ML19249D870
| ML19249D870 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Maine Yankee |
| Issue date: | 09/20/1979 |
| From: | Moody D Maine Yankee |
| To: | Reid R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| WMY-79-98, NUDOCS 7909250488 | |
| Download: ML19249D870 (31) | |
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L3.2.1 WMY 79 98 September 20, 1979 United Stater rNe lear Regulatory Coaaii ssion
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Washiegton, D.C.
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Attention:
Office of Nuclear Reactot Regulation N'
7 Robert W.
Reid, Chici l'j j,,
Operating Reactors Branch 94 Divis ion of Opera ting Rcactors Pe!erences (a) Licenae No. DPR-26 (Docket No. 50-309)
(b)
US"RC letter fre.n R.W.
Heid to R ll. Groce dated February 2, 1978;
Subject:
arandment No. 35 to Facility Operating 1.ic e n se (c)
!fiAFC letter (W.ft 73-32) from R.l!. Groce to R.U.
Reid dated May 31, 1973;
Subject:
Maine Yankee Fire Protection Prograt' I n forma t ion (d) tiSSRC letter from R.W.
Reid to R.li. Groce d a t c ri July 14, 1979;
Subject:
Re c, u e s t for Additional Information on Fire Protect ion SER l t e;n n,
bear Sir
Subject:
Su bmi t t al of Additio..ai Information on Fire Protretion Itens Re f e re n::e (d) above re ques ted t h it Maine Yankee re-address the sohject of Safe Shutdown Ca pab ili t y, SI:R Iten 3.
.l.
It indicated t h ri t rore infornation required by yeur s t a f f., and ericlowd a generic staff pacition on the u '.
subject.
We have reviet.ed the staff positica and our pre rious submittal on thin suoject [ Reference (c)], nnl fin:1 that very little new i nf orma t ion is required.
The problem appears to be that the origiaal staff concern and our original response do not follow the format requmted by the subacquent Jeneric pos it io n.
Thetefore, we have taken che original < taf f conc ern and r":pon ed to it usin; the c r iteri, listed in t!.: generic st af f posi t ion.
Thic, response is a tt aciu d as F.nclosure A.
We truit that this approach is acceptable to you.
If ycu have further questions o r c omme nt r., pleare con t..c t u>.
Very truly yours,
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1020 T.99 ys$,
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Enclosure A SER Section 3.2.1,; Safe Shutdown Canability The Maine Yankee Atomic Power Plant was designed and constructed to meet the requirement of Criterion Number 3 concerning Fire Protection of Nuclear Power
- Plants, klit h the later release of BTP o.;-l.- > Regulatory Guide 1.120, the NHC requested a survey of the plant to ascertain to what degree it meets the r.pecific, and =>cre detailed, requirements of these document.
After an inspection and review of the plant fire protection systems, Maine Yankee was requested to further evaluate the separation of redundant ecmponents required for sa fe shutdown, including power supplies and cables; end to analy>> toe results of fires in areas where this separation was not in conformance with the requirements of DTP 9.5-1.
The areas chosen for further analysis by the NRC were-1.
Control Room Cable Chase 2.
Protected Cable Vault
[p#{p 3, b,$ f ffgl 3.
Protected Cable Tray Room b
4.
Turbine Building f.Ik).dggf yg g 4
5.
Circula t i ng L a ter Pumphouse 6.
Primary Auxiliary Building 7.
Containment 8.
Co n t ai nc.e nt Spray Pump Building 9.
Vent ila tion Equipment and Personnal Air lock Area
- 10. Ste'm and Feedwater Valve House
- 11. The Containment Penetration Area Criteria for safe shutdoten had been detailed in the Maine Yankee Fire Hazards Analysis previously sub.aitted to the NRC.
The NRC request indicated that more specific requirements for safe shutdoun were preferred by the NRC reviewing teams, nanely:
1.
the ability to reach hot shutdown immediately, and 2.
the ability to reach cold shu tdown in 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
All areas abeze were analyzed in accordance with these specific requirements.
In addition, Maine Yankee considered it prudent to naintain the ability to analyses considered this.
borate the reactor coolant systen so the area The recent staff request for additional information, cor.plete with generic t.taff position, has caused Maine Yankee to re-analyze the eleven areas and submit the information requircd for staff review using the criteria listed in the staff position.
1020 200
I.
Deacribe the systens or portions thereof used to provide shutdown capability and r.odifications required to achieve any alternate shutdown capability, i f required.
Safe shutdown of the reactor plant requires the following functions be accomplished:
A.
Insert negative reactivity into tho reactor core B.
Control primary system overpressure C.
Control primary plant water inventory D.
Remove decay heat and cooldown the reactor core To ensure shutdeun capability, the cabic associated with the equipment or systeas which accenplish the four functions described above have been examined for their vulnerability to a fire in eleven locations of concern to the Commi nc io n.
The equipment required ta reach hot standby and cold shutdown are described in Figure 1 or 2, respectively.
A.
Recctivity Control Reactivity control at Maine Yan';ee is accomplished by insertion of control rods and by b ora t ion.
Negative reactivity is initially inserted into the reactor core by control rods.
There control rods fail safe.
They are i nsertel by removi ng power bo accomplished by cushing the trip to their holding coils. This r buttons on the main control board, or by opening the scran breakers in the protected switchgear room.
Control and power cables for the control rods pass through the fcilouiag areas of concern:
Q Q {Ql(yh g!hl
{ yh Protected Cable Tray Room I
Control Room Cable Chase Protected Cable Vcult Co nt a i nn.e n t Penetration Area Containment Should a fire occur in any of the areas of concern causinp either an open or short c irc ui t in the power supply cables, the balding coils would be de-energized and the control roa s would fal t into the reactor core.
Irmdia te bo ra t ion a f t er shutdcun is not essential for ceeping the reactor suberitical.
With the control rods inserted and xenon building up, the reactor core vill remain conservatively subcritical fo. s om.> time.
Boration is nornally accomplished uith the use of any one of three charging pu.npa located in the P. W ry Auxiliary Euildi These puaps are not required to achieve a hot <,utdown condition.
Howueer, to ach i evr-a cold shutdown condition, bo ra t ier would he r.e q u i r e d.
Control and powar cables for these pumpa pass thro :p the following crecs: 1020 301
e Protected Cable Trav Room
- Il 2@gf y
Control Room Cable Chase ff Protected Cable Vault Primary Auxiliary Building i,
in the event th a t a fire in any of the above areas of concern incapacitates all three main charging pumps. one alternative means of boration is to use the auxiliary charging pump located in the lower level of the Primar, Auxiliary Building.
This pump's power supply cables have been rercuted to avoid the Control Roon Cable Chase and Protected Cable Vault.
They do, however, pass through the Protected Cable Tray Room and Primary Auxiliary Building.
In the Protected Cable Tray Room, the auniliary charging pump power cable uns rerouted to avoid the south end of the room, providing spatial separation f rom t he main charging pump pawer cables. While the power cables to the main charginy pumps as well as the 4160 volt power feeder to the 480 volt switchgear supplying the motor control center for the auxiliary charging pump are all in the Protected Cable Tray Room, the cables for the main charging pumps are routed irnediately to the south wall, and then down into the Protected Cable Vault.
Those for the auxiliary charging pump are routed to the north wall, and then into the unprotceted cable tray roon through a 3-hour Eire barrier.
This routing and the spatial separation that exists is shown on drawing FM-3A.
As noted in Section 5.6 of the Fire Protection SER, the combust;bles in the area consist of moderate amounts of plastic and rubber cable insulation.
The trays connecting the north and south ends of the room contai n very little cable, and much of that cable i s arr'ored, 4160 vol t cable.
The SLR section lists many modifications to and improvements in the fire protection systens availabic in the room.
These nodi ficat ions,
the case of access to the room, and the spatial separation which exists fire would incapacitate the three main chargin;;
makes it unlikely that a
pumps as well as the auxili ary chargi ng pu:n.
Therefore, Maine Yankee charging punp will always be available for boration in spite feels that a of a fire in this room.
explained earlier, conservative estimates show that power However, as cables to either the auxiliary charging pump or to a main charging pump could be rerun in eight hours, after which cooldown to cold shutdown could begin.
The plant can be maintained in a safe hot shutdown condition until such repairs are made.
In the Primary Auxiliary Building, the power cables for the main charging pumpn are in conduit, embedded in conc rete.
The power cables for the auxiliary charging pump are routed in conduit such that a minimum 15 foot separat ion exists be tuee n them and the concrete enbedded main charging pump cables.
As stated in % ct ion 5.14.3 of the Fire Protection SER, the mai n charging pum ps are separated from the auxiliary charging pump by distance end by the concrete floor at the 21 foot elevation.
A fire at the auxiliary charging pump would not affect any of the main charging pumps or their power cables.
In addition, separation, curhing and drains prevent a fire in one mai n charging pump cubicle from damaging any other main charging pu.ap. 1020 302
It is p a r.s i bl e that a cable fire on the 11-foot or 21-foot elevation could incapacitate the lube oil pumps for all three main charging pumps.
llowever, as stated in Reference (c), the pump manufacturer has verified that the ain charging pumps can be operated without their lube oil pumps.
Ring oiling of the bearings is provided, which will adequately lubricate the bearings without the lube oil pumps.
There fore, the possibility of a fire in the Primary Auxiliary Building destroying the ability to borate is not considered credible.
In the extremely unlikely event that a fire in the Primary Auxiliary Building did somehos destroy the power cables to the auxiliary charging pumps and the three main chargi ng pumps, conservative es timates shou tat power cables to the auxiliary charging pump (480V) or to a main charging pump (4160V) could be re-run in 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />, after which cooldown could begin.
It is important to note that the plant can be maintained in a saf hot shu tdown condition unt il such rerouting is accomplished.
B.
Priuary Systen Overpressure Control The plant can be sa fely shutdown and cooled down without the loss of system overpressure should all pressurizer heaters be unavailable or out of service.
The pressurizer, because of its static nature, must be f orce-cooled using stean phase spray. During a cooldoun the reactor coolant systems cools down more rapidly than does the pressurizer, and there fore, the pressurizer heaters norr. ally would be secured during a cooldoun.
The pressurizer heater cables have been specially insulated with silicone rubber uith an overall jacket of silicone impregnated glass braid.
This insulation is a high temperature insulation which is fl ame resistant, non propaga ting and superior to the types of insulation normally used.
110weve r, if a fire vere to destroy the heater cables there are other al te r na t i ve s that could be used for naintaining system overpressure.
These include establishin; a nitrogen bubble in the pressurizer, compre ss ion of the steam bubble, and solid operation with the centrifugal charging pumps.
Based on the above plant characteristics and alternat ~vas available to maintain system overpressure, the loss of pressurizer heater cables as a consequence of a fire in any of the areas of concern will not prevent a safe reactor plant shu t d'own.
C.
Primary Plant Water Mako-Up or Inventerv The charging pumps are nornally used to provide primary system nake-up.
Their control and power cables pass through the follouing areas:
Protected Cable Tray Room Con ol Room Cable Chase Protected Cable Vault Primary auxiliary Building In the event that a fire in any of the above areas of concern incapacitatet all three mai n charging pumps, one alternative available to 1020 303 Y0 Okl0\\Q[
~~
e provide take-up to the reactor coc,lant system is the auxiliary charging pump located in the lower level of the Primary Auxiliary Building.
This pump's power supply cables have been re-routed to avoid the Control Room Cable Chase and Protected Cable Vault.
is previously noted, they do pass through the Protected Cable Tray Room and Primary Auxiliary Building.
The routing of the cables and the consequences of a fire in these areas together with its affect on %e fer pumps ho"e been di scussed in Section I A of this response, and will not k reiterrred here.
D.
Decay ljeat Removal Decay heat renoval is accomplished by venting steam to the atmosphere through the steam generatot safet) valves and the atmospheric steca dump valve.
Feed wa ter inventory is normily maintained in the steam generators with the use of either one (1) of two (2) electric driven auxiliary feed pumps, P-25A or P-25C.
Both of these pumps are located in a tornado protected room adjacent to the containment.
Cable for these pumps pass through the following co,non areas:
Protected Cable Tray Room Q
Q]%g[g Contral Room Cable Chase g
Protected Cable Vault Thereafter, the cables for the tuo pumps are routed through separate areas.
Those for P-25A pass through the Containment Penetration Area, and those for P-25C pass through the Primary Auxiliary Building.
In the event the cables for P-25C were destroyed by a fire in the Primary Auxiliary Lailding but all other areas of concern listed above remained undamaged, P-25A would he available f or ruint aining feedwater inventory because.ts power supply cables are routed through the Containment Penetration Area.
Similarly, if the cables for P-25A were destroyed by a fire in the Containment Penetration Area but all other areas of concern listed a5ove remained undamaged, P-25C would still be available for maintaining feedvater inventory because its power supply cables are routed through the Primary Auxiliary Building.
In the event both electric driven auxiliar.y feedwater pumps are incapac it a ted as a result of a fire in any or all of the remaining areas 01 concern, decay heat removal can still be achieved.
As be fore, steam would be vented to the atuosphere through the steam generator safety val ves' and the atmospheric steam dump valve.
The atmospheric steam dump valve may be controllel from the emergency panel in the emergency feed pump room or locally at the valve.
Feedwater inventory would be maint ained in the steam generators with the une of the steam driven auxiliary feed pump which is located in the Steam and Feedwater Valve llou s e.
The plant can be cooled to approximately 212 to 250 F by the abo me t h o.1 and is considered sa f ely shu td e an ' y 'taine Yankee.
llowe ve r, to reduce the reactor coolant temperature to cold shutdown as de finca in the plant Tech".ical Specifications, aa addittonal heat removal
_3_
1020 304
metho3 is reenired.
This is provided by the Residual lleat Removal System, Primary or Secondary Co.r.ponent Coaling Water Systems, and Service Water System.
Power supply cables to the residual heat removal system pump motors are routed through the following areas:
Protected Cable Tray Room Control Roan Cable Chase Protected Cable Vault St eca and Pee 'wa ter Valve House aQf y Containment Spray Pump P>uilding in the event that a fire in the Protected Cable Tray Room, Control Roon Cable Chase, or Prctected Cable hult disabled the powe-supply cables to the res idual hea t removal system pump motors; the time required to run temporary cablec is conservatively estimated to be less than 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> and considers obtainier the cables, installing then, and making the required cable te rmi na ti o ns.
Experience shows five (5) hours would be a conservativt estirate to place the residual heat removal system in service.
Once in service, the residual heat removal system is capable of cooling the reactor coolant system at a rate of 65 F per hour at the start.
Cold shu tdown can be reached in the time available proposed by the HRC.
Power nupply cables for the residual heat removal system pump notors are routed through the Steam and Feedwater Valve House.
Since the power supply cables are run through conduit embedded in concrete, it is not credible that a fire of any magnitude in this area would eliminate the residual heat re a val systeu pumps from service.
If this were to happen, the casualty procedure described above eculd-be used.
A fire in the Containment Spray Pump Pailding could render all residual heat removal systen pump m.otors unavailable for service.
Maine Yankee thinks this is extremely unlikely given the lack of combustibles, and the c omn i tme nt to insteil additional detec;ian and suppression equipment in this area.
Nonetheless, if a fire were to occur, it would not affect c ool down to 250 F.
The plant could remain safely in this condition, but if a continuation of couldown to cold shutdown were mandatory, it could be achieved as follows 1.
lis i ng h ou s e boiler steam for main turbine shaf t sealing and for operation of the air ejectors, a vacuum t;ould be drawn in the condenser.
2.
Steam from one steam generator would be directed to the condenser through one of several available paths.
3.
The prirary system would remain pressurized above the NPSH requirements for the reactor coolant punps so that one could be operated.
4.
Patrup water to the stean tenerator waald be supplied by one main cor ensate pmp takin; suc t ion frcr the condenser hotwell and punping _throu,h the normal feedwa t er system to the steam generator.
_3_
1020 G5
By throttling the flow from the steam generator to the condenser, cooldown could procoed below the cold shutdown temperature requirement.
l!olding the reactor coolant system temperature at 250oF until repairs could be e f fected is a more desirable situation because considerably less equipment is required; hovever, the second n:ethod is available.
The cooling water that is notTnally supplied to the residual heat renoval system heat exchangers (E-3A and B) is circulated by the component cooling water system.
The component coolirig wa ter system t rans f ers its heat to the service water systen via the component cooling water heat exchangers located in the Turbine llall. The power and control cabling for the component cooling water system passes through the following areas:
Protected Cable Tray Room f
=
Control Room Cable Chase Protected Cable Vault i UL Turbine liuil di ng in the event th a t a fire in either the Control Room Cable Chase or Protected Cable Vault damaged control cable for the component coolinp uater system, they can be repaired uithin the tim proposed by the MC.
Control of the pump motors is available at the breaker cubicle.
In the Protected Cable Tray lloom, the component cooling water pump power cables are 4160 volt armored cables that are located in cable trays in the northeast corner of the room.
Each set of component cooling water pumpa (primm y or secondcry) is in a separate tray, separated from each other by approximately 15 feet of horizontal distance.
To teach cold shu td own, caly one component cooling pump is required.
The potential for a fire in thic room was disconsed in Section I (A) of this submittal.
If a fire occurs in the south end of the room, the sixty foot separation, light cable loading and good accass to the room should prevent damage to the c or.ponent cooling pump power supply cables in the northeast corner.
If either the north end or the entire Protected Cable. Tray Room were los' due to fire, there remain two available options for achieving plant cooldown; 1.
Cabli.ng could be rerouted around the Protected Cable T'ay Room to repower one of the component cooling water pumps.
Thi-could be accomplished in tim to achieve plant cooldown within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
2.
Utti. mate cool i ng wa t.>r f or the residual heat removal systen heat exchangers could he nrovided from the fire nain by connecting hoses to fittings provided on the ceaponent cooling water lines to the residual heat removal system heat exchan,2rs and removing the heated water by ': i'ai lar hose connections.
Analyres have proven sufficicnt water would be avai.lable by thin method for several months of operation. 1020 M
The primary and secondary component cooling water pumps and heat exchangera are located in the northwest corner of the Turbine Building.
In the event of a fire in this area that resulted in the loss of all equipment including the cables, cooldown to cold shutdown couli continue using water from the fire pond for coolin';.
The residual heat removal system heat exchangers, one residual heat removal system pumo, and the diesel driven fire pump could be used since they would remain undamaged by a lurbine Building fire.
llose connectione are available on the shell side of both heat exchangers which permit fire pond water to be used to remove h e r. t.
Less than 400 gpm per heat exchanger would be required.
This flow rate can be continued for at least 2 months using the ninimu a amount of available water from the fire pond and the Montsweng P,roak Reservoir.
This cooldown path assures the ability to cool to a cold shutdown condition with reactor coolant system temperature well below the Techaical Specifications requirement of replacing / rewinding a 2100F.
Damage control measures as extensive as damaged primary component cooline water / secondary component cooling mter pump motor could be completed in this time frame.
Following the necessary damage control measures, the service water / primary component cooling water / residual heat removal system's heat removal pmth already described would be restored.
As discussed earlier, the service water system serves as the ultimate heat sink for plant cooldoun by removing heat from the component cooling water system via the camponent ceoling water system heat exchangers located in the Turbir.c Hal1.
The cabling for the service water system passes throuph the following areas-Protected Cable Tray Rooat Control Room Cable Chase Turbine Buildinp N
Circula ti ng Wa ter Pump House
[
'In the event there is a fire in the Control Room Cable Chase that resulted in danage to the control cables for the service water system, they can be repaired in the time available pcoposed by the MRC.
Control of the service water pump motorc. is available at the breaker cubicle.
In the Protected Cable Tray Room, the service water pump power supply cables are 480 volt cables that are routed in cable trays along the northeast corner.
To reach cold shutdown only one (1) of four (4) service water pumps is required, and the power supply cables to each of the pumps are routed in separate cable trays.
As previously discussed, if a fire occurs in the south end of the Protected Cable Tray Room, there is sa ti s f act ory separa t ion to prevent damage to the service water pump motor cables.
If either the north end or the entire Protected Cable Tray Room uere lost duo to fire, there remain two available options for achieving plant cooldown:
_7_
1020
,4o
(1) Cabling could be rerouted around the Protected Cable Tray Room to repower one of the ucrvice water pumps.
This could be accomplished in time to achieve plant cooldoen within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
(2) Ultimate cooling for the residual heat removal system heat exchangers would be provided from the fire main by connecting hoses to fittings provided on the corponent (ooling water lines to the res idual heat removal sys ten hea t exchangers and removing the heated water by similar hose connections.
Analyses have proven sufficient water would be available by this metnod for several months of operation.
The control and power cables for the service water punps are located along the north wall of the Turbine Building.
In the event of a fire in this area that resulted in the loss of the service water pumps cooldown to cold shutdown could continue using vater from the fire pond for cooling.
As previously discussed, the residual heat renoval systen heat e xch ange r s, one residual heat removal system pump, and the diesel driven fire pump, could be used since they would rer.iain undama<;cd by a Turbine Building fire.
Ilose connections are available on the shell side of both heat exchangers which permit fire pond water to be used to remove heat.
Lens than 400 gpm per heat e xchanpr would be required.
This flou rate can be conti nued for at least 2 nonths using the minimun ameunt of
- me,,,y available water from the fire pond and the Montsweag 3 rook Reservoir.
n This cooldoun path assures the ability to cool to a cold shetdown se condi tion wit h reactor coolant system temperature well below the
- [
Techn ical Sp ac i fic ations requirebent of 210 F.
Damage control measures replacing /rewindi.ng a damaged primary component cooling yf as extensive ac C'
wat<_r/si % dary component c oolin;; ater pump tr.otor could be completed in k
th;s lengthy Line fran:e.
Following the necessary damage control measures, th e service water / primary component cooling water / residual heat removal system's heat removal path already described would be restored.
The four service water pumps whi.ch provide the cooling water for the ul t imne heat sink required to brinp the plant to a cold shutdown condition are located in the Circulating Water Pumi, House.
With the minimal amount of conbuntibles in the building, early fire detection capability, anc additional fire figh t ing apparatus, the possibility of a fire elimina ting all four (4) service u:.ter pumps is r t'no t e.
- However, cooldown to cold shutdown could continue us ua water from the fire pond.
As previously discussed, the residual heat removal systen heat exchangers, one residual heat removal system pump, and the diesel driven fire pump could be used since they would remain undamaged by a pumphouse fire.
Hose connections are available on the shell side of both heat exchangers whic h permit fire pond vater to be used to renove heat.
Less than 400 gpm per heat exchanger would be required.
This flow rate can be continued for at least 2 nonths using the mininum anoont of water available from the fire pond ani the Montswean BroaP bservoir.
This coaldown pa t o a ssures the ability to cool to a cold shutdown condition with rea ct or coolant system tenperature well below the Tqchnical Specifications requircivut o f 210 F.
-S-1020 308
It should be noted that if all. service unter pumps were lost as a new cc',len could be re sol t of a fire which dam ned their power cable s,
run within hnor, and the normal se rvice wate r /pr inary companent c oo l i t y',
water / residual heat renoval syster.s rer,tored.
Cold sim tdown could be achieved within the tin propased bu the NKr fire t e ce.
With the phyr. i c al neparation between the pu., 3, dam"; e to all the motors-la di f f icul t to pu tulate. 110we ve r, the alternate cooli n:', t:nde noted above is availabic.
g s4
~.
1020
.09
FIGURE 1 HOT STANDBY Function Eau i p:m e n t Required Alternatives A.
Nenative Reactivity 1.
Control Rods 1.
None.
Rods fail safe Inrertion under all circumstances B.
Primary System 1.
None Required 1.
None Overpressure Control C.
Primary Plant 1.
one Charging Pump 1.
Auxiliary Charging Pump hter Inventory (3 pumps available) (See Note)
(See Note)
D.
Deca, Heat Removal 1.
Steam Cencrator 1.
Stearn Cencretor (a)
Steam to Atomsphere (a) Steam to Condenser-Cire.
Safety and Steam Dump val.ves Water Pump (1 of 4 pumps req'd) plus c o r:d. pump (1 of 3 pump; req'd)
(b) One Auxiliary Feed Pump for (b) Makeup f r<n ma in feed, makeup (3 pu: ps ava ilable )
cond. pump (1 of 3 pumps req'd) plus main feed putap (1 of 2 pumps req'd)
NOTE-Charging Pump includes 2 lube oil pumps Aux. Charging Pump includes 1 packing pump O
N O
4
- s. a.
We s
FIGURE 2 COLD SHUTCO'.iN Function Ernirment "acuired Alternatives 1.
No ;a tive "eac tivity 1.
One Char 7,inr, Pump (3 pumps 1.
Auxiliary Charging, Pump Insertion available) 3.
Pr ima ry System 1.
Decrease 1.
Increase Pressure Control (a) Spray - One Charging Pump (a) N2 Blanket (3 available) 2.
Decreane (a) Spray-Auxiliary Charging pump (b) Vent thru solenoid reliefs C.
Primary Plant 1.
One Charging Pump (3 pumps 1.
Auxiliary Charging Funp Water In,entory availabic)
D.
Decay lient Removal 1.
Steam Cenerator (a)
Steam to Atmosphere (a)
Steam to Condca,er Safety and Stcan Dump Valves cire. water pump (1 of 4 pumps req'd) plus cord. pnp (1 of 3 pumps reg'd)
(b) One Auxiliary Feed (b) Makeup from main feed -
Pump for makeup cond. pump (1 of 3 pumps (3 pumps available) reg'd) plus riain feed pump (1 of 2 punps req'd) 2.
RHR (Below 400 psig) (1 of 3 2.
RHR (below 400 psin) (1 of 3 o
pumps req'd) plus PCCW (1 of pumps req'd) plus fire pump (1 N
2 pumps req'd) or SCCW of 2 pumps req'd) o (1 of 2 pumps req'd plus service water (1 of 4 pumps req'd) iN 4
A,
~
II.
System der.ign by drawings ubich show normal and alternate shutdown control and power circuits, loca t ion o f component s, and that wirin;;
which is in the area and the wiring uhich is out of the area that required the alternate system.
Control Cable The loss, due to fire, of control cables and/or circuits is of no consequence.
All breakers for any of the equipment required for safe shutdown can aluays be m,nually operated at the switchgear without the need for control circuit s.
Po w r Cable noration and primary system make-up is normally achieved with the use of one (1) of three (3) main charging puups or as an alternative with the auxiliary charging pump.
The pcuer supply cables to the motors far all four of these pumps originally passed through the same fire areas.
Therefore, the power supply cables to the motor for the auxiliary charging pump were rerouted to avoid, to the extent possible, the areas through which the power supply cablas to the motors for the inain charging punps were routed.
The routing for the power supply cables for both the main and auxiliary charging i a mp ru t or s, as it now exists, is shown on the a ttached drawi ngs FM-2A and 3R.
The electrical distribution system at Maine Yankee is such that the '80 volt power comes f rom 4160/430 volt transformers.
As indicated on FM-3K the 4160 volt power feeder to the 480 volt switchgear for the auxiliary chaigind pump is routed through the Protected Cahic Tray Room, as are the 4160 volt pouer cables to the mai n charging pumps.
At the points of entry into the room, they are separated by 15 feet and in opposite directions.
The pouer feeder for the auxiliary run charging pump is then routed in a cable tray which ultimately travels along th e north wall of the Protected Cable Tray Room into the unprotected cable tray room t hrough a 3-hour fire wall.
The power cables to the rain charging pumps ara routed through trays adjacent to the south wall of the Protected Cable Tray Room.
The north and south walls of the Protected Cable Tray Room are separated by a distance ci 60 feet.
As is noted in Section 5.6 of the Fire Protection SER, the combustibles in the area consist of moderate ancunts of plastic and rubber cable insulation.
The trays connecting the north end and scuth ends of the room contain very little cable; and nuch of it is armored 4160 volt cable.
The SER sect ion lists many madifications to, and i mp rove:re n t s in the fire protection systems available in the room.
These modifications, the case of access to the room and the 60 feet of spatial separation which exist mai :s it uniikely that a fire vould incapacitate the three main chargins pumps as well as th> auxiliary charging pump.
The re fo re, Maine Yankce feels that a charging pump will al'ays he available for ho atien and makeup.
explained earlier, conservative estimates show that In addition, 2
power cablec to either the auxiliary charging pump er to a nai.n charging punp can be re run in eight hours, after which cooldown to
-l b 1020 212
cold r.hutdown can begin. The pl a n t can be riai nt ai ned in a r.afe hot shutdown condition until such repairs can be
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F ror. the unprotected cable tray t oom the 4160 volr power feeder for the auxiliary charp,ing pur.p is run up to the 4160/a 0 volt transformers in the unprotected switchge1r ;oom.
From tho 4SO valt switchgear in thin r o o.n, a '+80 volt po"2r f" Jer cable is - m back down into the unprotected cablo t ray rwa and finall; it o the Prinary Auxiliary Buildine t h r ou gl-the wall between thece two areas.
In contrast the power > :pply cables to the rai.n charping pump rutors origina te f rom the 4160 voit faitchgear in the protected switchrear room.
The routing for thene cables is throu gh the Protected Cnble Tray Room, Control Room Cable Chaae..nd Protected Cable Vault be fore enterin;; the P r i r.a r y Auxiliary P.u i l d i n g,.
The power cable; for the auxiliary and nain char >.ing pump motorr, originate from aed are routed to the Primary completely separate l areas and cre Au::i lia ry Buildi ng through dif ferent by one er more three (3) hcur fire rated barriers.
The po. r feeder cable for the ato:i l i a r, chargine pump after entering the Pr i. net ry Auxil ia ry building is routed in a generally dounvard directisa to MCC-911.
Specifically, the r7eder renotrates the P ri ma ry Auxil i ary Buildi ng in sleeves through th: east wall above the 36 foot floor elevation.
From here it enters.. sertical ri r-er adj acent to the vall.ua is routed dcun to just below the ceilin; of the 21 foot floar elevation.
From this point, the feeder is run in conduit to MCC-9B and enters fron th" top.
The ~otor leads for the auxiliary charging pump exit I':.C-9h f rou the botton and are run in conduit directly to the pump located cn the 11 foot flear elevation In contrast af ter enterinc the Primary ',uxiliary Building directly fror the Prc: >cced Cable Vault, tho power s u ppl ;. cables to the uain char l;ino punp c a t ors are routed through separate, four ( '+ ) inch conduit embedded in the concrete floor of the 21 foot floor elevatica in the Primary Auxiliary Building.
Because these power auppl; cables are routed in conduit r.hedded in concrete, it is not crediblt that they would be damaged by a fire uhich di,abled either '1CC-93 or the power feeder to thir MCC for the auxiliary charging punp.
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1020 i3
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Marker De finit ioas for Power liupply Cable Routing to Main and Auxiliary Char;'ing Pumpn 5,hown on FM-2A 6 3K
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Routing for the power r.uppl y cable s to each of the inai.n ch ar;,i ng ptrnp not or t, t hro :;,h the Protected Cable Tray "oon and Primary Auxiliary Piilding.
ma s e:s s r a s ta Ro t t i ng for the power supply cables for the auxiliary charging pun p t.o t o r t h r ou : 'i the Protected and Unprotected Cable Tray Rooms and t.h+
Primary Auxiliary !!uildin:'.
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III.
Verifica tion that changes ta sa f e ty sys te.ns will n,t degrade safety new isolation switches nd control,eitches should systems.
(e.g.,
i neet design crit.eria :nd r, t a:, h r d s in FSA!! for ele c t rical celui uaent in l
the systen that the switch is to be installod; c c.h i n e t s that the switches are to be mounted in should also meet the rane criteria (FSAR) as ot h er safet y related cahi ets and pan"Is; to avaid inadvertent isolation from the control re o:,, the isolation switches should be keylocked or alared in the control room it in the " local" or "i sola t ed" pos it ion ; periodic checks sho. lci be rade to verify switch is in the propar position for normal operation; and a single transfer switch or other new device should not be a source for a single failure to cause loss of redundant safety systems).
Maine Yankee has not r.ada any changes which dograle sa fety systems.
In particular there havo been no isolation switches, centrol switches, panels, or cabinets added.
p h Skb 9
1020 319
_1,, _
IV.
Verification that uiring, includina power courres for the control circuit and equi pment operation for the alternate shutdown method, is of equi ment wiring in the area to be avoided.
independent l
The only permanent rerouting of cables for equipment that could be used as an alternative mecns to ccmplete a safe shutdown invalved those for the auxili,ry charging pur.p ;> tor and is fully described in I and II.
Altero.itive methods which can be uned but would be of a temporary nature (for example, repairing or routing neu teraporary cable around areas damaged by fire) have, to the extent possible, been described in I.
As the exact details of any temporary recabling is colely dependent on the c irc ums t anc e r existing at the time, additional descriptive material is not considered necessary.
t P001 BMNA 1020 520
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V.
Ver i f ic a t ion that alternate chutdovn power sourcer., including, all breakers, have isolation devices on control circuits that are routed through the area to be avoided, even if the breaker is to be operated ciama l l y.
Mai ne Yankee has verified that alternative shutdown power sourcos, including all breakers, have isolation devices on cont rol c i rcuitr> that are routed throur,h the fire arean to be avoided.
To ampli fy our earlier corrent in 11 concernin;; cont rol cablo and circuits, all breakers can be nanually operated without the eed for control circuits.
OfYl0lllfl 1020 521 g._
VI.
Verification that licensee pre:adure(s) have been developed which describe the t n t.u to he performed to e f fect the shutdown method.
A summa ry of ther,e procedures should be reviewed by the staff.
The safe shutdoen r.wthod has been developed for the 11 specific areas of concern to the staff and in c c :ompl i sh ing that shutdown for theee areas, several di f f eront e: =a:
prortdures are oced.
The follo.eing information consists of a su m ry of those procedures and then a list of the areas showing the applicc51e p roc ed u re s to be used.
A.
E" rrenev %utdown Procea i rn 2-1 r
An emergency shutdowa may b-the result of autenatic action initiated by the reactor protective system or by anual initiation by the operator in r e s po nr.e to conditions which require the plant to be shutdoun i mme d i a t e l ".
Accompanying a plant trip, auton tic functions are initiatco co mafely bri ng the plant t.o a hot shutdown condition.
Veri ficalion that these automatic functions occur properly are an important part of this procedure.
Once the automatic actions have been veri fied, there are specific subcequent actions that are to be conducted.
On - such action states:
maintai n react or coalant systeu temperature by dunping steam to the condenrer or by
- . i n g the at.mospheric dump valve if the condenser is not avai3rble.
Plant condis'nos are evaluated to determine ca ;se of the plant trip and if cause cannot be correctea without a plant enaldown then the plant coaldown procedure r as t be initiated.
The final condi t i onr, o f the procedure are:
the plant is in a hot shu tdown cond it ion.
Cooldown has com enced if necessary.
11.
Loss of Con ensor Vacuur. EP A
>ss of condenser vacuet r.ay result from a failure in the condense. air remaval syst+,, or from a failure in the circul; ting wa ter sys t e:a.
For a plant t rip, wi th the stean dump and byps--
valves prevented from opernm, systen tenperaturn and pressurns are limited by the action of the steam generator code safett valves
.and the pressurizer relie f valves and code sa fe ty valves.
Tae atnorpheric decay heat relence valve and the steam driven.uxiliary feed pump my also be used for decay heat removal
- u. der these c ond i t io ns.
The procedure goes on to detail the opening of the atmospheric steau dump valve and the r t a r '.i n" of an auxilia ry feed pump.
The final conditions of the proceduro have the plant in a hot sha tdowa condi t ion.
Invetti ation into the cause for loosin condenser vacuum and necesscry correction action is underway.
%nk OklQ' v
i W 1020 1522 C.
Evacua t ion of Cont rol Roo n E P 7 _t A condition m,y exist uharebi the control room would become uninhabitable.
Under these conditions, a neans of shutting dowa the reactor and secondary plant from remote locations is necessary. Emergency ren te stations are manual and detailed actions for each sta tion are given to accompli sh the plant shutdown.
The final conditionn of the procedure will have the plant in a hot shu tdown condi. tion or a plant cooldown will be in progress from outside the control room.
D.
Er errency r, oration E P_.2__.5_
Era rgency hora tion of the reactor coolant systen nay become necessary to provide additional assurance of adequate chutdown margin in the unl ihel y event of an uncontrollable cooldown coupled with failures of multiple c,. ten components.
The r.ethod of boration chall be selected based on the severity of the condition.
The procedure goes on to detail the different inethnds, pumps, and val ve l i neu ps, available to acconplich emergency boration.
The final condition of the procedure requires that the reactor is borated to a shutdoen boron concentration.
E.
Service Water Header Runture iP 2-31 A s. rvice wa ter header rupture is capable of causing a complete loss of service water.
The objective of the procedure is to conplete loss of service water.
The procedure details prevent r
steps to t:Ae to accomplish that.
If the service water systen N,
reliability is in jeopardy, a plant shutdoun and coo 1 A vn is started.
""====
C.,Q F.
I.o s r. of Secondarv or_ Prinarv Cn.nnnent Cooling EP 2-32 or 33,
- g%
respectivels The various plant components that require cooling vater are cooled by ei ther secondary component cooling or primary component conling system.
Each procedure sets forth the actions required to place the plant in a safe condition following a total loss of component cool ing writor.
==
If component cooling water cannot be restored, the plant is cooled down.
The procedure indicates the use of temporary hoses.
The fiaal conditions are th a t the plant is either in a hot shutdown condition or (depending on the severity of the incident) in a cooled down condition.
G.
Los. of Hor.idual licat Renavn) EP 2-34 The residual heat removal system utilizes either of the low pressure safety injection purps and one or both of the residual heat retoval systua heat exa.nnt:rs.
The redundan-of systen c ompon e n t s and power supplic; ::ih the possibility of losin;; the 1020 323
entire sys t r.n e xt remel y remote.
llouever, should conplete loss of the ren id ual hnat remaval system occurs during a plant cooldoun or during re fueling opera t ions, alternate cooling paths can and vill be provided.
The procedure details the steps to be taken when a loss of the res idual hea t removal system occurs during coaldown and during re fuel ing.
To couldovo without the residual heat removal systcm procedure GP l-7-1 is used.
II.
Plant Con _ldoun by Abnormal Methoris OPI-7-1 Thin p ro c ed t.
will nupply alternate means of continuing plant cool doun ui thcu t the residual heat removal system.
Specific plant conditions vill dictate the step-by-step alignments which will have to be performed. The procedure specifien two alternate methods of c ool d own.
One method is used if electrical supply is lost but piping is intact.
The other method is used if pipi.ng or heat e xch angers are not available.
The final conditions of the procedure are that alternate plant c ool d own is in progress removing c uay heat.
J.
P_l a n t Procod o re s _Uhi ch Appl:. to the Eleven Areas of Concern Area #1 Control Room Cable Chanc Evacuation of Control Room EP 2-4 N
Area h2 Protecte2 Cable Vault Evacuation of Control Room EP 2-4 Area J3 Protr.cted Cable Tray Room
%g Eva_uation af Cont rol Room EP 2-4 Loss of
-nodary Ccmponent Cooling, EP 2-32 Loss of r tua ry Component Cooling EP 2-33 Loss oi Residual llent Recoval EP 2-34 Area #4 Turbine Building Loss of Condenser Vacuum EP 2-2 Loas of Service Water EP 2-31 Loss of Secondary Component Cooling EP 2-32 Loss of Primary Compan*nt Cooling EP 2-33 Area #5 Circulating Uater Pump House Lors of Condenser Vacuum EP 2-2 Loss of Service Water EP 2-31 Losn of Secondary Component Cooling EP 2-32 Loss of Primary Cemponent Coaling EP 2-33 Area 46 Primary Auxiliary Building Emergency Shutdown Procedure EP 2-1 Energency Doratio. EP 2-5 1020 524
+ > -
Area 97 Co n t a i n.,e n t Emergency Shudown Procedure EP 2-1 Sections of Evacua tion of Cont rol Room EP 2-4 Area
>S Containnent Spray Pu;np Building Erv r g e n c e Sautdown P r. c u.ure EP 2-1 Loss of Residual neat ' 'ioval EP 2-34 Plant Cooldawn by Abnormal Me thods OP l-7-1 Area 49 Ventilation Equipment and Personnel Air Lock Area Emergency Shutdown Procedure EP 2-1 Area 110 St eam ar.d F. cdw,
- r Valve House Emergency Shutdown Procedure EP 2-1 Area ill Containmen
- Penetration Area l{me r ge nc;, SSutdown Procedure I!P 2-1 Se c t io ns of Evacuation of Control Room EP 2-4
{
l h
m e.
e VII.
Verification that spare fuses are available for control circuits where tiwse fuces may be req u i r. d in nupplying power to cont rol circuits aced for the chutdown riethod and nay be blown by the effects o# a cable 3preading room fire.
The spare fusen should be located convenient to the e x i s t i n:: fuses.
'Ihe shutdown procedure should inforu the operator to check these fuses.
Maine Yanhee has versfied that spare fuses are available for control c irc ui tr, whe re the <;c fuses are required in supp1 vin-; power to control circuits for the chutdotm m thod, and could fail as a result of a fire in the cable tray room.
llowever, as Maine Yankee nated in II, all breakers can be manually operated without tha need for cont rol c i rcui.t s.
P00RBRIGllul.
. 1020
- 26
VIII.
Verification that the manpower required to par form the shutdown functior using tha p roc ed o re s of (f) as well as to provide fire brigade m ^2rs to f ir,h t the fire is available as renuired by the fire b ri ga de technical specifications.
Emergency Shutdown Procedure *P 2-1 is required immediately and esc be
.ror operators, thus allowing the fire accomplished by two cont rol brigade t i t..a to fight the fire.
I.o s s of Condenser Vacuum EP 2-2 is required inmediately and can 52 a cc ompl i sho' by two control roem aperators, thus allowing the fire brigade tim to fight the fire.
L.9cuation of Control Enom E P 2 -- ix required at some point beforo c:uldoen of the plant.
Sune activiti e required in the are done prior to lea vi ng the centrol room but most are interval of tim frun leaving t 'w control room and start of coollevn.
In this Imrticular car.e, the fir-brigade members have conflictic Lo fight the fire <:3 to shutdoen the plant.
It is in a
- dutiac, 1..
situation such ac this that the !ccal f i re departree nt would be called to render assistance.
It is i-, stant to note that the three aro e
requirin"- the use of this prc: N are, Protected Cable Tray Room, Control Rean Cable Chase, Protected C :b; Vault are areas that eill have, :one detection 2n't autem itic suppreniaa systemc.
liased on the above, it is our contention that there vill be sufficient manpower available fer this conti ngency.
Eme r r,e ncy Earation a 2-5 is not imrJintely required but is con Ected by the control room operator on the reactivity section of the contral board.
Service 1.ater Header Rupture EP 2-31 is not required until the pl:nt is ready to b ain removi ng decay ';es t with the residual heat renoval system so the mupower require-'nt can be met, l.o s s of iecondary Component Coolini; EP 2-32 and Loss of Primary Component Cool ing EP 2-33 are nM required until the plant is re a d; to begin removin", decay haat with : 1e residual heat removel system so the manpower requirement can be met.
Los< of Ecc.idual Heat Rem, val EP 2-34 and Plant Cooldewn by Abnornal Methodr, On 1-7-1 are not requirt. until after plant shutdown and init ial coaldown has been acccmpli shed so there is no problen manting, the aanpow r requireacnt.
300RORIGiu 1020 awl 3
-==-
I per f ar: ed.
Thene IX.
Vm fication that adoquate acceptanco tests are t.b o s
-1 verify that equipc'nt o w rates from the local control station transfer or isolation switch is placed in the local po-ition when and that the e q u i p;r.e n t cannot be operated from the coatrol r o o n., an4 that equipo nt operates from the control room but cannot be aperc*_ed at the loc al controi ;tation when the transfer or icolation switch is in the "reuate" po.,i t ion.
The equipr nt required for safc shutdoun can be courrolled Irou em'rnency (local) pnnels.
'l h o c on t rol
- r. witches used at thou-e ergency (lo al) panols are key lock wi t ches with Normal and D rgency position: indicated.
These
,ii t che s are used to icolate the equi;mont control circult s originating frcm the control r oc c.
no that local
( e: c. rne n c y ) operation is i nd.:por wnt of the position or state of the control ro<.m circuitr.
/,1 1 the locks in the key-lock switches 1 -
operabl. with a ec:.aon key, the key is freed in both the Normal and the E:ne r g e n<c o positions.
1; ben a control neitch Iccated on n eu rgency panal is positionel to tho 1:n o rg e n c., (local) position, the ansocinted control circolts originatinr frau the main control room are not func t i nncil.
C o n'.~ r r e l y,
when the control suitch is in the ';o rna l ( ren.o t e ) position, all appli.able control circuits f r c.n the erwrgency (local) localion
,e not f unc t ion :1 cxcept a few thit h ve been cpecifically desi:',nated to be f oncti onal from both location.
P30RBRIBIM
-W
-,s 1020
{9
X.
Techn ic ;il Sp<:c i f ications of the surveillcnce requiro,ent, and 1imitiny conditions for operation for that e q u i;e.m. not air.ady covered by existin, Tech. Sp<es.
For example, if : w isala tion and cont rol N i t ch _.. a re adde'l to a 'crvice water : y5 t eri, Lhe e:c ia ting, Te ch. S pe c.
surveillance requirenents on the service.ca t e r system should add a siatr ant <initar to the ! a llo.J i n:,
"Every third pamp t e ;t sh mid,1cn verity that the puan starle from the al te rin t e shutdewa sta t ion a f t er.aovi n;- all service water nysten i r,ol a t i n n switches to the lacal cont: 01 parition.
Maine Yankee do., not foresee the need or requirement to uodify any of its ex i ;ti ng Teclinical Spec i f icat ions.
b:DlNat 1020
- 29
XI.
Verifiention that the a v s t e ras availabic are adequate to perform the necesrctry shutdo.n functions.
The functions required chould be baa>3 on previints analyse., if past.ible (e.g.,
in the FSAR), such as a lou o f no r:,31 a.c. pouer or shutdos:n on a Group I isolation (IMR ).
Ti w equi y n. requir.>d for the al tern:i te capability should be th e saue er l
equivalent to that reli.ed on in the above analyais.
The tae thod s and equi pont discussed in I is believed adequate to demonstrate safe c hu t d o.en capability ir. the event of v:trious fire s c e na rio s.
Sb'//)llfg
_75_
1020
- 530
9 XII.
Ve ri fi c.:t i on that r e p.t i r p r o c,.i u ri ' for cold shutdo.za
' stems are developed and ru te r ial for renlir< ir maint ained on
.ite.
'l h e only repair cor ~li t t ed to in tho a na l :, s i r, is the ranning of po, c cables to 4 R0 and 4160 vol t motors in various synteas of the plant.
Instruction. for cable hand l i n;; cnd i nr,t al l a t ion, inclu(!ing splici are cont za i n ed i n a
's t o n a 6 '.-le b s t e r Instruction Manual located in t h e:
Ma i nten:.nce Depa rtr eut titled Electrical Standards.
'I h r eq u i pn,e n t req u i red to route and splice cables is available on site.
lhere is no requirenent or co. aitw. ant to hav.. cibles on site.
900g gm mwifgj
\\0)b 2I 4
I LU
./ J l