ML19092A125

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Fire Protection Evaluations for Unique and Unbounded Fire Barrier Configurations - M-663-00017A W08 CS to B1-98
ML19092A125
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Site: Wolf Creek Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation icon.png
Issue date: 08/22/2018
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Wolf Creek
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Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
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WO 19-0010
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APF 05-013-01, REV. 04 M-663-000 17 A FIRE PROTECTION EVALUATIONS FOR UNIQUE OR UNBOUNDED FIRE BARRIER CONFIGURATIONS ENGINEERING REVIEW: DRAFTER: CHECKER: ENGINEER:

SUPERVISOR:

APPROVAL 1. 0 APPROVED-MFG.

MAY PROCEED 2.0 NOT APPROVED--RESUBMIT FINAL DOCUMENT/DRAWING-MFG.

MAY PROCEED 0 YES 0 NO 3.0 APPROVED INFORMATION NOT CONTROLLED UNDER DESIGN PROCESS 4.0 ACCEPTABLE-MAINTAIN AS RECORD (INFO. ONLY) 5. 0 RESTRICTED FOR WOLF CREEK PLANNING ONLY-MFG.

MAY PROCEED 0 YES 0 NO APPROVAL OF THIS DOCUMENT/DRAWING DOES NOT RELIEVE SUPPLIER/CONTRACTOR FROM FULL COMPLIANCE WITH CONTRACT, SPECIFICATIONS AND/OR PURCHASE ORDER REQUIREMENTS.

COMMENTS:

INCORPORATED AS-BUILT INFORMATION P.O.#: VENDOR MANUAL: PAGE: CHANGE PACKAGE#:

INCORPORATED CHANGE DOCUMENT(S):

014269 WIP-M-663-00017A-W06-A-1 REV.# DC RELEASED:

W08 W$1F CREEK DC24 08/22/2018

'NUCLEAR OPERATING CORPORATION COMPONENT NUMBER(S)

COMPONENT NUMBERS ARE FOR INITIAL (REV, W01) DATA LINKING ONLY. ADDITIONAL COMPONENT LINKS ARE MADE IN DATABASE ONLY. COVER Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation M-663-00017 A Page#. Revision Page# Revision Cover Page W08* Attachment A3 i W08* Pages 1-12 W08* ii W08* Attachment 81 iii W08* Pages 1-8 W04 iv W08* Appendix 81 v W08* 81-1 W01 vi W08* 81-2 W01 vii W08* 81-3 W01 viii W08* 81-4 W01 ix W05 81-5 W01 1 W04 81-6 W01 2 W07 81-7 W01 3 W05 81-8 W01 4 W03 81-9 W01 5 W03 81-10 W01 6 W03 81-11 W01 7 W03 81-12 W01 8 W03 81-13 W01 9 W03 81-14 W01 10 W03 81-15 W01 11 W03 81-16 W01 12 W03 81-17 W04 13 W03 81-18 W04 14 W03 81-19 W04 15 W03 81-20 W04 16 W03 81-21 W01 17 W03 81-22 W01 18 W03 81-23 W01 19 W03 81-24 W01 20 W03 81-25 W01 21 W03 81-26 W01 22 W05 81-27 W01 23 W05 81-28 W01 24 W03 81-29 W01 25 W03 81-30 W01 26 W03 81-31 W01 27 W08* 81-32 W01 28 W04 81-33 W01 29 W04 81-34 W01 30 W04 81-35 W01 31 W04 81-36 W01 32 W04 81-37 W01 33 W04 81-38 W01 34 W04 81-39 W01 35 W04 81-40 W01 36 W04 81-41 W01 37 W04 81-42 W01 38 W04 81-43 W01 Attachment A1 81-44 W01 Pages 1-9 W01 81-45 W01 Attachment A2 81-46 W01 Pages 1-9 W01 ' 81-47 W01 *Changed this Revision Page i of ix Page# Revision Page# Revision 81-48 W01 81-100 W01 81-49 W01 81-101 W01 81-50 W01 81-102 W01 81-51 W01 81-103 W01 81-52 W01 81-104 W01 81-53 W01 81-105 W01 81-54 W01 81-106 W01 81-55 W01 81-107 W01 81-56 W01 81-108 W01 81-57 W01 81-109 W01 81-58 W01 81-110 W01 81-59 W01 81-111 W01 81-60 W01 81-112 W01 81-61 W01 81-113 W01 81-62 W01 81-114 W01 81-63 W01 81-115 W01 81-64 W01 81-116 W01 81-65 W01 81-117 W01 81-66 W01 81-118 W01 81-67 W01 81.,119 W01 81-68 W01 81-120 W01 81-69 W01 81-121 W01 81-70 W01 81-122 W01 81-71 W01 81-123 W01 81-72 W01 81-124 W01 81-73 W01 81-125 W01 81-74 W01 81-126 W01 81-75 W01 81-127 W01 81-76 W01 81-128 W01 81-77 W01 81-129 W01 81-78 W01 81-130 W01 81-79 W01 81-131 W01 81-80 W01 81-132 W01 81-81 W01 81-133 W01 81-82 W01 81-134 W01 81-83 W01 81-135 W01 81-84 W01 81-136 W01 81-85 W01 81-137 W01 81-86 W01 81-138 W01 81-87 W01 81-139 W01 81-88 W01 81-140 W01 81-89 W01 81-141 W01 81-90 .W01 81-142 W01 81-91 W01 81-143 W01 81-92 W01 81-144 W01 81-93 W01 81-145 W01 81-94 W01 81-146 W01 81-95 W01 81-147 W01 81-96 W01 81-148 W01 81-97 W01 81-149 W01 81-98 W01 81-150 W01 81-99 W01 81-151 W01 Revision W08 Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation M-663-000 17 A Page# Revision Page# Revision 81-152 W01 82-29 W04 81-153 W01 82-30 W04 81-154 W01 82-31 W04 81-155 W01 82-32 W04 81-156 W01 82-33 W04 81-157 W01 82-34 W04 81-158 W01 82-35 W04 81-159 W01 82-36 W04 81-160 W01 82-37 W04 81-161 W01 82-38 W04 81-162 W01 82-39 W04 81-163 W01 82-40 W04 81-164 W01 82-41 W04 81-165 W01 82-42 W04 81-166 W01 82-43 W04 81-167 W01 82-44 W04 81-168 W01 82-45 W04 81-169 W01 82-46 W04 81-170 W01 82-47 W04 81-171 W01 82-48 W04 81-172 W01 82-49 W04 Attachment 82 82-50 W04 Pages 1-9 W04 82-51 W04 Appendix 82 82-52 W04 82-1 W04 82-53 W04 82-2 W04 82-54 W04 82-3 W04 82-55 W04 82-4 W04 82-56 W04 82-5 W04 82-57 W04 82-6 W04 82-58 W04 82-7 W04 82-59 W04 82-8 W04 82-60 W04 82-9 W04 82-61 W04 82-10 W04 82-62 W04 82-11 W04 82-63 W04 82-12 W04 82-64 W04 82-13 W04 82-65 W04 82-14 W04 82-66 W04 82-15 W04 82-67 W04 82-16 W04 82-68 W04 82-17 W04 82-69 W04 82-18 W04 82-70 W04 82-19 W04 82-71 W04 82-20 W04 82-72 W04 82-21 W04 82-73 W04 82-22 W04 82-74 W04 82-23 W04 82-75 W04 82-24 W04 82-76 W04 82-25 W04 82-77 W04 82-26 W04 82-78 W04 82-27 W04 82-79 W04 82-28 W04 82-80 W04 *Changed this Revision Page ii of ix Page# Revision Page# Revision 82-81 W04 83-35 W01 82-82 W04 83-36 W01 82-83 W04 83-37 W01 82-84 W04 83-38 W01 82-85 W04 83-39 W01 82-86 W04 83-40 W01 82-87 W04 83-41 W01 82-88 W04 83-42 W01 82-89 W04 Attachment 84 82-90 W04 Pages 1-10 W01 82-91 W04 Appendix 84 82-92 W04 84-1 W01 82-93 W04 84-2 W01 82-94 W04 84-3 W01 82-95 W04 84-4 W01 Attachment 83 84-5 W01 Pages 1-8 W06 84-6 W01 Appendix 83 84-7 W01 83-1 W01 84-8 W01 83-2 W01 84-9 W01 83-3 W01 84-10 W01 83-4 W01 84-11 W01 83-5 W01 84-12 W01 83-6 W01 84-13 W01 83-7 W01 84-14 W01 83-8 W01 84-15 W01 83-9 W01 84-16 W01 83-10 W01 84-17 W01 83-11 W01 84-18 W01 83-12 W01 84-19 W01 83-13 W01 84-20 W01 83-14 W01 84-21 W01 83-15 W01 84-22 W01 83-16 W01 Attachment 85 83-17 W01 Pages 1-7 W01 83-18 W01 Appendix 85 83-19 W01 85-1 W01 83-20 W01 85-2 W01 83-21 W01 85-3 W01 83-22 W01 85-4 W01 83-23 W01 85-5 W01 83-24 W01 85-6 W01 83-25 W01 85-7 W01 83-26 W01 85-8 W01 83-27 W01 85-9 W01 83-28 W01 85-10 W01 83-29 W06 85-11 W01 83-30 W06 85-12 W01 83-31 W01 85-13 W01 83-32 W01 85-14 W01 83-33 W01 85-15 W01 83-34 W01 85-16 W01 Revision W08 Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation M-663-00017 A Page# Revision Page# Revision 85-17 W01 86-18 W01 85-18 W01 86-19 W01 85-19 W01 86-20 W01 85-20 W01 86-21 W01 85-21 W01 86-22 W01 85-22 W01 86-23 W01 85-23 W01 86-24 W01 85-24 W01 Attachment 87 85-25 W01 Pages 1-8 W04 85-26 W01 Appendix 87 85-27 W01 87-1 W04 85-28 W01 87-2 W04 85-29

1 2.0 Scope .......................................................................................................................................

1 3.0 Background

..............................................................................................................................

1 4.0 References

...............................................................................................................................

1 5.0 Methodology

............................................................................................................................

4 6.0 Fire Barrier Walls and Floors/Ceilings

.....................................................................................

.4 7.0 Penetration Seals .....................................................................................................................

6 8.0 Fire Wrap ...............................................................................................................................

22 9.0 Hatches ..................................................................................................................................

23 10.0 Fire Doors ..............................................................................................................................

24 11.0 Fire Dampers .........................................................................................................................

26 12.0 Structural Steel Fireproofing

...................................................................................................

27 13.0 Cable Tray Firestops

& Cable Tray Covers ............................................................................

37 Attachment A A1 A2 A3 Attachment B B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 B7 B8 B9 ATTACHMENTS

-Fire Protection Evaluations for Unique Or Unbounded Fire Barrier Configurations

-Fire Protection Evaluation for Control Room Floor Slab and Cable Trenches -Fire Protection Evaluation for Removable

& Flanged Containment Penetrations Sealing Devices -Fire Protection Evaluation for Sheet Metal and Ceramic Fiber Wall Segment Between Rooms 3301 and 3302 -Fire Protection Evaluations For Unique Or Unbounded Penetration Seal Configurations

-Fire Protection Evaluation for Penetration Openings Assigned New Typical Detail Designs -Fire Protection Evaluation for Penetrations that Exceed Opening Size Limitation -Fire Protection Evaluation for Penetrations that Exceed Service Temperature Limitations

-Fire Protection Evaluation for Penetrations that Exceed Movement Limitations -Fire Protection Evaluation for Penetrant Size Exceeding Typical Detail M-1 Limitation

-Fire Protection Evaluation for Penetrant Size Exceeding Typical Detail M-6A Limitation

-Fire Protection Evaluation for Penetrant Size Exceeding Typical Detail FB-1 Limitation

-Fire Protection Evaluation for Penetrant Size Exceeding Typical Detail RB-5A Limitation

-Fire Protection Evaluation for Penetrant Size Exceeding Typical Detail RB-1 or RB-8 Limitation Revision W08

Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation M-663-00017 A Page ix of ix B10 B11 B12 B13 Attachment C Attachment D D1 D2 Attachment E Attachment F F1 Attachment G G1 G2 G3 G4 G5 Attachment H -Fire Protection Evaluation for Penetration Opening with Steel Plates -Fire Protection Evaluation for Penetrations Interfacing with Seismic Gap Seals -Fire Protection Evaluation for Penetration Openings Crediting Calcium Silica and Fiberglass Piping Insulation

-Fire Protection Evaluation for Penetration Openings with Unique Bounding Attributes (PIR 2005-2384)

-Fire Protection Evaluations For Unique Or Unbounded Fire Wrap Configurations (There are currently no evaluations in this attachment)

-Fire Protection Evaluations For Unique Or Unbounded Hatch/Panel Configurations

-Fire Protection Evaluation for Containment Post-Tensioning Openings at "C" Buttress -Fire Protection Evaluation for Resin Loading Chute Cover Plate (Penetration P141S1028)

-Fire Protection Evaluations For Unique Or Unbounded Fire Door Configurations (There are currently no evaluations in this attachment)

-Fire Protection Evaluations For Unique Or Unbounded Fire Damper Configurations

-Fire Protection Evaluation for Fire Dampers Beyond Barrier Plane -Fire Protection Evaluations For Unique Or Unbounded Structural Steel Fireproofing Configurations

-Fire Protection Evaluation for Generic Fireproofing Issues -Fire Protection Evaluation for Structural Steel Fireproofing with Unprotected Thermal Shorts Within Open Rooms -Fire Protection Evaluation for Structural Steel Fireproofing With Unprotected Thermal Shorts in Closed Rooms with 650 kW Fire and No Ventilation or Forced Ventilation -Fire Protection Evaluation for Structural Steel Fireproofing With Unprotected Thermal Shorts in Closed Rooms with a Credible Fire and No Ventilation or Forced Ventilation -Fire Protection Evaluation for HAZ Assessment of Structural Steel Integral to Fire Boundary -Fire Protection Evaluations For Unique Or Unbounded Firestop and Cable Tray Cover Configurations (There are currently no evaluations in this attachment)

Revision W08 Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation M-663-00017 A 1.0 PURPOSE Page 1 of 38 1.1 Evaluate the adequacy of fire barrier and associated closure assembly configurations that are unique or not directly bounded by fire tested configurations.

1.2 Compile relevant information related to unique or unbounded fire barrier configurations into a single source reference document.

2.0 SCOPE 2.1 Fire barriers and associated closure components providing protection of redundant post fire safe shutdown (PFSSD) equipment and/or circuits.

These fire barriers are necessary to satisfy Wolf Creek's comparison to 10 CFR 50 Appendix R, Section III.G.1 and III.G.2.

3.0 BACKGROUND

Generic Letter 86-10, identifies that fire area boundaries need not be completely sealed. However, the document further states that in such cases the licensee is required to perform an evaluation to assess the adequacy of fire area boundaries to determine if the barriers will withstand the hazards associated with the area and protect important equipment within the area from a fire outside the area. At Wolf Creek all openings in fire boundaries are provided with some form of fire resistive penetration closure (penetration seal, fire damper, fire door, etc.). However, not all closures or closure attributes are directly bounded by 3-hour fire endurance testing. To address this issue, M-663-00017 A serves as the primary evaluation/reference document for unique or unbounded fire barrier configurations.

4.0 REFERENCES

4.1 Wolf Creek Licensing Documents 4.1.1 WCNOC USAR, Section 9.5.1, including Appendices A through E 4.1.2 SNUPPS FSAR, Section 9.5.1.2.2.3, Rev. 14 and 15 4.1.3 Wolf Creek Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report (SSER) 5, Section 9.5.1.2 4.2 Regulatory Documents 4.2.1 10 CFR 50 Appendix R, Fire Protection Program For Nuclear Power Facilities Operating Prior to January 1, 1979 4.2.2 Generic Letter 86-10, Implementation of Fire Protection Requirements 4.2.3 Regulatory Guide 1.189, Fire Protection For Operating Nuclear Power Plants, April 2001 4.3 Industry Documents 4.3.1 ANSI A 17 .1, Safety Code for Elevators and Escalators 4.3.2 ASTM E 119, Standard Test Methods for Fire Tests of Building Construction and Materials Revision W04 Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation M-663-00017 A 4.3.3 ASTM E 152, Standard Methods of Fire Tests of Door Assemblies Page 2 of 38 4.3.4 EPRI TR-1 00443, Methods of Quantitative Fire Hazards Analysis, May 1992 4.3.5 IEEE 317, Standard for Electric Penetration Assemblies in Containment Structures for Nuclear Power Generating Stations 4.3.6 IEEE 383, Standard for Qualifying Class 1 E Electric Cables and Field Splices for Nuclear Power Generating Stations 4.3.7 IEEE 384, Standard Criteria for Independence of Class 1 E Equipment and Circuits 4.3.8 UL 1 OB, Standard for Safety Fire Tests of Door Assemblies 4.3.9 UL 555, Standard for Fire Dampers 4.3.1 0 UL N-711, (A-126-00001

}, Fire Test Report Of Loaded Restrained Beams Protected By Cementitious Mixture, Dated August 11, 1976 . 4.3.11 UL N-712, (A-126-00002), Fire Test Report Of Loaded Restrained Beams Protected By Cementitious Mixture, Dated May 13, 1977 4.4 Specifications 4.4.1 M-162C, Specification for Non-metallic Thermal Insulation for Piping and Equipment Located In Auxiliary Building, Control Building, Diesel Generator Building, Fuel Building, and Radwaste Building For The Wolf Creek Generating Station 4.4.2 A-126, Technical Specification For Cementitious Fireproofing Of Structural Steel For The Standardized Nuclear Unit Power Plant Unit (SNUPPS) 4.5 Calculations 4.5.1 FP-M-011, Evaluation of Adequacy of Albi Duraspray on Structural Steel 4.5.2 FP-M-012, Rev 0, Structural Steel Fireproofing Thermal Shorts and Omissions Evaluation 4.6 Design Change Packages 4.6.1 04585, Design to Remove Unique (HatchNalve)

Thermo-Lag Coverings 4.6.2 05314, Clarify Use of Thresholds on Fire Doors 4.6.3 06513, Thermo-Lag Removed from A-16 Fire Stop 4.6.4 07037, Darmatt Fire Barrier Material Installation 4.6.5 09879, Replace SGK04AIB and SGK05AIB Air Conditioning Units 4.6.6 10257, Removal of Thermo-Lag from Hatch SKD/1207A 4.6.7 011038, Install Fire Wrap on Raceway in Fire Areas A-1 & A-18 Revision W04 Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation M-663-00017 A Page 3 of 38 4.6.8 4.6.9 4.6.10 4.6.11 4.7 Other 4.7.1 4.7.2 4.7.3 4.7.4 4.7.5 4.7.6 4.7.7 4.7.8 4.7.9 4.7.10 4.7.11 4.7.12 4.7.13 4.7.14 4.7.15 4.7.16 4.7.17 4.7.18 011656, Install Fire Wrap on Raceway Associated to EMHV8803A in Fire Area A-1 011888, 1-Hour Fire Wrap for Conduit 114U3D5R 012322, Fire Areas A-6 AND C-35 Darmatt 3-Hour Border Installation 012368 and 012568, Fire Area A-8, 1-Hour Fire Wrap for Conduits 4J3C1 N and 4U3D5P, respectively.

Fire Test Report Project 14980-98207, Fire Endurance Test of a Wall Assembly Clad with Thermo-Lag 330-1 M-663-00017, Penetration Seal Typical Details, Rev. W20 M-663-00157, Fire Qualification Test on Silicone Foam Floor Penetration Seals, Slab 5 SLNRC 84-0014, Fire Protection Review PIR 94-0143, Fire Door Gap Evaluation PIR 2002-2805, Penetration Seal Issues PIR 2002-2290, Darmatt Fire Wrap Issues PIR 2005-2384, Penetrations Seals Requiring Field Work PIR 2002-2287, Structural Steel Fireproofing With Unprotected Attachments USQD 00-0012 (USAR CR 00-016), Evaluation of Unbounded Features in Fire Barrier Separating the Turbine Building and Auxiliary Building, Rev. 0 USQD 97-0163 (USAR CR 97-200) Evaluation of Missile Shields in Fire Barrier Separating the Turbine Building and Auxiliary Building, Rev. 0 USAR Figure 3.8.45, Reactor Building Personnel Hatch, Rev. 0 USAR Figure 3.8.47, Reactor Building Typical Pipe Penetration, Rev. 0 USAR Figure 3.8.48, Reactor Building Fuel Transfer Penetration, Rev. 0 USAR Figure 3.8.49, Reactor Building Electrical Penetration, Rev. 0 USAR Figure 3.8.50, Reactor Building Purge Line Penetrations, Rev. 0 E-1 R8900, Sheet 65, Cable Tray Firestop Detail, Rev. 15 PSL-FPER-98-002, St. Lucie Unit #1 Fire Protection Evaluation for TSI Walls on Stairways Revision WOS Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation M-663-000 17 A Page 4 of 38 5.0 METHODOLOGY 5.1 This document was developed by Fire Protection to be a primary reference source for fire barrier related configurations that are unique or are not directly bounded by fire testing. Items compiled within this document are based on a comprehensive review of fire barriers and fire barrier documentation in comparison to design and regulatory commitment parameters delineated in Wolf Creek Fire Protection Program documents.

5.1.1 Predominantly, unique or unbounded configurations are evaluated within attachments to this document. However, where an existing document adequately addresses a unique or unbounded fire barrier feature, the unique/unbounded configuration is briefly described and the corresponding evaluation document is referenced within the appropriate fire barrier element section of this document.

5.1.2 Unique or unbounded configurations that were originally evaluated in FSAR submittals and/or NRC SERs that were a part of the original Fire Protection License Basis are discussed in the appropriate barrier element section of this document under the heading of "Issues Addressed in Original Fire Protection License Documents." Typically, only minor changes were made to these discussions with no change in technical content or intent. Where change in technical content or intent was deemed necessary to strengthen an evaluation or address current in plant conditions that could impact the original conclusions, a detailed evaluation was completed and documented as an attachment to this document.

5.1.3 Unless specifically identified within an evaluation, credit is not taken for area detection or suppression.

6.0 FIRE BARRIER WALLS AND FLOORS/CEILINGS 6.1 Description 6.1.1 Fire barrier walls, floors, and ceilings are provided as dictated by the results of the Fire Hazards Analysis.

Fire barrier walls are predominantly comprised of reinforced concrete or reinforced concrete masonry units (CMU). Fire barrier floors/ceilings are comprised of reinforced concrete, with or without corrugated metal Q-Deck. 6.2 Evaluation of Unique or Unbounded Configurations 6.2.1 Issues Addressed in Original Fire Protection License Documents

1. Trench Covers Between Fire Area F-2 and HMS-1 In Fire Area F-2 (Room 6104), the floor is on grade with the exception of a pipe trench, which opens into the room and connects with the Hot Machine Shop (HMS-1 ). The trench opening at grade in Room 6104 is closed by a heavy steel cover plate approximately 4 feet x 8 feet. At grade within the Hot Machine Shop the trench is covered by approximately 11" thick concrete plugs. This protective configuration for the trench ensures that fire will not propagate between the two Fire Areas. Revision W03 Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation M-663-00017 A 6.2.2 Ceramic Fiber and Sheet Metal Fire Barrier Segment Page 5 of 38 A fire barrier wall segment on the 2016' elevation of the Control Building between rooms 3401 (Fire Area C-35) and 3416 (Fire Area C-14) is comprised of ceramic fiber between sheet metal. The unique wall assembly design and associated penetrations are evaluated as 3-hour fire (F) and temperature (T) rated by change package 09879. 6.2.3 Blow Out Panel for Penetration P135W2346 Between A-15 and T-2 A blow out panel is provided as a protective closure assembly for penetration P135W2346 in the fire barrier wall separating the 2000' elevation of the Turbine Building (Room 4351 and Fire Area T-2) from the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feed Pump Room (Room 1331 and Fire Area A-15). The panel is provided to alleviate sudden pressure buildup in Room 1331 in the event of a High Energy Line Break (HELB). The panel is a UL listed per design U639. However, fire testing does not directly bound the installation of the panel beyond the barrier plane, on the Turbine Building side. This installation method is necessary to ensure that the panel could blow out and not wedge in the opening, in response to a HELB within Room 1331. USQSD 00-0012 determined that the blow out panel provides a level of fire protection that is commensurate with fire hazards present in the respective fire areas. 6.2.4 Drains from Fire Area A-23 to T-2 Two open ended 20" diameter drain pipes communicate between the 2026' elevation of the Auxiliary Building 2026' Main Feed Water Pump Rooms (Rooms 1411 and 1412 and Fire Area A-23) and the 2000' elevation of the Turbine Building (Room 1331 and Fire Area T-2). The unsealed openings provide a drain path from Rooms 1411 and 1412 in the event of a main feedwater pipe rupture. The drains do not communicate across a common fire barrier between the two Fire Areas, as one drain pipe passes through Fire Area 15 and penetrates T-2 behind Rooms 4304 and 4305, while the other passes through A-14 and penetrates T-2 near column TC. The drain terminations in Fire Area T-2 are approximately 23 feet apart. USQSD 00-0012 determined that the two drains achieve a level of fire protection that is commensurate with fire hazards present in the respective fire areas. 6.2.5 Missile Shield Separating Fire Areas A-23 and T-2 A non fire rated missile shield is provided at the 2065' elevation in the fire barrier wall separating the Turbine Building (Room 4501 and Fire T-2) from the Auxiliary Building Main Feedwater Pump and Valve Rooms (Rooms 1411, 1412, 1508, and 1509 and Fire Area A-23). The missile shield is comprised of four movable concrete sections that are normally fastened to the wall as a single unit. Each of the shield sections is 5'-8" wide by '17'-7' high by 2'-0" thick. The shield sections move on a rail system to allow entry into the Main Steam and Feedwater valve compartment.

The bottom rails are supported on an approximately two foot high sill. The upper "C" channel is secured to the top section of the opening. There is an off-set approximately two inches between the back of the missile shield and the face of the barrier. Additionally, there is a gap of approximately 2-3 inches between the top of the sill and the bottom of the shield due to the rail assembly.

USQSD 97-0163 determined that the missile shield provides a level of fire protection that is commensurate with fire hazards present in the respective fire areas. 6.2.6 Other unique or unbounded fire barrier features are evaluated in Attachment A. Revision W03 Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation M-663-00017A Page 6 of 38 7.0 PENETRATION SEALS 7.1 Description 7 .1.1 A penetration seal is comprised of the materials, parts, or assemblies, which close openings in fire boundaries necessary for the passage of mechanical or electrical penetrants.

Penetration seals are also utilized for spare openings that were created for future penetrant use and seismic gap openings necessary to accommodate building movements.

Typically, the seal provides the same fire resistance rating as the fire barrier. Penetration seal typical details and limiting parameters are provided in M-663-00017. 7.2 Evaluation of Unique or Unbounded Configurations 7 .2.1 Issues Addressed in Original Fire Protection License Documents

1. Reactor Building Penetrations (Reference 4.1.2) The Reactor Building shell is 4 feet thick, is lined with a continuous 1/4-inch thick liner plate, and is designed to be airtight at a design pressure of 60 psig. All penetrations through the containment shell are designed to ASME Section Ill. Since the penetrations are an integral part of the Reactor Building boundary and do not incorporate independent fire barrier seals, no testing was performed to establish a rating of the penetrations.

The following discussions describe the Reactor Building mechanical and electrical penetrations into adjacent buildings:

Mechanical Penetrations Refer to USAR Figures 3.8-4 7 and 3.8-50 for details of the process and sampling lines which penetrate the Reactor Building wall into the Auxiliary Building Fire Areas A-19, A-20, A-23, A-24, and A-25. In A-19 and A-20, the containment purge penetration (36-inch-diameter line) penetrates the containment.

Redundant containment isolation valves are provided on either side of the Reactor Building wall. In A-23, A-24, and A-25, process and instrument lines are welded to the heads on larger penetration sleeves, which are in turn welded to the containment liner. Fire and smoke will not pass through or around the process/instrument lines due to the steel construction.

The mechanical penetrations provide equivalent protection to a 3-hour fire barrier. Electrical Penetrations Electrical penetrations communicate with Fire Areas A-17 and A-18, which are Halon 1301 protected spaces with ionization detectors.

The penetrations, shown on USAR Figure 3.8-49, consist of a steel sleeve through the Reactor Building wall, which is flanged in the Auxiliary Building.

Each flange contains seven diameter penetrations, which are sealed with an epoxy based resin into which the solid electrical conductors have been molded. The electrical penetrations are designed to IEEE 317-76, which is the industry standard for containment electrical penetrations.

Revision W03 Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation M-663-00017 A Page 7 of 38 Mounted directly to the flange is a sealed NEMA-3R enclosure, which contains termination strips. These enclosures are air and dust-tight and help protect the penetration from postulated transient fires in the penetration room. Fires within the enclosures are not postulated due to the IEEE 383 cable, which is not susceptible to electrically generated fires. Due to lack of space within the enclosures, transient combustibles are not present within the enclosures.

On the Reactor Building side, all penetration sleeves are provided with similar NEMA-3R enclosures, which provide protection for the flanged penetration in the Auxiliary Building.

Again, the cables within the enclosure and passing within the steel sleeved Reactor Building wall are qualified to IEEE 383. Only the four medium voltage penetrations providing power to the reactor coolant pumps are not provided with enclosures on the Reactor Building side of the penetration.

Transient fires are not postulated in the vicinity of the electrical penetrations in the Reactor Building.

Also, the areas containing the electrical penetrations and the cable trays in the area of the penetrations are provided with an area coverage sprinkler system as described in the Fire Hazards Analysis.

Based on the previous discussions, the separation of the Reactor Building and Auxiliary Building fire areas where electrical penetrations exist is ensured. 2. Fuel Transfer Tube Penetration As shown on USAR Figure 3.8-48, the fuel transfer tube connects the Reactor and Fuel Buildings.

A double-a-ring flange is located in the Reactor Building, and a manual gate valve is located in the Fuel Transfer Canal. Either barrier provides equivalent protection to a 3-hour barrier. In addition, the Fuel Transfer Canal contains no installed combustibles. (Reference 4.1.2) 7.2.2 Scope and Review Methodology for Unique/Unbounded Penetrations As previously identified, M-663-00017 defines the critical parameter limitations of each typical detail utilized as a fire barrier penetration seal at Wolf Creek. The limitations established are based on industry fire testing coupled with engineering analysis.

PIR 2002-2805 identified that in some instances, penetration seals do not conform to one or more of the bounding limitations of M-663-00017.

To address this issue, the following selection and review methodology was established to evaluate penetration seals that do not conform to a typical detail limitation:

1. Transition all hardcopy M-OY/M-1Y penetration seal design information to the Engineering Information System (EIS}, as controlled electronic data. 2. Define all penetrations that provide PFSSD fire boundary protection.
3. Perform electronic data sorts for each penetration typical detail providing PFSSD fire boundary protection (Appendix R) against the following critical characteristic limitations, to identify the penetrations and associated attributes that do not conform to M-663-00017 limitations.
  • Opening size
  • Penetrant size
  • Penetrant movement
  • Penetrant temperature Revision W03 Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation M-663-00017 A Page 8 of 38 4. Develop a walkdown checklist to ensure uniformity of review for each of the penetrations determined in Step 3) above, to be within the review scope. 5. Walkdown and collect relevant data, including photos and sketches where necessary, for each penetration within the review scope. 6. Review Quality Control documentation, field change requests, and conformance reports for each penetration within the review scope. 7. Evaluate the acceptability of each penetration considering the Wolf Creek fire barrier license commitments identified in M-663-00017.

Document the evaluations within Attachment 8 to M-663-00017 A. 8. Where it is determined that fieldwork is necessary to satisfy the required fire resistance rating, identify the issue and recommended resolution in a Performance Improvement Request (PIR). 9. Document acceptability of penetration seal field changes necessary to satisfy Step 7) above, in Attachment B to M-663-00017 A. Table 7.2.2-1 identifies each penetration that is evaluated within Attachment B. Some penetrations are included in multiple evaluations due to more than one attribute that does not conform to the limitations of the applicable bounding typical detail. In these instances, the potential cumulative affects of multiple unbounded attributes were considered for each penetration of concern. Section 7.2.3 identifies the additional review methodology utilized for pen"etrations that do not satisfy unexposed side temperature (T) rating requirements.

Table 7.2.2-1 Penetrations Evaluated in Attachment 8 Communicating Fire Attachment

,, Penetration
  1. ' Areas Evaluation(s)

I, F'ire Resistance,Rating Side 1 Side 2 ,, .. P111W1584 A-1 A-4 88 3-hour F P111W1794 A-1 RW-1 81 3-hour F and T P112W1377 A-1 C-1 813 3-hour F P112W1378 A-1 C-1 82,87 3-hour F P112W1379 A-1 C-1 813 3-hour F P112W1380 A-1 C-1 82,87 3-hour F P113W0420 A-1 A-5 85 3-hour F and T P113W0421 A-1 A-5 813 3-hour F and T P113W0482 A-1 A-5 81,84 3-hour F and T P113W0483 A-1 A-5 81,84 3-hour F and T P114W0423 A-1 A-6 812 3-hour F P121S0251 A-1 A-4 81 3-hour F and T P121S0257 A-1 A-4 88 3-hour F P121S0258 A-1 A-4 88 3-hour F P121S0263 A-1 A-4 88 3-hour F P121S0264 A-1 A-4 82,83 3-hour F and T Revision W03 Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation M-663-00017 A Communicating Fire Penetration

  1. Areas Side 1 Side 2 P121S0265 A-1 A-4 P121S0266 A-1 A-4 P121S0267 A-1 A-4 P121S0268 A-1 A-4 P121S0271 A-1 A-4 P121S0273 A-1 A-4 P121S0274 A-1 A-4 P121S0275 A-1 A-4 P121S0277 A-1 A-4 P121S0278 A-1 A-4 P121S0279 A-1 A-4 P121S0280 A-1 A-4 P121S0281 A-1 A-4 P121S0283 A-1 A-4 P121S0284 A-1 A-4 P121S0285 A-1 A-4 P121S0287 A-1 A-4 P121W1779 A-1 RW-1 P121W1781 A-1 RW-1 P121W1782 A-1 RW-1 P122S0327 A-1 A-2 P122S0331 A-1 A-2 P122S0338 A-1 A-2 P122S0339 A-1 A-2 P122S0340 A-1 A-2 P122S0347 A-1 A-2 P122S0349 A-1 A-2 P122S0350 A-1 A-2 P122S0351 A-1 A-2 P122S0353 A-1 A-2 P122S0357 A-1 A-2 P122S0362 A-1 A-2 P122S0367 A-1 A-2 P122S0373 A-1 A-2 P122W1739 A-1 A-3 P123W0418 A-1 A-5 P125S0203 A-33 A-1 P125S0206 A-33 A-1 P125W2309 A-33 T-2 P125W2319 A-33 T-2 Page 9 of 38 Attachment c Evaluation(s)

Fire Resistance Rating ,, 83 3-hour F and T 88 3-hour F 88 3-hour F 88 3-hour F 82, 87 3-hour F 88 3-hour F 88 3-hour F 83,88 3-hour F 82,83,84,89 3-hour F and T 82,89 3-hour F and T 88 3-hour F 88 3-hour F 88 3-hour F 88 3-hour F 813 3-hour F 813 3-hour F 813 3-hour F 81 3-hour F and T 88 3-hour F 88 3-hour F 83,88 3-hour F 88 3-hour F 88 3-hour F 83,84,88 3-hour F 88 3-hour F 89 3-hour F and T 88 3-hour F 88 3-hour F 88 3-hour F 81 3-hour F and T 88 3-hour F 82 3-hour F and T 88 3-hour F 88 3-hour F 84 3-hour F and T 84 3-hour F and T 81 3-hour F and T 81 3-hour F and T 81 3-hour F and T 81 3-hour F and T Revision W03 Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation M-663-00017 A Communicating Fire Penetration

  1. Areas Side 1 Side2 P125W2432 A-1 A-33 P125W2434 A-6 A-33 P131S0491 A-8 A-1 P131S0492 A-8 A-1 P131S0504 A-8 A-1 P131S0513 A-8 A-1 P131S0517 A-8 A-1 P131S0522 A-8 A-1 P131S0525 A-8 A-1 P131S0526 A-9 A-1 P131S0528 A-9 A-1 P131S0529 A-9 A-1 P131S0530 A-9 A-1 P131S0531 A-9 A-1 P131W1967 A-9 A-10 P132S0680 A-8 A-1 P132S0682 A-8 A-1 P132S0683 A-8 A-1 P132S0684 A-8 A-1 P132S0693 A-10 A-1 P132S0695 A-8 A-1 P132S0697 A-10 A-1 P132S0698 A-10 A-1 P132S0699 A-8 A-1 P132S0700 A-8 A-1 P132S0704 A-8 A-1 P132S0710 A-8 A-1 P132S0713 A-8 A-1 P132S0722 A-8 A-1 P132S0723 A-8 A-1 P132S0739 A-8 A-1 P132S0749 A-8 A-1 P132W1433 A-8 CC-1 P132W1440 A-8 CC-1 P132W1441 A-8 CC-1 P132W1844 A-8 A-3 P132W1845 A-8 A-3 P133S0762 A-8 A-1 P133S0769 A-25 A-1 P133S0771 A-25 A-1 Page 10 of 38 .. Attachment Evaluation(s)

Fire Resistance Rating 812 3-hour F 812 3-hour F 86 3-hour F 82,87 3-hour F 81 3-hour F and T 88 3-hour F 81 3-hour F and T 88 3-hour F 88 3-hour F 83,88 3-hour F 83 3-hour F and T 88 3-hour F 83,88 3-hour F 83,88 3-hour F 81 3-hour F and T 85 3-hour F 82,87 3-hour F 82,812 3-hour F 82,812 3-hour F 82,83 3-hour F and T 81 3-hour F and T 88 3-hour F 88 3-hour F 88 3-hour F 88 3-hour F 88 3-hour F 88 3-hour F 88 3-hour F 88 3-hour F 88 3-hour F 82,87 3-hour F 81 3-hour F and T 812 3-hour F 85 3-hour F 85 3-hour F 82,87 3-hour F 813 3-hour F 813 3-hour F and T 88 3-hour F 88 3-hour F Revision W03 Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation M-663-00017 A Communicating Fire Penetration

  1. Areas Side 1 Side2 P133S0777 A-8 A-1 P133S0780 A-8 A-1 P133S0781 A-8 A-1 P133S0784 A-25 A-1 P133S0788 A-25 A-1 P133S0793 A-25 A-1 P133S0795 A-25 A-1 P133S0799 A-25 A-1 P133S0800 A-25 A-1 P133S0801 A-25 A-1 P133S0802 A-25 A-1 P133S0806 A-25 A-1 P133S0810 A-25 A-1 P133S0820 A-25 A-1 P133W0447 A-8 A-5 P133W0459 A-8 A-8 P133W0474 A-8 A-8 P133W1475 A-25 F-3 P133W2037 A-8 A-25 P133W2038 A-8 A-25 P133W2039 A-8 A-25 P133W2042 A-8 A-25 P134S0860 A-24 A-1 P134S0864 A-24 A-1 P134S0865 A-24 A-1 P134S0874 A-24 A-1 P134S0875 A-24 A-1 P134S0877 A-24 A-1 P134S0878 A-24 A-1 P134S0879 A-8 A-1 P134S0902 A-8 A-1 P134S0911 A-24 A-1 P134S0912 A-24 A-1 P134S0918 A-24 A-1 P134S0919 A-24 A-1 P134W0436 A-8 A-6 P134W2053 A-8 A-24 P134W2054 A-8 A-24 P134W2653 A-6 T-2 P135S0217 A-14 A-33 Page 11 of 38 Attachment Evaluation(s)

Fire Resistance Rating 81 3-hour F and T 86 3-hour F 86 3-hour F 813 3-hour F 813 3-hour F 88 3-hour F 81 3-hour F and T 82,83, 812 3-hour F 88 3-hour F 88 3-hour F 88 3-hour F 81 3-hour F and T 83,88 3-hour F 88 3-hour F 81 3-hour F and T 81 Not an Appendix R Barrier 81 Not an Appendix R Barrier 81 3-hour F and T 813 3-hour F 81 3-hour F and T 85 3-hour F 813 3-hour F 82,83,812 3-hour F 88 3-hour F 88 3-hour F 81 3-hour F and T 88 3-hour F 813 3-hour F 81 3-hour F and T 81 3-hour F and T 81 3-hour F and T 88 3-hour F 88 3-hour F 88 3-hour F 88 3-hour F 81 3-hour F and T 82,89 3-hour F and T 813 3-hour F 810 3-hour F 81 3-hour F and T Revision W03 Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation M-663-00017 A Communicating Fire Penetration

  1. Areas Side 1 Side 2 P135S0218 A-13 A-33 P135S0219 A-13 A-33 P135S0223 A-14 A-33 P135S0227 A-15 A-33 P135S0232 A-15 A-33 P135S0233 A-15 A-33 P135S0932 A-29 A-29 P135W2203 A-33 A-30 P135W2208 A-13 A-29 P135W2212 A-14 A-13 P135W2426 A-33 A-14 P135W2449 A-29 A-30 P141S1014 A-16 A-8 P141S1015 A-16 A-8 P141S1023 A-16 A-8 P141S1028 A-26 A-8 P141S1034 A-16 A-8 P141W1854 A-8 A-9 *P141W1907 A-16 A-26 P141W1908 A-16 A-26 P141W1909 A-16 A-26 P141W1913 A-16 A-26 P141W1980 A-16 A-9 P141W2486 A-16 A-26 P141W2487 A-16 A-26 P142S1052 A-27 A-8 P142S1079 A-16 A-8 P142S1083 A-16 A-3 P142S1086 A-16 A-3 P142S1097 A-27 A-8 P142W1932 A-16 A-10 P142W1933 A-16 A-10 P143S1102 A-16 A-8 P143S1111 A-16 A-8 P143W1488 A-5 F-4 P143W1489 A-5 F-4 P143W2514 A-16 A-5 P143W2515 A-16 A-5 P144S1173 A-18 A-24 P145S0943 A-23 A-29 Page 12 of 38 . ' Attachment Fire Resistance.

Rating Evaluation(s) 81 3-hour F and T 81 3-hour F and T 81 3-hour F and T 83 3-hour F and T 82,87 3-hour F 82,87 3-hour F 81 Not an Appendix R Barrier 81 3-hour F and T 85 3-hour F 81 3-hour F and T 81 3-hour F and T 85 3-hour F 82,87 3-hour F 813 3-hour F 813 3-hour F 02 3-hour F 810 3-hour F 88 3-hour F 813 3-hour F 813 3-hour F 81 3-hour F and T 813 3-hour F and T 88 3-hour F 82,87 3-hour F 86 3-hour F 81 3-hour F and T 86 3-hour F 82,813 3-hour F 82,813 3-hour F 81 3-hour F and T 813 3-hour F 82,89 3-hour F and T 81 3-hour F and T 81 3-hour F and T 82,87 3-hour F 82,87 3-hour F 813 3-hour F 813 3-hour F 81 3-hour F and T 82 3-hour F and T Revision W03 Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation M-663-00017 A Communicating Fire Penetration

  1. Areas Side 1 Side 2 P145S0944 A-23 A-29 P145S0946 A-23 A-30 P145S0947 A-23 A-30 P145S0952 A-23 A-15 P145S0954 A-23 A-15 P145S0955 A-23 T-2 P145S1010 A-23 A-15 P145W2338 A-23 A-23 P145W2339 A-23 A-23 P145W2341 A-23 A-23 P145W2342 A-23 A-23 P145W2344 A-23 A-23 P145W2345 A-23 A-23 P145W2468 A-23 T-2 P145W2469 A-23 T-2 P145W2470 A-23 T-2 P145W2471 A-23 T-2 P151S1196 A-20 A-26 P152W1421 A-19 CC-1 P152W2581 A-21 A-22 P152W2585 A-19 A-22 P152W2617 A-19 A-22 P152W2623 A-19 A-22 P153W2543 A-19 A-20 P153W2550 A-20 A-5 P153W2557 A-19 A-20 P153W2627 A-20 A-5 P154S1267 A-19 A-16 P311W0839 C-1 CC-1 P311W0841 C-1 CC-1 P311W0842 C-1 CC-1 P311W0845 C-1 CC-1 P311W0846 C-1 CC-1 P321S0081 C-5 C-1 P321S0083 C-6 C-1 P321S0084 C-6 C-1 P321S0085 C-6 C-1 P321S0086 C-6 C-1 P321S0097 C-6 C-1 P321S0110 C-6 C-1 Page 13 of 38 Attachrrlent
  • ' , Evaluation(s)

Fire Resistanc.e Rating 82 3-hour F and T 82 3-hour F and T 82 3-hour F and T 82,83,813 3-hour F and T 82,83,813 3-hour F and T 81 3-hour F and T 84 3-hour F and T 81 Not an Appendix R Barrier 81 Not an Appendix R Barrier 81 Not an Appendix R Barrier 81 Not an Appendix R Barrier 81 Not an Appendix R Barrier 81 Not an Appendix R Barrier 82,83, 84 3-hour F and T 82,83, 84 3-hour F and T 82,83, 84 3-hour F and T 82,83, 84 3-hour F and T 86 3-hour F 813 3-hour F 81 3-hour F and T 82, 87 3-hour F 87 3-hour F 81 3-hour F and T 81 3-hour F and T 81 3-hour F and T 86 3-hour F 81 3-hour F and T 85 3-hour F 82,87 3-hour F 813 3-hour F 813 3-hour F 813 3-hour F 81 3-hour F and T 85 3-hour F 81 3-hour F and T 81 3-hour F and T 87 3-hour F 87 3-hour F 81 3-hour F and T 81 3-hour F and T Revision W03 Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation M-663-00017 A Communicating Fire . Penetration

  1. . Areas .... Side 1 Side 2 P321S0115 C-5 C-1 P321S0123 C-6 C-1 P331S0127 C-10 C-6 P331S0136 C-10 C-6 P331S0137 C-10 C-6 P331S0138 C-10 C-6 P331S0139 C-10 C-6 P331S0143 C-10 C-6 P331S0200 C-9 C-5 P331W0162 C-9 C-10 P331W0882 C-10 D-1 P331W0883 C-10 D-1 P331W0890 C-10 D-2 P341S0272 C-6 C-6 P341S0288 C-15 C-10 P341S0306 C-16 C-9 P341S0311 C-16 C-9 P341W0209 C-35 C-13 P341W0216 C-35 C-14 P341W0227 C-35 C-16 P341W0250 C-35 C-15 P341W0380 C-16 C-16 P351S0339 C-21 C-15 P351S0356 C-21 C-15 P351S0371 C-21 C-16 P361S0462 C-27 C-21 P361S1052 C-30 C-23 P361S1055 C-30 C-23 P361S1083 C-32 C-25 P371W0948 C-22 C-33 P451S0318 T-12 T-8 P451S0321 T-12 T-8 P611W0071 F-1 F-3 P611W0082 F-1 F-2 P611W0083 F-2 F-3 P611W0197 F-2 F-3 P611W0201 F-2 F-3 P611W0206 F-2 F-3 P621S0137 F-5 F-2 P621S0153 F-5 F-3 Page 14 of 38 Attachment Fire Evahiation(s)

.** 81 3-hour F and T 87 3-hour F 81 3-hour F and T 81 3-hour F and T 81 3-hour F and T 81 3-hour F and T 81 3-hour F and T 81 3-hour F and T 81 3-hour F and T 85 3-hour F 81 3-hour F and T 81 3-hour F and T 81 3-hour F and T 81 Not an Appendix R Barrier 81 3-hour F and T 81 3-hour F and T 81 3-hour F and T 85 3-hour F 85 3-hour F 85 3-hour F 85 3-hour F 81 Not an Appendix R Barrier 81 3-hour F and T 81 3-hour F and T 85 3-hour F 81 3-hour F and T 81 3-hour F and T 81 3-hour F and T 81 3-hour F and T 813 3-hour F and T 81 Not an Appendix R Barrier 81 Not an Appendix R Barrier 81 3-hour F and T 87 3-hour F 85 3-hour F 82,87 3-hour F 81 3-hour F and T 813 3-hour F 81 3-hour F and T 82,87 3-hour F Revision W03 Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation M-663-00017 A Communicating Fire Penetration

  1. " Areas Side 1 Side 2 P621S0156 F-4 F-3 P621S0157 F-4 F-2 P621S0158 F-5 F-2 P621S0161 F-4 F-2 P621S0162 F-4 F-2 P621S0179 F-4 F-2 P621S0180 F-4 F-3 P621W0009 F-4 F-5 P621W0011 F-4 F-5 P621W0017 F-5 F-4 P621W0221 A-5 F-4 P621W0224 A-5 F-4 P631S0119 F-7 F-4 P631S0120 F-7 F-4 P641S0051 F-1 F-7 P641S0052 F-1 F-6 P712S0013 Radwaste Radwaste P712S0014 Radwaste Radwaste P712S0015 Radwaste Radwaste P712W1006 RW-1 Radwaste 7.2.3 Non-T Rated Penetrations Page 15 of 38 Attachment

' ': " Evaluation(s)

Fire Resistar1ce"Rating 82,87 3-hour F 82,87 3-hour F 81 3-hour F and T 86 3-hour F 82,87 3-hour F 811 3-hour F and T 811 3-hour F and T 82,87 3-hour F 81 3-hour F and T 82,87 3-hour F 82,87 3-hour F 82,87 3-hour F 811 3-hour F and T 811 3-hour F and T 811 3-hour F and T 811 3-hour F and T 81 Not an Appendix R Barrier 81 Not an Appendix R Barrier 81 Not an Appendix R Barrier 81 Not an Appendix R Barrier M-663-00017, identifies that where penetrations exist which do not satisfy temperature (T) rating requirements, a seal assembly with a fire (F) rating corresponding to the hourly rating of the associated barrier is acceptable, provided evaluation demonstrates that insitu combustibles and redundant PFSSD equipmenVcircuits on the unexposed barrier side will not be detrimentally affected by the increased penetrant temperatures.

The review methodology established to satisfy the M-663-00017 evaluation criteria for non-T rated seals involved the development of a heat affected zone for each applicable penetrant size. The heat affected zone, as depicted in Figure 7.2.3-1, is a length down the pipe and radius away from the pipe where unexposed side pipe temperatures could result in unacceptable thermal insult to redundant PFSSD circuits/equipment or ignition of exposed insitu combustibles.

For PFSSD circuits and IEEE 383 cable, this temperature limitation is 700°F. This limitation is based on EPRI TR-100443, which identifies that 700°F is a conservative damage threshold criterion for IEEE-383 qualified cable. Wolf Creek cable is IEEE-383 qualified.

A 400°F temperature limitation was selected for other Class A combustibles.

This limitation is based on the following considerations:

  • M-663-00017 unexposed penetration seal surface limitation of 325°F plus ambient.
  • Auto-ignition temperature of wood based materials (400°F to 500°F).
  • EPTR TR-1 00443 identifies 425°F as the damage threshold for unqualified cable. Revision W03 Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation M-663-00017 A PENETRATION SEAL CTYP) Notes: Radius Radius , (oF) Radius Radius ' (In) r (in)'.*. \ **: (In) , ,(In) 0.5 1557 3.9 5.2 1593 4.0 5.4 1 1262 2.5 3.9 1321 2.8 4.1 1.5 1026 1.5 2.8 1097 1.8 3.1 2 836 0.6 2.0 914 1.0 2.3 2.5 684 Contact 1.3 763 0.3 1.6 3 562 0.7 639 Contact 1.1 3.5 465 0.3 537 0.6 4 386 Contact 454 0.2 4.5 385 Contact 5 5.5 one o* *stances f or2 "Th roug 1ame er lpe h5"D" t p* 3" Pipe 4" Pipe R1 R2 .Temp. R1 R2 (oF)' >Radius' Radius (oF) Radius Radius I< , ., ' (in) , ,. (in) , (in) (in) 1607 4.1 5.4 1625 4.2 5.5 1344 2.9 4.3 1374 3.0 4.4 1126 1.9 3.3 1163 2.1 3.4 945 1.1 2.5 987 1.3 2.6 795 0.4 1.8 839 0.6 2.0 671 Contact 1.2 715 0.1 1.4 568 0.8 610 Contact 0.9 483 0.4 523 0.6 412 0.1 450 0.2 354 Contact 389 Contact a e .. -' ea ec e one 1s ances or roug1 1ame er 1pe T bl 7 2 3 28 H t Aff t d Z o* t f 6" Th h 14" o* t p* L1 & L2 6" Pipe 8" Pipe . 10" Pipe ....
  • 12" Pipe Distance Temp. R1 R2 Temp. R1 R2 Temp. R1 R2 Temp. R1 R2 (ft) (OF) Radius Radius (oF) Radius' Radius, (oF) Radius Radius (oF) Radius Radius (in) (in) (in) (in) I' (in) (in) (in) (in) 0.5 1659 4.3 5.7 1677 4.4 5.8 1697 4.5 5.8 1712 4.6 5.9 1 1431 3.3 4.6 1463 3.4 4.8 1497 3.6 4.9 1524 3.7 5.1 1.5 1236 2.4 3.8 1277 2.6 3.9 1321 2.8 4.1 1357 3.0 4.3 2 1069 1.7 3.0 1116 1.9 3.2 1167 2.1 3.5 1209 2.3 3.6 2.5 925 1.0 2.4 976 1.2 2.6 1032 1.5 2.8 1078 1.7 3.1 3 803 0.5 1.8 855 0.7 2.0 914 1.0 2.3 962 1.2 2.5 3.5 698 Contact 1.3 750 0.2 1.6 810 0.5 1.8 860 0.7 2.1 4 608 0.9 659 Contact 1.2 719 0.1 1.4 769 0.3 1.7 4.5 531 0.6 581 0.8 639 Contact 1.1 689 Contact 1.3 5 464 0.3 512 0.5 569 0.8 618 1.0 5.5 408 0.0 453 0.2 508 0.5 555 0.7 6 359 Contact 402 0.0 454 0.2 499 0.4 6.5 358 Contact 406 0.0 450 0.2 7 365 Contact 406 0.0 7.5 368 Contact Note* Refer to Figure 7.2.3-1 for depiction of L 1, L 2 , R1, and R 2. Page 20 of 38 5" Pipe Temp. R1 R2 (oF) Radius Radius (in) (in) 1641 4.2 5.6 1400 3.2 4.5 1196 2.2 3.6 1024 1.5 2.8 877 0.8 2.2 754 0.2 1.6 649 Contact 1.1 560 0.7 485 0.4 421 0.1 368 Contact 14" Pipe Temp. R1 R2 (oF) Radius Radius (in) (in) 1721 4.6 5.9 1539 3.8 5.1 1377 3.0 4.4 1233 2.4 3.8 1105 1.8 3.2 991 1.3 2.7 889 0.9 2.2 799 0.4 1.8 719 0.1 1.4 647 Contact 1.1 583 0.8 527 0.6 477 0.3 432 0.1 392 Contact Revision W03 Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation M-663-00017 A a e -' ea ec e one 1s ances or rou T bl 7 2 3 2C H t Aff t d Z o* t f 16" Th , >,

Pil:ie\ ,: '.** ..*. > ,:, *. , 1a** Pipe * . . .. ***., ..* , .. :.0c** ** * ** .. **ii>e' ,. L1 & l2 *. * ** '* 20'1: Pi ** Distance Temp.** R1 R2 Temp. R1 . .* R2 * *temp. *.' R1 *: R2 *** (ft) eF> Radius* Radius (oF) Radius Radius (oF)' ,* .Radius *Radius (in) (in) * *(in) (in) .* ; (in) (in) 0.5 1732 4.6 6.0 1741 4.7 6.0 1749 4.7 6.1 1 1559 3.9 5.2 1576 3.9 5.3 1590 4.0 5.4 1.5 1404 3.2 4.5 1426 3.3 4.6 1446 3.4 4.7 2 1265 2.5 3.9 1292 2.7 4.0 1316 2.8 4.1 2.5 1140 2.0 3.3 1171 2.1 3.5 1198 2.2 3.6 3 1029 1.5 2.8 1062 1.6 3.0 1091 1.8 3.1 3.5 929 1.0 2.4 964 1.2 2.5 995 1.3 2.7 4 839 0.6 2.0 875 0.8 2.1 907 0.9 2:3 4.5 759 0.3 1.6 795 0.4 1.8 828 0.6 1.9 5 687 Contact 1.3 724 0.1 1.5 756 0.3 1.6 5.5 623 1.0 659 Contact 1.2 691 Contact 1.3 6 565 0.7 600 0.9 632 1.0 6.5 514 0.5 548 0.7 579 0.8 7 468 0.3 501 0.5 531 0.6 7.5 426 0.1 458 0.3 487 0.4 8 389 Contact 419 0.1 448 0.2 8.5 385 Contact 412 0.1 9 380 Contact 9.5 Notes:

  • Refer to Figure 7.2.3-1 for depiction of L1, L2, R1, and R2. Page 21 of 38 gl 1ame er 1pe h 30" o* t p* I ' . * ..

30"Pipe**

R1 R2 Temp. R1 R2 (oF) Radius Radius (oF) Radius Radius (in) (in) (in) (in) 1763 4.8 6.1 1706 4.5 5.9 1615 4.1 5.5 1513 3.7 5.0 1480 3.5 4.9 1342 2.9 4.2 1357 3.0 4.3 1192 2.2 3.6 1244 2.5 3.8 1059 1.6 3.0 1141 2.0 3.3 942 1.1 2.4 1048 1.6 2.9 839 0.6 2.0 962 1.2 2.5 748 0.2 1.6 884 0.8 2.2 668 Contact 1.2 813 0.5 1.9 597 0.9 748 0.2 1.6 535 0.6 689 Contact 1.3 480 0.4 635 1.1 432 0.1 585 0.8 389 Contact 540 0.6 499 0.4 462 0.3 427 0.1 396 Contact ** Heat affected zone review distance for 30" diameter pipe is reduced due to the Schedule 30 pipe wall thickness utilized in the equation.

Schedule 30 is the thickest wall size commercially available for 30" diameter pipe. Revision W03 Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation M-663-00017 A 7 .2.4 Fire Area A-34 Penetration Seals Page 22 of 38 Change Package 012154 created new Fire Area A-34 on the 2000' elevation of the Auxiliary Building in effort to improve the post fire safe shutdown strategy for Fire Area A-8. The change package supporting documentation evaluates the acceptability for fire barrier penetration seals for the new Fire Area. Table 7.2.4 identifies the penetrations that are not directly bounded to M-663-00017 typical detail limitations.

In each case, the subject seals satisfy 3-hour fire rating with no heat affect zone impact on either barrier side. Table 7 2 4 .. Penetration No. 012154 Typical Detail P132W1969 RB-7A/A-7 P132W1970 RB-5A P132W1977 RB-7A/A-7 P132W1978 RB-7A/A-7 8.0 FIRE WRAP 8.1 Description 8.1.1 Fire wrap is predominantly comprised of Darmatt KM 1 in a radiant energy shield, 1-hour, or 3-hour fire rated configuration, considering the protection requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix R, Section III.G.2. The fire wrap is provided for protection of redundant PFSSD circuit(s) within the same Fire Area. 8.1.2 Thermo-Lag 330-1 is utilized on a limited basis as a fire wrap material providing 1-hour fire rated protection, considering the protection requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix R, Section III.G.2. The fire wrap is provided for protection of redundant PFSSD circuit(s) within the same Fire Area. 8.2 *Evaluation of Unique or Unbounded Configurations 8.2.1 Issues Addressed in Original Fire Protection License Documents

1. None. 8.2.2 Darmatt KM1 has been installed in the Reactor Building and Fire Areas A-6, A-24, A-33, and C-35 in accordance with the requirements of change package 07037. Configurations not directly bounded by fire testing associated with 07037, are evaluated within the change package documentation and PIR 2002-2290.

The 3-Hour Darmatt KM-1 installed in Fire Areas A-6 and C-35 have been installed without a border design at the wall interfaces.

Fire testing reviews performed by fire protection revealed that a single layer, 3" min wide border design will be required to fully bound the barriers in accordance with GL-86-1 0, Supp 1 and ASTM E-119 time temperature requirements.

The initial Darmatt KM-1 installation was in accordance with change package 07037. Border designs, installation requirements, and comparison to bounding fire tests is documented within change package 012322. 8.2.3 Darmatt KM 1 has been installed in Fire Areas A-1 and A-18 in accordance with the requirements of change package 011038. Configurations not directly bounded by fire testing associated with 011 038, are evaluated within the change package documentation.

Revision W05 Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation M-663-00017 A Page 23 of 38 8.2.4 Darmatt KM1 has been installed in Fire Area A-1 northeast corridor in accordance with the requirements of change package 011656. Configurations not directly bounded by fire testing associated with 011656, are evaluated within the change package documentation.

8.2.5 Thermo-Lag 330-1 has been installed in Fire Area A-8 corridor 1320. The fire wrap, which was originally installed to satisfy IEEE 384 electrical separation, was upgraded in accordance with change package 011888 to provide a 1-hour fire rated barrier. This fire barrier segment is evaluated within the change package documentation.

8.2.6 Darmatt KM 1 has been installed in Fire Area A-8 northeast corridor, room 1320 in accordance with the requirements of change packages 012368 and 012568. Configurations not directly bounded by fire testing associated with 012368, are evaluated within the change package documentation.

There are no Unbounded configurations associated with Change Package 012568. 8.2.7 Presently, there are no unique or unbounded configurations evaluated within an attachment for this fire barrier protective element. 9.0 HATCHES 9.1 Description 9.1.1 Equipment and personnel hatch openings are provided in various areas of the plant. Protection of these openings is provided by steel plate. The plate is either bare or encapsulated by a fire resistive material, depending on the fire hazards in the area. 9.2 Evaluation of Unique or Unbounded Configurations 9.2.1 Issues Addressed in Original Fire Protection License Documents

1. Auxiliary Building Equipment Hatches The Auxiliary Building is provided with two sets of equipment hatchways in the northern and southern ends of the Auxiliary Building corridors.

A monorail hoist serves each set of hatchways to allow equipment to be moved from one elevation to another. Hatch covers (checker plate steel) and automatic sprinkler protection are provided for each hatchway at elevations 2000'-0", 2026'-0", and 2047'-0" to separate the corridor fire areas (A-1, A-8, A-16, A-19, and A-20). (Reference 4.1.2 and 4.1.3) 2. Reactor Building Personnel Hatch The personnel hatch, shown on USAR Figure 3.8-45, penetrates the Reactor Building into Fire Area A-20. The hatch has two bulk head doors on either side of the Reactor Building wall, which are secured by multiple pin latches. The gap between the door and the bulk heads is sealed by double o-ring gaskets. When closed, the gap between the door and the bulk head is less than 5 mills. The bulk heads and hatch doors are in series and provide redundant fire barrier protection. (Reference 4.1.2) Revision W05 Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation M-663-00017 A 9.2.2 Hatches for RHR & Containment Spray Valve Encapsulation Tanks Page 24 of 38 At elevation 2000'-0" in the center of the Auxiliary Building, two adjacent hatchways are provided above the RHR and containment spray valve encapsulation tanks located on elevation 1988'-0".

These two non-rated hatchways are covered with heavy steel plate covers. The major portion of the cover will only be removed when repair/maintenance work is performed on the encapsulated valves. The Pipe Chases (Rooms 1203 and 1204) at elevation 1988'-0" contain no process valves or electrical equipment.

Small vent valves are located in the curbed area surrounding the hatchways.

Small sections of the covers are designed to allow removal for easy access to the vent valves. These hatch covers are only provided for separation of Fire Areas A-1 and A-8 from a fire in Area A-8. Fires are not postulated in Rooms 1203 and 1204 because there are low fixed combustibles and the rooms are well separated from the remainder of Fire Area A-1. The two doors into the area are fire rated; however, the piping penetrations are not necessarily provided with fire-rated seals. The above discussion was evaluated as acceptable in change package 04585. 9.2.3 Personnel Hatch Between Fire Areas A-1 and A-33 A small non-rated personnel hatch constructed of Y.." steel plate is provided between the Aux. Steam Condenser Recovery And Storage Tank Room 1129 (Fire Area A-1) and Pipe Chase area 1207 (Fire Area A-33). This hatch has been evaluated by change package 1 0257 as an acceptable fire barrier for the hazards present. 9.2.4 Emergency Escape Hatch Between Fire Areas A-23 and T-2 A small non-rated personnel hatch constructed of 3/16" checker plate steel is provided at the 2026' elevation between the Auxiliary Building Main Feed Water Pump Rooms (Rooms 1411 and 1412 and Fire Area A-23) and the Turbine Building 2015'-4" platform area (Room 4351 and Fire Area T-2). The hatch provides an emergency escape pathway from the lower elevations of the Auxiliary Building Area 5 in the event of a steam leak or pipe rupture. The hatch has been evaluated by USQD 00-0012 as an acceptable fire barrier for the hazards present. 1 0.0 FIRE DOORS 10.1 Description 1 0.1.1 A fire door assembly is the combination of a door, frame, and hardware that together provide a specific degree of fire protection to personnel passageway openings.

Typically fire door assemblies are 3-hour fire rated. Revision W03 Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation M-663-00017 A 10.2 Evaluation of Unique or Unbounded Configurations Page 25 of 38 1 0.2.1 Issues Addressed in Original Fire Protection License Documents

1. Missile Doors An evaluation (Reference 4.7.4) was performed on the powerblock missile doors located in fire barrier walls to evaluate the doors based on the criteria established in ANSI/ASTM E 152, Standard Methods of Fire Tests of Door Assemblies.

The evaluation concludes that the missile doors satisfactorily met the ASTM E 152 acceptance criteria.

The WCGS powerblock utilizes missile doors in fire-rated walls. These doors are identified in Table 10.2.1.1-1.

Six of the doors are single swing and four are double swing doors. Each leaf of the doors is of similar construction, which includes a 2 1/2-inch-thick steel plate and vertical and horizontal reinforcing beams, which form a boxed-in area near the perimeter of the door. The multiple point latching mechanisms pass through the reinforcing beams and fix the doors in the opening. Missile doors, which are credited as fire doors, are provided at the following locations: (Reference 4.1.2 and 4.1.3) Table 10.2.1.1-1 Missile Doors Credited As Fire Doors Door# Location Description Communicating

' Fire Areas 2. Elevator and Dumbwaiter Doors Elevator and dumbwaiter doors are rated at 1-1/2 hours as required by ANSI A17.1. The 1-1/2 hour doors are an industry standard and, as stated in ANSI A17.1, and are acceptable for use in a 2-hour rated elevator or dumbwaiter shaft. For a fire to propagate from one floor elevation to another, it would have to penetrate two doors. (Reference 4.1.2 and 4.1.3) Revision W03 Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation M-663-00017 A 3. Water Tight Doors Page 26 of 38 A fire test was performed to evaluate the fire resistance performance of watertight doors located in fire barrier walls. The fire test was performed in accordance with the Standard for Fire Tests of Door Assemblies, UL 1 OB. Immediately after the fire exposure, the door was exposed to a hose stream test as specified for 3-hour fire doors. The watertight doors without gaskets are classified by UL as Purpose Type Fire Doors and Frame Assemblies, Rating 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> (A). To achieve watertight integrity criteria, gasketing material was added to the door assembly in accordance with the manufacturer's recommendations. (Reference 4.1.2 and 4.1.3) 10.2.2 Change package 05314 and PIR 94-0143 evaluate the acceptability of up to a 1" gap between the door bottom edge and floor for swing type fire doors without integral seal packs. The fire doors identified in Table 10.2.2-1 contain a door bottom edge gap that exceeds NFPA 80 limitations.

The PIR evaluated each of these as acceptable and generically evaluated up to a 1" door bottom edge gap for all swing type fire doors without integral seal packs. Table 10.2.2-1 Fire Doors with Bottom Edge Gaps Exceeding NFPA 80 Limitations Door#

Communicating*

Fire .. . Areas

  • 32015 2032' Control Bldg. Lower Cable Spreading C-21 to C-6 Room to Southwest Stairwell 32092 1984' Control Bldg. Corridor 3206 to Corridor C-5 to C-6 3204 34071 2016' Control Bldg. Corridor 3406 to Battery C-35 to C-16 Room 3407 43091 2000' Turbine Bldg 2000' Stairwell T-2 Turbine Turbine Bldg. to life Building safety stairwell 1 0.2.3 Presently there are no unique or unbounded configurations evaluated within an attachment for this fire barrier protective element. 11.0 FIRE DAMPERS 11.1 Description 11.1.1 A fire damper is a device, installed in an air distribution system, designed to close automatically upon detection of heat, to interrupt migratory airflow, and restrict the passage of flame. Three-hour fire rated curtain type fire dampers are utilized within a 10 gauge (minimum) steel sleeve that is attached to the ductwork and supported by the barrier or sleeve enclosure.

Fire dampers are typically located within the plane of the fire barrier, and meet UL 555 requirements.

11.2 Evaluation of Unique or Unbounded Configurations 11.2.1 Issues Addressed in Original Fire Protection License Documents

1. None. 11.2.2 Unique or unbounded fire damper configurations are evaluated in Attachment F. Revision W03 Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation M-663-00017 A 12.0 STRUCTURAL STEEL FIREPROOFING 12.1 Description Page 27 of 38 12.1.1 Fireproofing utilized at Wolf Creek is a cementitious-based or intumescent material covering structural steel to prevent structural member collapse in the event of fire exposure.

Predominantly, a coating thickness necessary to achieve a 3-hour fire resistance rating is provided.

Albi Duraspray was used as the material of choice to protect structural steel (cementitious coatings) in Category I structures.

In 2005 the manufacturer informed WCNOC that Albi Duraspray would no longer be manufactured or distributed.

As a result, Monokote Z-146 was approved in September 2005 as a direct replacement or repair material.

Currently the vast majority of plant structural steel in Category I structures is protected with Albi Duraspray.

Both Albi Duraspray and Monokote Z-146 are cementitious and have similar physical characteristics, adhesion properties and fireproofing qualities.

In July 2017, Hilti Fire Finish CFP-SP WB was approved as an alternative fire proofing material to the cementitious-based materials.

Change package 015274 provides an alternative fireproofing material for protection of new structural steel. The alternate fireproofing is not approved as a repair material for existing structural steel protected with Monokote Z-146 or Albi Duraspray fireproofing.

The fireproofing material (Hilti Fire Finish CFB-SB WB) is a water based intumescent coating to help protect interior structural steel against the effects of fire. It has been tested to UL 263/ ASTM E119 standard and is approved for interior conditioned space and interior general purpose use. Typically fireproofing is utilized to ensure structural integrity of steel building columns and beams that are integrated as an element of a fire barrier or steel structures that are part of the building that may be exposed to fire. It provides protection of safety significant equipment and/or life safety protection from room/area structural failure due to fire exposure.

Cementitious or intumescent fireproofing materials are applied to a sufficient thickness (qualified by fire testing) over the exposed surfaces of the structural member in a manner that will sufficiently bond the fireproofing clad to the substrate being protected.

In some cases, lathing must be utilized for cementitious material to assure reliable adhesion to the underside of beams and repair areas in excess of one square foot. 12.2 Evaluation of Unique or Unbounded Configurations 12.2.1 Issues Addressed in Original Fire Protection License Documents

1. No fireproofing is provided for the Fuel building roof. Since the fire loading in this area is low, no credible fire can affect the roof. In addition, the roof is missile proof, 2-foot-thick reinforced concrete.

Therefore, no fireproofing is required in this area. (Reference 4.1.2) Revision W08 Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation M-663-00017 A Page 28 of 38 Additionally, in various plant areas structural steel has been integrated as part of the fire barrier assembly.

Refer to Figure 12.2.2-2 for a typical application of protected structural steel as an element of a fire barrier assembly.

However, fire testing does not directly bound the use of protected steel as part of a fire barrier assembly.

Such a configuration presents the potential to transmit detrimental temperatures to insitu combustibles and/or PFSSD circuits located in close proximity to the unexposed barrier side. This issue requires a Heat Affected Zone (HAZ) review similar to that discussed in Section 7.2.3 for non-T rated penetration seals. Considering the above discussion, Section 12.2.4 and 12.2.6, and Attachments G1 through G5 demonstrate, via evaluation, that unique/unbounded structural steel fire protection configurations, including the omission of thermal short protection, do not compromise structural steel integrity.

Section 1.1.1 identifies the overall fireproofing assessment review methodology utilized.

The evaluation approaches utilized were developed considering the structural steel fireproofing guidance provided in Section 4.2.2 of Regulatory Guide 1.189 (Revision 0}, and Fire barrier evaluation guidance from Generic Letter 86-10. Relevant sections from each are repeated below: Regulatory Guide 1.189. Section 4.2.2 Structural steel forming a part of or supporting fire barriers should be protected to provide fire resistance equivalent to that required of the barrier. Where the structural steel is not protected and has a lower fire rating than the required rating of the fire barrier, the configuration should be justified by a fire hazards analysis that shows the temperature the steel will reach during fire and the ability of the steel to carry the required loads at that temperature

..... Generic Letter 86-10. Enclosure 1 Item 4 The term "fire area" as used in Appendix R means an area sufficiently bounded to withstand the hazards associated with the area and, as necessary, to protect important equipment within the area from a fire outside the area. In order to meet the regulation, fire area boundaries need not be completely sealed floor-to-ceiling, wall-to-wall boundaries.

However, all unsealed openings should be identified and considered the evaluating the effectiveness of the overall barrier. Where fire area boundaries are not wall-to-wall, floor-to-ceiling boundaries with all penetrations sealed to the fire rating required of the boundaries, licensees must perform an evaluation to assess the adequacy of fire boundaries in their plants to determine if the boundaries will withstand the hazards associated with the area ..... Revision W04 Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation M-663-00017 A Figure 12.2.2-1, Typical Unprotected Thermal Short Attachment Figure 12.2.2-2 Typical Fireproofed Steel Integral to a Fire Barrier Page 29 of 38 Revision W04 Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation M-663-00017 A 12.2.3 Thermal Short and Barrier Assessment Methodology Page 30 of 38 The primary purpose of the fireproofing barrier review was to assess the impact of unprotected steel attachments (thermal shorts) on structural steel with fireproofing.

In effort to address this issue, Fire Protection performed plant walk downs and inspections in all Safety Related areas to collect and record relevant thermal short data. The walk downs were conducted on a room-by-room basis utilizing structural steel drawings and a best effort visual inspection to determine the worse case thermal short configuration for columns, beams and where the structural steel serves as a 10 CFR 50 Appendix R fire boundary.

Stairwells that separated Appendix R Fire Areas were reviewed by elevation because each elevation may have incorporated structural steel that separates fire areas with different combustible loading. The thermal short items identified for each room are considered the bounding configuration for all other thermal shorts within the confines of rooms and/or fire areas requiring structural steel fireproofing.

The thermal short selection process did not take into consideration the load applied to the attachment member. To determine a worse case scenario for thermal short attachment the following was considered:

  • Location of attachments, (flange, web and height on columns), bottom flange on beams and higher attachments on columns are considered worse case verses web attachment on beams and attachment to columns that are attached low to the floor, provided attachments are similar in size and weight. No consideration was given to location on steel spans or to adjacent steel connections and load sharing member capability.
  • Size & type of attachments (I beam shaped member verses tube steel, etc.), tube steel considered worse case due to area of unprotected steel.
  • Concentration of attachments.
  • Orientation of attachments.
  • Size of structural steel.
  • Appendix R separation, one-sided or two-sided structural steel protection and proximity of relevant circuits or components when thermal short impact is observed.
  • Thickness of fireproofing when applied excessively thick in areas of issue, were documented to provide thermal credit.
  • Structural Beams and columns with supporting or restraining wall interfaces.

To aid the evaluation process and to organize the data into similar configurations and conditions, field sketches were prepared to document the worse case scenario for thermal shorts and Appendix R HAZ issues, as determined by Fire Protection.

The field sketches included room layout and thermal short/HAZ attachments within each room or area under review. Room sketches depict the room layout to locate each issue being evaluated and attachment sketches provide details such as size, critical dimensions and general orientation of the attachments to the building steel. Sketches are not to scale and only depict general attachment layout and configuration to closely resemble the attachment member orientation and location to the structural member. Detail sketches do not provide steel or contain structural connection designs, but however provide sufficient detail to assist in determining the affects of heat flux through the unprotected member into the structural beams, columns and/or the affect of HAZ to PFSSD circuits or components on the unexposed side of the barrier, when applicable.

Revision W04 Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation M-663-00017 A Page 31 of 38

  • Field sketches and photographs are provided in Attachment G to document the evaluation of worse case scenarios.

Following completion of field walk downs, issue categories were developed with each room assigned to the corresponding applicable categories.

The unique/unbounded fireproofing categories necessary to address identified issues are summarized bellow.

  • Attachment G1 -Fire Protection Evaluation for Generic Fireproofing Issues Appendix R Barriers with Incorporated Structural Steel Steel Internal to Cable Chases Embedded Steel Miscellaneous Steel Steel Protection for Stairwells and Elevators Diesel Building Structural Steel Control Building Duct Chase
  • Attachment G2 -Fire Protection Evaluation for Structural Steel Fireproofing with Unprotected Thermal Shorts Within Open Rooms
  • Attachment G3 -Fire Protection Evaluation for Structural Steel Fireproofing With Unprotected Thermal Shorts in Closed Rooms with 650 kW Fire and No Ventilation or Forced Ventilation
  • Attachment G4 -Fire Protection Evaluation for Structural Steel Fireproofing With Unprotected Thermal Shorts in Closed Rooms with a Credible Fire and No Ventilation or Forced Ventilation
  • Attachment G5 -Fire Protection Evaluation for HAZ Assessment of Structural Steel Integral to Fire Boundary Table 1.1.1-1 identifies each room reviewed for structural steel fireproofing unique/unbounded configurations and the corresponding applicable evaluation that applies to the room. Revision W04 Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation M-663-00017 A TABLE 1.1.1-1 Structural Steel Fireproofing Evaluation Matrix Fire Roomo Building Elev.

Description:

.* ,. . :cb Area Page 32 of 38 ,Attachment

' Evaluation(s) . Revision W04 Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation 1\11-663-00017 A Fire Room. ; Building Elev. Area Page 33 of 38

Description:

Attachment ... . i.Evaluation(s) 1 Revision W04 Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation M-663-00017 A Fire Room

  • Building Elev. Area ;:;

.. Page 34 of 38 Attachment Evaluation(s)

Revision W04 Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation M-663-00017 A Page 35 of 38 Fire Room** ** .T ' Elev.

Description:

  • * * .*****.

' \* Attachment Area' I* i l*f**?:,.'!*

.*

  • yj;. * *.**.<* *. :** .. Evalllation(s) . 12.2.4 Design Omissions Due to Pipe Snubber and Struts: Snubber and pipe strut attachment points present a unique issue concerning the fire proofing protection of structural steel. In some instances it is necessary to locally remove fireproofing to provide accessibility to the snubber clevis pins to allow snubber removal during functional testing and validation activities.

When this is the case, Monokote Z-146 is used to restore the fireproofing in accordance with CNT-MC-600.

It is acceptable to contour the Monokote Z-146 so future disassembly efforts will not require subsequent fireproofing removal, provided the omission area is no larger than 64 square inches. The rework area is contoured to allow free movement and not bind the snubber or strut in any direction and allow unrestricted access to the clevis pins. Contouring the fireproofing to provide sufficient space between snubber, strut components and fireproofing is necessary to accommodate design moments. Figures 12.2.4-1 and 12.2.4-2 depict typical representation of fireproofing omissions where struts require unrestricted movement.

Snubber attachment points are similar and require the same protection technique, producing the same protection or contoured configuration in the fireproofing finish. Therefore, contouring the fireproofing for either a strut or snubber attachment point is considered equivalent, whether on beams or columns. Revision W04 Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation M-663-00017 A

""' Co'-"'-NS m:1S J V IT\Oiw "TIM* A0i'A loR . . lf"J16' fi&Tt!<-'1.:)

WITH Z.\".,...l" __i Al..8\ bul! 11> ... ,st4 I l2c:!M S

  • Figure 12.2.4-1 Typical Strut or Snubber Attachment Omission Figure 12.2.4-2 Page 36 of 38 Photo Of Typical Omission With Sloping Fireproofing Evaluations and reviews of areas within the plant identified similar sized protection omissions through unprotected steel attachments or thermal shorts that were determined not to affect building steel, in the event of fire. Unprotected steel attachments are considered a worse case scenario when comparing reduced fireproofing in areas of snubber or strut attachment locations. The areas of reduced fireproofing are not devoid of fireproofing material and remain mostly protected with limited thickness in the area of attachment point with increased thickness toward the outer perimeter of the contoured areas. These areas of contoured fireproofing slope gradually and provide better protection than that of larger unprotected steel attachments with no thermal short protection. Because the fireproofing is sloped, it will diminish the affects of thermal heat flux into the building steel structure by reducing the unprotected area at the point of attachment.

Although, not fully protected with full thickness fireproofing throughout attachment area, the areas are considered diminutive in nature when considering larger unprotected attachments found acceptable through analysis documented in Attachments G1 through G5. Revision W04 Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation M-663-00017 A Page 37 of 38 Based on the above discussions, it is reasonable to conclude that the contoured areas accommodating snubber or strut movement would perform no worse than unprotected steel attachments found acceptable through analysis.

Therefore, contoured fireproofing areas where snubber or strut attachments are required will not cause steel failures during fire exposures and are considered acceptable.

12.2.5 Calculation FP-M-011 evaluates the following:

1. Conditions where structural steel fireproofing does not conform to the minimum required thickness.
2. Protection adequacy of structural members that are smaller than fire tested member sizes. 3. Calculation FP-M-011 evaluated the Albi Duraspray coating thickness for unbounded sizes (smaller than tested) and found that the as-built thickness for the majority of coatings were adequate and identified where under thickness coatings were found they were to be reworked for compliance.

Calculation FP-M-011 did not consider large or multiple omissions of protective coatings due to thermal short attachments (secondary members).

Thermal Shorts and protection omissions are evaluated on a worse case basis by room and/or fire area, as documented in Attachments G1 through G4. 12.2.6 Interim Material Omission:

Based on the fireproofing evaluations documented in Attachments G1 through G4, interim removal of steel fireproofing (144 in 2) is permissible without administrative control (AP 10-104), Breach Authorization.

These evaluations have demonstrated the acceptability of unprotected thermal shorts. Considering these evaluation results, it is reasonable to conclude that interim small material omission up to 144 in 2 is comparable to an unprotected thermal short, and does not present an unacceptable determent to structural steel performance.

13.0 CABLE TRAY FIRESTOPS

& CABLE TRAY COVERS 13.1 Description 13.1.1 A firestop is a protective configuration provided to prevent the spread of fire along a combustible element. At Wolf Creek, this protective configuration is comprised of a combination of Silicone Foam and sheet metal covers for a limited number of cable trays. 13.2 Evaluation of Unique or Unbounded Configurations 13.2.1 Issues Addressed in Original Fire Protection License Documents

1. None Revision W04 Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation M-663-00017 A 13.2.2 Auxiliary Building 2026' Corridor Room 1408 Cable Tray Firestops Page 38 of38 Non-rated Silicone Foam firestop and sheet metal tray cover protection is provided for raceways 116J5830, 116U5D30, and 116U5E30 in Room 1408 (Fire Area A-16). This protective configuration, as depicted in E-1 R8900 Sheet 65, is provided to prevent fire propagation between redundant Component Cooling Water trains, which are separated by spatial distance.

An approximate 12" cable tray segment on each side of the firestop was initially protected with Thermo-Lag 330-1. The firestop, tray cover, and Thermo-Lag 330-1 protective configuration was accepted in the original fire protection licensing basis, as documented in Reference 4.1.3. Change package 06513 evaluates as acceptable the firestops and sheet metal tray covers without the Thermo-Lag 330-1 protection, which was removed due to combustibility concerns associated with the Thermo-Lag material.

13.2.3 Presently, there are no unique or unbounded configurations evaluated within an attachment for this protective element. Revision W04 Rev. No. W01 M-663-00017 A Attachment A1 Fire Protection Evaluation For Control Room Floor Slab and Cable Trenches Prepared By Date Reviewed By 8/22/05 Wayne S Aregood Jeff Suter ' Page 1 Date 8/22/05 M-663-00017 A Attachment A 1 Revision W01 Table of Contents Page 2 of9 Revision Log ...................................................................................................................................

3 1.0 Purpose ...............................................................................................................................

4 2.0 Scope ..................................................................................................................................

4 3.0 References

..........................................................................................................................

4 4.0 Evaluation

...........................................................................................................................

5 5.0 Conclusions

.........................................................................................................................

9 M-663-00017 A Attachment A1 Revision W01 Revision Reason for Revision W01 Originallssue Page 3 of9 Revision Log M-663-00017A Attachment A1 Revision W01 1.0 Purpose Page 4 of9 1.1 The purpose of this document is to evaluate an existing fire barrier design that does not conform to the temperature (T) rating requirements of ASTM E 119. This evaluation was conducted in effort to satisfy regulatory expectation regarding qualification and documentation of fire barrier issues. This evaluation was conducted in accordance with the guidance of NRC Generic Letter 86-10. 2.0 Scope 2.1 Control Room floor and cable trenches identified in Table I. 3.0 References 3.1 NRC Generic Letter 86-10, Implementation of Fire Protection Requirements, dated April 24, 1986 3.2 NRC Information Notice 88-04, Inadequate Qualification and Documentation of Fire Barrier Penetration Seals 3.3 10 CFR 50 Appendix R, Fire Protection Program For Nuclear Power Facilities Operating Prior To January 1, 1979 3.4 ASTM E 119, Standard Test Methods for Fire Tests of Building Construction and Materials 3.5 PIR 2005-0249, Control Room Cable Trench Design, compliance issue not meeting ASTM-E119 cold side temperature requirements (250°F + ambient).

3.6 Drawing E-OR3909, Raceway Sections and Details, Control Building, Rev 7. 3.7 Drawing E-1R3611, Raceway Plan Control Building Area 1, El. 2047'-6", Rev 0 3.8 Drawing C-1 C3611, Control Building Area 1 Concrete Neat Lines & Reinforcing Plans Floor EL. 2047'-6", Rev. 0 3.9 Drawing C-OC3613, Control Building Area 1 Concrete Neat Lines & Reinforcing Partial; Plans & Details EL. 2047'-6", Rev. 3. 3.10 Drawing C-1003, Civil-Structural, Structural Steel and Concrete General Notes, Rev 6. 3.11 Drawing A-1335, Hot Laboratory Equipment

& Furniture Layout Elevations and Details, EL. 1984'-0", Rev. 1 3.12 Specification C-1 01, Onsite Batch Plant And Furnishing Concrete For The Wolf Creek Generating Station, Rev. 26 3.13 Benjamin, I. A, 1961, Fire Resistance of Concrete, Symposium on Fire Resistance of Concrete, American Concrete Institute M-663-00017 A Attachment A1 Revision W01 3.14 The Fire Protection Handbook, 19th Edition, Volume 2 3.15 The SFPE Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering, 1st Edition Page 5 of9 3.16 EPRI TR-1 00443, Methods of Quantitative Fire Hazards Analysis, May 1992 3.17 AP 10-102, Control of Combustibles, Rev. 9 3.18 XX-X-004, Combustible Fire Loading for Each Room in the Various Fire Areas at WCNOC, Rev. 3 3.19 IEEE 383, Standard for Qualifying Class 1 E Electric Cables and Field Splices for Nuclear Power Generating Stations.

3.20 ACI301-72, Specification for Structural Concrete for Buildings (Revised 1981) 3.21 NUREG-1805, Fire Dynamics Tools Quantitative Fire Hazard Analysis Method for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Fire Protection Inspection Program 4.0 Assumptions 4.1 Based on partial visual examinations of trenches EF159 and EF163, it is reasonable to conclude that the remaining nine trenches are constructed in a similar manner, utilizing the same protective softener material between cable and concrete surfaces.

5.0 Evaluation 5.1 Assessment of Condition to Design Requirements The Control Room floor slab at elevation 204 7' -6" is constructed in accordance with drawing C1C3611 utilizing normal weight aggregate concrete per specification C 101. In general, the thickness of the Control Room floor is 8" throughout the entire area, except adjacent to the East and West walls and the 11 recessed cable trenches identified in Table I. The areas spanning from the East and West walls to the first structural beam are approximately 1 0" wide and are constructed with a 2" corrugated steel Q-Deck, thus producing a 6" floor thickness within the Q-Deck valleys. Because the design utilizes 2" Q-Decking, structurally the floor slab is considered 8", but a 6" floor thickness can only be applied for fire rating. Application of Figure 1 from References 3.13 and 3.14 reveals that a normal weight aggregate floor segment that is at least 5-1/2" thick is qualified for a 3-hour fire (F) and temperature (T} rating per the requirements of ASTM E 119. The integral cable trenches are recessed within the slab, yielding a reinforced concrete barrier thickness of 4%" at each trench. Cable trench details are depicted on drawing COC3613, while Figure 2 depicts a typical cable trench configuration.

The floor trenches separate post fire safe shutdown (PFSSD) circuits from their redundant counterparts in the Lower Cable Spreading Room, located below the Control Room.

M-663-00017A Attachment A1 Revision WO 1 Page 6 of9 The trench area 4%" concrete thickness will not allow the passage of flame or hose stream for a 3-hour duration, as the concrete is not consumed during fire exposure.

However, application of Figure 1 reveals that the trench areas will not satisfy the unexposed side fire barrier temperature limit of 250°F plus ambient, as required by ASTM E 119. Therefore, further review is necessary to assess PFSSD capability regarding impact to cables within the trenches, where unexposed side temperatures would exceed 250°F plus ambient when subjected to an ASTM E 119 fire exposure.

Trench or Raceway No. 7 c; 6 .. : 5 Q) c X4 u :E t-3 Qll -Q) !I.. 0 EF159 EF163 EF150 EF151 EF152 EF153 EF154 EF155 EF156 EF157 EF159 5 2 u 20 --TABLE I Control Room Cable Trenches Building Room Room Floor No. Description Elevation Control 3605 Equip. Cabinet Area 2047'-6" Control 3605 Equip. Cabinet Area 2047'-6" Control 3601 Control Room 2047'-6" Control 3601 Control Room 2047'-6" Control 3601 Control Room 2047'-6" Control 3601 Control Room 2047'-6" Control 3601 Control Room 2047'-6" Control 3601 Control Room 2047'-6" Control 3601 Control Room 2047'-6" Control 3601 Control Room 2047'-6" Control 3601 Control Room 2047'-6" 7.., v __ \>-iP""' _/:/ o\

7 [/

s\0 :;iii" . o.\e c:,Vl -""""' l

_...... v I? , ..... 40 60 SO tOO 150 200 :300 Fire End.urcnce, Mk1. FIGURE 1 Relationship of Slab Thickness and Type of Aggregate M-663-00017A Attachment A1 Revision W01 FIGURE 2 Typical Cable Trench Configuration Page 7 of9 5.2 Evaluation of Condition The failure mode necessitating eva l uation is 1he potent i a l effect of high temperatu r e exposure to redundant PFSSD cables routed and lying within the trenches in the event of Lower Cable Spreading Room fire. No credit has been given to suppress i on systems l ocated i n the Lower Cable Spread i ng Room. The Control Room reinforced concrete floor slab is constructed utilizing coarse normal weight aggregate and cement with combinat i on of # 4 and # 6 rebar , 3" X 2" X thick steel ang l e embedded and recessed into the concrete at the upper trench corners and tas a minimum compress i ve strength of 4000 psi. The corner angles are recessed %* to accommodate the%" trench flat steel cover plates to allow the floor surface to be completely flush elim i nat i ng any potent i al trip hazards within the Contro l Room. Each cable trench also contains a Unistrut support (ASOO or equal) located approximately in the center of the t r ench throughout the entire length to prov i de support for the floor closure plate to prevent sagging and deformation.

The Un i strut support is shown on Drawing E-40R3909. This Unistrut support is internal to the trenches and will have no impact to th i s eva l uation. The trenches contain IEEE 383 cable that i s separated from the concrete barrier surface by a 1/8" thick layer of dielect ri c mat material to protect the cable from chaffing. The mat is a silicone elastomer based material (similar to silicone elastomer based materials used for sealing penetration openings).

The mat provides some cable protection from direct radiant and conduct i ve exposure.

References 3.16 and 3.21 identify that the therma l insult thresho l d for IEEE 383 cable is 700°F. Figures 3 and 4 from Reference 3.15 r eveal that a four inch slab thickness for either siliceous or carbonate based normal weight aggregate concrete results in unexposed side surfaces temperature of less than 500°F. This provides at least a 200°F margin between maximum unexposed side temperature deve l opment and the cable therma l insult threshold of the IEEE 383 cable. Additionally , the predominately 8" thick slab surrounding the trenches will provide added heat sink capability when compared to the constant floor slab thickness represented in F i gures 3 and 4. Therefore , the data M-663-00017 A Attachment A1 Revision WO 1 Page 8 of9 ... 0 1500 1400 1300 1200 presented in Figures 3 and 4 are considered conservative in respect to potential temperature exposure to the trench unexposed side surfaces.

Based on the potential exposure temperature of approximately 500°F during an ASTM E119 three-hour fire exposure and the cable within the trenches having a temperature qualification of 700°F, it is concluded that functionality of cables within the trenches will not be impacted.

Therefore, there is no impact to PFSSD capability.

Moreover, the combustible loading (insitu and AP 10-102 transient combustible package allowance) within the Lower Cable Spreading Room would present a credible fire scenario that is significantly less severe than the 3hour exposure presented by an ASTM E 119 fire. Even when considering applied construction tolerances, as referenced in Drawing C-1003, Ref. 3.10 and ACI 301-72, Ref 3.19, the resulting trench minimum thicknesses will provide a conservative temperature exposure of 500°F, thus the trench slab thicknesses are bounded to this evaluation.

Therefore, actual unexposed side trench temperatures would realistically be even less than 500°F, presenting an even greater thermal margin to cables within the trenches.

1500 1400 1300 0"-1200 w 1100 1-< ffi 1000 w 1-SILICEOUS AGGREGATE CONCRETE (NORMAL WEIGHT) 3 4 1/2 1 1-1/2 2 3 4 FIRE TEST TIME, HA FIGURE 3 Temperatures within Concrete Slabs (Normal Weight Carbonate Aggregate) 1-1/2 2 FIRE TEST TIME. HA FIGURE4 Temperatures within Concrete Slabs (Normal Weight Siliceous Aggregate)

M-663-00017 A Attachment A 1 Revision W01 5.3 Post Fire Safe Shutdown Impact Page 9 of9 There is no impact to PFSSD systems or components as a result of this evaluation.

The cable trenches will not develop unexposed side temperatures that will challenge functionality of cables within the trenches.

Therefore, PFSSD capability is not negatively impacted by the Control Room floor cable trench design. 6.0 Conclusions The entire Control Room floor is 3-hour F and T rated with the exception of the cable trenches, which are only 3-hour F rated. The evaluation reveals that the maximum unexposed side cable trench temperatures will not exceed the thermal insult temperature of the cable, with substantial thermal margin. The Control Room floor and associated trenches satisfy regulatory requirements and commitments as well as WCNOC Fire Protection Program requirements, to prevent spread of fire from one fire area to another. It has also been determined through this evaluation that the lack of a T rating for the cable trenches will not affect the plant's ability to achieve and maintain PFSSD.

Page 1 W,

CREEK -'1** NUCLEAR OPERATING CORPORATION M-663-00017 A Attachment A2 Fire Protection Evaluation For Removable

& Flanged Containment Penetrations Sealing Devices Re . Prepared By Date Reviewed By Date W01 8/22/05 8122105 Wayne S Aregood Jeff Suter M-663-000 17 A Attachment A2 Revision W01 Table of Contents Page 2 of9 Revision Log ...................................................................................................................................

3 1.0 Purpose ...............................................................................................................................

4 2.0 Scope ..................................................................................................................................

4 3.0 References

..........................................................................................................................

4 4.0 Assumptions

..................................................................................................

4 5.0 Evaluation

...........................................................................................................................

5 6.0 Conclusions

.........................................................................................................................

7 M-663*00017 A Attachment A2 Revision W01 Revision Reason for Revision W01 Original Issue Page 3 of9 Revision Log M-663-000 17 A Attachment A2 Revision W01 1.0 Purpose Page 4 of9 1.1 The purpose of this document is to evaluate an existing fire barrier design that has not been fire tested in accordance with ASTM E 119. This evaluation was conducted in effort to satisfy regulatory expectation regarding qualification and documentation of fire barrier issues. This evaluation was conducted in accordance with the guidance of NRC Generic Letter 86-10. 2.0 Scope 2.1 Table I removable and flanged Containment penetration devices with gaskets. 3.0 References 3.1 NRC Generic Letter 86-10, Implementation of Fire Protection Requirements, dated April 24, 1986 3.2 NRC Information Notice 88-04, Inadequate Qualification and Documentation of Fire Barrier Penetration Seals 3.3 10 CFR 50 Appendix R, Fire Protection Program For Nuclear Power Facilities Operating Prior To January 1, 1979 3.4 ASTM E 119, Standard Test Methods for Fire Tests of Building Construction and Materials 3.5 Drawing M-1 09A-00013, Containment Spray Isolation Valve Encapsulation (TEN02A), W13 3.6 Drawing M-1 09A-00014, Containment Spray Isolation Valve Encapsulation (TEN02B), W12 3.7 Drawing M-109A-00014, RHR Isolation Valve Encapsulation (TEJ01A), W13 3.8 Drawing M-1 09A-00016, RHR Isolation Valve Encapsulation (TEJ01 B), W12 3.9 AP 10-102, Control of Combustibles, Rev. 9 3.10 XX-X-004, Combustible Fire Loading for Each Room in the Various Fire Areas at WCNOC, Rev. 3 4.0 Assumptions 4.1 It is assumed that the approved gasket materials have been used to seal the Containment penetration flanged sealing devices identified i1 Table II. This is acceptable based on a review of References 3.5 through 3.8.

M-663-00017 A Attachment A2 Revision WO 1 5.0 Evaluation Page 5 of9 5.1 Assessment of Condition to Design Requirements Containment penetrations are installed through the Reactor Building boundary, separating Auxiliary Building from Reactor Building.

These penetrations service plant systems that are required for plant functions during normal plant operations.

Several of these penetrations (mechanical) are equipped with flanges and sealing gaskets to allow disassembly and reassembly for maintenance or modification evolutions.

These penetration devices have not been specifically fire tested and therefore, an evaluation is required to determine fire impact to these penetration devices. Only the fire performance capabilities of the flanged designs are considered herein. In general, Containment penetrations and the lack of specific fire testing is an industry issue. Containment penetration assemblies are not typical and differ in specific design attributes that would make it very difficult to bound to a specific fire test, if tested. Because these penetrations are typically constructed in a manner that does not promote fire propagation, little concern or emphasis has been given to Containment penetration sealing devices regarding fire performance.

This evaluation focuses on six (6) Containment penetrations that have been provided with flanged surfaces and gaskets that sometimes require disassembly and reassembly during refuel or unscheduled outages. These flanged gaskets could be affected by fire and are herein evaluated, Table I identifies these penetration devices. TABLE I Removable

& Flanged Containment Penetration Devices Communication Penetration No. Fire Fire Comment: Area Area P-36 A-25 RB-1 AP 10-104, Used for routing maintenance support equipment.

P-68 A-25 RB-1 AP 10-104, Used for routing maintenance support equipment.

Encapsulated Valve A-1 RB-1 AP 1 0-1 04, Encapsulation Boundary Tank B (CTMT Spray) M-1 09A-00014 TEN02B Encapsulated Valve A-1 RB-1 AP 10-104, Encapsulation Boundary Tank B (RHR) TEJ01 B M-109A-00016 Encapsulated Valve A-1 RB-1 AP 1 0-1 04, Encapsulation Boundary Tank A (CTMT Spray) M-109A-00013 TEN02A Encapsulated Valve A-1 RB-1 AP 10-104, Encapsulation Boundary Tank A (RHR) TEJ01A M-109A-00015 M-663-00017 A Attachment A2 Revision W01 5.2 Evaluation of Condition Page 6 of 9 Each of the Table I penetrations are designed with flanged surfaces with a sealing gasket to ensure Containment Building pressure integrity.

These gaskets are 1/16" thick and compressed between mechanical flanges to ensure Containment design pressure integrity.

These gaskets are designed and manufactured by Garlock Sealing Technologies, Garlock, Inc. to steam saturation and have continuous operating temperature ratings of 400°F/650°F with a peak maximum exposure temperature rating of 700°F/1000°F, see Table II, below. Once compressed, the gaskets are not exposed to direct flame impingement and thus, not susceptible to ablative consumption during fire exposure.

The remaining design surfaces and pressure features are heavy wall carbon steel or stainless steel material (tank, pipe & flanges) that are not generally affected by fire exposure.

WCNOC design indicates there are two approved gasket materials to be used for sealing the subject flanged penetrations; Garlock Blue-Gard Style 3200, or Style G-9920, both of which have high temperature sealing capabilities, as indicated in Table II. Gasket resign data, as supplied by the manufacturers specification sheets, is provided in Figures 1 and 2. Gasket Type. 3200 Blue Gard G-9920 TABLE II Garlock Gasket Data Color Continuous Temp (F) Off-white 400° Mahogany 650° w/Biue Band Max. Figure Temp (F) No. 700° 1 1000° 2 Further, the combustible loading (insitu and AP 10-102 transient combustible package allowance) within Table I Containment penetration areas presents a credible fire scenario that is significantly less severe than the 3-hour exposure presented by an ASTM E 119 fire. The combustible loading on either side of the barrier is LOW and these areas are not normally traveled during normal plant operations, thus limiting the use and storage of combustible materials in proximity to subject components.

In the unlikely event a fire would occur on either side of the barrier, the LOW fire load could not produce a fire with such intensity to challenge the compressed gasket materials.

Therefore, the integrity of the flanged surfaces and gaskets during postulated fire exposures in these areas would not become degraded to such a degree that would allow the passage of smoke, hot gases or flame to the other side of the barrier. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that the flanged penetration surfaces with Garlock gaskets will not negatively impact the barrier to perform its intended function during fire exposure.

M-663-00017 A Attachment A2 Revision WO 1 5.3 Post Fire Safe Shutdown Impact Page 7 of9 There is no impact to PFSSD systems or components as a result of this evaluation.

The removable

& flanged Containment penetration sealing devices with Garlock gaskets will not allow the passage of flame through the Aux/Containment flanged penetration surface areas if exposed to fire. Therefore, PFSSD capability is not negatively impacted.

6.0 Conclusions Based on the above discussions, it is reasonable to conclude that the removable

& flanged Containment penetration sealing devices would not be affected by fire to a degree that would challenge barrier integrity.

It has been determined through this evaluation that the removable

& flanged Containment penetration seal devices satisfy regulatory requirements and commitments as well as WCNOC Fire Protection Program requirements, to prevent spread of fire from one Fire Area to another.

M-663-00017 A Attachment A2 Revision W01 FIGURE 1 laiiBDt SIIIB8200 BI.IIE-flBD4!1 IIIBkll/ng Materlm:.

A.ramid Flbl::r Binder Calor.: Off.. White Mn'limum Temperarurc:

Maxitm;1l111 "f-700":F (J7l"C) Continoooo Temp.: 40CJ'P (lO:S"C Pressure, Max-: 1200 psi (S:ll:i!lf)

Fluid Services.:

Water, Saturated Steam, Mild Add$,

Tlll.lrt Oases P Mmx.: 150,000 (12,000)" l/Jl .. &l!J6"' 250.000 (&.000}"'

liS" MJI!...-G-,14696 B AS'I'M' F*l9 ASTMF-36 AS"!M.f'.;J8 Me.thodB ASTMF*I46 ASTMf-152 T"!PlCAL PHYSlCAL PROPERTIES mllbt. Leak!!&(!.

1YPICAl, M'TM Fuel A

(),! Gasket Loo:d. 500 psi (l..S Nimrn 2) lnrernal 9.8 P bar) Nitrogea:

0 * .4 <iask.et 3000 p5i (2.0,7 N/mrn!) Recovery, min. (%); SO Ccnupmsibllity.

('*')range:

7-17 e:reep Mauti<MI, ('Ko); 11t4 22 Jm,@ 212° F (100" C) IFill iii Resistance Aftl!!r Ji"h'11 Ho.u.n mnnuslom ASTM #I Oil@ +300"' F' Thtckl:l.css Ran'e (%}; 0.10 Maxim1.1m

(%): 20 IRM903 Oil +30!¥' F Th!c;b!ess Range (%): 15*.30 Tcnsite Lo!iS, M11Ximum (%): 7Q> ASTM f':Y!I A@ 70-8S"F RalJGe {%): O.iS Weight Jnuresse.

Maimum (".4); 2S ASTM f!!ii B @.1D -Ji$"f' Tlitckness llttnge. (Y..): s-,21) Weight lnprJ.!a.<i.l'l, Maimum (%}: 30

  • Tensile Strength (psi) Across tlmln, psi (NJmmi: ;;:!300 (l9.3MP.t)

Di!n"ity, (iramslem)}:

u:)O (1.60) Page 8 of9 M-663-00017 A Attachment A2 Revision WO 1 FIGURE2 ,tWIUJCIIml s .. ggoo Color: Mllh()gany with Blue Brand Binder. Nit.-iBe (NBR) Fluid S<<'\'iQI!S; Saturated Steam, Wruer, J.nen Gases, A!ipbs!ic Gasoline, Mild Aclds and Mild Alkalies Page 9 of 9 iOflgineeted PrOikH:!B G:arlock SOO!Mng 1toflllftl!

St!W!II I -316-llV7-C811 ... ,

Temp., Mn.: +JOO(ff (+54Q"C);

ContiruJOOS Opeming Temp. -MS{l"F (+340"C) Pressure, Max.: 2000 p!;l P x.T, Msx.: 70!MlOO (25,000)-w:r&t/16".

3So,ooo (12,(M)(l)-t/8

ASTM TeSC Methud Typical Phvsital 'Pmnertjey F37 Se*lllmlity Leakage, .ASTM Fuel A (isooc.tme};

Gasket Load. 500 psi lnu:rnaJ 9.3 psi Nilm!l;en:

Gasket Lood, 3000 psi fin:s:>ure, 30 psi F38 Cr;eep IRelualion-%

f36 Rerovery-Min. P=t Fl46 Ftnid ReslsraneeAnerFive Dcnr FIS2 ASTM #I Oil @ +300"F' fiicrease.

Range:

Max.; ASTM #3 Oil@ +JOO"F 'fhlclrness Increase Rru1ge: Tensile Lpss, !\.fax.: ASTM Fuel A r@ 70-SS"F' Thkkne$ Increase Range: Weight rncreasc, Max: ASTM Fuel B@

Jncmse Range:

Max.: T!!nslk! ,Stl'lffigtb,

  • 1\:C]'()(;S Grain, pr.l: Density. lbs.Jft.'

{grams/em'):

Spetificmlon:

ABS Afiproved OJ 0.1 9.0 65 1-11 G-S% 10% 0..1()% 35% 0-S% 7% CHO% IS:% 11100 110 (1.76)

Rev. No. W01 W.-LF CREEK . r NUCLEAR OPERATING CORPORATION M-663-00017 A Attachment A3 Fire Protection Evaluation for Sheet Metal and Ceramic Fiber Wall Segment Between Rooms 3301 and 3302 Prepared By Date Reviewed By Page 1 of 12 Date 08/16/2017 8/29/17 Revision W08 M-663-00017 A Attachment A3 Table of Contents Page 2 of 12 Revision Log ..............................................................................................................................

3 1.0 Purpose ..........................................................................................................................

4 2.0 Scope .............................................................................................................................

4 3.0 References

.....................................................................................................................

4 4.0 Evaluation

.......................................................................................................................

5 5.0 Conclusions

...................................................................................................................

12 Revision WOS M-663-000 17 A Attachment A3 Revision Reason for Revision W01 Original Issue Page 3 of 12 Revision Log Revision W08 M-663-000 17 A Attachment A3 1.0 Purpose Page 4 of 12 1.1 The purpose of this document is to evaluate the sheet metal and ceramic fiber fire barrier configuration to be installed by change package 014269. The unique wall segment configuration is located between ESF Switchgear Rooms 3301 and 3302 on the 2000' elevation of the Control Building.

The evaluation was conducted in accordance with the guidance of NRC Generic Letter 86-10. 2.0 Scope 2.1 Sheet metal and ceramic fiber wall segment as depicted on drawing WIP-C-1 S3312-000-A-1.

3.0 References 3.1 NRC Generic Letter 86-10, Implementation of Fire Protection Requirements, dated April 24, 1986 3.2 NRC Information Notice 88-04, Inadequate Qualification and Documentation of Fire Barrier Penetration Seals 3.3 10 CFR 50 Appendix R, Fire Protection Program For Nuclear Power Facilities Operating Prior To January 1, 1979 3.4 LER 87-10, Technical Specification Violations-Inoperable Fire Barriers Caused By Personnel Errors 3.5 Change Package 014269, SGK05 Permanent Compensatory Modifications 3.6 Change Package 09879, Replace SGK04A/B AND SGK05A/B Air Conditioning Units 3.7 WIP-C-tS3312-000-A-1, Door 33023 Modifications Elevations

& Sections Control Building El. 2000'-0", Rev. 2 3.8 M-663-00160, ASTM E119-98 Fire Endurance Test Of a Wall Assembly Protected With a Ceramic Fiber & Sheet Metal Fire Barrier System, Rev. W02 4.0 Assumptions 4.1 None. Revision W08 M-663-000 17 A Attachment A3 5.0 Evaluation 5.1 Assessment of Condition to Design Requirements Page 5 of 12 Change package 014269 modifies double fire door 33023 between ESF Switchgear Room 3301 (Fire Area C-9) and ESF Switchgear Room 3302 (Fire Area C-10). The west leaf of the door will be removed and replaced with a sheet metal and ceramic fiber wall segment containing two 24" x 24" sleeved ventilation openings.

Each ventilation opening contains a fire damper, with a 165°F fusible link. See Elevation 1 and Section D (extracted from WIP-C-1S3312-000-A-1) below for wall segment details. The doorway for 33023 will be converted to a single fire door, with the west side of the frame (latch side) attached to structural steel for the sheet metal and ceramic fiber wall segment, as depicted in Section D below. Typically, power block fire barriers, which separate fire areas, are comprised of concrete or grout filled concrete block. I

[J ; i 1 I \ I , *1 I _.,v wALL t! *r.:-11 I I' 'hl '(" f----.---'-------1

\ ;' I *j --+* -441 1 \ I !*1 //"

  • II 1 HSS 3"*2"x'/," I {5 PLCSl \ I 1 ' I
J f----.---'-------1

\ II ' " I llf---,---'-----

1 \ /" -'1-:

f---'--r'---l

1. *
  • f---L-,-----1

<2 PLCS! I /\\ !! ... ,. , , ! : I 1 II _,. *, I ii__.----+---+-FOR CMIPER SUPPORT SEE f-----.---'------1 1 \ jj / *, j,..rllf --,-----"'----i DWG DETAIL I I \

I I I 1/ '\ I !1<:1 ** -.J. I I I I I II I ' / I I f-----.--'----1 ji *,_ ,. 1 lf---.--'----i I // \ : ji ... ... / ... i : 1 I /' \ ! ,. ,. X ' ' i !f---L-,--1---l

\ I ji r ' 1 I f---,--1-'----l/

\ *j/ '. I I I fC -J :q__._ __ _.___F-".F..:..:_

E=L*c_" =20=()0'-'*0=-" ELEVATION (LOOKING NORTH} f1\ SCALE: , ..

  • r-O" \;:::,.) Revision W08 M-663-000 17 A Attachment A3 HSS roo-m WE:SJ F'ILL INTERIOR SPACE wm; CE:RAMIC +"

CTYF'J FIEIERDDM!l (SEE NOTE L 1l Page 6 of 12 EXISTIIG C*U WALL .. . . . * ** I> .

  • II> ** .. ... . .. a'**
  • r.' * * *a'** *
  • ' *
  • 4 * * .. . . ' . ' ' .
  • t ... ' ... i * ,; .. .. .. .. ' . . . . .. . . .. . . . . . * 'I>* '6 * 'A * ' .. . .. . . w*. /ISJ7 IILL -ntlE..tO o 12" , .... ) c-c 5.2 Evaluation of Condition The approximate 36" x 96" wall segment is comprised of structural steel insulated with ceramic fiberboard and clad on the exterior with stainless steel sheet metal. Resulting ceramic fiberboard barrier thickness is approximately 11-5/8", providing a minimum 1" thick ceramic fiberboard protection over the perimeter of structural steel elements, with the exception of the interface with door frame. As shown in Section D, the latch side of the 33023 door frame, which is attached to a channel segment of the wall segment structural steel, is grout filled. A similar sheet metal and ceramic fiberboard wall was installed in an 8" thick concrete block wall between rooms 3401 and 3416, per change package 09879. The Fire Protection Review for revision 23 of the change package documented the acceptance of M-663-00160 as the fire test report basis for the design configuration.

The Fire Protection Review also conducted a critical parameter review of the design configuration in comparison to the fire tested configuration documented in M-663-00160.

Table 5.2.1 provides a comparison of 014269 sheet metal and ceramic fiber wall segment to the 09879 design and the fire test configuration documented in M-663-00160.

Where the 014269 sheet metal and ceramic fiber wall design is not directly bounded by the M-663-00160 fire tested configuration, an evaluation of the configuration is provided.

Revision W08

M-663-000 17 A Attachment A3 Critical Parameter Orientation Bearing/Non bearing Insulating Material Insulating Material Thickness Insulating Material Seam Protection Sheet Metal Table 5.2.1, Fire Barrier Critical Parameter Review 014269 Design 09879 Design Tested Configuration Wall Wall Wall Nonbearing (Wall is Nonbearing (Wall is Non bearing designed to carry designed to carry seismic seismic loads, but in loads, but in normal and normal and fire fire conditions the wall conditions the wall does does not carry a ceiling not carry a ceiling load). load). Primary -Thermal Primary -Thermal Primary -Thermal Ceramics 2600 Ceramic Ceramics 2600 Ceramic Ceramics 2600 Ceramic Fiberboard Fiberboard Fiberboard Secondary-Ceramic Secondary-Ceramic Secondary-Ceramic Fiber Bulk or Blanket (6 Fiber Bulk or Blanket (6 Fiber Blanket (8 lbs/ft 3) lbs/ft 3) lbs/ft 3) 11-5/8" total with 1" 8" total with 1" thickness 6" total with 1" thickness thickness over structural over structural steel over structural steel steel 1" minimum seam offset 1" minimum seam offset Seam staggering is for each Ceramic for each Ceramic required by Test Plan Fiberboard layer Fiberboard layer Report to be 1" 14 gauge stainless steel 15 gauge stainless steel 20 gauge stainless steel Page 7 of 12 Test Reference Evaluation

/Ref. No. M-663-00160 Tested parameter bounds design. M-663-00160 Tested parameter bounds design. M-663-00160 Tested parameter bounds design with exception that ceramic fiber blanket with a density of 8 lbs/ft 3 was utilized for the test assembly.

See E-1. M-663-00 160 Tested parameter bounds design with the exception of the unique configurations addressed in E-2. M-663-00160 Tested parameter bounds design. M-663-00160 Tested parameter bounds design with the I exception of the unique I configurations addressed in E-2. Revision W08 M-663-000 17 A Attachment A3 Critical Parameter Sheet Metal Thermal Expansion Allowance Sheet Metal Fasteners Max. Fastener Spacing ----------

014269 Design Fastener device holes in sheet metal are 1-1/4" 1-1/2" minimum sheet metal panel overlap Sheet metal panel size restricted to 4' x 4' max. Snug tight sheet metal fasteners Stainless steel -'!!.." diameter bolts with 3" diameter fender or square washers Carbon steel -'!!.." diameter drill and tap or self-tapping screws with 3" diameter fender or square washers Stainless steel-3/16" diameter pop rivets or bolts may be utilized at sheet metal overlaps and cutouts Horizontal

-12" Vertical-12" Edge-2" 09879 Design Fastener device holes in sheet metal are 1-1/4" 1-1/2" minimum sheet metal panel overlap Sheet metal panel size restricted to 4' x 4' max. Snug tight sheet metal fasteners Stainless steel -W diameter bolts with 3" diameter fender or square washers Carbon steel -W diameter self-tapping screws with 3" diameter fender or square washers Stainless steel-3/16" diameter pop rivets or bolts may be utilized at sheet metal overlaps and cutouts Carbon steel -3/16" diameter self-tapping screws may be utilized at sheet metal overlaps and cutouts Horizontal

-12" Vertical -12" Edge-2" Page 8 of 12 Tested Configuration Test Reference Evaluation

/Ref. No. Fastener device holes in M-663-00160 E-3 sheet metal are 1-1/4" long Sheet metal height is identified as 1 0', width is not identified Snug tight sheet metal fasteners Stainless steel or carbon M-663-00160 E-4 steel -'!!.." diameter bolts and screws with B52S B-Line Strut Carbon steel -3/8" bolts with B52S B-Line Strut at top row connection to structural steel I Horizontal

-24" M-663-00160 Tested parameter Vertical -48" bounds design. Edge-3" ------------Revision W08 M-663-00017 A Attachment A3 Page 9 of 12 Critical Parameter 014269 Design, 09879 Design Tested Configuration Test Reference Evaluation

/Ref. No. *. Penetrants (2) 24" x 24" ventilation P341W0983 1/2" 27" x 32" cable tray M-663-00160 E-5 openings containing 3-conduit, 2" conduit block out hour rated fire damper P341W0984

-1" conduit (2) 18" x 30" blackout within the plane of the P341W0985-1" conduit containing conduit and sheet metal and ceramic pipe fiber wall (2) 12" x 30 blackout containing conduit and a wire way EVALUATIONS:

E-1: Ceramic fiber bulk or blanket is utilized to seal ceramic fiberboard seams and small gaps between fiberboard and substrate.

The material will be tightly packed in the area of application.

The 6 lbs/ft 3 ceramic fiber is slightly less dense than that utilized in M-663-00160 (8 lbslft\ However, the less dense material will pack tighter resulting in an actual field density that is higher than the density of the original uncompressed product. The more dense the original product, the less the product will compress, resulting in a field density that is in closer proximity to the uncompressed version of the material.

Therefore, the limited use of 6 lb/ft 3 density ceramic fiber bulk or blanket will achieve the same results as that tested in M-663-00169.

The use of either ceramic fiber bulk or blanket material is considered interchangeable for this application, as the bulk and blanket materials are physical variations of the same product. Revision W08 M-663-000 17 A Attachment A3 EVALUATIONS: (Cont'd) Page 10 of 12 E-2: A total of three unique configurations are present in the ceramic fiber sheet metal wall design that require review to assess acceptability.

  • As depicted in WIP-C-1S3312-000-A-1 Detail4, a 5"x3.5"x1/4" angle is used on each barrier side where the ceramic fiber sheet metal wall interfaces with the tube steel vertical support located at the existing CMU wall above the doorway. The stabilizer plates connect the two barriers together via all thread rods through the CMU wall and the vertical tube steel support member for the ceramic fiber sheet metal wall. The stabilizer plates and thru bolts are protected with a 1" thick layer of ceramic fiberboard followed by a sheet metal overlay. This protection configuration provides adequate thermal pr0te:ct1on for the steel.
  • As depicted in WIP-C-1S3312-000-A-1 Section D, there is a 4" overlap on each barrier side where the ceramic fiber sheet metal wall interfaces with the existing CMU wall. The stabilizer plates connect the two barriers together via all thread rods through the CMU wall, spaced a minimum of 12" center-to-center.

This configuration provides adequate thermal short protection wall configuration, as the only locations presenting a direct thermal path the barrier are the all thread rods. Each of these present a small surface contact point, which is readily compensated for by the heat sink of the CMU wall.

  • As depicted in WIP-C-1S3312-000-A-1 Section D, there is a grout-filled door frame for door 33023 that interfaces with the ceramic fiber sheet metal wall. Door 33023 is a 3-hour fire rated barrier and is connected to the ceramic fiber sheet metal wall with appropriate fasteners.

The ceramic fiber sheet wall interfaces directly with the grout filled door frame and the frame is protected with a minimum of 1" think ceramic fiber board and sheet metal overlay. This protection configuration, along with the grout filling of the door frame create adequate thermal protection for the steel and the door frame. E-3: Sheet metal panel sizes are limited to a maximum 4' x 4' size. Utilizing the following formula, thermal expansion was calculated to be 0.92". Therefore, sheet metal fastener holes are required to be 1-1/4" diameter to account for fastener space allocation and panel thermal expansion.

This is comparable to the thermal expansion allowances tested in M-663-00160.

L = CE

  • L 0 * (T 1 -T 2) Where: L = Change in length CE = Coefficient of Linear Expansion

(.00001 04 in/in-°F for 304 stainless steel, which is slightly higher than the CE for 316 stainless steel) L 0 = Original length (48") T 1 = Initial temperature (75°F) T 2 = Final temperature (1925°F) Revision W08 M-663-000 17 A Attachment A3 EVALUATIONS: (Cont'd) Page 11 of 12 E-4: Fasteners utilized to secure the sheet metal to framing are commensurate with types and sizes utilized in M-663-00160 as well as other industry testing programs that were exposed to ASTM E-119 3-hour time and temperature requirements.

Structurally, fasteners are not expected to fail due to direct flame impingement.

The decreased fastener spacing required over that presented in M-663-00160 coupled with the use of 3" diameter fender or square washers, will maintain adequate attachment and eliminate potential added fastener stress presented by the unistrut deflection experienced during M-663-00160 fire testing. E-5 The two fire damper ventilation openings satisfy UL555 installation requirements.

The ceramic fiber material provides insulation protection of structural members within the wall segment ensuring that thermal insult from fire exposure will not result in opening deformation or damper binding that would prevent the damper from performing its design function.

Revision W08 M-663-00017 A Attachment A3 5.3 Post-Fire Safe Shutdown Impact Page 12 of 12 There is no impact to post-fire safe shutdown systems or components, as the sheet metal and ceramic fiber wall assembly provides a 3-hour fire barrier configuration.

6.0 Conclusions The sheet metal and ceramic fiber wall assembly, the fire dampers within the ventilation openings, and the interface with door 33023 provides protection equivalent to a minimum 3-hour fire rated barrier. Revision W08 Page 1 CREEK OPERATING CORPORATION M-663-00017 A Attachment 81 Fire Protection Evaluation For Penetration Openings Assigned New Typical Detail Designs Rev. Prepared By Date Reviewed By Date No. W01 8/18/05 8/18/05 Wayne S Aregood Jeff Suter W04 12/14/11 12/15/2011 Don Garbe Jeff Suter M-663-000 17 A Attachment 81 Revision W04 Table of Contents Page 2 of 8 Revision Log .................................................................................................................................

3 1.0 Purpose .............................................................................................................................

4 2.0 Scope ................................................................................................................................

4 3.0 References

........................................................................................................................

4 4.0 Evaluation

.........................................................................................................................

4 5.0 Conclusions

.......................................................................................................................

8 Appendix 81, Penetration Seal Data .................................................... ( 172 Total Pages)

M-663-00017 A Attachment B1 Revision W04 Revision Reason for Revision W01 Original Issue Page 3 of 8 Revision Log W04 Penetrations P125W2309 and P125W2319 were changed from M-6A typical detail to G-1 typical detail with a steel cover plate by chanQe package 013391 M-663-00017 A Attachment B 1 Revision W04 1.0 Purpose Page 4 of 8 1.1 The purpose of this document is to evaluate existing penetration seals that are not directly bounded to the typical detail limitations established in M-663-00017.

This evaluation was conducted in effort to satisfy regulatory expectation regarding qualification and documentation of fire barrier penetration seals, as discussed in NRC Information Notice 88-04. This evaluation was conducted in accordance with the guidance of NRC Generic Letter 86-10. 2.0 Scope 2.1 Penetrations identified in Tables I and II. 3.0 References 3.1 NRC Generic Letter 86-10, Implementation of Fire Protection Requirements, dated April 24, 1986 3.2 NRC Information Notice 88-04, Inadequate Qualification and Documentation of Fire Barrier Penetration Seals 3.3 10 CFR 50 Appendix R, Fire Protection Program For Nuclear Power Facilities Operating Prior To January 1, 1979 3.4 LER 87-10, Technical Specification Violations-Inoperable Fire Barriers Caused By Personnel Errors 3.5 M-663-00017, Penetration Seal Typical Details, Rev. W20 3.6 PMR 01756, RTV Foam Penetration Seals Discrepancies 4.0 Assumptions 4.1 It is assumed that existing penetration seal materials have been installed as required by applicable typical design details and procedures.

This is an acceptable assumption based on a review of the Quality Control documentation maintained during initial penetration seal installation activities and the intrusive inspections conducted to address LER 87-10, regarding seal material depth. 5.0 Evaluation 5.1 Assessment of Condition to Design Requirements Initial typical detail assignment for the penetrations identified in Tables I and II resulted in a condition where at least one M-663-00017 typical detail critical parameter was not satisfied for each penetration seal. In the majority of the cases, the nonconforming parameter was penetrant size in relation to seal material depth.

M-663-000 17 A Attachment 81 Revision W04 Penetration Number P111W1794 P113W0482 P113W0483 P121S0251 P121W1779 P122S0353 P125S0203 P125S0206 P125W2309 P125W2319 P131S0504 P131S0517 P131W1967 P132S0695

P132S0749 P133S0777 P133S0795 P133S0806 P133W0447 P133W1475 P133W2038 P134S0874 P134S0878 P134S0879 P134S0902 P134W0436 P135S0217 P135S0218 P135S0219 P135S0223 P135W2203 P135W2212 P135W2426 P141W1909 Page 5 of 8 TABLE I Penetrations Bounded by Typical Detail Assignment Communicating Old New Fire Areas Typical Typical Comments/Disposition Side 1 Side 2 Detail Detail A-1 RW-1 M-1 M-Bounded A-1 A-5 M-1 M-6A Bounded A-1 A-5 M-1 M-6A Bounded A-1 A-4 RB-5A RM-1A Bounded A-1 RW-1 RB-7A RM-1A Bounded A-1 A-2 RB-5A RB-1 Bounded A-33 A-1 M-1 M-6A Bounded A-33 A-1 M-1 M-6A Bounded A-33 T-2 M-1 to M-6A G-1 Bounded -Penetration was changed from M-6A to G-1 with a steel cover plate by change package 013391 A-33 T-2 M-1 to M-6A G-1 Bounded -Penetration was changed from M-6A to G-1 with a steel cover plate by change package 013391 A-8 A-1 M-1 M-6A Bounded A-8 A-1 RB-7A RM-1A Bounded A-9 A-10 M-1 M-6A Bounded A-8 A-1 1-3 A-7/RM-1A Bounded A-8 A-1 1-3 A-7/1-3 Bounded A-8 A-1 M-1 Bounded A-25 A-1 M-1 Bounded A-25 A-1 RB-7A Bounded A-8 A-5 M-1 M-6A Bounded A-25 F-3 M-1 M-6A Bounded A-8 A-25 M-1 M-6A Bounded A-24 A-1 RM-1A RM-1A Bounded A-24 A-1 1-3 A-7/RM-1A Bounded A-8 A-1 M-1 M-6A Bounded A-8 A-1 M-1 M-6A Bounded A-8 A-6 M-1 M-6A Bounded A-14 A-33 M-1 M-6A Bounded A-13 A-33 M-1 M-6A Bounded A-13 A-33 M-1 M-6A Bounded A-14 A-33 M-1 M-6A Bounded A-33 A-30 M-1 M-6A Bounded A-14 A-13 M-1 M-6A Bounded A-33 A-14 M-1 M-6A Bounded A-16 A-26 M-1 M-6A Bounded M-663-00017 A Attachment B 1 Revision W04 Penetration Number P142S1052 P142S1097 P143S1102 P143S1111 P144S1173 P145S0955 P152W2581 P152W2623

P153W2543 P153W2550 P153W2627 P311W0846 P321S0083 P321S0084 P321S0097 P321S0110 P321S0115 P331S0127 P331S0136 P331S0137 P331S0138 P331S0139 P331S0143 P331S0200 P331W0882 P331W0883 P331W0890 P341S0288 P341S0306 P341S0311 P351S0339 P351S0356 P361S0462

P361S1052 P361S1055 Communicating Fire Areas Side 1 Side2 A-27 A-8 A-27 A-8 A-16 A-8 A-16 A-8 A-18 A-24 A-23 T-2 A-21 A-22 A-19 A-22 A-19 A-20 A-20 A-5 A-20 A-5 C-1 CC-1 C-6 C-1 C-6 C-1 C-6 C-1 C-6 C-1 C-5 C-1 C-10 C-6 C-10 C-6 C-10 C-6 C-10 C-6 C-10 C-6 C-10 C-6 C-9 C-5 C-10 D-1 C-10 D-1 C-10 D-2 C-15 C-10 C-16 C-9 C-16 C-9 C-21 C-15 C-21 C-15 C-27 C-21 C-30 C-23 C-30 C-23 Page 6 of 8 Old New Typical Typical Comments/Disposition Detail Detail M-1 M-6A Bounded M-1 M-6A Bounded M-1 M-6A Bounded M-1 M-6A Bounded M-1 M-6A Bounded M-1 A-7/M-6A Bounded M-1 M-6A Bounded M-1 M-6A Bounded M-1 M-6A Bounded M-1 M-6A Bounded M-1 M-6A Bounded M-1 M-6A Bounded M-1 M-6A Bounded M-1 M-6A Bounded M-1 M-6A Bounded M-1 M-6A Bounded M-1 M-6A Bounded M-1 M-6A Bounded M-1 M-6A Bounded M-1 M-6A Bounded M-1 M-6A Bounded M-1 M-6A Bounded M-1 M-6A Bounded M-1 M-18 Bounded M-1 M-6A Bounded M-1 M-6A Bounded M-1 M-6A Bounded M-1 M-6A Bounded M-1 M-6A Bounded M-1 M-6A Bounded M-1 M-6A Bounded M-1 M-6A Bounded M-1 M-6A Bounded E-2A E-2A PMR 01756 evaluates an 8" seal depth as acceptable.

Actual sealant depth (10") meets E-2A requirements, resulting in a bounded penetration.

E-2A E-2A PMR 01756 evaluates an 8" seal depth as acceptable.

Actual sealant depth ( 11 ") meets E-2A requirements, resulting in a bounded penetration.

M-663-000 17 A Attachment B 1 Revision W04 Penetration

'Number P361S1083 P611W0071 P611W0201 P621S0137 P621S0158 P621W0011 Penetration Number P133W0459 P133W0474 P135S0932

P145W2338 P145W2339 P145W2341 P145W2342 P145W2344 P145W2345 P341S0272 P341W0380 P451S0318 P451S0321 P712S0013 P712S0014 P712S0015 P712W1006 Page 7 of 8 Communicating Old New Fire Areas Typical Typical Comments/Disposition Side 1 Side2 Detail Detail C-32 C-25 E-2A E-2A PMR 01756 evaluates an 8" seal depth as acceptable.

Actual sealant depth (10-1/2)

meets E-2A requirements, resulting in a bounded penetration.

F-M-1 Bounded F-2 F-3 M-1 M-6A Bounded F-5 F-2 M-1 M-6A Bounded F-5 F-2 M-1 M-6A Bounded F-4 F-5 M-1 M-6A Bounded TABLE II Non-Appendix R Penetrations Communicating Typical Fire Areas Comments/disposition Side 1 Side2 Detail A-8 A-8 M-6A Not an Appendix R Barrier, bounded A-8 A-8 M-6A Not an Appendix R Barrier, bounded A-29 A-29 N/A Not an Appendix R Barrier A-23 A-23 FB-1 Not an Appendix R Barrier A-23 A-23 FB-1 Not an Appendix R Barrier A-23 A-23 N/A Not an Appendix R Barrier A-23 A-23 FB-1 Not an Appendix R Barrier A-23 A-23 FB-1 Not an Appendix R Barrier A-23 A-23 FB-1 Not an Appendix R Barrier C-6 C-6 M-6A Not an Appendix R Barrier, bounded C-16 C-16 M-1 Not an Appendix R Barrier T-12 T-8 N/R Not an Appendix R Barrier, there is no seal installed T-12 T-8 N/R Not an Appendix R Barrier, there is no seal installed Radwast Radwaste RB-5A Not an Appendix R Barrier e Radwast Radwaste N/A Not an Appendix R Barrier e Radwast Radwaste RB-1 Not an Appendix R Barrier e RW-1 Radwaste N/R Not an Appendix R Barrier 5.2 Evaluation of Condition Field inspection and review of the penetrations identified in Table I revealed that each contained a seal material type and depth that allowed reassignment of a M-663-00017 typical detail that fully bounds the penetration attributes to the M-663-000 17 A Attachment B 1 Revision W04 Page 8 of 8 limitations of the new detail. The comprehensive assessment of penetration attributes was based on physical examinations and measurements implemented by Fire Protection personnel that have the necessary expertise to interpret physical characteristics and conditions to address bounding limitations and requirements in the re-assignment of typical detail designs, thus bounding the subject penetration seals within compliance parameters.

Penetration data that supports the Table I detail reassignments and dispositions is provided in Appendix B 1. Field inspection, along with review of plant architectural and civil drawings, revealed that the Table II penetrations were incorrectly identified as providing 10 CFR 50 Appendix R separation protection for redundant post fire safe shutdown (PFSSD) equipment/circuits.

These penetrations are actually either in non-fire barrier construction or fire barriers that are required only to satisfy life safety or insurance requirements.

Considering this, the Table II penetrations have been removed from the Appendix R fire barrier penetration seal program. No further review of these penetrations is required since they have no nuclear safety significance.

As such, they are not typically subjected to the same regulatory scrutiny as that of penetrations in fire barriers providing separation protection for PFSSD equipment/circuits.

5.3 Post Fire Safe Shutdown Impact There is no impact to safe shutdown systems or components as a result of this evaluation.

All penetration seals are either bounded to the limitations of a M-663-00017 typical detail or they are not Appendix R applicable.

6.0 Conclusions The fire resistance rating of the penetration seals listed in Table I have been determined to meet plant requirements and commitments to maintain penetration openings at a fire resistance rating commensurate with the installed barrier. These penetrations have been physically examined; measured and comprehensively evaluated through plant walk downs to determine the appropriate typical detail assignment and bounding conditions.

The new assigned typical details are consistent with limitations, configurations and critical attributes that bound each penetration seal listed. Table II penetrations were incorrectly identified as providing 10 CFR 50 Appendix R separation protection for redundant PFSSD equipment/circuits.

No further review of these penetrations is required since they have no nuclear safety significance regarding PFSSD.

  • *
  • M-663-0001 7 A, Rev i sion WO J Penetration Seal Data Penetration
  1. P111W1794 Penetration Type: M-6A Loc./Eiev.: 1984'-11 1. Barrier Thickness: 36" 2. Opening Size: 16"0 3. Penetrants
(1)8"P 4. Sealant Type: Foam 5. Damming Side1: Flush 6. Damm i ng Side 2: 21" rec es sed 7. Damming Continuity (Aec!Rej):

Accept 8. Boot Condition

{Acc/Rej): NIA 9. Sealant Depth: 13" Walkdown Comments: Page B l-1 of Bl-172 Appendix:

81 Fire Area (Side 1): A-1 M..OX Dwg: M-Q X 1 916 Fire Area (Side 2): RW-1 10. Annular Gap (smallest)

3* 1 1. Gap between pen: N/A 12. Barrier Type; F w 1 3. Opening Sleeved or Concrete: Steel 14. Pipe Insulated: Yes Wayne Aregood Prepared By: Jeff Suter Reviewed By: Rad waste tunnel, room 7133 , Fire Area RW-1 to A-1 Room 1102, used existing scaffold to Inspect. Tunnel side has compr e ssed bulk fiber. Sketch:

M*663-00017A.

R evi i on WOI Page BJ-2 ofBI-172 Photo : P111W1794 Fire Area A-1 (Side 1) Are Area A-1 (Side 1) Fire Area RW-1 (Side 2) Fire twa RW-1 (Side 2)

M-663-00017A, Revision WOl

  • Penetration Seal Data Penetration
  1. i P113W0482 Penetration Type: M-6A loc./Eiev.: 1982'-10 1. Barrier Thickness: 12" Nomin a l 2. Opening Size: 4"0 3. Penetrants:

(1)1-112"P

4. Sea'lant Type: Foam 5. Damming Side1: Flush 6. Damming Side 2: Flush 7. Damming Continuity (AccJRej): Accept 8. Boot Condition (Acc/Rej): NIA 9. Sealant Depth: 10" Nomin a l Walkdown Comments:
  • Page B l-3 of B l-172 Appendix: *Fire Area(Side 1): A-1 1 M.OX Dwg: M-1 X0 36 0 Fire Area (Side 2): A-5 10. Annular Gap (smallest)
1/2" 11. Gap between pen: N/A 12. BarrierType:

F 1 3. Opening Sleeved or Concrete: Concrete 14. Pipe 1 l nsulated: . No Wayne Aregood Prepared By: Jeff Suter By:

M-663-000 17A, R evision WOl Page Bl-4 ofBl-172

  • Penetration Seal Data Append ix: 81 Photos: P113W0482 Fire Area 1 (Side 1) Rre Area A-1 (Side 1 )
  • Fire Area A-5 (Side 2) Are Area A-5 (Side 2) *
  • *
  • M-663-00017A, Revision WOI Penetration Seal D at a Pen etr ation#: P 113 W0483 Penetration Type: M-6A Loc./Eiev.: 1980'-11 1. Barrier Th i ckness: 12* Nominal 2. Open i ng Size: 4"0 3. Penetrant s: 4. Sealant Type: Foam 5. Dammif!g Sid e 1: Flush 6. Damming S i d e 2: Flush 7. Damming Co nt inuity (A cc/Re j): Accept 8. Boot Conditi on (Acc/Re j): NIA 9. Sealant Depth: Walkdown Comments: Copper Pipe Sketch: t t-10* Nominal ---* I i Page B l-5 of Bl-172 Appendix:

B1 Fire Area {Side 1 ): A-1 Fire Area (Side 2): A-5 M..OX Dwg: M-1X0360 10. Annul a r Gap (smallest):

1" 11. Gap b e tween pen: N/A 12. Barrier T ype: F 13. Opening Sleeved or Concrete: Concrete 14. Pipe I n sulated: No Wayn e Aregood Prepared By: Jeff Suter Reviewed B y: .t J I M-663-000 17A. R ev i si o n WOI Page Bl-6 ofBl-172

  • Penetration Seal Data Appendix: 81 Photos: P113W0483 Fire Area A-1 (Side 1) Fire Area A-1 (Side 1 )
  • Fire Area A-5 (Side 2) Fire Area A-5 (Side 2) *
  • *
  • M -6 63-000 17 A. Revision WO 1 Page B l-7 ofBI-172 Penetration Seal Data Appendix: 81 Penetration
  1. P121S0251 Penetration T yp e: RB-5A Fire Area (Side 1): A-1 Fire Area (Side 2): A-4 LocJEiev.: 1988'-0" M-OX Dwg: M-OX1211 1. Barrier Thickness: 19" 10. Annular Gap (smallest)
2" 2. Opening Size: 10"0 1 1. Gap between pen: NIA 3. Penetra nts: (1)4"P 12. Barrier Type: F R W 4. Sealant Ty pe: HOSE/HOLE 1 3. Opening Sleeved or Concrete:

Steel 5. Damming Side1: NIA 1 4. Pipe Insulated: No 6. Damm i ng Side 2: N/A Wayne Aregood 7. Damm i ng Continuity (A ccJRej): NIA P r epared By: 8. Boot Condition (Acc/Re j): Accept Jeff Suter 9. SeaJa n t Depth: Assumed Per Detail Reviewed By: Wa l kdown Comments: High density on top, with boot on bottom. Qualified without boot. Duct on top appears to interfere with b oot installation. Slab thickness det e rmined by drawing C-OC1211. Sketch:

M*663-00017A, Revision WOl Page B1*8 ofBJ-172

  • Penetration Seal Data Appendix:

81 Photos: P121 50251 Fire Area A-1 (Side 1) Fire Area A*1 (Side 1)

  • Fire Atea A-4 (Side 2) Fire Mea A-4 {Side 2) *
  • *
  • M-663-000 1 7 A, Rev i sion WO l Penetration Seal Data Penetration
  1. P121W1779 Penetration Type: RM-1A LocJEiev.: 1990'-9 3 1. Barrier Thickness: 36ft 2. Opening Size: 4"0 3. Penetran t s: (1)2"P 4. Sealant T ype: HOSE/H O LE 5. Damming Side1: NIA 6. Damm i ng Side 2: N/A 7. Damming Continu i ty (Acc/Re j): NIA 8. Boot Condition (Acc/Rej): NIA 9. Sealant Depth: 36" Walkdown Comments: Page B l-9 of B l-172 Appendix:

81 Fire Area (Side 1): A-1 M.OX Dwg: M-OX1 9 16 Fire Area (Side 2): RW-1 10. Annular Gap (smallest)

1-1/2" 1 1. Gap between pen: N/A 12. BarrierType
F R W 13. Open i ng Sleeved or Concrete: Steel 14. Pipe Insulated: No Wayne Aregood Prepared By: Jeff Suter Reviewed By: Changed Detail from RB-7 A to RM-1A, no annular gap and no degradation observed . Sketch:

M-6 6 3-000l?A, R evisio n WOl Page B l-10 ofBl-172

  • Penetration Seal Data Append i x: 81 Photos: P121W1779 Fire Area A-1 (Side 1) Fire Area A-1 (Side 1)
  • Fire Area RW-1 (Side 2) Fire Area RW-1 (Side 2) *
  • *
  • M-663-00017 A , Revision WOl Pa g e Bl-11 ofB 1-172 Penetration Seal Data Appendix: B1 Penetration
  1. P122S0353 Penetration Type: RB*1 Fire Area (Side 1 ): A-1 Fire Area (Side 2): A-2 Loc./Eiev.: 1 988'-0" M-OX Dwg: M-QX1221 1. Barrier Thickness: 19" 10. Annular Gap (smallest)
3* 2. Opening Size: 10"0 11. Gap between p en: N/A 3. Penetrants
(1)3*P 12. Barrier Type: F R W 4. Sealant Type: Radflex 13. Opening Sleeved or Concrete: Steel 5. Damming Side1: Boot 14. Pipe Insulated: No 6. Damming Side 2: Boot Wayne Aregood 7. Damming Continuity (Acc/Re j): N/A Prepared By: 8. Boot Condition (Acc/Rej): Accept Jeff Suter 9. Sealant Depth: Assum e d Per ,Detail Reviewed By: Walkdown Comments: Stab thick ne ss de t e rmined from dr a wing C-OC1211. Detail changed to RB-1 based on the p h ys i ca l app e arance of side 2 (bottom).

Sketch: FA: A*1 ! I I I I SID E 1 _-'I-...... ---J:*+:_-!..._1 -:-. V': T"!D' -1 1 1 I If. I IIi 1/J r-r----I'.-' IV -_ I 'i l' 1 ' ' R. .,. _ l M-663-00017A, Revision WOl Page Bl-12 ofBl-172

  • Penetration Seal Data Appendix:

81 Photos: P122S0353 AreArea A-1 (Side 1)

Area A-1 (Side 1)

  • Fire Area A-2 (S id e 2) Fire Area A-2 (Side 2)
  • M-663-0001 7 A. Revision WOI Pa g e Bl-13 of B t-1 72
  • Penetration Seal Data Appendix: 81 Penetration
  1. P125S0203 Penetration Type: M-6A Fire Area (Side 1): A-33 Fire Area (Side 2): A*1 Loc.IEJev.: 1 989'-0" M.OX Dwg: M-1X1151 1. Barrier Thickness: 10* 10. Annular Gap (smallest):

2* 2. Opening Size: 1 O"D 11. Gap between pen: N/A 3. Penetrants

(1)6"P 12. Barr J er Type: F 4. Sealant Type: Foam 1 3. Open i ng Sleeved or Concrete: Steel 5. Damming Side1: Foam 1* rec essed from sleeve en 14. Pipe Insulated: No 6. Damming Side 2: Flush w/Q*d eck Wayne Aregood 7. Damming Continuity (Acc/Rej): Accept Prepared By: 8. Boot Condition (AccJRej): NJA Jeff Suter 9. Sealant Depth: Reviewed By: Walkdown Comments:
  • Undersi de of slab h a s Q-D e cking, effective barrier thickn e ss is meas u re d from corrugated valley . Sketch:
  • F A: A-1 M-663-0 0 017A, Revision WOl Page Bl-14 ofBJ-172
  • Penetration Seal Data Append ix: B1 Photos: P12550203 Fire Area A-33 (S ide 1) Fire Area A-33 (Sid e 1)
  • Fire Area A-1 (S i de 2} Fire Area A-1 (Side 2)
  • M-6 63-000 17A. Revi si on WOl Pag e Bl-15 of B I-1 72
  • Penetration Seal Data Appendix:

81 Penetration

  1. P125S0206 Penetration Type: M-6 A Fire Area (Side 1): A-33 Fire Area (Side 2): A-1 LocJEiev.: 1989'*0* M..OX Dwg: M-1X1151 1. Barrier Thickness: 1 o* 10. Annular Gap (smallest)
2" 2. Opening Size: 1 0"0 11. Gap between pen: N/A 3. Penetrants
(1)6"P 12. Barrier Type: F 4. Sealant T ype: Foam 1 3. Opening Sleeved or Concrete: Steel 5. Damming Side1: Flush w/sleeve 14. Pipe Insulated:

No 6. Damming Side 2: 1*recessed Wayne Aregood 7. Damm i ng Continuity (Acc/Rej): Accept Prepared By: 8. Boot Condition (Aec/Rej): N/A Jeff Suter 9. Sealant Depth: Reviewed By: Walkdown Comments: Undersi de of slab has a-Deck i ng , effective barrier thickn e ss is measured from corrugated valley .

  • S k etch:
  • M-663-000 17A, R evisio n WO l Page B l-16 ofBI-172
  • Penetration Seal Data Appendix: 81 Photos: P125S0206 Fire Area A-33 (Side 1) Fire Area A-33 (Side 1)
  • Fire Are a A-1 (Side 2) F i re Area A-1 (Side 2) *
  • *
  • M-663-000 17 A, Revision W04 Penetration Sea l Data Penetration
  1. P125W2309 Penetration Type: G-1 Loc./Eiev.:

1993'*1 3/ 1. Barrier Thickness:

42. 2. Opening Size: 14.X12" 3. Penetrants:

(1)10" P 4. Sealant Type: Grout 5. Damming Side1: N/A 6. Damming Side 2: NIA 7. Damming Continuity (Acc/Rej):

N/A 8. Boot Condition (Acc/Rej):

N/A 9. Sealant Depth: Walkdown Comments: Page Bl-17 ofBI-172 Appendix:

B1 Fire Area (Side1): A-33 M-OX Dwg: M-OX1928 Fire Area (Side 2): T-2 10. Annular Gap (smallest):

N/A 11. Gap between pen: NIA 12. Bar ri er Type: A F w 13. Opening Sleeved or Concrete: Concrete 14. Pipe Insulated:

No Jeff Suter Prepared *By: Don Garbe Reviewed By: Barrier thickness determined by Drawing M-1 X01352

  • Changed Detail from M...SA to G-1 with a steel cover plate per Change Package 013391. No sketch or photos are required for the detaU change to G-1 (full barrier depth grout with a steel cover plate on both sides). Sketch: FA: Ao33 Slde1 P125W2309

.*. ... ' . ' 4 D , . * * * . FA: T..Z Slde2 M-663-00 017A, R ev i si o n W04 P ag e B l-18 o fB l-172

  • Penetrat i on Seal 'Data Appendix: 81 Photos: P125W2309 Fire Area A-33 (Side 1) Fire Area A-33 (Side 1 )
  • F i re Area T-2 (Side 2) Fire Area T*2 (Side 2) *
  • *
  • M-663-00017 A, Revision W04 Penetration Seal Data Penetration
  1. P125W2319 Penetration Type: G-1 Loc./Eiev.: 1993'-8 3/8" 1. Barrier Thickness: 36" 2. Opening Size: 14"0 3. Penetrants
(1)10"P 4. Sealant Type: Grout 5. Damming Slde1: NIA 6. Damming Side 2: NJA 7. Damming Continuity (Acc/Rej): N/A B. Boot Condition (Acc/Rej): N/A 9. Sealant Depth: Walkdown Comments: Page Bl-19 ofBl-172 Appendix: 81 Fire Area {Side 1 ): A-33 M..OX Dwg: M-OX1928 Fire Area (Side 2): T-2 10. Annular Gap (smallest):

N/A 11. Gap between pen: N/A 12. Barrier Type: A F w 13. Opening Sleeved or Concrete: Steel 14. Pipe Insulated: No Jeff Suter Prepared By: DonGalbe Reviewed By: T-2 (Side 2) is in the pipe trench in the Turbine. B arrier thickn e s s det e rmined by Drawi ng M-1X 1 3 52 . Chang ed Detail from M*SA to G-1 with a steel cover plate per Chan g e Package 013391. No sketch or photos are requir e d for the d e tail change to G-1 (full barrier depth grout with a steel cover plate on both sides). Sketch: FA: A..s3 Side 'I P125W23 1 9 . *A .. , ... . . .. ,D. . .. FA: T-2 Slde2 M-663-000 17A, Revisi o n W 04 P age B l-2 0 ofBl-172

  • Penetration Sea:l Data Append i x: B 1 Photos: P125W23 1 9 Fire Area A-33 (Side 1) Fire Area A-33 (Side 1)
  • Fire Area T-2 (Side 2) Fire Area T-2 (Side 2) *
  • *
  • M-6 6 3-000 l7A. Revision WOl Penetration Seal Data Penetration
  1. P131S0504 Penetration Type: M-6A LocJEiev.: 2 000'*0* 1. Barrier Thickness: 12" 2. Opening Size: 10"0 3. Penetrants
(1)6"P 4. Sealant Type: Foam 5. Damm i ng Side1: N/A Page Bl-21 of B l-172 Appendix:

81 Fire Area (Side 1): A-8 M-oX Dwg: M-1X1311 Fire Area (Side 2): A-1 10. Annular Gap (smallest): 3/16* 11. Gap between pen: N/A 12. Barrier Type: F 13. Opening Sleeved or Concrete: Steel 14. Pipe I nsu l ated: No 6. Damming Side 2: Flush with barrier plane Jeff Suter 7. Damming Continuity (Acc/Re j): Accept Prepared By: 8. Boot Condition (Acc/Rej): NIA Wayne Aregood 9. Sealant Depth: 11" Reviewed By: Walkdown Comments: Slab thi ck ness based on C-1C1311. Side 1 foam was irregular with lowest point flush with the barrier plane . Changed detail to M...SA based on field inspection. Sketch: P13180504 FA;A-1 Slde 2 M-663-000 17A, R evision WOl Page Bl-22 ofBJ-172

  • Penetration Seal Data Appendix: B1 Photos: P13150504 Fire Area A-8 (Side 1) Rre Area A-8 (Side 1)
  • Fire Area A-1 (Side 2) Fire Area A-1 (Side 2) *
  • *
  • M-663-0001 7 A, Revision WOt Page B i-23 of B J-1 72 Penetration Seal Data .Appendix: 81 P131S0517 Penetration Type: RM-1A Fire Area (Side 1): A-8 Fire Area (Sfde 2): A-1 Loe./Eiev.: 2 000'-0" M..OX Dwg: M-X 13 11 1. Barrier Thickness: 20* 10. Annular Gap (smallest)
2-1/2" 2. Opening S i ze: 8"0 11. Gap between pen: N/A 3. Penetrants
(1)2" P 12. BarrierType
F R 4. Sealant Type: HOSE/HOL E 13. 'Opening Sleeved or Concrete: Steel 5. Damming Side1: HOSE 2* above Slab 14. Pipe Insulated: No HOSE F l ush 6. Damming Side 2: Wayne Aregood 7. Damming Continuity (Acc/Rej}: N/A Prepared By: 8. Boot Condition (Acc/Rej): NIA Jeff Su t e r 9. Sealant Depth: 22" Reviewed By: Walkdown Comments: S l ab th i c kness based on C-1 C131 1. Th i s seal i s bounded no annular gap observed . Sketch: FA: M Side1 P131S0511

., ..... . . .* .. ' . I * , *I * ; t;,, FA: A-1 Slde 2 M-663-0001 7A, R evisio n W Ol Page Bl-24 of B I-172

  • Penetration Seal Data Appe n dix: 81 Photos: P131S0517 Fire Area A-8 (Side 1) Fire Area A-8 (Stde 1)
  • F i re Area A-1 (Side 2) F i re Area A-1 (Side 2) *
  • *
  • M-663-00017A, Revision WOl Page Bl-25 ofBl-172 Penetrati.on Seal Data Appendix:

B1 Penetration

  1. P131W1967 Penetration Type: M-6A Fire Area (Side 1 ): A-9 Fire Area (Side 2): A-10 LocJEiev.:

2014'-6" M-OX Dwg: M-OX1920 1. Barrier Thickness:

24" 10. Annular Gap (smallest):

2" 2. Opening Size: 24"0 11. Gap between pen: N/A 3. Penetrants:

(1)10"P 12. BarrierType:

F 4. Sealant Type: Foam 13. Opening Sleeved or Concrete: Steel 5. Damming Side1: Flush 14. Pipe Insulated:

Yes 6. Damming Side 2: 1 o* recessed ** Wayne Aregood 7. Damming Continuity (Acc!Rej):

Accept Prepared By: 8. Boot Condition (Acc!Rej): NIA Jeff Suter 9. Sealant Depth: 12" Reviewed By: Walkdown Comments: Barrier thickness determined from Drawing C-1C1311. Side 21s in a contaminated area (estimate d depth). Detail changed from M-1 to M-6A based on actual sealant depth. Sketch: FA:M Sl0.1 fA:MO 1111412 M-6 6 3-000 17A. R evisi o n WOJ Page B l-26 ofBl-1 72

  • Penetration Seal Data Appendix: B1 Photos: P131W1967 Fire Area A-9 (Side 1 ) F i re Area A-9 (Side 1)
  • Fire Area A-10 (Side 2) Fire Area A-1 o (Side 2) *
  • *
  • M-663-0001 7A, Revi si on WOl Page B l-27 of Bl-172 Penetration Seal Da t a Appendix:

8 1 Pe netr a t i on #: P13 2 S0695 Penetration Type: A-7 1RM-1A Fire Area {Side 1): A-8 Fire Area (Side 2): A-1 Loc./Eiev.: 2000'-0" M.OX Dwg: M-1X1321 1. Barrier Thickness:

26" 10. Annular Gap (smallest):

1/4" 2. Opening Size: 10"0 11. Gap between pen: 114" 3. Penetrants

(17)3/8" J 12. BarrierType
F R 4. Sealant Type: HDSEIHDLE*
13. Opening Sleeved or Concrete: Steel 5. Damming Side1: Sealant Flu s h w/Siab 14. Pipe insulated:

No 6. Damming Sid e 2: Sealant Flush w/Ceiling Wayn e Arego o d 7. Damming Co n t i n ui ty (Acc/Rej): N/A Prepar ed By: 8. Boot Condition (Acc/Rej}: NIA Jeff Suter 9. Sealant Depth: 26" Reviewed By: Walkdown Comments: Slab thickn e ss bas e d on C-1 C1311.

  • Small section with sheet metal (annulus) insert around so m e instrument tubing with Ceramic Fiber fill. Hot tubing routed through C e ramic Fiber. Changed Detail to A-7/RM-1A. 21-1/2" Ceramic Fiber depth. Sketch: FA:M lei ' FlcA-1 2 M-663-0001 7A, R evis i on WOI Page Bl-28 ofBl-172
  • Penetration Data Append i x: 81 Photos: P132S0695 Fire Area A-8 (Side 1) Fire Area A-8 (Side 1)
  • Fire Area A-1 (Side 2) Fire Area A-1 (Side 2) *
  • *
  • M-663-000I

?A. Revision WOI Penetrat i on Seal Data Pen etration #: P1 32 S0749 Penetration Type: A-711*3 Loc./Eiev.:

2000'-0" 1. Barrier Th i ckness: 26" 2. Opening Size: 6"0 3. Penetrants:

(4)3/B" J 4. Sealant Type: H OSE/HO LE Pa ge B l-29 of B l-172 Appendix:

B 1 Fire Area (Side 1 ): A-8 M..OX Dwg: M-1 X1 3 2 1 Fire Area (Side 2): A-1 10. Annular Gap (smallest):

1" 1 1. Gap between pen: H4" 12. Barrier Type: F 13. Opening Sleeved or Concrete: R Steel 5. Damming Side1:

  • Sealant flush w/slab 14. Pipe Insulated: No 6. Damming Side 2: N/A Wayne Aregood 7. Damming Continuity (Acc/Re j): NIA Prepared By: 8. Boot Condition (Acc/Rej): NIA Jeff Suter 9. Sealant Depth: 26" Reviewed By: Walkdown Comments: Stab t h ickn e ss based on C-1 C 1311. The top s urfa ce of the seal can only be partially se e n through the hole In the cabinet Hoor (photo center). It ap p e a r s that H OSE/H O L E is at least level with the floor slab with som e bulk fiber i n the cabinet cavity. Sketch:

M-6 6 3-000 17A. R evis ion WO l Page Bl-30 of B I-172

  • Penetration Seal Data Appendix: 81 Photos.: P132S07 49 Fire Area A-8 (Side 1) Fire Area A-8 (Side 1)
  • Rre Area A-1 (Side 2) Rre Area A-1 (Side 2)
  • M-663-00017 A, Rev i sion WOJ Page B l-3 1 of B l-172
  • Penetration Seal Data Appendix: 181 Penetration
  1. P133S0777 Penetration Type: I M-6A Fire Area (Side 1 ); A-8 Fire Area (Side 2): A-1 Loc./Eiev.: 2 0 00'-0" M-oX Dwg: M-O X 1331 1. BarrierT:hickness
10. Annular Gap (smallest)
2. Opening Size: 1 O"D 11. Gap between pen: N/A 3. Penetrants
(1)s*p 12. Barrier Type: F 4. Sealant Type: Foam 1 3. Open i ng Sleeved or Concrete: Steel 5. Damming Side1: N/A 14. Pipe Insulated: No 6. Damming Side 2: 1" recessed Wayne Aregood 7. Damming Continuity (Acc/Rej): Accept Prepared By: 8. Boot Condition (Acc/Rej): N/A Je ff Suter 9. Sealant Depth; 14" Reviewed By: Walkdown Comments:
  • Foam flush with top of 4" extended sleeve . Sketch:
  • P13380m M-663-0 00 17A, Revision W O l Page Bl-32 ofBl-172
  • Penetration Seal Da t a Append i x: B1 Photos: P133S077 7 Fire Ar e a A-8 (Side 1) Fire Area A-8 (Side 1)
  • Fire Area A-1 (Side 2) Fire Area A-1 (Side 2) *
  • *
  • M-6 63-00017A , Revision WOl Page Bl-33 of B l-172 Penetration Seal Data Appendix: B1 Penetration
  1. P133S0795 Penetration Type: M-6A Fire Area (Side 1): A-25 Fire Area (Side 2): A-1 LocJEiev.:

2000'-0" M-GX Dwg: M-OX1331 1. Barrier Thickness:

12" 10. Annular Gap (smallest):

1" 2. Opening Size: 14*o 11. Gap between pen: N/A 3. Penetrants:

(1)10"P 12. BarrierType:

F 4. Sealant Type: Foam 13. Opening Sleeved or Concrete:

Steel 5. Damming Side1: N/A 14. Pipe Lnsulated:

No 6. Damming Side 2: Flush Wayne Aregood 7 , Damming Continuity (Acc/Rej):

Accept Prepared By: 8. Boot Condition (Acc/Rej): N/A Jeff Suter 9. Sealant Depth: 11" Reviewed By: Walkdown Comments: Top side foam flush with top of slab. Changed to M-6A from M-1 based on seal depth .. Issue WR to evaluate foam used in Rad Boundary. Sketch: fA: MS Slde1 P13380Tt5 M-663-0 001 7A, R evis i on WO l Page 81*34 of B 1*172

  • Penetration Sea'l Data Appendix: 81 Photos: P13350795 Fire Ar ea A-25 (Side 1) Fire Area A-25 (Side 1)
  • Fire Area A*1 (Side 2} Fire Area A-1 (Side 2) *
  • *
  • M-663-00017A.

Revision WOl Penetration Seal Data Penetration

  1. P133S0806 Penetration Type: LocJEiev.:

2000'-0" 1. Barrier Thickness: 12" 2. Opening Size: 8"0 3. Penetrants:

(1 )3"P, (1 )4"P 4. Sealant Type: HOSE/HOLE 5. Damming Side1: N/A 6. Damming Side 2: N/A 7. Damming Continuity (Acc/Rej): N/A 8. Boot Condition

{Acc/Rej):

N/A 9. Sealant Depth: 12" Walkdown Comments: Page Bl-35 of Bl-1 72 Appendix: 81 Fire Area (Side1): A-25 M-OX Dwg: M-OX1331 Fire Area (Side 2): A-1 10. Annular Gap (smallest):

2" 11. Gap between pen: 4" 12. Barrier Type: F R 13. Opening Sleeved or Concrete: Steel 14. Pipe Insulated: No Wayne Aregood Prepared By: Jeff Suter Reviewed By: Change Detail from RB-7 A to RM-1 A. based on plant inspection. HD sealant flush with slab, both sides of barrier , no gap present Sketch:

M-663-000 17A, R evis i o n WO l Page Bl-36 ofBl-172

  • Penetration Seal Data Appendix: 81 Photos: P133S0806 Fire Area A-25 (Side 1) Fire Area A-25 (Side 1)
  • Fire Area A-1 (Side 2) Fire Area A-1 (Side 2)
  • M-6 6 3-000 17A, Revis i on WOl
  • Penetration Seal Data Penetration
  1. P133W0447 Penetration Type: M-6A LocJEiev.: 2012'-10 1. Barrier Th i ckness: 12" Nominal 2. Open i ng Size: 12"0 3. Penetrants
(1)8" P 4. Sealant Type: Foam 5. Damming Side1: Flush 6. Damming Side 2: Flush 7. Damming Continuity (Acc/Re j): Accept 8. Boot Cond i t i on (Acc/Re j): NJA 9. Sealant Depth: 10" Walkdown Comments:
  • S k etch:
  • Page Bl-37 of B J-172 Appendix: B1 Fire Area (Side 1): A-8 M-OX Dwg: M-1 X0360 Fire Area (Side 2): A-5 1 0. Annular Gap (smallest)
2" 11. Gap between pen: N/A 1 2. Barrier Type: F 1 3. Open i ng Sleeved or Concrete: Steel 14. Pipe I nsulated: No Wayne Aregood Prepared B y: Jeff Suter Rev i ewed By:

M-663...()()()17A, R evis i on WOl Page Bl-38 ofBl-172

  • Penetration Seal Da t a Append i x: 81 Photos: P133W0447 Flre Area A-8 (Side 1) Fire Area A-8 (Side 1)
  • Fire Area A-5 (Side 2) Fire Area A-5 (Side 2)
  • M-663-000I?A , Re v ision WOI
  • Penetration Seal Data Penetration#:

P133W0459 Penetration Type: M-6A Loc./Eiev.: 201 2'-10 1. Barrier Thickness: 12" No m in a l 2. Opening Size: 12"0 3. Penetrants

(1 )8"P 4. Sealant Type: Foam 5. Damming Side1: Flush 6. Damming Side 2: 1/4" Recess 7. Damming Continu i ty (Acc/Rej): Accept 8. Boot Condition (Acc/Rej): NIA 9. Sealant Depth: 9-314" Nominal Walkdown Comments:
  • Sketch:
  • Pag e Bl-39 of B l-172 Appendix: B1 Fire Area (Side 1): A-8 M..OX Dwg: M-1 X0 36 0 Fire Area (Side 2}: A-8 t O. Annular Gap (smallest)
1" 11. Gap between pen: N!A 12. Barrier Type: N 13. Ope !"'ing Sleeved or Concrete: Steel 14. Pipe Insu l ated: No Wayne Aregoo d Prepared By: Jeff Suter Reviewed By:

M-663-000 17A. R evision WOl Page Bl-40 ofBl-172

  • Penetration Seal Data Appe n dix: B1 Photos: P133W0459 Fire Area A-8 (Side 1) Fire Area A-8 (Side 1)
  • Fire Area A-8 (Side 2) Fire Area A-8 (Side 2)
  • M-663-0001 7A. Revision WOl Page Bl-4 1 ofBI-172
  • Penetration Seal Data Appendix:

81 Penetration

  1. P133W0474 Penetration Type: M-6A Fire Area (Side 1): A-8 Fire Area (Side 2): A-8 LocJE iev.: 2020'-8" M.OX Owg: M-1X0360 1. Barrier Thickness:

12" Nominal 10. Annular Gap (smallest):

2" 2. Opening Size: 10"0 11. Gap between pen; N/A 3. Penetrants

(1 )6"P 12. Barrier Type: N 4. Sealant Type: Foam 13. Opening Sleeved or Concrete: Steel 5. Damming Slde1: Flush 14. Pipe Insulated:

No 6. Damming Side 2: Flush Wayne Aregood 1. Damming Continuity (Acc/Rej): Accept Prepared By: 8. Boot Condition (Acc/Rej): NIA Jeff Suter 9. Sealant Depth: 10" Nominal Reviewed By: Walkdown Comments:

  • Sketch: FA:A..S Slde1 I .;
  • M-663-000 17A, R ev i sion WOI Page Bl-42 ofB 1-172
  • Penetration Seal Data Appendix: 81 Photos: P133W0474 Are Area (Side 1) Fire Area (Side 1)
  • Fire Area (Side 2) Fire Area A-8 (Side 2) *
  • *
  • M-663-000I?A , Revision WO I Pa g e Bl-43 of B I-172 Penetration Seal Data Appendix: 81 Penetr:ation
  1. P133W1475 Penetration Type: M-6 A , fire Area (Side1): A-25 l fire Area (Side 2): F-3 loc.!Eiev.: 201 2'-0" :M-OX Dwg: M-OX1907 1. Barrier Thickness: 24" 10. AnnularGa.P (sma ll est): 2" 2. Opening Size: 12"0 11. Gap between pen: N/A 3. Penetrants
(1)6" P 12. Barrier Type: A F 4. Sealant Type: Foam 13. Opening Sleeved or*Co n crete: Steel 5. Damming Side1: 12-1/2" recess 1 4. Pipe In s u lated: No 6. Damming Side 2: Flush Wayne Aregood 7. Damming Continuity (Acc/Re j): Accept Prepared By: 8. Boot Condition (Acc/Rej): N/A J eff Suter 9. Sealant Depth: 9-1/2" Reviewed By: Walkdown Comments: Changed Detail from M-1 to M-6A based on actual seal depth . Sketch: FA: A-25 Slde1 P133W1475 FA: F-3 M-663-0001 7A, Revision WOJ Page Bl-44 of Bl-172
  • Penetration Seal Data Appendix:

B1 Photos: P133W1475 Fire Area A-25 (Side 1) Fire Area A-25 (Side 1)

  • Rre Area F-3 (Side 2) Fire Area F-3 (Side 2) *
  • *
  • M-6 63-0001 7 A. Rev i sion WO l Page Bl-45 ofBI-172 Penetration Seal Data Appendix: 81 Penetr,ation
  1. P133W2038 Penetration Type: Fire Area (Side 1): A-8 Fire Area (Side 2): A-2 5 Loc./Eiev.: 2018'-6" M.OX Dwg: M-1X1921 1. Barrier Thickness: 39" 10. Ann ul ar Gap (smallest)
1-1/2" 2. Opening Size: 12"0 11. Gap between pen: N/A 3. Penetrants
{1)6"P 12. Barrier Type: F 4. Sealant T ype: Foam 13. Opening 'Sleeved or Conc r ete: 5. Damm i ng Side1: Flush with barrier plane 14. Pipe In s ul ated: No 6. Damming Side 2: R ecesse d 23" Jeff Sute r 7. Damming Continuity (Acc/Rej): Accept Prepared By: 8. Boot Condition

{Acc/Rej): N/A Wayne Aregood 9. Sealant Depth: Reviewed By: Walkdown Comments: Change detail toM-SA based field i n s pection. Barrier th i ckness dete r mined by Drawing C-1C1331 (wsa) This is being acc es s e d in RF14 verify seal thickness. (JFS) Sketch: FA:W Slde1 'P133W2.031 6 .. w Steel M-663-0001 7A, R evisio n WO l Page Bl-46 of B l-172

  • Penetration Seal Data Appendix:

81 Photos: P133W2038 Fire Area A-8 (Side 1) Fire Area A-8 (Side 1)

  • Fire Area A-25 (Side 2) Fire Area A-25 (Side 2)
  • M-663-00017A, Revision WOl Page Bl-47 ofBl-172
  • Penetration Seal Data Appendix: B1 Penetration
  1. P134S0874 Penetration Type: RM-1A Fire Area (Side 1 ): A-24 Fire Area (Side 2): A-1 Loc./Eiev.: 2000'-0 w M.()X Dwg: M-1X1341 1. BarrierThickness: 10. Annular Gap (smallest)
2-1/2w 2. Opening Size: 20w0 11. Gap between pen: N/A 3. Penetrants
(1)WP 12. BarrierType
F R 4. sealant Type: HOSE/HOLE
13. Open i ng Sleeved or Concrete: Steel 5. Damming Side1: Sealant flush w/ top of sleeve 14. Pipe Insulated:
  • No 6. Damming Side 2: Sealant Flush w/ ceiling Wayne Aregood 7. Damming Continuity (Acc/Rej): NIA Prepared By: 8. Boot Condition (Acc/Rej):

N/A Jeff Suter 9. Sealant Depth: 16* Rev i ewed By: Walkd own Comments:

  • Slab thickness based on drawing C-1C1311. *Insul at ion on bottom side with Armaflex on topside . Sketch:
  • FA: M ... 2 M-663-000 17A, R evisi o n WOI Page Bl-48 ofBJ-172
  • Penetration Seal Data Append i x: 81 Photos: P134S0874 Fire Area A-24 (Side 1) Fire Area A-24 (Side 1)
  • Fire Area A-1 (Side 2) Fire Area A-1 (Side 2) *
  • *
  • M-66 3-000l?A, Rev is ion WO I Page B l-49 of B I-172 Penetration Seal .Data Appendix: 81 Penetration
  1. P134S0878 Penetration Type: Loc.JEiev.: 2000'-0" Fire Area (Side 1): A-24 M-OX Dwg: M-1X1341 F i re Area (Side 2); A*1 1. Barrier Thickness: 12" 10. Annular Gap (sma ll est): 3/4" 2. Opening Size: 1 o*o 11. Gap between pen: 1/8* 3. Penetrants
(6)318" J, ( 1 )3/8" J 12. BarrierType
F R 4. Sealant Type: HOSE/H OL E 1 3. Openi n g Sleeved or Concre t e: Steel 5. Damming Side1: Sealant 1/2" above Slab 14. P i pe In s u late d: No '6. Damming Side 2: Sealant flush w/ceiling

& sleeve Wayne Aregood 7. Damm i ng Continuity (Acc/Rej): NIA Prepared By: 8. Boot Condit i on (Acc/Rej): NJA Jeff Sute r 9. Sealant Depth: 12-1/2" Reviewed By: Walkdown Comments: Slab thickness based on drawing C-1 C1311. Sheet Metal Annulus installed with ceramic fiber fill, 1/2" above sealant level. Ceramic fiber depth is 13" through annular sleeve. Chang e d Detail to A-7/R M-1A based on actual seal depth and configuration. Sketch: .FA: A.a. 1 CCIM\IC:

A A 71 "'l""l Side2 M-663-000 I?A, R evision WOI Page Bl-50 ofBI-172

  • Penetration Seal Data Appendix:

81 Photos: P134S0878 Fire Area A-24 (Side 1) Fire Area A-24 (Sid e 1)

  • Fire Area A-1 {Side 2) Fire Area A-1 (Side 2) *
  • *
  • M-663-000 1 7 A, Revis i on WO l Page BI-51 ofBl-172 Penetration Seal Data Appendix: B1 Penetration
  1. P134S0879 Penetration Type: Fire Area (Side 1 ): A-8 Fire Area (Side 2): A-1 loc./Eiev.: 20 00'-0ft M.OX Dwg: M-1X1341 1. 'Barrier Thickness: 12" 10. Annular Gap (sma ll est): 1* 2. Opening Size: 10"0 11. Gap between r pen: N/A 3. Penetrants
{1)6" P 1 2. Barrier Type: F 4. Sealant Type: Foam 13. Opening Sleeved or Co n crete: Steel 5. *Damm i ng Side1: Foam Flush w/top of sleeve 14. P i pe I nsulated: No 6. Damming Side 2: 2"reces s ed Wayne Aregood 7. Damming Continuity (Acc/Re j): Accept 'Prepared By: 8. Boot Condition (Acc/Rej): N/A Jeff Suter 9. Sealant Depth: Reviewed By: Walkdown Comments: Slab thic k ness based on draw i ng C-1C1311. C hanged Detail from M-1 to M-6A based on actual sealant depth . Sketch: FA: A-1 Slde 1 P134SOI71

" e:>.' **

  • P'* *' ... .. . . .. ' .. *. . *IJ : . -; ... * .* -.* ** T?. . . . . -* . . . . . / . b'* . .. -. ?." !) ....... {'WI) !F A: A-t Sld*2 M-663-00017A, Revision WOl Page 81-52 ofBl-172
  • Penetration Seal Data Appe nd ix: 81 Photos: P134S0879 Are Area A-8 (Side 1) Fire Area A-8 (Side 1)
  • Fire Area A-1 (Side 2) Fire Area A-1 (Side 2) *
  • *
  • M-6 63-000 17 A, Rev i sion WO 1 Page B l-53 of B l-172 Penetration Seal Data Appendix: 81 Penetration
  1. P134S0902 Penetration Type: M-6A Loc./Eiev.: 2000'-0" 1. Barrier Thickness: 12" 2.. Opening Size: 12"0 3. Penetrants
(1)8" P 4. Sealant Type: Foam Fire Area (Side 1 ): A-8 M-oX Dwg: M-1 X 13 4 1 Fire Area (Side 2): A-1 10. Annular Gap (smallest)
1/2" 11. Gap between pen: N/A 12. BarrierType
F 13. Opening Sleeved or Concrete: 5. Damming Side1: Foam 1 12* above Slab 14. Pipe Insu l ated: No 6. Damming Side 2: Damm i ng rec es sed 1-1/2" Wayne Aregood 7. Damming Continuity (Acc/Re j): Accept Prepared By: 8. Boot Condition (Acc/Rej): NIA Jeff Suter 9. Sealant Depth: 10" Reviewed By: Walkdown Comments: Steel Slab thic k nes s b a sed on draw i ng C-1 C131 1. T o p s i de Foam extends 1/2" above floor slab w/in sleeve. Changed Detail from M-1 to M-6A based on actual sealant Depth. Sketch:

Side 1 fa ____ -"-_r 4. . " ..... '-6 .. '

  • I
  • I> . . FA:A-1 SkN2 M -663-0 00 17 A, R evisio n WO 1 Page BJ-54 ofBl-172
  • Penetration Seal Data Appendix: 81 Photos: P13450902 Fire Area A-8 (Side 1) Are Area A-8 (Side 1)
  • Fire Area A-1 (Side 2) Fire Area A-1 (Side 2)
  • M-663-00017A.

Revision WOl

  • Penetration Seal Data Penetration
  1. P134W0436 Penetration Type: M-SA LocJEiev.: 2009'-10 1. Barrier Thickness: 12" nominal 2. Opening Size: 8"0 3. Penetrants:

(1)6"P 4. Sealant Type: Foam 5. Damming Side1: Flush 6. Damming Side 2: Flush 7. Damming Continuity (Acc/Rej):

Accept 8. Boot Condition (Acc/Rej):

NJA 9. Sealant Depth: 10" Nominal Walkdown Comments:

  • Sketch:
  • Page Bl-55 ofBl-172 Appendix:

81 Fire Area (Side 1): A-8 M.OX Dwg: M-1X0360 Fire Area (Side 2): A-6 10. Annular Gap (smallest):

3/4" to 1* 11. Gap between pen: N/A 12. BarrierType

F 13. Opening Sleeved or Concrete: Steel 14. Pipe Insulated:

No Wayne Aregood Prepared By: Jeff Suter Reviewed By:

M-663-0 00 17 A, R evis i on W OI Page Bl-56 ofB 1-172

  • Penetration Seal Data Append i x: 81 Photos: P134W0436 Fire Area A-8 (Side 1) Fire Area A-8 (Side 1)
  • Fire Area A-6 (Side 2) Fire Area A-6 (Side 2} *
  • *
  • M-663-000 17 A , Revision WOl Pa g e Bl-51 of B l-172 Penetration Seal Data Appendix: 81 Penetration
  1. P135S0217 Penetration Type: M-6A FireArea(Side1

): A-14 Fire Area (Side 2): A-3 3 Loc./Eiev.: 2 0 00'-0" M4lX Dwg: M-1X1151 1. Barrier Thickness: 16" 10. Annular Gap (smanest): 2" 2. Opening Size: 12w0 11. Gap between pen: NIA 3. Penetrants:

(1)6" P 12. BarrierType

A F w 4. Sealant Type: Foam 13. Opening Sleeved or Concrete: Steel 5. Damming Side1; Foam Flush W/sleeve 14. Pipe Insulated: No 6. Damming Side 2: 7" rece ss ed Wayne Aregood 7. Damming Continuity (Acc/Rej): Accept Prepared By: 8. Boot Condition (Acc/Rej): N/A Jeff Suter 9. Sealant Depth: 12" Reviewed By: Walkdown Comments: Undersi de of slab has Q-D ecking, eff e ctive barrier thickness is mea s u r ed from corrugated valley . Sketch: F A: A*1 4 SIDE1 M-663-00017A, Revision WOl Page Bl-58 ofBl-172
  • Penetration Seal Data Appendix: 81 Photos: P135S021 7 Fire Area A-14 (Side 1) Fire Area A-14 (Side 1)
  • Fire Area A-33 {Side 2) Fire Area A-33 (Side 2) *
  • *
  • M-663-000 1 7 A, Revis i on WO 1 Penetration Seal Data Penetration
  1. P13550218 Penetration Type: M-6A loc./Eiev.: 2000'-0" 1. Barrier Th i ckness: 16" 2. Opening Size: 10"0 3. Penetrants
4. Sealant Type: Foam Page B l-59 of BJ-172 Ap , pendix: 81 Fire Area (Side 1): A-13 M.OX Dwg: M-1X1151 Fire Area (Side 2): A*33 10. Annular Gap {smallest): 2" 11. Gap between pen: N/A 1 2. Barrier Type: A F 13. Opening Sleeved or Concrete: w Steel 5. Damming S l de1: Foam flush w/sleeve 14. P i pe In s u lated: No 6. Damming Side 2: 8" recessed Wayne Aregood 7. Damming Continu i ty (Acc/Rej): Accept Prepared By: 8. Boot Condit i on (Acc/Rej): NIA Jeff Suter 9. Sealant Depth: 11" Reviewed By: Walkdown Comments: Underside of slab has a-Deck i ng , effective barrier thickness is measured from corrugated valley . S ketch: FA:.A-33 SI0!2 M-663-0001 7A, Re visio n WOI Page B 1-60 of B 1-172
  • Penetration Seal Data Append i x: 81 Photos: P135502 1 8 Fire Area A-13 (Side 1 ) Are Area A-13 (Side 1)
  • Fire Area A-33 {Side 2) Fire Area A-33 (Side 2) *
  • *
  • M-663-0001 7A, Re v i s ion WOl Penetration Seal Data Penetration
  1. P135S0219 Penetration Type: M-6A Loc.JEiev.: 2 0 00'-0" 1. Barrier Thickness: 16" 2. Opening Size: 14*0 3. Penetrants
(1)8"P 4. Sealant Type: Foam Page Bl-61 of BI-172 Appendix:

B1 Fire Area (Side 1): A-13 M-OX Dwg: M-1X1151 Fire Area (Side 2): A-33 1'0. Annular Gap (smallest)

1 3/4" 11. Gap between pen: NJA 12. Barrier Type: A F 13. Opening Sleeved or Concrete: w Steel 5. Damming Side1: Foam Flush w/sleeve 14. Pipe Insulated: No 6. Damming Side 2: 1*rec essed Wayne Aregood 7. Damming Continuity (Acc/Rej): Accept Prepared 8y: 8. Boot Condition (Acc/Rej):

NIA Jeff Suter 9. Sealant Depth: 12 1/2" Reviewed By: Walkdown Comments: Underside of slab has Q-Decking, effect iv e barrier thickness is measured ffom corrugated valley . .., Damm ing broke and pulled away on bottom side. W R-04-043706 issued to correct. Damming corrected on 10-21-04 W0#04-263486-00 0, breach closed by Mark St ra wde r. Damming Continuity status changed to Accept. Sketch:

M-663-000I?A, Revision WOI Page Bl-62 ofBI-172

  • Penetration Seal Data Appendix: 81 Photos: P13550219 Fire Area A-13 (S i d e 1) Fire Mea A-13 (Side 1)
  • Fire Area A-33 (Sid e 2) Fire Area A-33 (Side 2) *
  • *
  • M-663-000 17A, Revision WOJ Page B l-63 of B l-172 Penetration Seal Data Appendix:

81 Penetration

  1. P135S0223 Penetration Type: Fire Area (Side 1}: A-14 Fire Area (Side 2): A-33 loc./Eiev.: 2000'-o* M.OXDwg: M-1X1151 1. Barrier Thickness: 16" 1 0. Ann u la r Gap (smallest)
1 3/4" 2. Open i ng Size: 14"0 11. Gap between pen: N/A 3. Penetrants
(1 )8"P 12. Barrier Type; A F w 4. Sealant Type: Foam 13. Ope ni ng Sleeved or Concre t e: Steel 5. Damming S i de1: Foam flush w/s l eeve 1 4. Pipe I nsulated: No 6. Damming Side 2: a* recessed Wayne Aregood 7. Damming Continuity (Acc/Rej): Accept Prepared By: 8. Boot Condition (Acc/Rej}: NJA Jeff Suter 9. Sealant Depth: 12" Rev i ewed By: Walkdown Comments: Underside of slab has Q-Deck l ng , effective barrier thickne s s is measured from corrugated valley . S k etch: FA: A-14 SIDE1 . ...

M-663-0 00 17A, R evision WOl Page Bl-64 ofBI-172

  • Penetration Seal Data Append i x: 81 Photos: P135S0223 Fire Area A-14 (Side 1) FireArea A-14 (Side1)
  • Fire Area A-33 (Side 2) Fire Area A-33 (Side 2) *
  • *
  • M-663-0001 7A. Rev i sion WO l Page B l-65 of B J-172 .Penetration Seal Data Appendix: 1 81 Penetration
  1. P13550932 Penetration Type: N/A Fire Area (Side 1 ): A*29 Fire Area (Side 2): A-29 LocJEiev.: 2013'-6" M.OX Dwg: M-1X1352 1. Barrier Thickness: 12" 10. Annular Gap (smallest)
N/A 2. Opening S i ze: 18" X 10" 11. Gap between pen: N/A 3. Penetrants
16" X 12"V 1 2. BarrierType
4. Sealant T ype: N/A 13. Open i ng Sleeved or Concrete: Steel 5. Damming Side 1; NIA 1 4. Pipe I nsu l ated: No 6. Damming Side 2: N/A Jeff Suter 7. Damming Continuity (Acc/Re j): N/A Prepared By: 8. Boot Condition (Ace/Rei): N/A Wayne Aregood 9. Sealant Depth: No sealant Reviewed By: 'Walkdown Comments: Slab thickness based on C-1 C1352. Open hole , communicates to same fire area. No rurther eva l uation required . Remove from unbounded sort. Sketch:

M-663-0 00 17A, R evision WOl Page Bl-66 of Bl-172

  • Pen.etration Seal Data Appendix: 81 . Photos: P135S0932 Fire Area A-29 (Side 1) Fire Area A-29 (Side 1)
  • Fire Area A-29 (Side 2) Fire Area A-29 (Side 2) *
  • *
  • M-663-00017A, Revision WO I Penetration Seal Data Penetration#:

P135W2203 Penetration Type: Loc./Eiev.:

2009 '-1" 1. Barrier Thickness: 12" 2. Opening Site: 10"0 3. Penetrants

(1 )6" P 4. Sealant Type: Foam 5. Damming Side1: Flush 6. Damming Side 2: Flush 7. Damming Continuity (Aec/Rej):

Accept 8. Boot Condition (Aec/Rej):

N/A 9. Sealant Depth: 1 0" Walkdown Comments: Page Bl-67 of B l-172 Appendix:

B1 Fire Area (Side 1 }: A-.33 M-OX Dwg: M-1X1924 Fire Area (Side 2): A-30 10. Annular Gap (smallest):

1-314" 11. Gap between pen: N/A 12. Barrier Type: F w 13. Opening Sleeved or Concrete: Steel 14. Pipe Insulated:

No Wa y ne Aregood Prepared By: Jeff Suter Reviewed By: Barrier thickness dete r m i ned by Drawing M-1X1151 and field measuremen

t. Changed Detail from M-1 to M-6A based on actual sealant depth. Sketch: FA: A-33 Slde 1 *.o* '* *Qt* , .. . . . ; . FkMO Slde2 M-663-00017A, Revision WOl Page ofBl-172
  • Penetration Sea 1 1 Data Appendix: 81 Photos: P135W2203 Fire Area A-33 (Side 1) Fire Area A-33 (Side 1)
  • Fire Area A-30 {Side 2) Fire Area A-30 (Side 2) *
  • *
  • M-66 3-000 17A, Re vis ion WO l Page B l-6 9 of B l-172 Penetration Seat Data Appendix: 81 Penetration
  1. P135W2212 Penetration Type: M-6A Fire Area (Side 1): A-14 Fire Area (Side 2): A-13 Loc.JEiev.; 2009'-1" M..OX Dwg: M-1 X 192 4 1. Barrier Thickness: 12* 10. Annular Gap (smallest)
314" 2. Opening Size: 10"0 11. Gap between pen: N/A 3. Penetrants
(1)6"P 1 2. BarrierType:

F w 4. Sealant Type: Foam 1 3. Opening Sleeved or Concrete: Steel 5. Damming Side1: 114

  • rec e ss ed 14. Pipe !I nsulated: No 6. Damming Side 2: 114" reces s ed Wayne Aregood 7. Damming Continuity (Acc/Re j): Accept Prepared By: 8. Boot Condition (Acc/Rej): N/A Jeff Suter 9. Sealant Depth: 9-1/2" Rev i ewed By: Walkdown Comments: Barrier t h i c kne ss d e termined by Field measurement and Dr a wing M-1X1151. Changed Detail from M-1 to M-6A based on actual sealant depth. Sketch: FA: A..1C Slde1 .. -*' '
  • * , * *, (T"f*)
  • q . * .. ' . . . . . . .. FA: A-13 Slda2 M-663-000l?A, Re vision WOI Page Bl-70 ofB 1-172
  • Penetration Seal Data Append i x: 81 Photos: P135W22 12 Fire Area A-14 (Side 1) Fire Area A-14 (Side 1)
  • Rre Area A-13 (Side 2) Fire Area A-13 (Side 2)
  • M-663-000 17 A, Revision WO 1 Page Bl-71 ofBl-172 Penetration Seal Data Appendix:

B1 Penetration

  1. P135W2426 Penetration Type: M-6A Fire Area (Side 1): A-33 Fire Area (Side 2): A-14 Loc.IEiev.:

2009'-1" M-OX Owg: M-1X1932 1. Barrier Thickness:

24" 10. Annular Gap (smallest):

1-1 /2" 2. Opening Size: 10"D 11. Gap between pen: NJA 3. Penetrants:

{1)6"P 12. Barrier Type: A F w 4. Sealant Type: Foam 13. Opening Sleeved or Concrete:

Steet 5. Damming Side1: 5"recessed

14. Pipe Insulated:

No 6. Damming Side 2: Flush Wayne Aregood 7. Damming Continuity (AcciRej):

Accept Prepared By: 8. Boot Condition (Ace/Rei):

NIA Jeff Suter 9. Sealant Depth; 17" Reviewed By: Walkdown Comments:

Barrier thickness determined by Drawing C-1C1151.

Changed Detail M-11o M-6A based on actual sealant depth. Sketch: FA: A-33 SIQ1

('ffP) ' I (rtr) Fie A-14 Slde2 M-663-00017A, Revision WOJ Page BJ-72 ofBJ-172

  • Penetration Seal Data Appendix: 81 Photos: P135W2426 Are Area A-33 (Side 1) Fire Area A-33 (Side 1 )
  • Rre Area A-14 (Side 2) Fire Area A-14 (Side 2)
  • M-663-00017A, Revision WO l Page Bl-73 of BI-172
  • Penetration Seal Data Appendix:

81 Penetration#:

P141W1 9 09 Penetration Type: M-6A Fire Area (Side 1): A-16 Fire Area (Side 2): A-26 Loc./Eiev.:

2040'-2 1 M-oX Dwg: M-1X1919 1. BarrierThickness

12" 10. Annular Gap (smallest}: 1 f2' 2. Opening Size: 10"0 11. Gapbetween
pen
N/A 3. Penetrants
(1)6"P 12. Barrier Type: F 4. Sealant Type: Foam 13. Opening Sleeved or Concrete: Steel 5. Damming Side1: Flush 14. Pipe Insulated:

No 6. Damming Side 2: Recessed 1/2" Jeff Suter 7. Damming Continuity (Acc/Rej}:

Accept Prepared By: 8. Boot Condition (Acc/Rej):

NIA Wayne Aregood 9. Sealant Depth: 9*112" Reviewed By: Walkdown Comments:

  • Changed detail to M-6A based on field in spect ion . Sketch:
  • M-663-0 00 17A, R ev i sion W OI Page Bl-74 ofBI-172
  • Penetration SeaiiOata Append i x: 81 Photos: P141W1909 Fire Area A-16 (Side 1) Rre Area A-16 (Side 1)
  • Rre Area A-26 (Side 2) Fire Area A-26 (Side 2)
  • M-663-00017A, Revision WOl Page Bl-75 ofBI-172 Penetration Seal Data Appendix:

81 Penetration

  1. P142S1052 Penetration Type: M-6A Fire Area (Side 1): A-27 Fire Area (Side 2): A-8 Loc.IEiev.:

2026'-0" M.OX Dwg: M-1X1421 1. Barrier Thickness:

12" 10. Annular Gap (smallest):

1-1/2" 2. Opening Size: 10" D 11. Gap between pen: NfA 3. Penetrants:

{1)6"P 12. Barrier Type: F 4. Sealant Type: Foam 13. Opening Sleeved or Concrete:

Steel 5. Damming Side1: N/A 14. Pipe Insulated:

No 6. Damming Side 2: Flush with barrier Jeff Suter 7. Damming Continuity (Acc/Rej):

Accept Prepared By: 8. Boot Condition (Acc/Rej):

N/A Wayne Aregood 9. Sealant Depth: 11" Reviewed By: Walkdown Comments:

Slab thickness based on C-OC1411.

Detail changed to M-6A. Topside foam is irregular with lowest point flush with floor. Sketch: I , . P142S10i2

  • t 1 FA:M Sick!2 M-663-000 17A, R ev i si on WO l Page Bl-76 ofBl-172
  • Penetration Seal Data Append ix: 81 Photos: P142S1052 Fire Area A-27 (Side 1) Fire Area A-27 (Side 1)
  • Fire Area A-8 (Side 2) Rre Area A-8 (Side 2) *
  • *
  • Revis i on WOl Page Bl-77 of BI-J72 Penetration Seal Data Appendix:

81 Penetration

  1. P142S1097 Penetration Type: M-6 A Fire Area {Side 1 ): A-27 Fire Area (Side 2): Loc.IEiev.: 20 2 6'-0" M-OX Dwg: M-1 X 1421 1. Barrier Thickness: 24 a 10. Annular Gap (smallest)
1-118" 2. Opening Size: 8"0 11. Gap between pen: N/A 3. Penetrants
(1 )2-1/2"P 12. Barrier Type: F 4. Sealant Type: Foam 13. Opening Sleeved or Concrete: Steel S. Damming Side1: N/A 14. Pipe Insulated:

No 6. Damm i ng Side 2: Flush with barrier plane Jeff Suter 7. Damming Cont i nuity (Acc/Rej): Accept Prepared By: 8. Boot Condition (Acc/Rej): N/A Wayne Aregood 9. Sealant Depth: 26-1/4" Reviewed By: Walkdown Comments: Slab thickness based on C-OC1411. Based on top side configuration. Insulation does not p e netrate through seal. Sketch: FA: WZ7 Slde1 P14251017 FA: A-a SIH2 M-663-00017A, Revision WOl Page B l-78 ofBl-172

  • Penetration Seal Data Appendix:

81 Photos: P142S1097 Fire Area A-27 (Side 1) Fire Area A-27 (Side 1)

  • Rre Area A-8 (Side 2) Fire Area A-8 (Side 2) *
  • *
  • M-663-00017A, Revision WO l Page Bl-79 of Bl-172 Penetration Seal Data Appendix: 81 Penetration
  1. P143S1102 Penetration Type: M-6A Fire Area (Side 1}: A-16 Fire Area (Side 2): A-8 Loc.JEiev.
2026'-0" M-OX Owg: M-OX1431 1. Barrier Thickness:

12" 10. Annular Gap (smallest):

2-1/4" 2. Opening Size: 12"0 11. Gap between pen: N/A 3. Penetrants

(1)6" P 12. Barrier Type: F 4. Sealant Type: Foam 13. Opening Sleeved or Concrete: Steel 5. Damming Side1: N/A 14. Pipe Insulated:

No 6. Damming Side 2: Flush w i th barrier plane Jeff Suter 7. Damming Continuity (Acc/Rej):

Accept Prepared By: 8. Boot Condition (AcciRej):

N/A Wayne Aregood 9. Sealant Depth: Reviewed By: Walkdown Comments: Slab thickness based on C-OC1411. Changed detail to M-6A based on field inspection . Sketch: fA: A-11 &kle1 FA: A-1 SW.2 M*663*00017A, Revision WOI Page Bl*80 ofBl-172

  • Penetration Seal Data Appendix: 81 Photos: P143S1102 Are Area A-16 (Side 1) Fire Area A-16 (Side 1)
  • Fire !vea A-8 (Side 2) Fire Area A-8 (Side 2) *
  • *
  • M-663-0001 7 A., Revision WOI Penetration Seal Data Penetration
  1. P143S1111 Penetration Type: M-6A LocJEiev.: 2026'-0w 1. Barrier Th i ckness: 12" 2. Opening Size: 10"0 3. Penetrants
(1)6"P 4. Sealant Type: Foam 5. Damming Side1: N/A Page B J-8 1 of B I-172 Appendix: 81 Fire Area (Side 1): A-16 M.OX Dwg: M-O X 1431 Fire Area (Side 2): A-8 10. Annular Gap (smallest)
Approx 2" 11. Gap between pen: N/A 12. Barrier Type: F 1 3. Opening Sleeved or Concrete: Steel 14. Pipe Ins u lated: No 6. Damming Side 2: Flush with barrier plane Jeff Suter 7. Damming Continuity (Acc/Rej): Accept Prepared By: 8. Boot Condition (Acc/Rej): N/A Wayne Aregood 9. Sealant Depth: Reviewed By: Walkdown Comments: Slab thickness based on C-OC1411. Detail changed to M-6A based on field inspection . S k etch: Fk A-11 ""1 P143S1111 R evision WOI Page Bl-82 ofB 1-172
  • Penetration Seal Data Appendix: 81 Photos: P143S111 1 Fire Area A-16 (Side 1) Are Area A-16 (Side 1)
  • Are Area A-8 (Side 2) Fire Area (Side 2) *
  • *
  • M-66 3-000 17A. Revi s ion WOl Penetration Seal Data Penetration
  1. P144S1173 Penetration Type: M-6A Loc./Eiev.: 1. Barrier Th i ckness: 32" 2. Opening Size: 10"0 3. Penetrants
(1)6*P 4. Sealant Type: Foam 5. Damming Side1: N/A 6. Damming Side 2: Recess 1/2" 7. Damming Continuity (Acc/Rej): Accept 8. Boot Condition (Acc/Rej): NIA 9. Sealant Depth: 36" Walkdown Comments: Pa g e Bl-83 Appendix: B1 Fire Area (Side 1):

M-QX Dwg: M-1X1441 Fire Area (Side 2): A-2 4 10. Annular Gap (smallest)

1-112* 11. Gap between pen: NJA 12. Barrier Type: F 1 3. Ope n ing Sleeved or Concrete: Steel 1 4. Pipe Insulated: No Jeff Suter Prepared By: Wayne Aregood Reviewed By: Slab thickn e ss based on C-OC1411. Detail changed to M-6A based on field i nspect i on . Sketch: FA: A-11 Bidet P14451173 M-663-00017A, Revision WOt Page Bl-84 ofBl-172
  • Penetration Seal Data Appe n dix: 81 Photos: P144S117 3 Fire Area A-18 (Side 1) Fire Area A-18 (Side 1)
  • Fire Area A-24 (Side 2) Fire Area A-24 (Side 2) *
  • *
  • M-66 3-0001 7A, Revision WO l Page BI-85 of B I-172 Penetration Seal Data Appendix:

B1 Penetration

  1. P14550955 Penetration Type: M-6NA-7 Fire Area (Side 1 ): A-23 Fire Area (Side 2): T-2 Loc./Eiev.: 2026'-0" M*OX Dwg: M-1X1352 1. Barrier Th i ckness: 36" 10. Annular Gap (smallest): 1" 2. Opening S i ze: 10"0 11. Gap between pen: 2*1/2" 3. Penetrants
(4)1" P 1 2. Barrier T ype: F 4. Sealant T ype: Foam/C eram i c fiber 13. Open in g Sleeved o r Concrete: Steel 5. Damm i ng Side1: N/A 14. Pi pe I n sulated: No 6. Damming Side 2: Recessed 26" Jeff Suter 7. Damming Continu i ty (Acc/Re j): Accept Prepa r ed By: 8. Boot Cond i tion (Acc/Rej): N/A Wayne Aregood 9. Sealant Depth: 13" Reviewed B y: Walkdown Comments: Slab thickness based on C-1 C1352. Ceram ic fiber around annulus of penetrants. No degradation due to temperature observed. S ke t c h: FA: T.Z ... a M-6 6 3-000 17A, R evisio n WO l Page Bl-86 of Bl-172
  • Penetration Seal Data Appendix: 81 Photos: P145S0955 Fire Area A-23 (Side 1) Are Area A-23 (Side 1)
  • Fire Area T-2 (Side 2) Fire Area T-2 (Side 2)
  • M-663-00017 A, Revision WOl Page Bl-87 ofBJ-172 Penetration Seal Data Appendix:

B1 Penetration

  1. P145W2338 Penetration Type: FB-1 Fire Area (Side 1): A-23 Fire Area (Side 2): A-23 Loc./Eiev.:

2028'-0" M*OX Dwg: M-1X1931 1. Barrier Thickness:

36" 10. Annular Gap (smallest):

2. Opening Size: 14"D 11. Gap between pen: 3. Penetrants:

(1)4"P 12. BarrierType:

A 4. Sealant Type: Ceramic Fiber 13. Opening Sleeved or Concrete:

Steel 5. Damming Side1 : Boot 14. Pipe Insulated:

Yes 6. Damming Side 2: Boot Jeff Suter 7. Damming Continuity (Acc/Rej):

N/A Prepared By: 8. Boot Condition (Acc/Rej):

Wayne Aregood 9. Sealant Depth: Reviewed By: Walkdown Comments:

Barrier Thickness determined by Drawing M-1X1352.

This is not a fire barrier. lt is located in the wall containing the escape access opening from Area 5. Sketch:

M-663-00017 A, Revision WOI Page Bl-88 of Bl -172 Penetration Seal Data Appendix:

B1 Penetration

  1. P145W2339 Penetration Type: FB-1 Fire Area (Side 1}: A-23 Fire Area (Side 2): A-23 Loc./Eiev.:

2028'-0" M*OX Dwg: M-1X1931 1. Barrier Thickness:

36" 10. Annular Gap (smallest):

2. Opening Size: 14"D 11. Gap between pen: 3. Penetrants:

(1 )4"P 12. Barrier Type: A 4. Sealant Type: Ceramic Fiber 13. Opening Sleeved or Concrete:

Steel 5. Damming Side1: Boot 14. Pipe Insulated:

Yes 6. Damming Side 2: Boot Jeff Suter 7. Damming Continuity (Acc/Rej):

N/A Prepared By: 8. Boot Condition (Acc/Rej}:

Wayne Aregood 9. Sealant Depth: Reviewed By: Walkdown Comments:

Barrier Thickness determined by Drawing M-1 X1352. This is not a fire barrier. It is located in the wall containing the escape access opening from Area 5. Sketch:

M-663-00017 A, Revision WOl Page BI-89 of Bl-172 Penetration Seal Data Appendix:

B1 Penetration

  1. P145W2341 Penetration Type: N/A Fire Area (Side 1): A-23 Fire Area (Side 2): A-23 Loc./Eiev.:

2031'-9" M-OX Dwg: M-1X1931 1. Barrier Thickness:

36" 10. Annular Gap (smallest):

2. Opening Size: 30"0 11. Gap between pen: 3. Penetrants:

MANWAY 12. Barrier Type: A 4. Sealant Type: Steel Hatch 13. Opening Sleeved or Concrete:

Steel 5. Damming Side1: Boot 14. Pipe Insulated:

No 6. Damming Side 2: Boot Jeff Suter 7. Damming Continuity (Acc/Rej):

Prepared By: 8. Boot Condition (Acc/Rej):

Wayne Aregood 9. Sealant Depth: Reviewed By: Walkdown Comments:

Barrier Thickness determined by Drawing M-1 X1352. This is not a fire barrier. It is located in the wall containing the escape access opening from Area 5. Sketch:

M-663-00017 A, Revision WOl Page Bl-90 of Bl-172 Penetration Seal Data Appendix:

B1 Penetration

  1. P145W2342 Penetration Type: FB-1 Fire Area (Side 1): A-23 Fire Area {Side 2): A-23 Loc./Eiev.:

2028'-0" M-OX Dwg: M-1X1931 1. Barrier Thickness:

36" 10. Annular Gap (smallest):

2. Opening Size: 14"D 11. Gap between pen: 3. Penetrants:

(1)4"P 12. Barrier Type: A 4. Sealant Type: Ceramic Fiber 13. Opening Sleeved or Concrete:

Steel 5. Damming Side1: Boot 14. Pipe Insulated:

Yes 6. Damming Side 2: Boot Jeff Suter 7. Damming Continuity (Acc/Rej):

N/A Prepared By: 8. Boot Condition (Acc/Rej):

Wayne Aregood 9. Sealant Depth: Reviewed By: Walkdown Comments:

Barrier Thickness determined by Drawing M-1X1352.

This is not a fire barrier. It is located in the wall containing the escape access opening from Area 5. Sketch:

M-663-000 17 A, Revision WOl Page Bl-91 ofBl-172 Penetration Seal Data Appendix:

B1 Penetration

  1. P145W2344 Penetration Type: FB-1 (Remark 1 Fire Area (Side 1}: A-23 Fire Area (Side 2): A-23 Loc./Eiev.:

2026'-71 M-OX Dwg: M-1X1931 1. Barrier Thickness:

36" 10. Annular Gap (smallest}:

2. Opening Size: 8"0 11. Gap between pen: 3. Penetrants:

(4)1"P 12. Barrier Type: A 4. Sealant Type: Ceramic Fiber 13. Opening Sleeved or Concrete:

Steel 5. Damming Side1: Boot 14. Pipe Insulated:

Yes 6. Damming Side 2: Boot Jeff Suter 7. Damming Continuity (Acc/Rej}:

N/A Prepared By: 8. Boot Condition (Acc/Rej):

Wayne Aregood 9. Sealant Depth: Reviewed By: Walkdown Comments:

Barrier Thickness determined by Drawing M-1X1352.

This is not a fire barrier. It is located in the wall containing the escape access opening from Area 5. Sketch:

M-663-00017A, Revision WOl Penetration Seal Data Penetration

  1. Penetration Type: Loc./Eiev.:

2028'-0" 1. Barrier Thickness:

2. Opening Size: 3. Penetrants:
4. Sealant Type: 5. Damming Side1: P145W2345 FB-1 14"0 (1)4"P Ceramic Fiber Boot 6. Damming Side 2: Boot 7. Damming Continuity (Acc/Rej):
8. Boot Condition (Acc/Rej):
9. Sealant Depth: Walkdown Comments:

Page Bl-92 ofBJ-172 Appendix:

B1 Fire Area (Side 1): A-23 M*OX Dwg: M-1X1931 Fire Area (Side 2): A-23 10. Annular Gap (smallest):

11. Gap between pen: 12. BarrierType:

A 13. Opening Sleeved or Concrete:

Steel 14. Pipe Insulated:

No Jeff Suter Prepared By: Wayne Aregood Reviewed By: This is not a fire barrier. It is located in the wall containing the escape access opening from Area 5. Sketch:

  • *
  • M-663-00017 A, R e vision WOl Page B l-93 of B l-172 Penetration Seal Data Appendix:

B1 Penetration

  1. P152W2561 Penetration Type: Fire Area (Side 1): A-21 Fire Area (Side 2}: A-22 Loc./Eiev.: 2063'-11 M.OX Dwg: M-O X 19 4 7 1. Barrier Th i ckness: 12" 10. Annular Gap (smallest)
1-1/8" 2. Opening Size: 10"0 1 1. Gap between pen: N/A 3. Penetrants
(1)ti"P 12. Barrier Type: A F 4. Sealant Ty pe: Foam 13. Open i ng Sleeved or Concrete: Steel 5. Damming Side1: 1/4" recess e d 1 4. Pipe Insulated: No 6. Damming Side 2: Flush Wayne Aregood 7. Damming Continuity (Acc/Re j): Accept Prepared By: 8. Boot Condition (Acc/Rej): NIA Jeff Suter 9. Sealant Depth: 9-3/4" Reviewed By: Walkdown Comments: Wall thickness determined by Drawing C-1C1521. Changed Detail from M-1 to M-6A based on actual seal depth . Sketch: P152W2511 FA: A-22 Slcle2 M-663-0001 7A, R evision WOI Page Bl-94 ofBI-172
  • Penetration Seal Data Appendix: 81 Photos: P152W2581 Fire Area A-21 (Side 1) Fire Area A-21 (Side 1)
  • F i re Area A-22. {Side 2) A re Area A-22 (S i de 2) *
  • *
  • M-663-00017A, Revision WOI Penetration Seal Data Penetration
  1. P152W2623 Penetration Type: M-6 A Loc./Elev.: 2064'-3" 1. Barrier Thickness: 12" 2. Opening Size: 10"0 3. Penetrants
(1)6"P 4. Sealant Type: Foam 5. Damming Side1: Flush 6. Damming Side 2: Flush 7. Damming Continuity (Acc/Rej): Accept 8. Boot Condition (Acc/Rej): NIA 9. Sealant Depth: 10" Walkdown Comments: Page Bl-95 of B l-172 Appendix: 81 Fire Area (Side 1 ): A-19 M-OX Dwg: M-1X1948 Fire Area (Side 2): A-22 10. Annular Gap (smallest)
1/2" 11. Gap between pen: N/A 12. Barrier Type: A F 13. Opening Sleeved or Concrete: Steel 14. Pipe Insulated: No Wayne Aregood Prepared By: Jeff Suter Reviewed By: Barrier thickness based on drawing C-1C1521. Changed Detail from M-1 to M-6A Sketch: FA: A-11 Slde1 P152W2823 * .. b * : _,.
  • I
  • 0 . . ., F'OA"' (11l) --+--' I I> .* .. a*,* 1 4 ,. *t::l . . . . . FA: A-22 Side2 M-663-000 17A. Revision WOJ Page BJ-96 ofBI-172
  • Penetration Seal Data Appendix: 81 Photos: P152W2623 Fire Area A-19 (Side 1) Fire Area A-19 (Side 1)
  • Fire Area A-22 (Side 2) Fire Area A-22 (Side 2) *
  • *
  • M-663-000I?A. R e vis i on WOI Penetration Seal Data Penetration
  1. P153W2543 Penetration Type: M-6A Loc.JEiev.: 2064'-7" 1. Barrier Thickness: 12. 2. Opening Size: 1s*o 3. Penetrants
(1 )a*p 4. Sealant Type: Foam 5. Damm i ng S i de1: Flush 6. Damm i ng Side 2: Flush 7. Damming Continuity (Acc!Re j): Accept 8. Boot Condition (Acc!Rej): NJA 9. Sealant Depth: 1 0" WaJkdown Comments: Page Bl-97 of B l-172 Appendix.: 81 Fire Area (Side 1): A-19 M..OX Dwg: M-OX1946 Fire Area (Side 2): A-20 10. Annular Gap (smallest)
2-112* 11. Gap between pen: N/A 12. Bar ri er T ype: F 13. Opening Sleeved or Concrete: Steel 14. Pipe I nsulated: No Jeff Suter Prepared By: Wayne Aregood Reviewed By: Changed detail to M-6A based on field inspection . S ketch: FA: A-11 Side1 P153W25'3 FA: A-20 Slde2 M-663-000 1 7A, R evision WOI Page Bl-98 ofBJ-172
  • Penetration Seal Data Appendix: *B1 Photos: P153W2543 Fire Area A-19 (Side 1) Fire Area A-19 (Side 1)
  • Fire Area A-20 (Side 2) Fire Area A-20 (Side 2) *
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