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Joint Testimony Re Questions Al & D of 790405 Memo & Order ALAB-537 Re General Design Criterion Electric Power Sys, & Ongoing Improvement of Sys Reliability.Supporting Documentation Encl
	ML19253A091
Person / Time
Site:	Saint Lucie
Issue date:	06/01/1979
From:	Armand M, Bivans E, Coe W; FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	;
Shared Package
ML19241B311	List: ML19241B310; ML19253A091; ML19276G590;
References
	NUDOCS 7907160034
	Download: ML19253A091 (71)
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{{#Wiki_filter:NRG PUBLIC DOCUMENT Room s 4 I g DOW D Joint Testimony 9 2 JUN 61979 > l of G e,w., u - 11 !!ICilEL P. ARMAtlD, ERNEST L. BIVAT15 AND UILFRED E. COE WE Relating to y Questions Al and D of ALAB 537 1 My name is Ernest L. Bivans. I am the Vice President in charge of 2 System Planning for Florida Power & Light Company (FPL). My educational 3 background and professional qualifications appear in the Muclear Regulatory 4 Commission's record of the St. Lucie 2 proceeding following Tr. 4896 and are 5 incorporatcd herein by reference. 6 My name is Michel P. Armand. I am the Supervising Engineer of 7 Reliability and System Security in the System Planning Department of FPL. 8 A resume of my educational and professional qualifications is attached to 9 this testimony and is incorporated herein by reference. 1D The System Planning Department is responsible for: 11 (a) Forecasting peakloads and energy requirements; 12 (b) Planning and recommending to management appropriate expansion 13 for FPL's generation and transmission facilities as needed to meet load and 14 reliability needs; and 15 (c) Coordinating FPL's generation and transmission planning with 16 other utilities through organizations such as the Florida Electric Power 17 Coordinating Group (FCG) and the Southeastern Electric Reliability Council 18 (SERC). 19 fly name is Wilfred E. Coe. I am Director of Power Supply for FPL. 20 A resume of my educational and professional qualifications is attached to 21 this testimony and is incorporated herein by reference. 2091 272 k 7 o 0716003/[ g

4 1 The Power Supply Department is responsible for optimizing the 2 quality, reliability and economic supply of electric energy to meet the needs 3 of FPL customers. Power Supply is also responsible for the installation, 4 operation and maintenance of protective relay and power system control 5 equipment associated with generation, transmission and distribution cf elec-6 tric power. 7 SCOPE OF TESTIMONY 8 The purpose of this testimony is to respond to Questions Al and D 9 as stated in the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board Memorandum and 10 Order of April 5,1979, which are: i 11 A. General Design Criterion (GDC) 17-21/ 12 1. This criterion, entitled " Electric Power Systems," requires in its 13 third paragraph (emphasis added): 14 Electric power from the transmission network to the onsite 15 electric distribution system shall be supplied by two physically 16 independent circuits (not necessarily on separate rights of way) 17 designed and located so as to minimize to the extent practical 18 the likelihood of their simultaneous failure under operating and 19 postulated accident and environmental conditions. A switchyard 20 common to both circuits is acceptable. 22/ 21 All three transmission lines connecting the St. Lucie station to the 22 applicant's grid originate at the Midway Substation. The May 14, 23 1978 incident, in which all power at that substation was lost despite 24 redundant incoming sources, demonstrates that these circuits are 25 indeed susceptible to simultaneous failure. 23/ The testimony should 26 address whether the St. Lucie station nonetheTess meets this GDC-17 27 requirement. -21/ See 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix A (" General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants"). 22/ As we now view it, subject to being persuaded otherwise, the " common switchyard" provision refers to the switchyard at the site and not to a distant facility (such as, in this instance, the Midway Substation). 2091 273 t s 1 23] See the applicant's May 25, 1978 " Report on System Disturbance, 2 May 14, 1978." 3 D. Ongoing Improvement of System Reliability. 4 The testimony should provide a concise, up-to-date discussion of existing 5 measures, or those planned for the near future, by which the reliability 6 of the applicant's system may be enhanced. Particular attention should 7 be paid to the seemingly excessive number of personnel errors which 8 appear to have led to the May 14, 1978 outage and to have contributed to 9 the May 16, 1977 disturbance. 10 Our testimony will first describe how FPL has provided, consistent 11 with the requirements of GDC-17, a strong grid which is constructed and 12 operated so as to minimize to the extent practical, the likelihood of the loss of all sources of offsite power to St. Lucie.E e will then detail those 13 W l 14 measures which have recently been and are being taken to further enhance the 15 reliability of our system. 16 THE ABILITY OF THE PRESENT FPL GRID 17 TO SUPPLY A RELIABLE SOURCE OF 18 0FFSITE POWER TO ST. LUCIE 19 No electrical system can be designed, constructed, and operated to 20 completely eliminate all outages.-2/ 21 In order to reduce the probability of occurrence of the loss of 22 all sources of offsite power at St. Lucie, FPL has designed, constructed and 23 operated its system: if A description of the FPL grid is contained in the affidavit of Ernest L. Bivans, dated March 31, 1978. See Attachment #1. (System map omitted.) 2] See IEEE Standard Definitions in Power Operation Terminology, Standard 346, 1973; OUTAGE-FORCED: An outage that results from emergency coaditions directly associated with a comporent requiring that it be taken out of service immediately, either automatically or as soon as switching operations can be performed, or an outage cat. sed by improper operation of equipment or humsn error. 200 274 \\ t 1 A. To reduce the probability of occurrence of an oatage of any 2 one component on the system, and 3 B. To sustain the simultaneous occurrence of multiple events 4 before resulting in a loss of offsite power at St. Lucie. 5 In recognition of the changing economic and social environment FPL 6 annually updates its long range load forecast. This forecast is then used 7 as the basis for reviewing and modifying long range generation and trans-8 mission plans to meet future requirements. One of the objectives of such 9 planning is to prevent outages from occurring from loss of equipment due to 10 overloads or inadequate generating capacity. In addition, FPL selects and 11 tests all major components of the grid to rigid standards to reduce the 12 probability of outages due to equipment malfunctions. This p'anning and 13 equipment selection process assures that dependability and redundancy is 14 built into the grid, as well as into the relay and telemetering equipment 15 essential to its monitoring and protection. Following installation, a 16 continuous monitoring and testing program, performed by specially trained 17 personnel, maintains the equipment to specifications. 18 Recognizing that Peninsular Florida has its own unique environment, 19 FPL has designed a system to function reliably within it. Special measures 20 have been taken to prevent outages caused by wind,-3/ -4/ lightning, and various 51 21 forms of environmental contamination. In addition to these measures, which -3/ FPL's standards for constructior, of both substations and transmission lines assure their continued availability even during hurricane force winds. 4] The use of higher insulation levels, lightning arrestors, and overhead ground wires have significantly reduced the susceptibility of our high voltage transmission grid to lightning--reducing its vulnerability to almost zero at 500 kV. 5/ Critical line sections which may be susceptible to salt contamination have been specially designed to eliminate this cause of outages. Example: portions of the St. Lucie 240 KV line utilize vee-string insulators rated at about 500 kV to prevent outages due to contamination. 7091 775

~. e I have long been a mat Ler of routine practice, efforts have recently been 2 increased to conttol contamination and a variety of innovative imp, ments 6/ 3 are presently being developed." 4 Since l'ovember 1965 when the Midway Substation went into service 5 simultaneous events have occurred to interrupt power on only twa occasions. 6 The first occasion was May 16, 1977, when the automatic scheme at St. Lucie Z/ 7 functioned as designed and tuice shifted from of fsite to o';ite diesel power. 8 The only other occasion on which a loss of of f site power to St. Lucie 9 was experienced was on May 14, 1978. At this time, three separate events 10 combined to isolate the Midway substation from the rest of the FpL grid.~8/ 11 During this brief interruption of only eight minutes, the diesel generators 12 responded immediately providing AC power 6/ Recent experience has shown the need for additional innrovements in the area of conlomination detection and control. See Attachment !!2 discussing a system disturhance in April 1979; the protective systems functioned as designed to contain the outage to the affected area. As a result of this experience new inspection procedures have been initiated giving priority to critical circuits so that contamination can be detected and removed before it can cause an outage. See Attachment #3. 7/ The first changeaver to onsite pawar was the iesult of a voltage trans-ient lasting only a few cycles; i.e., a fraction of a second. Although ~ it is important to note that none' of the three St. Luc-ie-Midway lines lost power, the instantaneous dip in voltage was enough to actuate the automatic throwaver scheme at the plant starting the diesels immdiately. ~lhe plant operator chose to remain on diesel power for several ninutes althougli of fsii.e power was available. The second shif t to onsite power occurred later in the day, when the Andylown Orange River 500 LV line relayed incorrectly al a time when the system had not been fully restored from the earlier disturbance and multiple outages of calor equiprnL still existed. Although this interruption lasted 17 minutes, the diesels started immediately, supplying onsite power. ~8/ Attachment f4 (Figures 1-4) illustrate these events. First, the Ranch to prall & Whitney 740 kV line was out of service for testing. Second, a (footnote continued on next page.) >}00R BRIGIWi 2091 276.

a 1 Consequently, operating history confirms that the FpL grid can 2 sustain the simultaneous occurrence of L.ultiple events, and that at least 3 three separate events had to occur before losing offsite power to St. Lucie. 4 The Board has raised the question of the reliability of the 5 termination of the St. Lucie lines in a common substation at flid.tay, and 6 "whether the St. Lucie station neverthelesr. meets this (independent circuit) 7 CDC-17 requirment." 8 GDC-17 specifically requires only two independ: nf circuits, while 9 St. Lucie employs three. GDC-17 provide:. suf ficient flexil ili ty to select 10 a practical design s;hich minimizes the probability of a inoltaneous failure. 11 1his has been done for St. Lucie by tying the plant directly to the grid 12 through the 11idway substation by maans of three 240 kV lines. This 13 substation has tuo independent busses and all lines are Lied to both busses 14 through a breaker-and-a-hal f scheme thus maintaining both physical and 15 electrical separation. 16 The breaker-and-a-half scheme allows isolation of any major 1/ coa;.anent or portion of the substation. This is best illustrated by examining p/ (footnote continued from previous page.) switching error at pratt & Unitney substation resulted in the failure of a lightning arrestor, which in turn produced a fault on the Midway-Ranch 240 I:V line. Al though the Ranch end relayed correctly, the third event, an improperly connected polarizing circuit at Midway, caused the !!idway relays looking north to erroneously see the fault and kept the approp-riate relay from tripping the Mid.-tay to Ranch 240 kV line. The result was to erroneously trip the two Midway-Malabar 240 LV lines, as well as the Ilidway-plumosus 138 kV line. The two lines recnining at this time were rated at 69 1:V. They then tripped, isolating the Midway substation from all sources of offiste power for eight minutes, sixteen and one-half seconds. Following this outage, the polarizing circuit was corrected and new procedures were established for testing this relay scheme. 2091 277 -c-M N b l b !.

i n 1 the impact of the simultaneous loss of both 240 kV busses at Midway.-9/ Power 2 continues to flow into the station on all of the three lines from St. Lucie through 3 the mid-breakers and then out to the Indiantown, Sherman and Malabar substations. 4 With the loss of generation at St. Lucie, the reverse will be true and power 5 will flow into St. Lucie over the three 240 kV lines. 6 These three 240 kV circuits are so constructed and separated to assure 7 that each cannot physically interfere with the others. Over the Indian River, 8 the towers supporting the separate lines are spaced 200 feet apart and are 9 designed and insulated to resist the effects of environmental contamination and 10 high wind.-10/ They rise 173 feet, holding the conductors 153 feet above the 11 river. Tower spacing keeps the conductors at least 90 feet above the Intra-12 coastal Waterway and 61 feet above water elsewhere. Each circuit conductor 13 over water consists of one 3400 kcmil ACSR/AW wire. Over land, the transmission 14 structures for the separate lines 're spaced 126 feet apart and rise 60 to 80 15 feet above grade. Tower structures on each line are spaced at 660 foot 16 intervals, except where road or rail crossings require greater clearance. 17 Right-of-way easements are 1200 feet. Each circuit conductor over land consists 18 of two 1691 kcmil wires. Each circuit is sized for 100 percent of one unit 19 output, or 1000 MVA, which is in excess of 100 times the emergency shutdown load 20 of the unit. Electrostatic shield wires and other lightning protection equip-21 ment are provided at each tower as required. 9/ See Attachment #5. l_0/ For example, vee-string insulation suitable for 500 kV lines and structures 0 designed for winds in excess of 150 miles per hour are utilized. 2091 278 1 The termination of these three circuits into two separate busses 2 at a major strong point in the FPL grid exceeds the requirements of GDC-17. 3 This design configuration is more reliable than a design which only provides 4 for two circuits,each to be terminated at a separate substation. For a two 5 circuit design, the occurrence of only two simultaneous events would result 6 in a loss of all offsite power to St. Lucie. Even if one of the three exist-7 ing lines were terminated at a second point on the system, no significant 8 increase in reliability can be shown. This can be demonstrated by analysis 9 of the impact of terminating one of the three existing St. Lucie lines at 10 Ranch si'bstation. This could be done by rearranging the Malabar #1 and St. 11 Lucie #1 transmission lines at Midway substation so that the St. Lucie #1 12 line is in the same bay as the Midway-Ranch line. All three breakers in the 13 bay would then be removed and the two lines connected to result in a St. Lucie 14 to Ranch line which is about 65 miles long. Though this would increase the 15 number of substations tied directly to St. Lucie, it is not electrically 16 different because the present design configuration provides the same electrical 17 ties to the Ranch substation with the breaker-and-half scheme at Midway. 18 Furthermore, removal of the breakers at Midway would result in decreased 19 operating flexibility by eliminating the ability to sectionalize the Ranch-20 Midway and Midway-St. Lucie lines at Midway. Additionally, the total miles 21 of circuit exposure between St. Lucie and a strong tie into the grid would be 22 increased from 36 miles (three 12-mile lines from St. Lucie to Midway) to 89 23 miles (one 65-mile and two 12-mile circuits). Finally, such a scheme would 24 reduce the number of lines tied into Midway which would decrease the reliability 25 of Midway with no increase in the reliability of the Ranch substation. 2091 279 - 3 - 6 ) 4

7 1

ONG0It'G if-ifROVEf1ErlT OF SYSTEl1 RELI ABILITY 2 ,t 't?y June 1960 (approximately 3 years hefore the scheduled operation 3 of St! Lucie 2) several major projects will be completed, which will enhance 4 the reliability of FPL's grid.~ll/ 5 llistorically, in the ment mf a major system disturbance within 6 Florida, interconnections to the north (notably Georgia Power) have been 7 desigry so that the two systems immediately separated. Allhough this has 8 not significantly affected the reliability of FPL's grid, because it is de-5 sigred to fuoction independently, reliability could be in. proved if the grids 10 ren:ained irterconnected. FPL and Georgia Power Company are now nearing 11 completion of construction of r,'i additional 240 kV tie between the Periinsular 12 Florida grid and Southern Company. This tie directly connects FPL to Georgia 13 Power and will assure that the two systcms remain connected even in the event 14 of the loss of the largest unit on the FPL grid. 15 Another major system improvement, shown on Attachment #6, consists 16 of additions being made to the 500 kV portion of the system. These additions, 17 all of which are to be completed by the summer of 1980, will triple the size le of the 600 k0 system and establish it as the backbone of the grid. They will 19 consist of a 15.95 mile, 500 kV circuit from the existing 500 kV station at 20 Andytown to a new station in the center of the South Florida load center at 27 Lem, tm 83 mile, 500 kV circuits from the new fossil plant site at T1artin 22 to Andytown; and a 26 mile, 500 kV cirucit from f artin Plant to Tlidway substation. - 23 The completion of this network will further strengthen flidway substation and its 24 ability to provide offsite power to St. Lucie by electrically shortening its m 11/ See Attachment #6 which illustrates some of these major additons, all of which should be completed by June 1980. 2091 280 -

1 ties via the 500 kV grid to the rest of the system. When Martin Plant Unit #1 2 becomes operational in the spring of 1980, it will provide a direct source of 3 offsite power to St. Lucie through the Martin-Midway 500 kV line. By 1980, 4 there will be one (1) 500 kV, five (5) 240 kV, and two (2) 138 kV circuits 5 into Midway. As an integral part of the additions mentioned above, the 6 reliability of the relaying scheme at Midway will be improved still further by 7 the installation of additional redundant relays on all existing 240 kV trans-8 mission lines. 9 Particular emphasis has also been placed on reducing personnel 10 errors which could result in system disturbances. Field switch Sg personnel 11 and the system dispatcher / operators who monitor and control both the granting 12 of clearances and the sequence of switching are now better equipped to perform 13 their duties. Before granting a switching request, a steady-state loadflow 14 analysis is run to test the impact of such a clearance under ccr,tingency 15 condi tions. Next, the resulting leadflows are compared against transfer limits 16 which have been established by a series of transient stability studies to assure 17 that no bounding limits will be exceeded. A written switching order is then 18 drawn up in accordance with specific procedures and guidelines. This order 19 is checked, and if approved, issued to the party in the field. Finally, the 20 party in the field checks it prior to proceeding in accordance with specific 21 switching procedures in which he has t,een trained. During any switching sequence, 22 the system dispatcher / operator can monitor the progress of the switching from 23 the System Control Center, both on a dynamic board which depicts the whole system 24 as well as a specific dynamic CRT display of the substation where the switching 25 is tcking place. He may intervene at various points if conditions change due 26 to the outage of another section of the grid. This improved monitoring and 2091 281 _,o _

1 central control capability is designed to reduce outages which are the 2 result of switching errors. 3 In addition, the System Control Center, which will be completely 4 inservice by August 1979, will allow dispatcher / operators at a central 5 location to monitor and control the entire grid, including but not limited 6 to breaker status, transformer and line loading, generator output and tie 7 line flows. This system is displayed on a single dynamic map complete 8 with line flow information and equipment status. Additionally, an operator 9 may display any section, subsection, and status information as well. To 10 assist the operator in monitoring the system, various design limits are 11 programmed into the computer such that alarms are automatically generated 12 when limits are approached for items such as line and transformer thermal 13 ratings, equipment status change, and reserve margins (spinning, supplemental, 14 etc.). To assure system reliability, a security constrained dispatch has 15 priority over an optimal power flow. To aid the operator in testing the 16 impact of an anticipated action, he may simulate such action and a Security 17 Analysis Program will quickly alert him to o,7y ootential problems that may 18 arise by testing his simulation with up to 500 different contingency conditions. 19 The System Control Center will also provide the capability to analyze 20 near term (present through up to seven days) network conditions, allowing 21 dispatcher / operators to improve their operating strategy. 22 In addition to these measures, specific procedures have been adopted 12/ 23 'which guide the system operator's decisions under potential emergency conditions 7 --12/ See Attachment #7, Emergency Manual, Section 16521, " Transfer Limits" (describes transfer limits to be followed to assure a reliable power system); Section 16527, " Emergency Codes" (identifies emergency codes to be established under various power supply conditions and assigns certain personnel action to be followed). 209' 282 - 11

1 Included among the actions to be taken are the reduction of non-essential 2 loads, notification of customers with curtailable load contracts, and other 3 measures designed to reduce load if deemed necessary to protect the integrity 4 of the transmission grid. 5 In addition to minimizing the number of outages, it is also 6 important to contain the impact of a fault or malfunction of equipment to 7 that component of the grid. The System Control Center will further augment 8 existing containment efforts such as primary, redundant, and backup relays,-13/ 14f H/ 9 underfrequency load shedding schemes, and spinning reserve requirements. 10 As described above, this center, which represents the m te-of-the-art, contains 11 a variety of systems that alert the operator to any deteriorating conditions 12 and allow him to immediately assess the situation and take corrective action. 13 To fully utilize this capability, FPL operators are being trained, 14 on a newly installed Dispatcher Training Simulator, to respond to crisis 15 situations. With this trainer, the instructor can simulate any major outage 16 on a training console identical to the one at which the operator will normally 17 work. As a result of this training, operators will be able to respond to 18 crisis situations more rapidly, isolating the outage and restoring the critical 19 components of the grid. H/ These relaying schemes are designed to detect and trip appropriate breakers to isolate a fault in a fraction of a second. Additional redundancy here is currently being installed at substations such as Midway to assure prompt and correct action. 14/ Underfrequency load shedding schemes are designed to drop large blocks of load prior to the system becoming unstable due to the loss of generation. This is done in recognition of the need to protect the grid from an outage. H/ Spinning reserve enables us to offset the loss of the largest generator on our system by picking up load at various other plants which have maintained a reserve of generation for this purpose. 2091 283 1 Regardless of these efforts, some probability of the simultaneous 2 occurrence of a sufficient number of events (three or more) to interrupt the 3 offsite power to St. Lucie still exists. Although, historically we have 4 experienced a loss of offsite power to the Midway substation. twice 5 in 14 years, the improvements which have been' detailed in this testimony 6 will strengthen FPL's system in the Midway area so that the probability 7 of loss of offsite power to this point on the system will be substantially reduced. 8 As Mr. Flugger's testimony will demonstrate, analysis of the con-9 sequences of the loss of all AC power requires a consideration of whether either 10 onsite or offsite power can be restored within a reasonable length of time. 11 Historically, our mean restoration time for offsite power to any power plant .lE/ 12 following a major system disturbance has been conservatively about 37 minutes. 13 With the completion of the System Control Center, which will enable us to 14 monitor and control the system from a central location, we are further devel-15 oping existing restoration procedures specifically designed to restore offsite 17] 16 power to nuclear plants more quickly. With the above described imprcvements 17 in the areas of operator training, and system operati:ons, and with the trans - 18 mission and generation additions,.a mean restoration time of 15 minutes-would 19 be more representative of the FPL grid. 11/ See from Attachment #8 that between 1972, when our first nuclear plant became operational, and the present, we have experienced four major system disturbances which resulted in the loss of offsite power to a nuclear or fossil power plant in twenty-two instances. The restoration time varied from less than one minute to 77 minutes, with a mean restoration time of 26.27 minutes..Since there is a 99.5 percent statistical confidence that the mean restoration time will not be greater than 36.6 minutes, v;e have conservatively chosen 37 minutes as a representative figure for our system. 17/ See Attachment #9. Procedures 16602 and 16603 specifically outline the steps to be taken to restore offsite power to Turkey Point and St. Lucie nuclear plants, respectively. These supplement Procedures 16601 and 16610, which specify that in the event of a major outage, efforts should be made to maintain offsite power to nuclear plants if at all possible, as fiell as noting the probability that many palnts will have reliable auxiliary power 2091 284 _33_

MICHEL P. ARMAND Resume of Educational and Professional Qualifications My name is Michel P. Armand. My business address is P.O. Box 529100, Miami, Florida. I am Supervising Engineer of the Reliability and System Security Section of the System Planning Department of Florida Power & Light Company and I have served in that capacity since July 1, 1977. I graduated from the City College of The City University of New York in June 1968, with the degree of Bachelor of Electrical Engineering. In June 1971, I graduated from the Bernard M. Baruch College of The City University of New York with a degree of Master of Business Administration. In 1971, I attended in Schenectady, New York, the General Electric Company's one-year course in " Advanced Power System Engineering." In 1978, I attended the one-month "Public Utility Executive Program" of the Graduate School of Business Administration of the University of Michigan. I am a registered Professional Engineer in the State of Florida. I am a senior member of the Florida Engineering Society and of the National Society of Professional Engineers. I am a member of the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers. 2091 285

In June 1968, I joined the cadet training program of the Consolidated Edison Company of New York, where for two years I was assigned to various departments. In June 1970, I was permanently assigned to the System Planning Department in the Transmission Planning Section. I progressed to Assistant Engineer, then Engineer. In April 1974 I was employed by Florida Power & Light Company in the Syr.em Planning Department. In April 1976, I became a Senior Engineer in charge of the Reliability and System Security Section and I was promoted to Supervising Engineer of the section in July 197'i. I am responsible for testing and assessing the dynamic performance of the planned generation and transmission system and making recommendations. 2091 786

WILFRED E. COE Resume of Educational and Professional Qualifications My name is Nilfred E. Coe. My business address is P. O. Box 529100, Miami, Florida. I am the Director of the Power Supply Department of Florida Pcwer S Light Company and I have served in that capacity since October 1, 1973. I graduated from the Georgia Institute of Technology in 1950 with a degree of Bachelor of Electrical Engineering and in 1951 with a Master of Science in Electrical Engineering Degree. I attended Stanford University Graduate School. I am a registered Professional Engineer in the State of Florida, a member of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, and on the Interconnection Arrangement Committee of the Edison Electric Institute. I was employed in June 1951 as a Student Engineer. There-after, I worked in the Commercial Department and Engineering Department as various engineer classifications. In 1963 I became Regional Manager of System Protection Department and in 1968 was made Manager of System Protection Department. In 1973, I bacame Director of Power Supply Department. 9nn. n7-LV< 'O As the Director of Power Supply I am responsible for directiag the System Protection, System Operations and Power Supply Technical Services Groups. These groups are operating and associated technical support personnel who dispatch the delivery of power to the distribution substations as well as provide for the protection and control of the electrical equip-ment throughout the system. 2091 288

ATTACHMENT #1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATCMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING APPEAL BOARD In the Matter of: ) ) FLORIDA PONER AND LIGHT COMPANY ) DOCKET NO. 50-389 ) (St. Lucie Nuclear Power ) Plant, Unit No. 2) ) AFFIDAVIT OF ERNEST L. BIVANS 1 I am Ernest L. Sivans, Vice President in 2 charge of System Planning for Florida Power & Light 3 Company. My education and professional qualifications 4 appear in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's record 5 of the St. Lucie 2 proceeding following Tr. 4896. 6 The purpose of this affidavit is to addrciss 7 questions B.l(a) and o.2 in the Appeal Board's Order 8 of March 10, 19 78 together within their common context. 9 10 Grid 11 FPL serves approximately 200 municipalities 12 and over 30 counties in the State of Florida. The 13 Company's existing generation facilities consist of 14 eleven generating plants distributed geographically 15 around its service territory. These plants are tied 16 into a system-wide transmission network, sometimes 17 referred to as a grid, the purpose of which is to 2091 289

I transport _argy from the generating plants to the 2 load areas and to assure system reliability. Florida 3 Power & Light Company operates approximately 4,165 4 circuit miles of transmission lines. A map showing 5 the FPL system and interconnections is attached to 6 this affidavit. 7 Florida Power & Light Company is directly 3 interconnected with nine other Florida utilities, 9 both public and. private, which have significant 10 generating capacity. FPL maintains fourteen normally 11 closed and two normally open interconnections. Included 12 in the normally closed interconnections are one 115 kV 13 and two 240 kV interconnections with Florida Power 14 Corporation, which in turn has interconnections outside 15 of Florida: one 230 kV and four 115 kV ties to Georgia 16 Power Company, and one 230 kV tie to Gulf Power Company. 17 Peninsular Florida possesses special geographic 13 and electrical features. Surrounded by water on three 19 sides, opportunities for interconnections with major 20 utilities outside of Florida are restricted to the north. 21 In addition, Florida has been subject to hurricanes and 22 is one of the most severe lightning storm areas in the 23 United States. 24 Consequently, Florida Power & Light Company, 25 and the other utilities in Florida, have had to take 2091 290 ~ t I these factors into consideration in designing and 2 building a reliable statewide system and thereby 3 lessening the need for strong interconnections 4 outside of Florida. 5 6 The St. Lucie Plant 7 The Florida Power & Light Company grid 8 and connections to nuclear power plants on it are 9 designed and operated so as to comply with applicable 10 NRC requirements. In particular, GDC-17 requires a 11 system of sufficient capacity and capability "to 12 assure that (1) specified acceptable fuel design 13 limits and design conditions of the reactor coolant 14 pressure boundary are not exceeded as a result of 15 anticipated operational occurrences and (2) the core 16 is cooled and containment integrity and other vital 17 functions are maintained in the event of postulated 18 accidents". With respect to offsite power, GDC-17 19 also requires that there must be "two physically 20 independent circuits . designed and located so 21 as to minimize to the extent practical the likelihood 22 of their simultaneous failure under operating and 23 postulated accident and environmental conditions". 24 In addition, there must be provisions "to minimize 25 the probability of losing electric power from m A 4 209i i'>> 1 any of the remaining supplies as a result of, or 2 coincident with, the loss of power generated by the 3 nuclear power unit, the loss of power from the trans-4 mission network, or the loss of power from the onsite 5 electric power supplies". 6 At this time, offsite power is available 7 to St. Lucie Plant from not two but three separate 8 240 kV transmission circuits from Florida Power & 9 Light's Midway substation ten miles to the west. 10 The transmission system consists of three separate 11 circuits, placed parallel to each other, which are 12 designed and constructed to assure that each cannot 13 pbfsically interfere with the other. Over the Indian 14 River, tha towers supporting the separate lines are 15 spaced 200 feet apart. They rise 173 feet, holding 16 the conductors 153 feet above the river. Tower 17 spacing keeps the conductors at least 90 feet above 18 the Intracoastal Waterway and 51 feet above water 19 elsewhere. Each circuit conductor over water consists 20 of one 3400 kemil ACSR/AW wire. Over land, the trans-21 mission structures for the separate lines are spaced 22 126 feet apart and rise 60 to 30 feet above grade. 23 Tower structures on each line are spaced at 560 foot 24 intervals, except where road or rail crossings require 25 greater clearance. Right-of-vay easements are 1200 feet. 2091 292 1 Each circuit conductor over land consists of two 1691 2 kemil wires. Each circuit is sized for 100 percent 3 of one unit output, or 1000 MVA, which is in excess of 4 100 times the emergency shutdown load of the unit. 5 Electrostatic shield wires and other lightning protection 6 equipment are provided at each tower as required. 7 The design cf St. Lucie Plant also provides 8 for the independence of power supplies so as "to 9 minimize the probability of losing electric power from 10 any of the remaining supplies as a result of, or coin-11 cident with, the loss of" one. Each unit is provided 12 with two start-up transformers. During normal plant 13 operation, AC power is provided from the main generator 14 through the unit's two auxiliary transformers. Normal 15 transfer of power between the auxiliary and start-up 16 transformers would be initiated by the operator from 17 the control room. If a main generator should trip 13 unexpectedly, the auxiliary AC load transfer from the 19 auxiliary transformers to the start-up transformers 20 would be initiated automatically by protective relay 21 action, thereby providing sufficient offsit,e-power to 22 safely shutdown or mitigate the consecuences of a 23 design basis accident. Offsite power, in such case, 24 would be supplied from the transmission system or the 25 other operating St. Lucie unit. Should offsite pcwer 2091 293 _s_

1 not be available from either of these sources, suffi-2 cient power to accomplish a shutdown would automatically 3 be provided by the ensite diesel generators. 4 Physical separation of transformers and trans-5 mission lines and flexible, automatic switching arrange-6 ments are utilized to protect against the simultaneous 7 loss of any two sources of power (unit main generator, 3 offsite, and onsite) to safety related loads. In 9 addition, the onsite safety related electric power 10 system for each unit is separated into two redundant 11 and independent trains, each with a diesel generator. 12 Either train is capable of assuring a safe unit shutdown. 13 14 The Midway Substation 15 The Midway 240 kV substation is presently con-16 nected to the north by two 240 kV circuits to Malabar 17 Substation and from there by two 240 kV circuits to 13 Brevard Substation which provides access tu generation 19 at Cape Canaveral Plant, Sanford Plant, and also inter-20 connections with Florida Power Corporation, Orlando 21 Utilities Commission, and Jacksonville Electric Authority. 22 Two 240 kV circuits connect Midway Substation to 23 the south with one circuit going directly to Ranch Sub-24 station and the other going to Ranch Substa icn via 25 Indian cwn and Pratt & Whitney Substations. Ranch 2091 294 _6_

1 Substation provides access to generation at Riviera 2 Plant, Lauderdale Plant, Port Everglades Plant, Turkey 3 Point Plant, all of which are on the east coast, and Fort 4 Myers and Manatee Plants on the west cuast. Also included 5 are interconnections to the Lake Worth municipal 6 system and Tampa Electric Company (which is also 7 interconnected with Florida Power Corporation). 8 In adt;. ion, the 240 kV Midway Substation 9 is connected by two 112 MVA autotransformers to a 10 138 kV substation, also at Midway, which is in turn 11 supplied by one 138 kV line to Plumosus Substation 12 to the south and from there to the Riviera Plant; another 13 138 kV line, temporarily operated at 69 kV, ties 14 the Midway 138 kV substation to the Malabar 138 kV 15 substation to the north. This last line serves as 16 an interconnection with the municipal generating 17 systems of the Cities of Fort Pierce and Lero 18 Beach. In the unlikely event of separation of all 19 the four 240 kV and the two 138 kV lines feeding into 20 Midway Substation at present, the restoration of any 21 one of these lines would allow energization of the 22 Midway bus and restoration of offsite power to the 23 St. Lucie Switchyard. 24 25 System Improvements and Mcdifications 2091 295 1 The growth of any dynamic system recuires 2 additions and changes. These changes involve trans-3 mission construction, relaying practices and operating 4 procedures and are designed to minimize the likelihood 5 of an outage. 6 As a result of outages which occurred on April 7 3 and 4, 1973, FPL contracted with Stone & Webster 8 Engineering Corporation to review the Florida Power 9 & Light Company bulk pcwer system reliability and to 10 provide recommendations designed to improvo it. Out 11 of such recommendations and other internal studies, 12 Florida Power & Light Company has implemented numerous 13 changes to its system since 1973, including transmission 14 additions which have strengthened the ties between the 15 southern area (south of Ranch Substation) and the rest 16 of Florida; a second tie to Tampa Electric Company; 17 new transmission lines down the west coast to Ft. Myers; 18 and the new 500 kV circuit across the Everglades from 19 Ft. Myers to Lauderdale. In addition, the east coast 20 transmission was strengthened by reinforcing old 21 lines, adding new lines, and recrranging circuits 22 from the Midway Substation southerly through Lauderdale 23 and into the Miami area. Two major additional inter-24 connections with adjoining utilities were also estab-25 11shed at Sanford (Florida Power Corpcration' and at 2091 296

1 Bradford (Jacksonville Electric Authority). During this 2 same time frame, additional generation was added at Manatee, 3 Ft. Myers, Putnam, and St. Lucie Plants. 4 5 Scheduled Improvements - 1978 to 1981 6 During the period from 1978 to 1981, new lines 7 are scheduled to be installed which will increase reliabil-8 ity and therefore benefit the St. Lucie units. 9 In 1978, a new 240 kV circuit from Midway Sub-10 station to Martin Plant, which is under construction, will be 11 energized. In 1980, a 500 kV circuit from Midway Sub-12 station to Martin Plant will be energized and two 500 kV 13 circuits from Martin Plant to Andytown Substation will be 14 built and energized to coincide with the operation of the 15 first unit at Martin (775 MW). By 1980, there will be one 16 500 kV, five 240 kV, and two 138 kV feeds into Midway Sub-17 station. In addition, at Martin Plan *., second unit (775 MW) u 18 is scheduled to go into service in 1981. 19 In 1980, a 240 kV tie between Georgia Power Company 20 (Kingsland) and Florida Power & Light Company (Yulee) is 21 scheduled for completion. A new System Control Center is 22 scheduled to become operational by December 1978. 23 Operating History 24 The Midway Substation, originally named St. Lucie 25 Substation, went into service in uovember 1965. 2091 297 -9

1 The Florida Power & Light Company operating record 2 reflects that until the events of May 16, 1977, no 3 outage or any system disturbance had ever caused a loss 4 of power at the Midway Substation. 5 Two days prior to the events of May 16, 1977, 6 the Florida Power & Light Company Andytown - Orange 7 River transmission line had been converted from 240 8 kV to 500 kV operation, as part of the continuing 9 program to strengthen the system. This line was out 10 of service on May 16, 1977, in order to complete the 11 final tests of its protective relays. Had this 500 kV 12 line been in service, the loss of the Turkey Point Uni: 13 No. 3 at 10 :0 8 a.m. and the outage of the Ft. Myers - 14 Ranch 240 kV line at 10:24 a.m. would not have resulted 15 in the loss of any system load. 16 A number of independent contingencies caused 17 part of the system to come down. The principal reasons 13 for the outage were the loss of Turkey Point Unit 19 No. 3 due to a defective auxiliary relay and 16 minutes 20 later, the Ft. Myers - Ranch 240 kV line from an 21 unrelated phase-to-ground fault. The loss of the Ft. 22 Myers - Ranch 240 kV line caused the system to split 23 south of Midway, leaving Midway Substation and St. Lucie 24 Plant switchyard energized from the system to the north 25 of Midway. The split of the system caused the St. Lucie 2091 298 1 Unit No. 1 to reject lcad and it was tripped manually 2 at 10:24 a.m. The Plant continued to receive offsite 3 power from Midway until 10:38am, when the system 4 voltage decayed to a level which caused the diesels to 5 start automatically. The Plant continued on onsite 6 power for a period of time after the grid stabilized, 7 and at 11:00am, offsite power was reconnected, and 8 the use of diesels was terminated. 9 Immediately following the system outage south 10 of Midway, the Orange River - Andytown 500 kV line 11 was put back into service to facilitate the restoration 12 of service. At 12:03pm, an incorrect relay operation 13 at Andytown caused the 500 kV line to trip. The 14 resulting power surges resulted in the interruption 15 of service from Midway south, this time inclusive of 16 Midway Substation, causing a loss of offsite power to 17 St. Lucie. Emergency diesels were again started auto-18 matica11y. However, 17 minutes later, Midway was re-19 energized from the northern part of the system, offsite 20 power was restored to the St. Lucie switchyard and 21 the use of diesels was terminated. The unit was 22 returned to service in a normal manner, and synchronized 23 to the system at 9:58pm, without incident. 24 Following the May 16 events, the grid status 25 was reexamined, previous studies reviewed, new studies 2091 299 1 initiated, and a number of actions taken to further 2 improve reliability. Gas turbine controls were 3 modified to permit automatic synchronizing at lower 4 bus voltages; restoration plans were reviewed and 5 updated; maintenance priorities were set and in-6 spection increased for transmission lines; a 7 " dispatcher training simulator", has been pur-8 chased and is being used to improve dispatcher 9 or power coordinator training; a new type of fault 10 locating equipment was purchased for installation on 11 key transmission lines; the Martin - Midway 500 kV 12 circuit was also rescheduled for completion in 1980 13 instead of 1983 as originally planned. 14 The new System Control Center will allow 15 power coordinators to monitor relevant parameters 16 such as megawatts, megavars, volts, amperes, and hertz 17 for transmission lines, generators and substations. The 18 status of all positional devices such as circuit breakers 19 and switches in the transmission system will also be 20 monitored. All information received from the field 21 will be checked against limits and alarms produced if 22 these limits are exceeded. Tha power coordinator will 23 be capable of assessing syste.n security under 2091 300 1 both single and double contingency conditions by 2 use of a computer program which is capable of 3 simulating automatically up to 500 contingency con-4 ditions every 30 minutes. 5 The System Control Center will also provide 6 the capability to analyze near term (present through 7 up to seven days) network conditions, allowing the 8 power coordinators to improve their operating strategy. 9 All these actions, taken since May 16, 1977, 10 will make major improvements to the reliability of the 11 system. 12 13 Assurance of Electric Power at St. Lucie 14 With specific reference to Appeal Board Question 15 B.l(a), Florida Power & Light Company does not possess 16 the data to compare the assurance of power at St. Lucie 17 with other plants. Nevertheless, based upon the fore-18 going, there is overall assurance that there will be 19 electric power at St. Lucie under both accident and 20 normal conditions: 21 A. The Florida Power & Light Company 22 system is designed and operated to 23 take into account the unique nature 24 of Peninsular Florida and its elec-25 tric grid and to conform to all 2091 301.

1 appl. cable NRC recuirements. 2 3. Offsite power to St. Lucie is 3 available from three separate 4 240 kV transmission circuits. 5 Each circuit has conductors 6 which are sized to carry the 7 entire output of one unit. 8 C. There are at present six sot.rces 9 of power to the Midway Se.cstation 10 240 kV bus connecting the three 11 circuits to St. Lucie Plant. 12 By 1983, there will be eight 13 sources of power to the Midway 14 S ubs tation. This assures that 15 Florida Power & Light Company's 16 abilit3 :o supply offsite power 17 to St. Lucia Plant will not be 13 impaired. 19 D. There are no critically shared systems 20 between the two St. Lucie units. / 21 E. Finally, a variety of significant 22 measures have been and continue 23 to be taken to improve the rel ability 24 of the transmission system. 25 With reference to Appeal Scard Question 3.2, 209i 302 1 and the need to minimize the probability of the co-2 incident loss of power sources, as demonstrated above, 3 (1) GDC-17 will be met, (2) the likelihood of the trip 4 of one of the St. Lucie un:.cs causing the other to trip 5 is minimal, and (3) the possibility of a reoccurrence 6 of an outage similar to that on May 16, 1977 has 7 . been substantially reduced. 8 Further, FPL's evaluation of the system as 9 projected for 1983 and thereafter indicates that in 10 the event the two St. Lucie units were to trip 11 simultaneously, offsite power will not become un-12 available due to system stability. p .q7'g-f l~, -<w. ?' 7 ERNEST L. BIVANS Vice President STATE OF FLORIDA ) ) ss. COUNTY OF DADE ) Subscribed and sworn to before me this 3 ! -ur day of I'h ( d. 1978. =ctm pueue mir es nener et unca My commission expires: E M i'f"..j " ": $ $ ";;j $ f.'./) ~//&s" / -, -% s. <. NOTARY PUBLIC 2091 303 ATTACHMENT #2 r w a w is,. i .j Y'~ [ f m g h s -a 7-U '5 %NnW FLOR DA PO'.*.23 t. UGHT CCt.*?A W May 22, 1979 1 r-United States Department of Energy Division of Power Supply 6 Reliability Office of Utility Systems Economic Regulatory Administration Washington, D.C. 20461 Gentlemen: Attached is a copy of the disturbance analysis report for the power interruption which occurred on the Florida Power 4 Light system at 11:57 p.m. on April 4, 1979. Further analyses of this disturbance are being done by the Florida Electric Coordinating Group - Operating Committee. The findings of their study will be furnished when completed. Sincerely, fh.' S C. h'. E. Coe Director - Power Supply WEC/ayg Attachment cc: Florida Public Service Commission - J. D. Jenkins SERC - Grady L. Smith Florida Electric Coordinating Group - W. D. Lang bec: E. A. Adomat E. L. Bivans G. E. Liebler H. N. Paduano A. D. Schmidt R. E. Uhrig G. D. Whittier 2091 304 C. O. Woody

4/25/79 Rev. 5/8/79 FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY SYSTEM DISTURBANCE LOSS OF GENERATION AT TURKEY POINT WEONESDAY, APRIL 4, 1979 11:57 PM

TABLE OF C0flTENTS PAGE PRE-D I ST URB AI!CE C OND I T I C NS............................... 1 D I S T U R B A N C E.............................................. 2, 3, 4 TABLES SYSTE M RE S PO NS E S U MMARY.................................. 5 FPL GE NERAT I NG UN IT GOVERNCR RES PONSE.................... 6 T I E L I NE RES PONS E........................................ 7 CHARTS & DI AGRAMS TURKEY POINT TRAllStilSS 10N L i tJE T R I P P I N G S E QU EllC E............................... 6 SYSTEM FREQUENCY FROM RANCH OSC I LLOGRAPH................. 9 SYSTEM FREQUENCY AT PORT EVERGLADES .....................10 F P L S Y ST E M L OAD......................................... 11 FPL CENERATION...... ...................................12 FPL NET ltfTERCHANGE..................................... 13 S OUT H E R N C OM PA!1Y N ET I NT E R C H ANGE........................ 14 UNDERFREQUENCY LOAD SHEDDING AREAS...................... 15 2091 306 4

llTG/ DAM:dep 4/21/79 Rev. 5/8/79 PRE-DISTURBANCE CONDIT10NS During the afternoon and evening of Wednesday, April 4, 1979, the Florida Power,& Light transmission system was experiencing widespread incidents of flashovers resulting in the tripping of major 230 kV transmission lines in its Southern service area. The flashovers were caused by the combination of an accumulation of salt end dust on in-sulators caused by a period of extremely dry weather and strong winds, followed by an increase in the humidity level. By 11:53 P.M. four of seven transmission lines leaving Florida Power and Light's Turkey Point plant were out of service as shown by the system configuration diagram and sequence of events chart on page 8. These were the Turkey Point-Davis #1 230 kV line, the Turkey PointcDavis #3 230 kV line, the Turkey Point-Flagami #1 230 kV line, and the Turkey Point-Dade #1230 kV line. The three remaining transmission circuits out of Turkey Point Plant had a combined thermal capacity of 1621 MVA. Prior to the disturbance Florida Power & Light's load was 3870 Mw and the net interchange was 150 Mw, out of FP&L. The system frequency was 60.03 Hertz. FPL was carrying approximately 492 tte of spinning reserve <, while its requirement was 331 Mw. Furthermore, there were an additional 491' Mw of on-line steam available and 1778 Mw of quick start gas turbines which could be made available within 30 minutes. At the time of the dis-turbance Flori.da Power Corporation was importing 200 Mw of power from Southern Company.

Spinning Reserve as defined by the Florida Coordinatino Group.

20(H 307 -

DISTURBAI1CE Between 11: 53 and 11:57 P.M. the remaining three t ransmiss ion lines i out of Turkey Point plant tripped, and isolated Turkey Point from the rest of the system. At the time the lines tripped, three Turkey Point units were on: Turkey Point Unit 1 was carrying 352 Mw net, Turkey Point Unit 2 was carrying 181 Mw net, and Turkey Point Unit 4 was carry-ing 600 Mw net. With the loss of the transmission lines, Turke'y Point UniE 4's instruments detected the loss of connected load, and ran the unit back. Immediately after, the unit tripped on a low steam generator level trip signal. Simultaneously, Turkey Point Unit 2 was tripped by its ant i-motoring protect ion, and Turkey Point Unit 1 reduced its gener-I , ation but remained on-line carrying the plant auxiliary uses. The resultant col oined generation loss within 'FPL was 1133 Mw. When the Turkey Point generation was lost, the power flow into Pen-insular Fiorida increased. This power surge caused Florida Power Corporation's Archer-Ft. White 230 kV line and Ft. White-High Springs 69 kt line to trip, isolating Peninsular Florida from the external systems. At the time of separation FPC's interchange with Southern Company changed from 200 Mw (IN) to 20 Mw into Florida indicating the creation of an additional loss of 100 Mw within the isolated region. Thus, the loss of this import from Southern Company, coupled with the loss of Turkey Point generation resulted in a total deficiency of 1313 / Mw within, Peninsular Florida. 20p 308.

The resulting mismatch of load and generation caused the frequency to decline. Within FPL the system frequency declined to a low of 59.01 Hz, and, initiated underfrequency relays which shed approximately 470 itw of load in the areas shown below. Governor resp ~onse and load shedding within Peninsular Florida stabilized the frequency at 59.85 Hertz within 10 seconds. FPL LOAD SHED BY UNDERFREOUENCY RELAYS Division Load Southern 240 Northern 95 Eastern 66 Western 69 TOTAL 470 in addition, other utilities within Peninsular Florida shed the following amounts of load: Utility Step 'O' Step 'l' Total (59.7 Hz) (59.2-59.0 Hv) FPC 150 76 226 TECO 70 60 130 ouC 0 5 5 JEA 0 90 90 TOTAL 220 Mw 231 Mw 451 Mw FPL generating units responded by providing 173 Mw (see Governor Response Tabic, page 6 ), while the FPL tie lines with other utilit ies provided on additional 491 Mw (see Tie Line Response, page 7 ).The generating unit and tie line response, coupled with the reduction in load, made up the entire loss of Turkey Point generation. A summary of the response of the FPL system is shown on page 5. g 309 _3

Prior to the reestablishment of the ties with the external s) Lems, FPL's net interchange was 310 Mw (IH) and the frequency had recovered to 59.92 Hertz as a result of an increase in generator output. Florida Power Corporation's transmission tics with the external system were reestablished approximately two minutes af ter the ~ start of the disturbance, at which time load restoration was initiated by other affected systems. Once this was completed, FPLL proceeded to restore its own load. Most of the FPL load was picked up within 20 minutes after the disturbance originated. The FPL net interchange returned to its predisturbance level 11 minutes af ter the origination of the disturbance. At 1:02 AM a transmission line was closed in to tie the Turkey Point 230 kV buss to the network, but it separated at 1:05 AM. At 1:27 AM the buss was once again synchronized to the network, but the line tripped at 2:12 AM. Finally, at 6:11 AM a third and successful attempt was made to tic Turkey Point to the network permanently. A second transmission line was successfully closed in at 7: 23 AM. Turkey Point Unit 2 was brought back on-line at 7:43 AM on April 5th after these two transmission circuits had been restored. The remaining t ransmission circuits were subsequently restored. Turkey Point Unit 4 was intentionally lef t of f-line, as it was scheduled to come off for refueling after the system peak of April 5th. 2091 310 4

FLORIDA POWER AND LIGHT DISTURBANCE RESPONSE

SUMMARY

FPL SYSTEM DISTURBANCE RESPONSE DATA SHEET Prepared By D. A. Meinn;< Date 4/16/79 Disturbance LOSS OF TURKEY POINT UNITS Date 4/4/79 Time 11:57 Cause TRANSMISS 10N LINE OUTAGES 53.85 H z, aF .15 H z, F+ 59.01 Hz F

60. 03_ _H z, F

1 y 2 G 4020 Mw, G2 1060 M'a, AGen -960 Mw y 341 IN MW, A HI 491 IN MW fl 150 OUT Mw, NI2 y 3870 M'd, L A L L1 2 Loss * (Load +, Generation -) 663 Mw, Scheduled Ni 179 y Response (oNI - Loss) 173 Mw

Generation Loss 1133_ MW; Load Loss 470 MW N

Fy = FREQUENCY JUST BEFORE DISTURBANCE F + = MAXIMUM FREQUENCY EXCURSION 1 2 = FREQUENCY AFTER STABILIZATION BUT BEFORE CORRECTIVE CONTROL ACTION TAKES PLACE F y = GENERATION JUST BEFORE DISTURBANCE [ G 2 = GENERATION IMMEDI ATELY AFTER FREQUENCY STABILIZES G Nil:= NET INTERCHANGE JUST BEFORE DISTURBANCE 2 = NET IfffERCHANGE IMMEDI ATELY AFTER FREQUENCY STABILIZES N1 Ly = LOAD JUST BEFORE DISTURBANCE L = LOAD IMMEDI ATELY AFTER FREQUENCY STABILIZES 2

FPI' GCt: ERAT it1G UlllT Date 4/16/79 GOVERt!OR PESP0tiSE Prepared By D. A. McInnir. ACTUAL GEtt .15 Hz ACTUAL CONTi tlUOUS BEFORE EST itiAT E D EXPECTED PLAT 1T CAPACjTY OPEllf NG(- (lN) 2 (ry) DISTURBAt!CE % VALV RES P0tlSE RES P0ilSE (ftt) (t4W) Ut!lT TURKEY P0lflT 1 369 352 95 0 0 TURKEY P0lflT 2 185 181 98 TRIPPED TRIPPED TURKEY P0ltlT 3 0FF 0FF 0FF 0FF TURKEY POIf1T 4 610 600 TRIPPED TR1PPED PORT EVERGLADES 1 190 PORT EVERGLADES 2 205 391* 99 4 0 PORT EVERGLADES 3 369 PORT EVERGLADES 4 150 457** 89 26 40 3 PORT EVERGLADES GT OFF 0FF 0FF 0FF LAUDERDALE 4 138 180 65 14 16 LAUDERD'.i.E 5 138 3 LAUDEh0 ALE GT OFF 0FF 0FF 0FF RIVIERA 1 0FF 0FF 0FF 0FF RIVIERA 2 0FF 0FF 0FF 0FF - RIVIERA 3 273 207 77 14 5 RIVIERA 4 0FF 0FF 0FF 0FF ST. LUCIE 1 0FF 0FF 0FF 0FF FT. MYERS 1 138 112 81 7 10 FT. MYERS 2 369 345 93 18 22 g' FT. MYERS GT OFF 0FF 0FF 0FF fMt!ATEE 1 0FF OFF 0FF 0FF MAtlATEE 2 772 370 48 38 30 CAPE CANAVERAL 1 369 345 93 18 25 CAPE CANAVERAL 2 0FF 0FF 0FF 0FF SANFORD 3 0FF 0FF 0FF 0FF SANFORD 4 364 230 63 18 15 SANFORD 5 364 250 69 18 10 PUTNAli 1 0FF 0FF 0FF 0FF PUTNAM 2 0FF 0FF 0FF 0FF TOTALS 5003 4020 175 173 Notes: 1 Actual Cen/ Continuous Cc. city (Before Disturbance) 2The smaller of: a) Continuous cap. y X.167 X 11Z/.5 (Max Hz to be used =.5 or b) Continuous capa.ity - actual gen. 3 o. of units on line X (37-28) if (F1 +) 659.9 Hz. N 4No. of units on line X (57-40) if (F1 +) f59.9 Hz. 2091 312 No. of units on line X ?.3.5 X Hz) if (F1 +)?S9.7 Hz. 5 ctual Continuous Capacity A Generation for Pt. Everglades Unit 1 and 2 are combined into a single value.

- Generation for Pt. Everglades units 3 and 4 are combined into a single value.

FPL TIE LINE RESPONSE Prepared By D.A. McInnis0ato 4/16/}9 Disturbance LOSS OF TURKEY POINT UNITS Date 4/4/79 Time 11:57 FLOW FLOW BEFORE AFTER TIE DISTURBANCE SUBTOTAL CHANGE SUBTOTAL DISTURBANCE Big Bend-Ringling 230kV 70 IN 190 IN Big 'end-Manatee 230kV 38 OUT 32 IN 258 IN 290 IN 100 IN 53% Sanford-Turner 115kV 12 IN 8 IN North Longwood-Sanford 230kV 80 OUT 115 0UT Brevard-West Lake Wales 230kV 10 OUT 12 I N 93 IN 105 IN 50 IN Indian River-Cape Canaveral 230kV 90 IN 19% 162 IN E' Greenland-Putnam 230kV 125 ouT 50 OUT Baldwin-Normandy 115kV 5 ouT 170 OUT 133 IN 37 OUT 8 IN Duval-Normandy 230kV 40 OUT 27% 5 IN

New Smyrna Beach 115kV 13 OUT 13 OUT Vero Beach 138kV 18 OUT 14 OUT Ft. Pierce 138kV 37 OUT 7 IN 30 OUT Lake Worth 138kV 6 0UT 1%

3 OUT Homestead 138kV 0 0 TOTAL 163 OUT 491 328 IN N 100% OW

Discrepancy between net interchange total and sum of Individual tics due to New Smyrna Beach not included in total.

g

1 4 TURVsEY P0litT TRAfJStilSSI0il LillE D TRIPPitlG SEQUEllCE t DADE I U 3 G:)1--T------------ -------------- _ _ _.> g DADE_l..... t:5. U R ____/___________._ _________2____

7. _ _ _ _ _

6:12--1: g ~~ LD E '~ y--.-.-__ ._1. ________1_____________________3 g D PFL 1 G:)3-- .. t:0 .P------------.----.--2--.----.5__________D_ .,_,g,,,,,_ DADE i O rD, =---

80'

-E -- - -> l G:14 - - I - -- - 1 ------ - D - - .tD 14 D D DADE I _ _j g T -.- _ _ _ _ _ _2 _ _ -g__.-___- D D F i ~ u .._...l...._. .. - + - - - - - - -L .A 1 D-4 _ - _3- _ _ _ _ ~ D - - A D D G I DADE I D D L ---t+++_-----+--------- -A r-+- --R.--+--91. D F U M 1 P 1 I I O I IC-----L---C--+---D r----- E Y A I .I D I R ._.... l Y C D V I I D I T I S-----T---+------I I D I D I D D r+, LR I D Y S I D - -- + - - ~ + -- - - D - o - 1.. - D - + + + - - - 8 R.' - --+ - - + 1. D I D D I D A MKTl D D D I D D - - u - o - 2+ - D - -- 1 -- I - - - - -> l D-----1--D .S I D D D i D L._....l. C D D D D I M t.) I U-----2--D M C D--2---D I I A I T U 1 D 1 A----2--Y .1 L-----S--D A G D I M D 1 E M R R-- I D I R--------+--- -I O V D-+--+-M . 1. D D V--+ -S D I D--------+-----D E D-----+ -*+++-D E I D D D D D C RNY.I D-++++*-+-+-++++++-D-++-+-H-+---+1 D D D 1 1 J 1) FLAGAMI-TP #1 Tripped 10: 35 PM - Shattered Insulator String 2) DAVIS-TP #1 Tripped 10:41 PM - Contamination Lef t Out of Service for Washing 3) DADE-TP #1 Tripped 11:50 - Contamination 4) DAV IS-TP #3 Tripped 11:53 - Shattered insulator String

5) FLAGAtil-TP #2 '

Exact Trip Time Unknown 11: 53 - 11:57 Shattered insulator String Found %} )j4

6) DAVIS-TP #2 Exact Trip Time Unknown 11:53 - 11: 57 Shattered insulator String Found

7) DADE-TP #2 Exact Trip Time Unknown 11: 53 - 11: 57 Contamination 9

N I I M LOSS OF TURKEY P0lt.T 6060 -pl GENERAT80N 59 9 _ / f Lt 59.8 - /. f INITIATION OF STEP 0 Ut:0ERFREQUENCY O k 59.7 - f" SLOPE - 1 HZ/SEC. FREQ. ,W (HZ) 59.5 l 59.4 - FREQUENCY RESPONSE RECORDED AT g.j RANCH SUBSTATION FOLLOWING LOSS CF TURKEY P0ltT GENERATION ON 59.3 - A . APRIL 4,1979 p 11:57 P.M. ). 59.2 h Na n, w l NITI ATI OV 59.1 - 0F STEP 1 UNDERFREQU ENCY u " J9.0 _ U l' 2 3 5 6 7 8 g ,^o ' TINE (SEC)

SYSTEM FREQUENCY AT PORT EVERGLADES 138kV BUSS APRll 4,1979 8 i i i l i ! : : I ! j'! ; : ! i l ~ i i i ! *j l l.., .l. . [.. l. ..j. !.. l. j t _. t.. j..'. 12:30 Ali - i l .1-- i ? ? j 8 l !l d j i j

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M A 2 M A T 1 ~ N I O N P N YO EI KT RA UR TE 0, N 7 FE 9 OG 1 S i d, S a4 O o L Ll M P mr ep l / 2 tA 1 sy, S ya \\ Ld P s Fe n deW M P 1 1 g NCDr s u- ~ M \\ P 0 7,1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 7 6 5 4 3 4 g

s t1 __ r r-i I fb OQ. 2 O I O C tw g g Om oy pz i

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4 O \\ C-m O.~ m O L. o CL g E< a . O { +J t v, r-1 MT [ m J O CL C L *O O 3 r I r i (L ri l k i r-1 O o O o o. O O O o O 4 N, r ~ 2091.318

FLORIDA POWER C LICliT ' NET lilTERCHANGE APRIL 4/5.1979 e p-g --. 1 An i M E G AWy.'-F'j-M E G A VARS ,;i 400 2 0 0.' * ' ' M O,. L.... .6 200 400 A g' k I i_ ,i ,! t l" k I ,' I ! !lll! l 's. I' l 1 5.., t i ,.,3,. w Y e.. l

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ATTACHMENT #3 SYST 8 OPEATIG E 4-25-79 16651 .33vs o,re no ...e_, MJSJECT SacT1o>e TRANSMISSION LINES - ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS 8.ERGBC( (Wgt SCOPE To provide guidelines for action by System Operations in the event of abnormal environmental effects that may affect critical transmission lines, substations, and/or plant switchyards. GENERAL RESPONSIBILITY It is the responsibility of System Operations to advise the responsible Division Transmission and Distribution manage-ment of the need for specific maintenance action and to confirn that the actions are timely and adequate. Actions within the authority of System Operations, such as de-energizing lines and substations are to be carried out as expeditiously as practical should such environmental conditions arise. ACTION REQUIRED Transmission lines, substations, and plant switchyards located in high contamination areas require special attention at times due to environmental conditions and require specific actions such as: 1. Washing while energized. 2. De-energizing until washed. 3. De-energizing until environmental conditions change. 4. De-energizing and repair as required. ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS Conditions that may require specific action are: 1. Salt spray as a result of wind speed and direction. 2. Dust or other contaminants, such as bird droppings. 3. Fire or smoke. 4. Heavy lightning activity. 5. Other conditions which cause unexplained relay actions. SPECIFIC RESPONSIBILITY Division Load Dispatcher: Notify the System Operator when any condition described above may affect system reliability. System Operator: Notify the Assistant Manager - Power Coordination or the Manager. If imediate action is required, direct appropriate switching to alleviate equipment damage and/or system jeopardy. Direct the Division Load Dispatcher to notify the appropriate T&D personnel of problem. Log appropriate coments on the System Log (recording tape). 2091 322 eage 1 of a ~

l SYSTB10KPATI006 .ssue one 4-25-79 16651 54JAJE CT SECT 1o*4 TRANSMISSION LINES - ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS BERGBiCY 'WiUAL CRITICAL CIRCUITS The following list of circuits is considered critical and requires special consideration: Andytown - Orange River 500kV circuit Andytown - Broward 240kV circuit Andytown - Lauderdale #1 - 240kV circuit Andytown - Lauderdale #2 - 240kV circuit Broward - Lauderdale #1 - 240kV circuit Dade - Davis 240kV circuit Dade - Lauderdale #1 - 240kV circuit Dade - Port Everglades 240kV circuit Dade - Turkey Point #1 - 240kV circuit Dade - Turkey Point #2 - 240kV circuit Davis - Flagami 240kV circuit Davis - Turkey Point #1 - 240kV circuit Davis - Turkey Point #2 - 240kV circuit Davis - Turkey Point #3 - 240kV circuit Flagami - Lauderdale 240kV circuit Flag?mi - Turkey Point #1 - 240kV circuit Flagami - Turkey Point #2 - 240kV circuit Ft. Myers - Orange River #1 - 240kV circuit Ft. Myers - Orange River #2 - 240kV circuit Indiantown - Midway 240kV circuit Indiantown - Pratt & Whitney 240kV circuit Laudania - Lauderdale 240kV circuit Laudania - Port Everglades 240kV circuit Lauderdale - Port Everglades #1 - 240kV circuit Lauderdale - Port Everglades #3 - 240kV circui,; Malabar - Midway #1 - 240kV circuit Malabar - Midway #2 - 240kV circuit Midway Ranch ?40kV circuit Midway - St. Lucie il - 240kV circuit Midway - St. Lucie #2 - 240kV circuit Midway - St. Lucie #3 - 240kV circuit 2091 723 Page 2 of 3 r

SYSTB1 OPEPATIGS ,ssus ons 4-25-79 16651 = = ~ a. i +, c,, LIJSJ8CT S E CTIQ ** TRANSMISSION LINES - ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS g.EED l'#M CRITICAL CIRCUITS (CONT) Orange River - Ranch 240kV circuit Pratt & Whitney - Ranch #2 - 240kV circuit I-f-7f APPROVAL: % e (E, DATE: Manager -! System,0perations " [ # ^ DATE: d W - Pf APPROVAL: Director - Power Supply 2091 324 Page 3 of 3

ATTACHMENT #4 -T---- ll0 M geef f AU (CTLD AAEA 2r04 LJ 21047 22085h 110&J I I s W 1 1 40355: i 40 M 40333 40352 40340 40330 4 ,2, 9,,6 1 ST. LUCIE E MW MIMV N N STAAT-uP 2416 2415 2485 2478) 2M52 2438 2442 2451 24747 Pu m0 sus 2452 244 2 495 2465 24751 th - C 23586 6526 6515 W okt! CMC!!! 88 " ' $555 naeTMAq t 24N 39720 WA s ut tAWTOW N 24715 O )S725 ?>325 5 [ ] 33929 39710 33333 l MATT & uptTx!Y N 36812 L. \\_J5930 36815 g>=, ,F 1I E - OPENED N(NUALLY v RA=c" B - TRIPPED zus 2%5 O - CLOSED 25 4 2555 2091 32-3 25 % 2566 M A'I \\4 1316 i x i t T i N c, Ces uTiew4 9 Rc1 Is $NSTEn D1livRa ptE FIGURE I

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ATTAClliENT il5 i An uia.lynir, won performed on the cont ingency of the ]ons of bot:h f-lidway 240 kV busnes. The end re.;n1t of the loan of both bunnen with a breaker and a half scheme in that the breakers connec t:od to the bunnen are open and the linen coming into the substation only connect to the mi.d-breaker and continue on out again. Specif i_cally at Ili dway, after the lon., t.here would be four linen tha t would pans t-brough the 111dway mid breakers: 1. St. Luc ie-Ilidway -She r, ui n 230 kV 2. II.ila ba r-t' i dv;a y-St. Lucio 230 kV 3. SL. Luc i e-tli.duay-Ind ian t own 230 kV 4. Malaba t - flidway-Rrinch 2 30 kV Of thone four lincu, one connects St. Lucie t.o the north, t wo con n 'c t. S t. Lucie t.o the nouth, and a fourth pannen by with no connection lo St. Lucio. A loadf. low ntudy wan parforced to t est what dis tr ibution of power flow would result if the loss of both busses occurred at the time of peak nummer 1979 load with t:he SL. Lucio 41 unit in nervi ce. Two load f.l ow: were run, (normal and with the loss of both busses) and the portinent f. lown vere plotted on the attached mapn. These plots show that no line overloads would be expected and the St. Lucie 240 kV bun in still connected to both the north and south. 2091 329

1979 mxsu 6>>ou a =n. NORMAL Q2104< 0 22: - 0::x Q2ia l ST-LUCII: l 1 HL'TCHIMSON ISLAND l h4>1-l ['j4.?'5j 4334) 4332) g:4 C c.3u gmr mu 2 253 i{ O.' O. m;> I O. : ' 26/ I5I i v iv } 4, 11 IA /qtg STARI *T 17 PT - Ci 1 y O'/ MIDWAY I -)- g h2472c 2c 24, 2 u,t t 247e ~ d24<si 0:- 0 246

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g E gl,,m, J' C / ~ u i / STATE OF FLORIDA f,',sd.,,,,,.. S,',. c 3 "' 's' " ELECTRIC SYSTEM MAP U L /, U Pf;EPAREO HY 1 civv er >tv ersi FLORIDA COCRDINATING CONP 1 i n, 1 so o e to n 4 y m a ss et t --- t_-. - t - - *- .t er..o... t2-si-Te

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g--- Q,.j[d ATTACHtiENT #7 s ,i.... d......, h"""' SYSTD1 OPEfMT10f6 6-i-78 16521 ,,, m m., S E CTe O H MJehJECT Area Protection g.Eg3g mtjljQ There are modifications to dispatching steps required SCOPE in order to maintain a reliable power system. This procedure outlines these steps. SOUTH FLORIDA AREA BOUNDARY The boundary for protecting the South Florida load area is: l-Malabar-Midway 240kV lines. ( 2-Malabar-West 138kV line. 3-Ft. Myers-S. Bay 138kV line. 4-Ft. Myers-Ranch 240kV line. 5-Andytown-Orange River 500kV line. TRANSFER LIMITS The transfer limits are to provide for protection in the South Florida area for the reasons listed below. Area spinning reserve will allow an additional import on a megawatt for megawatt basis.

1) Loss of largest unit in south md east load areas, ininediately followed by,

2) Loss of largest east-west line due to a fault (500kV line if in service).

Andytoten-0 range River 500kV line in service: For loss of t.Ne largest generating unit in the south and east areas: N Largest unit on line + present import Rec - Soinning reserve = 1500 MW .= Andytown-Orange River 500kV line out of service: For loss of the largest generating unit in the south and east areas: N Largest unit on line + present import f,e* - Spinning reserve = 1200 MW 2091 334 Page 1 of 2

-QQ........d,......f=b ~ ,f SYSTD10PERAT10tG 6-1-28 16s21 = .s,mm u c.Teos suon a UEKBiCYl'tYiUAl_ i Area Protection s DISPATCli STEPS CONDITION GREDI exists for normal operatton. 1. Follow the normal dispatching steps until the transfer limit is reached. Area spinning reserve will allow an additional import on a megawatt for megawatt basis. 2. Maintain area limit with GT operation. Provide system regulati% with generating units north of i boundary. COUDITIOM DLUE exists witen the area reserve capacity ~~ and hnport cannot cover tite loss of the largest unit on line. 3. Purchase schedule "A" or "B" power as appropriate. Run Port Everglades and Turkey Point Diesels. 4. Exceed limit by adding spinning reserve on a megawatt for megawatt basis. Limit to 200 MW step zero. CONDITION YELLOW crists when not able to maintain spinning reserve within the area or import spinning withou.t exceeding dispatch flaiJs. Additional import should be on the west-east lines rather than the Malabar-Midway lines as long as the 500kV is in service. 5. Peak GT's in area with additional spinning on step zero. 6. Peak steam units in area. s COM0lTION RED crists when load.teduc tion measu,tes a,te in effeet. (Voltage reduction, curtult.ng load, 01 feeder dropping.) 7. Voltage reduction. 8. Reduce load. 2091 33r3 '/ ~ Off IV DATE: APPROVAL: ^ f fianager - System Operations [ [, DATE: 4 -/ ' 7/ APPROVAL: Director - Power Supply Page 2 of 2

, 1 r R . -,i J-l 3 A......"......,.' f 5 SYSTEM OPEPATIONS ,u vi. o m s-1-7a q1ss27

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( Emergency Codes BERGEK'Y fWHL SCOPE Power Supply conditions are identified by color codes to assist in a general understanding of system conditions. t CODES Green ticrmal condition. Reserve generation capacity available to back up loss of largest unit. fic transmission limitations. Blue Alarm condition. Reserve generation capacity ( not available to back up loss of largest, or transmission limitation may limit use of reserve, or imminent extreme loads expected due to weather change. Yellow Critical condition. Operating reserve nearly exhausted. Not able to maintain spinning reserve. Imminent possibi!ity of loac cortail-ment or voltage reduction. Red ' Interruption condition. Customer interruption in effect. Emergency load control procedures in progresb Blackout restoration in progress. l OPERATI0t1 ACTION The following actions are to be taken by System Operation personnel. Condition Green - flormal, no action required. Condition Blue - Notify Assistu?. Manager and Manqqer. Normal - full staffing in tibisions and Sysrcn s Control Center. Teletype tessanes are sent to Division / Plants affected stating concern. Notify Director - Power Supply by A;sistant Manager or Manager. Pl30t and/or transmission maintenance work curtail ' as necessary. Condition Yellow - Emergency nann ng of Divisions and System Control Center. W t'fication of Assistant Manager, Idanager, and Direc*.or - Power Supply of <ondition. Tel e type ir.es s.3 ;e: are cent to Division / lants a f fected stating coricern. Some substation manning may be required (Non-supervisory control'+ } Extra crews called as required. Comunica t ions Center manned (ninimum). 1 J Coridition Red - Interruption of service in effect. Emer-gency manning required in Divisions and Systr Control Center. Comm.:nications Center mancef ti.' Restoration procedures in effert. Cmergency communica tions in ef fect, up 'a ted as reqaired. APPROVAL: d c DATE: 1/ 6 M ~ Eanager/- System Operations 2091 336 APPROVAL: DATE: ~Q ~ - / 3' - 2[ nir..rtn, _ o m.,o r Genid o

ATTACHMENT 8 Restoration Time of Offsite Power Since FPL's first nuclear plant became operational in 1972 until the present, there have been four major syst2m disturbances which resulted in the loss of offsite power to power plants. Table 1 tabulates the restoration times encountered in each instance. TABLE 1 Restoration Times Minutes April 3,1973 April 4,197 3 May 16,1977 May 14,1978 Power Plant Disturbance Disturbance Disturbance Disturbance Cutler 30 40 Ft. Lauderdale 17 13 31 & 9& 20 Port Everglades 22 43 15 & 17 Riviera 30 32 & 17 St. Lucie 1* & 17 8 Turkey Point 20* 23 & 43 53 & 77 Min

Restored offsite power to station buss though Plant Operator elected to remain on diesel power.

A statistical analysis of these restoration times determined that FPL has had a mean restoration time of 26.27 minutes with a standard error of 3.65 minutes. Using the student t distribution for 21 degrees of freedom (sample 22-1), there is only a .005 probability that the restoration time will exceed 36.6 minutes. Conservatively, we have therefore chosen a mean restoration time of 37 minutes as being representative of our grid. 2091 337

>= ATTACHMENT #9 -QC h s ,, o. o.,oi...,o '/cc.. SYSTBi OERATIONS 4-21-7a 16601 ,ssu om, 54JSJ ECT SEcTa ore System Restoration - Area BERGBiCY IMIML SCOPE To provide guidelines for system restoration where a portion of the power system is still connected to the interconnected system. GENERAL 1. Inform the Division Load Dispatchers of blackout and instruct them not to close any lines until the boundaries of the blackout area have been determined. I 2. Maintain off-site power to the nuclear plants if at all possible. 3. In reenergizing system, protect FPL and customer equip-ment from damage. 4. Maintain control of system conditions during restoration. 5. If possible, restore system from the interconnected system. 6. In reenergizing portions of the blacked out system, try to limit the frequency dip to a maximum of 0.1 Hz on each step of load pick up. 7. Avoid energizing high voltage cables at the end of a long, lightly loaded system. RESTORATION PROCEDURE Energize in a step by step " ladder" sequence from the energized system to each bulk station load center. 1. At the bulk station that is to be energized: a. Open all high voltage line terminals that feed "beyond" the bulk station. b. Open all subtransmission line terminals. 2. Close the breaker at the station in the " energized" system to energize the high voltage line and the " bulk" station. 3. Close the necessary subtransmission terminals to pick up " radial" load to load the high voltage transmission line to more than " surge impedance loading". a. An example of a " radial" load could ^ a 138kV line serving several substations with the far terminal opened. 2091 338 Page 1 of 2

SYSTBiOKRATIONS 166 I .sms om eson.o. co.e,. s t eo=v coun=v sLJSJ F CT SEcys oH System Restoration - Area g.gg yg f. RESTORATION PROCEDURE (cont) b. " Surge impedance loading" is the load which prevents a rise in voltage on a lightly loaded transmission line. The MW values for various line voltages are: LINE VOLTAGE SURGE IMPEDANCE LOADING KV MW ( 500 625 240 144 138 48 115 33 69 12 4. Close a second high voltage tie from the original energized system to the " bulk" station. 5. Pick up additional " radial" load to load both high voltage lines to " surge impedance loading", if possible. This " bulk" station is now part of the energized system. Now proceed to energize the next " bulk" station in a ( similar manner. This could result in the high voltage transmission being tied together serving the " bulk" stations and " radial" subtransmission lines out of the " Sulk" stations. Once most of the load has been picked up, the subtransmission can be restored to a normal arrangement. - 2 / - 7(b APPROVAL: A DATE: Manager ISystem Tperations 'Y APPROVAL: M [. 4 DATE: ~ Dirbctor - Power Supply 2091 339 Page 2 of 2

F i G }$S J.C,u,, m,,..M SYSTBiOPEPMIONS .s suusa r e 5-1-79 16602 SOSJECT Sic.Ts O N SYSTEM RESTORATION - TURKEY P0It!T EERGBD' FNGL SCOPE To provide a specific switching guide for a statewide blackout in order to restore off site power to Turkey Point Plant from the Lauderdale Plant and Port Everglades Gas Turbines. GEtlERAL Refer to Pro.n' rn 1660'. 'or general guidelines. RESTORATI0ft 0F GAS TURBINES For a statewide blackout the Port Everglades and Lauderdale Gas Turbines are to be restored by using the Independent Start Procedure #16612. ( EMERGENCY AUXILIARY POWER TO LAUDERDALE STEAM PLANT The next step would be to provide emergency auxiliary pcwer tc Lauderdale Steam Plant following Procedure #16611. RESTORATION OF 240KV LINES TO TURKEY POINT The restoration of 240kV to Turkey Point is to be done carefully not to exceed the capability of the generation available. Surge impedance loading is to be followed in order to maintain a proper voltage profile en the restored part of the system. ( PROCEDURE 1. Open all 240kV and 138kV breakers at Lauderdale Plant, Port Everglades Plant, and Laudania. 2. At Lauderdale, close 240'.11146 - energized E. 240kV bus and auto. 3. Close 240W1076 - energizes Laudania 240kV line. 4. At Laudania, close 240W43414 - energizes Port Everglades line. 5. At Port Everglades, close 240'.119058 - energizes South 240kV bus and auto. 6. Synchronize Port Everglades GT's and close 240W35140, tieing Port Everglades GT's to Lauderdale Site 2 GT's together. 7. At Flagami, open all 240kV and '.33kV breakers. 8. At Lauderdale, close 240W1092 - energizes Flagami 240kV line. 9. At Flagami, prepare the 133kV system to pick up approximately 144 MW of load in stages to coordinate with the available GT generation. 2091 340 Page 1 of 2

,,._,Qf kn.t m 't. t.... b. 7.. ' S SYSTB1OfERATIO.ls 5-1-79 16602 ,ssue ox,c W0 LECT SEc ra ote SYSTEl1 RESTORATIO!! - TURKEY P0lt1T BERGBEY flA!U1 4 PROCEDURE (CONT.) 10. Close 240W28565 - energizes North 240kV bus, auto and 138kV bus. 11. Pick up approximately 144 MW of radial load at Flagami. The Riverside 138kV lines energized up thru Airport and into Miami thru the Lawrence cable is the preferred restoration path.

12. At Turkey Point, open all 240kV breakers.

13. At Flagami, proceed by closing 240W28545 - energizes the Turkey Point #2 line.

14. At Turkey Point, close 240W26534 - energizes the Unit #3 startup, flE bus and Unit #1 and #2 startup. 15. Close 240W26522 - energizes Unit !4 startup and SE bus. i k l i 7 APPROVAL: '4.'.I Y DATE: "~ ~ Manager - System Operations / APPROVAL: /' fM DATE: Director - Power Supply 2091 341 Page 2 of 2

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2. 2,... <..,5 SYSIB1ORPAT[0:is 5-1-79 16603

,smc m e WDifCT >c cf 4 0'8 SYSTEM RESTORATION - ST. LUCIE B.T REF'I:Cl IWSJ_ ( SCOPE To provide a specific switching guide for a statewide blackout in order to restore off site power to St. Lucie Plant from the Lauderdale Plant and Port Fverglades Gas Turbines. GEf1ERAL Refar to Procedure #16601 for general guidelines. This is a continuation of the restoration of off-site power to the nuclear units. See Procedure #10602. PROCEDURE 1. Open, if not already open, all 240kV and 138kV breakers at Ranch, f4id.tay, Pratt & Whitney, Indiantown, and St. Lucie. 2. Close 240N1080 - energizes the Ranch 240kV line. 3. At Ranch, close 24022556 - energizes E 240kV bus. 4. Close 240N2544 - energizes the Pratt & Whitney 240kV line. 5. At Pratt & Whitney, close 240236315 - energizes the Indiantown line. 6. Close 240W36819 - picking up the Pratt & Whitney load. ( 7. At Indiantown, close 240W33929 - energizes the Midway 240kV line. 8. At l'idway, close 240W24641 - energizes the St. Lucie #1 240kV line. 9. At St. Lucie, close 240W40333 - energizes the West 240kV bus. 10. Close 240W40367 - energizes Hutchison Island Substation. 11. Close 240W40364 - energizes the startup transformer 18. 12. Close 240W40361 - energizes the East 240kV bus. 13. Close 240W40323 - energizes the startup transformer l A. // n., // 2* / APPROVAL: /\\ N (' DATE: ~ ~ f4anager - System Operations t APPROVAL: /-[ - k DATE: '? Director - Power Supply 2091 342 Page 1 of 1

SYSE 0(EPATims ,to.... .. w - c - - .s>v==^'- 54JOJECT S r.CT10M Plant Protection - Blackout BEEC( FAN [R s SCOPE To provide a basic understanding as to procedures to be followed at power plants following a major system disturbance. PROTECTION After a system disturbance that isolates individual plants from the energized transmission system, it is essential that first, the generating units be protected, and second, that they be ready to come back on the line as soon as possible. RELIABLE AUXILIARY POWER Those units that were tripped by low frequency relays and are supplying their own auxiliary power should be kept in that condition, if possible. Care must be taken, however, to insure that 60 Hz power is being supplied to the auxiliary equipment. In a system disturbance of this magnitude the unit auxiliary power is the most stable source of power to the unit and should be kept until such time as a reliable source of start-up power is assured. I DIESELS Those units that tripped and were not able to supply their auxiliary power should be secured in such a way as to protect them until a source of start-up power can be supplied. The diesel unit at Port Everglades is required for any units at these locations. Start-up of these units should be based on the availability of start-up power and the re-establishment of the transmission system. INDEPENDENT START Protecting the gas turbine units at Port Everglades and Lauderdale can be accomplished by initiating " Independent Start". " Independent Start" will be performed by plant personnel without instructions from System Operations in the event of a total power failure at the location. See procedure #16612. APPROVAL: hi DATE: M Managek - Syst'em Operations APPROVAL: bf DATE: PL*Y Director - Power Supply 2091 343 Page 1 of 1}}

ML19253A091

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SUMMARY

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