05000321/LER-1980-006-03, /03L-0:on 800113,one Standby Gas Treatment Sys Rendered Inoperable W/Both Units in Power Operation.Unit Not Proven Operable within Required 4-h.Caused by Inability to Prove Filter Train Operable within 4-h

/03L-0:on 800113,one Standby Gas Treatment Sys Rendered Inoperable W/Both Units in Power Operation.Unit Not Proven Operable within Required 4-h.Caused by Inability to Prove Filter Train Operable within 4-h

ML19257D032
Person / Time
Site:	Hatch
Issue date:	01/24/1980
From:	Baxley S GEORGIA POWER CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML19257D031	List: 05000321/LER-1980-006, Forwards LER 80-006/03L-0 05000321/LER-1980-006-03, /03L-0:on 800113,one Standby Gas Treatment Sys Rendered Inoperable W/Both Units in Power Operation.Unit Not Proven Operable within Required 4-h.Caused by Inability to Prove Filter Train Operable within 4-h
References
LER-80-006-03L, LER-80-6-3L, NUDOCS 8001310241
Download: ML19257D032 (3)

LER-1980-006, /03L-0:on 800113,one Standby Gas Treatment Sys Rendered Inoperable W/Both Units in Power Operation.Unit Not Proven Operable within Required 4-h.Caused by Inability to Prove Filter Train Operable within 4-h

Event date:
Report date:
3211980006R03 - NRC Website

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NRC FORM 066 U. S. NUCLE AH HEGUL ATOHY E OMMISSION (7 77)

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EvtaroEccnYenoN. oencaANcSIIcNcNCES 10ne Standby Gas Treatment System was rendered inoperable with both units in power oper-1 o

lation.

Technical Specifications Section 3.7.B.1 requires the operability of the remaint-

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Lng three SBGT Systems to be proven operable within four hours of rendering one SBGT I

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a I ystem inoperable.

One of the Unit II SBGT Systems was not proven operable within the 1 S

gis I our hour limit.

There were no effects upon the public safety or health due to this I

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CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

filter trains to be operated for three hours each durino weekly surveillance, for purpose of assuring heater operation of each train for ten hours a month.

One train for Unit I and one train for Unit II was proven operable within the four hours. The remaining train for Unit II was not proven operable within this fcur. hcur time limit.

HNP-1-3655 and HNP-2-3655 have been reviewed and revised t'o allow omission of heater operation when operating SBGT Systems to prove operability for inoperative components.

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ilARRATIVE REPORT Cn January 13, 1980, Unit One rendered SBGT System IT46-D001B inoperable due to failure to achieve required flow.

Immediately the remaining train for Unit,0ne and one train for Unit Two was' placed in operation to establish operability.

Due to the three hour time rta required by HNP-2-3655 to prove operability, the second SBGT System on Unit Two was not operable by procedure within the four hour time limit.

The problem with meeting the four hour time limit for proving operability of the SBGT Systems when one system is rendered inoperable is not a reoccurring problem. The procedures HNP-1-3655 r,nd HNd-2-3655 which effected Units One and Two have been revieved and revised.

9 184i C29