ML18193B012
| ML18193B012 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
| Issue date: | 01/15/1992 |
| From: | Zeringue O Tennessee Valley Authority |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Wu A | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9202030168 | |
| Download: ML18193B012 (127) | |
Text
0. J. "lke' Zerlngue Vce Pttlslb~t. Browns Ferry Opwar~orls JAN 1 5 1992 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comnission ATI'N:
Docwent Control Desk Washington, D.C.
20555 Gentlemen :
In the Matter of
)
Tennes~ee Valley Authority 1
Docket Nos. 50-259 50-260 50-296 BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT (BFN) - FIRE PROTECTION REPORT (FPR)
The purpose of this letter is to transmit the revised BF'N-FPR.
llris report is being provided for staff r e v i e w so tltat TVA may implement Generic Letters (GL) 86-10 "Implementation of Fire Protection Requirements" and 88-12 "Removal of Fire Protection Requirements from Technical Specifications".
In the near future, TVA will supplement this report with a license amendment request to:
(1) replace the existing license condition based on the "Plan fox Evaluation, Repair, and Return to Service of Browns Ferry Plants 1 and 2 (March 22, 1975 Fire)" with the etandard licenee condition baaed on an upgraded fire protection program, and (2; remove the fire protection requirements from Technical Speciffcatione.
The BFN-FPR (Enclosure 1) contains:
(1) the "Fire Protection Plan" for BF?4, (2) the Fire Hazards Analysis", (3) the "Safe Shutdown Analysis",
and (4) the "Unit 2 Appendix R Safe Shutdown Program." The enclosure ie a consolidation of the BFN fire protection program into a single document and will become the basis for BFN's fire protection program.
The report will be incorporated into the Browns Ferry Final Safety Analysis Report via the annual update. This report reflects present fire protection programs for Units 1, 2, and 3, and Unit 2 Appendix R Safe Shutdown. These program were approved by NRC for the Unit 2 startup.
However, since TVA haa not established the Appendix R Safe Sllutdown program for Units 1 and 3, the information for these units ie not provided. Consequently, TVA will provide this information prior to each respective unit's startup.
9202030 16Q 929 1 1 5 PDR ADOCW 03000259 Tab 005
U.S. Ifuelear Regulatory Comiaaion JAN 1 5 1992 On April 4, 1988, TVA jiurued a letter containing the "FPR" and the "FPR Supplerent - BP111."
The FPR was to become TVA'e baaio for BFN'a fire protection progru and waa ioaurd ao a ffrae step for replacement of the aximtiq lic~nas coaditisn which is baaed on the "Plan for Bvaluation, Repair and Return to Service of Browas Ferry lhrclear Planta 1 and 2 (March 22, 1975 with an upgraded fire protection program.
On Harch 18, 1991, TVA received a request from RRC for additional information re&ardin# the BPI!!-FPR submitted in the April 4, 1988 letter.
In preparing a response to this request, TVA found that the information contained in the April 4, 1988 submittal had become out of date.
Conacquently, in a letter issued on September 19, 1991, TVA withdrew the April 4, 1988 eubmittrl.
IEnclosure 2 provides a comparison of the BFW Fire Protection Program to NRC Branch Technical Position (BTP) CHEB 9.5-1, and is included to aidij the staff in reviev of the fire protection program. This comparison supercedea the comparison suberitted in the April 4, 1988 latter a d in the discuaoion of compliwllee with BTP CHBB 9.5-1 contained in the October 24, 1988 BFA Nuclear Perfotnrance Plan, 8evision 2. Aa prsviouely stated, WA is issuing this letter 88 part of the requirements of GI, 86-10 and 88-12. Once the program is approved by the staff and a license amendment is issued, the fire protection program will fall under the guidefineat o f 10 CFR 50.59 and no further revisions to this enclosure will be required, Bnclosurc 3 containa the 7 i r e Co~anitment Evaluation - BFN." On April 4, 1988, TVA iasrucd the Fire Protection Up~rade liet in a aupplauent to the Fire Protection Report. This Fire Protection Upgrade list was subsequently updated by a September 21, 1989 letter. The acope of this liat included the antire BPA mite and was to provide complete and integrated fire protection system for the plant.
h e list provided by the encloeure identifies the projects that TVA ie camittin8 to the RBC with the mit/cycle outage scheduled implementation. Those proJects not included on the liat have been evaluate4 by TVA and determined to Be acceptable in their e x i m t i ~ configuration to satisfy safe ahutdown requirements. The projects previously submitted as "to be determinedw will ba evaluated for inclueio~ into the BFH integrated schedule. TVA wtll continue to pursue this course of action and each fire protection project will be evaluated on a case-by-case basla per the Master Issuea bist.
Pleare refer any questions regarding this matter to Paul R. Baron at (205) 729-7570.
Sincerely,
U.8. Nuclear Regulatory Commirrim Baclorurs cc (fhclosurs 1 r NRC Resident Inopectot Brmr Ferry Nuclear Plant Route 12, Box 637 Athenr, Alabama 35611 Mr. Thisrry M. Rosa, Project Manager U.S. Nuclaat Regulatory Cammiaaion One White Flint, North 11555 Rockvil1e Pike Rockville, Maryland 20852 Mr. B, A. Wilson, Project Chief U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Coamiaeion Region I1 101 Rarietta Street, NH, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Gaorgia 30323
c PEEPARED BY:
SEHIOR FIRE PROTIZCIfOll SPECIALIST BY:
e
PIItrAcI............................
A.
X m O m I o I I.............................................
1 D.
DfSCUSSIBR...............................................
2 1. D.fm+in-(hpth.....................................
4 2. u+. of Water on Electtlcal Cable ?iron...............
6 3. Emtabliahme md Use o f Fire A r e u..................
7 4. Ikfinitiaar..........................................
6 C.
PQSITXOl.................................................
13 1. Fir Protaction Prwtu Requirement................. 13 a. Fire Protection Progra..........................
1 3 b. Fire lazardm krrlyrio............................
23 c. Fire Suppramion Sy8t.r
?hair.............
27 d. A:tematirs or Ddfcatrd Shutdown................
29 e. Jmplrwltation of Fir Protrctiun Prwr a".......
29 2. a l n i m t r a t i v c Control8..............................
30 3. firm 8ria&......................................... 38 4. Quality Asmuranee Pr-r.r............................
87 b.
C.
d.
e.
f.
@ =
h.
I.
j.
Deai-and Ptewr9lcrrt Doc-t Coatrol..........
47
?mtmctioR., ?rocdureo. md Drsvlmgr...........
48 Control of Purchased Haterial. Uquigment.
a d Sexvicar.....................................
48 Itupectioa.......................................
48 Tert urd Tost Cautrol............................
46 Inapectloa. feat. urd Opatatitu Statu8...........
49 lloneonformlm I t a m..............................
49 Corrective Action................................
49 Recorda.........................................
49 audit8...........................................
49 S.
Gmcral Plant Guidcllnei.............................
30 a. Buildiru Jhrfm..................................
50 b. Safe Shutdown Capability.........................
58 c. Altcmatirt or Dedicated Shutdown Capability.....
60 d. Control of Corrburtibler..........................
63 PLDzcelOb 067-7 if
S. General Plant Cuidcllnem (Continwd).................
e. Electrical Cable Conatructlon. Cable Traym.
arad Cable Penetrati olL............................
66 f. Ventilation......................................
70 4. Lighting and Caranamlcation.......................
73 6
Fire Detection.ad Suppa.raim 74 a. Fir@ Iktscticia...................................
74 b. Fire Protection Water Supply S y a t m.............
77 d. Won Sugpreeaion Smrm........................
87 e. Carbon Dioxide Suppremmiea Spate"...............
88 4. Portable Exti~uldleaRl...........................
89 c. Water Sprinkler rad Hoar Stawlpipe lymtsu.......
63 7. Guidefinem for Specific Plant A r e u..................
89 P #
b.
d.
f c a.
h.
i.
J
- k.
1.
m.
a.
0.
P.
9-r.
C.
e.
Primary and S s c o n d s ~ Cantai~mmat................
89 Control b m Carplcx.............................
94 Cable $grrullry Poal.............................
97 P l a t haputel: B-99 Svitt9ue.r Rocma................................. 100 R w t e Safety-Related httrrg R o c ".............. 1132 Saf*tg-lrlated Battery Boar..................... 103 Turblne Buildla#................................. 104 Dir#el 6anerator Areu...........................
105 D i u e l bel O i l Storua A t e u.................... 107 Safety-Relo..
............................. 108 Spmt Roc1 Pool Area............................. 1W ckv A r k 8....................................
109 hdWWt* Ud &CQtkta&ihBtim Are48............... 109 Safety-Erlatd Water Tam&...............
1........ 118 Peco rd. Storqe A r e u............................ 110 Coolfw Towers...................................
111 Rimccllancoum....................................
111 8. Special Protection Guldelincm........................
112 8. Storye of Acetylmne-Oxy&en n#l kr.0........... 112 C. EImr8rdour e h # i C d r..............................
113 b. Storoqc Arcar for I o n &zetaage Rerlnr............ 112 d. Hatrrirls Containing Prdioactirfty............... 113 Refrreacer...............................................
114
A.
C*n*ral Design Criterion 3, "Flre Protection", of Appmdix A "Ccncrsl Qesiqn Criteria for h c l t a r Power Plant.",
to 10 CPP Part SO* "Licenuin#
of Production and Utilization FaeiPiticn", rcquirea that mtmcturem,
~ y s t c ", and cmpcmenta important to safety be desimcd urd located to mhimizc, comirtcsat vitR other safety r e q u i r m t s, the probability and effect of fires and explosives.
IVoncaar$uoeiblc and heat-rs8istmt materials arc required to be used wi-nercver practical throughout the =it, particulorly in locations such as the conrafnmc~~t urd control roan.
Criterion 3 also requires that fire detection and m p p r e s s i o ~
aystcers of appropriate capacity and capability be provided and desfl;nsd to unsure that thsir failure, rupture or Inadvertent operaties do-net s 1 e i f l c u l t P y impair the safety tapability o f theme o t m t u r e s, wet-,
ud c t 4 x " t s.
2"hia Branch Technical Poeltian (BTP) presents r~idclinem acceptable t o the RRC ttafd for iaplswntiru thjs crieerim in the developwnt of 8 firc protection proarema for nuclear pevcr plmtm.
Theme revimcd #uldclincm include the acceptance crfteria I f 8 t e d i n a nmber of docmento, includiw ApFmdix R to l0Cm Part 50 m d lOCF'R Part 50, Section 50.48.
The gurpo8e o f tho Fire Protection Prosrun Is to emure the c8prbility to shut down the reactor and maintain It In a safe shutdown condition &nd t o minimize radioactive talcarrm to the environment I n the event of f i r e.
I t lmplemcntr the philosophy o f dcfcnme-in-depth protectilea a18irut the hazards of f i r t uaftty-re:8tcd eguijment.
mnd i t 8 a88OCirted cffectm on 1
I I
-1 A = -
Ro ammemment required.
PLDI$E106 087-9
i f darignr or method8 6lffereat froa the guidelines r e c o s P d c d herein are wed, ehcy muat provide uquivaltnt fire protection.
Suitrble baaam m d Ju8tificrtiun akould be provided for alternative appsoachee to e8tabli8h aLf )table iapltrcntation of General D
xi Criterion 3.
mi8 BIT addresser fire protection p r o a r m for safety related ryrttro uuI equipment md for other plant area#
contalniw fire hazardr that could advtrrcly affect rafcty-related rystem~.
It doer not l i r e guidance for protectin8 the life or r r f r t y of the +ita perramel or for protection againat economic or property looa. This docuasnt rupplaantr Rc(u1atory 6uide 1.75, "Fhyric~l Independence of Electrical S y i t s u ", frt determfniw the fire protection for redundant cable system@.
There have been mmerous firer in operati-U. S. lhclear Power Plants t h r o w Deccrber 1975 ob which 32 were important emoryh to report. Of eheae, the fire ofl k r c h 22, 1975, a t BFH, m a the m o m t aevere. With approximately 250 operatiry reactor yeorr of experience, one u y infer I frequency ofi the order of one per 10 reactor yearn. Thus, on the averwe, a nuclear power plant u p experience ont or bore f i r m of vc,yin.$ reterity during it.
operatin# l i f e. Althoua WASH-1400 "Reactor Safety Study - An Asoessment of Accident Riokm in U. S. Coamercial Auclear Power P l u a t s ", dated October 1975, concluded thrt the BFU fire did not affect the validity of the overall risk a ~ s e ~ ~ ~ n t,
the otaff concluded that cort-affective fire protection measurer ohould be Instituted to rienificantly dccrcarc the frequency and reverity of fire and consequently initiated the development of thi8 5TP.
PLDE106 087-10
In this d c t t e l o m t, the staff made ume of many national mtandardu a d other publications related to fire protection. The documents discussed below were particularly useful.
A document entitled "The fnttmation8l Guidsllncr for the Ffrc Protection of lhrclear Paver Plants" (IGL), 1974 Bdition, Second Reprint, publlohcd on behalf of the Rational Nuclear riek8 Insurance Pool8 and Association, providec a 8cep-by-mtcp approach to as~easiry the fire rlak in a nuclear power plant and describe.
protective per-ts be t-u a part of the fire protection of thest plants.
I t prarides useful auidmcr in chi6 important area. The Ruclear Encrw Liability and Property Insurance Association ( W I A ) and the b t u a l Atordc Encru Pciaourancc Pool ()UERP) have prepared document entitled "Specifications for Fire Protection of llav Plants", which aiveo eencrcl.
conditions u x l valuable criteria. A special review group or&anitecl by REC d e r Dr. Stephen H. R.R.uer, Technic81 Adviaor to tba Executive Director for Operatione, to s t a y the BI)I flre, i w a d a report, XIREG-OOSO, "Peenrrmbrtionm Related t o Browns Ferry Fire", in Fcbwxy 1976, vhich contains r t c e 8 t d 0 ~
applicable to a11 nuelerr plmts. This BTP m e 8 the applicable infomation contained in these doctments.
The fire protection program for a nuclear power plant presented in thio BTP consists of dttian features, pers6ZIPIC1, tputpment, urd procedures that provide the defense-in-depth prottctfon of the public health urd rrftty. The purpose of the prosram is t o prevent miolficurt fires, to m u r e the capability to shut down the reactor and maintain i t in a osfe shutdown condition, uld to minimize rarliosctlve rclrvoco t o the enviroment in the event of a significant fire.
Pw)(IE106 087-11
To meet there objectives, it ia essential that "na~tmtnt participation continue through plant operation urd
- hat a qualified 8naff be rcaponriblc for 8nnunciatioa, confinement, and mpprermion for the plant. Tha rtaff
.houfd.loo b,* responrible for fire prevention activitiaa, maintenance of fire protection I ~ S
- C I U, train in^, and
" a 1 fire fightiv actiritlea. It ir the combination of all these that provideo the needed defense-in-depth protection of the public he8lth and safety.
S-of the major conslurioar that emeraad frm the BFA fire inteati&ationr warrant empharia and are df8curaed below.
Ruclear Power pllntr use the concept of defense-in-depkh to achieve the required h
w dearte of 8ofetp by wing echelon8 applicable to fire ufety in nuclear povcr plants.
W i t h respect to the fire protection, the pro8r.a defense-In-depth principle I8 aimed at achieviq an adequate balance in:
O f 88fety 8 y S t. u.
'Ihie COUCept i8 a180
- a.
Preventi-fires from otari-;
- b.
Detectiw firer quickly, rupprerafn(r those fires that occur pJttiW them out quickly, uad limiting their d m e ; and C.
Dtri&nin& p1-t 86fety q a t -
H) that a fire that starts in spite of the fire prevention proaru and b u m for a considerable time in spite of f i r e protection activities w i l l not prevent essential plant safety functions from beiry performed.
l'LDNE106 087-12
Ik, o m of tbs8a tchelom can bc perfect or complete by itmelf. Each cshtlon ahould m e t certain minima requIre"t8; however, r t r w t h e n i w any one can co9pap.ate in sooc meabure for weahcam, known or uriknct~~
in the otherr.
The primary objective of the fire protection prolru io to minimize bath the probability and eonaequence6 of 5 3 8 t U h t d firell.
In mpite of.tepa taken t o reduce the probability of fire, firem are expected t o occur. Therefore, muu are needed t o detect mnd 8upprarr fircm rfth partictaler eapbslo on providing pUaive and active fire protection of i~ppr~g~itiite eopcbflity and adequate uprccity for the 8yrtcmu neccmprry t o achieve and rrintmia uafc plant b t d o u n with or without offsite power.
For other oafety-related aymt-#
the fire protection ahsuld enmare e h t Q fire w i l l not caumc the 1-o f f a t i o n of m u c h myatema, et-tho-IOU of redundancy within the matam aay occur u a t m l t o f the fire. Gcneaa10y, in plant arcan vhcrt the potential fire damage may jeop4ditc u f e plant rhutdovn, the primary meam of fire protection should c o m i a t of fire barriers and fixed autaaotie fire detection urd manual fire fiati-capability ahould be provfdmd throu&out the plant to limit the extent o f fire -e.
Portable cquipent c o m i o t i ~
of hoser and nozzles, portable exeiwuishers, complete ptraonncl protective cquiplacnt, and air b r e a t h i ~ equipment ahould be provided for use by properly trained fire fighting personnel. Access for effective pun\\u1 application of fire uthguishiw agent. to colabustiblta uhould be provide.
8 q p r W i O l l -8trw.
AI-,
&B b8Ckrp
TBa adeqwe9 ef fir* prutccttun for rag particular plant srfmty ryrtt. or area rhould be dctrrminrd by anrlyrie of the rffseta of the p m t u l a t s d f i r e ralativa t o matnorlinlly the rbilit3 to r a f. 1 ~
a u t the p m t rsd m ~ i n i ~ e radioactive trlra8cr t a the e n v i r m t in tnt; event of a flrr. Fire prgtsction start8 with desi-aad rtut be c s r r i d t h r o w a l l pharrr of conrttuction d epe:atioa.
A Quality Asmurmcc (QA) program is needed to t d m t i f y and rectify etrora i n desim, construction, 404 operation a d I s aa emrmtial part of defmur-indepth.
Experirnca w i t h aajor rlectticai cable firer S b m that vater will prarptly utiquimh 8ucB firer. Stace p r w t extirA@uirrb4ng of fir* i e rft.1 to reactor mafrty, ftrs end viter -8 t o aafety rpatmu ir reduced by the more efficient application of water from fixed myrtu.praying directly oa the fire r8ther than by ernual application vith fire hoses.
Appropriate fire Pi&hting procedures and fire trriniw mhould provide the technique.,
.quimt, and &ill. for the uue of -tor in fi&itiw electrical c8bls firre in nuclear plant.,
concmtration of electric cable8 vlth mKtiCUl8rly in 8rG.a COUC@inia(
hi&
pl8StiC imUl8tiCUL ThiD i 8 net t o 88y that f i x 4 Water 8yotars should be imtallcd svcryvhrrc.
tqtaipent that MY be d-ed by vater ahould be chicldcd or relocated away from the fire hazard a d the water.
PLDNE 106 087-14
Drains rhouLd be provided t o remove m y water wed f e r f i r e tt~pprrrrian and utlwrstaBim+at t s atuure that water rrcumulrtien dorm aat Iwcaprcitrte rsftty-relate8 tqulparnt.
- 3. --
i
BBMCH "CIL POSITIOH Q 4 5 9.5-1 ColIPdpISOll The fire hazard analyeio will be the mechanim to determine that fire areas hawe been properly aelectcd.
Suitable design of the ventilation eysteme can limit the consequences of a fire by preventing the spread of the products of combustion to other fire areas.
It io important that means be provided to ventilate, uthruart, or isolate the fire arua ae required and that conaideration be adven to the comequcacer of failure of ventilation uystema due to fire catmi-1088 of control for ventilating, exhausti-,
or f w l a e i o n a givem fire are. The C8Wbflity to ventilate, ULh.uat, or isolation ie particularly important t a ensure the habitability of room? or spacer that plus0 be attended in an emergency.
In the design, provision ahould be Mdr for personnel accesa to
.nd eacape routea from each fire area.
Fox the user's ccmvenfence, acme of the tern rehated to fire protection are presented below w i t h their definitionr as used in thie BTP.
Dr0ve.d - teated and accepted for a apecific purpoec or application nationally rtco&zcd t e s t i w laboratory.
Aut-
- melf-acting, optrating by its own mechurim when actuated by some impersonal influence such as a chuyZe in current, prer$sure, temperature, or ecchurical configuration.
-rial
- material that does not meet the definition ob noncombustible.
BIDBE106 nR7-16
- the tone served by the control room emergency vcntilazion ayceem (Bee SRF Section 6.4, "B(-,bi ersbf 1 i ty Sya t e m 1.
-F_lr_c
- an exposare fire i s a fire in given.sea that involves either in s i t u or transient cmbustiblea and :s external eo any atmcturea, eyotcme, or components located in OF adjacent to that same area. The effects of such fire (e.g.#
szeokg, heat, or ignltion) can adversely affect those Btmctukes, r y s t e ", or componente important to safety. Thus, a fire involving one train or safe olhutdovn equipment slay constitute an expearre fire for the redundent train located in the 8 a e area, and a fire involving combustibles other than either redundant train may constitute and exposure fits t o both redundant trafm located in the a m
area.
- that portion ob 8 buildi-
~r plant that i m 8eparated from othur areu by boundary fire barrier..
- thoee components of construction (walls, floors, and their supports), iacludiw beams, joists, col",
penetration seals or closures, fire doors, and fire dampers that are rated by approvIn# laboratordca in hours of resistance to fire and are used to prevent the apread of fire.
Fire Stop - c feature ob construction that prcvtnts fire propagation along the length o f cable8 or preventu apre8diog of fire to nearby combrutiblee vithin a given fire area or fire zone.
PLDIlElO6 087-17
- the t t m O f plant personno1 assiwied t o fir4 fighting and who are equipped for and trained in the fighting ab firaa.
- a device deeigncd t o autcmatically detect the presence of fire an initiate an alarm syatcm and other appropriate action (see aFPA 72E, "Automatic Fire Detectors").
Some typical fire detectors are classified as follows:
W D e t -
- a device that detects a predetermined (fixed) temperature or rata of temperature rise.
w k c Detectol: - a device that detects the visible or invisible products of combustion.
Detectof - a device that detects the infrared, ultra-violet, or ririble radiation produced by a fire.
e D e t e c t a - a device in which detection ie continuous alone a path (e.o.,
fixed-temperature, heat sensitive cable and rate-of-rise pne-tic tubing detectors.
U z ~ 5 o t e c U o n Pr 0-
- the inteursted effort involving components, procedures, and personnel utilized in carrying out all activities of fire protection.
It includes system and facility de6im, fire prevention, fire detection, annunciation, confinement, suppzessfon, adPrinistrative contrsle, fire brigade organization, inspection and maintenance, trrlning, qual1 ty 88SUr8SlCCI a d test in&.
PLDIoE106
Res-
- the time that materials or crsscmbliee have withstood a fire exposure a6 established in accordance with the tcut procedures of "Standard Method8 of Fire Pests of Building Construction and Materials" (NFPA 251).
- control and utinguiahing of fires ( f i r e fiahting).
fire ouppresoion io the use of hoses, portable extinguishers, or manually-actuated fixed 8yeteaw by plant personnel.
Atatemtic fire euppression ic the u8c of autamticallg actvatad fixed Gy8tcPas auch as water, halon, or carbon dioxide eyetems.
Fire Z o m - the 8ubdiViSiOnS sf fire areas in which the fire suppression mystems are designed to combat particular types of fires.
- a.
A material which in the form in which it is used and under the conditions anticipated, will not ignite, burn, support combustion, or release f l m a b l e vapors when subjected to fire or heat.
- b.
Haterial having structural base of noncombustible material m m defined in a., above, with a surfaciu not over P/8-inch thick that has a flame spread rating not higher than SO when measured using ASTH E-84 T c ~ t "Surfaciw Burning Characteristics of Building Materials".
~
c c
w
~
- refer to Regulatory Guide 1.75.
q
- any area to which IICCCI[IS l a controlled by the licensee or purgssea of protecting individuals from elrposuse t o rrad5axlon and radioactive materials.
sA&s.2---
syisturrPl and camponants required to shut down the reactor, mitigate the comcqm."a o f postulated accidents, 3r maintain the reactor in a safe shutdown condition.
5
- a structure that comp1etel;- encloses primary containment, used for controlling containment leakage.
Sari-Svstqgg - a network of piping connected to a reliable water supply that will distribute the water throughout the area protected and will efacharge the water through sprinklers in aufficicnt qsrantity either to extinguish the fire entirely or to prevent ita spread. The system, usually activated by heat, includes a controlling v d v c anrd a device for actuating an alarm when the system is in operation. The bolPoving categories of sprinkler systems are defined in NFPA 13, "Standard for the Installation of Sprinkler SystemsvP:
Wet-Pipe System Dry-Pipe System Preaction System e DCPllgl? system Combined D r y Pipe and Preaction System h - o f f Sy8tePP StsndDiPe and Hose S Y s t w - a fixed piping system with hose outlets, hose, and ROZZlC8 connected to a reliable water supply to provide effective fire host streams to specific areas inside the building.
SJaser u-
- 8 network of pipi-simi1.r to a eprinklar egsesnr uccpt that it utiltzco open-bed spray nozzler. lWPA 15, "Water Spray Fixed S y s t m ", provide8 ~uidabcc OR these syrtcgs.
- 1.
ProtectSon A fire protection program should be eatabliohed a t each nuclear power plant. The program ahould eotablish the fire protection policy for the protection of atructure~, aymtem8, urd eoaponcnta irrpertans to noftty at each plant and the procedures, equiplent, utd permomel required to implentat the p r o a r u 8t the plant riec.
(1) The fire protection program should ba under the directIan of an individual vho haa been dele(8ted authority commamurate vith the rcspmaibilitiea of the po8ition 8nd vho ha8 available w a f t ptraonncl knowledgeable in both fire protection and nuclear ~afcty.
- 1. Fire Protection Program Requlrclacnts The Fire Protection P l a n (FPP, Section 1.2, (Rcdercnse 1) details the policy for minimizing the f i r t hazard and damage t o structures, systems, and components important t o safety. The organirs*ional staff is described in of the FFP.
The procedures required to maintain and teat the fire protection cquipent ie contained in the Fire Protection Administrative P r o a r m (Reference 2).
(1) As stated in Section 3.0 of the FPP, the Senior Vice President of Nuclear Gmctatfcn has the overall responsibility for eoeabli~hing program and policlcs related to f i r e protection, and asscssit~g chc effectiveness of the BFlP Fire Pyotcction PTOgrm.
This authoricy ha8 been delcgrted t o the Site Vice President and then further delegated t h r o w the BFH organization to the Operations Phnagtr who is responsible for fire eartrsency response activities rnc' performing fire protection aurveillanceo. The Tcchnlcal Support W a g e r is responsible for a l l fire protection q i n e e r i n g and technical issues. The Rarclcrr Engineerdw F(moecr is respomiblc for all fire protection system design activities utd Ruclear Safety.
3-
(2) The fire protection program should extend the concept of defense-in-depth to fire protection in fire arcas important to safety with the following objectives :
0 to prevent fkres from starting; to detect rapidly, control, and extinguish promptly those fires that do occur; mu to provide 2rotection or structures, systems, unb components important to safety so that a fire that is not promptly extinguished by the fire suppression activities will not prevent the safe shutdown of the plant.
(3) Responsibility for the overall fire protection progrem should be arsigned to a person who has management control over all organizations involved in fire protection activities. Formulation and maurancc of program implementation may be deledated to a staff composed of pcroomcl prepared by training and experience in fire prctection end peraonael prepared by training and experience in nuclear plant safety t o provide a balanced approach in directing the fire protection program for the nuclear power plant.
The staff should be responsible for:
(a) Fire protection program requirements, including considcratjon of potential hazards associated with postulated fires, with knowledge of building layout and systrms design.
(2) The objective of the Fire Protection Administrative Program is to prevent fires Prom starting. Fixed detection and suppression systems detect, coctrol, and extinguish fires that may occur.
Compartmefitation is provided to prevent a f i r e from spreading so that sare shutdown -in be achieved. These objectives are detailed in Section 1.2 of the FPP (Reference 1).
(3) The Senior Vice President of Nuclear Generation, who has management control over all organizations involved in fire protection activities for T'VA's Nuclear Plants, has final responsibility for the BFN Fire Protection Prog am.
This responsibility has been d e l e g a t e ee the BIB Site Vice President who has management control over all organizations involved in fire protectioh aetiviries for h i s facility. The day-to-day implementation of the fite protection program has been delegated to the Operations and Teeknical Support Managers and theiz stedfs, The responsibilities of these staff are outlined in Sections 3.4 and 3.5 of the FPP fReference I).
(e) The Opeyations and Technical Support staff is responsible for the f i r e protection program requirements including adherences to the fire protection administrative program (i.e.,
maintaining compartmentation requirements to prevent the spread of fire, maintaining suppression systems, limitina potential fire hazards, ensuring f i r e sa;ety is incorporated into all work processes, etc.).
(b) Poet-fire ahutdown capability.
(c) Desigr,, maintenance, surveillance, md quality aasurance of all fire protection features (e.g.,
detection ayattms, suppression systems, barriers, dampers, d o o m,
penetration oeals, and fire brigade equipment).
(d) Fire prevention activities ivlminiatrative contrclr and t raini-).
(e) Fire brigade organization and tra iniw.
(f) Pre-fire planning.
(b) ~ l l plant licensed operators (i.e.,
Reactor Bperators [RO] and Senior Reactor Operators [SEO]) are trained to perform post-fize shutdown fmctions.
Assistant Urdt Operators (AUO) are trained and perform supporting shutdovn functions.
(c) The design of fire protection projects is performed by Nuclear Engineering (NE). The OperationdFire Protection organization performs the surveillances on the fire protection systems. The Plant Haintenance organization performs the corrective maintenance on fire protection syetcms and components. The quality assurance function is the responsibility of the site Quality Assurance Organization.
The Technical Sudport Fire Protection Engineering Staff integrates the activities of the other organizations to assure a coherent, focmed program.
(d) The Technical SupportIFire Pzotection Engineering Staff defines/develops~maintains the Fire Prot-ction Administrative Program in order to ensure fire safety is incorporated into a work process. The OperationdFire Emergency Response Organization implemente the Fire Protection Administration Program.
(e) The Opcrations/Fire Emergency Response Organization is responsible for responding to fire emergencies and and fire protection services performs the required training.
( f ) The Technical Support/Fire Protection Engineering Staff is responsible for dgveloping/maintaining pre-fire plans.
PLDNE 186 087-23
(4) The organizational reeponaibilitiee and lines of c a m m i c a t i o n pertaining to fire protection should be defined between the various poiitions through the use of organizational charto and functional descriptions of tach position's responsibilities. The following poeitiondorgarnizations should be designated.
(a) The upper level offsite managanent position which has management reaponsibility for the formulation, implementation md assessment of the effectiveness of the nuclear plaat fire protection program.
(b)
The offsite managawnt positien(s) directly respoaoible for formulating, implementing, ulb periodically asaeesing the effectiveness of the fire protection prografn for the licensee's nuclear pover plant including fire drills and training conducted by the fire brigade and plant personnel. The results of these a s s e ~ s m ~ ~ ~ t e 8hOUld be reported to the upper level management position rcsponaible for fire protection with recommendations for improvements or corrective actions as deemed necessary.
(4) The Fire Protection Organization responsibilities are described In FPP Section 3.0 (Reference 1).
(a) The Senior Vice President of Nuclear Generation has mardgement formulation, implementation and assesement of the effectiveness of the nuclear plant fire protection program.
(b) The Vice President of Operations Services establishes the policies and basic guidelines for formulating and implementing the fire protection program at BFN as described in the FTP Section 3.0.
Management Directive PZD-210 - Fire Protection (Reference establishee and defines Ruclear Powers Policy for fire protection.
Standard 12.15 - Fire Protection, establiaheo urd describes the Fire Protection Program (Reference 4). The Site Vice President is responsible for implementing the fire protection program.
e The responsibility for annual, biennial, and triennial assessments of fire protection program including fire drills end training is placed with the Site Quality Organization.
Results of the assessments and audits are sent to the EFlp Site Vice President for corrective action.
Fire protection audit results and recommendations are available for review by the Senior Vice President of Nuclear Generation.
PLDlOE 10 6 087-24
(c) The onsite ~ n r g c ~ n e n t porition adminiatration of the plant operationn and emergency plans which include the fire protection and prevention program 8nd which provide I s h g l e point of rrrponriblt for the O V Q r 8 1 1 contingencfee.
(d) The onsit control and contact for all
) which posit-ion(
- i.
Implements periodic inspections to:
minimize the amount of combustibles in safety-related areas; determine the effectiveness of housekeeping practices; assure the availability and acceptance condition of all fine protection syotems/equipment, emergency breathing apparatus, emergency lighting, communication equipment, fire stops, penetration seals, and fire retardant coatings; and assures the prompt and effective corrective actions are taken to correct conditions adverse to fire protection and preclude their recurrence.
ii. Is responsible for the fire fighting training for operating plant personnel and the plant ' s fire brigade ;
design and selection of equipment; periodic inspection and testing of fire protection systems and equipment in accordance with established procedures, and evaluate test results and determine tne acceptability of the systems under test.
( c )
The Site Vice President is responsible for all fire protection arcivitiee at the plant. The Shift Operations Superviaor on duty is the S i t e Vice President's designee an the overall tmtrgency coordinator and l e the ainglc paint of control for all contJngencies.
Fire emergency plans arc developed and maintained by the Technical Support1 Fire Protection Engineering staff, in coordination with the Radiological Emergency Preparcdntos Section.
- 1.
Supervisor and his etaff are re8pOnSibh for implementira the required adminiotrativc controls, as outlined in Section 7 of the FPP.
The Site Operatlonj Fire Protection Periodic plant inspections are conducted in order to ensure adequate control of combustibles. Theac impectiona require neccesiry corrective action and are documented by plant procedure.
Recurring programmatic deficiencies are implemented into the piant Condition Adverse to Quality (CAQ) Program for cki-and resolution of the ntificd deficiency or weakness; thus, uring prompt and effective corrective ion.
ii.
The responsibility for the fire fighting training of the plant's fire brigade is delegated to Fire Protection Services. The training is monitored by the BFN Operations1Firc Protection Staff.
PLDm 10 6 087-25
iii. Arrirt8 in the critique Of 811 firs drillr to determine how well the trainiry objective. have been met.
ir.
ReVieWB and evaluatar propoaed work activiticr to identify potential truuient fire loadr.
- v.
Implawmta a program for indoctrination of all plant contractor pcroonnel in appropriate adminiatrativc procedure8 vhlch implement the fire protection program, and the emergency procedure.
relative to fire protection.
ha6 the raoponsibilicy for the design and selection of inatallcd equipment.
Other equipunt, periodic inepectien, and taoting of fire protection systems and equipment, avuluation of test regults and acceptability of system testa i o the reeponsibilitj of the Technical Support/Fire Protection Engineering Section.
iii. The Incident Commander and the Site Operatiom Fire Training Officer assict in the critique of a l l fire drills to deeemSne that the training objectives are being met.
iv. Each rsupervlror ir responsible to review and evaluate proposed work activitito to ensure that transient combustibles are handled in accordance with t&
Fire Protection Administrative ProgrePD (i-e., control of combustibles, etc.
safety-relata! cablea and equipment.
ateam of the aite containing These guidelines apply to all
- v.
BFH Training teasha. General Employee Training (GET), which detAilS how to report fire emergencies, f i r e prevention rcquirementB, plant f i r e brigade functiona, and an overall description of the BFN Fire Protection Program. All pereonnel working onsite are required to tdte GET when lnltirlly C O f d n g Onsite md updates petiOdiCAlly.
The Operations Fire Protection s t a f f perform periodic plant inspections to evaluate work activities t o ensure adequate ZontroP of transient combustibles.
PLDrpE 1 0 6 087-26
v i.
Implemante a proaram for inetruction of peroonnel on the proper handling of accidental events ruch aa l e a or npillr of flaamable mterials that are related t o fire protection.
(e)
Tbe oneitc position responsible for fire protection quality asourance.
This position should be responsible for 8ssuring the effective implementation of the fire protection program by planned inspections, scheduled audits, and verification that the results of these inepeetione or 8udits are promptly reported to cognizant management ptroonnel, (f) The positione which are part of 9
the plant fire brigade:
- 1. The plant fire brigade pooitions should be rceponsiblc for fighting fires. The 8uthority and responsibility of each fire brigade position relative to fire protection ohould be clearly defined.
vi. BFW Training Organization conducts 4 hazardous materials course for tho fire emergency reeponee organization who is responsible for hazardous material leaks or spills. This course specifies the actions that should be taken when a leak or spill of flanraable materials OCCUTS.
(e)
The Site Vice President has responoibility for all aspects of the Ffre Protection Program. The Gpcrations Manager, Technical Support Manager, and the Site Quality Organization monitors the effectiveness of the program. Day-to-day implementation of the policies is a line
.supervisory responsibility. The oite Quality Organization is responsible or scheduling all fire protection audits.
Audit deviations arc incorporated into the plant Conditiondl Adverse to Quality (CAQ) Program.
(f) The Fire Emergency Response Organization is described in detail in Reference 2.
f. The Shift Operations Supervisor/Site Emergency Director a s e m e s overall responsibility for all plant fire emergencies. The Incident Commander (ASOS) reports to the Shift Operations Supervisor and is designated for each shift by the operator's schedule or the Shift Operations Supervisor. Reporting to the Incident Commander during f i r e emergencies are the Level I members which are the Operations Fire Emergency Rcsponsle Organization. Level I1 technical response fire brigade members also report to the Incident Commander and consista of Operators, RADCQR technicians, chemical laboratory analysts, and Nuclear Security.
PLDIQE106 087-27
ii.
brigade position rhould correrpond with the action8 required by the fire f i a t i w procedures.
The rerponribilities of each fire iii.
brigade asebarr W e t n o m 1 p l m t condition8 ahoold not conflict with their responribilitiem d u r i q 8 fire aarsrasncy.
The rerponaibilitiu of the fire ir. The minimar a m b e r of trained fire briybe r m b a r r available a m i t u for each operaem rhift mhould be conrimtent with the rctivitier required to combat t h e m r t 8ignifiCUt fire.
The r i t e of the fire brilade rhould be b u d upon the functiaar tsquired to fight firem with 8dequate allfiw8nce for injurier.
The firr bri8a.d.
r h o h a m Level I1
.upport p e m o m e l vho rempond to the fire epuiplpant cage locrtiom md remain ameraancy Lm over.
The fire bri88de alro ha8 available Level If1 memberr c o m i r t i w of on or,Iff-rhift Level I,
Level 11, or any employee that the ohift operation8 muperviror d a m necamrary to rrapport any fire emcraency.
at &he q u i m t C84a8 =til the fire ii.
The rerponaibilitier and actions required by Fire Emergency Perponoe Organization poaitionm are defined in Reference 2.
iii.
Emergency Rerponrc Orgmization m e r n o m a 1 plant c o n d i t i m do not conflict with their rerpon8ibilitfco during a fire emergency 88 demctibed in Reference 2, Fire Emergency Responme Organization and Pre-Fire Plans.
Tha ruponribilitirs of ttM Fire iv. me mini" n m b e r of trained.1)
Emergency Rempome Organization members available onrite for each operating rhift i m 8 Incident Com"ler, Fire Brigade Leader, and four aemberr.
PLDllElOd 087-28
Q,
The rtcommnclatiorm for orgurizarfon, training, u r d equipment of "Private Fira Brigdea" aa specified in aPPA No. 27-1975, including the applicable W P A publicationa lirttd in the appendix to RFPA No, 27, are canridered appropriate criteria for oraanizing, training, and operating 8 plant fire brigade.
(a)
The positiori re6ponfiible for formulation and implementation of the fire protection program ohould have within his oraurizrtion or as a conaultant a fire protection engineer who io a graduate of m enginceriry curriculum of accepted standing and
@hall have completed not lea@ that six years of enginecriry attainment indicative of arowth in errlDincerinl competency.nd achievement three years of which r h l l have been in reopomible charge of f i r e protection en&wrin.g work. Theoe requiremente are the eligibility requirements as a member in the Society of Fire Protection Engineers.
(b) The fire brigade mmber8' qualificationm should include sumination or performing strenuour 8ctivity, and Q the dire brigade training described in Position CG3.d.
04tirf8CtOry Completion Of 8 phyoic.1 1-
- v.
The baeic rccmmmdmtfons of " P A "Private Fire trl@sr",
currently BFPA 600 vere w e d in formulating the guideline8 for the organization urd brigade.
(a) The position responsible for the formulation of the fire protection program is the Technical Support Manager. AE a minimum, the Technicul Support Manager will have an individual who meets the eligibility rcquirtaents of a full member of the Society of Fire Protection Engineers.
The Operatione knager ia responsible for the implementation of the Fire Protection Adminietrative Program.
(b) Fire Emergency P~q~~n8d!
Organization members are evaluated annually to assure they can perform strenuous activitier and obtain a medical clearance without restrictions for fire emergency rceponec duty and training. The Fire Emergency Response Organization members are trained and qualified as members in accordance with the requirements specified in the Fire Emergency Response Organization and Pre-Fire Plans (Reference 2).
PLDRE 106 087-29
(e)
Tha paraotmel rrspmaibls for the maintenance md tsrtiq of the fire protection myat" h u l d be qualified by tr~fninl; md rxpcrimce for much work.
(d) The pereonnel rerponrible for the t.aining of the fire brigade ehould b?
qualified by training.nd experience for 8UCh work.
(6)
The following " P A publications should be waed for guidance to develop the fire protection program:
No. 4 - "Organization far Fire Services" lo. 4A - "Organization of a Fire Department" Ho. 6 - "Inducrtrial Fire Loas Prevention" lo. 7 - W a n a g m e n t of Fire Emergencies" No. 8 - "Management Rtuponoibilfties for Effects on Fire on Operatiom" Ilo. 27 - "Private Fire Brigades" Organization io responsible for the teetirq of the fire protection ayiteas, nnd ere qualified by trdniry uxl experienc 1 for testing of fire protection eyntem.
The maintenance of fire protection eystam is p c r f o m d by the Plane Maintenance Organization who are qualified craftman.
(d) M i n i m training and experience requirements have been establiehed for the persronnel vithin Fire Protection ServIcea, Fire Training Academy, vho are reeponoibls for training of the Site Fire Emergency Peepoxme Qrganizatione, The training personnel have been evaluated by the lVFPA.
The AFPR determined that the training personnel were qualified for the positions they held a6 of January 1988.
(6) Of the six FlFPA standards referenced, three have been cancel1 and two others art applicable to municipal fire departments, not to industrial fire brigades.
RFPA 600 "Private Fire Brigades" (which supereedcd " P A 27) provides only general guidance and no specific criteria.
used in the formulation of BPA'a Fire Brigade. With the cancellation of the other " P A atmndards, no HFPA guidance was available for oehcr program areas.
Therefore, OHSA regulations (29CF'R1910.156), 10CFR50.48, and BTP CMEB 9.5-1 were used to formulate the BFB Fire Protection Program.
The gu'dance of FmpA 600 V89 PLDNE106 087-30
(7) On sitsr vhere there i8 up operating reactor 8nd corutruction or aodificatian of other unitr ir uaderway, the superintendent of the oprratiw pl8nt rhould have the lead rr8pOa8ibility for Site fire prOteCtiOll.
Yhe Firs MazarUs Analysis should demonatrate that the plant will maintain the ability to perform safe shutdown fmctions an minimize radioactive releaaea to the environment in the event of a fire, The Fire Hazards Analysio chould be performed by qualified fire protection and reactor systems engineers to (1) consider potential in eitu and transient fire hazards, (2) determine the consequences of fire in any location in the plant on the ability to safely shut down the reactor or on the ability to minimize and contrcl the release of radioactivity to the environment, and (3) apecify mcaeures for fire prevention, fire detection, fire suppression, and fire containment and alternative shutdown capability as required for each fire area containing atructurea, system, and components important to safety that are in conformance with NRC Guidelines and Regulations.
( 7 )
At BFR, the Fire Protection Plan (FPF) and the supportina procedure8 cetablimh the requirements and controls n e c c e e a ~
to msi:rc proper firr protection practice6 nrc followed.
All work performed onsite must be In accordnncc with the ETP and the supporting 8dsrinimtrativt procedures and chawea to them &re rpproved by the plant Qpcrations Review Ccnmittee (PORC) before they are implemented. PORC is made up of the ecnior manager& of various plant orgmizat ions incliiding Operations. P O W io charged with assuring eafe opcratfono in the plant.
Complete Fire Hazards and Safe Shutdown Analyeis Rar been performed for BFB to dmonetrate cmpl~8.ncc with apg;icable poreime of 10CFR50 Appendix B aa required by 10CFR50-48. These malyseo dcmonBtrate the ability of the plant to achieve oafe ohutdorn functions and minimize radioactive releases in the event of a fire.
Summurice of the analyses are docmenzed in the BFN Fire Protection Report, Volume 1 (Reference 1).
The FHh does not address radiological emergenciee. The BFlJ Radiological Emergency Plan establishes the methods to be used to minimize contamination in thr-event of a f i r e which may tcleaee radioactive materiala.
The F'HA evaluates the in eitu combustibles, and transient combustibles which are generally expected to be present in the area. Transient combustibles are evaluated and controlled by the Fire Protection Administrative Program (Reference 2).
The fire protection features of each fire rrea/zone of the plant have been evaluated to ensure that a, postulated fire can be contained, controlled, and extinguished within that area, and that a redundant safe shutdown train will remain available free of fire damage, PLDNE106 087-31
%ret casea firea need not $a nonfire-related failures in 88fsty aystema, plant accidents, or the most
- evere natural phen/m"a.
r pomtulatod to ba simultaneous with On multiple-reactor $Iten, unrelated flree in two or more unitn need not be postulated to occur simultaneously.
Firea involving facilities shared between unite and fires due to man-made site-related events that have a reaaonable probability of occurriw and affecting more than one reactor unit (such am an aircraft crash) should be considered.
Because fire may affect safe shutdown systems.r,d because the loss of funcYlon of system used to mitigate the consequence8 of design basis aecldentr under posefire conditions does not per Be impact public safety, the need to limit fire damage to aysteme requjred to achieve and maintain safe ohutdown COnditiOM is greater than the ne d to limit fire d-88 t o tho8k ayUteUI8 retyIbrea t o mitigate the consequences o f design baois accidents. Three levels of fire damage l h i t s are establinhed 8ccording to the safety function of the structure, system, or component:
Hot Shutdown - One triiin of e q u i p "
necessary to achieve hot shutdown from either the control room or emergency control station(8) must be maintained free of fire damage by a single fire, includjng an exposure fire.
z"=B The fire hazard. a d rafc rbutdbwn PLDNE 106 087-32
equipment accemmary to achieve cold rhutdown nay be damaged by a olngle fire, includfng an cxporute fire, but d ~ n 8 g e must be limited mo th8t at le8mt one train can be rcp8ircd or m8dc operable within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> w i n g onsite ckprbility.
Design B88is - Both train0 of accident equipment necesrwy for dtigation ob consequences following derfgn b r b h acsidcnts may be damaged by a single exposure fire.
The most otringent fire damage limit should apply for those oystemo that fall. into more than one category.
Redundant system used t o ~ltigate the conrequencer of ether dcrign basis accidentr but not neceesary for oafe shutdown may be lost to a e i q l e utpsourc fire.
However, protection shall be provided so that a fire within only one ouch eyetem will not damage the redundant system.
The fire hazards analyais should rcparatsly Identify hazards and provide appropriate protectfoil in locations where safety-related losse4 can occur u1 a result of:
(1) Concantrations of combustible contents, including transient fire lord8 due to combustdbles expected to be used in normel operations such as refuelfng, maintenance, and modi f icat ion8 ;
(2) Continuity of combustible ContentB, furnishings, building materials, or combinations thereof in configurations conductive to fire spresd; PLDIVE 106 087-33
(3) Crpomure firs, h m t, "kc, or water exposure, including thoas that map n e c c ~ ~ i t a t c evaluation from are-that are required to be attended for safe shutdown.
(4) Pire in control rooam or other locatitma having critical 88fety-rehted func e i O M ;
(5) removal facilities that impede firt extinguishment in eafety-related areas; Lack of adequate access or moke (6) Lack of exploaion-prevention measure8 ;
(7) c i rcui t a ;
Loa. of electric power or control (8) Inadvertent operation of fire suppression mystem.
The Fire Hazards Analyeie should verify that the RBC Fire Protection Program Guldelinco have been met. The uulyrie Aould liot applicable clanente of the program, with explanatory statements as needed to identify location, type of system, and design criteria. The uralyrie Should identify and justify any deviationo from the regulatory guidelinee. Justification for deviations f rota the regulatory auidelineo should ahov that an equivalent level of protection will be achi wed.
Deletion of a protective feature without compcnsaring alternative protection measure8 vi11 not be Acceptable, unless it ie clearly demonstrated that the protective measure i ~ )
not needed because of the design and arrangement of the particular plant.
PLPNE104 087-34
c. 1 (1) Total rrlirncr rhauld not be placed on a r i u l r fire rupprerrion myrta~.
Appropriate backup fire rupprerrioa capability rhould be provided.
(2)
A r i q l c aczive failure or a crack in a moderatr-anerly line (pipe) in the fire vrpprerrion ryrtam rhould not impair both the primary urd backup fire ruppramrion capability. For example, neither the failure of a fire p a p, it8 povrr rupply or controlr, nor a crack in a moderate-marw line in the fire rupprerrion ryrtem, rhould maul: in lora of function of both rprinklrr and hore artandpips ryrtaaa in an area protected by much primary and backup ryrtamr.
(I) Backup flrc oupprerrion copability ia provided by a trained Fire lhrrisncy Rerpcmsc Oraanization vith available atandpipe myate" and port8blc cxti~uirherr loc8tad throwhout the plult.
( 2 )
The flre protection myrtemr arc derigncd ao a rlrylc impaiment will not degrade or disable both primary and backup fire rupprerrion capabilitlcr.
The water rupply for the "idpip@ 8118 the pneral area preaetion rprinklet symeaar are rupplicd from different underground feed..
In addition, the oprinlthr urd r t a p i p c ey~tema arc oupplied by a "gridbed" pipin4 arrangement.
Isolation valva8 are located throughout the vater rupply loop and iridr to irolatc oliwlc impairment, I. @., crack, or inopcrrble valve.
The electric m d die8el driven f i t r punpa proribiw water rupply to the underground firs loop are located in eeparate b u i l d l ~ r. Additionally, a 100% capacity portable diaocl driven fire pmp ir available 8t the rite to eupplement the fixed water rupply rystem.
A rlryle fire pump innpalmane will not affact the vater rupply to the rtmdpiper a d rprinlrler rystam.
PLDRE106 08 7-35
(3) Aa a ria-,
the fire ruppresrion q a t -
bhculd be capable of daliretlcu within home much of are-csntafnina equiplarat required for rafe plant
. h u t d m f o l l o w i ~
the rafe.hutdown oeimic activity, the rtaff will ne&
to drripl the fire detection mid
~-ippruaion rylot-to be functional followin# the SSE.
water to -1 ho89 8t8itim located mat-(8sE).
coarider On 8 CUa-by-Car.
b88i8 t h e In 8ra.I Ob hi&
(4)
The fire protection mystem8 rhould retain their oriainal derign capabdlity for (a) natural phenomena of larr eeverity urd arsatsr frequency than the moat mevera natural phenomena (approxt~trlp oace in 10 grass) much rtorru, or a u l l - i n t m i t y earthqudcer that are characterirtic o f the aaographic relion, and (b) potential m n 4 u rlte-related event8 much 81 oil barge collimioal or 8ircraft crarhea t h t h8Vb a re8rolubfe a8 tO&OUs, hurfic8nu8, flOOd8, ieU probability O f o c c u r r i ~
8t 8 Specific P1-e 8itr.
requirr that rururl homm mtationa and rt8ndgPpss be deri&-rad to famain functional during a d after a safe rkutdown earthquake.
a backlit requirement for p l m t m of BFR'a vintage.
Thh hua not been It ir urticipated that most firer could be extiwuirhed uaiw portable fire extiruuiuhiw squipaant. The portable txtiruuiahiw equipaunt can be ured i f fixed rupprearion system are not available. Duriq or after a seimic event, a mobile fire apparatus i r available am a backup in the w e n t of Hioh Prcrrure Fire Protection (HPPP) ryrternr failursn, (4) Metural phmowanr. (auch 60 tornadoen, floodr, and ice storm) and potential nun made rits-related events (euch as o i l barge collisions and aircraft craoher) were not a opecific criteria in the design of fire protection syateme. However, the fi.
protection oyrtmw are likely to withstand there phenomena, am the majority of the component8 are located within rafety-related rtructures that are designed to withatand the natural ph"aml and man-made cvente.
Phyrical reparation of the diesel fire puap from the elcctrfcal fire pump8 and the adequate looped design of the fire the porsibility of total loso of the oyatem due to physical damage.
MiM With i8OhtiOn capability Qinimizt PLDHE106 087-36
mLm"3
'Fhr oifrctm o f If@itnirkg rttlker Aould be included in tho overall plant fire protection proarm.
(5) 3" consequcncsa of inadvertent opaaation of or a crack in a moderate anergy line in t!!e dire ruppraesion r y r t w ~
ohould meet the auldelinso rpecified for moderate-energy systems outeide containment in SRP, Section 3.6.1.
a O
r Re-ed Altenutiva or dedicated shutdown capability mhould ba provided where the protection of eyetuna vbo functionr are required for oafe shutdown ir not provided by emtablished fire muppreesion method or by Position C.5.6.
- e. ImPfanentation of Fire Protection Pronrame (1) The fire protection program (plmo, perronntl, and equipment) for buildings storing new reactor fuel and for adjacent fire area6 that cauld affect the fuel storage area rhould be fully operational before fuel is received at the site.
Li&tnin$ protection h a m brm addressed In the deoiw of the plant, The top of the p o w r h o w e rtmcturer are o f metal construction which comectr to the buaiad ground mat via the bulldicu rtruetural m e a l. The mwitchyard ha8 an overhead arownd wire my8tsm which ir virad to the around mat. Ground wirer are rarn above the tranamiarion llacr and grounded v i a the trannmirobon lint towers. The other major rtpucturar onrite a100 have li*tning protection.
Additionally, lightning arreatorm arc provided adjacent to a11 major electrical equipment.
( S )
See TVA reoponoc t o guideline C.5.c(2) and C.6.c(l).
- d. m v
e or Deucated Shotdom Alternative rhutdown capability requirements are being met as documented in the Safe Shutdown Analysis (Reference 1).
- e.
-tation of Fire Prot ectjon EEukrmU (1) The Fire Protectfon Program has b e m implemented which encompasssa and a p p l i e s a l l phase6 of plant activitiee, i. e.,
operations, outage8 and modifications.
See TfA rceponec to euideline C.e.(2).
PLDHE106 087-37
Such adjacsnt areal include thore whore flmea, hat aeoes, and fire-amcrated toric and cotromive productr m y Jeopardize u f e t y.zIQ rurvaillmo of the atored fuel.
(2) The fire protection proaru for M entire reactor unit ahould be fully operational prior to initial fuel loading in that reactor unit.
(3) On reactor rites where there ir an operati-reactor and conrtruction or mdificrtion of other unito ir under way, the fire protection progrm should provide for continuing evaluation of fire hazards. Additional firs barriers, fire protection capability, and administrative controls lshould be provided aa aeeeslsary to protect the operating unit fram construction fire hazards.
- 2. -ti ve Con-Administrative controls shou d be used t o maintain the performance of the fire protection system and personnel. These controls should establish procedures to:
- a. Prohibit bulk rtorage of combustible material8 inside or adjacent to rafety-related buildings or ayrtema during operation or maintenance periods. RegUhtOty Guide 1.39 provides guidance OE housekeeping, including the dlaposal of combustible osterials.
( 2 )
been developed by the Fire Protection Plln and implaPlmted by the Fire Protection Adainistratioe Proarm.
The Fire Protection Program is implemented urd applies during all phase8 of plant operations.
The Fire Protection Proqrra has (3) The Fire Protection Plan eetabliaheo the requirements necersary to aaaucc plant fire protectior, hazards are evaluated prior to performirrg work vhich vi11 breach fire barriers, create sparks or other ignition sourcca, remove fire protection syetemm from eervice or othervise degrade fire protection, the Opcrationa/Fire Protection Staff determines what, if any, compensatory meaaurer are required. Additional requirements be implemented into work activities order to provide fire safety.
- 2. Adrnfnfstrati V e Gggtrola
- a. The Fire Protection Administrative Progrlm (PePercnce 2) eetablishes controls fot the bulk etoraigc of sombuotible materialo inside or adjacent to cafety related buildings or eyotcms during operation or maintenance periods.
Good housekeeping requirements and controls are established ip Site Standard Practice (SSP) 12.7, Housekeeping/Temporary Equipment Control (Reference 18).
PLDKE106 087-38
- b.
W v e m the hradlin& llld limitation of the u e of ordinary combustible materials, ud fl-ble 8arem urd liquidm, R i a efficiency particulate air ud charcoal filter.,
dry ion 8x-e reaim, or other combustible nvpplier in rafety-related area..
C.
Govern the hrndli-of and limit trumient fire load8 ruch a#
coabwtibla md flramablc liquidr, wood lad plastic producer, or other combustible materials in buildings containir~ 8afcty-related oystems or equipment cturi-all phases of operati-,
and especially during maintenance, modification, or refueling Operat i O l U
- d.
rtspomible for the in-plant fire protection review of proposed work trawient fire hazards and specify required additional fire protection in the work activity procedure.
D s s i m t e the onsite staff member activities t o idatify p o t a t i d
- b. Iruuient cambuotibleo ( l. e.,
flumablc gaoer and liquids, combustible utei-falo, e t c. )
are controllad in accordurce with the Fire Protection Administrative Program requirement8 (Reference 2).
- c. The control of t r u m i m t fire loads ouch ar combuatdble and fl-bfe liquids, wood, urd plaatic products in safety-related area8 during all phaecr of plant operation ir required in 8ccordmce with the requirements detailed in the Fire Protection Administrative Program (Reference 2).
- d. The work plan write process requires the Fire protection Administrative Program requirements to be incorporated into each pre-planed activity (;.e.,
modification or corrective maintenance) in order to ensure ffre hazards are handled in accordance with eatablished fire safety auidelines that art identified in the Fire Protection Adminirtrativc Program, Reference 2.
F'LDHE106 087-39
- e.
Covarn tha w e of ignition mourcer control welding, flame cutti-,
brazing, or mldering operationo. A oeparate permit ahould be i8nued for each a r m vhere work is to bt done. If work continuer over more than one ahift, the permit should be valid for not more than 2 A hourr when the plant ir operat-or for the duration of a particular Job d u r i w plant ahutdovn.
by U8d Of & flm pmit 8 y 6 t m to
- f.
Control the removal from the area of 011 waate, debri8, Ocrap, o i l spills, or other combuotibles resulting from the work activity m e d i a t e l y folloving completion of the 8CtiVity, or at the end of each work shift, whichever comes first.
- g.
Govern leak testing; similar procedure8 much ar airflow detemimtion mhould use one of the coplmcrcidly avaihble techniques.
Open flamer or coolbustion-generated moke should not be permitted.
- h. Maintain the periodic housekeeping inspections to ensure continued compliance vith these administrative controls.
c n!AlE"
- e.
Torch Cutti=, Welding, O p m - P 1 m Grinding, and Spark Producing Work eetrblishes "hot work" repuirtrcntr and uoverna the use of ignition nourccs.
A aeparate permit is requireQ for each job. The permit requires fore" evaluation of the Job activity each ohift in order to verify compliance with peraait rcquirsprento.
"Hot Work" activitisa are controlled in accord8nct with the rcquire"tr of the Fire Protection Adminintrative Program.
- f.
Prompt removal OP combustibles is mandated by the Site Staudard Practice (SSP) 12.7, entitled "Houoekeeping/Temporary Equipment Control", which requires that where excess waste is generated by the work being performed, waste should be removed while the maintenance is being performed; otherwise, after each shift or at the completion of the job, whichever come8 first.
8. The Fire Protection Plan (FPP) 0 Section 7.3 prohibits the use of open flamen or combustion-generated smoke for leak testing.
- h. Weekly fire inspections are performed and documented by procedure in accordance vith the Fire Protection Administrative Program. The inspection verifies that fire sar'ety methods are implemented in plant work activities through the control of transient fire loads and general housekeeping.
PLDNE106 087-40
- i.
Control the w e of opecific colPbrutibla8 in 8afetp-related areas.
All vosd uaed in safety-related areas during maintenance, modification, or refueling operation (ouch ao Pay-down block8 or acaffoldiw) ohould be treated w i t h a f l u retardant.
Equipment or rupplies (ouch an new fuel) shipped in untreated combustible packing containere may be unpacked in safety-related areaa, if required. for valid operati-rearone.
However, all combustible matarialo should be removed from the area immediately following unpacking. Such transient combustible material, unlers otored in approved containers, should not be left unattended during lunch brs.ko, ehift churgeo, or other oimilas periodsr.
Loom combustible packing material much a8 wood or paper excleeior, OF polyethylene oheetiw should be placed in metal containers with tight-fitting aelf-closing metal covers.
- j. Dieaming of fire detection or fire suppression systema should be controlled by a permit system. Fire watches ahould be established in areas where systems are so disarmed.
Imdequacier in bourekerpiri8, ttlasitnt fire load.,
irpairmant parmiti, md "hot work" procedure. a m docamanted per pracadure..
The campletad inspectla io +c+iewcd and approved by the Operation8 Fire Protection Superrimor.
i. The Pire Protection Admisiottativc Pro&ram, Attachment C - Control of Trmeierit Combwtible8, establishst csntrolo to enour8 that the Operations Fire Protactian otaff is aware of transient combustibles md CM put comrpensatory measures in plaec vhere neceaoary. The procedure a l l m a the use of fire-retardant treated lranber only in a r e u containing oafcty-related equiprsent.
Untreated Iuaber is not pemittcd in these areas, unless approved by the plant Fire Protection Engineering staff.
Attachment C requires that shipping crate.
or combustible containers be removed from equipment or material prior to taking theet i t e m into areas housing safety-related equipment when feasible.
If removal is not feasible, the containers are to be removed from the area aa soon as uncrating is completed.
Such material cannot at any time be l e f t unattended in euch areas.
- 1. Fire detection or fire suppression systems may be removed from service or otherwise impaired only after a permit to do so has been approved by the Operations Fire Protection staff based on the minimum operating requirements of the FPP Section 9.0, Periodic Inspections and Testing of Fire Protection Systems.
L-PLDNE 1 O 6 087-41
- k.
Succe8sful fire protection require&
teetjlnl md rvintaauree of the fire protection equfprsnt.ab the emergency lieat-and c-ication.
A test p1.n that lists the individuals ormd their re8poxuibilitfe8 in connection with routine tart. and inspection8 of the fire detection and protection myate". b a l d be developed. The test plan rhbuld contiin the typeo, frequency, m d detailed procedures for testing. Proccdurer should also contain instructions on maintaining fire protection during thooe periods when the fire protection system is impaired or during period. of plant maintenance, e.8.) fire VatChes or temporary hoee connection8 to water opsteme.
- 1.
Control actiona to be taken by an individual discovering e fire, for example, notification of control room, attempt to extinguish fire, urd actuation of local fire suppression rystcme.
- k. feating and maintQnrncc of the fire protection.patema axxi t q a f v t ara gctfomed la 8c:ordsnca with th. Tpp Sectlea 9 the FPP asitled "Periodic Insgectiolu and Teati-of Fire Protection S y m t m -, Paferunce 1. This aectisn detail8 the type rad frtquaxy of iasgectians and test8 mxl any needed colapenamtory measure8 durLry impairment of the fire protection system.
Detailed fire ptotectioa aurveill.nces and instructions are prepared to implement the specifid terting omd inspection requirements. The Operations Fire Protection Section i o reagonsible for conducting fire protection surveillances and inspectione. Ea&
Fire protection 0 Surveillance wlll identify compensatory measures that are required during the performance of the surveillance.
- 1. The Fire Emergency Response Organization and Pre-Fire Plans defines the actions of the individual who diecovere a fire, the control room operator who receives the alarm, and the fire brigade, Each employee onsite receives periodic training on the rtquired actions to perform when a fire is discovered 88 part of the general employee training (GET) program.
PLDlPE 106 087-42
a, Caatrol mtiaer f a b8 t d " by tk coatrol roo1 operator t o &&miser t&
need for bri-dr umirrawa rpaa r'dp9rt of a Clrr br receipt of rfam aa control tom rnatpMlster p a w l for
- example, locrtfoa of fire over PA.rat-,
ILOtlLpdhg firm aim",
.ad n o t i f y i u the shift rrrpdrrirot rs8 the fire briydc leader af tha tJrpr,
~ i t e,
and locationr of the fire.
- n. Control action8 to be taken by the fire brigade after notification by the control room operator of a fire, for exunple, usembling in a designated location, receiving directions from the fire briards leader, an8 discharging 8peciffe fit8 fiahtinq rtmpoMibilitIsll, ineluding malaction and transportation of flrt fi@tiw equipment t o fire location, melacolon si protaceiva equipmat, operatin$
instructions for use of fire muppreasion eyeteam, and use of prs-planned atrategiea for fighting firee in slpecific areas.
0. Define the strattgies for fighting firer in all safety-related areas and areal prcocnting a hazard to aafety-related equipment. Theet etra.tcg?es ehould daofgnate:
0. Pre-fire plana for each of the areas which cauld effect raftty-relrted
@qulpmant at@ contained in the Fire Emergency Rcoponrs Oraanizrtlon and Prt-Fire PI-docuwnt.
I-PLDNElO6 08 1-43
( 3 ) Host farorablr direetioa f r a which to attack a fire in each m e 8 in viev of the ventilation direction, are mort likely t o be free of f i r s, and the beat s t a t i m or rlrvation for fightin# tha ire.
A l l acccas ged egrrrm routra thut involve locked door6 should be rpccifically identified in the procedure vith the appropriate grecaratienr am3 mtihdr fer accc01 rpeci f ied.
8 C C e 8 8 hallWapS, a t a i r l, urd doors that (4) Plant 8 y m t e u u that ahould be manaasd to reduce the drreage potential dutiw local fire md the location of local and remute cbntrofo for ruch management ( c. g., any hydraulic or electrical oystema in the zone covered by the specific f i r e fighting procedure that could increase the hazards in tbz area because of over-pressurization or electrical hazards).
(5)
Vital heat-acnritire mystem componento that need to be kept cool while fighting a local fire.
Particularly hazrrdouo combustible that need cooling should be designate?.
( 4 )
The pra-fire pfrnr identifies plant e q u i m t (e.a.,
ptrrpr, electr bQuiprwnt, t t c. ) that in locetcd in fire etta. The Incident C-er exmutes that the appropriate equipment/tystems are either 160latrd and/or de-enereited in order t o l i m i t potential damage and ensure f i r e tatergency rtrponoe team aafaty.
( 5 )
The prc-fire p l m s identify hazardoun m t c r i a l / l o c r t i ~ and the location of mfcty-rcl8tcd equipment located in the plant areas.
FLDNE 106 087-44
( 8 ) Vsntilrrioa -.tam operation that bnmfe8 desired plant air diatributioa vban the r m t l l a t i o n flow i8 modified for fire contai-t or.sokc clerri-operat ion.
(9) Qprratioru rrquiriw control rwm uul sift.ryiaear cosrdin&tion or author i ta t ion.
(10) Instructions for plrnt operators urd 8merrl plant personnel durina fire.
( 8 ) Ventilation ryrta optrati~n requiraanea are provided in the pre-f i re p l a m.
(9) on any operation, that would requite control roam and rbift operatic" auptnisor eoerdination or authorizationa The prc-fire plana provide auidurct (10) The only tcspamibility of general site persohnd i g to r e p r t a fire and evacuate the area. The Fire Emer8ency Rcspunae O r ~ a n i z a t i m.ad Pre-Fire Plane docuant identifier the re8ponoibilitlto of the Fire bcr8ency Response Orgutitation and general rite personnel.
PLDNE106 087-45
- b.
A rite fire bri4.d.
trained 8nd equipped for fire fi&tin#
rhould be astablirhed to eruure adequats -1 fire fiatixu capability for all area8 of the p l m t containirq atructurm, symtt.L., or componmt.
important to safety. The fire bt-l@.de ohould be at laaot five sambar8 on ea& 8hift. the briaade leader unl at leaat two brigade member8 should have mufffcienl tr8ining in or hcwleQe of pllnt mrfety-related ryata~r to understand the effect8 of fire and fire aupprsmantm on aafc ahutdowa capability. The qualification of fire brigade member8 ahould include an annual physical examination to determine their ability to perform strenuous fire fightiry actiritiem.
The 8hift rugerwisor ohould not be 8 member of the fire brigade. The bri88de leadtr shall be cuapetmt to a88eai the potential eafcty conatquencca of a fire and 8dVi8e control room permoanel. Such competence by the brig8dt leader MY be evidenced by poreeraion of an operator'a licenoc or equivalent knowledge of plant oafcty-related rye t e m.
- b.
A mite Fire Bwrggtcl P-e Orgmiutiaa h.. ban wtsbfidwd. Ihe Shift Operatima Supetriwrt rbo i m cerp.t.nt to ~ ~ e a m thr potential u f c t y c ~ e q u e n e a ~
of a fire md adrlta control r001 petroimel. A180, tee C.3.a Iwidmt -8r 10 t b h8i8t8Ett prrrioua recti-.
PLDlJElO6 087-46
the brigade should c~l?aist of pet+onaI protective equiprant much an turnout C V a E Q, b t., dowm, b r d hrt.,
rcrrrrgancy e-icrtlonr rqulpscnt, and hrsrthim spgsuratus using full-face
~ i t i v c p r e a ~ u r e ruk. approved by RIOSH (Rational fmtitute for Occup.tieM3 Seftty.nd Health approval formerly given by the U.S. Bureau of Hints) should be provided for fire brigade, d m
a control, ut8 cmtroi room geraormcl.
A t lsut 10 uokm shall Bc 8vailable for fire brigade personnel. Control r o m p e r o m e l may be totmished brtathi-air by 8 "ifold w8tm pipad from a 8toraae remsrvotr if practierl. Service or rated operat1n.g life shall be a m i n i m of me-half hour for the self-contained units.
gortabft SlCtfmi8bt8.
& l f - C @ l l t 8 i s
- d A t leaat two extra air bottle.
should be located onsita for each
.elf-contained breathiw a f t. fn addition, an oneite six-hour 8upply of reBeme air should be provided urd arrwud to permit quick and complete replenistamcnt of exhattatmi supply air bottle8 aa they are returned. If comprcssoro are used as a Boufce of breathing air, only units approved for breathing air shall be used; compressors shall be operable assumiw a 100s of offmitt power.
Special care must be taken to locate the tomprcsror in area0 free of dust and contaminants.
The ?ire Emera-UrmLzetfm rad Pte-Fire Pl-ctoef;rant drscrlbe the fire protection equipment requirements.
PLDHE106 087-47
(a) Indoctrination o f the plant fire fighting plan with rpecific identification of each indirfdvlal'8 rcepon8ibilitit8.
(b) I d a t - 'cation of the type urd lscatioa of f i r s hazard8 utd ar+ecirc+8 types ob firs. that could occur in the p l a t.
(d)
Identification of the locatioa of fire fiat-equiprant for each fire are& urd frsi2iarfzation with thc layout of the plant, including accalo and egress route# to ea&
area.
(e)
The proper use of available fire fighting equippent and the corrective acthad of filshting each type of fire.
The typsr of firam covered rhould
!ncluda firer in energized electrical cquiparmt, fire8 in cable8 rsd cabfa trrye, hydroam firer, firer involving fl-ble 8nd ccrabu8tiblc liquid8 or hazardour proccrro chemlcrlr, firer rceulting from cormtruetion or codification (wsldiu), md record file firer.
P L D E 10 6 087-48 PLDHE106 087-49
( I )
Prrctlcr rorriens ahauld be held for each ahif-fire B r i ~ a d c oa tbe proper method o fiatins the rariow types of fire. that could occur in a nvclcrr power plant.
d r-PLDAE 106 017-so c
m b a m w i t h axperirace in actual fire U t f q u i t rad the USQ of amergmey bruthfsq qqmraaua M e r.arenttetl.
conditions encountered in f i r e fighting the typ@a ef ficpfgPent available i n the nuclear power p l a ~ t.
ib) These practice seasions mould be provided a t le-t m c e per year for each fire briaadc mmbcr.
(71 Drills I&)
Fire Qrf&&& drills ahodd be gerfnread In the p l m t uo that the fire briydr can prrstiss u 8 em.
participate in a t l a u t tw drills per 0 YQIr A rufflcient nt.lj)dr of these drills, but not Its8 thax one for each shift fire bri(p%e pcr ytctr, "aid be
~ P ' W X U Q M C ~ to detcmine the fire fiat$- redinem of the plant fire brigad?, briladt laadtr, aid fire protection 8 y m m d e q u i p t.
Parrsar platmi-
.ab ruthorieinl am un-tlacrd d r i l l. h a a d " a r e that ambra w e not.watt that a drill is bciw plum& =til it is be&=.
Unumomcrd drill8 8hculd bot be rchedollil clorcr than four weeks.
the r l # F o n d b 8hfft f i n brig8da eti mession trainiw is due 12 eonths I r a the list trainiw date.
A grace p e r i d aneuds to the cad of the c*l&rt quarter is which training i o due.
(7) erills (7)(&), (bl$ oab <e).
Periodic d r i l l s are coxxlucted which meet a l l of these regofremento. Fire EPar&encp Bcapsnse Orgmitrtion D r i l l Guidelines.nd B e t p i r m t + art detailed la the Fire EMrgency Etc8ponst Orimiutioa and Prr-Fire Plan doctment.
PLDKE106 087-51
At lsaat one drill per year ahoyld be perfamed an a "back rhift" for each ahift fire brigade.
( c ) The d r i l l s should ba prcplannsd to emtablioh the training objectisas of the drill urd ahould be critiqued ta determine hov well the training Qrflla abmld ba plumed and critiqued bg rwmbcrs of the management staff reapomsibla for plant aafcty and fire protection. Perforasrnce dsticisncicr of a fire brigade or of individual fire brigade "bars should be remedied by scheduling additional training for the brigade ar mubtra.
ObjeCtiVe8 h 8 V 4 baSn PMt. IhUnn0UnC.d Unuti8factory drill gerforaunce 8hould be f o l l w d by a repeat drill vithin 30 dajl.
(d) These drillo 8houLd provide for local fire department participation ptriodicsilly (at lcant rnnwlly).
(e)
A t three-yaar intewals, a randomly sslccttd t"ounced drill ahould be critiqued by qualified iadividuals indapendmt of the licenree'u staff. A copy of the w i t t m report from ouch individual8 rhould be available for llpC reviev.
(f) Drill8 should as a minimum include the following:
i. A8SsS~mnt of fire alarm efftctivencue, time required t o notify and aosemb1s fire brig.de, and ~efectic?n, placement, and w e of equipment m d fire figbting rtratcgics.
(d) The local fire dap8rt"t ir briefed QII plmt actititiu, ud for the triarni.1 fire protection audit. That audit I8 performed by UI irrdepdart qualified tndiridoal. A randomly selected urmmwttnced drill is p e r f o m and critiqued during the trimmaul audit.
(I) i throw ir. Tha Firs Emeruency Eug"e Organiutian rpd Prc-Pits Plans docIMnt atstublirbrr t h BFH Fire Drill Proaru raquitarrcntr. 'we BpIt program cospliar with these gufdcline8.
PLDaE 106 087-52
ii. Assessment of each brigade membcrr knowledge of hio or hat role in the fire fight%% strategy for the area asslard to contain the fire.
A8Sd!mt of the brigade members conformance vitb aetabliuhtd plant fire fightiw procedure. md w e of fire f % @ t w equipaunt, including atlf-containtd emergency breathing apparatw, communication equipment, and ventilation equipment, to the extend prbctfcable.
iif. The oimulatcd use of f i r e fighting equipment required to cope with the situation md type of fire selected for the drill. The area and the type of fire chosen for the drill should dfffer from those uetd in the previous drillo so that brigade members are trained in fighting fires in oarioua plant areas. The situation.elected ahould ebmulate the size.n4 a r r u U m e n t of a fire that could rea8OnAbly occur in the area ueitcted, allowing for fire development due to the time required to reapand, to obtain cquiperent,.nd organize for the fire, assming loss of automatic euppreooiun capability.
i v. ADmes8ment of brigade leaders direction of the fire fiating effort as to thoroughness, accuracy, and effectiveness.
PLDHE 106 087-53
-4s-
Individual records of training provided to each fire brigade member, 1ncluF.ir.g drill critiques, ahould be maintained for at h48t three yearo t o ensure that each member receive training in all part8 o f the training program.
These record8 of training should be available for NRC review. Retraining or broadened training for fire fighting within buildinge should be scheduled for a11 thooe brigade mesbers whose performance records ahov deficiencies.
HFPA 27, "Private Fire Brigade", should be followed in organization, training, and fire drills. ?hi8 standard also ie applicable for the inspection and maintenance of fire fighting equipment. Wxqg the otandarde referenced in thia docmat, IWPA 197, "Training Standhrd on Initial Fire Attach", ahould be utilized an applicable. HFPA booklets and pamphlets limted in RFpb 27 may be u6ed a8 applicable for training referenceo.
In.&lition, COUTIC~ in fire prevention and fire mupprcssion that are feco8nized or sponsored by the fire protection industry rhould be utilized.
Individual training recorda, including drill critiques, are maintained by Docment Control and retained for three years. Retraining or broadened training for fire fighting within buildings are rcheduled for a11 thooe brigade members whore performance records ahow deficiencies.
The fire brigade is organized, trained and drilled in accordance with the following the guidelines, "Private Flre Brigades", currently NFPA 600.
IVA's training program has been reviewed by the National Professional Qualification Board and accredited as a national certifying agency within th Rational Professional Qualification '0 System for the Fire Service for the following levels :
Fire Fighter I, 11, and I11 Fire Instructor I and I1 Fire Officer I Fire Apparatus Driver Operation Fire fighting equipment maintenance and inspection io performed by the flre protection staff, following the guidance of " P A 600.
BPUCB Z'ECBIIICAL WBITIOA QQ5B 9.5-1 C013PAUfSOA The Quality Assurance (QA) program of applicantm and contractor8 should amur'c that the guidelines for derign, procurement, installation, and testing and the administrative controls for the fire protection systems for safety-related areas are satisfied.
The QA program should be under the management control of the QA organization. This control consiets of, (1) formulating fire protection QA program that incorporatee suitable requitemante and is acceptable to the management responsible for fire protection or vmifying that the program incorporatar suitable requirements urd i8 acccptabPe to the management rcsponuible for fire protection, and (2) verifying the cffectiventsa of the QA program for fire protection through review, surveillance, a d audita. Performance c f other QA program functions for meetilllg the fire protection program requirements may be performed by personnel outeide of the QA organization. The QA program for fire protection should be part of the overall plant QA program.
It should satiefy the specific criteria listed below.
- a.
Proc-t Do-Conttol Meaeures should be eetabiished to en8ure that the guidelinee o f the regulatory poeition of this guide are included in design and procurement documents and that deviations therefore are controlled.
The Quality A88Uran,lc proarm for fire protection ir implemtnted by Scctlon 3.8 - Quality Aerurance Program of the PPP. The program mecto the KRC guideline8 setforth in BTP 9.5.1 (CPIEB).
PLDNE 106 087-55
Irupcctiona, teats, adminietratlve controlr, fire drill.,
urd trainiry th8t govern the fire protsction program rhould be prescribed by documented inrtructionr, procedurer, or drawingr, and should be accomplirhed in accordance with them documento.
C.
a t r o l of Pur-Hat-S c r v i c a Mauuree rhould be ertablirhed to ennure that purchaeed material, equipant,.nd rervlcer conform t o the procurement documents.
A program for independent inspection of activitita affecti-fire protection ohould be established urd executed by or for the organization perbowing the activity to verify conformance with documented installation drawiago and tart procedures for 8ccomplirhing the activitier.
A teat proarm ahould be cat8blished and implemented to m u r e that testin#
is performed md verified by irmpection and 8udit to demonstr8te conformance with design and syotem readinem requirementr. The testa chould be performed in accordance with written teat procedures; teat rerulta should be properly eV8lUated 8nd 8cted on.
-4a-PLDIOE106 087-56
Hemuran ohould be established to provide for tho identification of i t e m that have rstiefactorily paooed required te8t and lnepectione.
Measurers should be eetabliahed to control i t e m that do not conform to 8pecified requirements to prevent inadvertent use or installation.
- h. m e c t i ve Act-Mtamuree should be eetablished to emure that condition6 adverre to fire protection, such ae failures, malfunctionu def~clencic8, deviations, defeetiva component8, uncontrolled coaabuatible material and nonconformanceo, art promptly identified, reported, and corrected.
Record8 ehould be prepared and maintained to fuMioh evidence th6t tile criteria enmerated above are being met for activities affecting the fire protection program.
- 3. Audits Audits ehould be conducted and documented to verify compliance with the fire protection program, including deelgn and procurement docments, instructions, procedures, and drawings and inspection and test activitieB.
(1) Fire barrier6 with a minimum fire resistance rating of three hours mhould be provided to:
(a) Separate oafety-related systems from any potential fire in nonsafety-related areas that could affect their ability to perform their safety function; (b) Separate redundant divisions or trains of safety-related systems from each other so that both are not subject to damage from a single fire; (c) Separate individual units on a requirements of General Design Criterion 5 are met with respect to fires.
mltiph-unit Site unless the (2) Appropriite fire barriers ahould be provided within a mingle eafety division to separate components that present a fire hazard to other eafety-related components or high concentrations of cafety-related cables within that division.
(3) Openings through fire barriers for pips, conduit, m d cable trays which separate fire dreae should be sealed or closed to prlvide a fire resistance rating at ldast equal to that required of the barrier itself. Openings inside conduit lirger than four inches in diameter lohould be sealed at the fire barrier penetration.
(l)(a),(b),
and (c).
BkV ham provided fire rated compartmentation in accordance with the guideline6 set forth in 10CFR50 Appendix P, Section 1II.G.
The BFM Fire Hazards Md Safe Shutdown Analysis (Reference 1) defines the Fire Areao 8nd provides the engineering evaluation8 for defining and/or justifying B F " 8 Fire Areail md fire resietive barriero. The 8 V 8 i h b h compartmentation and fire resistive barriers ensure that redundant equipment and cablea are adequately reparated to maintain safe rhutdown capability during and after a fire.
(2) See response to C.5.a (1) (a), (b 9 and (c).
(3)(a),(b),
and (c).
See responoe to C.S.8 (1) (a), (b), and (c),
Fire rated m a l e have been evaluated by one of the following methods:
PLD10E106 087-58
Opening8 inwide conduit four inches or less in diameter ehould he sealed at the fire barrier =lese the conduit extends at lease five feed on each aide of tha fire barrier urd io sealed either at both and. or at the fire barrier with noncombustible material co grawnt the passage of omoke and hot gaoea. Fire barrier panetrationo that muat maintain environmental isolation or pressure differentiafs ehould be qualified by teat to maintain the barrier integrity -under such conditions.
Penetration designs whould utilize only noncombustible materials and should be qualified by teats ahould use the tims-temperature exposure curve epecifiad by ASTM E-118, **Fire Test of Buildiw Constmetion and Materials".
The acceptanca criteria for the test shduld require that:
(a)
The fire barrier penetration has withstood the fire endurance test without peesage of flame or ignition of cr.bles on the unutpoeed aide for 8 period of time equivalent to the fire resistance rating required of the barrier.
(b) The temperature levels recorded for the unexposed aide are analyzed and demonstrate that the maximum temperature does not exceed 325.P.
(c) The fire barrier penetration remains intact 8nd doer not allow projection of water beyond the unexposed surface during the hose etream teat.
The penetration seal le UL listed or approved by a recognized independent teRting facility. The rating of the penetration real i o either equivalent to or exceedr the requirement for the atructurc it i o installed in. The penetration aealo which have been qualifted by fire tests in acc--a uance with ASTM E814 meet these NRC requirements.
The penetration seal design and installation has been previously approved by the "RC.
This vould include the penetration seals described in the TVA Recovery Plan, Revision 6, April 6, 1976, Part X-Section A, 4.0, Fire Stop penetration Design and Testa (Reference 5).
Method 3 The penetration seal designs were evaluated and approved by a qualified fire protection engineer per NRC guideline8 i-Generic Letter (GL) 86-10.
The penetration seal design for pipe, conduits, and cable trays are further detailed as follows:
3
- Mechanical penetrations, including pipes, conduits, 8nd conduit8 in pipe sleeves, through fire rated barriers are provided with approved seals. Seals can be 1-hour to 3-hour ratings as appropriate to withstand the hazards associated with the area.
Fire barrier penetrations that mu8t maintain environmental isolation or pressure differentials are qualified by test to maintain the barrier integrity under such conditions. Penetration seal details and selection criteria are provided in Reference 6.
PLDNE106 087-59
The e t r e m shall be delivered through a 1-1/2 inch nozzle est at a discharge angle of 30 percent vith a nozzle pressure OP 75 psi and a minimum discharge of 75 ggm with the tip of the nozzle a maximum af five feet from the uporcd face; or the stream shall be delivered through a 1-1/2 inch nozzle set at 8 diechmge -le of 1 S percent with a nozzle preeoure of 75 p s i and a minimtan dircharge of 75 ggm with :he tip of the hozzle I maximum of 10 feet from the exposed face; or the stream shall be delivered through a 2-1/2 inch national standard playpipe equipped with 1-1/8 inch tip, nozzle pressure of 30 poi, located 20 feet from the expooed face.
(4) Penetration openings for ventilation systems should be protected by fire dampers having a rating equivalent to that required of the barrier (see H?TA-90A,
'*Air Conditioning and Ventilating System").
Flexible air duct coupling in ventilation and filter systems should be noncombustible.
Internal G o u t Sc&
- Internal conduit
' fire eeala are required either at both ends or in the fire barrier, if the conduit terminates within one foot of the fire barrier. Smoke and gas rcals are installed at both ends if the conduit extends more than one foot beyond the fire barrier.
Smoke and gas sealo art not the basis for fire rating. Installation of smoke 8nd gam seal may be prudent based upon penetration qualification test of specified plant parameters. The intemal conduit seal criteria are baeed on full w a l e fire tests by Omega Point Labs (Reference 71, PROMATEC (Reference 6) and Conduit Fire Protection Research Program (Reference 19).
Tray P e n e t r a t i m - Cable tray penetration seal deeigne are baaed on f i r e teste conducted by TVA and previously approved by rjaC (Fire Recovery Plan, Part X, Section A, paragraph 4.5 and FSAR Section 8.9.2).
As part of the Appendix E program, these seals have b re-evaluated and were compared to a a i three hour rated UL tested configuration to determine their adequacy. The seal designs were found to be comparable to UL listed design. (Reference 9).
m (4) Fire dampers in ventilation systems penetrating rated barriers are 1-112 or 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> rated depending upon the fire resistive rating of the barrier. The f i r e damper8 are installed in accordance with NFPA No. 90A, Installation of Air Conditioning and Ventilation Systems, UL Standard for Safety No. 555, or Sheet Metal Air Conditioning National Association (SMACIVA) gvidelinee. In cases where the actual mounting of the fire dampers are not in rccordance with the 8bove standards, justifications/engineer ng evaluations are provided for the types of mounting.
PLDaE106 087-60
(5) Door openings in fire barriero e
ahould be protected with equivalently rated doors, framea, and hardware that have been tasted and approved by P rutionally recognized labor8tory. Such doors should be self-closing or provided vith closing mechanisms and should be inspected semiannually to verify that automatic hold-open, release, and closing mechanisms and latches are operable. (See NFPA 80, "Fire DoLrs and Windows").
One of the following measures should be provided to ensure they will protect the opening as required in case of fire:
(a)
Fire doors should be kept closed and electrically supervised at 8 continuously manned location; (b) Fire doors ohould be locked, cloeed, and inspected weekly to verify that the doors are in the closed pas d t ion; (c) Fire doors should be provided with automatic hold-open and release mechanisms and inspected daily to verify that doorvays are free of obstructions; or (d) Fire doors should be kept closed and inspected daily to verify that they are in the closed position.
The fire brigade leader should have ready access to keys for any locked fire doors.
Areas protected by automatic total flooding gas suppression systems should have electrically supervised self-closing fire doors or should satisfy option (a) above.
(S)(a),(b),(c),
8nd (d):
Fire doors in barrier walle, including frame and installation hardware, are 1-1/2 or 3 koua rated depending upon fire resistive requirement of the barrier.
Only labeled or lieted doors are used. Where listed doors are not availabl? for specific applications, engineering evaluations have been performed.
The fire rated doers identified by the 47W216-Series drawings are inspected in accordance with Section 9.0 of the Fire Protection Plan (Reference 1) which satisfies the NRC guidelines.
Note that Units 1 And 3 compartmentation components defined by the 47W216 series drawings will be upgraded prior to the restart of each respective Unit.
The areas protected by autoamtic carbon dioxide suppression eystems have electrically superviased self-closing doors or eatisfy option (a), except the doors into the individual diesel generator compartments in the Diesel Generator Buildings.
The d o o m into the individual diesel generator compartments are self-closing fire doors but are not electrically supervised. Fire daor configuration is controlled by the Fire Protection Administrative Program.
Compensatory actions are required to be taken prior to breaching any fire door located in an area protected by an automatic total flooding gas euppression system.
The Incident Commander has available, keys for any locked fire doors.
I PLDrJE 106 087-61
DRAHm TECHAIGAL POSITIOII Q(Ks 9.5-1 ColIpdpISOll (6) Personnel access routes and escape routes should be provided for each fire area.
Stairwalla outside primary containment serving an escape routes, a c c e m router to areas containing equipment neceaeary for srde shutdown should be enclo8cd in masonry or concrete tower8 with 8 minimum fire rating of two hours and eelf-closing Clasr B fire doore.
(7) Fire exit routes should be clearly marked.
( I )
contain only one redundant safety division. Cable eprerding r o o m ehould not be rhared between reactors. Cable oprsading room should be separated from each other and from other treao of the plant by barrier0 having a minimum fire resistance of three hours.
Each cable opreadtw room chould (9) Interior wall and structural componento, thermal insulation materials, radiation shielding materials, and aoundproofing ohould be noncombustible.
Interior finishes ohauld be noncombustible.
Platerials that are acceptable for use 8s interior finish without evidence of test and listing by a nationally recognized laboratory are the following:
Plaster, acoustic plaster, gypsum plasterboard (gypsum wallboard),
either plain, wallpapered, or painted with oil or water-brecpaint; c
zYAlwmw (6)
Personnel acccsa routes are define
. fox c8ch fire area in the prc-fire plans.
Stairvclle outside primary c~ntrinment and acctaa routen to areas containing equipment necessary for rafe 8hutdom arc not in two-hour rated towers with sclf-clooing fire doors. This io justified becauoe of the multlple access and recape routes within the various elevatione of the Control Building and the three Reactor Buildings.
(7) Exit routes have been marked with a igns.
(8) The cable epreading room contain multiple divieione and wrve multiple reactora, and are not separ8ted from each other or othat portions of the Control Building by %hour rated barrierce, The Safe Shutdown Analysio (Reference 1) documents the safe shutdown syetems analyses end justification for thi8 based on the availability of alternative shu cepability.
A preaceion sprinkler system ia installed in each of the c8ble epreading rooms, and a manually actuated C02 system is installed in order to provide backup euppression capabilities. Both smoke detectors and heat detectors are installed for actuation of the sprinkler flow control valve and for early warning fire detection.
vi' (9) Interior wall and structural components, radiation shieldirq materials, and sound proofing materials are noncombustible. Plastic thermal insulation is discussed in the response to NRC guideline C.S.d.(3).
Other thermal insulation materials used in the plant are noncombustible.
Interior finishes are noncombustible (flame spread rating of lese than SO) except for plastic light covers in suepended ceilings in the Control Rooms, Shift Operations Supervisor's office. These combuetiblcs arc evaluated in Fire Area 16 of the Hazards Analyeis (Reference 1).
PLDREl06 087-62
0 Ceramic tilt, ceramic panele; GIBES, glass blocks; Brick stone, concrete blocka, plain or painted; Stcrl and aluminum panela, plain, painted, or enameled; Vinyl tile, vinyl-asbeetoa tile, linoleum, or asphalt tile on concretz floors.
(10) ?!eta1 deck roof conrtruction ehould be noncombustible and lieted a8 "acceptable fer fire" in the UL Building Materials Directory, or lletcd ab Class I in the Factory Mutual System Approval Guide.
(11) Suspended ceiling and their supports should be of noncombustible construction.
Concealed rpacte chould be devoid of conrbuetible8 except a6
@ note4 in Pomition C.6.b.
(12) Transformere Installed inside fire areas containing safety-related systems rhould be of the dry type or insulated end cooled with noncombustible liquid.
Transformers filled with combusttble fluid that are located indoore ehould be enclosed In a transformer vault (see Section 450(c) of RFPA 70, "Rational Electrical Code").
The drywcll gap between the steel pressure vessel and the reinforced concrete shield wall i n filled vith polyurethane foam t o a m a x i m u m thicknee8 of 2-1/14 inches (BFN FSAR 5.2-3).
A n engineering evaluation has been performed on the d w e l l polyurethane foam liner, (Reference 8).
Administrative controls to prevent combuetion of the polyurethane foam liner by "hot work" activities are contained in the Fire Protection Administrative program (Reference 2).
(10) Turbine and Reactor Building roof construction meets the Factory Mutual (FM) approval guide requiremento for Class I constructions as of May 1969.
(11) Suspended ceilings and their supports are of noncombustible construction except for the plastic light cover8 diecurecd in the response bo NRC guidelines C.S.a.(P).
Concealed rpacco have limited amount8 of combuotibles, mainly cable ineulation. 'Iheee cables have been accounted for in the Fire Hazards Analysis.
(12) Tranaformere located inside buildings containing oafety-related equipment are of the dry type or are insulated and oil cooled. The combustible loading of oil filled transformers has been considered in the Fire Hazards Analysis (Reference 1).
The compartmentation, fire barrier6 and/or fire suppresslon system8 are adequate to contain and cxtinguioh the fire within the fire area/zone.
PLDElO6 087-63
BRMCE 'Zg-CAL POSITIOA 9.5-1 CmAUISOI (13) Outdoor oil-filled tr.nrfomerr mhould have o i l rpill confinement featursr or drainaae away from the building8. Such transformer8 rhould be located at h a r t 50 feet distant from the building, enruting that ruch buildi-wallr vithin 50 feet of oil-filled trrrufermerr are without openings and have a fire resistance r a t i w of at least three hours.
(14) Floor drain8 sized terCmoVc expected fire fifiting waterflow without floodiw r8fety-related equipecnt ehould be provided in thove area8 vhera fixed water fire ruppresrion rprtema are inatallad.
Floor drain8 rbould also be provided in other.rear m e r e hand hose liner may be ured if ruch fire fighting water could cauue unacceptable damale to rabety-related equipment in the area
( r e a MFPA-92, "Waterproofin& md Draining of Flooro").
zltus" (13) The outdoor oil-filled trumformers rre located at least 50 feet from rtructurea containing safety-related equipment, except for the north wall of the Turbine Building. This reduced rpacing is acceptable since the only eafety-related equipment in the Turbine Building is cablina located along the south wall, ovet 300 feet from the exposed north wall.
The tranaformers are protected by automatic water mpray systems which reduces the exposure to the Turbine Building.
Oil epillm from the tranofarmero would be collected in the,gravel filled drainrge area rurraunding the transformere and directed away from the bui lding.
(14) throughout the plant araam where fix water ruppreooion syrtca~. are instal Floor d ~. a i ~
have been provided A rtudy of the IdeQU8CY of drain8 and pO8Oibility of flooding damage to erfety-related equipment upon actuation of sprinkler8 in the Control Building showed that the accumulation of water on flooro war minimal m d would not caure my d m a g t to eafetg-related equipment or prohibit oafs operrtion of the plmt. (Pefarence 10).
I-PLDRE 106 08 7-64
Where gam ruppaeseion myate are installed, the drains should be provided with adequate 80818 or the 888 ruppresoion rymtem rhould be sized to compa~ate for the l o r o of the aupprmuion.gem through the dr8im.
Draina b area8 containing combustible liquids ahauld have provisions for preventing the backflow of comburtible liquide to a8fety-related areao through the interconnected drrin syrtema.
Water dreiarye from area8 th8t m y contain radio8ctivity should be collected, mamplad, and m y z e d before di8Ch8rge to the environment.
PLDRE106 087-65 The Reactor, Turbine, Dieoel Buildingo and Intake Pmp Station are provided with floor drrins. These drains are expected to handle the normal discharge from the sprinkler ayetem. A flooding and drainage evaluation waa performed for all areas where safety related equipment is located and fixed fire suppresaion systems is provided. The hounding case for the analysie was the assumption that no drains are provided in the area.
The level of water accumulation vae determined ba8ed on the a m o m t of water diecharged through the sprinkler heads. Adequate hose steam allowance w m included. It was concluded that safety related equipment will not be damaged due to excessive water accumulation on the floor (Reference 11).
The floor drains in the cable spresdlng rooms of the Control Building have liquid eeal connection6 to retain the carbon dioxide in thaae roome in the event the system ie actuated.
The turbine oil tank emergency drqin sump pump system with the discharge routed to the outside of the building controla the possibility of backflov of combustible liquida to eafety-related areas. Control Boom muncihtion of a s m p overflow reduces the likelihood that overflow of the pump might create an unnoticad fire hazard.
The diesel generator r o w have curbs to assist in control of possible combustible liquid spills between the other dieeel generator rooms in the same building.
(1) coplponent.
important to rafe shutdown.
There feature. rhould be capable of limiting fire damage so that:
Fire protection faaturee should be yrovidd fot 8tmCtlUdBs Oy8tCIPIIs m d (a) achieve and maintain hot rhutdown condition6 from either the control room or emer8ency control atation(8) ir free of fire d 4 a ; and One train of eystaau necessary to (b) maintain cold shutdown from either the control room or emergency control rt.tion(8) can be repaired within 72 hour6 Sy8tem nsceraary to achieve and e
zlwlw" The curbs with floor drain8 around the recirculating pmp ?I6 lets on elevation 639 of the Reactor Buildings are arranged to prevent poseible back flow of spilled o i l to other areas containing safety-related equipment. T h e m floor drains are also routed to the emergency drain sump pump system.
Drain8 from the Reactor Building are collected, mmpfsd, and analyzed before discharge to the environment. Diem1 Building eump is oampled before discharge. Turbine Buildiw drains are also sampled on a regular bash.
Water drainage from areas that m y contain radioactivity 1s collected and analyzed before discharge to the environmmt.
(l)(a)B(b)n (2)(a)B(b)p(c)s and (3).
A complete Fire Hazards and Safe Shutd h l y r i a has been performed for BFR de"trate c m p l i m c e with applicable portions of lOCFBS0 Appendix P as required by 10CFRS0.48.
The analysis du"tratea that the plant can achieve and maintain cold ehutdown within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> for a fire in any plant location.
Details of the analysis is provided in Fire Protection Report, Volume 1, Safe Shutdown h l y r i s (Reference 1).
PL311E106 087-66
(2) To meet the guidelines of Position C5.b.1, one of the following means of ensuring that one of the redundant trains is free of fire damage should be provided :
(a) Separation of cables and equipment and associated circuits of redundant trains by a fire barrier having 8 three hour rating. Structural steel owing a part of or supporting such fire barriers should be protected to provide fire resfstance equivalent to that required of the barrier; (b)
Separation of cables and equipment and associated circuits of redundant trains by a horizontal distance 0% more than 20 feet with no intervening combustible or fire hazarder.
In addition, fire detectors and an automatic fire suppression system should be installed in the fire area; or (c) Enclosure of cable and equipment
@ and 8seociated circuits of one redundant train in a fire barrier having 8 one-hour rating.
fire detectore an4 an automatic fire suppression system 8houJ.d be installed in the fire area.
In addition, (3)
C5.b.l and C5.b.2 cannot be met, then alternative or dedicated shutdown capability and its associated circuits, independent of cables, systems or components in the area, room, or zone under consideration should be provided.
If the guidelines of Positions PLDm106 087-67
BPMCE "CAL POSITIOI 9.5-1 COHPARISOE (1) Alternative or dedicated shutdown capability provided for a specific fire area should be able to achieve and maintain subcritical reactivity conditions in the reactor, maintain reactor caolmt inventory, achieve md maintain hot standbye conditions for a PWR (hot $hutdown* for a BWR) and achieve cold shutdown* conditions within 72 hour8 and maintain cold shutdown conditions thereafter. During the post fire shutdown, the reactor coolant system process variables ahall be maintained within those predicted for a loss of normal &c power, and the fiesion product boundary integrity shall not be affected; $.e.,
there shall be no fuel clad damage, rupture, or any primary coolant boundary, or rupture of the containment boundary.
(*As defined In the Standard Technical Specification).
(2) The performance goals for the shutdown functlone should be:
(a) The reactivity control function should be capable of achieving and maintaining cold shutdown reactivity conditione.
(b) The reactor coolant makeup function should be capable of maintaining the reactor coolant level above the top of the core for BUR8 and be within the level indication in the pressurizer for PWRs.
ryAAs"
- c.
vc or D w
e d
Shutdvm (1) Alternative ohutdown capability for BFlO is defined as actions resulting from a fire causing abandonment of the main control room, i.e., accomplishment of safe shutdown by using the backup control panels and equipment. Hence, alternative shutdown capability is provided for Control Building fire (Fire Area 16).
Refer to the Safe Shuedovn Analysis (Reference 1) for details.
8 (2)(a-e)
The performance goals for the safe shutdown functions will be met as stated in the Safe Shutdown Analysis, Section 3.3 (Reference 1).
PLDNE 106 087-68
(c) The reactor heat ramoval function nhould be capable of achieving and maintaining decay heat removal.
(d) The proceos monitoring function should be capable of providing direct readings of the process variables necessary to perform and control the above functions.
(e) The supporting functions should be capable of providing the process cooling, lubrication, etc., necessary to permit the operation of the equipment urad for oafc shutdown f m c t i one.
(3) The shutdown capability for specified fire areas may be unique for each such area, or it may be one unique combination of systems for all such areas. In either case, the alternative rshutdown c8pability shall be independent o t the specific fire area(o) and shall accommodate postfire condition8 where offsite power ia available and where offsite power is not available for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. Procsdurce ohall be in effect to implement this capability.
(3) The Safe Shutdown Analysis documents the systematic evaluation of each fire area to perform aafe shutdown functions. Safe ehutdovn capability is unique for e8ch fire area. The alternative ohutdown capability for the Control Building (Fire Area 16) is independent of the specific fire area. Procedures are in effect to implement this capability.
P L D E 3 0 6 087-69
B W C E 'ZBCHAXW POSITION QIBB 9.5-1 COWPAUISOI (4) If the capability to achieve and maintain cold shutdown will not be available because of the fire damage, the equipment. and systems comprising the means to achieve and maintain the hot atandby or hot shutdown condition shall be capable of maintaining such conditiono until cold shutdown can be achieved. If such equipment and eystcme will not be capable of being powered by both onsite and offeite electric power systems because of fire damage, an independent onsite power eystenr ohall be provided.
of onerating shfft personnel, exclusive of fire brigade members, required to operate much equipment and oyster&
shall be onsite at all times.
The number (5)
Equipment and system comprising the meane to achieve and maintain cold shutdown conditions should not be damaged by fire; or the fire damage to ouch equipment and systems should be Pimitad so that the systeme can be made operable and cold shutdown achieved within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. Haterialo for such repairs ohall be readily available oneitc and procedures shall be in affect to implement such repairs. If ouch equipment and system used prior to 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
after the fire will not be capable of being powered by both onsiee and offoite electric power system because of fire damage, an independent onsite power system should be provided. Equipment and eystems used after 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> may be powered by offsite power only.
e l7lu" (4) Equipment and system8 ured to achieve m d maintain the hot shutdown conditions vi11 be capable of maintaining such conditione until cold shutdown can be achieved.
The Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis and Safe Shutdown Instructions (SSIs) identifies the independent onaite power supplies that will be available with the diesel generatoro. An Operations Admlniatrative Procedure (Reference 12) will identify the number of operating srhift personnel that vi11 be required o m i t e at a11 times and will include sufficient number of personnel to operate the safe ohutdown equipment m d syatema.
(5) Equipment and system6 required to achieve and maintain cold shutdown conditions remain free of fire damage and do not require equipment repair.
Syetcms, component8, and circuits t credit for in the safe shutdown of a fire area will be free of fire damage.
The safe ehutdovn system will be capable of operation with either offsite pover available or unavailable for up to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
PLDNE106 087-70
e
( 6 ) Shutdown ry6tsms installed to e m u r e portfire shutdown capability need not be dasigned to meet seimmic Category X criteria, oingla failure criteria, or other dcoign basie accidant criteria, except where required for other reasons, e.g., because o f interface with or impact on existing safety ayattm, or because of adverse valve action due to fire damage.
(7) The aafe shutdown aquipment 8nd system8 for each fire area ahould be known to be ieolated from aseociated circuits in the fire area ao that hot shorts, open circuite, or ehorts to ground in the ursotliated circuit0 will not prevent operation of the arfe hutd down equipment. The eeyaration and barriers bctveen trays and conduit containing associ8ted circuits of one safe shutdown diVi8ion and tray8 and conduits containing aoeociated circuits or rafa rhutdom cablea from the edundant division, or the isolation of
.E heee 8erociated circuits from the aafc shutdown equipment, ahould be euch that a postulated fire involving associated circuits will not prevent eafe shutdown.
(1) Safety-related system ohould be isolated or eeparated from combustible materials. When thi6 is not possible because of the nature of the safety system or the combustible material, special protection should be provided prevent a fire from defeating the fety system.
(6)
The Safe Shutdown Analyolo, Sectio2 3.5 ie consistent with these guideliner.
(7)
The safe ahutdown cguipmmt and systems are protected from the conaequmcee of the fire-induped faults resulting in spurious operation of equipment and are bounded by the following:
(i) The safe shutdown capability should not be advereely affected by any one spurious actuation or signal resulting from a fire in any plant area; and (ii) The safe shutdown capability should not be adversely affected by a fire in any plant area which results in the losa of all automatic functions (signals, logic) from the circuits located in the area in conjunction with one vorst case spurious actuation or signal resulting from the fire; and (iii) The safe shutdown capability should not be adversely uffectd by a fire in any plant area which rerrulto in spurious actuation of the redundant valves in any one high-low pressure interface line.
Complete associated circuit analysis is documented in Section 5.0 of the Safe Shutdown Analysis (Reference 1).
- d. Control of Combusti blm (1) Emergency diesel generators are protected by an automatic carbon dioxide fire suppression system, so that a fuel o i l fire should cause only limited damage. Further, the wide separation between the two diesel buildings assures that no fire in a single fuel oil day tank will expose all diesel generator units.
PLDm 106 087-71
Such protection luy involve 8 combination of automatic f i r e auppression, m d construction capable of withstandiu and containi-a fire that consumer a11 combuatiblas present. Example6 of such combustible materials that lay not be separable from the remainder of its system arc:
(a) Emergency diaoel generator fuel oil day tanks.
(b) Turbine-generator o i l and hydraulic control fluid ryotears.
(c)
Reactor coolant pump lube o i l Sy8tm.
(2)
Bullc l a 8 storage (either compressed or cryogenic), should net be permitted inside structures housiw safety-related equipment.
Storage of flammable aaa much a8 hydroam should be located outdoor or in separate detached buildi-s SO that a fire or expleaion will not adversely affect any safety-related ryaeeats or equipment.
(Refer to "PA 50A, "Gaaeowo Hydrogen System").
Care should be taken to locate high preorure gao storage container8 with the long axil prrbllel to building walls. This will minimize the possibility of wall penetration in the event o f a container (especially flammable and fuel gaoto) inside buildings should be controlled.
(Refer to ISFPA 6, "Induamial Fire Lose Prevention").
The turbfnc-generator lube o i l tmh expose s i n g l e train of safcty-related cablca along the loath w a l l of the Turbine Building. The lube oil tanks are protected by water spray aystemr.
Other turbiac lube o i l and hydraulic control fluid rryste" do not upoae arfaty-tclrtcd SYSCC~S.
h e recirculation pmps i r e located in primary containment, which is inertcd during unit operation. The assaciased motor-senerator (ffi) Bets also contain large quantities of o i l, but they are protected by a u t ~ a t l c APFP fire rupprermim myatem and wdeqwte curbiw ie provided around the % sets to contain the spill of ail.
(2) No bulk atorage of gas is permitted inaide structures homing atored outside the truildings.
-=Ogm The m aafety-related e q u i m t.
hydrogen rtoraae area is protected with an autfneatic water spray oystcm inside the partial, open-sided, noncsmbuetiblc storage building.
The epacing and general arrangement of the hydrogen storage is in accordance with RFPA SOAP Standard for Gaseous Hydrogen at Consumer Site, 1984 Edition.
The hydrogen trailere are oriented with the long axis of the eylindete pointed toward the northeast c o m e r of the Turbine Building. The concrete west wall of the trailer port reduces the possibility of a hydrogen container striking the Turbine Building wall.
Even if such an event did occur, the only safety-related equipment ii the Turbine Building i o a single tray of cables along the south wall, over 200 feet south of the hydrogen trailer port.
PLDRE106 087-72
( 3 )
ahould be minimized.
In particular, chloride (WC) and neoprene rhould be uead mly vhen w b t i t u t r noncoaebwtible material8 aro not availabls.
The \\LM of glaatic materiafa hrlO&at.d 0188tiC8 mch a8 gOlyVi-1 (4) Storale of flammable liquidr rhould, aa minim, camply vith the reguiremsntr of I A
30, "Flamable arid Combuatible Liquido Code".
( 3 ) The uoe of pltrrtfc materiala inside building8 fr controlled by the Firs Protection P l m, Section 7.2 (Reference 11, Plastic materials wed at BFFl includa pipe insulation (Po-Plastic), cable insulation ( W C atc.), list covera ttc. The eombttstiblt Lwzarcb of them patcrirlr have been coasidcrerd in the Fire Btztrdo &dyeio. It dpsuU be noted that current electrical bc8ign atandarb8 prohibit thrs w e of PVC.
The us* of cablem ubi& are qualified to the fleme ratrsdurt requir-ta of IEEg-383 or tht uLc of firt rttrrdrnt coatirtg ( i, e., Flummmtic) on non-16Blt 383 cable8 limits the fire hazardm o f the cable insulation. Availability of rutmatic or " a 1 fire mtrppression mema provider wiilitiolul Protection.
(4; I ' 1 ~ b l c uui combustible liquid atorage inside r t m t u r ~ m containiry oafcty-related equipment ie atrictly controlled. Flammable liquid8 are stored only in d t o i m t e d areu of the plant.
Outdoor rtoragc of fl-ble md combustible liquido i m well removed from mtmcturea containi-mafcty-related cpuigarent and generally followa the baaic guideline8 of RFPA 30, "Flammable and Combuatible Liquid8 Code".
PLDrJE 106 087-73
( f ) ?ydroaan lbarn in rafety-related areas ahould be bither dasfgnad to aleevsd auch that the water pipe i 8 directly vented t o the outside, or should be equipped with euceai flow valves eo that in c11e of 8 line break, the hydroam concentration in the affected area8 will not exceed 2 percent.
iB@fgPliC Clime E fhqtffr-tl, Or (1) Only metal mhould be w e d for cable tray..
wed for conduit. Thin-wall mutallic tubin# should not be used, metallic tubiiu ehould only be uoed in ahart l w t h s not connect c#Pponenta to made of n m c m b w t i b l e material.
Only w t a l l i c tubing ahould bt Flexible quiplwnt. Other f8C6Way8 &auld bt (2) Redundant eafety-related cable oyst-outaide the cable rpreadin~
room rhould be reparated from each other md from potmtial fire exposure hazard8 in nonsafety-related arcam by fire barricra with a minim-fire rating of three hours.
trayr should be provided with continuous lins-type heat detector* and ahould be accerrible for aurual fire fightiry. Cablco rhould be derigaed to allow vetting down with fire ruppreooion water without electrical faulting.
These cable
( 5 )
The hydmgso liner used for (enerator c o o l t w are touted from the hydrogen trrffdr port md mtcr ehr furblns Buildinq 4 t col#n T-6 rnd T-14 l / 2 and run t o cotrsmr %.
'fbtrs f m no arfqry-related epufgmenz in the vicinity rJf the hydroam coollnq Ifnco.
'The concentration of Fi2 La tha ~h candcnaar and off-gar.pat= piping Ir maintained below four percent tu discussed in FsAIl Ssctim 9.5.
(1) Qnly metal cable trrp md cosdui:
construction is u a d. '%in-ua;iI metallic tub-is not wed.
P I a i b l t metallic t u b i w is mly wed in &rt lengths 04 a h feet or lesa.
s (2)
Redundant aafety-related cabla syattarr outaide the cable 8 p r d i r y tu-hare not hen reparated from each other by 3-hour fire rated barriers. kvever, the aeparatfon 8nd fire protection features far thome cables required to achieve md maintain safe shutdovn arc in compliance with the tequircaamtr of Sectlon 111-6 of 1OCFESO Appendix EL.
Cablcs are designed to allow wetting down vitk fire muppreoeion water vithout electrical faulting.
BFR 1s presently undergoing major upgrade of It8 fire alarm 8nd detection system.
The present oystem w i l l be replaced with microprocessor based system8 uairg addreeaable devices.
Present cabic tray line-type detectors will be abandoned in areas which are being upgraded. Area wide smoke detection system will provide adequate of combustion. Refer to the rife Prutection Upgrade Program for dcta early warning for any incipient
Itmu.1 bore rtrtioar end gottable hrne sxtiauirbtro 8Muld be protibad.
(a) 24-ineh-wid8 c r b h t r a p (both rrfety-related and nonr~fety-rrhted) i n e 4ivm fire area ie r i x or 1-0; The m e r of apuivalaet* stsndrrd
(*2rmyr exccediw 24 inchem m u l d br counted an two treyr; traps exceedSn#
48 inchrr should be taunted 88 three treyi, regrrdleor of tray f i l l. )
1 These are tvrr met8 a t cablt mystems fn the fntcks Puprp Statim.
olart 8et 18 iba an era. cantafniw redundant povtr cables for the BLBstSU oy8rem.
D i w f s f o a I crblca 8rt prurlded with 1-hour f l r e resistance vrlpr.
Mdittcmalliy, the lire& i n protected by a u t a u i t c rprinklcrs. ?he other set coluiotr bf four IO-inch cable trays.
The ate8 t a acctariblc for n m m l fire fiihtim.
but fe not protcctd by a m k s detectors of Itnc-type hrat bcttctorr. The cable tunnel l c r d i u t o the lntake Pump Station contains ci@t 18-fnch trays.
P L D ~ 1 0 6 087-75
(b) The cabling docs not provide inatrumentation, control or power to systePla required to achieve and maintain hot shutdown; and (c) the area of these cable routings, and continuous line-type heat detectoro are provided in the cable traye.
Smoke detectors are provided in S8fety-related c8ble trays that are I L O t accessible for mual fire fighting should be protected by a zoned automatic water syetaa vith open-head deluge or o p ~ n directional epray nozzles arranged ao th.t adequate vater coverage is provided for each cable tray.
protected from the effects of a potential exposure fire by providing automatic water suppression in the area
&ere euch a fire could occur.
Such cable trays uhould also be In other area8 where it may not be porrible because of other ovtr-riding design features necea~ary for reaeons of nuclear safety to eeparrtc redundant mafety-related cable ryetuns by three hour rated fire barriers, cable traye ohould be protected by an autoamtic water mystem with open-head deluge or open directional spray nozzles arranged 80 that adequate water coverage is provided for each cable tray. Such cable trays ehould also be protected from the effect8 of a potential exposure fire by providing automatic vater euppression in the area where such a fire could occur.
PLD&ElO 6 087-76 There is no fixed euppression in the cable tunnel, but the area ir adequately accessible for manual fire euppreseion. T h e m are make detectors in the tunnel, but there are no line-type heat detectors in the traye.
In the Re8ctor Building, the opm-herd deluge system for protection 9f c8ble trays and asrociated line-type heat detector. &re being de-collmaissioncd prior to reetart of their reapeetive
=ita (Unit 2 work haa been completed). This ia contingent upon completion of automatic eprinkler eyste" upgrade to provide area vide eprinkler coverwe in 8ccord.ncc vith m A - 1 3 requirement..
Refer to the Fire Protection Upgrade Proaru for dee&iln.
The opm-hcaded water npray eyettma are 8 conatant source of inadvertant aetuatioru. The uperaded eprinkler and detection syrtcrs will provide adequ8tc prOttCtiOn ag8inst exposure or c8blc fire initiated by electrical fault.
B m
TEQWICU POSITIOI QarB 9.5-1 COWARISOR The capability to achieve and maintain oafs shutdown considering the effecto of a fire involving fixed m d potential transient combustibles ahould be evaluated with and without actuation of the automatic suppreooion system and should be justified on a suitably defined basis.
(3) Electric cable construction should, as a minimum, pass the flame teat in the current IEEE Standard 383.
(This does not imply that cablea passing this test vi11 not require fire protection).
(4) Cable raceways ahould be used only for cablea.
(5)
Hiscellanceus storage and piping for flammable or combustible liquids or gases 8hould not create a potential exporure hazard to oafcty-related systepur.
M e capabi1,Fty t achieve and maintain safe shutdown capability is in accordance vith the 10CFRS0 Appendix Q requirements. Fired and potent181 transient combustibles have been considered in the Fire Hazards Analysis (Reference 1).
(3) Cables installed after 1977 have been qualified in accordance with the flame test requirements of IEEE 383.
Cable6 inssalled prior to this date may not meet this guideline.
However, all non-IEEE 383 qualified cables in open cable trays in the secondary containment area of the Reactor Buildingo, cable 8ptGading rooms, Diesel Generator Buildings, Pntakc Pumping Station, and cable tunnel to the Intake Pumping Station have been coated with a flame retardant coating to reduce their combustibility t o a comparable level as provided by IEEE 383 qualified cableo.
(4) Cable raceways are used only for cables.
(5) Transient combustibles are controlled 3y procedural attachments to the Fire Protection Adminiotrative Program (Reference 2) entitled "Control of Transient Combustlbles" and "Storage and Labelling of Hazardous Chemicals, FlamPlable or Combustible Liquids and Compressed Gas Cylinders".
Fixed storsge urd piping for flammable or combustible liquids located inside strucrures conzaining safety-related equipment have been evaluated as part I
of the fire hazards and safe shutdown I
analysis and do not effect redundant safe shutdovn systems. Refer to C.5.d.(2) and C.5.d.(S) for diacussion on flammable or combu8tib:e gases hazards.
I I
P L D E 106 087-77
- i.
(11 The products of combustion and the meona bg which they will be removed from each fire area should >e establiohed during the i n i t i a l stages Ob p l m t de8ig~. Csnrider8tion 8hOUld he g i v a to tne ismtallation of automatic ruppreorion ryrtemr as a 1111111 o f Ifmitirug EQQ" e and end heat generation. Smoke and corrosiv- &ares ebould generally be discharged directly outride to an area that vill not affect rafet:.-relatcd plant atear.
The nerlp.1 plant ventilation mystem MY be w e d for this purpomc i f capable and available. To facilitate rurolrl fire fiati-,
reparate mmoke and heat Vente rbould be provided in rpccifie areas 8Uch 8S cable 8Qre8diIl.g YoOQO, die8el fuel oil atorage arema, svktchgear room, and other area. vhers the potential slrirtr for heavy swhe conditionm (ace IWPA 204 for additional guidance on anoke control).
(2)
Rehare of "Le and g a m s containing radioactive material. to the environment mhould be monitored in accordance vith emergency plana a8 described in the guidelines sP Regulatory Guide 1.101, "Emergency Plmnirg for Muclear Bower Plant$".
h y ventilation ryrtem designed to exburt potmtially rediaaetive moke or aaees ohould be evaluated to m s u r c that imdvertcflt operation or si,-%lc failure81 will not violate the radiologically controlled areas of the plant deaign. Thir requirement includeo containment functions for protecting the public and maintaining hmbitmbility for opcrmtions personnel.
(1) Smoke removal ea11 be accomplished by using the existing EbAC &au&t rrystemn in the Reactor, ?'rr'bine, mA Dicael Buildings, otutdov; board rooms, m d cable rpreading room&.
The Standby Car Treatment Syrtun (SBGT) CUI also be utilized to remove earoke from the Reactor Building during emergency rituatioar. Portable move ejectors and port8ble &enerators art available to rupglement fixed exhaust system or to flmCtPOn a8 backup if the fixed ayotems a x not available due to direct fire dunage or 1088 of offsite power.
(2) The BFIV Radiologfcal Emergency Plan (REP) establirher measures for protection of TVA p e r o m e l and protection of the health and eafety of the public in the evem of radiological cmergencg r a t BFN.
The REP was developed in accordance with the current guidelines in HUREG 0654 "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological hergency Reaponse Plane and Prepardness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants".
N R E G 3654 slupercedes Regulatory Gulde 1.101 referfed to in this guideline.
The Radiation Wonitoring System monitors all releases to the enoiroment through a network of procees and area monitors. ?be monitors provide readout bo L locally and in the control room.
PLDRE LO 6 807-78
(3) Special protection for ventilation power and control cables may be required. The power supply and controhe for mechanical ventilation eysrtem should be run outside the fire area served by the system where practical.
(4) Engineered eafety feature filters should be protected in accordance with the guideline6 of Regulatory Guide 1.52.
An:-
filter that includes combustible materials and le potential erposure firs hazard that MY affect eafcty-related components should be protected as determined by the fire hazards analysis.
(3) Detailed W A C analyedaa was performed for all areas of the plant where eafe ehutdoam components are located. It vaa concluded that W A C equipmmt will be required for the Control Building, Reactor Building Shutdown Board Rooms at elevation 621 and 593, ELHa pump room, and Diesel BuiSding. The availability of thcse W A C systems is fire area specific.
Detail analysis l e provided in the Safe Shutdown Analysis (Reference 1 and Reference 13).
(4) BFN is not comitted to meeting the requirements of mC Regulatory Guide 1.52, The Standby Gas Treatment System (SBGT) filter units at BFB are conaidered engineered safety feature unitR. BEPA and charcoal filters meet the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.52.
The charcoal a d HEPA filters and electric heatera are tested in accordance with All31 H510-1975 requirements. Combustible material present in these units includes charcoal in metal cabinets. A continuous decay heat removal capability i s available in the filter units eo prevent buildup of heat in the charcoal beds due to radiolytic heating. Additionally, indication and ala" are provided in the main control room or high moisture content and temperature in the filter units.
The 3 redundant SBGT nits are located in a separate building outside the main powerhouse complex. The SBGT units a r e not required for safe shutdown during a fire event. The safety-related equipment located in the other plant areas of the powerhouse complex will not be affected by a fire in any of the SBGT filter units. No fixed suppression system %re provided in the filter units. Fire extinguishers are available in the SBGT building and fire hnse protection is available from yard hydrants.
PLDaElOB 087-79
(5) The frsoh air rupply intakes to areas containing mafety-related equipment or uyetema should be located r a t e from the a u n t air outlets and smoke vent8 of other fire areas to minimize the porribility of contaminating the intake air with the products of conrbuation.
(6) Stairwells ahould be designed to minimize smoke infiltration during a fire.
(7) Where total flooding ea8 extinguishing eyotclu are used, area intake and exhauait ventilation dampers ahould be controlled in accordance vith RFPA 12, *G8rboa Dioxide Syetemo", and arirptain the ncccrrary gas concentration.
HFPA 12A, "Halon 1301 SYlt-",
t o (5) Safety-related aream provided vith fresh air intake.
are the Reactor, Control, and Diesel Generator Buildingr. The.it intdeo for these building8 are either widely separated from my other ventilation smoke exhaust openings or the arrangement of the air intake8 1.
ouch that smoke contamination from the nearby exhaust opening8 ir highly unlikely.
(6) Those stairway8 that are enclosed will provide shcltcr for personnel traveling either up or dovn the stairr rince the doore 8rt norm&lly clo8ed. b~C108Ud etainellr at BPLl vere not 8pacifi:ally designed to minimize "kc infiltration. A nuQber of otalrr in the Re8CtOr md Turbine BUildi1Ig8 are not mclooed. Hovcver, rince w A e l y separated multiple p 8 t b 8te available for accese or egrerr throughout the plant, rpoke filtration into m e of rtaitvellr ir not a conccru. Also, contained breathiw apparatw are 8vailable to the operators to perform oaft shutdown functions duriug 8 fire event.
some meaaurt of smoke yb (7) The areas protected b-9 the lov prersure carbon dioxide or Halon 1301 system b v e intake and ubaumt damptrs controlled to maintain the necsrrary gas concent rat ion.
P-106 017-80
Lighting and two-vay voice communication are vital to safe ohutdovn and emergency rerponne in the event of fire. Suitable fixed and portable emergency lighting and caaaunication devices should be provided as followr:
(1) Fixed otlf-contained lighting conofrting of florescent or sealed beam a f t 8 with indfvidual 8-houi-mini" battery power supplies should be provided in areas that murt be named for aafe rhutdown and for acceas urd e g r e m route@ to and from a11 fire areaa.
Safe rshutdown areas include thome required t o be manned i f the control room muot be evacuated.
(2) Suit8blc 8e8hd-bdam battery-powered portable hand light8 rheuld be provided for emerasncy w e by the fire brigade ond other opcrationr perrolllael required to achieve rafe plant rhutdown.
(3)
Fixed emergency comunicatbau independent of ehe normal plant COePnUliC8tiOn W8tm Bhould be installed rt gra-selected statioru.
(4) A portable radio C o s " i C 8 t i O l l ryatcm rhould be provided for uae by tlfe fire brigade and other operations peroonnel required to achieve safe plant rhutdovn.
interfere vi th tb e conrnunicatione capabilities of the plant security force, Fixed repeazero instrlled to permit u8c of portable IO c ~ i c a t i o n unit8 rhould be protccted from exporurc fire damage.
Thio system rhould not (1) Fixed self-contained lignting conaietiag of nealed beam unite with individual &hour m i n ~ m u m brttery power supplies have been provided in arcaa that must be "ad for rafe shutdown and for acceas and egress routes to and from those arean.
(2) Suitable 8enled-ba.m, b8ttery-powered, portable hrnd l i a t r arc provided for raesgmcy use by the Fire Eortrgcncy Response Organization.
(3)
Roreprl urd tmergmcy co"1cationr aytatenw have bccn provided throughout the plant. These.system have been evaluated 85 part of the Appendix B uralysir to eneure that adequate communications crgability vi11 be avadlable for sontrolling plant operations and fire anywhere In the plant.
fighti-8CtiVitiel4 during 8 fire A s o d povcred telephone eyrt'em ie rlro provided throughout the saftty-related are..
(4) A portable rbdbo COamtUr~icat~on syrstem 1s provided for ume of the fire brigade and operational peraonncl.
The radio system for the fire briaade and plant operatiom will nCt interfere with the t8dio system for the plant recurity force.
PLD~106 017-81
Prcoperatiorul rad periodic trstiu mhauld damonatrate t h t the frequcncica artd for port8ble rrdia C ~ U n i C 8 t i O n will not 8ffset the actuation of protective rclryr.
(1) Detection 8y8tao ahould be proribed for a l l area# that contain or pt8-t fire srporurc to rafetprelated equiprat.
nu" A plurt radio repeater system has been provided 80 that portable radio communications capability vi11 be 8Prfhble for a11 area8 of the plant.
Ttrting of the portable radio cammication equipment ham been conducted. Plant are18 have been phyricrlly identified where false actuation of protective relryr could occur due to the use of portable comunfcstion equipment, (1) Detection syotQIlu.re currently not provided for all.re88 containing safety-related equipment. Detection system 8re provided vbcn required to meet the ~eparatioa requiremants of I O C F ~ I ~ppanciir R. section Irx G.
A M J o r upgrade of the fire alarm an e detection syotem i m currently mrderv~y.
detection ny8trop vi11 be an addreorable, intelli&ant, md malo8 type ayetam.
are the Unit.
2 and 3 Reactor Building8, the Control Buildings, Dicrel Generator Buildiry, and Intrkt ptrplp Station. The Unit 1 Reactor Buildiu detection syrtlru will be upgraded prior to the rartart of Unit 1.
Detection and alarm circuit. rhrll meet the following requirement..
The new fire alarm anb The arean being uparadcd PLDMEl06 087-82
The Initiating M i c e Circuit8 (Itrca) ahall be connectad t o the fire alarm panel in accorburcs with tha raqufrsarsnta of 8S"h 7 0, "Natidnul Electric Code", Attisle 7 6 0, "Birr Protection Signaling Svrtenu*', The mymtem &all meet the alnigna pctfommnca rspuisemunto of a atyla "DR in accorthncc vith the raguirem@ntm of IWPA 72-1990, Table 2-6.1, "Pcrforrsurcr Capcitter of Initiating Device CircuitB (IDC)",
for the required performance capacitica.
The Indicating Applimec Circuito (IACa) for alarm bel lm, honu, end lights &all be rtyle "Z" in accordance vith the reqUf"It8 of W P A 72-1990, Table 6-4, "PerforPLitce Capabilities of Indicating Appliance C ~ X C U ~ C ~ ~,
T i r e Protective Signrllng S y e t a ".
A11 riipnrliw line circuit.
(SLC) ci,e., frop local cantrof p m a l r t o central fire etation) and from local for lnitlatiru device8 m h l l meet the mini" performance requiremmtm of mtgic "6" in accordance with KTPA 7&-1990, Tabla 2-7.3, "Performance and Capaciticr of Signrrlim Lina Circuitr".
control m t l r t O ~ddre88ablt module8 Adeltiom1 details ate pravidcd in the Fire Protection Upgrade Program mcctlon.
The follwlly rarporuco apply to the sxirtiw 8yrtea:
(2)
Fire detection oyrtcDIll do n6t emply with ell requirmntm of C l a m A m y r t m 6 defined in lsrpA 72D, "Stmdrrd for the Xnatnllution, binttromce, and Use of Proprietary Clam8 f clrcultm &I dcfinud in IFFPA 70, "Mation.1 Electrical Code".
I Protective Si4nrliry Syite"",
m d I
i i
-7 5-
(3) urd installed in accordance with UFPA f Z E, NAutomatic Fire Detectorr".
Preoperational astl pariodic tenting of pulred linu-type heat datactoro rhould d m n r t r a t e that the frequencier w e d will not affect the actuation of protective relay.
in other plant Firs drtrctorr rhould be relected 8370tw.
(4) 8udible 8nd virual a h r m 8nd annunciation in the control room.
Where zoned detection ryrtcmr ara used in a given fire area, local mema
&soul8 be provided to identify which detector zone h8r 8ctu8ted. Local audible a l a n u rhould round in the fire area.
Fire detection ryrtenu rhould give (5)
Fire a1 ram rhould be dirtinctive and unique 60 they will not be confused with my other plant rgrtom alar".
(3) Thermal 8nd 8moke detectorr ate UL-listed and generally inrtalled in accordance with the requlrementm of NFPA 72E, "Standard on Automatic Fire Detectors", 1984 Edition. Detector epacing deficiencies do u i r t in 8omc areas.
The line-type thermal drtectorr that are in use are not of the pulred type.
(4) All detection.yotaw give audible and visual alarm and annunciation in the control room, with the exception of thermal detectors uaed to actuate e02 systems. Theme rystepls will not alarm in the control room for a detector actuation, but will alarm upon COq flow.
All detection system having mare than one zone have a local alarm panel which idantifiea the fire affected zone.
Detection rystema installed prior to the 1975 B% fire are not provided w e
local ala-.
All uymtrms inatalled during and after the 1975 fire recovery effort8 are provided with alarm bell8 in the fire area.
All ncv detection oyrteme installed as part of the Fire Protection Upgrade Program vi11 bring BE'"8 Fire Detection Systems into " P A Code Compliance.
(5) Where provided, the fire alarm bells at local panels are distinct from other plant alarms. The audible alarm notification in the control room is not distinctive from other plant alarms.
For each uurunicator vindov a specific annunciator response procedure b e been deveiopcd delineating required actions to be taken by Operation8 pcreonnel.
PLDBElO6 087-84
(6) Primary and secondary power oupplieo should be provided for the fire detection ryetun and for electrically Operated control valve8 for automatic ruppresofon eystema.
Such primary and recondary power CPUppliSS should satisfy provinions Of Section 2220 ob NFPA 72D.
Thir can be accomplished by using normal offsits power as the primary supply with a four hour battery supply an secondary supply; and by providing capability for manual connection to the Clara IE emergency power bus within four hour8 of lone of offsite power.
Such connection ahould follow the applicable guideline8 in Regulatory Cuidem 1.6, 1.32, and 1.75.
(1) An underground yard fire main loop ehould be iaetalled to furnish 24, "Standard for Outeide Protection",
given necessary guidance for auch installation.- It references other design coder and otrndardn developed by ruch organizationr as the American Rational Standardla Institute (ANSI) and the American Water Works Association
( A W A ).
Type of pipe and water treatment should be design conniderationn with tabulation a8 one of the parameters. Means for impacting and flushing the eyotem mhould be provided.
mticipatcd Water requirauente. HFPA The plant-vide fire alarm trlacnrittcd from the control room for pcrrannel notification iu not distinctive.
It is also ueed for medical emergencies. The alarm rignrlr are followed by verbal comunicationn over the public rddreos sysrtcm.
(6) fire detection syetlln pe.nel8 i 8 provided by the 120V AC Inatrusrent and Control Bus A.
Onaite diesel generatore or batterice provide backup to the primary eupply.
The yimary power supply t o the Secondary power rupplitrr ara pforiddd for local detection panels except for thoae monitoring Ifne-type thermal detectors or for the c8rbon dioxide system. The secondary eourcea are either dedicated battcriee located in the p.na10 or a central 24V battery.
Primary and secondary power supplies where provided, meet the minimum proviaions of 72D.
- b. 7 (1) eyetem ir looped around the main powerhotire uul is sized to furnish the anticipated water requdremente. Fire hydrant8 are of an approved type, and are installed at approximately 275 foot intervole around the powerhouse.
Underground installation detailr, such as thrust blocks, clamps, etc, have not been reviewed as a past of t h h comparison. However, the performance history of the underground piping has shown no unusual problem with syrtem integrity. Periodic flow testing In 8ccord.nce with the Fire Protection Plan (Reference 1) has indicated continued adequacy of the flow capability.
The underground yard fire main PLDHE 10 6 087-85
(2)
Approved rirually indicatiw rrctional control vrlver such a8 port-indicator valvau rhould be provide8 to irolatr portions of the main for mnint.nnnco or repair without abutti-off the.;upply to priury and backup fire ruppris8ion eyste" rerving arean that contr!n or expore rafety-rclat6d equipment.
(3) Valve8 should be installed to pemrit lrolrtion o f OUt8ide hydranto from the fire main for maintenance or repair without interrupting the water
@upply to autcmatic or " a 1 fire rupprermion rprtenr in ury area coatainiw or prrrenting a fire hazard to rafety-related or mmfr mhutdown equipment.
(4) Thr fire main mtm p i p i u rhould be rsparate from rervfcr or sanitary water r y s t m pipiw, except am described in Porition C.S.c.(4).
The systea can be fluohed through the yard hydrant8 and tbrou&h the*inrlde hooe conneetiom.
(2)
The mujorlty of the underaround oettionalizing valves are port-indicator type valver.
Valve0 md underground yard maim are arrangaU 80 that a r f q l r impairment should not 8iPultln6OtWly remove both the primary and rccondary rupprersion ryitt~. from rervice.
(3) Each fire hydrant ha8 a gate valve which enabler lrolrtlon of individual hydrants retarice water myst-.
The shared feature. of the two ryrtemu are dercrfbed in the FSAR and have prcvlourly been accepted by the RnC.
"106 087-86
(5) A c o m o n yard fire main loop may serve multi-unit nuclear power plant rites if cross-connected between
=ita.
Sectional control valves ohould permit maintaining independence of the individual loop around each unit.
For ruch inotallationo, common water rupplier may a180 be utilized for multiple reactor sitae with widely separated plants (approaching one mile or more), separate yard fire main loops should be used.
(6) ryrtem prarourr or flow requirementr, 8 sufficient number of pmps should be provided to enaure that 100 percent Cap4City w i l l be available assuming failure of the largest: p m p or lO66I of offsite power (e.g.,
three 50 percent pump.
or two 100 percent pumps).
This can be rccompliohed, for example, by If pump6 are requirad to meet providing either:
(a) Electrical motor-driven fire p i p ( r ) and dieaal-driven fire pmnp(r);
or (b) Two or more aeiamic Category I Claer IE electric motor-driven fire pump61 connected to redundant Clase IE emergency power b u m s (see Regulatory Guides 1.6, 1.32, and 1.75).
Individual fire pump connections to the yard-fire main loop rhould be reparated with eectionalizing valves between connections. Each pump and ita driver and control6 should be located fn a room reparated from the remaining fire pump by a fire wall with a minimum rating of three hours.
(5) The underground yard fire main system loops all three Units but not the Individual Unitr r i m e they are adjacent to each other. The distribution system cxtendr into the Turbine and Reactor Building# where additional looping uistr.
Sectional valves permit the isolation of the fire main system to any one Unit, while o e i l l maintaining the fire main syetem availability to any other two Units.
(6)(a) and (b) Three 100 percent electrical fire pump6 are located i m i d e the Intake m p
i
~
Station.
A 100 percent diesel w i n e driven fire pump fr provided remote from the electric fire pmps m d is located in a separate building adjacent to gate structure 2 on the cold water channel.
(Rote that the pumpr are conridered 100 percent when they can meet the sprinkler/rpray ryrtem and home rtation demand for the hydrrulically most remote and demanding location in a mfsty-related area.)
Alro, see TVA reeponie for C.l.C.(2).
Separate yard fire main connection8 vith eectional control valve8 bctveen connections are provided for the electric fire pmpe (common header for the three pumps) and diesel fire pump.
RLDNE 106 087-87
The fuel for the dieoel fire pump(s) a h m l d be aeparated 00 that it doe8 not provide a fire aourcc expooing eaftty-rclattd equipment. Alarms indicating pump runnine, driver availability, failure to otart, and low fire-main preasure should be provided in the control room.
The fire pump inatallation ehould conform to X W A 20, nStandard for the Installation of Centrifugal Fire Punpa".
(7) Outside manual hose installation should be rufficient to provide an effective hose stream to any oxmite location where fixed or transient comburtibler could jeopardize rafety-related equipment. Hydrantr should be inrtalled approximately every 2SO feet on the yard main eyrtem.
hooe house equipped with hose and combination nozzle and other auxiliary equipment recommended in RFPA 24, "Outride protection", rhould be grwided a8 needed, but at ltaat every 1,000 feet. Alternatively, mobile means of providing hose and associated equipment, such ar hore carto or trucks, may be amed.
When provided, ouch mobile equipment ahould be equivalent to the equipment supplied by three hose houees.
A (8) Threads compatible with thoee used by local fire departments ahould be provided on all hydrants, hose couplings, m d standpipe risers.
The diesel fire pump an8 its fuel tank
- r in 1 building which io well reparated from.ny rafety-related equipment (7) at approximately 275 feet intervals w i t h the actual opacing dependiry upon other equipment and underground yard main locatiom. Fire equipment houses are located throughout the plant area and are equipped with home, nozzles, and other auxiliary equipment.
them alro include wheeled dry chemical fire extinguishers.
A fire truck, equipped vith adequate hoae and other auxiliary equipment, i r also availabl Outoidt yard hydalntr are spaced Some of (8)
Threads are compatible vlth those used by the local fire departments.
PLDrJEl 04 087-88
(9) Two neparate, reliable frcahwater mupplies ohould be provided. Saltwater or brackish water should not be used unleea all freshwater rupplios have been exhauotsd.
If tanks are ueed, two 100 percent (minimum of 300,000 gallons each) system capacity tanka ehould be installed. They ehould be 80 jnter-connectad that pumps can take auction from either or both. However, a failure in one tank or ita piping should not cuuse both tank8 to drain.
Water supply capacity should be capable of refilling either tank in eight houra or lese.
(10) Common tank5 are permitted for fire and sanitary or service uater otorage. When this is done; however, minimum fire vater storage requirements should be dedicated by passive means, for exmple, use of a vertical rtandpips for other water oervicec.
Administrative controls, including lock. for t4nk outlet valves, are unacceptable as the only means to ensure minimum water volume.
(11) The fire water supply tahould be calculated on the baoir of the largeat expected flow rate for a period of two hours, %ut not lese than 30, 000 gallom. Thie flow rate ehould be bared (conoervatively) on 500 gpm for manual host otreama plus the largeot dcoign demand of any oprinkler or deluge ryetem a8 determined in accordance with NFPA 13 or NFPA 15.
The fire water supply ehould be capable of delivering thisl design demand over the longeet route of the water aupply aye tam.
(9) The electric driven fire pump6 take suction from the Wheeler Berervoir. The diesel driven fire pump taker auction from the cold water channel which is rupplied from the Wheeler Reservoir.
(10) Not applicable.
(11) The fire water oupply l e unlimited fsom the Wheeler Relrcrvoir.
-8 1-PLDhElO6 087-89
B U X M TB-CAL P(JS1TIOIII 9.5-1 GOWARISOH (12) Fresh water lakes or pondo of sufficient r i z e may qualify as mole source of vatcr for f i r e protection but require aeparate redundant ouctiom in on.
or more intake rtructurem. There supplies rhould be separated 80 that a failure of one rupply will not rerrult in a failure of the other supply.
(13) When a comon water supply is permitted fer fire protection and the ultimate heat sink, the following conditione should also be rrtiebied:
(a)
The additional fire protection water requirements are designed into the total atorage capacity; and (b) Failure of the firs protection rystem ahould not degrade the function of the ultimata heat sink.
(14) Other water syotdlPs th8t may be used as one of the two fire water aupplies ahould be permanently connected to the fire main system and whould be capable of autoamtic alignment to the fire main system.
Polmpe, controls, and power supplies in there eyrtcmo should satisfy the requiremento for the muin f i r e pumps.
The UIC of other water Ryette" for fire prctection should not be incompatible w i t h their functions required for oafc plant ehutdown. Failure of the other oyetem should not degrade the fire main ryst em, (12) Whteler Reservoir is the sole source of water for fire protection in o8fcty-rehted area6 of the plant.
Each p w p takea suction from a aeparate bay in the Intake Pumpiu Station. The diesel driven fire pump'o intake structure is located on the cold water channel and i m widely reparated from the Intake Pumping Station. The failure of one pump'r supply will not result in a failure of the other supplier.
(13) Wheeler Reservoir i e a cournon water oupply source for fire protection and the ultimate heat sink ryrtem. T h e Wheeler Reservoir provider an unlimited iource of Water for both syatms.
Failure of the fire protection syetem vi11 not degrade the function of the Ultimate heat rink.
(14) Wheeler Reservoir provides the role rource of vater for the fire wain ryetem.
PLDNE 106 087-90
(1) station atandpiper should have connections to the plant underground water main eo that a mingle active failuru or a crack in a moderate-meray line cannot impair both the primary and backup fire suppression ayetenu.
Alternatively, hsadeto fed from uach end are permitted inrfde buildingr to supply both rprinkler and rtandpipe ryatama, provided rteal pipin8 and fittiqa meeting the requitemmtr of ANSI B31.1, "Power Piping", are used for the headerr up to and including the first valve rupplying the sprinkler eyresmr where much herderr are part of the seiwnically analyzed hore atendpipe ryetam.
When provided, such haaderr are conridered an extenmion of the yard main ryrtem. Each rprinkler and otandpipe ryrtcm rhould be equipped with OS & Y (outride screw and yoke) gate valve or other rpprovad rhutoff valva and waterflow ala-.
s8fety-rehtad squipment that doer not itrelf require rprinkler water fire protection but ir rubject to unacceptrble damage i f wet by rprinkler water dircharlc rhould be protected by water rhieldr or baffles.
Sprinkler mystsnu and manual hose (1) The rprinkler myrtsnu and hose ritetion atandpiper a t e connected to the plant underground vater main and are derigned so that a #ingle impairment will not degrade or disable both primary and backup fire suppreorion capability.
The sprinkler oyrteme and hose etation/rtandpiper are rupplied from different feeds. In addition, the eprdnkler and standpipe aystenu are rupplied by a "griddad" piping arr.ngement.
Irolation oalver are located throughout the water rupply loop and 8ridr to irolate mingle impaimant (i.c.,
crackr, inoperable valva) 0 Each rprinkler ryrtaa ir provided with an indicatiw type rhutoff valve.
Waterflow alar" arc provided for the spriaklsr syrtsmr by prerrurc switches located downatream of the ryrtem control oalver. Standpipe ryrtems 8anerally are not provided with approved rhutoff valve8 o f waterflow
&18m8.
-8 3-PLDNE106 087-91
(2) Control and rectionaliaina valve8 in the fire water ryrtumr rhould be electrically rupami8sd or adminirtrati+oly controlled. The electrical mupervirion r i m 1 rhould indicate in the control ram. All valrer in the fire protection ryrtem rhould be poriodlcally checked to verify porition (reo NFPA 26, nSuprnPrlon of Valveon).
(3) Fixed water u t i ~ u i l h i ~
oyrtrmr rhould confom to requirement8 of 8ppropriato rturdardr ouch am H?PA 13, nSt.ndsrd for tho Iart8llation o f Sprinkler Syrte"", and R I T A 15' "Standard for Water Spray Pixd syBt.IP8".
(4) Interior manual hors inrtallation rhould be ab10 to reach any lamtion that contaim, or could prerent a fire exporure hazard to, rafrty-related equipment with at lsart one effective hore etrem.
Safety-related equipment located in area8 protected by sprinkler myetcmr have not been protected against potentiBlly damgin8 vaterepray in a11 Shutdown AnalyUis, e water #pray rtudy vas conducted. It concluded that redundant rafc 8hutdovn equipment were sufffciently oeparated i o r i f e rhutdovn capability would be maintained during a fire 8nd rubrequent release of fire auppresrion water. Refer to Firs Hazrrdr Analyeim, Section 5.1, for detrilr (Reference 1).
carel. Hovever, a8 p8Pt Of the h f t (2) Control and cectionalizing vrlvee arc adminirtrativaly controlled.
Control and ~sctionrlizing velver in lafety-rehtcd 8reai are checked monthly par plant procedures.
(3) There are dsviatlonr from " P A 13, nStandard for the Inatallation of Sprinkler Syrtem&in, urd KFPA 15, "Standard for Water Spray Fixed Syrte"'.
Refer t o the Fire Protection Uparrde Progrm for prepored upgrades to meet W P A 13 requirement..
Fixed water rpray ryrtew are b e i w decomirrioned after prerction rprinkler rystam8 in the m e a have btcn upgraded in accordance with ??ITA 13 requirements.
(4) I m i d e the powerhoure complex, hore artations of 1-1/2 inch lined fire hore are provided to reach any rrfety-related equipment with h leart one effective home otream with the exception of the primary cqntainment which ir inerted during normal plant operation and the SBCT Building. Horc rtationsl arc provided with a maxi" of 100 feet of hose when mounted on racks and a maximum of 300 feet of home mounted on reels.
PLDNElO6 087-92
To accomplish thia, tatandpipee with horse connections equipped with a maximum o f 100 feet of 1-112 inch wovon-jacket, lined fire hose and suitable nozzles ehould be provided in all building9 on all floors.
Individual atandpigto snould be at laaot 4 incheo in diameter for multiple hose connections and 2-1/2 inches in diameter for einglc hose connections.
These syetame should fcallow the requiremanto of NFPA 14, "Stadpipe and Hooe Systms", for sizing, spacing, and pipe support requ'ir4rmentr.
B o m rtationr ahould be located am dictated by the fire hazard analyeis to facilitate acceae and use for fire fi8hting ogerationa, Alternative hose stations should be provided for an area i f the fire h8z8rd could block accesm to a mingle hose station renting that a r m. Provioiona ehould he made to rupply water at Peaot to standpipes urd hose connections for manual f i r e fighting in area8 containing equipment required for safe plant shutdown in the event of a eafe ehutdown earthquake.
The piping system cerving ouch hose stations ehould be analyzed for SSE leading and ohould be provided with eupporto to ennure rsystem pressure integrity. The p i p i u and valve0 for the portion of hose standpipe eyetm affected by thie functional requirement ahould, 80 8 minimum, ratiefy ANSI 831.1, "Power Piping".
The water supply for this condition may be obtained by manual operator actuation of valves in a connection to the hose standpipe header from a normal seismic Cattgory I water eyatam much ae the essential service water system.
PLDNE 10 6 087-93 Individual home connections a t e oupplied from l-1/2 inch rtandpipes and multiple hoe8 connsctioxm Ire oupplied from 3-inch atandpipea. Ro home otationr are provided in the SBGT, but hydrantu are available nearby.
Hose stations have been locrted to facilitate accemo and uae for fire fighting operationo.
Alternative hose stations are alro available.
The rtandpiper in aream contahfng equipment required for oafs plant shutdown have not been designed to remain functional after an earthquake.
Thim har not been 8 backfit requirement for p l m t r of BF"r vintage,
h POSITIO11 m B
9.5-1 -MISOB The croar coansction rhould be, (a) capable of providiw flow to at least two hore mtutionr (approximately 75 gpm
$er hose rtrtioa), and (b) derigned to the a m e atandarcla a8 the reireic Category I water ryrtam; it should not degrade the performance of the eeiomic Catoaory I water system.
(5)
Be supplied to each area ohould be baaed on the fire hazard analyrir, The urual combination spray/straiaht-stream nozzle ehould not be used in areas where thu mttaight rtream can cduae u~cceptabl6 m6ch.nical damage. Fixed fog aozzlea rhould be provided at location8 where high-voltage rho&
hazard8 exist. All hose nozzle8 rhould have shutoff capability. (6uid.nce on aafe di8ta.nCm for water application to live electrical equipment MY be found in the "NFPA Fire Protection Handbook".)
The proper type of hoee nozzle to (6) Fire hose ehould be hydrortatically tested in accordance with the r e c ~ a n d a t i o n r of NFPA 1962, "Fire Hose - Care, Use, ?!aintenancen.
Hose stored in outside hose houaer rhould be teeted annually.
Interior 8tmdpipe hose should be teated every 3 years.
(5) All fire hose nozzles placed inside the building are of the electrically safe fog type with shutoff capability, except that :he refuel floor nozzles are the straight strearn type. Exterior hore carts have nozzles which can be adjueted to 8 straight etream pattern. Imide the p l m t hose nozzles are available only to the fire brigade and can be adjueted to a straight etr-cam pattern. Use is rcrtrlcted because a relatively untrained anployee could cause either mechanical damage or peraolwel injury with a straight stream nozzle, where the trained fire fighter8 assigned tm the fire brigade need the flexibility to use atraight atrema when indicated by fire conditione.
(6) Fire hoses stored outside are annually tested per plant procedures.
Fire home 8tored inaids buildings are tested every three years per plant procadureo. Theat preventive maintenance procedure8 incorporate the recommendations of lpFpA 1962.
PLDBE106 087-94
(7) Certain fires, such as those involving flumnable liquids, respond well to foam suppresmion.
Conrideration rhould be given to uae of mcchunicul low-expantsfon foam eystcme, high-expansion foam generators, or aqueoua film forming foam (AF'FF) uystcms, including ths AF'FF deluge myatem. These ovotem should comply with the requirements of KFPA 11, l U B HXTA 11B, and rOFPA 16, am applicable.
Halon fire utinguiehiw eystuna ehould comply with the requirements of W P A 12A and W P A 128, "Halogenated Fire Extinguishing & a t System - Halon 1301 and Halon 1211". Only Ublistsd or FH-approvsd agent0 should be uoed.
Provieionm for locally disarming automatic Halon ryrtt" should be kept locked and under strict administrative control. Autoslrtic Halon extinguishing system should not be disarmed unleso controls a8 described in Poaftion C.2.c.
are provided.
In addition to the guideline8 of XWPA 1U and 12B, preventive maintenance and teating of the system8 including chsck-weighting of the Halon cylinders, rhould be done at ltort quarterly.
Particular consideration ohould also be given to:
(1) Minimum required Halon concentration, distribution, soak time, urd ventilation control; (2) Toxicity of Halon; (7) Aqueoua film forming foam (APFF) is available through the use of foam cart8 and eductor mzzleo.
AFF'F preaction rprinkler ayrte" complyins with !WPA 11 and 16A are installed above the Unit 2 motor generator sets far the recirculation pumpo. Refer to the Fire Protection Upgrade Program for details of proposed oprinkler aystem upgrade fer Unite 1 and 3.
Bore statio-are located in the two atairwells on elevation 639 in order to support manual fire suppression activities for the motor generator Betta.
- d. b l o n S u
v v
r v
The only Halon utinguirhing oyrtem in the powerhowe i 8 currmtly being inetalled in a non-safety related area (process computer room) of the Control Building. Thir myatem conform with theme guideliner.
Adequate preventive maintenance and testing program will be prescribed for thi8 8ySta.
PLDAE 106 087-95
(3) Toxicity usd corrosive ch.racteriotice of thermal drcmposition product8 of Halon; and (4) activating detectore.
Location en8 tielection of the
- a. &.&on D i u e S w r m s s i o n S v s t w Carbon dioxide extinguishing syrtc~rs rhould comply with the requiremento of RFPA 12, "Carbon Dioxide Extinguishing Syatamewa Where automatic carbon dioxide system are used, they ehould be equipped with a predischarge alarm ray8tana and a dimcharge del8y to permit personnel agrrsa. Proviaioru for Socally diaaming rutomtic carbon dioxide ayatema ehould be key locked and under 8trict rdlainiotrative control. Automatic carbon dioxide extinguirhirng oystssrs rheuld not be dharmcd unlesr control8 81 described in Position C.2.c are providd.
P8rtireular conaideration should r h o be given to:
(1) Minimum required C02 concentration, diatribution, noak time, and ventilation control; (3) Poeribility o f 8tCOnd8ry thermal ehock (cooling) damage; (4) Conflicting requirements for venting during C02 injection to prevent overpressurization versus sealing to prevent lose oE agent; and (5) Location and eelectior: of the activating detectore.
- e.
-boa The carbon dioxide extinguishing systems were installed using the guidelines of NFPA 12, 1966, "Standard on Carbon Dioxide Extinguishing Systems".
AI1 automatic Carbon Dioxide C02 systems sounU an alarm horn in the protected area and are delayed from minimum of 20 oeconds to 120 stcondr prior to agent discharge.
Administrative control8 required by Section C.2.c are provided when the C02 systems are disarmed.
Hinilsum required C02 concentrationo, distributions, and ventilation contro have been adequately conaidered in the system deaigne.
Xinimum discharac and roak times for varioua C02 protected areas vere re-evaluated based on actual discharge te8ts. Consequently, the COP discharge duratian w88 increased to 8chieve the required r o d time (Reference 14).
Anoxia, toxicity of carbon dioxide gas and the possibility of thermal shock damage are known factors and have been considered.
The need for overpressure protection hae been addressed in the system design. Full C02 discharge tests have indicated that overpreeaure protection ie not 8 concern at BFN.
several pressure relief dampers were pinned shut (Reference 15) to enable better sealing to araintain GO2 concentration. The location and
- Hence, stlec*ion of detectors is evaluated response to guideline C.6.a.
PLDIpE106 087-96
f. -
Fire extinguisher. should be provided in are88 that contain, or could prerent Q fire expomure hazard to, safaty-related equipment in accordance with guidelines of "PA 10, "Portable Fire $Xtinguirherm, Imtall8tdon, Pkintenance, md Use".
D r y chemical csxtinguiohers ohould be fMt8lled with due consideration given to poesiblc adverse effect6 of oafcty-rel8ted equipment installed in the area.
- 7.
8. 1 Fire protection rsquirementr for the primary and.ccondary containment areao ahould ba provided for hazards identified by the fire hazardo analysis.
Fire exeinguiehero have been provided throughout the plant in accordance with the guideline. of rmPA 10, "Standard for Portable Fire Extlaguimhets".
Fire extinguisher8 are loc8ted throughout a11 plant aretia.
Class ABC dry chemical utinguiohero are provided in moat.rea8 of the plant. Exceptions are made in areas occupied by electrical witchboards and control panel8 where carbon dioxide, dry chemical, or H810n extinguishers are used for large work areas where space for movement i8 available arrd where warranted by potential fire severity.
- 7.
Pl-
- a.
S e
c w
Con-
?su The primary containment ir inertcd with nitrogen during normal plant operation and II fire is not pootulated to occur.
Therefore, fire protection systems have not been provided inside primary containment.
PLDRE 106 087-97
Examplea of such hazards included lubricating oil or hydraulic fluid ayetem for the primary coolant pumps, cable tray rrrmgamanto and cable pmetratiom, and charcoal filtero.
Because of the general inaccereibility of primary containment d u r i w normal plant operation, protection rhould be provided by automatic fixed eyetems.
The affect8 of postulated fires within the primary containment should be evaluated to ensure that the integrity of the primary containment ie not Jeopardized assuraiu no action is taken to fight the fire.
(a)
Operation of the fire protection eyetau ahouPd not compromise the integrity of the containment or other eafety-related eystema. Fire protection activltier in the containment are-should function in conjunction with total containment requirements ruch ar ventilation and control of contaminated liquid and gareoue relaare.
PLDHE106 087-98 The Fire Protection Administrative Program impleaents necessary controls for transient combustibles, "hot work" activities, urd fire protection ryrtem requirements. Syrtema urd equipment art verified md aaintrlntd operable in accordance with the requirement. of the Fire protection Plan, Section 9.0 (Reference 1).
(a) Since primary containment (drywell) is inerted during normal operation, fire protection system have not been provided inside primary containment.
All fixed suppression system provided in aecondary containment areas are water baaed. Delivery and removal o m
water to and from these areas during euppresaion system operation will not vio:ate containment integrity nor will safaty-related Byatema be affected.
However, application of water directly on safety-related equipment could result in its damage or spurious operation. A suppreeeion damage evaluation ha8 been done to determine potential damage to those componcnta from suppression activities. I t was concluded that redundant oafe shutdown components were protected against eimultaneoue spray damage. Details are provided in Reference 16.
(b) Pnside noninerted containment one of the fire protection meana stated in Positionr C.5.b.l and C.5.b.2 or the following fire protection meam should be provided: reparation of cabler and equipment and aerociatad nonaafary circuits o f redundant trains by I noncdmbustible radiant caeriy shield having a minimum fire rating of one-half h a w.
( c ) In prillury containment, fire detection aysitama should be provided for each firs hazard.
detection used and the location of the detectora should be the most suitable for the particular type of fire hazard identified by tha fire hazard analysis.
The type of A gmsral area fire detrction capability should be provided in the primary containment 8s backup for the above described hazard dctsctiori. To rccorapli8h this, ruitable makc or heat datectora comprtiblc with the radiation environment should be installed.
a (d) containmeat8 that are not inertcd.
Standpipe urd hose stations imide containment may be connected to a high quality water supply of sufficient quantity and pressure other than the fire main loop if plant-specific features prevent utendilrg the fire main supply inside containment.
Stmdpipe and home 8tatIOM s%ould be Inride COTltaimtnt8 and BUR (b) Rot applicable mince containment is hatted.
(c) provided inside primary tontainracnt oincc containment io iaerterl.
Firt detection has not been (d) not been provided imide primary containment since containment is iner t ed.
Standpipe and home rtations have PLDlVE106 087-99
For BWR drywelh, rtaadpipe rad home rtationo rhould be plated outride the d w e l l with adequate 1sngth.a of hose, no lower than 100 f e a t to reach any location inside the drywall with M effective hoaa atream.
'IBe sontainraant penetration of the rtandpipa ryrtm rhculd m e t the isolation requirement of General Deripr Criterion 56 and ohould be oeimle Category I.nd Quality Group B.
(e) The reactor coolant pmp8 rhould ba quipped with rn oil collection syrtse if tha containment l e not insrted duriru normal operation. The oil collection ryrtem ahould be 10 deoignad, eryineered, UUIL in8tal2ed that failure will not l e d eo fire during normal or d e 8 i m barir accident conditione urb that there ir reaeonable uaurmce that the &y8tem will withatand the arfe shutdown earthquake, Such collection ryste" rhould be capable of collecting lube o i l from a l l potential prcrourit~d and tmprcrrurited leakage o i t s r in the reactor coolant pump lube si1 mymtapp..
be collected uzd drained to a vented closed container that ern hold the entire lube o i l ryctam inventory.
A f l a w arrertcr l a required in the vent i f t3c flarh point chrractcrirtico of the oil present the hazard of fire flashback.
Leakale rhould (e)
Reactor coolant PIIP. are not utilized on BFW.
m w h am the recirculation mtem do not require oil collection capability mince p r h r y coxltrigaet is incrted d u r i w nonu1 operatiom.
Oil coatainixu prrpr PLDNE 106 087-100
(fl For ~ c o a d r r y contriment area.,
cable fire hazard8 that could affect R e f i n e l l n g and rulat.P.ncr operatioar in e c n r t r M t.uj introduce dditioarl haZua8 mch 111 controinrtioar control matariala, decont&mir.atfon muppllea, wxtd plralkg, tlrporary wiriiw, weldiry,.rad flr# cutting ( w i t h portable cueprrrred a u fuel mupplp).
Forribla firdo wwld mt nacaaoarily b.
in t b vicinity of fixed detection and ruppreaoiq ayote".
m c a a n r procedures md control8 necewary to emure adequate firs protection for traamimt f i r e 1-h u e d i 8 " d in Podtion c.1.
PLDNE 106 087-103 (f) See reaporue t o auibelinr C.S.a.(2).
- b. --
PLD3w106 087-102
ilanual fire f i g h t k g capability should be provided for both:
(1) Firt originating within a cabinet, console, or connecting cables; and (2) eXposu- - fires involving combuotiblc in the general room area.
Portable Clare A md Class C fire utinguiahcrs should be located In the control yoom.
A hose station should be inatallcd ixmcdiatcly outside the ccntrol room.
lozzlts that are compatible vith the hazards md equipment in the control roo1 ahould be provided for the manual hose station. The nozzles chosen ahould aatinfy actual fire fighting ntcda, aatiefp electrical nrfcty, and minimize physical duprgc to electrical cquimrat from home stream impingement.
@'+Smoke detectors ahould be provided 10 the Control room, CabiXlCtIl, and connolea. If redundant aafe shutdovn e q u i m e n t Is located in the am:
control r o w cabinet or console, additional f i r e protection measures shousd be provided.
Alarm and l o c a l indication shoulC be provided in the control room.
Breathing apparatus for control room operators should be readily available.
The outside air intake(s) for the control room ventilation system shonld be provided with smoke detceLion capability t o l-am in the control room to enable manual isolation df the contr;l room ventilation system and thus prevent smoke from e n t e r i x the c o n t r o l room.
These hose stationa are norm?lly dry with the valve on the opposite aide D f the wall opened only in an emergency.
The nozzles for the hose stations are full shutoff, fog nozzlce.
Smoke detectfon is prcvidcd in selected panels and at the ceiling of bath constantly attended control rooms.
Smoke detection ie provided only in two electrical panels in the relay room.
A 1 1 detectors provide alarm indication in the control rc --:.
Self contained breathing apparatus are available in the control rooms for the operators.
The outside air intakes far the control rcom makeup air ventilation are not f u m i a h c d with smoke detection capability to alarm in the control room; hovevtr, smoke detection capability provided in the c m t r o l i O O m complex vi11 alarm in the event of amokc and indication i o provided at tne local panel.
Capability ie available to i s o l a t e t h e recirculation portion of the main control room normal ventilation aystcm by means of a volume contrgl damper.
Hanual smoke venting of the control room using the W A C system is not available to the operator.
- Xowevcr, portable exhaust fans will be used for smoke venting.
CtiZlng spaces are not used a8 air plenums fcr control room ventilation.
Fire dampera arc provided in all ver.tilation openings uetveen the control roGm cc:?lex and adjtrlent f i r e areas.
PL;3HE106 087-103
atiry of moke produced by fixe In tut ctmtrcll room by me-of the normal ventilation ryatEar ia acbcptable; however, provision should be made t o permit iaolqtion of the recirculating portion of the normal ventilation ayotem. m u a l l y operated vcnting of the control room ohould be availablr? t o the operators.
A l l cables that enter the control room should termiw-e in the control roam.
I That is, no eLb1in.g should be routed through the cootrol roam froa one area to another. Csblca In underfloor and CcilIng 8p8cea should meet the separation criteria necessary for fire protection.
Air-hnndliag ftnctions should be ducted ocparattly from cable in such apace#; i.e.,
i f eablcc are routed in underfloor ceiling spaces, these spaces ahoald riot be Latd a8 air plenum for ventilation of the control :&om.
filly eaclo8cd electrical ractvnym loc8tcd in nu&
underfloor m d ceiling q a c e a, i f mer one aquare foot In croan-occtional area, should have 8 u t w m t l c fire 8UQprSIPiOn iaslde.
Area automatlc fire suppression should be provided for underfloor and ceiling space8 I f used for cable runs unless a11 cable l a run in a four-inch or aMller steel conduit or the cables axe in fully enclosed racevays internally protected by automatic f i r e sunprezalon.
There should be no carpeting in tile control room I A l l CtIdes enttrhg each ccntrol roam t.cminatc in the control room. There arc no uderfloor agmcee and no rafcty-related C8hlc8 inatallrd i n ceiling spaces.
The carpeting used in the control room has a flrme sprc8d rating of lees than
- 25.
A fire in m y area of the Control Building, including the main control rooms or pcrlpheral room In the control room complex will not defeat the plant's safe rhutdown capability.
Required erfe ohutdown functions will be capable of bring ptrforned frorsl remote ohutdovn panels located in scpnratt fire nrt&a. Refer t o Fire Hazards Analysis, Fire Art.
16 (Reference 1) for detailtd f i r e protection evaluation.
An dincussed in Section C.6.8, a
microproceuor bared addremsable detection aysttm is being lnntalled in control room complex to provide area vide coverage md fire detection Inside control panels.
Refer t o Fire Protection Upgrade Progras for details.
PL D hT 1 0 6 GZ 7 -1 04
TX-CIL WSITfO11 busB 9.5-1 CO#PAEISOR The $rima= fire suppression In the cable spreading room should be an automatic vatex oystem &uch am closed-head eprinklcrr, open-herd deluge nyotem, or open directional water spray syatem. Deluge and open 89r.y s y r t m a rhould 3avc provisions for manual operation a t a remote 8tati0~; however, tk,tre should be provisione t o preclude iiiadvcrtent operation.
Location of aptinkler hcnPs or spray nozzle should conmidcr cable trap arrangtmcntm lad poroible transient comburtiblcm t o cnrurc adequate vater coverage for arean that could present exposure haznrdr t o the cable syatm.
Cablcr should be dcalgncd t o allow vetting d o n with water 8upplicd by the f i r e suppression system without tlectrical fnul-.ing.
Open-head uelugc and open directional spray system8 should be zoned.
The use of form io acceptmblc.
Cable npreading room ahould have:
(1) At leamt two remote and ecparatc entrances for accesa by fire brigade personnel ;
( 2 )
at l e a s t 3 feet wide and 8 feet hlgh; An aisle separation between stacks (3) Hose stations and portable extinguishers installed immediately outside the room; The primary suppression for the cable spreading room is provided by preactior sprinkler syatens.
Backup ruppresalon la provided by manually operated carbor dioxide syottm.
The prcacnt rptinlrler syattm in the c8ble 8Qr&adlnl, room&
will be upgraded in accordance vith WPA 13 rtpulrtlaenta to provide cclllng level md under cbrtruction coverage, HFPA 231C guidance will be uocd t o nad mprinklcro bctutcn racks of cable trayr.
Sprirllere will be quick respama: type.
Sei Fire Protection Upgrade PYogram for details.
There are two remote urd aeparatc ca..ranceS to Each rprtrding rorm.
hislea have not been provided between
- able tray stacks and are not feapibie to incorporate into the plant design a5 a backfit.
Fire extinguishers are located inside and imtdiatcly outside the aprcadir,g rooms.
Hose stntiona are inatrllcd nesrby at the bottom of each stairway a t elevatfon 593.
Each home station is equipped vith 100 fttt of 1-1/2 inch hose and fog nozzles.
Hose from fire hose stations located as elevation 621 could also be brought down the stairways and i n t o the spreading rooms.
I f required, Additional hose is available from adjacent areas.
Both smoke detectors and rate canpensated heat detectors a r e provide(
in the spreading rooms. T h e s e detector6 are installed in a cross-zoned brrangement t o actuate t h e preaction sprinkler system. The present detection system in the c a b l e Fpreading rooms is being upgraded t o a microprocessor based addressable syster CIS described in Section C.6.a.
S e e F i r e P r o t e c t i o n Upgrade Pr3gram for d e t a i 1s.
I
(4) hrea rmoke detection; urd (5)
Continuour line-type heat dsttctora for cable trryr inridc the cable 8prtading to-.
Drainr t o remove fire fighti-vrtcr rhauld be rclaoved.
When gar syrte" art lnmtalled, drainm rhould have rdtquatc realm or the 1.8 utiruulrhing r y r t e " rhould be rfzcd to coapcnratc for lorrcm throwb the d r a i m.
A oep8ratc cable rprc8dia.g room rhould b t proridtd for each redundant diviaion.
Cable rprerdiry rooma rhould not be ohartd betwee3 reactor..
Each cable aprcadiw room should be acparrted from the other8 uld from other w e a m of the plant by brrricrr with a m i n i m f i r t r r t i u of 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />.
Sf thin i o not porribit, a dedicated ryrtcm nhould be provided.
. The tentilrtion 8 y. t ~ ~
to each cable 8prcadin.g row 8houid be dcrignd t o i r o h t c the area upon actuation of any aar utinruimhinl r y r t a ~ In the area.
Stparacc manually actuated mmoke venting that l a operable from outmidc the room should be provided for the C.1 le spreading room.
Continuour line-type heat detectors are not installed in the cable trryo.
Becrura of the rmdundmce of rupprarrioa ryrte" and both rmoke and heat Uctcctfon a t the ceiling, tho abrtace af continuour line-type hcrt detectors i n jurtificd.
Drains are provided urd have liquid trapa to contain the carbon dioxide inridc the rooma i f the ayrtcar are actua t cd.
Scprratt cable a p r e r d i a roomi are not provided for each redundant divi8ion.
Sprcadim roow art rhrrtd between Unitr.
The two rprardi-roonu a t e not reparated from c4ch othqr or from other artam of the Control Buildirq by 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> barriers.
n e rprerding rooor are separated by 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> brrrierr from the Reactor a
Buildings urd Turbine Bulfdlry.
A f i r t in any part of the Control Buildla, includiru the rpreading Toon will not defeat the plant'r raft uhutdown crpabllity.
Required s r f e rhurdovn functiono will be capablt o f being pcrfotmed from remote shutdown panel6 located in 8cparatc f i r e nfe45.
The ventilation eyatem t o e -.
- i cable rprcading room i8 dtaigned to isolstt the area upon actuation cf the carbon dioxide extinguishing system prctectlng t h t room.
Two 100 percent capacity exhaust fans serve both spreading r o o m.
Portablt emokt ejcctoro can also be used t o remove smoke from the arc'n.
PLDhi 1015' 087-106
Computer roo-for computrrr performing rafet:-relsted function8 that are not part of the control room cwplar ahould b8 reparated from othtr ateam of the plant by brrrlsrr hrvin& a miniam fire raiirtance rrtin4 of 3 houtr and rhould be protected by &utoratic detection 8nd fixtd r u t o r r ~ l c rupprcoalon, Comptttctm that art part of the control rom complex but not in the control room rhould be reparated rnd protected 41 dcrcrlbcd in Poiltion C.7.b.
Computer crbinetr located in the control room 8hould be protccttd II other control room equimcnt and cable "8 therein.
Ronrrfcty-related cotputera outride the control room complex 8hOUld be 8tp&r8ted from r8fety-rclattd aril by fire barrier. with a minimu rrtiru of 3 houri and mhould be protected an needed to prcvtnt firt &?d moke dnmanc to iafrty-related equipment.
Q The coaputtr rooma arc not pert of the control ram tomplu.
They are located on efe*.tion 593 of the Control Building.
computer equipment in there t o o m doer not perform rrfcty-rtlrtcd functionr.
T h e computer roo" ate reparated f t m othcr aream on Control Bulldiw clzvatlon 593 by non-fltc-rated concrete block wrllr m d from room an Control Bullding elevation 606 by a non-fire rated reinforced concrete ccill-.
The Control Buildina l a mtparattd from the Reactor m d Turbine Bulldin&r by 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> firt rated bmrricrs.
The new procerr coaputer room vllf be mclorcd by 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> f i r e rattd 8ypmum wall 4nd 1-1/2 hour ?ire rated concrete block wall. The room will be protected by dutosatic halon utiruulshiru syoterr. The m v procerr coaputer room f i r e protertioa feature. comply vith RFPA 75 - 1989 Edition "Protection of tlcctronlc Computct/Data Proccrsinl:
Equipment Pequitmtnt.".
The computer rooma haft amoke dctectlon vith &nnunci8tion to the control rooms.
The prcrent detection sayatem is plrnncd to be ugaraded t o a microprocensor bared addrearable syrtem.
See F i r t Prottctlcn Upgrade Progrmm for d c t r l l r. Hanually opcrNttd carbon dloxidc utin&ulohin~ iiyatcms ate Lnotalled in tach corqmtcr room.
PLDhTi06 087-107
Switchear r o m containing mrfetp-related equipment ihould be reparated from the rtaaladet of the p l m t by bartilt8 wlth a minimur fire rat!-
of 3 houri.
Redundant witchtar rrfety diririoar rhould be orparated from each other bf bmrrictr with a 3-hour fire tatiw. Automatlc fire detector8 rhould aIam and annunciate in the control room m d alarm locally.
Crblca entcrirq the rwitchacat room that do not tcminatt or perform a function there rhould be kept at a mininu t o mininize the comburtlblr lobdixq.
Thema roo" rhould not be ured for my othsr purpore.
Pltc hors atationr and portable f i r t utlnguirhcti nhould be readily avail8ble outride the area.
Equiprent 8hOUld be located t o facilitate aceem for manual fire fi&htiw. Drain8 rhould be provldtd tn durrglw mfety-rrlsted equiprent (ICE R I T A 92n, "Waterproofing urd Draining of Floor8").
Ptmote m u a l l y actuated rtntilation ihould be provided for vcntiw mokc vhtn manum1 fire dgpprcmioa effort 10 needed (see Poritior, C. 5. f ).
'. prrrtnt water accrrulatloa from Satty i r t t d awitcusrr ir located in the ahutoba board roDp. on elevation8 593 and 621 o f ereh Etrctor B u i l d i w and on tlevrtfonn Sa5 lad 583 of the unit 3 dlercl 6eficrator buildi-.
The ahutdown board rooma in ths Reactor Buildi-8 arc not adjacent.
reparated froa other plant ate18 by batzlerr hariw 3-bout fire rerirtrncc ratiwr. The rhutdovn board rooma in the unit 3 dlrrcl 8cartator building ate adjacent, They are reparated from other plant are18 by P-hour firt rated barrier. m d from eLch othtt by 1-1/2 hour fi;c rated barrfera.
They are Coaburtiblc l o a d i w from cabler tattrim the r v l t c ~ t r r room a d not terminating hao been taken intc account la the Fire Eazardr Analyrim.
a Fire horc rtationr and fire cxtin&uirherr arc available outaidc t abutdown board room.
Drain. are provided on elc*ationa 593 urd 621 of the Reactor B u l l d i a a in order to provide drainaae for the Shutdown Board Room, i f water from manual f l r t iupprcirion aetivitles rcctlarulrtcr.
The mhutdown board rooms have acprrrte exhaust fan8 which can be urcd for v c n t i w amokc. The fans cmn be controlled ~anually from a remote lacation, Por*able raoke ejectors ern ala0 be urcd to remove smoke.
-100-PtDK*.r,:
I 0 b 087-108
Smoke dctectorr ate mounted a t the c c i l l q in the rhutdoun board roo-in the Unit 3 Ditrel Cenarrtor B u i l d i u urd in ventilation ductwork for the Shutdown Board Rooma in the Reactor Buildin$..
Area coverage deteetorr 4rt not provided for Shutdown Board Roo" fa the Errctor Builditus. Thc detcctorm for the Shutdown Board R o w in th8 Unit 3 Dierrl Generator Buildiw ala-locally and in the Control Eoou, The drtrctorr located In the Reactor Buildingr Board P o o u ventilation ductwrk alarm only in the Control Poor.
Arc4 vide detection covsrrge l a planned for Unit. 1, 2, rad 3 rhutdown board rooma.
Alro, detection cortra&t will be provided in Unit 3 Diemal Shutdown Board Rooas, Refer t o Fire Protection Upgrade Pro8r.m for detail..
The fire-rated compartmentation and fire protection feature8 provided enrurci that r a f s rhutdovll capability can be maintained during a d after a fire.
Detailed Flre Hmzardr Analyrlr ia provided in Ecfrrcncc 1.
-101-PLDKElQb 087-109
Redundant safety-rtlrted pinelr remote from the control room complex rhould be reparated from arch other by barriers haviw a minim-fire ratin& of 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />. Panela providing remota rhutdown crpability nhould be separated fora ths control room complex by barrier8 h a v i u a m i n i m fire rating of 3 houra.
ahtatdown capability ahould be clectrically lmolrted from the control room complex so that I fire in either area will not affect.butdown capabillty from the other art..
&enera1 area houalry remote safety-related pulela should be provided with rutomat!ic fire detectors that alarm locally m d alarm and urnunciatc in the control room.
Conbuotfble natsrialr should be controlled and limited t o those required for operation.
Portable utlruuirherr m d u n u i l hone rtationn rhould be rtadily available in the sencral area.
Pantln providing rtmote The PLDhT 1 06 087-110 Safe rrhutdom panels located remote from the control room are provided to oafely rhut down the plant for I portulated fire in the control room complex, There remote panelo arc concidcrtd a8 providirq a l t t m a t i v t shutdown capability In accordance with 10CFRfO Appendix E,Section III.G.3, and are atparated by 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> barriers from the control room complex, The plnclr art 4 h O clectrically iaolatcd from control room complex so that a flrt in either rea vi11 not defeat shutdown capability from the other area.
When required by Appendix R Section III.G, fire detection is provided in the areal containing the rtmotc pantla. In other arcan contriaing rrfety-relattd pantle the BFlp Fire Hazard Analyoie was used t o
o determine the need for fire detection and rupprenrfon.
The shutdown board rooms containing the remote ahutdoun panels are provided vith smoke dztcctors mounted in the room'r ventilatton ductwork. The detectors alarm locally and in the control rooms.
Rote that pl-8 arc currently underway to provfdt u t a wide detection coverajic in a11 areas containing remote shutdovn panela.
Refer t o the Fire Protection Upgrade Program for details.
- 102-
Safety-related battery room8 ohould be protected againat f irrr urd u p l O D i O a 8.
Battery room rhould be reparated from each other and other arm. of the pllnt by brrrlatr having a m i n i m fire r r t i m of three hour8 inclurivc of a11 penstratioar uid opmingr.
DC rvitchgear and invtrters uhauld not be located in there battery rooan. Automatic fire detection ohould be provided to alarm and lnnunciatt in the control room and alarm locally.
Venti18tion 6yotePu in the battery toom8 rhould be capable of maintaining the hydro6cn concentrrtioa well bc'.ow 2 percent by volmc, Loar of ventilation ihould be alomcd la the control row.
Sttndpipe and hore md portable utlnguirhcro ohould be readily available outride the roop.
- mEy=-,- PLDKEIO6 1 u -
087-111 Ttmrient comburtiblcr are controlled by the Firc Protection Administrative Program, A t t a c h c a t C (Reference 2).
Firc uctinguirhcrr and horc station8 w e rcrdily avallablc in the areas conteiniru remote paneln.
The three safety-related battery r o o m are located on elevation 593 of the Control Buildin&.
They arc reparated from each other and from other aream of the Control Buildiw by barriera having minlmtm f i r e rrtiw of 1-hour. The 1-hour fire rated barrier6 will be erprhlc of withrrurdiw the cxpoaure combuntibla loadin& on tither side of the brrrierr. The Control Bulldin8 is reparated from the Reactor and Turbine Bufldium by 3-hour fire-rated barriers.
fire i n V O l V i w tht mUiM 8ntiCiQrted There are no irivcrtcrr or DC rvitchgcar in the battery room.
Inverters and DC 8 W i t C t u e r r are inatallad in battery board room adjacent to the bat:ery rocmi and are in the a m t f i r e mrtas.
-103-
The Turbine Building rhould be rrpatatad from adjacent ItruCtUrer
-. eontainiw rrfctg-related equipment by a fire barrier with minian rating of 3 hourr. The fire bartierr rhcruld be integrity even in the event of a complete collaple of the turbine structure, Opcnius and penetrrtlonr in the fire barrier ahould bt minimized and rhould not bt located where the turbine oil. mystem or generator hydroam coolin# 8yrtt.m trtrtcn 8 direct fire exposure hazard t o tht barrier.
Conridering the reverity of the fire b z i f d i, dcfenre in depth may dictate additional protection to ensure barrier integrity.
deritntd BO 88 ^,O M i U t a h 8 t N C t U r r l Automatic Moke detection and ruwally operated rptinlclrt l y r t m ~ r art provided in there toome.
There "eke dttrctota r1.m in the control room, but do not alarm locally. Refer Eo the Fire
?rotaction Upgrade Provrca for details of the detection ryrtsr upgrade in the Battery Room, The ventilation r y r t w are capable of maintainfw the h y d r o a m concentration belov two percaat by volupe.
Lorn of ventilation i 8 rlarued ia the control room provldiw rtatur of the battery rOOI d ¶ 8 U D t fm.
Bore connection8 a d fire ucinguiaherm are readily available outaide thtrc room8.
The wall8 rcparrtir~ the Turbine bulldim from the Control m d Reacto Buildingo arc 3-hour fire-rated brrrfcrr.
The Turbina Buildixq, the cable tunnel to the Intake Praplnl Station, and the Raduarta Building are 8cpar8tcd from each other by non-fire-related barriers and art trerttd a8 bciry in the same fire area in the Fire flrtardr wnd Safe Shutdown Arialyrir (Pcferrncc 1).
The fire bartierr reparating the Turbfne B u l l d l ~ from the Control and Ptactor BuildiaJa art deriantd to maintain rtructurrl intearity In event of complete collaprc of the turbine mtructurc.
The fire barrier wall is constructed to a c t as a ohear wall.
Openln&r in thc8c barriers are not locattd in the imediete vicinity of the turbine lube cil ayBtem or the hydrogsn cooling ryrttm.
PLDKE 10 6 087-112
Dieael i m c r a t o t r ohould be separated from each other and from other 4mar of the plant by fire brrricrr haviry, 4 minilrum fire rcrlrtlnct mtiw of 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />..
Fixed water rpray ryrtePr arc inatrlled to protect the following hrtardr:
(1) Hydroam real o i l unitr (2) Reactor feed pmp turbine o i l tmnko (3)
Turbine head endr (4)
Turblac o i l rercrvolrr (5) Cable pcnstrrtlonr from rprcrding room.
Carbon dioxide ruppremrion ryrtem8 are inrtclled to protect the following hazard areal:
(1) Permanent rotord rtoraRe room (2)
Lube o i l purification room Fire detection lr'pxov~bmd over the A ~ ~ i l l ~ r y Boilrrr anUs3tnb the cable tunnel t o the Intake -ping Station.
Fire extiwuirherr m d horc conncctlonr are inrtall8d in rrriaur arm8 of the Turbine Bulldity.
See a180 S t c t i o a r C,S.d(l) and C.S,c(2).
Thtrc nrc two m&-paratc Dlcmel Generator diemel generator. each, Tht Dltrtl Generator Bulldiry for Unit.
1 urd 2 i r located ou th5 wcrt ride of the Unit 1 Reactor Buildiw.
Buildi-8 Coatrrnim f Q U t met#tnCy 5 -
PLDKElCG 087-113
Automatic fire ruppreosion ohould be inrtalltd to combat m y dicrel generator or lobricatfng o i l fires; ruch ryrtema rhould be deuianed for operation when the diesel in runnin8 without affecting the d i t o t l.
Automatic fire detection rhould be provided to alarm md umuncirtc in the control roop and alarm locally. Booe rtationr and portable extinguisherr rhould be readily avrilable outride the m e a. Drainage for fire fightisg water and meam for local manual venting of amoke rhould be provided.
Day tlnlu vith total capacity up to 1100 #8llOnB are permitted in the ditrcl &enerator area under the folloWia condition.:
(1) The dry tank i8 located in a rcprrrce enclorurt with a minimmn fire raniatmcc rating of 3 hoUrB, including doors or penetrations. Thert
+
I aaclorurai ahauld be caprble of containin8 the entire contantr of the dry tanka and rhould be protected by an automatic fire suppression ryrtem, or (2)
The dry tank ir located inridc the diertl &enerator room in 8 diked enelorure that has rufficient crprcity to hold 110 percent of the contenti of the day tank or ir drained t o a safe 1 oca t ion.
The Dieael Generator B u i l d h i for Unit 3 l a located on the eart ride of the Unit 3 Reactor Building. The Diem1 Ctnrrrtor Bulldirqa are eepararad from rdjrceat buildingr by 3-hour fire-rrttd barricra.
The Dierel Generator Elooau are iCpar4Csd from each other and Croa other room8 within the buildhga by non fire-rattd reinforctd concrtb@d wrllr, All rooma within r riwla Diene1 Generator Building (except the Unit 3 mhutdovn board roomr) are part o f the mame fire area.
Automatic crrb~n dioxide aupprtr~ion ayrtcmr are inotrlled in the diercl 6tntrator room urd fuel oil tranrfcr pmp rooms.
Preactfon rprinklet ryotcms
.re inrtrllcd in the pipe and electric tunnclr outaldc the diesel ~ c n c r r t o t r o o m.
Automatic fire detection 18 provided e the dicrel #enerator room, fuel o i l transfer punp room, and pipe and electric tunnclr for rupprcarion ryrtem actuation. The fire d a m signal fram the pipe m d electric tunnel.
i m tranrmltttd to the control room and round8 a local alarm, The f i r e dettction in tht dicrel &enerator rooms and fuel o i l trrnrfer p m p room.
acturtcn the carbon dioxide oyrtca control logic. The c o x r o l logic actuate8 prc-diachargc alarm8 in the protected rooma.
A carbon dioxide flav alarm provider control room annunclatlona. Rtfcr to the Fire Protection Upgtrdc Program fot dctnils of the detection eyetcm upgrade.
Diertl fuel O i l t-With 8 caprcity greater than 1,100 grillon8 rhould not be located inaide building8 containlry aaftty-related equipment, If abovt-round tanka are uocd, they rhould be located a t least 50 feet from any b u i l d i w containing saftty-related equipment or, i f located within 50 feet, they rhould be hourtd in a acparrtc building with construction having a minimum f i r e renistance r8ting of 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />.
e The diere1 engine colrburtlon rlr intrkce and cxhrurtr are ducted t o the rrylner and arc not irolated vhen the carbon dioxide mupprtrrion aymt-are rctuatcd.
Hovavsr, ventilation cooling air for the 8sacrator rooma i a irolarcd on rctuatlon of the rupprtrrioa iyrtem m d must be rainltlattb t o prevtnt overheating of the electrical acnerator8 and dienel auxiliary equippant.
Horc rtatlom and fire extiryuiohero are rvrilcble outride of the individual diemel generator room.
A h O, the dicrcl senttator room doorr to the outride could be opentd t o m a b l r hole rtreama from hydrrntr to be umed.
There doorr can rlro be urcd to drnin water m d vent amok@
The dienel futl O i l dry tank8 8 r a 550 8allon capacity.
Curb8 arc provided at the tntrmce to each room from the pipe and alectric Lunnmln.
The firt-rated campartmantation and fire protection feature8 provided for the Dirael Cenerrtor Bulldinla vi11 amrure that mafe rhutdorn crprbility in maintained during md after 4 f i r e.
The d i m e l fuel Oil.tOra&c t 8 n k S art embedded In the concrete floors beneath the two Dierel Generator Buildings.
Tha tanka contain a reven day rupply of fuel oil for the dicrel gtncratorr.
Additional fuel rtora8e I8 provided In the yrrd.
Twa 71,000 gailon tanks arc located over 50 feet from the powerhoum complex. Oil s p i l l s from the tanka will be contained by a berm around the tanka. Ho automatic f i r e supprcssion is provided for thcee tanks, 7-
ruairiun cm!xl 9.5-1 COHPARISOH Potential o i l rpillr ohould be confined or directed away from buildingr containing eafety-related equlpmcnt.
Totally buried tlnlsr are acceptable outiide or under buildi-s (ace WPA 30, "Flamrble and Combustiblt Liquids Coden, for addition p~idance),
Above-ground tanks ohould be protected by an automatic firt supprcrsioa rystem.
- k. m e t v -
Pump hOU6C8 and r o o m hourin# redundant aafcty-related pmp traiar rhould be reparated from each other and from other artam of the plant by fire barrierr having at leart 3-hour ratinga. There room rhould be protected by aetombtic fire detection md mupprrrsion unleor 8 fire hazards analyaim cm demonstrate that a fire vi11 not endanger other rafet3-related equipment required for rafe plant
- *. rhutdown:
Fire detection rhould alarm lad annunelate in the control room and alarm locally.
Hone rtationr and portablr extinguirherr ahould be readily rccearible.
Floor drains ahould be provided t o prevent vater accumulation from Position C.5...(14)).
Adamaging mrfcty-related equipment (ace Provioione should be made for manual control of the ventilation syatem to facilitate smoke removal if required for manvnl fire fighting operation (see Position C.5.f).
In gtneral, arfcty-rtlatcd pumps at BFN are not houocd in reparatc rooms enclored in 3-hour fire rrttd barrlcrn. lhomc pmpm that.re required for rsfc rhutdown d u r i u and bfter fire are reparated in acca:dancc vith the requirements in 1OCFPSO Appendix El, Section 1II.G.
When rtqtiire by Section I1I.G..
fire ruppreriion a d detection will be provided in the arcam vhcrt the rrfc mhutdom pmpi ate located.
In othe area8 containin4 rafety-related pumps the BFN Fire Hazard Anrlytis was used to determine the need for f i r e detection mQ augpreasion.
Hose stations and fire extinguishers art available in all artam containing safe ty-tela t ed pumpo.
See the reaponac t o Sections C.S.a.(ll) and C. 5. f for dircueaiona on drains and emokc removal respectively.
a
-108-PLDNElO6 087-116
Hand portable extinguishers rhould be located within this urea.
Alro, hore atrtiona should be located outside but within hooc reach of thio area.
Automatic f i r s detection rhould alarm and annunciate in the control room and alarm locally, Comburtibltr rhould be 1Pmittd to a minLmutP in tho ntv fuel area.
provided vith a drainage system to preclude rccumulation of water, The atorage area rhould be The rtorage configuration of new fuel nhould always be EO maintained a# to preclude criticality for m y vater density that might occur durifq f i r e water application.
Protection for the rpent fuel pool area rtationr and portable u t i n g u i r h t r e.
Automatic fire detection rhould be provided to &lam and.nnunciatt in the control room and t o alarm locally.
.should be provided by local bore Fire barricre, automatic f i r e aupprcsaion and detection, and ventilation controls should be provlded.
Fire extinguishers art located outaide and near the new fuel rtorage vrult hatches. Hose atationr are a100 located outside, but within reach of these arean.
The fuel areas are not provided wlth a fixed fire detection o y r t m.
Combuatfbltr ate limited to a minimtrm and controlled by rdminiutrativt proccdurcr.
The ntoroat area dralnaic systems precludt the acemulation o f water.
The atorate confi8uration i8 maintained to prccluclc criticality for any water denaity that miiht occur duriru f i r e f lghthu.
Protection f o r the spent fuel pool
&fern in provided by local holrc rtmtioar and fire u t i w u i s h c t a.
There ia no automrtic f i r e detection for the rpent fuel pool arcan.
However, there are no appreciable amount of in-aitu combu8tibler ncr any rafe ahutdown componentr in the area.
The rpcnt fuel pool area ia alno continuourly monitored by recurity ptteonncl.
- n. gad vaste and D e w n a t i o n A r a a Barrlers vith 3-hour f i r e rating8 are provided between the Radw&otc Building and the Reactor, Control, and Unlt 1 and 2 Dleael Generator Buildlngs.
The Radwastc Building i a separeted from the Turbine and Service Buildings by non fire-rated barriers.
-109-
Storale tanka that rupply water for raft shutdown rhould be procccted from Combwtiblc material. ihould not be
. the affect8 of UI cxporurc f i r e.
otorcd m.:t t o octdoor tmk..
Records rtoraac areas Ehculd be ea locattd md protected that a fire in thtrc areas doc8 not txpoac safety-related myatema or equipment (g2-e Regulatory Guide 1.88, Collection, Storage, And MaLntcnmce of Nuclear Power Qun:ity Assurance Eccord8).
J Tbc~.r art ~
i 3
automatic fire rupprcorion or detection ryotcms in there arcar.
Boveger, there are fire ext!rauishtrs and hore rta:ionm thrt?u&out the RIdvrrtc Building.
The decontamination rrol a t the northvent mide oE the Unit 1 Turbine B u i l d i q doer ncrt have automatic fire
~upprsrrioa or detection ryatcal in this #rea. Fire utiquirhcrr and hore conrectionr arc roaihblc t o thio area.
Neither the tladwrrtc B u i l d i q nor the dtcont.minatioa room contain8 m y 88fety-relrted equipment.
The conricnsrte rtoraac tmk. lOC8tcd outride the erit vall of Unit 3 are w a d 18 Duction path, i f &valla5lc, for the BPCI p-mp operation during safe rhutdovn. Otherwire, the torus (rupptcsrion pool) provide8 the required auction path.
Ilo eombuatiblc arttrial ir r t o t t d adjacent to these tmlu.
Record8 r t o r r & c complies with Regulatory Guide 1.88 with the exception8 noted in the TVA Nuclear Quality Assurance Plan.
-110-P L D E 10 5 087-1lE
Cooling towcr8 rhould be of noncombustible construction or so locuttd and protected that a fire will not advcrrcly affect axxy saftty-related aystcma o r equipment.
Cooling towera should be of noncombustible construction when the basin8 are uned for the ultimate heat m l d r or for the fire protection water rupply.
P. -
fli8cellmoour area8 such 6s rhopm, wareh0u~e8, muriliary boiler toom, fuel o i l tanka, mLi flammable and combustible liquid starage trllka should be no located urd protected that a f i r e or effects G f a fire, includlng amoke, will not adverotly affect any mftty-related ayetcma or equipment.
f,.
- 1 The cooling towcrn are of combustible construction, but arc well separated from rafety-related areas of the plant.
A-fire in any of the cooling towers would not &dveritly affect m y safety-related 8y8ttmr or equipment.
The b8oin8 of the cooling tower8 are not uaed for the u l r i m t e heat rink ar for the f i r e protection water supply.
~ i s ~ c l l a n c o u r aream ruch a 1 mhopn, wkmhouaem, fuel o i l tmnkr, and fla"blc and combustible liquid storage tanks are well ecparatild from arens containing safety-related equipment. The auxiliary boilers are located in the Turbine Building near cable trayr containing cables for a
.ingle train of 8afety-related equipment.
A Cite in the auxiliary boiler area w i l l, not prevent ehfc mhurdovn of the plant.
1-
? L E K 1 D 6 087-119
>-GAL
'rOSI!ZOW 9.5-1 00(PIPISOE1 Gar cylinder storage location8 rhould not be in area.
that contain or expose rafety-related equipment or the fire protection 1y8tam that serve those rhould be required to uoc thir equipment in rafety-related areas of the plant (also see Poaition C.2).
.8ftty-rel.t8d 8 r t l O.
A ptm!t I Y P t m Unused loa exchange rerina ohould not be stored In area8 thrt contaln or expose eafcty-related equipment.
- 1 1 2 -
Tht ga8 cylindtt m i f o l d 8 of acetylene and oxygen for the.hop.
in the Service Building are located outride the north wall of the buildla.
There aurifolds are protected by vater apray ryatcru actuated by thermal detectors, Ihcac
&rea8 do not expose any saftty-related equi parent.
The bulk storage of acetylene and oxygen cylinderr are located o u t r i d e the north wall of the Power Stores Builn'ng ~ n d do not urpoac any safety-related equipment.
Iht Fire Protection Administrative Pro&ram require. a permit byrtem t o bc i.?pltmenttd prior to uaing a &an cylinder in a r u s that contain eaftty-relmtcd eguipawnt.
Unurcd ion exchange reains in eafcty-related areas are controlled by the Fire Protection Adminiotrativc Program (Reference 2).
Eatrtdoua chcmicalr mhould not be atorcd iE artam that contain or expose raftty-related equipment.
Hrtcriala thRt collect and contala rndinactioity much an npeat ion CKC-S remini, charcoal filtcrr, and nPAfilter8 8hould be rtored in clomed k t a l tanka or contalncra that ere located ita area8 free from ignition ibources or combumtfbler. There aterlalm rhould be protected from exporurc to firer in adjacent arean an well.
requirement. for removal of dtcap heat from entrained radioactive materials.
Conrideration rhould be 8ive.n to A f i r s on elevetion 621 in the Reactor Building (an area mere.om@
of the ion cxchuye rerim are kept in m e a l containerr) PIP expome aafcty-related equiparent; however, both train8 of red-andant 8rfC ohutdown 8 y 8 t m VI11 not be dlargjcd duz t o the effectr of a fire.
Hrzardoun chemicalm (reactive, combustible, or fllrarblc) are not rtored in area. that contain refety-related cquipent.
Transient cmburtiblea are controlled in accordance with Fire Protection Administrative Progr-(Reference 2).
Xaterialr th8t collect m d cmtafn radioactivity are rtored in closed Metal containerr in a n a s free Piom i w i t i o n iourtem and combustibles.
Decay nFat fro3 entrained materials was conmidcred in the dtnlan of the equipQtnt used t o process radioactive wantee.
3-PL3NE 10 6 06 7 - 1 i. 1
9.5-1 C0)TpARISMI
- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
6.
7 "
- a.
- 9.
10
- 11.
- 12.
- 13.
- 14.
- 15.
- 16.
- 17.
- 18.
- 19.
Fire Protection Report - - Volmc 2 0 Fire Protection Plan Fire Hazards Anal a i r 4 Safe Shutdown A&ir Wit 2 - Appendix L Safe Shutdown Proiraa Pire Protection Report - Volume 2
@ F i t + Protection Adminiotratioe Programs 8 Fire Emet&ency Rcrponrt Organization and Pre-Fire Plana Firc Protectioa Report - VoltPPe 3 Branch Technical Porition CKEB 9.6-1 Compariuon Fire Protection Uparrdc Program Comburtible Loadixq Tablea Standard 12.5 - Fire Protection TVh Firt Recovery Plan, Revision 6, April 9, 1976 Criteria for fire urd prcamurt real8 BFX-50-799
%:%it-47W391-Scrier (Penetration r e d detail8 baaed on PRmiiTEC ifre rcrtr).
Ome a Poin: Laboratorlea, "Full-Scale 3-Hour Test1 of Internal Coduit Smoke and Gaa Seuls", June 29, 1989, (pIns322 890fOf 202 and 1322 a90720 no).
Calculations "Firc Evaluation of D ell Polyurethane Foam Liner",
Im-QO303 -890b01, (RIAS, 822 890120 %).
"Cable Tray PemtratiOn S e d EV8lU8ti0na, (PrW B22 911010 006).
Safety Fvaluation for BCA L1854.
"Flooding m d Drainage Braluatfon Due to Dilrchar e from Fixed Water Sprinkler and Bore Statiom", (RIM B22 890630 Ob).
SS? 12.1, "Conduit of Operationsm "A pcndix El, Etati Vcntilrti, and Air Conditioning Review",
Cafculrtion lW-Q29818SO166, Pe%ion
- 1.
IS2 LKEBm90025 "CO Discharge Timer !& P u i n t ~ " ~
?RIPS 822 900503 0033.
CO W0396D.
Prcscrure Relief Damperr Modification, DCHs W0251DI W0252D, and Calculation KD-Q0026-696024, "Appendix P Suppression Damage Evaluation",
management Directive KO-210 - Fire P:otection.
S i t e Standard Practice SSP 12.7 - ilousckteping/'J.'cmporary Equipment Control.
"Conduit Fire Electric Power tl. Kamlnksy t o Protection Research Pro ram", Conducted by Wiacansin Compiny Lcttcr dated 5 anuary 2 9, 1990, from Originai Funding Participants.
-114-PLDPlE 10 6 087-122
E 3
F i n rratectim Upgrade Progrrs The April G, 1986 Fire Protection Report submittal had a supplement which contained a Fire Protection Up~rad? List. n i s Fire Protection Upgrade list contained 52 projectr. I%c scope of t h i s list included the entire Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant r i t e and was t o provide complete and inttgrattd fire protection efsttm for the plant considering NRC and NFPA guidelines and insurance company and utility industry standard practicer.
The list below nhows all projects that TVA i6 comaittiag to the NRC with the rtnit/cycle outage scheduled implnatntation.
Those project6 not included in the list have bem evaluated by TVA and determined to be acceptable in their existing configuration to ~atisfy safe shutdown requir-ts.
The deleted projecte previously submitted as "to be dctcrmiatd" rtatcd that there project8 will be evaluated for inclusion in t h e BFN integrated schedule.
TVA will continue to pu*:6uc this course of action and each fire protection project will be evaluated on a case by case basis per the Masters fssuer List.
An c c m m i c evaluation will be performed and then there projects will be ranked with all other potential projects by the BFN Change Control Board. TVA will then wGrk all projects in ranked order that can be financed by the available annual 1.,
budget.
The following projects art caunitted to by N A with specified Qjstsgcs for implementation.
- 1.
Unit 3 Reactor Building - Automatic Sprinkler Upgrade -
h i t 3 Cycle 5B 2.
Unit 2 Reactor Building - Automatic Sprinkler Upgrade -
Unit 2 Cycle 6
- 3. h i t 1 Reactor Building - Automatic. Sprinkl2r Upgrade -
h i t 1 Cycle 6 4,
Install Central Fire Alarm Panel in Units 1 and 2 Control Room -
Unit 2 Cycle 6 5.
Unit 3 Reactor Building - Upgrade Fire DetectionIAlarm -
h i t 3 Cycle 5B
- 6. Unit 1 Reactor Building - Upgrade Fire DetectionIAlarm -
Unit 1 Cycle 6 7,
Unit 2 ReactGr Building - Upgrale Fire Detection/Alarm -
Unit 2 Cycle 6 Page 2
- 8. Install Cmtral Fire Alarm Panel in Unit 3 Control Room -
Unit 2 Cycle 6 9.
Upgrade Unit 3 Cantrol Rom Fire Detection - Unit 3 Cycle 5B
- 10.
Unit 3 Dlesel Generator Building - Fire Detection/Alarm Upgrade -
Unit 3 Cycle 5B
- 11.
Unit6 1 and 2 Diesel Generator Building - Fire ktection/Al8m Upgrade - h i t 2 Cycle 6
- 12.
Cmtrol Building - '3pgrade Fire Dztection/Alarm and Suppression -
Unit 2 Cycle 6
- 13.
Upgrade Units 1 and 2 Control Room Fire lktcction -
h i t 2 Cycle 6 I&. Cable Spreading Room A - Fire Dettction/Alarm Upgr8dt -
Unit 2 Cycle 4
- 15.
Cable Spreading Room B - Fire DttectionIAlarm Upgrade -
Unit 3 Cycle 5B
- 16. Intake Pump Station - Upgrade Fire Dctection/Alarm System -
Unit 2 Cycle 6
- 17.
Cable Spreading Room A - Suppression System Upgrade -
Unit 2 Zyelc 6
- 18.
Unit 3 Cycle SB Cable Spreading Room B - Suppression System Upgrade -
FIRE PROTecTION UPGRME PROGRAn
- 1.
Sprinkler System Upgr8dc:
The purponr of thir prwjtct is to upgrade the exirting automatic nprinktler ryrtemr in s8fety related area# of the plant to brina them in conformance with National Fire Protection A8rociation (NFPA) code rcquiracatr. The upgradcr may involve inotallatian of new piping, aprinklcr headr, v61vss. and air supervirion; cxtcnrion of existing Byatens to provide area wide coverage including below obstruction ccverage; inrtallation of water ccrtainr around c q u i p t n t hatch and st8lrwcll opening.;
and neccsrary Iwdificstionr to ensure adequate water Irupply to meet upgraded nystwr demand.
The rprinkler upgrade. will >e performed in accordence with current editions of NFPA 13, NFPA 16A and NFPA 231/231C an applicable.
Additional guidance fror full w a l e f i r e teBt rerulta will be utilized to adercrr unique hazard occupancies ruch an cable spreading rami.
Some of the significant deficiencies identified in the cxieting spatema include:
Improper rprinkler head locatlwn Non-lirted equipr"/canpunento Poor sprinkler head coverage Hiering air supervirion, omall orifice heads, t t c.
e,.
The sprinkler aystcnr in the followin8 safety-related areas are planned to be upgraded.
Unit 1 Reactor Building Unit 2 Reactor Building Unit 3 Reactor Building Cable Spreading R o o m 8 A and B Intake Prsp Statim Note: The sprinkler syi3ten upgrades in Unit 2 Reactor Building were completed a6 part of the Appendix R compliance program during the Unit 2 Cycle 5 outage.
Additionally. it is inttnded to replace the existing !.oca!ized spray system protection for the HPCI pumps with a sprinkler sys'lem providing area wide coverage.
The HPCI pump r o w upgrade for h i t s 1 and 3 will be included 46 part of their sprinkler Rystem upgrade. The new system w i l l provide improved fire protectior as well as eliminate problems associated with inadvertent actuations.
The existing preaction sprinkler systems in t h e Intake Pump Stations, where redundbnt safe shutdown circuits are l o c a t e d, generally neets the HFFA-13 requil.ement6.
Hawever, i t lacks a i r supervision. The Intake Pum? Stationti sprinkler u p g r a k e Invol E F the additiorr of eir fiupervision t o the exiqting system.
Page 4
- 2.
Fire Al8m and Detection System Upgrade The purporc of thir project i6 to replace the cxiating f i r e detection and alarm rystem i n rafety-related arear of the plant with a microprocessor bared electrically rupervired cyat-utiliting addttrrablc (inttlli#mt) detectarr and manual pull mtaiionr, microprocearor bared 1x.l fire alarm control purelr and Central Proccrriag b i t (CPU).
d e r i p rcguiracntl:
The new ryater rhall meet the followin8
- a.
- b.
C.
- d.
The Initiating m i c e Circuitr (IDcr) rhall be connected to the Local fire Alarm Pantlr in acTordmcc with the rcquiremntr of WFPA 70, Vationml Electric CDde.: Article 760, "Fire Protection S i p l i n g Syatcu." The ryrter rhall w e t. the m i n i "
parformmnee requirclrmtr of a utyle "D" in 8ccordmncc with the rtquirclartr of W P A 72. Table 2-6.1,
'*Px'Pormancc Capacitiea of Initiating Device Circuits (IN)."
for the required pcrforuanct capaeiticr.
The Indicating Appliance Circuits (LAC#) for alarm bell#, horns, and light. aha11 be wtylc "2" in accordance with the t e q u i r a m t r of NFPA 72, Table 6 4, "Performance Capabilitica of Indicating Appliance 760,** Fire Protective Signaling Systems."
IACa not connected to a central ruperpimory rtation rhall conform to the rtyuircrenti of NFFA 70, Article 800, "C-iclrtion Circuits."
Wiring for All mipaling line circuitr (SIX) (i.e., from local control panclr to central fire rtatiun) m d f r a local c m t r o l pantls to addreosnble mdules for initiating dwicea rhall meet the minimum performance rcquirerrnti of utylc "6" in accordance with NFPA 72, Table 2-7.1,
- 'Perforaancc arrd Capacities of Signaling Line Circu! ts."
The Central Fire Alarm Stationr ahall be designed in accordance with NFPA 72, Chapter 9, "Proprietary Protective Signaling Systems" and meet the provieions of NFPA 70, Article e "Commmication Circuits.
Some of the significant deficiencies identified in the existing systems include the following:
Tie aiystems do not meet the NFPA 72 and 72E code, for detection tallat at ion, supervision, ctc.
's
.'f"?a wide coverage is n o t provided.
e PLi,eplacement parts are difficult t o obtain due to sge of the t.:w tems.
The new f i r e alarm and detection syoKea shall be provided for the following areas:
h i t 1 Reactor Building Unit 2 Reactor Building h i t 3 Rtactor Building Control Building (including Cable Spreading Rooms)
Unit* 1/2 Dicrcl Generator Building h i t 3 Dicrcl Generator Building Intake Pmp Station b
I 3: