ML19254E093

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Testimony Addressing Question B1 of Aslab 790405 Memorandum & Order Re Offsite Power Supply.Discusses Bulk Electric Power Supply Planning & Design Program.Supporting Documentation Encl
ML19254E093
Person / Time
Site: Saint Lucie NextEra Energy icon.png
Issue date: 09/21/1979
From: Fowlkes E
FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION
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NUDOCS 7910310085
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UNITED STATES OF APERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY CCPMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY & LICENSING EDARD 1

In the Patter of: )

FLORIDA PCWER & LIGHT COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-389 (St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant, )

Unit No. 2) ) -

S 170 TestL:cny cf Edward J. Ecwikes September 21, 1979 b

4 701 0310

Testimony of Edward James Fowlkes -

Relating to ASLAB Meerandum and Order of April 5, 1979, en Electrical Grid Stability and Emergency Pcwer Systems (Questien B1 - Failure of Offsite Pcwer)

1. My name is Ede rd Ja=es Fcwlkes.
2. I am a Supervisory Electrical Engineer ~ serving as the Chief, 3 Interconnection & Special Investigations Branch in the Federal
4. Energy ReEulatory Ccmission's Office of Electric Power Regulation / _

5 Divisien of Interconnection and Systems Analysis. My education and

6. professional qualifications statement is attached to this testimony 7 and herein incorporated by reference.

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SCOPE OF TESTIMONY

1. The purpose of this testimony is to address Question B1 as
2. stated in the AtcAic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board Memorandum 3 and Order of April 5,1979, a statement of which is provided in
4. my acccmpanying Affidavit.
5. Offsite Pcwer Supply to the St. Lucie
7. 1,579 MW Nuclear Plant Frca the
8. Midway 500/230/138 kV Substation
9. Evaluation
10. Presently and in 1983, the prcposed cperational date for the
11. St. Lucie No. 2, 802 MW, cuclear unit, there are three heavy duty, ~
12. (952 MVA) conservatively designed 230 kV lines, respectively  :--

13 . 11.,62, 11.77 and 11.75' miles in length. A breaker-and-a-half

14. 230 kV circuit breaker arrangement is used to terminate the lines
15. at both ends and in no case are the lines in ,the same three-
16. breaker bay. At Midway Substation,' excluding the St. Lucie 230 kV
17. lines, there will be one 500 kV line, via a 500/230 kV 1,500 MVA -
18. FCA auto transfert:er with two Icw-side circuit breakers; five 230 "
19. kV lines, and two 138 kV line, connected via two 230/138 kV 224 MVA
20. auto transformers. Specifically these lines are (Ratings in ~~ "
21. parenthesis):

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5 172

-=,-m -. <

--,e . , .

,. 1. Length Teminations Voltage

2. 26.4 Midway - Martin (2,650 MVA) 500 kV 3 53.74 Midway - Malabar No. 1 (387 MVA) 230 kV
4. 50 39 Midway ' Malabar No. 2 (387 MVA)
5. 230 kV 6.

(These two lines are en a ec=cn

.Right-of-Way north to Malabar

7. substation)
8. 53.31 Midway - Indiantown - Pratt & Whitney -
9. Ranch (840 MVA)
10. 230 kV 53.26 Midway - Ranch (773 MVA) 230 kV 11.

12.

(These two lines utilize a cocon Right-of-way scuth to the Ranch

13. Substation) 14 47.9 Midway - Sher an - Martin 230 kV
15. Indiantown (420 MVA) 230 kV
16. Midway - Plu=csus (178 MVA)
17. 138.kV 7 33 Midway - Hartman (City of Fort
18. Pierce) 138 kV
19. These lines will provide eight scurces (over four transfer "

20.

paths) of FP&L system and other Peninsula Florida system supply 21.

_ cf offsite pcwer to the Midway - St. Lucie substation. The 230 22.

kV lines teminate at Midway and St. Lucie in four substation bays ~

23. arranged in a breaker-and-a-half protective sche =e' . To dis- *~ ~

24.

connect ene line's terminal, two circuit breakers :::ust open. Should 25.

one of the two breakers fail to clear, at most one line (generator '

26.-. a;-St. Lucie) would be disconnected from service. If a bus side '

27. associated line breaker fails to clear, the associated bus will 28.

..be cleared, hcwever, this would not affect the continuity of any -  ;%

29. other line (generatcr at St. Lucie) except the faulted line
30. , initiating protective. relay action. Fcr all double contingency --~

31.. .(n-2) pcssibilities at the Midway substation, at ttost ene Mid- -

32. way to St. Lucie 230 kV line's cperatien is affected and at 33 least six line scurces re=ain to Midway and at least two 230 kV 34 lines to St. Lucie. Micway sucstation deuble centin6encies

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5 173

1. considered were:

2.

3.

(1) 230 kV or 138 kV line fault with tus side breaker failure;

4. (2) 230 kV cr 138 kV line fault witn mid-bay (not adjacent to bus) failure;
5. (3) 500 kV line fault with stuck breaker;
6. (4) 230/138 kV bus fault with breaker failure; -
7. (5) 500 kV, bus fault with breaker failure:
8. (6) double 230 kV line or 500 kV plus 230 kV line
9. fault; and,
10. (7) double 230/138 kV bus fault.

11.

'Ihece cutage ccnditions are within the scope (SERC & FCG Planning

~ '

12.

Criteria) of those normally considered to provide-an adequate ' '

  • 13.

bulk power supply system. In nor=al utility system cperation, -

3- -

14.

all facilities cperaticnal, the double contingency would be 15.

caused by the sin 11taneous failure of two components, hcwever,

16.
  • _ ..this condition could also evolve from the urscheduled (ferced) '

17.

. outage of one during the scheduled (maintenance) outage of another.

18.

Even with a triple contingency (n-3), excluding the %ss of all 19.

, three Midway to St.Lucie 230 kV lines, at the Midway sutz. cation, - - -

20.

'ahighlyunlikelyeventnotnormallyconsideredasadesihi - ' ' ' ~

21.

event, 3 to 4 230 kV lines (depending en which mid-bay breaker 22.

fails to clear) re=ain connected to the Midway substation and ~

23 2-3 230 kV lines continue operation between 18.dway and St

24. Lucie. '

25.

Therefore, it may be concluded that, shcrt of a sustained -

26.

loss of all Midway to St. Lucie 230 kV lines, the less of all 27.

Midway supply lines and thence all effsite St. Lucie plant

28. supply is an event substantially beycnd nor=al electric
29. utility design criteria.

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5 174 me m - e 5mw -. w ewye e - w - e mw- -

-.-.----* - - . , . emmy-o w - e-g w. w m

1

1. It .could require the sicultaneous occurrence of more
2. than three disabling events at Midway substation or system 3 .. collapse, including a disturbance event causing the islanding
4. and loss l generation to the FP&L Midway substation to cause
5. the ec=plete loss cf all offsite power to St. Lucie. Short
6. of the destmetion of the Midway substation, eight essentially
7. independent transmission failure events cust occur to lose Midway -- -
8. substation.
9. To quantify the approximate failure frequency of transmission
10. supply to the Midway and St. Lucie substation, a limited scope
11. transmissica reliability assessment was mde of the transmission n -
12. system supplying Midway substation through to the St. Lucie 230 kV
13. . substation. To si=plify calculations, the following assu=ptions
14. were cade:

s

15. (1) Circuit breaker, relay, tus and transferrer failure events
16. were not included. This was partially because no source of i
17. - ,.. 500/230 kV transformer failure rates-and repair times was - ~ ^~'-
18. available. A bus fault concurrent with a break failure
19. Cust occur to affect a line. ---

20.- (2) While the Midway - Malabar 230 kV lines and the Midsay - - -

21_. P.anch and Midway - Indiantcwn - Ranch 230 kV lines' -3 5. ' r>

22. occupy cce=cn right-of-ways, failure independence was . = "
23. assumed; 2h. (3) The failure event improvement provided by the 138 kV lines
25. (>'idway - Fluccsus and Midway - iiartman) was excluded;

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    • . . , _ . . , _ _ . .-o, .

.m.. .. e--_

1. (4) Eecause o" the sparsity of line failure event data provided
2. by FP&L, 230 kV line failure rate and repair characteristics 3 in Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) -
4. . _ _. -publication en transmission syste= reliability calculaticns _ . . . . .
5. were used (Vol. PAS-87, No. 3, March 19c8, "A Method for
6. Calculating Transmissicn System Reliability" Stephen A. ..
7. Mallard and Virginia C. Thomas - Table I).

The Transmissicn

8. .. Interruption Snmry per a by FP&L only covered the few- . ... . _, . .. ..

9 230 kV Midway' substation line (138 kV also provided) failures -

10. that cccurred during the 1975-1978 pericd. System cutages are
11. not incorporated in the data base.
12. -(5) The 230 kV line failure rate (cutages per unit per year i useL... ,= . . _ . , .

13 was the weighted average of forced nor=al weather and forced

14. - adverse weather outages. The i= pact of the adverse weather -- - ~ " " -
15. cc=ponent (152.63 imes the nor=al co=penent) was incorporated o  :-
16. I _ based up U.S. Department Cccterce/ Weather Bureau /Cli=atolegical.. - . .c~
17. Services Divisien data provided in Technical Paper No.19,
18. -

"Mean Nu=ber of Thunderstcrm Days in the-United States", - " - - - 'e " " - '

19. September 1952 which showed Miami, Florida with a mean " -
20. annual nu=ber of thunderstcr= days of 91. Therefore, the u. . = ~

?1. . adverse weather failure rate cc=ponent was given a 25% weight. .

22. The 230 kV line failure rate used was 0.11C5915 cutages per 23 mile-year censisting of ner=al and adverse weather cc=ponents .

- 24. respectively of 0.00285 and 0.435. The ner=al and adverse ~

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1. weather repair times respectively were 4.43 and 15.2 hcurs
2. which when weighted accordingly provided an equivalent 3 repair > ti=e of 7.115 hours0.00133 days <br />0.0319 hours <br />1.901455e-4 weeks <br />4.37575e-5 months <br />. Failure rates calculated with the
4. FP&L 230 kV data varied between 0.0 and 6.25 per-year with "-
5. cost about 0.5 per year (0.01 outages / mile-year for 50 mile
6. line)
7. (6) The same failure rate (230 kW) was used for the Midway -
8. Martin 500 kV line

- 9. - (7) Scheduled cutage and.. overloads dae the catage of. another. ,

10. facility effects were not included.
11. Following are the line failure rates (outages p'er year)
12. used in the calculations.. The ccaponent repair.__ time.was 7.115 13 hours for all lines.

Outages Per

14. ' -

Line Tem.lnations _ . .

Year

-15. 1. Midwa'y - Malabar No.1, 50.39 =iles 5.5727 16.- 2. Midway - Malabar No. 2, 53.74 miles _. 5.9432

17. 3. Midway - Martin 500 kV, 2& 4-miles- -  ;---
2.9196 ---
18. 4. Midway - Sherr.an - Martin 230 kV - - - - ~, - - - - - -
19. Indiantcwn, 47.9 miles 5.2973
20. 5. Pldway - Indiantewn, 24.12 miles 2.6675
21. 6. Indiantcwn - Pratt & M11tney - Ranch, -
22. - - 29.19 =iles .: .- .

- 3.2282 23 7. Midway - Ranch, 53.26 =iles 5.8901 24.' 8. Midway - St. Lucie No. l~,11.62 ciles - :

1.2851 -

25. 9. Midway - St. Lucie No. 2,11.77 miles 1.3017 26.-10. Midway - St. Lucie No.:.3, .11.75 miles ; . . .. .. 1.2995, -

5 177

1. Lines 4. and 5. were censidered as a parallel cccbinatien in
2. series with Line 6. This result was taken as a parallel cc=bination
3. - .. With Lines 1., 2. , 3. , and 7.- to Midway substation,. resulting in . .
4. a combined unavailability of all lines and failure frequency (events ._
5. per year) respectively of 652.2066 x 10 # and 4.0178 x lod
6. events per year (Mean Time Eetween Failures (MTEF) of 248,890,300
7. .4 years).

8.. Lines 8., 9.. and 10, were ccebined in parallel with this . c.. . ;

9 cctbinatien taken in series with the abcve to St. Lucie 230 k7

10. substation. The resultant unavailability cf all lines, failure .

11..  ? frequency and MTEF respectively were 1.1653 f-10 v 4 3058 x-- " 7.1.

, 42. 10 events per year and 232,244.79 years. These results

.13.. .._ apply only to the specified transcission line ccmponents withcut. . . . . . . . . .

14. .. consideration of generation beirs_avM hhle .to . supply _the lines.. . . . . . . . - ..

i 15 .-- - - -- -- Attachment Nos. 2 and 3 discussion design :cens1demtions as .they &- - - -

16. apply and are used in Peninsula Florida and the FP&L intercennecticas ..
17. with other Peninsula Florida sys* m .

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. . _ 10 - -

1. REFERENCES 1
2. 1. 1978 Power System Statement (FPC Fer: No.12) 3 from Florida Power & Lignt Company
4. 2. 1978 Power System St,nement from Flcrida Pcwer Corporation
5. 3. 1978 Power System Statement from Tampa Electric Company.
6. 4. April 1, .1979, Coordinated Bulk Power Supply Program, .

7 1979-1998 from Sesutheastern Electric Reliability Council.

8. 5. April 1,1978, Bulk Power supply Program, 1978-1997
9. fecm Southeastern Electric Reliability Council- . - . ..
10. 6. August 1, 1979, 1979 Ten-Year Plan-State cf Flcrida- ._. .
11. Electrical Generating Facilities and Associated - - --
12. Transmission Lines, Florida Electric Power 13 Coordinating Group . --
14. 7. March 1979, Rerort of Special Transient stability Study - -
15. ---. for 1978.Su==.c. Peak,- to the Sys. tem Planning Ccc.mittee . .

. w-

16. by the Special ~1978 Transieat Stability Task Force.
17. 8. January 1979, Transmission Lcadflcw Analysis Report - .. . . _ ; _ . . _ _ . , _ _ .

18.- 1982 & 1987 Su"=er Periods by Florida Electric Pcwer -- ' - >- --

19 Coordinating Group System Plannng_Cct=ittee,.Trans- . .. . . _ . .

20. mission Task Force

'- 21. 9.' August 23, 1978, Peninsula-Florida Generation Reliability-  ;- - : -

s~

22. Study, 1978-1987 by Florida Electric Pcwer Coordinating -

23 Group, Inc.

2 4 .' ' ' 'TA A Method for Calculating transmission System-Re1= ability, - -~ e u- -

25. - - Stephen A. Mallard"and Virginia C. -Thomas. IEEE .Trans r_: _ - ,,
26. acticns en Power Appuratus and Syste=s, Vol.--FAS-87, -
27. No. 3 pp. 824-834, March 1968. ._.
28. 11. A Probability Method for Trannission and Distribution -

. _:f . _ ~ .

29. Outage calculations, Z.G. Todd.. IEEE. Transactions en .. .. . . . .
30. Power Appamtus and Systems, 'vol. 83, pp. 695-701, - - - -
31. July 1964.
32. 12. On Procedures for Reliability Evaluations of Trans=ission 33 Syste=s, Robert J P.inglee and Sheila D. Goode. .TEEE. . . , _ . . . ,,
34. Transactiens en Pcwer Ap.:aratus and Systems, Vol. PAS - - --

35, 89, No. 4, pp. 527-536, April 1970 5 179 e

= ->e- mu mmme.e se *-ees-. --- mm- e- -a== m----

,- 1. 13 Power-Syste= Peliability calculations, Roy Billinton,

2. Robert J. Ringlee and Allen J. Kcod. The Massachasetts
3. Institute of Technology Press, Cam'cridge, Massachusetts,
4. 1973
5. 14. Pcwer Syste= Reliability Evaluatica,. Roy Billinton
6. Gordon and Eeach, Science Publishers, Inc., New York
7. 1970.
8. 15. Transient Stability Evaluation of the Impact of the
9. New 230 kV Tie Between FP&L and Georgia Pow?r
10. Company, Florida Pcwer & Light Cc=pany, August 31, 1979 ' '
11. 16. Review of the Performance of Varicus Electrical . -- --
12. Configurations between St. Lucie Plant and the 13 FPL Grid, Florida Power & Light Comp;ny, August 31, 1979
14. 17. Testimony of Frederick George Flugger relating to
15. ASLAB Mecerandum and Order of April 5,- 1979,-on- -
16. Emergency Grid Stability and Emergency Power
17. Systems (Questices A2, B1, B2,' B3, and B4 of
18. ALAB 537) Ju .e 22,1979. .. . . ..
19. 18. Joint ". .attrony of Michel P. Armand,
20. Ernest L. Bivans, and Wilfred E. Coe
21. Ralating to Questions Al and D of ALAB 537.
22. June 1, 1979 ~

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. .L. -.. .-_ %_. . _ _ . -

i  :

Edward J. Fcwlkes Professicnal Cualificaticns Statement

1. My name is Edward J. Fcwlkes. I am Supervisory Elec*.rical
2. Ergineering.ssrving as the Chief, Interecnnection & Special Investigations 3 Eranch in the Federal Energy Regulatory Co:r.ission's Office of Electric , . . . . .
4. Power Regulatien/ Division of Interconnection and Systems Analysis.

5 The ISI Branch analyzes and evaluates: (1) transmission, inter- .

6. conhection and cperational characteristics of electric power systems -
7. - associated with FEF.C, cc other proceedings-and investigations _upon .. -
8. request; (2) FERC licensing jurisdicticn .over ele.ctric transmissicn
9. -

lines associated with hydroelectric projects; and, (31. benefits .. _.m... .

10. ~ ' hVa'ilable through increased coordination and pooling'of electric --- - n., -vi.

- 11. power systems. Prior to my Federal ecployment beginning in.1971 ,

~

12.- ' -with FERC's predecessor the Federal Prwer Com=ission/Bu.reau.of. _. ,m m,.

13. '" Power /Pcwer Supply' & Reliability. Division, -I ms- eploy.e'd by .thei, .g,,
14. Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp., in Poughkeepsie, .New York. ,, -
15. --

I received a Bachelor of Science Degree in Electrical ,. . ,, .- e .. __ .

16. - Engineering (Power Cpticr;) B .1964 from.Hcward University in . , , ..__. .,__., .
17. Washington, D.C. and a Master of Enginering Degree in Electric
18. Pcwer Engineering in 1971 frem.Rensselaer Poly. technic Institute
19. - - in Tr6y, New York. In .1968-697 I attended the Genewal. Electric.. . . ., ., ., .

- - 2^ . Cocpany's Pcwer System; Engineering Ccurse in.Schenectady, New.. . , _. ._. .. . . .

~

21. York. I am a registered Professicnal Engineer in the State of
22. New York and a member of the Institute of Electrical and _
23. Electronics Engineers.

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Attachment No. 1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORI (TERISSICN '

EEFORE THE ATCMIC SAFETY AND LICE!SI?G APPEAL ECARD In The Matter Of: )

FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-389 (St. Lucie Nucler Pcwer Plant, -

)- ,c , ,

Unit No. 2) )

AFFIDAVIT OF EEWARD J. FCWLKES -- -

. i

1. I am Edward J. Fcwlkes, Chief, Interconnection & Special

~

2. I'.stestig'ations 'Eranch for the ' Federal Energy -Regulatcry Ccenission's -  %- . -

3 Office of Electric Pcwer Regulation /Divisicn of Interconnection and -

.. Systems Analysis. My education and professional qualifications -

2. appear as an attachment _to this. testimony. _I am participating
6. here at the request of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Ccanission's -
7. Counsel for the NRC staff to provide assistance in their assessment
8. of the adequacy of the Florida Power & Light Ccmpany and the -

9 Peninsula Florida transmissicn system fcr the offsite emergency _ ..

10. pcwer requirer.ents cf the 3:2 ". St. Lucia "a. 2 nucin r unit.

5 182 m

om 'm- m

Attachmen', No.1 Page 2 of 4

1. The purpose of this affidavit is to respond to Question El
2. cencerning the failure of St. Lucie nuclear plant offsite power in
3. - the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Memorandum and Order of April 4 5,1979 (ALAB-537).
5. C'ESTICN B1
6. As we see it, the likelihood of less of all AC power at St. Lucie - '
7. may be expressed as the product of two facters: (1) the prcbability
8. that there will be an offsite pcwer failure involving the FPL net - - - -

9 Work generally ce the Midway substaticn in particular and a

10. resulting less of station power - which prcbability seecs based -
11. en historical events, to lie in the range 1.0 ant 0.1 per year;
12. and (2) the prcbability that neither of the two onsite AC pcwer
13. ~ systems (diesel generators) will start. The probability that. '

" ' ~ ~ ~

14. any one diesel generator will fail to start en demand is taken
15. --by the staff to be one per hundred demands, 'i.e. ,1c-T ' 25/.- "~~^
16. - If these figures are accurate, then the ccmbined probability -
17. for th
18. .to 10'g ".per year. 25/ In this regard, the staff's Standardlcss of all AC pcwer" sc . -
19. ' -Review Plan fcr Nuclear Power-Plants sets fcrtMnumerical guidelines' ~
20. for deter =ining whether an event "resulting from the presence ^ of' ' '

~T 2il . hazardous caterials or activities _in the vicinity of'the plant"' ' ' '"~ ' '

22.- 3 should be censidered in designing the plant"(1.e. , wheth~er it - "' '

.- 23.= is a " design basis" event). 2I/ Under these guidel-ines, events w ' ~

24. with a realistically, calculated probability value of at least
25. 10-7 per year (cr 10-o - per year a conservative calculation) -
26. must be so censidered.
27. -The "less of all AC power"- sequence is not precisely' within the ' '
28. .

"N~

categcry of events centecplated by the Standard Review Plan. -" ' ~~ ~

29. However, its ultimate result - assuming that power is not ---

30.- -timely restored -is an unpretected less of ecolant accident, '

31. -- the censequences- of which are likely to exceed the guidelines - ~ ' -

- 32. cf 10 CFR Part 100. We do not understand why this sequence of -

33. events (i.e., less of'cffsite p'cwer ccebined with failure of -

~

34 diesels to start), which appears to have a probability well accve

35. -

the guideline values, cshculd not be -taken into censideration in n -

36. the design of the plant. 23/ Ihe parties are to address this
37. point, setting forth their reasons for adhering (if they do)e -
38. a contrary pcsition. ~
5 183

Attachment No. 1 Page 3 of k i

1. -25/ Fitzpatrick Affidavit of June 12, 1978, p. 4. Also see -
2. Regulatory Guide 1.108, Section 8.

3 ~26/ This conclusion further assumes that the failure of two

4. diesel generators to start would be statistically independent
5. events, an assumption which leads to the lowest likelihoed
6. cf ceabined failure, and which might be nonconservative if
7. there exists the potential for common failure codes for
8. the ensite systems.

9 27/ NUR E 75/087, Section 2.2.3, paragrapn II. . _,

10. 28/ We have accepted the Standard Review Plan guideline values as
11. reasonable in another case. Public Service Electric and Gas
12. Cccpany (Hope Creek Units 1 and 2), ALAB - 429, c liRC 229
13. 234 (1977). ..

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Attach =ent No.1 Page 4 of 4

1. I, Edward J. Fowlkes, being first duly sworn, depoce and say
2. that statements cf this affadavit are true to the best cf =y knowledge
3. and belief,'and that if asked questiens thereon, ry answers in response
4. thereto would be as contained herein.

cbdru '

Ck'.$k&

Edward J. Pcwlkes Washington, D.C.)

J/ "T S

, ___ Subscribed and sworn to before_me this day of _ _ _

September, 1979.

rl r .A O

u i J. O G * / c' Notary Puolic

$12 Ccmminicr. E,..a Jc./ 1. U^2

. J s

Attach: ent No. __

Page 1 of 15

1. Discussion of the Bulk Electric Pcwer Supoly Planning and Design Program. ., .
2. All of the follcwing contingency analysis tests are incorporated 3 in the FP&L and Peninsula Florida syster.3 bulk electric ~pcwer suppply 4 planning and design process. - hhile extensive. FGC studies of the 1983
5. Peninsula Florida system have not been perfccmed because of the
6. tentative nature of area utility plans, such studies, I have been _ .
7. informed, are planned to be completed by early 1980.
8. ---In tne process of designing the bulk pcwer supply. facilities, . . . .; .

9 generation and transmission, the pcwer system is analyzed at peak _

10. as well as lower load conditions. In the-ease of Peninsula Flcrida -
11. systems such analysis is done en an individual utility basis as well
12. - as a-Peninsula Florida basis-(Florida Electric Power tocedicating. _..: .
s. .

. 13. Grcup). Cnce the level of generation needed is established, the _

14. ~ transmission system cust be analyzed to provide an adequate.means -
15. ,for'tPansferring the supply to. the load (Ed and KIAR).. The trans . -,

~16. ' ^ missicn system-design must be- thcrcughly-cocedinated-with the --- -

cc-generation expansion program and visa versa.

17 18.

~

~ ~ ' Establishment of an adequate transmission system must consider- e- -- -

19. 'both normal and unusual conditions both of the available generatict. -

~ and cf the transmission system. Ccmpounding this analysis are the -

~

20.

21. ever present pcssibilities that a planned generation er transmission. f- ,
22. facility will not be available as planned (institutional, envircneental 23 or other regulatory delay). The abnor-al design conditions evaluated _
24. seek to acccunt for scheduled cutages (generation, trans=1ssicn line- .
25. - cr substaticn maintenance) and forced (unscheduled) cutages of generation-
26. cr tra.raissi:n facilities. .Lcn nnal/ sis is p vf : . c.hr:4n ;;0 cf
27. load f:.. and stability computer programs.

S 186.

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. Attachment Fo. 2

- Page 2 cf 15

1. Load flow is used to determine the distribution pattern of the
2. electric power thrcught the transmission system and losses with a 3 specified generation schedule (econc=ic dispatch and spinning reserve
4. allocation)' and unit availability, system load level (MW) and 5.. transmission facility availability. Such analysis will determine if
6. with specified availability of facilities, at a _ specific system load 7 level, whether the trans=ission system compcnents cperating within
8. their capability limits (MVA) and voltage limits. The spectrum 9 of situations analyzed would include:
10. Base Case (all generation and transmission facilities
11. available) .
12. A. Peak Load

. 13 B. Lcwer Lead Level _ . . ,

14. Single Centingency

, 1

15. A. Single line cutage --- -
16. P. Single generater cutage
17. Deuble Ccntingency . . _ _ _ . _
18. A. Double line cutage (generally restricted to a double-circuit -
19. transmissica line cutage er two single-circuit lines on a
20. common right-of-way) 2 r. B. Double generatcr~ outage (this would account for situations .

' 2 2'. where a unit was scheduled cut and another unit had to -:-

23 be taken off line where both units cny not be at the

24. same site and where the second unit was not lest due to fault or sudden trip) ln[
25. ., r 3 O e

a'-- ww-.

l Attachment No. 2 Page 3 of 15

1. C. Single line outage and generator cutage (this would
2. account for conditions wherein a line er generator-3 was scheduled out and a line or generatcr was forced . ..
4. out of service)
5. D. Other Multiple Outages (outages of nore than two tulk pcwer supply facilities

~

--~

6. - -
7. may be considered depending en anticipated. area..or . . . ._ ...
8. regional conditions tut are not generally design ._
9. criteria)
10. Area Transfer Capability - - - . . - . . . . . - - .
11. -A.-- Intra system transfer capability..(to determine :the capability .c . -: ,:...- -
12. to transfer power from one utility system subarea to another.
13. J- Such analysis 14. may be useful in developing restcratien -. -

m - - -

14. plans and'in determining limiting facilities)--- - ' - - ' '

i

15. B. Inter system transfer capability,(to deter =ineithe ' = . . . -- r wa n
16. import or export capability between utility.syste=s . _
17. cr regions) - -
18. The preceeding centingencies are evaluated both at peak and- --- -
19. -lower load corditions in the process-of analyzing-the bulk power, - -

.r- c:.

20. supply system .idequacy.and ita adherence to. design criteria...In . _ .. .
21. all cases, it is presumed that if a facility cr facilities are
22. cutaged because of a fault condition, the system is transiently .

23 stabre and the effect of interconnected utility systems are - -- -

24. ~ represented through appropriate model equivalents.: These load ,. .-

^

5 188

. -- ~ - - -

~

Attachcent No. 2 Page 4 of 15

1. ficw contingency studies are also performed as a routina
2. part of normal system operation's periodic security analysis 3 via on-line load ficws at modern system operatior.s control .
4. centers, for each capability period-summer and winter, en the
5. mid range system plan 3-7 years in future and en the longer -
6. range sfstem 9-15 years in the future. The extensiveness -

7 .~~ of' the contingency testing will depend- cn. the study requirements. ___.. . ,

8. and reasons precipitating the particular study. The stability of
9. the syste=(s), the ability to survive major disturbances without
10. uncontrolled losses of generator or load and without system
11. ~ ~ collapse, ia determined. througir transient stability,-modelling. ,_ ,_ ; . , , . . . ,
12. -Transient stability programs are design.to evaluate electric. . , _ , . .

13 power system dyna =ics resulting from sudden losses _of. bulk. power

14. ' stipply facilities and loads due to faults or other sudden con- - -

~

15. tingencies. These =ay include:
16. Loss of Generation -

Cutage of a critical transmission line caused by a fault. ;_

17. A. _.

19.- B. Cutage of a critical transmission line caused by a fault 20.~

~~

during the scheduled cutage of another. critical line. . ,.s- , , . ._

' C.- Sudden loss of all lines on a commen right-of-way (this 21.

22.

could include the' unlikely loss-cf three-orpre lines --

23 occupying a co==on right-of-way) - . . . .

'^

5 189 e

. Attachment No. 2 Page 5 of 15

1. D. Delayed clearing of a fault at any point on the system
2. due to failure of a circuit breaker to cpen (this accounts
3. foc system dynamics that may result if the primary protective 4 relay system dynamics that any result if the pri=ary protective
5. and the back-up protective relaying and associated circuit
6. breaker (s) must operate to clear the fault) -
7. E. Sudden less of a substation plus transformation including -
8. - any generating capacity connected thereto. The substatica - "-
9. . _ loss, fran a practicaLview point < would be limited to a_.- . _ . . m.... .
10. --- - single voltage level at a multivoltage level substation. - - - -
11. The evaluation of the foregoing events would be ' directed towards ' - -
12. the transient analysis of the power system (s) and would :nodel the .
13. generator; -load and protectiverrelay dynamic perfor=ance to verif- that , e---

~-

14.: .no'.tacontrolled syste= sepa.~.ations; -Icss of genemtiongfacility .-~ :4: m mr."-

15c overloads or system collapse occurs. Alser modelled would be the .. 2 . __.-

16. performnce of underfrequency relay response consonant with encountered -- e -

..17 .-situations...The fact that.theamlysis shcws that .underfrequency relays. e . m.

18. cperate as planned is an apprcr.riate result dictated by the extent 19... transmissicn and generation supplym_.Ihe analysis =ay also be.used to. .. . . . .
20. develop the apprcpriate underfrequency relay-lead shedding scheme. - -- --

5 190

- - . =

~ ~

Attach =ent No. 2 Page 6 of 15

1. Florida Peninsula Design Criteria For System Planning and
2. Ooeraticn 3 The Florida Pcwer & Light Company along with the other
4. Florida Peninsula systets design their transmissicn facilities 5 to met the Florida Electric Power Coordinating Group (FW)
6. criteria which parallels the SERC. Regional Criteria. The FCG ,
7. planning criteria is for the operating systems in Florida
8. is set out in the FCG Planning Handbook.

9 SERC Regional Criteria - the cbjective of the criteria

10. is to assure that cascading outages do not result from any
11. forseeable centingenciese Thereirt cascading is defined as the- .. .c- -r -

. 12. uncontrolled successive. loss of system elements as a result of 13 a centingency at any locatien. Cascading results in an _

14. . uncontrolled, widespread. collapse of, system generation and . , , , , . . . . .
15. lead, which collapse carinot be restrained from subsequently '~ m -
16. spreading beyond a predetermined area through appecpriate
17. engineering models, (load flew and transient stability
18. studies).
19. ~ Pursuant to the SERC Regional Criteria, electric systems are to be , ,
20. planned to prevent cascading shculd any of the folicwing centingencies
21. occur: - -
22. U - 1. Less of Generation - the sudden loss of..the entire 23 generating capacity at any one plant.

3 $h\

m O O w

.am.

-T- Attachment No. 2 Page 7 of 15

1. 2. Less of Lead - the sudden locs of a large lead er major
2. or major lead center. _..

3 3. Less of Transmission

4. - -

, A. The catage of the most critical transmission line -

5. due to a three-phase fault concurrent with the
6. outage of any other critical transmission line. .
7. B. The sudden less of all trans=ission lines en a
8. occmon right-of-way.

9.- C. The sudden loss of a substatien.(limited to a _ . _ . . _ .

10. single voltage level within the cubstation
11. -including transformaticn frcs that voltcge level),
12. including any generation capacity connected thereto. -

13 D. The delayed clearing of a three-phase fcult at

14. any system locatien due to the failure cf a
15. first-protective-zene circuit breaker to cpen
16. to clear the fault. . . _ _
17. FCG Planning Criteria
18. A. More Probable Centingencies - to be sustained without load loss
19. other than that connected to the lost.elecene. . . - - -
20. 1. Loss of generation - sudden loss ef:any ene . generator . _ .

. ;; . - c r- -

21. . 2. Loss of transmission '
22. a. single line outage of any cne transmission line.

23 b. less of any cce transfer =ec bank.at,.any.cne

24. generating plant er tulk transmission substaticn. r _-
25. B. Less Probable Contingencies a to be sustained with possible
26. loss of sete load.
27. 1. Loss of generation - sudden loss of any en generator while
28. any one generatcr is out of service.

' 29 .~' - 2.5 Loss of transmissien - loss of any two double-circuit tcwer .

30. transmissicn lines. . _
31. 3 Les: cf "eneratier and tr' tmiscien - less cf any ena tr,ne-
32. mission line during the seneduled-cutage of any cne 33 generator.

5 19,2

.u.- . ..==-e.e- >-eu ,, es= - - --

Attachment No. 2 Page 8 of 15

- 8-

1. '&.ese regional criteria serve as cin" -- fcr all SERC systems and
2. discussion with FP&L staff indicated they were at least consonant 3 with the F03 Criteria which is followed by FP&L. Because of the
4. - limited interconnection capability betweertFlorida Subregion -..
5. electric syste=s and electric syste=s in the remainder cf SERC
6. which are interconnected with all other e?actric systems east
7. of the line ferred by the eastern borders of Mentana, 'dyoming,
8. ~ Colorado and New Mexico excluding Texas, presently endor lesses -

-9. - _.of Peninsula Florida generation .(largest _ plant.- Turkey Point. -. , . . . . -- .

10. (FPL), 2066 M4 or largest unit. - Crystal River No. 3- (FLPC),- "r " e 11.- 824 W) would result in the separate of the Flo~rida systems - -" 3' " -
12. frca the remainder of the Eastern Interconnection. This 'e r -
13. - assumes that the specified plant and units were operating -

- " e' v--

14.. at their rated capabilities and there were:no' scheduled" '

w e ~ m u...--.s,

15. tcinsfers to Florida.
16. -

In 1983, the present scheduled cperational-date for the '

- .17. .St. Lucie No 2, 802 K4: nuclear _ unit,_ the. largest Florida Sub, ..... m ;e . -

18. regicn plant and unit respectively will be the FLPC's 2,280 W _

-. 19 . Crystal 2iver plant and its Crystal River No. 3, G rd, nuclear .. ..

. 20. . unit. Fowever, for transient stability study" purpcses, the - '

- - .c ~ -

21. largest Florida peninsula. plants in 1983 would be Turkey. .
22. Point (2,066 M'd), St. Lucie (1,579 W), Martin (1,550 K4) 23 Manatee (1,528 K4), and Crystal River 500 ky-i. >s.3 a' 4 .

'24 (1,464 F4). By then, the Installed Interconnection Capability

25. (I:C) and :ce Energency Transfer G,a nli;y m'C) t a n en 26 Florida and Georgia will increase cs follcws: ,

g}

e

+ e-aw- >-m.- . = -e. . . . ..

Attachment No. 2

~

Page 9 cr 15

_ g_

Florida Scuthern to to Southern _ Florida 1979 198J 1171 1983 Wd Wd Wd Wd IIC 200 900 .300 1000 ETC 50 550 100 600 The interecnnecticns between Peninsula Flcrida and the remainder of the Eastern Interconnection will be:

Yulee JP&L) - Kingsland (COPC) 230 kV lJuwanee (FPC) - Pinegrove (GOPC) 230 kV Port St. Joe (FPC) - Callaway (GUPC) 230 kV Suwanee Plant (FPC) - Twin Lakes (GUPC) 115 kV Jasper (FPC) - Pinegrove (GOPC) 115 kV Jasper (FPC) - Traver (GOPC) . .. 115.kV

. \

1/ Jennings (FPC) - Valdesta (GOPC) 69 kV Monicello (FPC) - Ecsten (GCPC) _. 69 kV 1/ City of Quincy (FPC) - Attapulgus (GOPC): ,69.kV 1/ Nernally Open Interconnections .

O" 194

+,-+=ew- -- *+w

.. ent No. 2 Pace 10 of 15

1. Restricting discussion to the Southern to Florida subregicn capabilities,
2. the IIC.and ETC values respectively increase by 700 MW/333.33% and .

3 500 MW/600%. These incraased values result from transmission

4. reinforceme'nts between the Floride and Southern Subregions: (1) 1980
5. operaticn of the Yulee (FPL) - Kingsland (Georgia Pcwer Corp. - GUPC)
6. .10.. mile 230 kV line, and.(2).1982.uprate to 230 kV and. retermination - . - . . . . .
7. to Callcway (GUPC) of the Port St. Jce (FLPC) - Wewa 37.75 mile 115 kV
8. line and other Florida Subregion transmission reinforcements. Between
9. December 31, 1978 and December 31, 1983, 7tS.56 miles of 230 kV cperated
10. - -trans=issica line will be added: to the Florida Subregicn eithe: as '
11. new line additiens or uprating of existing 115 kV lines. In additien,
12. 125.4 miles of 500 kV trans=ission, all cn the FP&L system, will be

.13 .:added. Of_the planned Florida. <.30 kV line. additionsi 342.40 . . . _ _ _ . . . . .

14  : milesAS.7%. additions sre .on the. FP&L system. The FP&L 500 kV additions.: . .- .

15. 'through 1983 plus 199 miles planned for addition during the 1984-1988 .
16. period will establish 500 kV as the FP&L primary transmissien level

. .37... . in.their. North. Central, Eastera,.Scutheast and Miami Divisicns. ..m. . . . . . . . . . . .

18.- :ln:1978, these Divisions ~. constituted 76% (33,379.9 GWH).of system .T. _ .

19. .ecergy supplied and 78% (6540 MW) of the syste=s non coincident _ . . .
20. peak demand.

21... :bhile apprcpriate transient stability and lead flow. studies . = _ .-- -

22. for the 1983 and subsequent periods cust te perfer ed to

.23. satisfy frca an engineering viewpoint ccepliance with planning _. .

24. criteria, it is reasonable to presume that with the planned -
25. Flcrija - Cccr,p2 tr.:.criacia. _atccfsce cerEc. a ta aler.;
26. with those in Flcrida, for the loss of the Crystal River No. 3, 824 rd, 5 195 ,

. ~ - . - _ . - . . , _ .

'. l '

Attac=ent No. 2 .

Page 11.of 15

1. nuclear unit, the Florida syste=2 shculd remain interconnected
2. with the Eastern Interecnnection. In 1983, for the loss of-the 3 Crystal River No. 3 unit, abcut 778.1 MW (96%) of the instantanecus
4. electrical energy balance adjustment will come fecm outside the -
5. Flcrida system through the Florida - Georgia interface and in
6. terns of the planned 1983 interfac capability of 1000 MW - .
7. -(IIC), the Florida systems shculd ro d n interconnected with the
8. Eastern Interconnection as long as: (1) no major interface lines
9. are out of service; (2) no =ajor transmission paths from the . _ _ _ . , .
10. -

Fl'rida--

o Georgia interface south are. unavailable; and.(3)-the .

.r..-

e

. 1-1. - scheduled Georgia to Florida transfer is less.than.about_400 MW. .

12. The loss of this unit might occur 3s a result of at .least cne of. two .. -- - c- __

13 events: J(1) by tripping of- ther unit or,(2) loss of,.both 500 kV. lines;2 L ,, m.

14. frecPthe plant (cutage of cne 500 kV .line due-to fault during-the _ j .
15. -

mintainance outage of the other 500 kV line), .hcwever, t;his ,

~

16. would 'al'so cause the.lcss of the _ Crystal River:No. _4, 640 MW, coal fired
17. unit, plar:ned for installation in 1982, as well resulting in a total loss .
18. of 1,464 MW. This would exceed in generaticn loss magnitude as would-

-19 . - the 'lcss of St. Lucie:Nos.1 and 2, .1,579 MW, the -largest situation-

20. - provided-in the August 31, 1979 FP&L analysis. Therefrem, I wculd presu=e. ..
21. that fece a transient stability viewpoint, that initiation of Peninsula
22. Florida separation fecm the Eastern Intercennecticn would begin in less 23 - than 3.87 seccnds and the autc=atic underfrequency relaying will .
24. cpar.ta M chcd fi r '.nd.

5 M6 em

--.=-# ,,

  • ttachment No. 2

' Page 12 of 15

-u-

1. The preceeding discucsien does not indicate the design adequacy, with
2. respect to SERC Regional Criteria for less cf generation,1 cad or 3 transm1ssion. This can cnly be determined through transient stability 4 studies." Ky discussion with both FP&L and FCG staff concluded that
5. FCG studies for 1980-85 pericd had not been done tut were scheduled fer
6. later this year. However, the transient stability evaluation by FP&L
7. cenfires in part that no separatice. would cccur cr firm load shedding
8. with an i= pert of.300 MW and the loss of 800 MW.
9. Spinning reserve criteria for the Peninsula Florida syste=s is described.
10.  :-by :the FW Operating Cccmittee in- the FM. Operating Handbock which is~ used - -
11. in conjunction with the Ncrth Anterican I cwer Systems Interconnection
12. Cccmittee (NAPSIC) Operating Manual. While I have no't seen the FCG -
13. Operating Handbeck, the SERC foordinated Eulk Power Supply Program of - ~
14. April 11, 1979 under item 7-A," Cocrdinatica of Operations", for the. a- . .. .: - 2.-
15. , Florida Subregion su==arizes several of the cocrdinatsd practices including .
16. the Operating Reserve Policy. Daily Cperat:ng R e erve is that a= cunt of
17. generating capability and/or equivalent load relief over and above fere - -
18. -casted daily peak load which is availsble to respond to load ~
19. connected and-respcnsive 1:=ediately to load changes and capabler . 1. . - - -
20. - of becccing fully loaded in respense-to a frequency decline of 0.5 H "= -- -
21. (to 59.5 H freci no=inal er scheduled frequency of 60 Hz); and, (2)
22. -Supplemental Reserve 7any generating capability and/cr lead --

23.. relief measure which carr be mde fully responsive to its .--.n .

24. planned for reserve capability within 30 minutes.

5 197

-en es.-.=- #

w -

.___.,mm-w

13 -

/ Attachment No. 2 Pase 13 of 15

1. The Daily Operating Reserve =aintained by the cc=bined syster.s
2. (Florida Subregion systems) is equal to, ce greater than, the 3 sum of the Peak Capabiltiy Ratings of _ the two largest units in 4 service. Spinning Reserve is maintained at, cr greater than, the
5. Peak Capability Rating of the largest generating unit in service.
6. -- The balance of the Daily Operating Reserve is Supplemental --
7. Reserve and upon the loss of a unit, Supple = ental Reserve is
8. converted to Spinning Reserve, if required, to reatore the
9. recc== ended level of Spinning Reserve.
10. Daily Operating Reserve and Spinning Reserve requirements are . .3_.
11. allocated a=cng participants, weighted 501 in proportion to each --

~

12. partcipant's anximum de=and for the preceeding year and 50% -

'13 for the Peak Capability of his largest unit. The effect on a 1-

. . . - c

14. - l participant's' spinning reserve allocaticn ::ust be fully 'censidered  :-r, - ,.

before agreeing to sell pcwer to another participant; the' protection- _

15.

16. of a new unit undergoing, shakedcwn.is- the cwner's responsibiltiy; -

-17. - based upon 5% governors, no more than-16.6% of the Continuops . . .

  • 18.
  • Capability of a unit can be assigned to any one unit; and, each
19. participant's Daily Cperating Reserve allecation shculd be .. , _ . . __. . .
20. -available to other participanta-withcut restriction by transfor=er, . -- e _ ..c- .
21. line er other limitations , ,

^'

5 198

, , . - . --%-w-me . --ww -

e-- ,e,,,e,-.

Attachment No. 2 Pace 14 of 19

1. In the event that Spinning Reserve and Eastern Interconnecticn
2. transmissicn cuppert is insufficient, the Peninsula Florida s ystem has a Lead Preservation Progra encorporating autccatic 3

4 underfrequency relaying (UFR). Thrcugh UFR operation a

5. mini =um of 2,859 KJ (16.6%), 2,829 rd (16.4%) and 4,438 ffd (25.7%)
6. cf load will autocatically be shed respectively by a frequency - -
7. decline to 59.0 Hz, 58.7 Hz and 58.5 Hz. This represer.ts 58.7% of .
8. the 1979 su==er peak load and would leave at least 41.3% (7,124.4 Kd) 9 of Icad and generation cperable fer restcration of lost generatica .

10., and/cr load. In addition, each Florida Subregicn system has

-11. generating units capable of cperating-for extended pericf.s isolated . .

. 12. fran the system and carrying their cwn auxiliary power loads, wtich 13 should reduce system restoration ti=e.

9 5 199 e

e

-.. . - . .wg. ,.m.m. -

Attachter,t No. 2 Page 15 or 15

_ 15 ,

L g est Peninsula Flerida Generatir3 Unit and Plant, 1978 - 1985 -1/

1978 1979 - 1981 Largest FP&L -2/ FP&L Plant Turkey Point Turkey Point 3/

2066 MW 2066 MW 2/

Largest FLPC FLPC Unit Crystal River No. 3 Crystal River No. 3 797 MW 824 MW 1982 - 1983 _

1984 - 1935 o Largest FLPC FLPC Plant Crystal River 4/ Crystal River 5/

2280 MW -

2920 MW Largest FLPC FLPC r-Unit Crystal River No. 3 crystal-River No. 3 '

824 MW 824MW ,

1/--April 1, 1979, Scutheastern Electric Reliab111ty.Ceuncil (SERC), _ .

Coordinated Eulk Pcwer Supply Program for the 1979 - 1998 period.

2/ FP&L - Florida Pcuer & Light Cccpany; FLPC - Florida Pcwer Corporat.icn .

-- 3/ ~ Unit Nos.1 & 2 (367 MW 6) cbnnected to- N.E. and N.W. 230 kV tusses; -- -

Unit Nos. 3 & 4 (666 MW 6) ccnnected to S. E. and S. W. 230 kV bussas; bus tie breakers between both-Nortn-and South bus sections. .

,4/ Unit Nos.1 & 2 (383 MW, 433 MW) on 230_ kV; . Unit Nos. 3 & 4 (824 MW, ._

6ho MW) on 500 kV; No kV to 230 kV connection at plant substaticn. ,

5/ -Unit Nos. 1, 2 & 5 (383 MW, 640 MW) en 230 kV; Unit Ncs. 3 a.4 en ,

500 kV; No 500 kV to 230 kV ccnnecticn at plant substatien.

5 200

--+wa.---- e e==mmi.-me ,w-.e.w . e-.= e_ =,m -

Attachment No. 3 Page 1 of 5 Flotida Power & Light Company . .

Interconnecticn with Other Peninsula Flcrida Systems

1. The Florida Pcwer & Light Company (FP&L) has a total
2. installed generating capacity of 10,491 KJ and additions 3 thrcugh 1983 (Martin Nos..'l & 2,775 K4 t,1980 and.1981; Dade i
4. Solid Waste Facility, 40 MW,1980; and, St. Lucie No. 2, 802 Kd,
5. ~ 1983) of 2,392 K4m.'.1 raise the total system capacity to 13,333
6. KJ. The Florida Subregion generatica and 1 cad (sum =er peak) are
7. projected to crew by 1983 respectively frem 21,S00 K4 and 17,261 - -
8. . . Kd to 26,782 K4 and 21,528 Ed. .Between. FP&L and.other Peninsula... u.:'.... .
9. Florida systems there are sixteen interecre.ections (Table I) ~ ' t~
10. . operating at 69 kV__to 230 kV. Presently, three of th'ese inter -
11. connections are for limited area backup protection and'are normally; ~
12. cpen. Therefore, there are 7-230 kV,' 2-138 kV,1-115 kV, and - -
13. . 3-69 kV normally closed interconnections with Peninsu1&- Florida' ' ' ' ' ~~ M "-~

14 generating utilities. By the spring of 1980, the Yulee to Kingsland

15. -(Georgia Power Ccmpany) 230 kV. line will be operatienal,. providing - -

._1-~..

16.' one more source of emergency supply to FP&L'directly'and other - -- - ~ ~

17. Peninsula Florida system. -

18.. . - As part cf the ongoing asses::=ent, cf. the adequacy. of the- --.<...t - : :- - .

19. Peninsula Florida system, the ~ January 1979 Florida El~ectric Pcwer ~ "
20. :Cocedinating Group (FCLVSystectPlanning Cec =ittee/ Transmission - ..:  : . = ..
21. . Task-Force' < Trans=ission_ Lead ficw Analysis Report,. 1982 & 1987 . .
22. Su=mer Periods evaluated among other thrcush the single-line-23 outage adequacy of the 1982 Peninsula Florida transmissicn system 5 20' e

- mew -

Attachnent No. 3 P3se 2 of 5 Interconnections Eetween Flcrida Power & Light Carpeny and Chter Peninsuls Flcrida Sveter.: - 19~9 G'nerstion Florida F0ver Corperstion - 3,6h7 MW

l. Sanford Plant - North Longvced 230 kV
2. Brevard - Holopaw - Canoe Creek -

West Lake Wales 230 kV (fren 3:evard, there are two 230 kV linec via "alabar to Midway cub-station) 3 Canford Plant - Turner 230 kV

h. Ncr:111y cpen ~
a. Columbia - Live Cak Tap -

East Oak 69 kV

b. Taps off of Palatka Plant Deland 115 kV line --

(1) Earberville 115/69 kV (2) Deland East 115 kV Jacksonville Electric Authority - 188h MW

1. Baldwin - Normandy 115 kV
2. Baldwin 115/230 kV - Duval -

Normandy 230 kV 3 Putnan' Plant - Orangedale Greenland (JEA) - Robinvced Acreas 230 kV Tampa Electric Cervany - 2,5C5 MW _.

1. Ringling - Manatee Plant - Ruskin 230/69 kV
2. Ringling - Gillette - Ruskin 230 kV Criando Utilities Ccenission - Th2 MW
1. Cape Canaveral Plant - Indian River 230 kV Lake Worth Utilities Authcrity - 1hl MW
l. Hypoluxo - Plant Sub 138 kV (from Hypoluxo, there is a 133 kV line to Ranch 13S/230 kV)

0

l

,. Attachment No. 3

'5" City of Vero Beach - 13? MW *

1. West (138 kV) - South Sub. 69 kV Fort Pierce Utilities Authority - 116 W
l. Hartman (138 kV) - Sub. No. 1 138/69 kV (fr:m Hartman, there is a 138 kV line to Midway 138/230 kV and a 138 kV line via West to "clabar 138/230 kV City of Henestead - C2 '4W
l. Lucy - Mcginn Sub. 138 kV O

. 5 203

- w em o rew

- '4 -

Attachment No. 3 Page 4 of 5

1. and the Area-Transfer-Capability (import capability) of the major
2. systems. That stady concluded the fcilcwing:

3 Sintle-Line-Outages

4. The Penincula Flcrida 1982 system performed adequately and
5. Within design limits for all but three contingencies which pro-
6. duced up to 5% overloads on three facilities:
7. a) L/0 (FP&L) Sanford-North Lene.;ced 230 kV -

8.

(FLPC) Turner - Lake Emma 115 kV loaded to 103% of

9. rating and ics voltages experienced in FLPC's
10. eastern division. = ,- - - -
11. b) L/0 (FP&L) Ringling - Laurelwood 230 kV . '1
12. (FP&L) Ringling - Charlotter 230 kV loaded to
13. 104% of rating.

14 ,

c) L/O Woodmore (FLPC) - Pine Hills (CELA)'230 kV) _.....__ _

15. -

(ORLA) Southwcod - Turkey Lake 115 ks ifne leads.to '

16. 105% of its emeergency rating.

17.

It- shculd be noted that none of these overloads exceeds 5% 'and ' ' -

'-" ^ ' ' '

18. therefere are not considered m jor overicads. Furtherscre, they
19. would only occur if peak load ccnditicas existed coincident with ---
20. the specific line cutage and even so, adjustments cculd be mde
21. in generatien schedules to alleviate the overload ccndition.

5 204 m

- - - - es-, , - * + 4 e- -

-we N mee a> gam-= --e+ane -w- o-e.ee - - - +e-+

_ 5_ Attacn=ent No. 3 Page 5 of 5

1. FP&L's I= crt Case
2. The Big Bend to Gillette 230 kV line lxded to 442 M7A,10%

3 cf its rating when 1,100 M'd was imported by FP&L. The import

4. to FP&L was simulated such that Florida Pcwer Ccrporation, Tampa
5. Electric Company, and Jacksonville Electric Authority each
6. exported cne-third (367 tri) of the pcwer.

7 The Big Eend - Gillette 230 kV line includes an intertie

8. with the Tampa Electric Cccpany (TEC) at the Ruskin substatica,
9. one of two TEC interconnectica points with FP&L, so that the _. . , . . _
10. abcut 40 M7A cverload probably- could be reduced by reducing the. , -
11. TEC's share of the impcrt by about 40-50 MW. -
12. The FP&L 1,100 MW import level (11.1% of FP&L's 1962 peak 13 load represented) would cover most ccmbinations of two unit outages -.
14. - ' orr the FF&L system except the unavailability of St. Lucie Nos.1.. .... .;
15. & 2 (1,589 W), Manatee Nos. 1 & 2 (1,528 MW), Turkey Point Nos.
16. 3 & 4 (1,332 W) Maratin Nos. -l &.2 (1,550 MW) and sem cccbina- --

17.- - tiens of these. However, it is unlikely that a 1,100 W import . . . . . , .

18. requirement would occur because of the maintenance cutage of one
19. unit plus the forced cutage of another unit during peak load pericds. _

5 205

. .w.-er pe g mia m - a w *--

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