ML19254F763
| ML19254F763 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 09/28/1979 |
| From: | Hendrie J NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | Fascell D HOUSE OF REP. |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19254F764 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7911160545 | |
| Download: ML19254F763 (2) | |
Text
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4 LVGossick UNITED STATES RSmfth NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION TRehm
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8 September 28, 1979 RMinogue CH A IR M A N 3
lo HDenton Millie Groff PFine The Honorable Dante B. Fascell SECY-79-0803 United States House of Representatives CA Washington, D.C.
20515 NHaller
Dear Congressman Fascell:
I apologize for not providing this response to you sooner but, as you are aware, the Commissicn and staff have been occupied with continued support of the efforts at Three Mile Island, Orders to other facilities,
' appearances before the President's Coanission and various committees of Congress that are investigating the Three Mile Island accident, and the realignment of our own resources and priorities to give immediate attention to the problems resulting from the accident.
After the accident, the NRC sent Bulletins to licensees of all pressurized water power reactors, including a Bulletin specifically for reactors such as those at Turkey Point which were designed by Westinghouse, identifying actions to be taken to prevent operational errors and system misalignments identified during the accident.
Copies of the Bulletins sent to licensees of Westinghouse designed facilities are enclosed.
Task forces have bee [ working within the NRC (1) to give direct support to Three Mile Island on such matters as core cooling, cleanup and recovery operations, (2) tc.eview responses of utilities to NRC Orders and Bulletins, (3) to identify, analyze and recomend changes in licensing requirements and in the licensing process based on lessons learned from Three Mile Island, (4) to as.sure the continued safe operation of operating plants, and (5) to complete work on Unresolved Safety Issues.
The results may include new or revised NRC regulations and review practices concerning such matters as the training of operators, operating procedures, emergency planning, instrumentation, and design. Priority is being given to plants that the NRC has ordered to shut down, plants that are operating, and plants that are near to being ready for operation.
However, new requirements and procedures will also apply to other plants under construction, where there will be more time available for making changes. Both pressurized-water and boiling-water reactors are under review to determine what modifications may be necessary.
The TMI-2 Lessons Learned Task Force has issued a status report and short-term recommendations. A copy of this report, NUREG-0578 of July 1979, is enclosed for your information. The short-tem recommendations are to be implemented in two stages over the next 18 months on operating I347 202 79na ao 5 F
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The Honorable Dante B. Fascell.
plants, plants under construction, and pending construction pemit applications. There are 23 specific recomendations in 12 broad areas, nine related to design and analysis and three to operations. These recomendations are intended to constitute the short-tem requirements that the Task Force feels need to be adopted to ensure the safety of plants already licensed to operate and those to be licensed for operation in the near future. The July 1979 Task Force report has recently been reviewed by the Comission's Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards and, af ter careful consideration of the comments provided by that Comittee, the Director of fiRC's Office of fluclear Reactor Regulation has briefed the Commission of his intended course of action to implement the Task Force's recommendations. Enclosed is a copy of the September 13, 1979 Followup Action Letter sent to all operating nuclear power plants, including Turkey Point. As noted in that letter, Commission review of the results of other investigations, including the Presidential Comission and the tiRC's Special Inquiry Group, can be expected to lead to additional requirements. The Task Force is now turning to the broader, more fundamental regulatory questions which should be addressed for longer tem regulatory actions. The Task Force intends to develop its final recomendations and issue a final report next month.
The fluclear Regulatory Comission has established a Special Inquiry designed so that the !iRC, in order to fulfill its regulatory respon-sibilities, will have the fullest possible understanding of the events at Three Mile Island, both from the technical standpoint and from the standpoint of how our regulatory processes functioned. A copy of the charter for the Special Inquiry is enclosed.
The itRC review of the Turkey Point nuclear power plant mentioned in your letter is for the proposed program to repair the steam generators.
Enclosed is a Safety Evaluation by the Office of fluclear Reactor Regulation on this subject, issued on May 14, 1979. A petition to intervene in this proceeding has been filed by an individual and an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board has been assigned to consider the petition and detemine whether a hearing should be held. The Board is expected to make this detemination in the near future. This is separate from the question of modifications to be required in the Turkey Point plant as a result of the investigations of the Three Mile Island accident.
Sincerely,
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203 Original signed by Cleared with all Cmrs, by SECY C/R Yicter Gilinay a f G
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Enclosures:
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Bulletins sent to Westinghouse 9y % g/J.1 /g 3 p
designed facilities i
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10 REG-0578 E D0LN RR.._ _...
..SECY 0CA
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- september-13, 1979-Followur Action Letter PFine
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. y charter 9/26/79 9/b6/79 4.
Spedial Inquir 9."* Safety Evalua inn rbtnet nac roxx ns (9.n/12Fcd424al979
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September 28, 1979 CHAIRMAN The Honorable Dante B. Fascell United States House of Representatives Washington, D.C.
20515
Dear Congressman Fascell:
I apologize for not providing this response to you sooner but, as you are aware, the Commission and staff have been occupied with continued support of the efforts at Three Mile Island, Orders to other facilities, appearances before the President's Commission and various committees of Congress that are investigating the Three Mile Island accident, and the realignment of our own resources and priorities to give immediate attention to the problems resulting from the accident.
After the accident, the NRC sent Bulletins to licensees of all pressurized water power reactors, including a Bulletin specifically for reactors such as those at Turkey Point which were designed by Westinghouse, identifying actions to be taken to prevent operational errors and system misalignments identified during the accident. Copies of the Bulletins sent to licensees of Westinghouse designed facilities are enclosed.
Task forces have been working within the NRC (1) to give direct support to Three Mile Island on such matters as core cooling, cleanup and recovery operations, (2) to review responses of utilities to NRC Orders and Bulletins, (3) to identify, analyze and recommend changes in licensing requirements and in the licensing process based on lessons learned from Three Mile Island, (4) to assure the continued safe operation of operating plants, and (5) to complete work on Unresolved Safety Issues. The results may include new or revised NRC regulations and review practices concerning such matters as the training of operators, operating procedures, emergency planning, instrumentation, and design.
Priority is being given to plants that the NRC has ordered to shut down, plants that are operating, and plants that are near to being ready for operation.
However, new requirements and procedures will also apply to other plants under construction, where there will be more time available for making changes.
Both pressurized-water and boiling-water reactors are under review to determine what modifications may be necessary.
The TMI-2 Lessons Learned Task Force has issued a status report and short-term recommendations.
A copy of this report, NUREG-0578 of July 1979, is enclosed for your information. The short-tenn recommendations are to be implemented in two stages over the next 18 months on operating 1347 204
i The Honorable Dante B. Fascell plants, plants under construction, and pending construction permit applications.
There are 23 specific recomendations in 12 broad areas, nine related to design and analysis and three to operations. These recomendations are intended to constitute the short-term requirements that the Task Force feels need to be adopted to ensure the safety of plants already licensed to operate and those to be licensed for operation in the near future.
The July 1979 Task Force report has recently been reviewed by the Comission's Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards and, af ter careful consideration of the comments provided by that Committee, the Director of NRC's Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation has briefed the Commission of his intended course of action to implement the Task Force's recommendations.
Enclosed is a copy of the September 13, 1979 Followup Action Letter sent to all operating nuclear power plants, including TJrKey Point. As noted in that letter, Commission review of the results of other investigations, including the Presidential Commission and the NRC's Special Inquiry Group, can be expected to lead to additional requirements.
The Task Force is now turning to the broader, more fundamental regulatory questions which should be addressed for longer term regulatory actions.
The Task Force intends to develop its final recommendations and issue a final report next month.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has established a Special Inquiry designed so that the NRC, in order to fulfill its regulatory respon-sibilities, will have the fullest possible understanding of the events at Three Mile Island, both from the technical standpoint and from the standpoint of how our regulatory processes functioned. A copy of the charter for the Special Inquiry is enclosed.
The NRC review of the Turkey Point nuclear power plant mentioned in your letter is for the proposed program to repair the steam generators.
Enclosed is a Safety Evaluation by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation on this subject, issued on May 14, 1979. A petition to intervene in this proceeding has been filed by an individual and an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board has been assigned to consider the petition and determine whether a hearing should be held. The Board is expected to make this determination in the near future. This is separate from the question of modifications to be required in the Turkey Point plant as a result of the investigations of the Three Mile Island accident.
Sin erely, e
/d q
oseph M. Hendr!e
/'
Chairman
Enclosures:
1.
Bulletins sent to Westinghouse designed facilities 7
lJ47.7nc.UJ 2.
NUREG-0578 3.
September 13, 1979 Followup Action Letter 4.
Special Inquiry charter 5.
Safety Evaluation dated May 14, 1979
DA NTE D. F*ASCELL.
CHARLES R. 0" REG AN
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COMasrTTEES:
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2051o COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPc April 6, 1979 C H AIR M AN CAN ADI AN-UNITED ST ATES INTERPARLI AMENTARY GROUP CHAIR M AN, U.S. DELEG ATION The Honorable Joseph M. Hendrie Chairman Nuc1 car Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555
Dear Chairman Hendrie:
The recent events at the Three Mile Island Nuclear Powerplant have brought more clearly into focus some strident questions about the nuclear safety issue--an issue which I know is one of your strongest concerns. You are to be commended on your initiatives in overseeing the occurrences at this plant, and for becoming the definitive voice which brought the f acts to the public.
It now seems apparent, however, that it is imperative that the LTC continue to be the official spokes-man and ombudsman for all plants throughout the country. This action will of course require the full cooperation of the individual states and local governments; specific guidelines for each plant; and a comprehensive and continuous monitoring system by NRC officials.
It is my understanding that as a consequence of the Three
'!ile Island incident, the NRC has undertaken an emergency plan to
/'
evaluate all nucicar powerplants.
I would appreciate your advising me when such a revieu will be completed.
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It is my further understanding that because of its history, the NRC already has under review the Turkey Point Nuclear Powerplant, located in my Congressional District.
I would also appreciate being
[OP advised when this study will be completed, what the results are, and P
if any changes are foreseen in the Comhsion's approach to investi-gating these matters in light of Three Mile Island. Moreover, I trust that the NRC is considering the review of its own standards to deter-mine the safety of these plants.
I would also like to know if such a review is anticipated so that safety precautions can be met.
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Membere6f Congress DST:RT h
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April 1,1979 MEMORANDUM FOR:
B. H. Grier, Director, Region I J. P. O'Reilly, Director, Region II J. G. Keppler, Director, Region III K. V. Seyfrit, Director, Region IV R. H. Engelken, Director, Region V FROM:
florman C. Moseley, Director, Division of Reactor Operations Inspection, 01E
SUBJECT:
IE BULLETIN 79-05, NUCLEAR INCIDENT AT TH:.EE MILE ISLAND The subject IE Bulletin should be dispatched for action by April 2, 1979, to all S&W power reactor facilities with an operacing license.
Subject' bulletin and enclosures should also be discat:hed for information to all etner power reactor facilities with an cperating license and to all pcwer reactor construction permit holders.
The text of the Bulletin, Enclosure 2 and draft letters to the licenses are enclosed for this purpose. which cor.sists of the referenced Preliminary Notifications, should be added by the regional office.
The letters to the licensee make the cor.mitment to forward the continuing Preliminary Notifications of the incident.
These should be forwarded as they are received.
,4
,y y h.ff's-w h u) [
T Norman C. Moseley, Director Division of Reactor Operations Inspection Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Enclosures:
1.
Draft Transmittal Letter to B&W Licensees 2.
Dra#t Transmittal Letter to all other power facilities 3.
IE Bulletin No. 79-05 1347 207 (w/ enclosures - 3)
CONTACT:
D.C. Kirkpatrick, IE 49-28150 c
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8 (Oraft' letter to B&W power reactor facilities with an operating license)
IE Bulletin No. 79-05 Addressee:
Enclosed is IE Bulletin No. 79-05, which requires action by you with regard to your power reactor facility (ies) with an operating license.
Should you have any questions regarding this Bulletin or the actions required by you, please contact this office.
Sincerely, Signature (Regional Director)
Enclosure:
IE Bulletin No. 79-05 with Enclosures 134/
208 O
(Draft letter to all power reactor facilities with an operating license or a construction permit)
IE Bulletin Nc. 79-05 Addressee:
The enclosed Bulletin 79-05 is forwarded to you for information.
No written response is required.
If you desire additional information regarding this matter, please contact this office.
The Preliminary Notification of the subject incident (Enclosure 1) will continue to be issued periodically.
These will be forwarded to you as they are issued.
Sincerely, Signature (Regional Director)
Enclosure:
IE Bulletin No. 79-05 with Enclosures 1347 209 G
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR. REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, D.C.
20555 April 1,1979 IE Sulletin No. 79-05 NUCLEAR INCIDENT AT THREE MILE ISLAND Description of Circumstances:
On March 28, 1979 the Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2 experienced core damage which resulted from a series of events which were initiated by a loss of feedwater transient.
Several aspects of the incident may have general applicability in addition to apparent generic applicability at operating Babcock and Wilcox reactors.
This bulletin is provided to inform you of the nuclear incident and to request certain actions.
Actions To Se Taken By Licensees (Although the specific causes have not been determined for individual sequences in the Three Mile Island event, some of the following may have contributed.)
For all Babcock and Wilcox pressuri::ed water reactor facilities with an operating license:
1.
Review the description (Enclosure 1) of the initiating events and subsequent course of the incident.
Also review the evaluation by the NRC staff of a postulated severe feedwater transient related to Babcock and Wilcox PWRs as described in Enclosure 2.
These reviews should be directed at assessing the adequacy of your reactor systems to safely sustain cooldown transients such as these.
2.
Review any transients of a similar nature which have occurred at your facility and determine whether any significant deviations frcm expected performance occurred.
If any significant deviations are found, ' rovide the details and an analysis of the significance and p
any corrective actions taken.
This material may be identified by reference if previously submitted to the NRC.
3.
Review the actions require <
with transients.
The item:
DUPLICATE DOCUMENT Entire document previously 4
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19W/10337
-O No. of pages:
e e5 lJ PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION March 23,1979 PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION OF EVENT OR UNUSUAL CCCURRENCE--PMO-79-57 This oreliminary notification constitutes EARLY notice of event of POSSIBLE safety or oublic interest sienificance.
Tre inforration Dresented is as initially received Without verification or evaluation and is basically all that is knova by IE staf f on nis date.
Facility:
Three Mile Island t'it 2 Middletown, Pennsf vania i
(Docket No. 50-720)
Subject:
REACTOR SCRAM FOLLOWED BY A SAFETY INJECTIC'; AT THREE '4ILE ISLAND - UNIT 2 The licensee notified Region I at approximately 7:*5 AM of an incident at Three Mile Island Unit 2 (TMI-2) which occurred at approximately 4: C0 P at 985 power when the secondary feed pumps tripped due to a feedwater
- clishing system problem.
This resulted in a turbine trip and subse-quent reactor trip on High Reactor Coolant Pressure.
A combination of Feed Purp Operation and Pressurizer Relief - Stean Generator relief valve o;eration caused a Reactor Coolant System (RCS) cocidown.
At 1500 psig, Emergency Safeguards Actuation occurred.
Ali ECCS conponents started and operated properly.
Water level increased in the Pressurizer and Safety Injection was secured manually approximately 5 minutes after actuation.
It was subsequently resumed.
The Reactor Coolant Pumos were secured when low net positive suction head limits were approached.
About 7:00 AM, high activity was noted in the RCS Coolant Sanple Lines (aporoximately 500 mr/hr contact readings).
A Site Emergency was then declared.
At approxinately 7:30 AM, a General Emergency was declared based on High Radiation levels in the Reactor Building.
"t 8:30 A? site boundary radiation levels were reported to not be significant (less than 1 mr/hr).
The source of activity was stated to be failed fuel as a result of the transient, and due to a known previous primary to secondary leak in Steam Generator B.
The Region I Incident Resconse Center was activated at 8:10 AM and direct communications with the licensee and IE: Headquarters was estab-lished.
The Response Team was dispatched at 8:45 AM and arrived at the site at 10:05 AM.
At 10:45 AM the Reactor Coolant System Pressure was being held at 1950 psig with temperature at 2200F in the cold leg.
By 10: 45 AM, radiation levels of 3 mr/hr had been detected 500 yards offsite.
CONTINUED l 3 4 /
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Page 2 tiarch 28, 1979 Continued PNO-79-67 There is significant nedia interest at the present time because of concern about potential offsite radiation / contamination.
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and EPA have been inforced.
Press contacts are being made by the licensee and NRC.
Contact:
GKlingler, IE x25019 FNolan, IE x28019 SE5ryan, IE x28019 E.S Distribution:
Transmitted H St ;S M Chairman Hendrie Commissioner Bradford S. J. Chil k, SECY Commissioner Kennedy Commissioner Ahearne C. C. Ka mme re r, C A Commissi:ner Gilinsky (For Distribution)
Transmitted:
MN53 : '
P. Bldg 3.46 J. G. Davis, IE _
L. V. Gossick, EDO H. R. Denton, NRR Region
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H. L. Ornstein, EDO R. C. DeYoung, NRR J. J.
cu:hard, PA R. J. Mattson, NRR N. M. Haller, MPA V. Stello, NRR QM!L)
R. G. Ryan, OSP R. S. Boyd, NRR J. J. Cummings, 0IA H.
K. Shapar, ELD SS Bldg i R. .inogue, SD W. J. Dircks, NMSS PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION 1347 212 O
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PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATI0i' fia rch 29, 1979 PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION OF EVENT OR UNUSUAL OCCURRENCE--PNO-79-67A This oreliminary notification constitutes EARLY notice of event of POSSIELE safety or cublic interest sicnificance.
Tne information presented is as initially received without verifica:icn or evaluation and is casically all tna: is known tv IE staff on this ca:e.
Facility:
Three Mile Island Unit 2 Middletown, Pennsylvania (CN 50-320)
Subject:
NUCLEAR INCIDENT AT THREE MILE ISLAND - UNIT 2 This su::lements PNG-79-67 dated March 23, 1979.
's of 3:30 p.m., on Farch 23, 1979, the plant was being si:wly cocied down witn Oeactor Ccolant System (RCS) pressure at 450 :si, using normal letdosn and makeup ficw paths.
The bubble has been colla: sed in :ne 2eac:cr Ccolant L0cp hot leg, and some natural circulation c0 cling has been established.
Pressurizer level has been decreased :: the hign range of visible indication, and some heaters are in 0::e-a icn.
Tne secondarj olant '.;as being aligned to draw a vacuu, in the ain ::rcenser and use ?e A Steam Generator for heat rencval.
Tne faci'ity. lans t continua a siOw (30F/hr) coldown, until the Cecay Hea erovai System can be ;iaced in operation at 350 psi RCS pressure, 3500F RCS temperature in 15-lE hours.
As of 3:30 a.m., a plume approximately mile wide and reading generally 1 mr/hr was -'oving to the nortn of the plant.
The A M's nelicopter is being used to define the length of the plume.
Airborne iodine levels of up to 1 x 10-3 uCi/nl have been detected in Middietown, Fer.nsylvania, which is located north of the site.
Media interest is continuing.
The Cc ronwealth of Pennsylvania is being kept infor-'ed by plant personnel.
Contact:
GKlingler, IE x28019 FNolan, IE x23019 SESryan, IE x2SC19 s -
Distribution:
Transmitted H St lb'Idd. l, b, u' Cnalrman Hendrie Commissioner Bradford S. J. Chilk, SECY Commissior.er Kennedy Commissioner Ahearne C. C. Karrerer, CA Commissioner Gilinsky l {. Q (For Distributien)
Transmitted: MNSB j k YO, P. Bldg /6 i V! V J. G. QAvis, IE L. V. Gossick, ED0 H. R. Cen on, NRR Region.L IL LC H. L. Ornstein, EDO R. C. DeYoung, NRR J. J. Fouchard, PA R. J. Mattsen, NRR N. M. Haller, MPA V. Stello, NRR O';IL)
R. G. Ryan, OSP R. S. Soyd., NRR, J. J. Cumnings, CIA
inccue, SD 2
M. K. Sna;ar, ELS SS Sidg t
W. J. Circks, NMS$
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T PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION 1347 "21379$fLLQ5 6
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PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION
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March 30,1979 I
PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION OF EVENT OR UNUSUAL OCCURRENCE--PNG-79-673 This oreliminary notification constitutes EARLY notice of event of P0553LE safety or ouclic interest sianificance.
ine informatien cresented is as initially received without verificaticn or evaluation and is casically ali tnat is known by IE staff en tnis date.
Facility: Three Mile Island Unit 2 Middletown, Pennsylvania (DN 50-220)
Subject:
Nuclear Incident at Three Mile Island Plant Status Three Mile :Sland Unit 2 is continuing to remove decay heat th"Ougn A-loop steam generator using one reactor coolant pump in tnat icco for coolant circulation.
The reactor coolant pressure and te ce-ature were stable and under control throughout the night of March 29.
There has been some difficulty in maintaining coolant ietdevin flow due to resistance in the purification filters.
The licensee notified IE at accut 11:00 p.n. on March 29 that they expected to remain in this coo'.ing. ode for at least 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
The licensee's engineering staff was requested by NRR to cbtain a better estimate of the volume of the noncondensible " bubbles" in the reactor coolant system.
There are apparently two such bubbles one in the pressurizer that has been intentionally established for control of pressure and level, and one in the reactor vessel head caused by the accumulation of noncondensible gases from failed fuel and radiolytic decorcosition of water.
The estimate is to be obtained by correlating pressurizer pressure and level indications over the cast hours of stable operation.
The volume of the bubble in the reactor vesse; is of interest in assuring that sufficient volume remains in the upper head for collection of more noncondensible gases arising from continued ocera. ion in the present cooling mode as well as to assess tne potential fcr mcvement cf the bubble during a switchover to decay heat removal operation.
The licensee believes it is prudent to remain in the present cocling mode due to tne potential for leakage of highly radioactive coolant from the decay heat removal system into the auxiliary building, moverent of noncondensible gases into the reactor coolant loop, and boiling in the core when the reactor coolant pump is shut down.
~
CONTI':UED 1347 214 DUPLICATE DOCUMENT Entire document previously entered into s' stem under:
V ANO A
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No. of pages:
ff
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PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATI0f1 m.
March 30,1979
~
PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION OF EVENT OR UNUSUAL OCCURRENCE--PNO-79-67C This oreliminary notification constitutes EARLY notice of event of FOSSIBLE safety or ouolic interest sicnificance.
Tre infornation cresentec is as initially received without verification or evaluation anc 1s casically all tnat is known by IE sta#f on this cate.
Facility:
Three Mile Island Unit 2 Middletown, Pennsylvania (CN 50-520)
Subject:
NUCLEAR INCIDENT AT THREE MILE ISLAND Plant Status There have been intermittent uncontrolled releases of radioactivity into tne atmosphere from the primary coolant system of Unit 2 cf the Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Plant near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.
The licensee is atter; ting to stop the intermittent gaseous releases by transferring the radicactive coolant water into the ::rimary containment building.
The levels of radioactivity being measured have been as high as 20 to 25 millirem per hour in the imediate vicinity Of the site at ground level.
Off-site levels were a few millircentgen.
At ab:ut 11:30 a.m. EST, the Chairman of the NRC has suggested to Governor Tnornwg of the Co=onwealth of Pennsylvania that pregnant women and
- re-school children in an area within five niles of the plant site be evacuated.
Yembers of the NRC technical staff are at the site and efforts to reduce the temperatures of the reactor fuel are continuinc.
These tenperatures have been coming down slowly and the final depres-surization of the reactor vessel has been delayed.
There is evidence of severe damage to the nuclear fuel.
Samples of primary coolant containinc high-levels of radiciodine and instruments in the core indicate high fuel temperatures in some of the fuel bundles, and the presence of a large bubble of non-condensible gases in the top of the reactor vessel.
Eecause of these non-condensible gases, the possiblity exists of interrupting coolant flow within the reactor when its cressure is further decreased and the contained gases expand.
Several options to reach a #inal safe state for the fuel are under consideration.
In the reantime, the reactor is being maintained in a stable condition.
Contact:
SESryan, IE x2SISS ELJordan, IE x28183 l34[ 2l5 Distribution:
Transmitted H St !), D Cnairman Sendrie Commissioner Bradford S. J. Chilk, SECY Commissioner Kennedy Commissioner Ahearne C. C. Kamerer, CA Commissioner Gilinsky (For Distributied MN55 ( y P. Bldg !J Il J. G. Davis, IE Transmitted:
L. V. Gossick, E00 H. R. Centon','NRR Recion T C ic H. L. Ornstein, EDO R. C. DeYoung, NRR J1 4 C '.
93, J. J.D
[Go J. J. Fouchard, PA R. J. Mattson, NRR 7
('?IL N. M. Haller, MPA V. Stello, NRR Cumings, 0: A R. G. Ryan, OSP R. S. Bovd. *!~
H. K. Shapar, ELD SS Bldg L!,b L Vinocue, SD W. J. Dircks, f.SS PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATIO!'
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///
t IMMEDIATE PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION March 30, 1979 PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION OF EVENT OR UNUSUAL OCCURRENCE--PNO-79-67D This oreliminary notification constitutes EARLY notice of an event of POSSISLE safety or cuolic interest sianificance.
The information cresented is as initially received without verification or evaluatinn and is basically ali that is known by IE staff on this cate.
Facility:
Three Mile Island Unit 2 Micdlet:.-;n, Pennsylvani-(CN 50-320)
Subject:
NUCLEAR INCIDENT A TWEE MILE ISLAND Plant Status Gaseous radioactivity from the primary ccolant system letdcwn has been contained in waste gas decay tanks since the last gaseous release at a::roximately 2:50 o.m. Parch 30, 1979.
At the present reactor coolant letdown rate of aaproximately 20 gpm it may be necessary to ake a planned release of radioactive gas tomorrow to prevent gas de:3v tank relief valve operation at its setpoint of 100 psi.
The licensee has
~
installed a temocrary line from the gas decay system back to reactor containnent which is under evaluation before being placed in coeration.
Containment pressure is being maintained slightly negative (-l psi) as a result of fan cooler operation.
Reactor coolant tercerature measured at fifty-two locations at the outlet of tne core nave continued to come down slowly. Three outlet tem;erature instruments continue to indicate above saturatier terrerature.
The NRC staff was informed by the licensee on Friday morning that examination of containment pressure data for March 2S indicates a pressure soike up to approximately 30 psi occurred at approximately 1:50 p.m.
NRC perscnnel are evaluating the possibility that a hydrogen explosion was the cause of the containment internal pressure spike.
The reactor coolant path is through one reactor coolant pumo and cne steam generator.
The steam generator is being fed by an auxiliary feed-pump.
Several ootions for depressuri:ing the reactor and continuing cooldown via the residual heat removal syste- --- * ~ e N eien.
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IMMEDIATE PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION Ma rch 31,1979 PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION OF EVENT OR UNUSUAL OCCURRENCE--PNO-79-67E This immediate oreliminary notification constitutes an uodate of event of safety and cublic interest sianificance.
The information cresented is as initially received without verification or evaluation anc is basically all that is known by NRC staff at this time.
Facility:
Three Mile Island Unit 2 Middletown, Pennsylvania (DN 50-320)
Subject:
NUCLEAR INCIDENT AT THREE MILE ISLAND Plant Status Reactor cooling continues using the 1 A main reacter coolant pumo with steam generator A steaming to the main condenser.
Changes to this ccoling. method are not planned for the near term.
An operability status cf equipment is being compiled for use as backup in the event of failure cf existing operating equipment.
The hydrogen recombiner is in an operable status; hov.ever, shielding of its piping and components is not f ully installed and is presently con-sidered inadequate.
Lead for shielding has been located and will be moved to the site on an expedited basis.
Calculations of hydrogen in containment show that the present concentration is less than 45, the staff's limit on allowed concentration to ensure an explosive mixture is not obtained.
Attempts are being made to obtain a containment atmosphere sample.
The wa'te gas decay tank pressures were 80 psi at 10:15 p.m. on March 30 s
and had been relatively constant for about five hours.
The tank is set to relieve pressure at 103 - 110 psi.
The radiation field (60 R/hr at contact) prevents resetting relief points.
Reactor coolant temperatures measured by incore thermoccuoles at 52 locations ;cesently show only one location above saturation temperature.
Temperaturss in the core as measured from outlet thermocouples are gradually de:reasing.
Other system parameters are remaining stable.
Environmental Status Three ARMS flights of one-hour length we 9:30 p.m. on March 30, and at midnight a DUPLICATE DCCUMENT CONTINUEC Entire document previously entered 1 to s stem under:
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IMMEDIATE PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION April 1,1979 PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION OF EVENT OR UNUSUAL CCCURRENCE--PNO-79-67G This oreliminary notification constitutes surmary information of an event of safety or cuolic interest sicnificance.
The inferration cresented is a summary of information as of 7:00 am on 4/1/79.
Facility:
Three Mile Island Unit 2 Middletown, Pennsylvania (DN 50-320)
Subiect:
NUCLEAR INCIDENT AT THREE MILE ISLAND Plant Status "There has been no substantial change in the primary syster tercerature and pressure.
Incore thermoccuples continue to shos a donnward trend.
Actions are underway to vent radioactive gases frc: the waste gas decay tank to the containment building.
This will be perfor.ed tnrcugh a temporary pipeline.
The licensee plans to hook up and shield two recembiners prior to initiating recombining operations to reduce the concentrations of hydrogen in the containment.
The licensee estimates that it will require about 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> before the recombiners will be operational.
Calculated values by the licensee of the volume of nonconcensible gases above the core continue to vary.
The NRC staff has been unable to draw meaningful conclusions from this data.
Environmental Status ARMS flights at approximately 3-hour intervals were continued on March 31 and the early hours of April 1.
Survey results reflected stacle condi-tions.
Maximum readings were 2 mR/hr in the plume at a distance of 1 mile from the plant.
The plume width has been about 1.5 miles out to a distance of 10 miles.
At a distance of 10 miles, plume readings were 0.15 mR/hr.
Milk was collected at nine stations on March 31<, no radio-active iodine was detected.- Offsite ground level gamma surveys performed in the predominant wind direction sho # ' -* * "- nf 0.6 mR/hr at 500 yards from the plant to a low of C 3 miles.
An exception was noted durir the waste gas decay tank when gamma le distance of 500 yards east of the plar DUPLICATE DOCUMENT CONTIt Entire document previously entered into system under:
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IMMEDIATE PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION April 2, 1979 OO PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION OF EVENT OR UNUSUAL OCCURRENCE--PNO-79-67H This oreliminary notification constitutes summary information of an event of safety or public interest sionificance.
Tne informacion cresented is a summary of information as of 12 noon on 4/2/79.
Facility:
Three Mile Island Unit 2 Middletown, Pennsylvania (DN 50-320)
Subiect:
NUCLEAR INCIDENT AT THREE MILE ISLAND Plant Status
. Reactor pressure is being held at abcut 1000 psi.
Incore thermocouples continue to show a decrease in fuel channel temperatures, witn all measurements below aoout 475 degrees F.
Sulk core inlet and outlet temperatures are 250 degrees F.
At 11 p.m.,
April 1, a centairment air sample indicated 2.3% hydrogen.
Further analyses and consultations with experts has led to the develop-ment of a strong concensus that the n0* oxygen generation rate inside the noncondensible bubble in the reactor is much less than originally conservatively estimated.
Also, measurements at the plant appear to indicate that the volume of gases within the bubble is being signifi-cantly reduced.
Further developments are being closely followec to confirm these favorable indications.
Action on Other Facilities The Three Mile Island Unit 2 (TMI-2) pressurized water reactor was supplied by Babcock & Wilcox.(B&W).
All utilities with an cperating B&W reactor were sent an NRC Bulletin yesterday to provide them with inforna-tion about the TMI-2 incident; require a prompt review of their plant conditions, and to effect action to prevent such an incident.
NRC inspectors are being sent to each licensed B&W reactor to provide increased inspection coverage.
Additional reactor shutdowns or power reductions are not being required by the NRC at this time.
Environmer.tal Sta+gs, Thirty-seven thermoluminescent dosimet by the NRC at distances from about one plant.
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,,#pa a c cw*e UNITED STATES n
v, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3 ( %)) $
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 N[
April 11, 1979
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MEMORANCUM FOR:
B. H. Grier, Director, Region I J. P. O'Reilly, Director, Region II J. G. Keppler, Director, Region III K. V. Seyfrit, Director, Region IV R. H. Engelken, Director, Region V FROM:
Norman C. Moseley, Director, Division of Reactor Operaticns Inspection, IE SUBJECT-IE BULLETIN NO. 79-06, REVIEW OF OPERATIONAL ERRO:iS AND SYSTEM MISALIGNMENTS IDENTIFIED DURING THE THREE MILE ISLAND INCIDENT The subject Bulletin should be dispatched for action on April 11, 1979, to all pressurized water power reactor facilities witn an operating license except S&W facilities.
Facilities with a construction permit, Ft. St. Vrain, BWR and tne B&W facilities with an operating license should receive the subject Eulletin for information only.
The draft letters to licensees are enclosed for your use in expediting and dispatching the Bulletin.
The Bulletin text will be placed on Wylbur later today, at which time your office will be notified by telephcne.
l
, ' ]LW x
Nopnao,.fo ey, Di rector Division of Reactor Operations
' Inspection Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Enclosure:
1.
Draft Transmittal Letter to all Operating Licensees less BWR and B&W plants 2.
Draft Transmittal Letter to Operating Licensees of l 347 f.2()
B&W plants, Ft. St. Vrain and all Construction Permit Holders 3.
IE Sulletin No. 79-06 a
CONTACT:
E. B. Blackwood, IE 49-28019 D
7f$5.LLfM7
(Draft letter to all B&W power reactor facilities with an operating license and all power reactor facilities with a construction pemit and Ft. St. Vrain.)
IE Bulletin :;o. 79-2 Addressee:
The enclosed Bulletin 79-05, is forwarded to you for informatien.
- c written response is required.
If you desire additional informaticn regarding this matter, please contact this office.
Sincerely, Sianature (Regional Director)
Enclosure:
IE Bulletin io. 79-06 with Enclosures 134 /
c?21
(praft letter to pressurized water power reactor facilities other than B&W witn an operating license.)
IE Bulletin No. 79-06 Addressee:
Enclosed is IE Bulletin No. 79-06, which requires action by you with regard to your pressurized water reactor facility (ies) with an operating license.
Based on our current understanding of the Three Mile Island accident sequence, and discussion with the designer of your pressurized water reactor, we have reason to believe that pressurizer level indication in your facility may not provide reliable information regarding level in the reactor coolant system under certain transient or accident condition. You should immediately instruct your operating personnel accordingly. In addition you should consider this possibility in responding to the enclosed bulletin.
Should you have any questions regarding this Bulletin or the actions required by you, please contact this office.
Sincerely, Signature (Regional Director)
Enclosure:
IE Bulletin No. 79-06 with Enclosures 1347 222
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, D.C.
20555 April 11, 1979 IE Bulletin No. 79-06 REVIEW 0F OPERATIONAL ERRORS AND SYSTEM MISALIGNMENTS IDENTIFIED DURING THE THREE MILE ISLAND INCIDENT As previously discussed in IE Bulletin 79-05 and 79-05A, the Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2 experienced significant core damap which resulted from a series of events initiated by a loss of feedaater transient and apparently compounded by operational errors.
Several aspects of the incident have generic applicability to all light water power reactor f acilities, in addition to those previously 1; itified as applicable to Babcock and Wilcox reactors.
This buildn :s to identify certain actions to be taken by all other light water power ractor facilities with an operating license.
Acticns previously have been required of licensees with B&W reactors.
Action to be taken by licensees:
For all pressurized water power reactor facilities with an operating license except Babcock and Wilcox reactors:
1.
Review the description of circumstances described in Enclosure 1 of IE Bulletin 79-05 and the preliminary chronology of the TMI-2 3/28/79 accident included in Enclosure 1 to IE Bulletin 79-05A.
This review should be directed toward understanding: (1) the a.
extreme seriousness and consequences of the simultaneous blocking of both auxiliary feedwater trains at the Three Mile Island Unit 2 plant and other actions taken during the early phases of the accident; (2) the apparent operational errors which led to the eventual core damage; and (3) the necessity to systematically analyze plant conditions and parameters and take appropriate corrective action.
Operations personnel should be instructed to:
(1) not overrice b.
automatic action of engineered safety features without careful review of plant conditions; and (2) not make operational decisions based on a single plant parameter indication when a confirmatory indication is available.
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All licensed operators with operational respo review and such partic DUPLICATE DOCUMENT records.
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