ML19208B179
| ML19208B179 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 07/25/1979 |
| From: | Marsh B, Scheimann F, Zewe B Metropolitan Edison Co, NRC Office of Inspection & Enforcement (IE Region III) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 7909190192 | |
| Download: ML19208B179 (74) | |
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA HUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION E
In the Matter of:
2!
IE TMI INVESTIGATION INTERVIEW 2!
of Group Interview CRO's 4I i
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Trailer #203 91 NRC Investigation Sita TMI Nuclear Power Plant 10!
Middletown, Pennsylvania 11:
June 28, 1979 12!
(Gate of Interview) 13l July 25, 1979 (Date Trans;ript Typea) 14!
320 15!
(Tape Numcer(s))
16!
17:
181 19!
20t 21!
NRC PERSONNEL:
22l Bob Marsh Dale Donaldson 23; Tim Martin Dordin Hunter 24i 25:
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.c co, 7909f 90 /92
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MARSH: Okay, the time being 10:57, starting with the second casette of 2
this interview.
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.p 00NALDSON:
I'd like to just finish up with some general comments and, you Si know, please, all of you contribute on this one.
What I'm interested in j
are your general impressions and understandings of the...the various action 6
7j levels and how thev relate to your emergency operating procedures. Whether gl or not you feel that they're clearly enough stated for you to understand g
what's meant by them, whether you had any input into the preparation of them.
Just a general comment.
I'm sure you probably hasseled these over a 10r 17 couple of times with various people.
Sill, why don't you go ahead start D
y it.
13 ZEWE:
I have went over them many times while I was in Unit 1 and 2 since they're station procedures and I have not found that they are unusable.
I think that they are good and that the overall TMI emergency plan it would've g
proven that it works well.
Some of the specific crit. aria that we pointed out earlier on about the LOCA here on the high sump and so forth they're good decent further definitive statements.
There they would certainly help 19!
to clarify and also to reference the evacuation procedure..the action 20i levels more in the context of our emergency procedures would be helpful and 21!
I know that we're looking at that in the future.
Other than general ccaments 22l i
like that, I think that they're ineffected in that they work with...like 221 anything else as a result of this accie...i t. we could have further 24) definition and more refinement.
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lj DONALDSON: Just a point of clarification.
Currently do any of your E0P's 2
have as either a...an immediate action step or subseqent action step a 3{
reference...a cross reference to cr a statement to declare a particular 4j level f emergency based upon the procedure that your in?
Si ZEWE:
6 There is in the...in several procedures they reference the same criteria.
tl I have to review some of the followup action to say the specific words of how it has you go back into the TMI emergency plan.
But now since the accident I've been very much involved in rewriting the Unit 1 procedures and we have included that in as the last manual action in the various LOCA procedures in that which they are not at that place in the procedure now nor are they in all the spots where they should be.
But now the...the last statement of the "mmediate manual action, alright, these will confirm the 131 criteria for a local site and general emergency at that point in time and 14t not leave it up to further down the line in the followup action which is not adequate as we look it today.
16i 17!
DONALDSON:
Fred, do you have any thoughts on this?
ISt 191 SCHEIMANN:
No.
Sill pretty well summed it up as far as I'm concerned.
20:
21:
FREDERICK:
I think Bill's rignt in that the procedures we have are workable.
22!
The tough part about any emergency procedure is writing comprehensive 2 31 sympton type statements that'll get you startep n a procedure.
And it's 241 hard to anticipate any kind of or all of the situations that would start 25i q Q.s
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l you on a procedure.
Symotons have to be general, they have to be general 2
and specific at the same time.
You have to try and accomplish a wide I
3; number of circumstances, but they have to use specific indications to get 4!
you start.
So it's a tough assignment and I don't...I think most of the 5
pr cedures we have are good but a lot of assumptions that have to be made 6i before you can jump on using acy particular procedure ar.d you get the 7j circumstance.
Usually the beginning of a transient like that the emergency y
procedures that you usa later on are not relate to the original problem.
This is exactly what happened to us.
We had a loss of feedwater and many g
10l f the emergency procedures we might have used were not.at all related to feedwater. And you had to pick up the symptons along the way.
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DONALDSON:
Craig.
13]
1 41 FAUST:
I think Ed and Bill just stated about all of it.
They were thinking on it.
It's hard to...it's what we've been trying to get out and I'm sure people were aware of that we weren't in to just one thing.
We don't even 17l have some procedures covering...two specific things that I can indicate which would be overall ones.
One is just a little one that was nagging us 19!
was the loss of hotwell, hign which we might've ended up in loss of vacuum.
201 We don't have anything tc cover that and decreasing pressure with an increasing 21!
pressuri:er level.
I don't think you'll find that written down anywnere.
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231 DONALDSON: One final thought cccurred Bill, I guess primarily for you.
241 The way this particular scenario evolved the...there appeared to be plenty 251
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4 lj of time in a sense that you were able to call in people.
Your conference 2l call between Lee Rogers and Herbein and Miller.
Dubiel was called in and 3l essentially by the time you had symptons of radiological implications you i
4j had pretty much a full compliment either there or on the way.
In retrospect 5
and I realize this may not be an entirely fair question but I think you can probably get a handle on.
If the event had culminated if it had not been a 6
slowly developing scenario, do you feel that the backshift compliment, the 7
way that you were staffed on the backshift and the duties that you have to 8
g; perform would have allowed you to implement the plan as effectively?
10f ZEWE:
I feel it's really very hard to u.y.
I feel that the training that I received, that we'd all received that I could implement the action plan as it is, alright, but it's certainly easier with more people available but i
131 I'm sayinging, you know, at the same time that I feel that it could have been implemented, alright, that it agree to where it was very helpful and t..
we could've carried through with the program, but it's certainly a lot easier with those types of people readily available.
17!
18i DONALDSON: What...what's the general philosophy of a backshift response?
19!
Is the philsophy any different then...then during a day response when 20!
you've got everybody available?
21:
22f ZEWE:
Oh, yes, you have to consider, you know, which I did early on is 23l j
that we had an event at which we were still trying to find the right course 2 41 l
of ac'. ion to take and that I...and it's always better to have more eyes, 25i r* \\
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p more ears and more thought processes going into any evolution because you 2l begin look at something on one train and it could' holdup your thought process, you know, just from another view, so initially that's the way that 3
4j I'm instructed to have, you know, some other people called in, the gist to Sj have, you know, more mind so to speak and more eyes and ears to go through this process, you know, and try to determine what we were going to do.
6 7!
DONALDSON: Well, on this backshift reponse has been a rapid developing 8
situation. Would your philosophy have been to control the plant, hold the g
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plant, get the teams out, go through the environmental monitoring, make all the state notifications?
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ZEWE: Well, one, try to control the plant best as we could and certainly make the offsite notifications, alright, with the State itself or...and to call the duty section leader and then have him make the other calls that I would not make myself so that I would not be deluded.
171 1
18l DONALDSON:
Is the philosophy that you would or would not implement onsite 19i and offsite surveys?
20j 21!
ZEWE:
I certainly would.
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CONALDSON:
You would.
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ij ZEWE:
Certainly.
2' 3l DONAL0 SON: Okay.
Thanks a lot.
4!
MARSH: Okay. At this time we're going to replace Larry Jackson and Dale 5{
6i Dor,aldson with Darwin Hunter and Tim Martin from the operations portion of 7f this investigation and I'd like each of those individua's to identify 8
themselves and there posit.'on. While they're getting settled, I've got one g
brief question which I'd like to pose to you Bill Zewe.
I've been requested 101 by 0.C. that we present this to you.
I know...again we've discussed it through the course of our previous interviews, but we'd like to bring it g
together with a little bit more specific comment and that's during the course of the day, looking at the 28th, can you give me some words about how your feelings evolved regarding the seriouness of the ac::ident? When 14,.
did you first preceive it was anything but a normal trip and how did your feelings on the severity of it evolv9 during the day?
17!
i ZEWE: Okay well, first of all, very soon into the accident and I'm just 18!
saying within the first 5 minutes, we knew that we had an abnormal situation.
Then again there has not been a trip that has really been textbook so to 20!
speak.
It's never fallen right in place. We've always had something else 21!
to contaminate the perfect type trip response or turbine trip response or 22l l
something else. There's always been something, you know, to make each one 23{
a little bit different, and I didn't feel at this point in time, that the 24!
situation that we had, alright, was termed very serious problem.
But that ke
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l lj we did have an unusal situation with the low pressure and a high level, but 2
we were just trying to combat these indications that we had and try and i
3j take a course of action to correct them, and we were continually trying to t
4; think of ways and responses to take care of it.
But I didn't feel that we 5l had anywhere near the scope of seriouness of the accident that we later 6[
develeped int and I really didn't feel that we had a tremendous problem j
until we got into the point to where we had to secure the cooling pumps or 7
g where we choosed to secure the reactor coolant pumos.
9!
10l MARSH:
That time being, about what time?
11!
ZEWE:
That was about quarter to 6 or so.
5:40 or something like that.
13 Whenever we knocked off the last 2 coolant ptmps.
l 14!
MARSH:
What would tne next escalation point be then when you began to get the arm system coming into
..?
17,i ZEWE:
No.
The point at which the nuclear instrumentation began to show increasing count rate, alright, which at that time thoroughly confused me, I didn't know why we had the increase count rate, I didn't know why the 20i I
boron samples were coming back at reduced concentration and I though that 21i maybe the analyses was wrong, but I couldn't account for the change in the 22!
source rate and intermediate range communication.
We're already into 23l emergency cloration or just about the same time that we were on high pressure 24 injection flow at this time, so, we were feeding the A steam generator l
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1 trying to establish natural recirculation at this point.
And I really 2j didn't have any other action level to or any status to have taken the plant t
3j or change what I was doing and the...most of th people who I had contacted
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were either still in contact with us or were already onsite to offer some Sj m re guidance, but I felt at that point and yet didn't have a problem, but.
i here again I didn't know how serious but I knew that it was more serious 6i than it had been earlier.
8f MARSH:
When did you begin preceed the full seriousness and begin to consider g
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ZEWE:
Well, that whole day I didn't consider core damage.
I thought...I 12!
I knew that we had when the radiation alarms came in that we had a very 131 serious problem there.
And I knew that we had transferred water from the reactor building over to auxiliary building because we had reports of the water that was on the floor, so I knew that we had contamination and I was fairly certain that we had a very large crud burst to the system that could have released an awful lot of high activity into the water and gotten over 18!
to the auxiliary building, but I really didn't have any concept of fuel 19!
damage or any severe clad damage.
I thought at that point we could have 201 had some minor cladding problems but very minor.
21!
22.'
MARSH:
23!
About what point did you perceive the problem as we recognize it today.
We'll be looking at the day downstream, 2 or 3 days downstream, or 241 a week?
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lj ZEWE:
I really don't know, but I would say at least 2 or 3 days downstream, 2:
because it wasn't until, I don't know, Friday or Saturday that we really or 31 least that I knew that we had, you know, a very severe cladding failure of 4i some type.
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MARSH: We've been asked to present that same question to each of you, but 6i 7{
rather than have each of you reine ate the same facts to...Does Bill's g
presentation differ marketly from anything that you preceeded.
Any of you g,
recognize something earlier in the sequence that you fully realized what 10i Y " **#*
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I don't think anybody realized what we were into.
17f MARSH:
Up...until about the same time going a couple of days later when...?
13 I just, you know, myself I just...once I came over to the ma :eup pumps I just...I didn't know what the heck was going on, but that'5 the best way I can state it.
I didn't understand what was going on.
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23l And even, say 2 or 3 days later when we realized that we had some clad 24!
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damage we, or at least I anyway hadn't perceived that we had as much damage L
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1 as we perceive now. We thought then that maybe we have no very very small 2!
percentage of clad failure,1 or 2 percent, I don't know the actual number i
f but now they are saying there is very savere amount up to 50 or 60 percent 3
4j or something like that in the cire water reaction and cracking cladded so Sj that part of it I really didn't learn for maybe a week or so later that h
they were really considering, you know, very large amounts.
I had heard, 7-.
you know, reports from very very little to there was co core left and I 8!
didn't know what realm or what quality yardstick to use to say well, we're g
somewhere between or we ain't there yet or what, I really didn't know.
10!
11l MARSH:
Okay. Appreciate your comments and we'll turn over to Tim Martin.
I 12!
13l MARTIN:
This is Tim Martin, I&E Inspector for the Performance Appraisal 3 ranch.
Bill, this is a question specifically to you.
At 4:00 shortly 15:l thereafter we started notification. What keys notification, what tells you who to notify on any trip?
17f ZEWE:
Well the keys that I use, alright, is that I always notify the Unit superintendents and the unit suparintendent of technical support, the supervisor of operation ~on any major transient.
And of course a turbine 20!
trip and the reactor trip of a major portion, ;o I certainly call them to 21!
notify them and tell them why and assist...or they can further assist me as 22l j
needed, so that is true with any event, alright.
Any...and realms from any 23!
I 24i relatively minor problem to a very major problem, alright, of which a turbine trip and reactor trip by themselves are not a major problem, but 25I i
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l they're certainly need of notification at that level of our management 2
structure.
Like before I could page the reactor critical again, just say I
3 that we had lost feed c-just have various trip, I would have to contact my i
4; upper management, you know, to get permission again tn bring the reactor Sj critical, you know, and put the turbine on tha line and so Arth.
So that r
6l is really a normal notification for anything.
That night knowi.'g very soon y
before I had a change to make or ask any calls to be made, the pressurizer g{
level high and the pressure low, plus we had lost all feed, alright, I gj certainly would have notified them then as soon as I could,; you know, and 10 ask for some help because at that point I didn't know why it was high, why the pressure was low and why we had lost heat eject.
I~didn't have any idea until acout, I guess that it was a minute or 2 into it that the cause 3
]
of it was a total loss of feed. We were reacting to the turoine trip and 14l' to the reactor trip, at least I was, and I really didn't look at the the reason were the loss of the main feedwater pumps.
I didn't know what caused them to go and everything else.
I had directed to be called the...
George Kunder and Joe Logan and Jim Floyd and'so forth and I had called over the other shift supervisor from Unit 1 as a further help to me plus he hasn't been the shift supervisor all that long and the experience for him would have been helpful too.
All of these things at that point were normal 20!
so to speak and I knew that we didn't have a nomal trip so I was just 21!
asking for more help, more input.
22) 231 MARTIN:
Bill, is this written down someplace that you had to call these 24!
people?
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ZEWE: Other than memos, no. We do have memos from Jack Herbein and Gary 2
Miller that they informed for any major load reduction on either Units and i
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that also that you have to get, well it is written down formally that you 4j have to get permission from the Unit superintendent, alright, before you 5
can go critical.
Si MARTIN: Okay, but these 3 specific people, supervisor of ops, unit superin-7 tendent, technical superintendent, the requirement to call in is written in g
some memo?
g, 101 ZEWE:
I believe...yes, there are in memos like superintendent memos and ops memos from the department heads and from the superintendent and from standing night orders if you will, alright, it's a...if yo1 have a problem 13!
you know, make sure that these people are contacted.
t 15t MARTIN:
Okay.
This question is for all of you.
One of the ways of removing heat from this plant if a void exist at the top of a candy cane would be to go on what is called the steam condensing made where you raise the level in 18!
steam generator very high so that any steam on the primary side sees water on the secondary side and condenses so basically steam comes out of the hot 20 leg ceases the thing and condenses and comes down.
This mode is called a 21!
steam condensing mooe, and my question is to all of your, have you ever i
received training in this mode of heat removal from B&W, from your own 231 plant? Has it been discussed before the everd?
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ZEWE:
I have no idea... alright...
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3 Everybody speaking.
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Sj I figured it out later on.
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ZEWE:
Right, I'm sure that we were aware of just, you know, any hr.at source or any condenser type. medium that you could have this reflex water 8
gj type action, alright, but I never, never associated that with the primary system and a way to remove heat, never before no.
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MARSH:
Excuse me Bill, just to clarify the record that's a negative response on each of your behalf, right? That you have not received training?
I 14' EVERYB00: Yes.
151 16.
MARTIN:
Late in the event we did raise steam generator level to the 97, i
99% range on the operating level. What was the philosophy of going to that 18{
point? Were you following some specific procedure?
19l 20!
ZEWE: Alright, once we tripped off the last two coolant pumps, alright, 211 i
the operator went to 50%, tried to on the A steam generator, S was already 22' isolated at this point, alright, and then later on, I'm not sure of the 23i t
time frame between that and going to 95 or so, but we realized that we were 24!
not getting any good natual circulation low and since we only had one steam i
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14 lj generator available. George Kunder and I had discussed, you know, let's go 2l to the highest level that we can in one cause it's better off at a reduced 3
level, but not and it was just based on trying to inhance a natural circu-4j lation, low. We really didn't get into the...or at least I didn't about 5
the process that you just talked about I just rather from having a higher I
colder water level to inhance natural ciruelation.
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MARTIN:
Okay.
New subject area. With having problems with the alarm 8
printer, you've probably run across this question before.
I'm trying to g,
changed de prkter out so that I can Nnd out what buttons he n
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pushed after he got it plugged back in.
Do any of you remember the person or persons involved in the change out.
Now I'm going to give you some names that might help you. Mr. Ke:n, Mr. Vincent, Mr. E. Norman, a Mr.
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Langeheine, a Mr. M. Toole, Mr. G. Lawrence and a Mr. D. Weaver.
Apparently 14.
all these people were around and capable of doing it. We're talking about 151 approximately 6: 48 in the morning.
Do you remember seeing anybody around the typer helping you guys, you know, kinda...?
ISj ZEWE:
I do not know at all who was there, alright, I really learned after 191 the fact that we had lost that block of time on the alarm typewriter.
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did not direct to be or anything else but I'm sure that he took 21!
the action of what's required.
I don't know who it was or...I learned it 22l l
all aft r the fact.
I knew that the typewriter was backed up and the alarm 231 l
printer, but we were using the console indications anyway and I just don't 24!
know at this point.
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MARTIN:
Same area, new question.
Is it standard procedure that if a 2:
typewriter is changed out and we're in the middle of an event to try and 3l get the alarms current so that they might be of some use to you?
4; 5l ZEWE:
I would answer that most surely....
i 6i MARTIN:
And that...
al ZEWE: We're so far behind I can't wait.
I don't care, I like to know gg what's happening now and if I would've thought of it that day I would've 10 directed them to go back to time Zero, cause I wanna know what's happe' ling g
now.
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MARTIN:
I believe there is 2 mechanisms for doing that.
One is to initiate reinitialize the computer and there's also an alarm suppressful function.
g Is this what normally an operator would utilize to get that stuff current so he could use it?
18i Um Um.
That prints out when you use it too.
20:
Um Um.
21!
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MARTIN: Are you familiar with what an alarm suppress does?
231 24:
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Um Um.
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3 MARTIN:
Do you basically understand that it says it throws away past 4
records and starts time zero and then it gives you the last 5 printouts or l
s...
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Gi 7-FREDERICKS: There's one thing you have to realize, Okay.
The records g
weren' t important to us.
It's how you guys might want it to read but it's g,
not important to operate the plant.
So if we didn't need it, erase it.
i 101 11.l MARTIN:
Okay.
New subject area.
Reviewing the ccmputer the printout
]
which is available to us we know had an ES approximately 2 minutes into the event.
The diesel generators peared to start.
Did both diesel generators run?
141 15l ZEWE: Yes. As I remember thcy did....
17l MARTIN:
Okay.
ISl ZEWE:
...They did run, but they did not close into the box.
20i 21:
MARTIN:
Okay.
Again referring to...again referring to the computer printout 22' at 30 minutes into the event it appears that we get diesel generator fault 23 alarms from both generators within 15 seconds of each other.
It has been 24i' inferred that this means that the diesels are being shutdnwn.
Were operators 25i dispatched to shut these down?
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ZEWE:
Yes they were. You can't shut them down from the control room.
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3 MARTIN:
I...looking at the diagrams, I see stop bottons.
Are they not 4;
stop bottons up in the control room that would allow you to stop it?
Si I
6 Just like any other ES component, you can't stop one of the ES signals in.
7f MARTIN:
8 30 minutes into the event ES had already been bypassed.
9l 10t The ES signal starts the diesels, so you can't stop them from the control room.
lxy You gotta go locally.
14:
EVERYBODY: You have to trip the fuel racks, locally.
16i MARTIN:
17l Alright, so an A0 aaparently was in dispatached to trip the fuel racks.
Would he...once had he tripped and shutdcwn, should he then reset 18i the fuel racks?
19t 20l Yes.
22!
l MARTIN:
Again looking at the record and looking at the computer printout, 2 31 we don't see the reset occur until 9:49 in the morning...
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What are you basing that on?
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MARTIN: Again, the computer printout.
41 5
What does it say?
Si 7{
MARTIN: Those 2 alarms, fault alarms clear.
The 3156, 3158 data points on the computer.
g 91-101 Do those heat pumps between starting of the emergency diesel and emergency standby?
12!
MARTIN:
131 They would indicate that the shutdown relay the SE relay has again been deenergi:ed. As long as the SE is energi:ed one of which is you've lost oil pressure....
151 16; It's the OLs.
17l 18f MARTIN:
...You could not start with that SE energized and therefore a 191 change in state of that contact is required to allow the diesels to run.
20!
21!
For the ES or for manual SE not that...
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23i 5E also...
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MARTIN:
SE solenoid.. 5E solenoid I quess...
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I ZEWE:
That should be...
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i 4l MARTIN:
It's in parallel of 5.
51 61 7f ZEWE:
...Either the 5A or the STR...
8_
i MARTIN:
... And it's in parallel with the STR, it's also.in parallel with g
that.
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ZEWE:
But that contact monitor that only.
12!
13l MARTIN:
That's a sole function, that's the only thing it comes off of.
14!
Again we have found errors in the computer so if it...there may...
15l 16i ZEWE:
Still we've got te stop it from starting on the ES.
17l 18t MARTIN: That brings up the next question. We have 1, 2, 3, 4 subsequent ESs with no indicstion to diesel start. Why?
20!
i 21f That's probably because want to reset.
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23t MARTIN: Well we know that they were reset about 9:49 in the morning.
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Sure because they started after that.
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MARTIN: No sir.
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41 Si They were on reset when we reset them.
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6i MARTIN:
7 Is it not possible to reset the fuel racks but to prevent the g
diesel from function in some other manner, such as going to the maintenance position?
g 10 Yeah, it could.
11.'
12!
MARTIN:
13!
Were the diesel placed in maintenance position to prevent restart?
14)
UNINTELLIGIBLE 15!
16i I don't think so. Not that I know of.
17l 18!
Not that I'm aware of.
19}
20i No.
21!
22!
ZEWE:
As far as I know from when they went down to shut them down, I 23!
j thought they were back in automatic mode from that point on, because I 24!,
remember at least one other time in my mind where they did come up again 251 and we had to reshut them down...
'O
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j!
21 l
r Taat m'ight have been...
2l 3
ZEWE:
.And I'm not sure how many times that was...
4l Sj CouTd be air compressor cycle?
Si p
MARTIN:
Not after and no subsequent ESs did the air compressor cycle.
8l
!!UNTER:
Some way it appears that they didn't start.
Asking again if you 10 are aware f the conditions that they were put in.
Firstly, who was the A0 l
that went down to declare both diesels or was it 2 people or one person?
Are you aware?
i 131 I don't remember myself, specifically no.
151 I don't remember wno it was.
16i 17!
It might have been given by, you know, one of the people in the...that were helping to send somebody down to shut them down and saw they were running and we didn't need them running at that time.
201 21; ZEWE:
I know they ran for a considerable period of time and....
23l The first acuation...
24!
25i
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22 l
lj Everybody talking.
l 2!
3 MARTIN:
it indicates about 28 minutes to be exact.
So what it.,.as far 4
as you know there was no lock out of the diesel after 4: 10 in the morning?
5l 6
How would you lock out the diesel?
71 MARTIN:
g By going to maintenance is one way of doing it.
91 u n w, myse couldjust...
10i n;
Everybody talking.
131 I can just remember them running and we didn't need them.
That's about all 141 l
I can remember about them there...somebody was sent to shut them down.
15; 16:
l That's what I remember too.
17!
18f MARTIN:
Do you remember every seeing the diesels run after that point?
20!
ZEWE:
I do remeber...as I recall I remember them starting at least one 21!
other time that I can remember, but I'm not sure exactly what time period 22!
j that was and I really don't recall.
It was just an area that we knew we 23[
didn't need and I really didn't know how to focus on that area.
i 24!
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I 23 I
i 1.!
MARTIN:
If they had started would that not drop the air pressure on the receivers and would that not start the air compressors?
2 31 4j ZEWE:
I am not sure that each and every time that they start that they gl drop down enough to start the air compressors.
l I don't know that.
6i 7j MARTIN:
With 4 ESs which would imply at least 4 starts should we not have 8
recycled?
9\\
ZEWE:
I believe so...
y ni You ought to go along both of them 4 times...
13l h
Because their rather obvious alarms, you know...
15i That't true, that's true.
17j Everyone talking 19 That's irritating...there's enough irritating us that day but that one was another one.
21!
22l HUNTER:
Would...Craig would you guys have noted if the audible alarm came 2 31 I
on because of its unusual type alarm, even during this event?
2 41 25i n
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2A lj FAUST:
I'm not sure now became I didn't...I remember at first when it 4
2 first picked up and we were hearing the alarms, bat 11on't remeaber the...I 3
just don't remember the second 'mte.
I might've...I have a tendancy that I 4j can get engrossed with somethit.7 Si 6
What evidence do you have that...that it was not running ~all during the event? In other words it was...
8!
MARTIN: We have no indication...we have an indication that the diesels were shut down.
m
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What time?
12l 131 MARTIN: At 43016 for the diesel and 43033 for the A diesel.
We have 141 indication of them being reset and 94922 for the B diesel and 9^948 for the A diesel.
16i s
17l Based on the SE relay.
ISr
'lSt HUNTER:
Based up3n the SE relay and O so the air c:mpressor just as a by N @l the way because they did start with the ES and they did shut down subsequent 21l All subicquent ESs those initiated manually, those initiated by to that.
22j i
i 1600 pounds pressure, those initiated cy building isolation and those 23l initiated when we had the reactor building spray.
All of those cave no 24!
indication of the SEs. hanging state nor do they give any indication of air r
' 25!
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25 llj compressor starts nor do they give any indication of lube oil pressure 2j transients.
31 4;
Did you every get anything out of a log that says that somebody went a reset it, you know, like a day later?
cd 61 7f Possibly.
81 Did you find anything like that?
g 101 No sir.
12!
Well let's assume then *..Jt they were not reset. What does that imply?
14:
It implies that they acren't available and that's wnat we need for our scenario.
16' 17!
Why?
18i 191 Because, for one thing, techs specs requires them to be operable.
21:
Whose surveillance?
22';
i 23l Yeah, but this is...
2 41 25i c
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No, tech spec requires them to be operable in this plant condition.
2 3{
HUNTER: Mode 1, 2, 3, 4 modified mode 5 and mode 6.
4; 5
Um Um.
i Si 7j Everyone talking.
Sl g
after the initiation of the emergency safeguards.
10 HUNTER:
Because made 5 is...you are somewhere between hot shutdown and cold shutdown.
131 j
If the ES occurs, then what tech spec implies after the ES?
15, HUNTER:
You are still in that made in hot or cold shutdown.
You see, the thing being is you have to...
I 18e 1.
What procedures requires that that be reset after an ES?
,96 20-HUNTER:
Once the system you obtain the end of your emergency procedure the E5...
22l 22 Everyone talking.
2$
25j Q
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27 i
1 We didn' t obtain it.
We were still fighting it.
2:
3j Yeah.
I 4i Si We never came out of the original ES.
6i HUNTER:
7 Realizing that, but the ES procedure requires the diesels to be P* * * ""
E" *
"9' 8
9!
No it did not 10I 11!
HUNTER:
To provide...
12l 13!
The tech spec recuires that they me operable prior during E5...
15:
That's what we...
15i 17!
They operated as they should have and there's no requirement to reset them.
18!
191 HUNTER:
I realize what your saying is...
20!
21i No, I realize what you're trying to imply.
22l 231 HUNTER:
No.
241
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l 28 ilj Okay.
2l 3l HUNTER:
I'm not trying to imply anything. What we must understand is that 4
the ES has occurred which requires the emergency diesels to start because 5
f the kind...you know, the type of condition you're in.
There's also, not having the tech spec does not address ES, the tech specs'specifically 6
7; address station power requirements in these modes.
It doesn't even address g{
ES.
The station power requirements are that the diesels be available in made 1, 2, 3, 4 and modified mode 5 and refueling...
g 10)
I referred and couldn't tell you what the requirements are, but what proce-f dural or surveillance procedures or requirements to fill that tech spec 12.
requirement. What steps are taken after an ES to reset the system.
131 141 HUNTER:
There's nothing wrong with manually blocking the ES signals, go down and shut the diesel down and put it back to automatic and if it's a containment building ES you can't block it, you're going to get it again if 17' it's a low pressure E5...
19t It's a lot stronger if you do it.
20!
21!
HUNTER:
UNINTELLIGASLE.
r 22!
2Jl Is that a Is that within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />?
241 25; i
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29 I
f HUNTER:
You let the...you let the diesel run for 30 minutes...you let the I
2j diesel run for 30 minutes. You, in fact, went down and shut it down whenever i
3; yo's got around to it.
All during that time if you had a loss of power that i
I 4
diesel would have served it's function.
If the guy had of gone down alter Sj you blocked ES, which is allowed by your procedures to set the system up 6l and take control of the ES so that you have control of it.
Then he went 7l down and reset the emergency diesel but put it back to automatic.
Did, in i
gj fact, it would have been operable in the mode based on the requirements for...
g; 10l g
Sure, that's a fortunate circumstance, but it's not required.
i 12i HUNTER: Well, okay. You know I... electrical power requirements and techs f
spec just because you've got an ES on not removed that requires a not removed.
16, g;
How much time do you have is if the diesels are inoperable to shut down the plant.
19f HUNTER:
You, in fact, if you keep...the tech spec does not..doesn't even 21;,
address the removing 2 diesels from service, in other words, I don't want to get into an argument about it, okay.
It says that. you can take out one 22!
l for maintenance or surveillance.
You cannot...
23; 24i t
25i s
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i 30 llj That's what I'm trying to say. You're in violation of NLCO, wnat's the 2f action?
i 31 4l HUNTER:
The action is you get the diesels back and then...
5!
6 Or be in cold...
7!
f HUNTER: Or be in cold shutdown and you weren't.
a 9!
e was t ning to get t.5ere.
lui 11:
HUNTER:
Yeah.
I...we don't want to talk...we don' t want to argue the g
point.
The point being is what we were trying to tell the public and our scenario is that the diesels that required to be operable during these times, okay. And when we went through the scenario and the printouts we found that it appears that the fellas either went to maintenance, maybe, or put the...left the diesel and then left the racks locked out.
i 18t Still what I'm trying to say is, the only way you can verify the diesel was 19!
inoperable is to do the surveillance.
Or to have an E5 and it doesn't 201 work.
21!
22' HUNTER:
No that's...
23l 24l 2Si l
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j 31 i
I Only two ways to do it.
21 i
3j HUNTER: No, that's not true.
You can walk down and find a switch in i
4 maintenant. when it's not suppose to be and it is, in fact, inoperable.
i 5;
Because operability is designed on automatic...
I 6:
7 The only way to is down to look at these things is through the g
procedures.
91 HUNTER:
But the procedures didn't...the procedures...
11!
]
Don't apply.
131 HUNTER' The procedure does not allow you the diesel operating procedure in g
mode...abov. made 5 of the emergency procedures above in the condition or do not allow you to block on both diesels. There not written that way at all.
17!
But that's not the point we just want to make sure we get the...
18I ZEWE:
Just a final thing is that they should have been placed in automatic and we don't know, if in fact, they were off automatic for sure or who did 20!
it that's all.
21:
22' HUNTER:
Right, we want to...
231 241 l
25i N
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lj ZEWE:
I agree that should've been shutdown and placed in automatic for any 2
subsequent need for the diesel.
It should've been that way.
That is correct.
I assumed that we were that way.
I did not no that we were not, 3
4j I don't think that we could p"ove truth that the day of nct were not the Sj indications can't support that it was either.
I 6i MARSH:
Al ri ght. Oorwin you want to start.
8!
HUNTER:
Okay.
Let me go back to a subject we talked a little bit about g
before.
Natural circulation was entered after...at the time you dropped i
the last reactor coolant pumps at a 101 minutes into the event.
One of the
]
things that natural circulation requires is to raise the steam generator levels to 50% operating and which you did.
During that time frame, slightly 12!
after the pumps were turned off, I think, you kr.ow, looking at the way 141 the curve is set up the way they show it.
One of the indications that we have is that you fellas have you ever seen natural circulation oa Unit 2, Rill?
18{
ZEWE:
I have not.
19!
20i No.
21i 22f i
No.
23l r
24l 25i
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33 f
lj No, i
2:
3l HUNTER: You haven't?
4l 5l No.
i, 6i 7;
HUNTER:
Secondly, have you, in fact, had specific simulator training for i
gj natural circulation at B&W?
St I
10j No.
l 11!
ZEWE:
I have had it in varying degrees but we never...we have initiated it, I believe at various times when I was there.
We never carried it out to any extent, alright, that we established the water levels either automa-141 g
tic 211y or manually and it established just basic control of plant and then we left it there.
1g; I
17l l
HUNTER:
Right.
You didn't follow through on it to watch natural circulation 18t 19i continue and follow it through until or maybe a half hour or s mething to see what happens?
21!
FREDERICKS: We did not as far as I can remember.
23 HUNTER:
Okay.
25i s\\
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1l.
MARSH:
Excuse me.
Just to clarify that was a negative response by Frederick 2
and then Bill Zewe you gave you feelings on it.
How about you other two.
i Faust and Scheimann?
3f 41 5l SCHEIMANN:
To my knowledge, no, I hadn't ever had simulator training to 6l the point where we extended when into a natural circulation condition.
t 7\\
HUNTER:
Another question.
g 9i MARSH:
Can I get Faust's response on that tco.
11:
FAUST:
I can't remember having natu-al circulation training of the simulator.
- 12l, l
At least at any point that I didn't remember that's prevailing.
13!
14!
HUNTER:
Question.
Another question.
Have any of you fellas been involved in natural circulation testing or pre-ep testing that type of activity on Unit 1 or Unit 2?
'.71 IS!
FAUST:
No.
19!
20!
No.
21l 22!
No.
231 24l 25!
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1!
I have not.
i 21 i
31 HUNTER: Okay. What about specific plant training? Do you have a heat 4j removal OST from the OTST by a decay heat removal in case of a loss of 5
offsite power? And that procedures available to you in that it indicates g
what you should do.
Have you received any plant training or walk-throughs 7
on that procedure simular to what you would have got like in emergency gl procedures, added on procedures? What you would expect during natural circulation?
g 10\\
l ZEWE:
The blackout procedure is the only place that I know of that addresses
]
natural circulation and it's just covered like any other followup prank or action for due emergency procedures as fas as training goes.
141 MARSH: Bill, I'm gonna break at this point and turn this tape over.
The 15; time being 11:42.
17' MARSH:
Resuming at 11:42, reading 705 on the metec.
ISf 19!
HUNTER:
Bill, you were indicating that the blackout procedure picks up the natural circulation but as far as training and retraining is covered simular to other operating procedures of routine...
2 21 23!
ZEWE:
It's just...
24i 25i s
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[
HUNTER:
... Review.
I 2:
3 ZEWE:
It's just mentioned that the plant is designed to know to remove the 4j decay heat by natural circulation mode and it's inhanced, you know, by the gj steam generator water levels coming up automatically 50% and so forth.
But i
6i other than that no really detail on what to look at or how long to look at 7
it or if you don't have what were you indications be if you do not have it, 8
r how long you'll have to wait before you start to see invalid indications g,
one way or the other.
Those sort of things we really...it's implied and really never covered for detail.
10!
11:
g I think the only thing it says is something like, watch for a 25 degree delta T between the steam generator and the tube feed.
14!
That's about it.
151 t
16; In other worcs if you keep it within that range, I guess, you're...you got 17;,
what your suppose to have.
19!
HUNTER:
Okay.
In the morning a few ainutes after the last pump which secured...it became obvious, throughout the confusion, in the interviews previously and also looking at the steam...the primary perimeters, it 22l 23l became obvious to you fellas looking at the steam generator computer printout you actually demanded some temperature readings on the actual siaam generator 24!
delta Ts down the steam generator.
It became obvious that you or you were 25i l
Q>
e.
, st
37
)
d questioning the lack of natural' circulation. What did you base the specifi-h cally base the lack of natural circulation on? Craig, you were on the steam generator and somebody was backing you up maybe but or...
3 4j Sj FAUST: What I saw that bothered me a lot was just the drop off of down comer temerature, it just and pressure just dropped right...I didn't expect 6i 7f to see that. It dropped down rapidly.
It just sort of indicated to me gf that we were cooling down the T seals cold waves and just cooling them dna and it wasn't doing much.
g 101 HUNT S: Okay. One question, Fred it's for you specifically.
Right prior to the event you were, in fact, at the resin area and the trans involved in
{
trying to assist in the transfer of this...of the resin to the trans storage tank or the transfer tank from I quess vessei 7, tnere was a resin blockage g
in the pipe...
16i SCHEIMANN:
Yes.
18[
i HUNTER: What method were you using to remove that resin blockage?
19!
20l SCHEIMANN:
The method we were using for removing...for removal of the 21;,
resin blockage was to take and have an additional demin water pumps on.
22!
And with the two demin water pumps if you open and shut the resin slurring 23; I
valve you could attempt to take in by pushing additional pressure surges on 24!'
that line and try to force the resin through it.
25i
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f 4
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28
!lj HUNTER:
Fred, what kind of pressures would you being getting at by using 2l the second demin water pumps?
I 31 SCHEIMANN:
I would expect to see any where around 140, 150 pounds.
5!
i 6l HUNTER: Okay. This apparently didn't work.
Did you leave the area in the 7j res n block was still there?
I 8!
SCHEIMANN:
When I left to go upstairs to response to the turbine trip, gj 10 reactor trip the block was still there.
t 11; HUNTER-Okay.
Had... Fred has this happened before?
13l SCHEIMANN:
It still is, yeah.
It still is blocking.
15.
HUNTER: Okay, that's...
171 SCHEIMANN:
18f You can still see it in the site glass.
ISt HUNTER: Okay, good.
20(
I'm going to try and cover some specific areas and would like you guys to answer if you can.
I don't recall, I don't know, 21' yes we did, whatever the answer is.
Try to stick with each This i
22}
is your name and then answer if you can.
In time 2 minutes which is at 22i this...and I'll try to build up just with a short one liner, but a time 2 i
2 41 minutes and this is around the time when the ES occurred after they commenced
\\f '
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s 4
I i
l 39 1;
the event. An operator or someone reques d reactor coolant loop be cold 2:
legged from the computer and it read 573.6 degrees Now,itcameouto[a 31 demand typer.
Do you recall doing that through demanding a temperature at 4j 2 minutes, I would assume it was one of you fellas you' guys have to be the 5i ones that are there but do you recall doing that?
i 61 7
ZEWE:
I do not.
8!
SCHEIMANN:
I was'still on my way up to the control rocm.
g; 10!
nl FREDERICK:
No, I do not.
12f g
FAUST:
I didn't 14l l
ZEWE: There was absolutely no reason for us to request that anyway.
16i 17:;
Is that a VHER point?
ISl It's data point.
20!
Data Point?
21!
2.7' Did you say data or did you say VHER?
23f 24l 25i
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c
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40 ij I said data.
2:
l The reason some of this stuff...
3 41 HUNTER:
Somebody...somebody...we are assuming by the data point that 5
Si somebody acutually request, didn't any of you wonder why ~you would look at 7
Tc being 573.6, it's high?
l 81 Maybe the computer just spit it out on it's own, it's...
10l And you know it goes into the 12l UNITELLIGABLE.
131 14' I don't believe so.
15:
16; They weren't on second reading, I don't know...
i 18I HUNTER:
2 minutes.. 2 minutes into the event...
19l 20r There wasn't anyone over there yet.
21l 22!
HUNTER:
Did you have an engineer in the
?
23 24!
25l 11 3
g t
I 41 l
lj I don't think they were over there yet, no.
1 3
HUNTER: Okay.
4l Sj I don't think anyone was there, but us.
l 6i SCHEIMANN:
To my knowledge when I got up...
7 I
8i What's the point in...
g 10!
SCHEIMANN:
...to the control room there were just 4 of us.
12l HUNTER:
I didn't write the point number down, it's Group BTC beta point and we have it, but... it was just a point that it was there and we wantad...
why would you fellas ask for that point in that time in the morning. Was 15i the high Tc bothering you or, you know, or had you had recognized the hign ic at that time?
i 17l 18 l
It reset and stopped.
19!
20:
MARSH:
Are those requested by point numbers?
2 11 22f Yes, they are requested by point numbers selected printout.
231 241 2,'-
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j 42 lj MARSH:
Could be an accidental mistype while looking for point number 61 2j and get 60 or something such as that?
3l 4
ZEWE; At that point,I don't think it.. 2 minutes into it...
Si i
6i Nobody would UNINTELLIGABLE the computer.
4 71 l
HUNTER: Okay.
8 9!
10; We had the trips and the verifications and the feed and everything else...
l 11!
HUl[jR: But your ccming, no one would have been requesting data at that point?
14' ZEWE:
Not that I know of.
16:
We had no reason to.
17!
18!
ZEWE:
If someone was, I wouldn't know wno.
19i 20!
HUNTER:
Okay.
21!
22f ZEWE:
that factor.
23l 24!
25i
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43 lr Who was never really there.
2:
3l HUNTER:
2 minutes into the event, I am assuming that...
4; Sj UNINTELLIGASLE go with VACR it would be printing out automatically by 6l itself.
l' 8i, It is a data point.
Se glad to show it to you after the 91 I had scme problem finding it at that time.
101 11I HUNTER: Okay.
Nine minutes into the event, try to progress along as far
,a,,.,
as where we're going.
During the intial part of the event a loss of feed occurred, you, in fact, have an ES and you've taken care of that.
One of the indications that we have in other interviews and you can confirm this, is that after this type of a trip one of the things you end up doing is
,6 1
attempting to reestablish the main feedwater system.
Apparently you like you would like to feed the generators with the main feedwater system and 1St you were, in fact, attempting to reestablish main feedwater.
One of the-points on the computer is that condensate pump B continued to operate and then in the morning in about 5 minutes condensate lA was started which put 2 condensate pumps on and then 9 minutes into the event the condensate pump 22l 1A tripped leaving one condensate pump on, but it's just at the point that 23; maybe you would be aware the starting and stopping of a condensate pump.
2 41 25i 9
t
l i
44 lj ZEWE: As far as I'm concerned I first went over and addressed the fact 2j that we were to try to get ali the natural feed as soon as we can.
Bravo 3
pump was never started at this point. The things that you just over where the B continued to run and was foined by A and then A was tripped later on 3l is totally erroneous and that I know for a fact that all 3 condensate pumps 6
were off and the 3 condensate booster pumps were off and~ remained off until 7{
I finally started them condensate pump which could have been around that 9 gl minute period, alright, which I think may have been from 6 to 12 minutes after it happened, alright, and the attempt to start the purps we couldn't g
set them started at first. we tried to start them an several times and they wouldn't start so going to start and back to normal after the start may have got the computer to pick up a...some of those alarms and in fact, l
once we got a condensate pump running it remained running for quite some u!
time there after and then we attempted to run the booster pump but we were unable to until we opened up the polisher bypass valve which was probably 45 minutes after the trip.
17l HUNTER:
Alright, let me...go ahead, go ahead.
18f 19!
MARTIN:
Bill, I'd like to take a look at the memory trip review which 20j shows the pressures up to 15 minutes after the trip.
And also the alarm 21!
printer output for that period.
The pressure never died ano the discharge 22l of the condensate pumps.
In fact you see it flip up and stayed 164, approx-23t l
imately the discharge head of the condensate pumps.
You also have had to 24i replace some bearings and the...I forget which one of the pumps, condensate 25t pumps that were...
r G/
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45 I
lli The B pump.
4 2!
l MARTIN:
...the B pump that continued to run under cavitation. At 15...
3t l
4!
ZEWE: Why would it cavitate then?
Sf 6i MARTIN:
Because it just heats up, it has no place to go.
And in fact, at y
i 59 minutes when colds will be 12 with open you see that the slug of hot 8
water passed the temperature element.
You see the pressure come back on g
the booster pump and suction pump.
101 11:
ZEWE: Aright and...that'll be true, alright, what I'm saying is as far as I'm concerned it's totally inacurate.
As I remember because I actually 131 started it when I first got over there they were all off, alright, and that 14;:
is as I remember, you know...
16:
MARTIN:
As you're well aware of and that's consistant with your memory because...
18:
19!
ZEWE:
Number 1, that's exactly as I rememcer it that's what happened.
20!
21!
o L
MARTIN:
And your earlier testimonys also and you get the same thing, so 3
22l you know. Your memory has not changed?
23I 24 25!
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46 j
lj ZEWE:
By the way it's of little consequence anyway.
2l MARTIN:
I understand that.
f 3
4:
[
ZEWE:
UNINTELLIGABLE l
~
6i MARTIN:
7 One thing we want to pursue Bill, is that you, okay and I want to g;
make sure that we understand you position that morning.
You came out of your office and ended up surveying the situation and apparently in this 6 g
to 12 minute time frame you were, in fact, attempting to start the condensate 10 pumps, you were in that area.
Then there's a time that you went down to the turbine building area.
Do you recall your...when you went downstairs to work in that area? Was it after that and did you stay there?
13!
. 14 '
ZEWE: After we had a 1 concensate pump on and I couldn't get any suction pressure to the booster pumps and that's why they wouldn't start.
I tried to open up C0012 from the control room but it wouldn't respond.
Just then and just about that time is when we were doing some other things then the one operator called up that..a had a pretty good leak but the condensate 191 header and the hotwell was offscale high down in the site glass and in the 201 primary plant was fairly stable at that point at about 520 some degrees and 21; I recall saying to them, knock off the fourth pump if you get less than 525 and I left to go down there and that's when I helped to isolate the suction 2 31 to the 2A condensate booster pump, look at the polisher valves and all them 2 41 were isolated, then I remember thinking that it was the polisher valves 6
25i that isolated everything.
[] "
(
I
I 47 1
MARTIN:
And did you stay down...did you stay down there?
2 31 ZEWE:
I went down and crawled up on the ventilation duct and try to manually 4{
open up COB 12 and a hand wheel was missing and I sent an operator for a Si pipe wrench and a ladder and meanwhile I had found the handle it was lying g;
down behind a duct and I crawled up on the duct and I was opening it up 7
when I was joined by 2 other operators.
We cracked it off its seat, opened gj it up partially. We called the control room and had them push the button g
and opened it up fully and I went over and we blow down the vacuum pumas i
10' and tried to open up the reject valve to reject some of the water to the g
storage tank.
So I'm not sure how long that I was gone.
I...when I got back to the control room George Kunder was already there, him and Ken Brian and Fred and Ed and Craig were all going over the situation and it was g
shortly thereafter that we got into stopping the reactor coolant pump.
l 15:
MARTIN:
Okay.
That put you in that particular area sometime it looks like 15 minutes down to about 5, sometime in that area and then you made it back to the control room.
But you didn't go back to the control room in between.
Did you make camouter data
?
201 ZEWE:
No, I've been 22!
I MARTIN:
Okay.
Ken Brian had come over from Unit 2 at 8 minutes he came 23l over 6 minutes.
He came over the same time that you got the 12 valves open 24l and he, in fact, was in the control room during that time.
25i 3\\
3 l
l 48 I
ZEWE:
Right, he was there when I left.
1 2!
4 MARTIN: Okay.
Something came up in the morning fairly quickly.
At the 3
time 15 the rupture disc on the reactor coolant drain tank popped and discharged the contents of that tank into the containment.
One of the g
l things that came up was reactor building fire alarms and operation of Gi reactor building coolers. Were any of you gentlemen involved in that particular activity?
Si 9!
SCHEIMANN:
Yeah, I startec the coolers...
11:
ZEWE:
Ed put on the coolers.
12 l
131 MARTIN:
Do you recall at what time you obtained fire alarms and what they 14i were? Did you check the tamperatures at that time in the containment? The 15, reactor building fire alarm, the cooler operations was fairly early in the 16i morning.
Reactor building temperatures came up early, 15 minutes plus and 17!
they started rising.
Do you recall which fire alarms you had and any ISt disct'ssions that you had concerning those?
19!
20t No.
21!
22!
ZEWE:
I don't remember any either of these fire alarms at all going.
I 23i
~
only remember instructing Ed to put on the RB coolers using the river water 241 booster pumps, but I'm not sure of that exact time frame.
25k
3 49
's i
~
HUNTER:
Bill, would that be conceivable of the 12 minutes?
L 2l ZEWE:
No, it was not.
4:
HUNTER:
No, it would be 5:00 o' clock on when you were met in the...back 5!
in the control room?
6 t T
ZEWE:
I believe so, yes.
It was after I came back from the condensate...
g, 9i HUNTER: Ken Brian was in the control room.
Did you discuss the high 10!
temperatures in the containment or the fire alarms with him and the oceration 11.
of the river water cooling system.
12',
13l
.. because I told No, Bill's the one who talked to him about the coolant 14i him that we were going to use river water...
15:
4 16; I don't rememoer ever, well, I don't remember ever seeing any fire alarms.
IT I wouldn't have been looking over there necessarily at that time, now.
18!
19f HUNTER: Those are high temcerature...those are temperatures which is...
20!
from the containment, Okay? Want to discuss a little bit with Craig with 21; you specifically at time 8 minutes we found the...you guys found the 12 22!
valves closed and that the steam generators were not receiving water.
The 23{
procedures with why the...that you, after a turbine trip reactor trip, loss 2a1 of feedwatec they all inter-relate to establish feedwater and come up on 25!
-1' jj' r.
c o-1
?
t i
i 50 i
the 11 valves and control 30 inches. One thing that...in your interviews y
2j the 12 valves were closed and then were opened.
The 11 valves you indicated, I believe, that you'd placed them from manual swung swamping them all the 3
way open to insure that they were open... you drove them...
z Si FAUST:
they drove them open in like 3 steps.
Other words, when I Ot first took my manual control of them I expected to be throttling and what I
/
was doing was thrcttling the 11's open to the point where I actually did it in three points and I just didn't seem like I was getting in any.
91 10l HUNTER: Alright, at that time the 12 valves were still closed?
11; i
12:
FAUST:
Closed and...
13!
14!
HUNTER: Okay, then you found the 12 valves, at that time the 11 valves 15 1
were manual all the way open?
16i 171 FAUST: Yes.
18:
19i HUNTER: Okay. When you opened the 12 valves you had 3 emergency feedpumos 20!
on and you had then the 12 valves coming open.
The flow initiation would 21i appear to then commence and go through full open 12 and full open 11 valves, 22 l
which would feed the generators substantial amount of water to run...the 23j limiting orifice flow.
Did you, in fact, then or could you recall taking 246 manual control level 11 valves A and B and throttling them?
25!
-1
( (d ' '
.I i
i
't i
51 s
i FAUST: Not until I got a level rise. When I first saw a level rising in 1!
the generators that's when I started throttling back.
3:
HUNTER: Do you, can you recall looking at the 12 valves A and 8 valves, 4;
when you would have seen a level change on the startup ranges I assume that Si y u w uld be looking at the startup ranges?
Si T
gl FAUST: Wait a minute, what was that now?
Si HUNTER: You said when you saw a level increase in the steam generators ycu recall when you, in fact, would've...when you, in fact, saw a level increase looking at the 8 minutes plus...
13i FAUST:
No, I didn't reference it to any time I just was watching generator level until I saw the indicator rise on it.
15-16' HUNTER: Was the rise substantial or a small amount?
17 18!
FAUST:
I don't remember that.
19!
20t HUNTER:
Do you recall?
21:
22i FAUST: That's all I can say is that's what keyed me to start throttling 23!
back.
24:
25:
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52 1
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1:
Alright,letmegoalittlefurtherj:o. The decay heat removal HUNTER:
2]
was via the atmospheric dumps at that time. sl'ou had In...
3!
N hey weren 4.
4:
-c:
No.
Si I
71 HUNTER:
I'm not, excuse me.
The turbine bypass velvas at that time.
g, 9I 101
-FAUST:
Right.
II HUNTER: And 12,'
13!
FAUST:
Those 14' 15' HUNTER: Were they i.7 autcaatic at 'that time or were you taking manual 16:
control because they weren't...
17!
181 FAUST:
Before I got the 12's off I was taking them in manual.
191 20:
HUNTER:
If I recall ycu had then cracked them, slightly, just to provide a 21' path to the condenser.
22l 231 t
FAUST:
Yes.
24!
25i
I
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53 I
lj HUNTER: And when you started feeding, did you put the turbine bypass 2
valves back to manual, I mean back to automatic, or did they stay in manual i
31 do you recall?
i 4j gj FAUST:
I don't ever rememcer putting them back into auto.
Si HUNTER:
Did they stay in manual then?
7; S!
FAUST:
Through the whole thing.
g, 10!
HUNTER: As long as you recall? Okay.
Did you observe the steam generator pressures while you were feeding? Specifically they were dcwn to about 800 pounds and then they started to rise when you started feeding...
14!
FAUST:
Right.
16; HUNTER:
...or 780.
Did you watch the pressures and the level as you were feeding the generator?
i 19!
FAUST:
I was watching pressure and level but I can't...I'm not sure, in 20; other words, I'd be watching level, initially.
I was watching that harder 21!
than I was watching pressure.
The initial...the thing I remember about 22l l
pressure was the initial drop when I first cracked them, right, and also, 23l just the...on the trend recorder, it looked like it was initially before, 241 you know, when I had first come back over it looked like pressure was just 25:
cy ^
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I 4
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54 cycling, which later on it looked like it was too.
It was just gradually 1
increasing and decreasing right around 1000 pounds.
Then I had, it disturbed 2:
j me at the time it just didn't seem like we were cooling so I figured if I'm n t feeding the generator I should see pressure decreasing.
Scmewhere in 4;
there, you know, I looked over and saw at the bypasses were shut at the g;
time, in other words, it bottled up apparently and that's when I took them 6
and just cracked them and I did see my pressure drcp then which I figured 7,
I'm still not feeding and I think I went...that was the last drive I made g
on the 11 valves to drive them all the way open and I waited again because g
"E *
"9' Y "
"E *
- 10!
saying I'm still not feeding and looked on 12 shut.
t 12:
HUNTER:
Alright, Craig. What would be your understanding of the feecwater flow to the steam generators with the 11 valves and 12 valves wide open?
What type feed flow would you expect?
16 FAUST:
Feeding rates.
The EP calls for feeding at 2 inches a minute, alright, so the one thing I didn't have a feel for what the capacity would 181 be going in there with the 11's and the 12's wide open, no.
I just knew I 19!
would be exceeding that rate, that's for sure.
20j 21!
HUNTER: My understanding is that you were feeding in the maximum...would 22:
l you understand that you were feeding the maximum amount at that time?
23!
24!
25i
, q_
.3-n y -.
I 55 FAUST:
No, I was concerned with getting water back into the generators.
1 I didn't...to me it was critical to have water in the generators and I 2j didn't realize I had so much time in there.
3 4;
HUNTER: Al ri ght.
Allow me then to pursue another...in the same direction.
5l Looking at the reactimeter traces and the strip charts. ' Steam generator 6
levels in the one between 8 and 20 minutes one level started to come up.
/
That's 12 minutes.
And the other levels started to rise substantially at g
0425 which is a substantial 5 minutes after that one.
In other words, the g
steam generator level were running basically at minimum level and then they 10,l started to rise at 20 minutes and 25 minutes.
So the time betweer; 8 and 20 11; and 25 minutes into the event, the steam generators levels did not change 12' substantially.
In other words, they seem to hang close to the 10 inch, 14 131 inch or what ever the minimum level was on that program.
14' 15 FAllST:
I think I had throttled back I don't think I changed 16:
anything at that point.
IT 18!
HUNTER.
I'm following then, that you're saying that you were under the 191 impression that you were feeding the maximum amount you could feed with 3 20; pumps on and the 11 valves wide open looking for a level change?
21, FAUST:
Right.
23!
- 24i, 25i
'b.b l i
l I
l 56 I
i HUNTER: You have a maximum of a few hundred gallons per minute per generator l
thr ugh a restricting orifice set up on that particular system.
2 i
i 31 FAUST:
I was not aware of the flow rate on it though.
Say you could get 4f gj with it wide open.
i 6i HUNTER: Was there any way that you knew at that moment that the 11 valves
/
in fact were open?
91 FAUST: Just looking at the valve position indicators, which when I finally 10!
reached maximum demand on it, they indicated a liability.
11!
12l I
HUNTER: And that is a physical indicator on the EFil valves?
12!
1 14!
FAUST:
I believe it is, yes.
15; 16i HUNT Ei;:
It's not a demand indicator... position?
17!
18i EVERYBODY:
No.
19I 20!
i HUNTER:
I'm having trouble understanding steam generator level staying 21,I below 30 inches or from time 8 to 20 minutes and 8 to 25 minutes.
22!
23 FAUST:
Maybe the ll's weren't to strong in there I guess.
24i 25!
3 '
u:
i 57 1!
HUNTER: With the 12's going at a so called maximum amount, it appears if 2
y u look at the pressures coming up and then, not...one...the 8 generator 3j pressure stays below saturation pressure and the A generator cycles.
It 41 appears that they were being throttled, intentionally or unintentionally.
5!
Because again, also 8 and 12 is 20 and 8 and scmething is 25.
Si 7;;
FAUST:
All I can remember I didn't throttle back what I saw, a specific gl rise on generator.
One of my first, yeah, I think it was the B, I guess or was it the A.
g 10:
HUNTER:
I think it was the...
12' Couldn't the steam and water been going up to the steam line instead of 131 accumulating in the generator.
Since it doesn't come through the downcomer it comes through the upper ring.
16i HUNTER:
Yes, I hear you. And if you were being at maximum and the level 17!
was not in fact you were not in fact obtaining the level.
Under those IS conditions you were in fact steaming in excess of the...in excess of the 19i feedwater.
Two reasons, first off because you did not cbtain a level for 20; 12 minutes, secondly, because the steam generators never reached saturation 21; pressure.
In other words, wita Tav at 549 degrees or 550 degrees, if you 22' have a saturated condition those steam generators should have been running 231 steady at 1010 pounds.
They never did that, until later on.
The fact is l
they would run up and then the pressure would drop as if the ficw was g3'g 25i dropping, then they would go up and then they would drop.
ox e
l
6 58 i
,l FAUST:
I can't explain, you know, what I did that I can remember at that time. Can remember throttling back.
2 I
31 HUNTER: Were you concerned about water hammer and thermal shock of the 5l generators?
6i FAUST:
I figured I already...when I opened the 12's it was, in other words
,t e
if I would've redone it again I would've probably throttled back on the g
ll's open and the 12's and then shift again to slowly feed but it was sort g
of a spontaneous...the 12's are shut and I opened them up.
11!
l HUNTER: Okay, let me ask you.
There is a possibility that you fellas lost 12l l
instrument air, and the reason that we concluded through our, and you 131 fellas were doing a lot of work in that area too, but it is somewhat possible 14) that you lost instrument air and the EFil A and B valves fail as is, but 15 you in fact do have indicators on the EFil valves.
I'm trying to... to 16i look back and say did you have duel indication which would...
17!
i 18l FAUST:
UNINTELLIGABLE 19!
20i HUNTER:
...you really wouldn't know where they were or did you in fact 21!
have full indication and didn't you know where they are? Did you un.derstand 22j i
me...
2 31 24!
25i
's ik L uS1 c
l 59
[lj FAUST:
No.
2!
t' HUNTER:
3l
...If they were this far open you'd have dual.
ai FAUST:
Lets put it this way, I'm not sure when I got the full open indica-
-1 6
tion or let it through, anymore.
7' 8i HUNTER:
Do you recall any alarm...
91 FAUST:
If I were seeing it at one time.'
i li:
HUNTER:
Do you recall a icw instrument air system alarm, during that early morning event?
131 14' FAUST:
No, I don't.
15.
16i HUNTER:
The loss of instrument air results in the deminerali::er discharge 17!
valves going closed.
Either they're full of water or you got the dryers IS!
full of water and instrument air pressure gces down.
19t A lot of things can happen at that time.
20!
Loss of instrument air also would defeat the EFil valves and some of your comments in earlier interviews with the 11 valves 21.'
22!
weren't traveling as quickly as you thougnt they shoul.' have.
i 23i i
FAUST:
They weren't doing what they were suppose to be doing.
24I 25j 3,J
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3
)
l 60 1
HUNTER: Alright, and I key to that and I ey to that because those valves should with air should have been moving earlier than they possibly were and 2,
I'm just, I trying to understand what happened and keying to 3
41 63 sj 6l that and also something else that happened and the ft
. that the generators are not getting feedwater, yet you've told me that you were feeding them or thought you were, I'm still not sure you're feeding them.
y 8
By the indications I have on the charts I would say probably unequivacably you g
10(
11!
FAUST:
12 Scy I'd say that I was feedig them...
I 131 HUNTER: As you thought you were...
15 FAUST:
The pressure swing on the discharge pressure on the feedpumps 16i that's how I figured out the 8 minutes to begin with.
17!
18!
Yeah.
191 20I Plus we heard, UNTELLIGABLE 22!
We heard 23l 24i h
25i 3
s e
5 s
o I
.,I i
I 61 i
1:
HUNTEg:
And you were feeding, don't get me wrong, you were feed l
2,'
i But we weren't in control...
3!
4l UNINTELLIGABLE si 6i 7
HUNTEg:
You were not in fact feeding maximum or you would have in f c
reached a saturation condition and...and in fact it would h 81 showed up on g
the...
10l In other words we had scmething esle going on that we were not aware of.
12!
HUNTER:
That you maybe not been aware of.
121 I'm just sayir.g that's what I'm keying on and it's something, again, I couldn't, I can't get it straight in 15:
my mind yet.
There's no recording of instrument air level pressure that we... I've even gone back and find out what every all the valv es how does a reject valve fail if it looses instrument air.
fails closed.
If the line falls on it, it 18i 19I True, it's closed.
20l 21:
HUNTER:
That's right, but the line fell off so I couldn't key to that 22!
h I
couldn't key to that for the lose of instrument air.
231 But that may have been the reason you had a 1 2 of...a icw instrument air 24i pressure downstairs cause that line fell off before the event started.
That's being looked at,
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62
)
that'ssomethingtoquestion,youknow,t5t'sthesameheaderthatsupplies 1
f the instrument air to the polishers.
2 31 4
But you half inch...with a half inch tubing in there.
Si,
~
HUNTER: Yeah, but it's on a tail end of a header, so it might have just 6i p
lowered the air pressure low enough so that the valves drifted closed and lowered the suction pressure on the booster pumps, and once the booster g
pumps go, it don't matter what happens.
That loss of instrument air could t
1s affected the EFil valves.
You are not feeding, I'll say that.
It 10l does not appear that you were feeding the rate you indicated you were 11:
feeding.
I 13!
Well I'm just saying what I had.
I'm not saying what the rate was.
141 15' HUNTER:
Right and I'm trying to make sure that I understand that the reason that you weren't feeding wasn't intentional.
You weren't throttling 17; you were not...I wanted to ask you again...back again, While you were 18l feeding were you aware of Tav in the reactor coolant system pressure? Were 19!
you watching those parameters?
20i i
21!
FAUST:
I was not watching pressure, I was looking at Tav, but I heard, I 22' l
don't even know where I got the number if I got it weighted or not, I just 23 remember...I'm saying from Fred and Ed over there while I'm voicing it, 2 41 l
pressure was low and pressurizer level was high and I heard them talking 25!
about it going off.
1 1
( -
l i
I 63 lj HUNTER:
Tav, Craig, Tav being low or pressure being low, would that effect 2,
the way you felt about feeding the generators or did you feel like it was t
dry and you should feed them?
3f 4l FAUST:
At the time I felt like I should feed them.
I thought I was giving Si them a low pressure condition but I figured we could recover from that.
6 7l HUNTER: Alright, Okay.
g 9t FAUST:
In other words once I reestablished an indication of the generators, 101 then I'd worry about getting pressure back up by throttling back.
Because I think Fred voiced that it seems to be holding at that time.
Pressure 12',
seems to be holding or it was holding.
131 141 HUNTER:
Okay.
16; FAUST:
I figured, well, I might as well back off now; it looks like we'e-17' at an equalibrium.
18i 19!
HUNTER:
Alright, I'll pursue that further.
At time 60 minutes.
Another 201 subject.
At tir,,e 60 minutes the operator or someccdy requested the computer 21!
printout of a certain items and it included the E.MOV and the code safety 22!
valves.
At 60 minutes, Bill I'm under the assumption that you either had 2 31 i
just come in or were on your way back to the control room. Yet you and 24; Fred were in the area of the makeup system and were looking at that parti-25i i
}\\
J n.
si
.i l
64 i
t cular system. That particular printout shcws the EMOV to be 64 degrees y
above the code relief valves.
Do you recall that being printed out on the 2
[
demand typer now, you had to call out that program, those points.
Do you recall that being printed out at that time by Ken Brian or by yourself that g
early in the morning?
g t
Si j
No.
/t t
8I No.
9!
10l HUNTER:
Do you recall if Ken Brian or an engineer was providing you 11!
fellas much with data off of the ccmputer at that time?
i 12:
l$1 ZEWE:
To my knowledge for the most part at that time we were still pretty 14:
much involved with getting most of our information off the console itself.
15 :
Things were still moving fairly enough that our indication was right in front of us is what was holding our attention pretty well.
Anothersubject. At time 87 minutes the B steam generator 19!
in fact was isolated due to delta P and indications that you had a problem.
20!
The 4B and 7B valves were in a closed, what about the ISB valve.
The stop 21l valve to the...turoine bypass?
22l n[
No.
We...that was one of the things we wanted to make sure we didn't 24i isolate.
It was a reason why we just made sure before we shut it.
I 25i
-ha 3'
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l 65 I
lj think it was in consideration with getting the feqd pumps back on We were 2
g nna isolate because they feee off has the i
so as the B feed pump 3j comes off the A header, the A15 valve, so, you know, thinking along that 4l line we just pau:ed before we shut it.
Si t
HUNTER:
But you did close it at that time?
6i i
7!
No.
9!
HUNTER: Okay.
10l What procedure did you use for isolating the steam generator?
Do you recall?
i 12:
The major steam line break...the rupture I think it's called, the break rupture.
I don't think we used, we referenced, in other words, Xen Brian had gotten the procedure out.
We had already isolated it and then I went and we handed the procedure later on some where in there, and just went 17l over it briefly and made sure I had all the isolations shut.
i lei HUNTER:
Craig, part of the procedure includes checking certain valves Lo!
closed, it would include the 158 valve in that procedure if I'm following..
20l 21!
FAUST:
Yeah.
22,'
23!
HUNTER: Okay.
It may have been a minute or two after the...a few minutes 24i before you completed all the checking but it's your understanding that the 25l
'[N l
b
. ([i e
r a
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66 15 valve was closed which is part of isolating after a short period of y
thought to make sure you weren't messing up your 2 pump, lineup?
2 31
[
FAUST:
Right...we...
Si HUNTER:
Okay.
6 i
7!
FAUST:
... It wasn't long it was just a...
8 91 HUNTER: Alrignt, one of the things that happened then at 6:35 in the morning is that you were...you fed the B steam generator backup.
You may or may not have been there, to 50% and then the feed pump, the steam genera-12!
tor, the 15 valve was opened. You guys had decided we didn't have a leak
, 31 1
at that time, it was really the PORV in the containment pressure coming 14:
down showed it, so you said to yourself apparently with B it's really not a problem, so we're going to put it back on.
Okay.
And during this time then you opened the 15 valve. One of the things that occurred during this time is the B..
28 pump was restarted and then the 3 generator was unisolated IS; by opening the B, 48, and 78.
The steam...the turbine bypass valves come 19!
off upstream of the 48 and the 7B valves, in other words, they come off 20; before the steam isolation valves.
21j 22!
j You opened them?
231 24!
i 25!.
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4
I.
9 l
l 67 1!
HUNTER: Yeah, the were cycled open and then closed.
One of the questions 2j we had is why would you've opened those if...and not just the B valve.
3 There's just the ISB valve.
Secondly, it appears that ICS control system 4j may come off of the steam header downstream of the 48 and the 78.
Sf 6
They do.
They do.
7\\
l HUNTER:
So if you were gonna put the turbine back to its control system in g
automatic...
g 10l HUNTER:
...On the B side. Would that be reason to open the 48 or 7B t
valves?
12',
i 13l I think there was a mistake the opera... behind the panel...
1 41 15 HUNTER:
Okay.
17'
...when he set it on isolated, right, he went and hit the button, you have to let them drive open before ycu can shut them again...
20f Yeah. On what?
21:
22!
23l MARTIN:
Tim Martin again...
1 24; 25i
_n.
(
i I
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68 1
... on the A steam headers.
2!
~
3j MARTIN:
Let me clarify...
4i Si That's right.
I 6i MARTIN:
Look into the computer printout.
The computers dead...you know, 7;
8l we've had this little block of data that is missing so we have no indication of whether the 15 valve was closed or open during this period of time, but g,
subsequent to tnis time when we see it go shut, so obviously it had to be open sometime before and we think it's in the dead time when the computer was off.
We know from your earlier testimony that you were feeding the B steam generator.
131 We know because we can look at levels and strip charts and measure times off that and it was clear that in the dead time of the computer you started feeding the steam generator.
Once the computer starts up, we see the reactor coolant pump started, we see you start 2 circ. water pumps which would then enable the turbine bypass capability.
Then we see the 4 and 78 valve go open.
That time happens to correspond almost exactly with when we believe you got your condensor, vacuum exaust, high radiation 19f level alarm, okay.
20!
I assume that's the only way your gonna get it open again, unless you go through the main steam drains or whatever and get it 21!
i into the condensor.
22l We're trying to understand why the 4 and 7 had to go open and one of our theorys was that that was needed to put the turbine 23j header pressure under some type of automatic control, we're just trying to 24!
find out why.
Is that the rea.,en?
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There's a good reason for that...
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3j MARTIN: That's fine.
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I think that was, I think it was stated on isolated and the guy, who ever 3;
6l it was behind the panel just was on isolating and now he, you know, not the 7f 12 we were at the 4 and 7.
We were just going to steam it through the 14 and 15.
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91 Is it possible to control the throttle valves right at the condensor MARTIN:
10 without having the ICSC turbine header pressure?
Information I don't know.
12:
You control it from the control room.
131 1 41 Yeah, and...
15!
16; And manual and so you don't really need that? And that's what MARTIN:
17!
It's several minutes later by the way tnat we're trying to clarify. Okay.
181 we finally see the 15 valve shut and I don't remember what....
19!
20l HUNTER:
It's 8 minutes later.
21; 22!
MARTIN:
8 minutes later.
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1l Well, it's probably in response to the...I don't know what it was in response gl for.
I imagine the activity.
I don't know...
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4i ZEWE:
Yeah, we had it on isolated as soon as the alarms did everything...
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Didn' t we get chemistries...
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EVERYONE TALKING 8{
91 H w fast was it when we got the che'istries samples back?
0, 11!
On what?
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You said that verified we had a primary seccndary leak in the generator.
In the 8 generator.
16, ZEWE: That was much later because the sample came back at the A steam 17:
generator had the leak. We had to deisolate it and than they had the sample points reversed. That was much longer because I reverified it.
201 I had found some key to isolate it.
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ZEWE:. Yeah, the alarms again. We got it isolated at sometime, 20 after 6 231 or so or 6:30...
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lj Okay.
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31 6:35.
f 4l 5j ZEWE:
If we isolated RCR V2 with RV2 and we said, "Oh heck", that was the 6
problem Bravo doesn't have a throttle.
4 71 l
Right.
8 9f ZEWE:
10!
So we fed it or we... I isolated it and we began to feed it.
Then we started the pump and everything come in at once and then we isolated it.
MARTIN:
131 The term to use unisolate, that was only on the feed side or are 14; we talking both feed and like the 15 valve?
15, ZEWE:
16!
I can not recall specifically.
I know that we just wanted to unisolate it, and we should've completely unisolated it, alright.
But frem Craig had told me before, that we never got the isolating steam, which wouldn't suprise me either way because we hadn't been into it that long, but when I said unisolate it, I meant fully at that time because I had no coi reason to have it reisolated again, if we in fact were going to use it.
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At least we wanted to have the capability of going back to the ZEWE:
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2j condensor with these turbine bypass valve.
31 Let me get a couple of points quickly and then we'll try to wrap HUNTER:
41 Boron samples are required to be taken, primary system samples are it up.
5 required to be taken after a trip and it's required by the turbine trip gj Do procedure and also the reactor coolant trip... reactor trip procedure.
7; you recall asking for those samples and aproximately what time do you gj recall who you asked for those samples?
g, 10 I didn't ask.
12!
I remember notifying chemistry /HP and I'm not sure what time frame ZEWE:
131 it was but I notified them that we had a trip and that they had to take 14!
But who exactly it was...I believe it may have been Mike Janouski samples.
15; at that time, but it's 16i 17!
Would that be early in the morning Bill, like between 0400 and the HUNTER:
181 12 minutes later or 191 20!
I don'i think that it was until after 5 til I c::me back to the ZEWE:
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control room 22l 1
23l Scmebody may have already ask for samples in the meantime.
HUNTER:
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- lj ZEWE
I don't doubt that, its standard anyway because, we don't really 2{
have to specifically call down at any particular time, if I feel they 3{
already have the word.
There was no doubt in the whole site that we had 4
had a turbine trip and a reactor trip.
5t HUNTER: Okay.
,6 7!
ZEWE:
8 Aright, because I had announced that to everybody a couple of g
times, and that we had had a call from HP in chemistry early into it, likely in the first half hour.
II.
MARSH:
I'm going to have to break the tape at this time being 12:27, t
reading 390 on the meter.
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