system during hot shutdown and the provisions for boration in achieving and maintaining hot shutdown. The licensee has not developed fully the list of minimum systems needed for achieving and maintaining hot and cold shutdown condition. The licensee is continuing to refine the list of minimum systems and equipment needed for achieving and maintaining both hot shutdown and cold shutdown conditions. Further, the licensee is continuing the ef fort to determine the exact location of electrical race-ways for those systems and auxiliaries required to safely shutdown and cooldown the plant.
Finally, the licensee has not demonstrated that the plant can be safely shutdown in the event of a fire in any fire area.
. Staff Position Provide a list of minimum systems and equipment needed for achieving and maintaining safe hot shutdown and safe cold shutdown following a severe fire in the plant considering the following shutdown functions:
1.
Placing the reactor in a suberitical condition and maintaining the reactor subcritical.
2.
Bringing the reactor to safe hot shutdown conditions and maintain-ing it at hot shutdown for an extended period of time (i.e., longer than 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />) using only onsite power sources and onsite water supplies.
3.
Fbintaining the reactor coolant system inventory using only onsite sources of makeup water.
4.
Bringing the reactor to safe cold shutdown conditions within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> using either onsite or offsite power sources.
Hot shutdown should be achievable from the control room or the remote shutdown panels. Where a fire in a given fire zone causes inoperability of hot shutdown equipment from the control room or remote shutdown panels, remote manual operation of valves and breakers is permissible provided it can be shown that there is sufficient time and manpower to accomplish these manual operations. Manual operation of valves and breakers and replacing of cables for achieving and maintaining safe cold shutdown is permissible provided it can be shown that these operations can be done within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
Demonstrate that the plant can be safely shutdown using any one or com-bination of the following in the event of a fire in any fire zone:
1.
Redundant systems and equipment are located in separate fire areas.
(Fire areas are defined as areas bounded on all sides by three-hour fire rated boundaries.)
2.
If redundant systems are located in the same fire area, there is reasonable assurance that redundant systems will not be damaged considering potential exposure fires, flame spread characteristics and fire protection features within the zone.
(Note: Sole reliance should not be placed on active, automatic fire suppression systems.)
3.
An alternate shutdown system will be provided which is independent of the influence of the fire within the fire zone by rerouting cables and relocating equipment.
Licensee's Response Equipment required to place and maintain reactor in a suberitical hot shutdown condition (per unit):
i a.
Steam generator safety valves b.
An emergency diesel generator c.
A battery d.
An auxiliary feedwater pump and associated valves needed to feed one steam generator c.
A station air compressor f.
A cooling water pump g.
A steam generator power operated relief valve h.
A boration path, either one of the following:
i)
Emergency boration which includes a charging pump, a boric acid transfer pump, a boric acid storage tank or refueling water storage tcnk and heat tracing associated with the path.
- 11) High head injection which includes a safety injection pump, a boric acid storage tank or refueling water storage tank, supply valves to pump and associated boric acid supply heat tracing.
1.
Steam generator level indication J.
Reactor coolant pressure indication Equipment needed to maintain the reactor coolant system inventory using only onsite sources of makeup water.
The refueling water storage tank through one of the boration paths itemized in the response above will provide makeup.
Equipment needed to bring the reactor to safe cold shutdown conditions within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> using either onsite or of fsite power sources.
a.
Those items listed in the response above. items d through j.
b.
In addition, the following:
i)
A residual heat removal pump, heat exchanger and valves needed for recirculation from and back to reactor coolant leop.
ii) A component cooling pump, heat exchanger and component cooling loop isolation valves.
iii) Cooling water valves to supply the component cooling heat exchanger.
iv)
Reactor coolant temperature indication.
v)
Pressurizer level indication.
Demonstrate that the plant can ba safely shutdown using any one or com-bination of methods described in the staff position.
This will be specifically determined and addressed in a response scheduled before 3-2-79.
. PF-13 Cable Spreading & Relay Ro;m Alternate Shutdown Requirements Staf f Concern The cable spreading and relay room contains cables, in close proximity, of redundant sys'. ems of both Units 1 and 2 that are required for safe shutdown. The room is protected by a double shot CO system actuuted by 2
thermal detectors.
Portable extinguishers are available in the room and hose stations are nearby near vicinity. However, there is a heavy con-centration of combustible cables, especially in the ce ling area of the rocm and access to this area is limited to the extent that manual suppres-sion of the fire would be difficult.
It is the staff's concern that (1)
CO2 system may not be effective in suppressing a deep seated fire, (2) the spatial separation between redundant divisions of safe shutdown systems may not be sufficient to prevent an exposure fire from damaging both divi-sions.
Staff Position An alternate shutdown capability should be provided independent of the cable spreading and relay room such that the conditions specified for safe shutdown in PF-12 are met.
Licensee's Response The licensee has initiated an engineering study.
PF-14 Booster Hose Service for Electrical Equipment Areas Staff Concern The following fire zones contain electrical cabinets and panels that are susceptible to hose stream water damage: Fire Zones 10; 11; 13; 16; 17; 18; 18A; 79; and 82.
Hose stations are provided adjacent to these fire zones to permit manual suppression of fires originating in these zones. Hrvever, use of a 1 1/2" hose and nozzle may damage nearby safety-related equipment and circuits in cabinets not involved in the fire.
Staff Position A one-inch booster hose with variable gallonage nozzle with shutoff should be provided adjacent to existing hose stations 21, 23, 24, 64, 69, and 70.
In addition, a cabinet should be provided outside the cable spreading and relay room with waterproof tarpaulins to be used to protect the relay cabi-nets from water damage.
Licensee's Response Licensee agrees to provide the equipment stated in the staff position.
Tarpaulins will be stored with the other fire fighting equipment at the central location which will be near the cable spreading and relay room.
. PF-15 Containment Fire Hose Standpipe Staff Concern During normal operation the containment hose stations are dry.
Following detection of a fire in containment it is necessary to remove containment fire hose standpipe system flanges attached at the inner and outer containment boundaries and to install spool pieces in the fire water system. The licensee's description of his procedure to reestablish fire water to containment indicates that fire suppression water would not be available for a period of 6 to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> following detection of a fire in containment because of containment integrity considerations prior to cool-down to 200*F.
A more timely method for providing fire water to containment hose stations is needed to assure prompt extinguishment of a fire within containment.
Staff Position The containment fire hose standpipe system should be solidly piped to the fire water supply header outside containment. A valve may be provided on the outside of containment to maintain the fire water piping inside containment dry until needed to suppress a containment fire.
Licensee's Response An engineering study will be initiated to evaluate more timely methods for providing fire water to containment. The solidly piped water supply is a potential solution which will be considered.
It is expected that an accept-able method will be determined by 3-2-79.
PF-16 Auxiliary Building, Fire Zone 74 - Control of Combustibles Staff Concern Fire Zone 74 contains cables cf redundant systems needed for safe shutdown of the plant.
At the present time, approximately 1000 pounds of clothing and other combustibles are stored along the north wall of the zone.
The licensee proposes installation of a preaction sprinkler system in the area to promptly extinguish an exposure fire. However, failure of the preaction sprinkler system to actuate in the event of a fire could jeopardize safe shutdown of the plant.
Staff Position The storage of combustible materials along the north wall of Fire Zone 74 should be discontinued. No combustible materials should be stored in this fire zone.
, Licensee's Response Bulk storage of combustibic materials along the north wall of Fire Zone 74 will be discontinued. Any small storage of Hot Lab supplies will be in NFPA Code 30 lockers.
PF-17 Diesel Generator Rooms - Penetration Seals Staff Concern Each diesel generator room contains approximately 700 gallons of combus-tible liquids. The diesel generator rooms are located adjacent to each other at the 695' elevation and are contiguous to the east boundary of the auxiliary building in the vicinity of Fire Zone 58.
Fire Zone 58 contains redundant systems required for safe shutdown.
The walls surround-ing the diesel generator rooms have a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire resistance.
- However, the licensee is not certain that the penetration seals in thesc walls have a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire resistance.
Staff Position All penetration seals between the diesel generator rooms and the auxiliary building should have 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire resistance.
Licensee's Response Penetration se.ls between DG rooms and auxiliary building will be included in the review of all safeguard area fire boundary wall seals.
PF-18 Turbine Building, Fire Zona 69 & 70 - Hydrogen Seal Oil Units Curbs Staff Concern The hydrogen seal oil units are located at the east and west ends of the turbine building at the 695' elevation.
Each unit contains a significant quantity of lube oil and rupture of either unit may permit the spread of oil such that in the event of a lube oil fire the structural integrity of portions of the turbine building and the adjacent auxiliary building could have an adverse af fect on safety-related and safe shutdown systems.
Staff Position A curb should be provided around each hydrogen seal oil unit of sufficient height to contain the entire contents of the unit plus a margin for fire suppression water.
Licensee's Response An engineering evaluation will be initiated to study methods of containing collecting, or diverting spilled oil from the hydrogen seal oil units. The method selected will be reported 3-2-79.
< PF-19 Turbine Building, Fire Zones 69 & 70 - Lube Oil Reservoirs Staf f Concern The turbine lube oil reservoirs are located at the west and east ends of Fire Zones 69 and 70 respectively.
Each reservoir contains a large quantity of lube oil.
A fire at either reservoir could result in the los of structural integrity of the turbine building.
Such a loss of turbine building structural integrity could have an adverse af fect on safety-related and safe shutdown systems and components in adjacent areas.
Staff Position A.
Verify that the design density, coverage and nozzle locations of the Reservoir Fire Suppression Systems are adequate to suppress a fire involving rupture of the turbine lube oil reservoirs.
B.
Apply a U.L. listed fire retardant coating, suitable for protection of structural members, to the turbine building columns adjacent to the lube oil reservoirs.
Licensee's Response Agree to initiate an engineering evaluation to verify the adequacy of the Reservoir Fire Suppression System and agree to apply a U.L. listed fire retardant coating to columns adjacent to the lube oil reservoirs.
PF-20 Position Number Not Used PF-21 Equipment Needed to Suppress Combustible Liquid Fires Staff Concern There are a number of areas in the plant where there is a heavy concentra-tion of combustible liquids.
Fire fighting actions necessary to suppress combus t ible liquid fires may require special equipment and supplies in order to be effective.
Staff Position Suitable equipment consisting of foam concentrate and foam applicator nozzles with pick-up tubes for use with 1 1/2 inch hose lines should be provided at a centralized location to facilitate the suppression of com-bustible liquid fires.
Licensee's Response Agree to obtain the equipment and locate it at a centralized location.
PF-22 Cable Spreading & Relay Room - Safe Shutdown Equipment Staf f Concern The cable epreading and relay room contains control and power circuits
. for systems normally used to shutdown the plant. Notwithstanding the provision for an alternate shutdown capability independent of the cable spreading and relay room, a fire in the room may cause sufficient damage to cabling to cause spurious actuation of equipment resulting in adverse effects on the safe shutdown capability of the plant.
Staff Position Verifv that a fire in the cable spreading and relay room would not cause the types of spurious movements of components that would adversely affect the ability to safely shutdown the plant.
Licensee's Response The licensee will be prepared to respond to this position 3-2-79.
PF-23 Flammable Liquified Gas Tanks Staff Concern Flammabic liquified gas tanks and attached piping to these tanks are not rigidly supported. The piping to these tanks cculd easily be ruptured due to impacts from work operations in the vicinty of the tanks.
Staff Position Provide rigid supports for flammabic liquified gas tanks and better physical protection for the attached flammable gas piping.
Post a warning sign near each flammable gas tank reading: " Danger Flamnable Gas".
Licensee's Response The licensee agrees to the physical modifications and sign posting suggested in the staff position.
PF-24 Hose Station Pressure Staff Concern The highest hose station is abo it 140 feet above the fire pumps which are designed to operate at about 120 psi.
There may not be sufficient pressure available at this highest hose station to properly operate with the 1 1/2" nozzle (Elkhart All-Spray, Model L-E).
Staff Fosition Demonstrate that there is sufficient pressure at the highest hose station to properly operate with the installed 1-1/2" nozzle, or provide a nozzle designed to operate at the lower pressare tested.
. Licensee's Response Pump design, and verified by testing, is 2000 gpm flow at 125 psi with minimum pressure at highest elevation of 60 psi.
Using this basis then:
Pump centerline 672' 125 psi to head in feet 289' 961' Elevation of highest hose station 809 Head diff 152 feet = 65.8 psi Manufacturer's local representative has verbally verified the LE Model Elkhart nozzle will function as designed down to a nozzle pressure of 50 psi with, of course, a decrease in flow and ef fective reach.
Pump delivery rates below the rated 2000 gpm result in significantly higher pressures at the hose station.
PF-25 Hydrant Hose House - Hose Attachment Staf f Concern It is current practice at the plant to attach a L 1/2 inch hose to the 2-1/2" hose gate valve in the hydrant hose house by use of an adaptor.
This hose arrangement may cause an unacceptable reductfon in fire water pressure available at the scene of the fire, particularly if the avail-able pressure at the hydrant is limited to 120 psi.
Staff Position The practice of connecting a 1-1/2 inch hose directly to the hydrant should be discontinued. A 2-1/2 inch hose should be connected to a hydrant outlet gate valve.
Licensee's Response Staff is in error in their review of current practice.
Prairie Island hydrants have two outlets, one has a 2-1/2" gate valve with 100 feet of 2-1/2" hose attached. The other is reduced to 1-1/2" with a 1-1/2" gate valve and 100 feet of 1-1/2" hose attached.
Each house also has 100 feet of spare 2-1/2" hose.
PF-9 will add 100 feet of 1-1/2" hose plus the gated Wye.
We believe the above described configurate satisfies NFPA 24.
PF-26 Hot Work Permits Staff Concern The licensee does not utilize a hot work permit system for the control
. of welding, burning and grinding operations but instead specifies any hot work precautions on the work permit.
This practice may result in the omission of important precautions that should be taken during such oper*tions.
Staff Position The licensee should adopt a hot work permit system in accordance with NFPA SlB for work operations involving welding, burning or grinding.
Licensee's Response The licensee will develop a hot work permit system which will be incor-porated in the work review process. Specifically a separate checklist identifying requirements for open flame and other types of fire hazards will be used with the work request.
PF-27 Piping Containing Flammable Cases Staff. Concern one oxygen line (3/4") and one hydrogen line (l") pass from the gas house through the east end of the turbine building into Fire Zones 58 and 73 in the auxiliary building. The hydrogen line is fitted with a high flow shut-cf f and the oxygen line which provides low volume, low pressure supply to the recombiner, has a manual emergency shutoff.
Fire Zones 58 and 73 con-tain safety related systems and equipment that may be required for shutdown in the event of a fire and a fire or explosion in these zones could damage systems needed for shutdown of the plant.
Staff Position Provide an analysis to demonstrate that the quantity of hydrogen or oxygen that could be leaked before detection ard isolation of either gas line is not sufficient to jeopardize safety related systems and equipment needed to shutdown.
Licensee's Response An engineering analysis will be initiated as described in the staf f position.
P F-28 Diesel Fuel Oil Transfer System Staf f Concern There are a number of areas in the plant in which are located diesel driven auxiliaries and their associated day tanks. Diesel oil is transferred to these day tanks from storage tanks located underground outside the main plant.
The areas where these diesel driven auxiliaries are located are:
1.
The screenhouse (Fire Zone 41) contains two diesel driven cooling
. water pumps and a diesel driven fire pump.
2.
Fire Zones 25 and 26 each contain an emergency diesel generator.
\\
The transfer piping for the diesel driven auxiliaries in the screenhouse enters the cast wall of the building and runs along the ceiling across the area in which the electric driven fire pump is located. In the vicin-ity of the diesel driven fire pump two of the lines which provide diesel oil for the diesel driven cooling water pumps enter the upper level of the screenhouse and are piped to their respective day tanks. The remain-ing line is piped directly to the diesel driven fire pump day tank.
Diesel oil transfer piping for the emergency diesel generators is buried until it reaches the rooma in which the day tanks are located.
A fire fed by the day tank fuel supply could have serious consequences if provisions are not adequate to automatically or manually stop the transfer of diesel oil from the storage tank to the day tank in the event of a rupture of one of the fuel transfer lines or a fire at the day tank.
This is especially serious in the case of the fire pumps since the day tank for the diesel driven fire pump is located approximately 17 feet from the elec-tric driven fire pump outlined in Item 4 of Enclosure 3, failure to cut-off the supply of diesel oil could result in an aggravated exposure fire.
Staff Position 1.
All diesel oil transfer piping that enters the screenhouse should be replaced with double jacketed pipe along its full length from its point of entry to the building to its termination at each day tank.
2.
A fusible link actuated shutoff valve should be provided in the diesel driven fire pump fuel transfer line at a point as close as post:ible to where the line enters the diesel driven fire pump day tank.
3.
Pre-fire plan strategies should be developed for all diesel fuel day tank areas to provide for tripping the diesel oil transfer pumps and/
or isolating the fuel supply lines to the day tank in the event of a fire or a piping rupture.
Licensee's Response 1.
Initial review indicates that present piping with additional protection (insulation, retardant coating, ect.) will be sufficient for pipe p'rotection.
We do not intend to replace the three oil supply lines along their en-tire length to the terminations at the day tank.
2.
A study will be made io determine if a fusible link actuated shutoff valve will provide the protection suggested by the staff position.
3.
Agree to add the precautions for isolating oil pumps to the zone fire fighting strategies which are to be developed.
. PF-29 Electrical Cable Tray Penetrations Staff Concern On Pages 2-3 of the i'rairie Island Fire Hazards Analysis the licensee states that cable tray penetrations thrcugh walls, floors and ceilings are provided with a fire stop if the wall, floor or ceiling is a fire rated barrier.
From this statement, it is not clear which walls, ceil-ings and floors are considered to be fire rated barriers in which rated fire stop are installed in cable tray penetration.
Staff Position Provide a list (or mark-up drawings) of all walls, ceiling and floors between fire zones which are not fire rated barriers.
Provide justifications where cabic tray penetrations passing through fire zone boundary walls, ceiling and floors do not have fire rated seals in-stalled.
Licensee's Response The criteria used in the Fire Hazards Analysis was to consider only those areas containing safety related or safe shutdown equipment.
In making the initial inspection of these specified areas, open penetra-tions other than cable were found.
In a later inspection of non-safeguard rooms, additional openings were found.
At the time the Fire Hazard Review was written, these conditions cFisted, but shortly thereaf ter a program was initiated to close up all known open-ings.
As stated above, these openings did not contain cable, so they were filled with concrete or bricked up.
In cases of small pipe or conduit, the opening was grouted; for large pipe, which requires a sealing material that would allow movement, thermal insulating wool #2 was used to fill the opening and then the area was sprayed with Flammastic 71A. At this time, all known penetrations are closed.
PF-30 Mechanical Penetration Seals and Fire Dampers Staf f Concern A number of mechanical (piping, ventilation ducts and cable conduit) penetra-tions between fire zones are unsealed. Dampers are not provided in most vent ducts where the ducts penetrate fire barriers.
These unsealed penetrations and open ducts could provide a path for the spread of fire, smoke, and hot gases from one fire zone to another.
The consequences of fire damage in two or more fire zones, has not been deter-mined.
In addition, the spread of fire to other zones would increase the difficulty in manually fighting a fire. The potential for spread of fire, smoke and hot gases could result in additional requirements for fire bri-gade personnel above that recommended in staff position PF-7.
h Staff Position The mechanical penetration seals and ventilation dampers in fire barriers should be upgraded as indicated below:
1.
Fire Zones 8, 9, 14, 69 and 70 at the boundaries of these zones and the auxiliary building - Fire dampers and mechanical penetration seals having a three hour rating.
2.
Fire Zoner 12,15, and 83 - Fire dampers and mechenical penetration seals of a rating equivalent to the combustible loading in each zone.
3.
Fire Zones 13, 18, 18A, 19, 31, 32, 61 and 66 - Fire dampers and mechanical penetration seals having a three hour fire rating.
4.
Fire Zones 33, 34, 35, 36, 80 and 81 - Fire dampers and mechanical penetration seals having a three hour fire rating at the zone bounda-ries contiguous with the turbine building.
5.
Fire Zones 3'i and 38 - Fire dampers and mechanical penetration seals having a three hour fire rating at the zone boundaries contiguous with the turbine building and with Fire Zone 24.
6.
Fire Zones 58 and 73 - Mechanical penetration seals between charging pump cubicles of a rating equivalent to the combustible loading in each cubicle.
7.
Fire Zone 68 and 72 - Mechanical penetration seals having a fire rating of three hours at the boundaries between each zone and the auxiliary building.
Licensee's Response The number of penetrations existing in the seven areas designated are numerous and require a major ef fort to review. By the 3-2-79 reply date, we should have an accounting of penetrations which meet the criteria, need updating or are not required.
Georgia Power Company Post Oftce Box 442 Baxley, Georgia.31513 Tetephone 912 367-6666 912 367-7781 Georgia Power Eowin t. Hatch Nuclear Plant
, r; n s oc r
.Januar y 5, 1979 PM-79-12 EL6NI_EuluB6ICH NRC Monthly Report Doci<et No. 50-321 Office of Plans and Schedules Directorate of Licensing U.S. Nuclear Regulator y Commission Washington, D.C.
20545
Dear Sirs:
Pursuant to Section 6.9.1.(c) of the Hatch Unit 1
Technical Sp e c. i f i ca t i ons, please find attached the NRC Monthly Operating Report.
/h a wz-1 W7 Manry Plant Mana9 r MM/bvw xc:
H. C. Nix T. V. Greene File O%,
t i
7901100269
{
e i
t OPERATING DATA REPORT DOCKET NC. 50-321 DATE 1-5-79 COSIPLETED llY JL_Wil:nw i
TELEPilONE 912-36/-/781 l
OPER A IING STATUS
.N'u t es llatch 1 I Unit Name:
Decenher 1978
- 2. Reporting Period:
2436
- 3. Licensed Thermal Power (N1Wt):
OU9
- 4. Nameplate Rating (Gross 51We):
3
^
786 S. Design Electrical Rating (Net 31Wel:
748.6
- 6. 51aximum Dependable Capacity (Gross SIWE):
717
- 7. Sf aximum Dependable Capacity (Net SIWE):
- 8. If Changes Occur in Capacity Ratings (items Number 3 Through 7) Since Last Report. Give Reasons:
- 9. Power Level To Which Restricted.If An;-(Net MWe):
- 10. Reasow For Restrictions.lf Any:
This Stonth Yr.-to.Date Cumulatise 744 8760 37706 *
- 11. Ilours in Reporting Period 702.8 6617.3 28447.2 *
- 12. Number Of Ilours Reactor Was Critient 0
0 0
+
- 13. Reactor Reserve Shutdown llours 673.6 6375.9 26000.7
- 14. Isours Generator On-Line 0
0 0
- 15. Unit Resene Shutdown flours 1548029 13662963 49595785
~
- 16. Gross Thermal Energy Generated (51Wil) 509190 4493470 160 50 3 'a'
- 17. Gross Electrical Energy Generated (StWil) 48692.1 4277309 152 7189 r
- 18. Net E:ectrical Energy Generated (MWil) 90.5 72.8 71.2
- 19. Unit Senice Factor 90.5 72.8 71.2
- 20. Unit Asailability Factor 63.1 57.6 91.3
- 21. Unit Capacity Factor (Using MDC Net) 83.3 6F.1 53.2.
- 22. Unit Capacity Facter (Using DER Nes) 9.5 17.7 18.1
- 23. Unit Forced Outage Rate
~
- 24. Shutdowns Scheduled Oser Nest 6 Months (Type. Date and Duration of Each):
Maintenance Outage; 3-3-79; 6 weeks
- 25. If Shut Down At End Of Report Period. l.st; mated Date of Startup:
- 26. Units in lest Status (Prior to Commercial Operation):
Forecast Achiesed INil l A L CRillCAl.I T Y INil I A t. I 1.1:C 1 RICI IY CONINILRCl \\L OPER A 1 ION t
- Corrected Ily The Addit ion Of 1 llour To Incpude Tirre Change 10/31/77 07/77 7901100127 7_
AVERAGE DAILY UNIT POWER LEVEL DOCKET NO.
50-321 Ifatch 1 UNIT 1-5-79 DATE S. Wilson COMPLETED BY 912-367-7781 TELEPfl0NE Af0N111 December DAY AVERAGE DAILY POWER LEVEL DAY AVER AGE DAILY POWER LEVEL (MWe Net)
(MWe-Net) 647 755 g
2
-14 18 751 3
-13 19 751 4
214 20 271 550 715 5
21 6
678 22 759 7
711 23 768 8
628 24 762 9
736 25 765 10 755 26 765 g3 753 767 27 12 757 28 767 758 758 13 29 14 758 763 30 15 754 31 761 16 738 INSTRUCTIONS On this format. list the aserage daily unit power lesel in MWe-Net for each day in the reporting manth. Compute to the nearest whole megawatt.
(9/771
.- 9
50-321 DOCKET NO.
UNIT SIIUTDOWNS AND POWER REDUCTIONS UNIT N AME Hatch - 1 DATE 1-5-79 S.
Wilson COMPLETED BY REPORT MONTil December-TELEPilONE 912-367-7781 n.
E c
.5?
Sh
$E5 Licensee 5-r,
{"3 Cause & Corrective Action to No.
Date i
33 js5 Event g?
g' Prevent Recurrence Report mU fE 3 5 =g t-ou O
78-25 12-1-7S F
58.6 B
1 SF VALVEX Repairs to llPCI Valve in D/W 78-26 12-8-78 S
0 11 4
ZZ CONROD Rod Pattern Change.
78-27 12-20-78 F
11.8 A
3 CD VALVEX MS1V Closure at 100% Power I
2 3
4 F: Forced Reason Method:
Exhibit G-Instructicas S: Scheduled A Equi ment Failure (Explain) 1 -Manual for Preprration of Data B Maintenance of Test 2 Manual Scram.
Entry Sheets for Licensee C. Refueling
- 3. Automatic Scram.
Event Report (LER) Fde (NUREG-D-Regutatoiy Restriction 4-Other (Explain) 0161)
E Operator Training & License Examination F-Administrative 5
G-Oper ational Er ror (Explain)
Exhibit I-Same Source (9/77)
Il-Othe r ( E xplain)
I i
I i
NARRATIVE
SUMMARY
HATCH 1 Dec. 1 Reducing load to repair-leaks in drywell 1810 CST Dec. 2 Off Line 0004 CST Dec. 4 On Line 1040 CST Dec. 5 Preconditioning.
Dec. 8 Rod Pattern Change 0004 CST Dec. 20 Rx. Scram 1-78-12 (GO-1-78-17) MSIV Closure at 100%
p ower-0054 CST Dec. 20 On Line 1242 CST There was no single telease of radioactivity o r-single radiation exposur e which accounts for mor e tisan 10 percent of the allowable annual values during the trion t h of December.
Ii i
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HATCH 1 SAFETY RELATED MAINTENANCE REGUESTS TO BE REPORTED FOR DECEMBER 1978 NUMBE8 DoIE_ COL 1ELEIED DESC81EIIQu_
77-1015 12-12-78 Install two SS blanics between RHR and fuel pool cooling 77-2089 12-14-78 Tighten pacl<itig around 1G11-OO28 78-2835 12-7-78 Terminate and tedline cables 78-3073 11-30-78 Replace i on-c hamb e r-in RD17 S/N 156.
Clean iticulator and insulate ~R106 lead and C101 lead.
78-3159 12-21-78 Disassemble valve lapped seat rings and gate.
Replace pressure ring.
Reacccmble cnd torl< bolts.
3220 12-5-78 Replace bonnet gasi<et IE51-F054 3222 12-8-78 Replace relay and set alarm setroints 3440 12-16-78 Inspect vacuum gauge and crani < case vacuum 3443 12-5-78 Replace relays 831-K138 ahd 831-K13A 3471 12-5-78 Repair valve and replace all gasite:s 3496 12-5-78 Repacl< valve IN21-FOO58 3506 12-12-78 Change filter in each section requested 3582 12-8-78 Repair valve - inspect seats and replace gasicets t
i s
e
!i I
I
m HATCH 1 SAFETY RELATED MAINTENANCE REGUESTS TO BE REPORTED FOR DECEMBER 1978 NUdSEE D6IE_COMELEIED RESCBIEIl0N_
3588 12-11-78 Change motor oil and inspect pump) as per HNP-1-62OO 3719 12-3-78 Remove f la p p er-from valve housing and repair 3752 12-5-78 Repack 1E51-FO39 3816 12-4-78 Replace motor
- bearings, carbon rings, and lap pump housing 3827 12-21-78 Replace G12 for 15V source.
Perform test per HNP-1-3OO5 3893 12-13-78 Spray contacts and calibrate switch per 5243 3897 12-5-78 Repack valve IE51-FOO1 3928 12-5-78 Fix light and sensor 1-D21-N235 3974 12-5-78 Replace broken fitting on sensing line 4020 12-1-78 Lubricate motor and inspect cooling coils per HNP-1-E.E.20 4021 12-1-78 Lubricate motor and inspect cooling coils per HNP-1-E.620 4022 12-1-78 Lubricate motor and inspect cooling coils per HNP-1-6620 4023 12-1-78 Lubricate motor and inspect cooling coils per HNP-1-6E.20 t
P i
i t
i HATCH 1 SAFETY RELATED MAINTENANCE REGUESTS TO BE REPORTED FOR DECEMBER 1978 NUd3E8 D6IE_C0dELEIED DESCBIEIION_
4060 12-5-78 Repair loose connection on input light 1R42-5052 4084 12-7-78 Repack valve and tighten packing 4086 12-5-78 Replace oil ring T46-COO 1A and 8 g
4089 12-1-78 Replace ball joint IX41-COO 58 4093 12-2-78 Replace bulbs 1H11-P651 4098 12-5-78 Inspect pump and clean out drain line 4099 12-5-78 Replace amplifier in recorder.
Calibrate and check for proper operation procedure HNP-1-5228 4103 12-4-78 Replace J7 H.V.
connector and P7 VG-932/V 4107 12-2-78 Epoxy face plate to inside of meter berel 4108 12-2-78 Calibrate gauge IR43-AOO3C & D l
4109 12-5-78 Calibrat'e sougen and put isolation valves on each air receiver 4110 12-2-78 Calibrate gauge and put isolation gauge on 4113 12-4-78 Replace bulbs 1H11-P601 4117 12-17-78 Replace tumbler in door F
i HATCH 1 SAFETY RELATED MAINTENANCE REGUESTS TO BE REPORTED FOR DECEMSER 1978-UUMEER D6IE_COMELEIED RESCRIEIlON_
4125 12-13-78 Replace slidewire assy.
in red pen section of IT41-R621 r e c or der-4130 12-8-78 Repair low level attnuticiator-4132 12-8-78 Check calibration per procedure HNP-1-5262 4134 12-7-78 Replace ineter and calibr ate p er-HNP-1-52OS 4138 12-5-78 Replace relays as requested on MR and DCR 478-443 4143 12-5-78 Replace tube in artir de t ec tor-on D11-NO12C on refueling floor.
Calibrate per HNP-1-5114 4144 12-7-78 Check cable to breaker 1R24-5026-ESS-C34 4146 12-7-78 Replace oil and check recovoir.
In s p ec 't check valves and flush through.
4154 12-5-78 Replace valve borir:et
- stud, four nuts and new gasket.
4158 12-3-78 Check valves s t etri arid pack breaker in 4174 12-21-78 Replace broken pipe and inotor.
4175 12-12-78 Inspect and check tightness of CE CR106 contactor interlocks ti it f
HATCH 1 SAFETY RELATED MAINTENANCE REGUESTS TO BE REPORTED FOR DECEMBER 1978 UUMBEB DoIE_CDUELEIED DESCEIEIION_
4176 12-12-78 Inspect and c hecic tightness of GE CR109 contactor in t er locics 4177 12-12-78 Inspect and c h ecl<
tightness of GE CR106 ated CR109 contactor inter locles 4178 12-17-78 Repair seal with necessary parts.
4179 12-8-78 Calibrate alarm unit p er-HNP-1-5207 4181 12-7-78 Replace alarm card from test shop s tocic 4182 12-8-78 Correct omrii s ua r d.
Calibrate per HNP-1-5271 4187 12-8-78 Replace cable C51-J600 4200 12-8-78 Turn monitor A bac!c on 4209 12-17-78 Clean pump aied cliecl< pressure at 480 psig.
4210 12-17-78 Clean pump and checic pressure at 475 puig.
4211 12-17-78 Tiglaten valve bonniet boltu 4221 12-13-78 Replace capacitor and motor ori blacic pen of recorder 4223 12-12-78 Investigate operation of
- cond, bay temp recorder panel
i HATCH 1 SAFETY RELATED MAINTENANCE REGUESTS
- O BE REPORTED FOR DECEMBER 1978 NUMEEB DoIE_CQbELEIEQ DESCRIEI1ON_
42F.3 12-8-78 Readjust limits on twitch 4a34 12-19-78 Investigate TIP sysiem 4238 12-21-78 Run pump before relieving pressure.
Clean out discharge tubes.
4245 12-15-78 Replace light bulbs and t1can relays in relay unit 4249 12-18-78 Complete HNP-1-5012 4257 12-20-78 Investigate oil temp alarm 4265 12-13-78 Polish cam and oil switch 4266 12-13-78 Replace alarm card for FPC system skimmer surge tank low level 4267 12-13-78 Repair s ens or-and c onver ter-Dil-NO1E.8 4269 12-15-78 Replace mountiftg screws and adjust limit 4270 12-17-78 Correct loose connection on the breaker 4278 12-15-78 Fill oil lever to proper-level 4287 12-2 -78 Repai valve and install new gaskecs 4289 12-1E. -78 Adjust limit switch and replace mounting screws
HATCH 1 S/EETY RELATED MAINTENANCE REGUESTS TO BE REPORTED FOR DECEMBER 1978 tfJbSEE RoIE_COMELEIER RESCBIEIION_
4304 12-15-78 Replace torque switch and cycle valve.
Also check oil 4307 12-16-78 Remove broken sight glass and replace 4312 12-21-78 Adjust switch to actuate and reset at correct setpoint per HNP-1-5278 4_19 12-21-78 Replace core in valve stem 4340 12-23-78 Calibrate t, witches per HNP-1-52 79 4342 12-21-78 Remove filter from ducting and fabricate a window in door 4343 12-21-78 Remove filter from ducting and g
fabricate a window in door 4344 12-20-78 Connect 0.1 cell in RWCU sample I
hood and run leads to meter G31-NO17 4347 12-21-78 Calibrate switches per HNo-1-5240 43E.O 12-18-78 Tighten union and other fittings to stop leal <s 4365 12-21-78 Draw cotter pin from bin and install i pin of snubber 4366 12-20-78 Checl< upscale alarm and upscale trip points per HNP-1-5010 4378 12-20-78 Investiate Yarway level instrument for accurate readings i
t
l l
i HATCH 1 SA. ETY RELATED MAINTENANCE REGUES TS TO BE REPORTED FOR DECEMBER 1978 t
i NUMSEE DoIE_ cot 1ELEIER DESC81EIICU_.
l 4384 12-19-78 Change Lundell Point Card 4386 12-25-78 Replace b o r l<en pen a s t,emb l y.
Clean and repair chari drive motor 4391 12-22-78 Open sarreple line I
4421 12-22-78 Recet brealcer to reset timers sequence L
O e
4 I.
e t
i
N o
Nortihern Indiana Public Service Compang Nuclear Staff RR #3, Box 501 Chesterton, IN 46304 December 29, 1978 BAILLY GENFhAfING STATION N-1 Mr. Ronald Ballard Environmental Projects Branch No. 1 Directorate of Licensing U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20545 RE: NORTHERN INDIANA PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY BAILLY GENERATING STATION NUCLEAR 1 DOCKET 50-367
Dear Mr. Ballard:
Enclosed herewith are ten (10) copien of the following:
1.
Well Charts for 12/13/78 - 12/20/78 2.
Bailly Wells Without Recorders for 12/20/78 3.
Pond Levels for 12/20/78 4.
Pneumatic Pressure Transducers for 12/20/78 5.
Water Meter Readings for 12/14/78 and 12/18/78 Sincerely, R. J.
Bohn Manager, Nuclear Staff MD/me Enclosures File: Ground Water Observation Monitoring Wells k
ety\\
\\
790110027o
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BAILLY WE'J S WITHOUT RECOPIEPS 12/20/78 O
WELI.
- WATER ELEVATION IN FEE
- 62 30.71 65 25.89 67 20.77 72 10.31 73 10.78 74 13.48 DBY:1r 12/20/78 O
O
POND LEVELS PO!D 12/20/78 1
FROZEN 2
FROZEN 3
NOT CHECKED 4
NOT CHECKED 5
NOT CHECKED 6
FROZEN 7
NOT CHECKED 8
DRY 9
FROZEN 10 39.07' 11 40.01' 12 37.10' 13 37.31' DBY:lr 12/20/78 e
O
PNEUMATIC PRESSUFI TRANSDUCEFS 12/20/78 TRANSDUCER WATER ELEVATION IN FEET O
P-1 8.5 P-2 8.1 P-3 4.6 P-4 12.3 P-5 14.6 g
P-6 13.7 DBY:lr 12/20/78 O
O
WATER METER READDIGS liETER FIADDIG DISTANTANEOUS FIDW RATE DATE TIME (GALIONS)
(GPM)
Sumo Pu:r:o Discharge 12/14/78 1:51 PM 209546000 274 12/18/78 2:10 PM 211115000 270 0
Well Point Discharue WELL POINT SYSTEM NOT IN USE DBY:lr 12/20/78
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