05000341/LER-2019-003, Secondary Containment Declared Inoperable Due to Opening Both Airlock Doors
| ML19210B833 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fermi  |
| Issue date: | 07/26/2019 |
| From: | Fessler P DTE Energy |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| LER 2019-003-00 | |
| Download: ML19210B833 (5) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) |
| 3412019003R00 - NRC Website | |
text
Paul Fessler Senior Vice President DTE Energy Company 6400 N. Dixie Highway, Newport, Ni 48166 Tel: 734.586.4153 Fax: 734.586.1431 Email: paul.fessler@dteenergy.com DTE 10 CFR 50.73 July 26, 2019 NRC-19-0053 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001
Reference:
Fermi 2 NRC Docket No. 50-341 NRC License No. NPF-43
Subject:
Licensee Event Report (LER) No. 2019-003 Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C), DTE Electric Company (DTE) is submitting LER No. 2019-003.
No new commitments are being made in this LER.
Should you have any questions or require additional information, please contact Mr. Jason R. Haas, Manager - Nuclear Licensing, at (734) 586-5076.
Sincerely, Paul Fessler Senior Vice President and CNO
Enclosure:
Licensee Event Report No. 2019-003, Secondary Containment Declared Inoperable Due to Opening Both Airlock Doors cc: NRC Project Manager NRC Resident Office Reactor Projects Chief, Branch 5, Region III Regional Administrator, Region III Michigan Public Service Commission Regulated Energy Division (kindschl@michigan.gov
Enclosure to NRC-19-0053 Fermi 2 NRC Docket No. 50-341 Operating License No. NPF-43 Licensee Event Report (LER) No. 2019-003 Secondary Containment Declared Inoperable Due to Opening Both Airlock Doors
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- 3. Page Fermi 2 05000 341 1
OF 3
- 4. Title Secondary Containment Declared Inoperable Due to Opening Both Airlock Doors
- 5. Event Date
- 6. LER Number
- 7. Report Date
- 8. Other Facilities Involved Month Day Year Year Sequential Rev Month Day Year Facility Name Docket Number Mnh Dy Ya Yer Number No.
ay er N/A 05000 Facility Name Docket Number 05 29 2019 2019 003 00 07 26 20 19 N/A 05000
- 9. Operating Mode
- 11. This Report is Submitted Pursuant to the Requirements of 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply)
Q 20.2201(b)
Q 20.2203(a)(3)(i)
E 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)
E 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
El 20.2201(d)
E 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)
Q 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)
[
50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 20.2203(a)(1) 1 20.2203(a)(4)
[] 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
E] 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
Q 20.2203(a)(2)(i)
E 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)
Q 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(x)
- 10. Power Level 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 1jj 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)
E 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A) 73.71(a)(4) 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)
[] 50.36(c)(2)
[
50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) 1] 73.71(a)(5) 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)
[
50.46(a)(3)(ii)
/
50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)
E] 73.77(a)(1) 100 20.2203(a)(2)(v)
Q 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)
Q 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D) 73.77(a)(2)(i) 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)
Q 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)
E 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 73.77(a)(2)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)
Other (Specify in Abstract below or in
CAUSE OF THE EVENT
As part of the planned sequence of events, the "Drill Adversaries" carded through RBD08 to take up a position at the inner air-lock door (propping the door open); while the drill controller stayed back behind the outer air-lock door to stop personnel from accessing the door. During the course of the drill play, the controller failed to maintain the access control measures at the outer air lock door which resulted in additional drill personnel accessing through the door creating a loss of SC for approximately two seconds.
The direct cause evaluation concluded that the planned access control measures failed when the drill controller (utility -
unlicensed) failed to maintain situational awareness and was involved in a conversation detailing the simulated drill configuration of the door. During the conversation an additional drill player (utility - unlicensed) accessed the door resulting in the SC breach. The lack of situational awareness was a human performance error.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
The inner air lock door was immediately secured. The door was blocked for general personnel to access by the Shift Manager.
A human performance departmental event free day reset evaluation was completed. The event briefing sheet was presented and discussed within the security department. Security Management communicated to the staff the importance of maintaining situational awareness during critical tasks.
Security Procedure "Guidance for the Preparation of Force on Force" was revised to add additional guidance for the Drill Controllers to mitigate distractions during drills and exercises.
PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES
There was one previous occurrence that involved the human performance error of simultaneous opening of both air lock doors. The event was reported by Licensee Event Report (LER) No. 2019-002, Secondary Containment Airlock Doors Opened at the Same Time Resulting in a Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications and involved a separate SC air lock.
The event described in this LER is different than LER 2019-02 because in that case the SC air lock doors had engineering controls that failed. The doors had an interlock that should have prevented opening both doors.
When both airlock doors were opened simultaneously the doors became stuck open for about 5 minutes until the latching pin was adjusted.
Both LERs described an element of a human performance shortfall that allowed both doors to be opened at the same time.Page 3
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