ML18178A024

Enclosure 9: Changed UFSAR Pages (Non-Proprietary)

ML18178A024
Person / Time
Site:	07201042
Issue date:	06/14/2018
From:	Orano USA, TN Americas LLC
To:	Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards
Shared Package
ML18178A029	List: ML18178A017 ML18178A018 ML18178A020 ML18178A021 ML18178A022 ML18178A023 ML18178A024 ML18178A025
References
E-51535
Download: ML18178A024 (38)

Text

Enclosure 9 to E-51535 CoC 1042 Amendment 1, Revision 1 UFSAR Changed Pages (Public Version)

NUHOMS EOS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 01/18 June 2018 Revision 1 72-1042 Amendment 1 Page 1-3 x

Three EOS-89BTH DSC basket designs. Basket Types 1 through 3 correlate with the respective HLZC 1 through 3 (Figure 2 of the Technical Specifications [1-7]).

Each of these basket types also allows for three levels of boron loading in the poison plates (Low, Moderate, and High).

EOS 89BTH Basket Types Neutron Poison Loading Option Type 1 (HLZC 1 max. 43.6 kW)

Type 2 (HLZC 2 max. 41.6 kW)

Type 3 (HLZC 3 max. 34.44 kW)

M1-A (Low B-10)

A1 A2 A3 M1-B (Moderate B-10)

B1 B2 B3 M2-A (High B-10)

C1 C2 C3 The criticality evaluations in Chapter 7 refer to the basket types based on the boron content in the poison plates. In Chapter 7, the references to the basket types differ from the above table. The correlations between the basket types used in Chapter 7 and basket types identified in the above table are clarified below:

EOS-37PTH basket types A1, A2, A3, A4H, A4L, and/or A5 are identified as EOS-37PTH basket type A in Chapter 7 EOS-37PTH basket types B1, B2, B3, B4H, B4L, and/or B5 are identified as EOS-37PTH basket type B in Chapter 7 EOS-89BTH basket types A1, A2, and/or A3 are identified as EOS-89BTH basket type M1-A in Chapter 7 EOS-89BTH basket types B1, B2, and/or B3 are identified as EOS-89BTH basket type M1-B in Chapter 7 EOS-89BTH basket types C1, C2, and/or C3 are identified as EOS-89BTH basket type M2-A in Chapter 7 The thermal evaluation in Chapter 4 refers directly to the HLZC instead of using the basket types.

Provisions have been made for storage of up to eight damaged fuel assemblies in lieu of an equal number of intact assemblies placed in cells located in the EOS-37PTH basket as shown in Figures 1F and 1H of the Technical Specifications.

Damaged fuel assemblies are defined in Section 1.1 of the Technical Specifications [1-7].

The EOS-37PTH DSC is also designed to accommodate up to a maximum of four compartments with failed fuel, placed in cells located at the outer edge of the DSC as shown in Figures 1F and 1H of the Technical Specifications. Failed fuel is defined in Section 1.1 of the Technical Specifications [1-7].

All Indicated Changes are in response to OBS 8-2

Proprietary and Security Related Information for Drawing EOS01-1010-SAR, Rev. 2B Withheld Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.390

Proprietary and Security Related Information for Drawing EOS01-1020-SAR, Rev. 1A Withheld Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.390

NUHOMS EOS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 01/18 June 2018 Revision 1 72-1042 Amendment 1 Page 2-5 Spent Fuel to Be Stored 2.2 The NUHOMS EOS System is designed to accommodate pressurized water reactor (PWR) (14x14, 15x15, 16x16 and 17x17 array designs) and boiling water reactor (BWR) (7x7, 8x8, 9x9 and 10x10 array designs) fuel types and reload assemblies that are available for storage. As described in Chapter 1, there are two DSC designs for the NUHOMS EOS System: the EOS-37PTH DSC for PWR fuel and EOS-89BTH DSC for BWR fuel. The EOS-37PTH DSC is designed to accommodate up to 37 intact PWR FAs with uranium dioxide (UO2) fuel, zirconium-alloy cladding, and with or without control components. The EOS-37PTH DSC is also designed to accommodate up to eight damaged FAs or up to four compartments with failed fuel, with the balance intact FAs. The EOS-89BTH DSC is designed to accommodate up to 89 intact BWR FAs with UO2 fuel, zirconium-alloy cladding, and with or without fuel channels. Specifications for the fuel to be stored in the NUHOMS EOS System are provided in Technical Specifications (TS) Sections 2.1 and 2.2.

The cavity length of the DSC is determined for a specific site to match the FA length used at that site, including control components (CCs), as applicable. Both DSCs store intact, including reconstituted and blended low enriched uranium (BLEU), FAs as specified in Table 2-2, Table 2-3 and Table 2-4. Any FA that has fuel characteristics within the range of Table 2-2, Table 2-3 and Table 2-4 and meets the other limits specified for initial enrichment, burnup and heat loads is acceptable for storage in the NUHOMS EOS System. Damaged and failed fuel that meet the characteristics detailed in Table 2-2 and PWR fuels in Table 2-4 are also acceptable for storage in the EOS-37PTH DSC in the appropriate compartments as shown in Figures 1F and 1H of the Technical Specifications [2-18].

The maximum allowable assembly average burnup is limited to 62 GWd/MTU and the minimum cooling time is two years. Dummy FAs and reconstituted FAs are also included in the EOS-37PTH DSC and EOS-89BTH DSC payloads. Low enriched or natural uranium fuel rods or unirradiated non-fuel rods are acceptable for storage in an EOS-37PTH DSC and EOS-89BTH DSC as intact FAs.

Fuel assemblies that contain fixed integral non-fuel rods are also considered as intact FAs. These FAs are different than reconstituted assemblies because fuel rods are not replaced by non-fuel rods, rather the non-fuel rods are part of the initial fuel design.

The non-fuel rods displace the same amount of moderator, with zirconium-alloy (or aluminum) cladding and typically contain burnable absorber (or other non-fuel) material. The radiation and thermal source terms for the non-fuel rods are significantly lower than those of the fuel rods since there is no significant radioactive decay source. The internal pressure of the non-fuel rods after irradiation is lower than those of the fuel rods since there is no fission gas generation. The reactivity of the fuel rods (from a criticality standpoint) is significantly higher than that of non-fuel rods. In summary, the mechanical, thermal, shielding, and criticality evaluations for these rods are bounded by those of the regular fuel rods. Therefore, no further evaluations are required for the qualification of these FAs.

OBS 8-2 OBS 8-1

NUHOMS EOS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 01/18 June 2018 Revision 1 72-1042 Amendment 1 Page 2-6 Fuel assemblies are evaluated with five irradiated stainless steel rods per assembly, and 40 rods per DSC. The cooling time is the same as unreconstituted FAs. The reconstituted rods can be at any location in the FAs. There is no limit on the number of reconstituted FAs per DSC; the FAs containing irradiated stainless steel reconstituted rods are modeled in the inner compartments as shown in Figure 6-1 for EOS-37PTH and Figure 6-2 for EOS-89BTH of Chapter 6.

For BLEU fuel the Co-60 activity in the UO2 matrix after irradiation is based on the values shown in Section 6.2.5.

The EOS-37PTH DSC may contain less than 37 FAs and the EOS-89BTH DSC may contain less than 89 FAs. In both DSCs, the basket slots not loaded with FAs may have empty slots or be loaded with dummy FAs. The dummy FAs approximate the weight and center of gravity of an FA.

The NUHOMS EOS-37PTH DSC can also accommodate up to eight damaged FAs placed in the DSC as shown in Figures 1F and 1H of the Technical Specifications [2-18]. Damaged PWR FAs are defined in Section 1.1 of the Technical Specifications [2-18].

The NUHOMS EOS-37PTH DSCs can also accommodate up to a maximum of four compartments with failed fuel, placed in cells located on the outer edge of the DSC as shown in Figures 1F and 1H of the Technical Specifications [2-18]. Failed fuel is defined in Section 1.1 of the Technical Specifications [2-18].

Following loading, each DSC is evacuated and then backfilled with an inert gas, helium, to preclude detrimental chemical reaction between the fuel and the DSC interior atmosphere during storage. Multilayer, double seal welds at each end of the DSC and multi-layer circumferential and longitudinal DSC shell welds ensure retention of the helium atmosphere for the full storage period.

2.2.1 EOS-37PTH DSC The EOS-37PTH DSC stores up to 37 PWR FAs with up to eight damaged FAs or four failed fuel compartments with characteristics as described in Table 2-2 and the PWR FAs listed in Table 2-4. One or more PWR fuel designs are grouped under a PWR class. EOS-37PTH DSC payloads may also contain CCs, such as identified below, with thermal and radiological characteristics as listed in Table 3 and Figure 1A through 1I of the Technical Specifications [2-18]:

Burnable Poison Rod Assemblies Burnable poison rod assemblies (BPRAs),

Burnable absorber assemblies (BAAs),

Wet annular burnable absorbers (WABAs),

Vibration suppression inserts (VSIs),

All Indicated Changes are in response to RSI 8-2

NUHOMS EOS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 01/18 June 2018 Revision 1 72-1042 Amendment 1 Page 2-7 Thimble Plug Assemblies Thimble plug assemblies (TPAs),

Control spiders, Orifice rod assemblies (ORAs),

Control Element Assemblies Control rod assemblies (CRAs),

Rod cluster control assemblies (RCCAs),

Control element assemblies (CEAs),

Axial power shaping rod assemblies (APSRAs),

Peripheral power suppression assemblies (PPSAs),

Flux suppression inserts (FSIs),

Neutron Sources Neutron sources, Neutron source assemblies (NSAs).

Burnable Poison Rod Assemblies Burnable poison rod assemblies are used for one or two cycles and changed out.

They consist of a spider or holddown assembly with burnable poison rods that fit into the guide tubes. The BPRA spider assembly is made of stainless steel with small amounts of Inconel for items such as springs. The burnable poison rods use Zircaloy or stainless steel for cladding, end fittings, and nuts. The burnable poison is a mixture of Al2O3 and B4C or borosilicate glass tubing with B2O3 [2-20]. Burnable poison rod assemblies, BAAs, WABAs, and VSIs are all classified as BPRAs performing a similar function.

Thimble Plug Assemblies Like BPRAs, TPAs consist of a spider assembly with rods extending into the fuel; however, the rods are shorter with the purpose of inhibiting flow to empty guide tubes. These are typically not changed out since they are outside the core zone.

The spider assemblies, orifice rods, nuts, and orifice plugs are all typically made of stainless steel with small amounts of Inconel [2-20]. Thimble plug assemblies also include control spiders and ORAs.

All Indicated Changes are in response to RSI 8-2

NUHOMS EOS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 01/18 June 2018 Revision 1 72-1042 Amendment 1 Page 2-8 Control Element Assemblies Control element assemblies are inserted into guide tubes within a fuel assembly to control the neutron flux. Control element assemblies consist of a spider with individual rods attached at their upper ends that fit inside the guide tubes of the fuel assemblies. This category includes CRAs, RCCAs, CEAs, APSRAs, PPSAs, and FSIs. The spider is stainless steel material. Control rod cladding is stainless steel with stainless steel end plugs, intermediate plugs, and nuts. The control rods neutron absorbers are typically Ag-In-Cd; however, hafnium, aluminum oxide, or B4C are also used [2-20].

Neutron Sources Neutron sources are placed in guide tubes of assemblies on opposite sides of the core. These are held down by a plunger and spring. The source is made of antimony-beryllium, polonium-beryllium, and/or plutonium-beryllium and clad in stainless steel. The upper subassembly consists of an upper fitting, couple, and tube to center the lower assembly in the active zone of the core. The plunger, upper subassembly, cladding, and spacer for the lower assembly are stainless steel [2-20]. The neutron source category includes CCs known as neutron sources or neutron source assemblies (NSAs).

Furthermore, non-fuel hardware that is positioned within the fuel assembly after the fuel assembly is discharged from the core such as guide tube or instrument tube tie rods or anchors, guide tube inserts, BPRA spacer plates or devices that are positioned and operated within the FA during reactor operation such as those listed above are also considered as CCs.

Damaged fuel containing control components may be stored in the designated damaged fuel compartments. Similarly, failed control component debris may be stored in the failed fuel compartments. In both cases, top and bottom end caps must be utilized.

Damaged fuel containing control components as well as failed control component debris may be stored in the damaged/failed fuel compartments within the EOS-37PTH basket with top and bottom end caps.

Control components not explicitly listed herein, but that meet the definition provided above and have similar functional characteristics as those listed above, are also authorized within the DSC.

Figures 1A through 1I of the Technical Specifications [2-18] defines the maximum decay heat, failed/damaged fuel locations, and other parameters for PWR fuel assemblies, with or without CCs, authorized for storage. These tables are used to ensure that the decay heat load of the FA to be stored is less than that as specified in each table, and that the corresponding radiation source term is consistent with the shielding analysis presented in Chapter 6. The maximum weight of a FA plus CC, if applicable, is 1,900 lbs.

All Indicated Changes are in response to RSI 8-2

NUHOMS EOS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 01/18 June 2018 Revision 1 72-1042 Amendment 1 Page 2-9 The heat loads listed in in Figures 1A through 1I of the Technical Specifications [2-18] are the maximum allowable heat loads for each FA and the maximum allowable heat load per DSC. These heat loads can be reduced to ensure adequate heat removal capability is maintained to accommodate site-specific conditions. Some examples of the site-specific conditions are a higher ambient temperature, different blocked vent duration, a requirement to use a different neutron absorber plate or a requirement for a specific coating on the basket steel plates. Each of these changes could result in a change to the inputs of the thermal evaluation utilized in the UFSAR. To ensure that adequate heat removal is maintained with these modified inputs, the bounding evaluations for storage and transfer operations should be re-evaluated. The maximum fuel cladding temperature based on the modified inputs shall be lower than the maximum fuel cladding temperatures listed in the Chapter 4 and Chapter A.4 for the same bounding evaluations.

As limited by their definition, damaged FAs maintain their configuration for normal and off-normal conditions and are confined to their respective compartments by means of top and bottom end caps. Damaged FAs do not contain missing major sub-components like top and bottom nozzles that impact their ability to maintain their configuration for normal and off-normal conditions during loading.

From the standpoint of NUREG-1536 Revision 1, the damaged FAs for the EOS System are more similar to the undamaged FAs, where their geometry is still in the form of intact bundles. For completeness, the failed FAs for the EOS System are more similar to the damaged FAs per NUREG-1536 Revision 1.

The fuel compartment and the top and bottom end caps together form the acceptable alternative, per NUREG-1536 Revision 1 for confinement of damaged and failed FAs. If fuel particles smaller than a pellet are released from the damaged assembly, the top and bottom end caps provide for the confinement of gross fuel particles to a known volume. Note that the EOS-37PTH DSC will provide the retrievability function for damaged and failed FAs per ISG-2, Revision 2.

The structural analysis for damaged fuel cladding described in Chapter 3 demonstrates that the cladding does not undergo additional degradation under normal and off-normal conditions of storage. No structural analysis is performed for failed FAs. The criticality analysis described in Chapter 7 limits the allowable contents for damaged and failed FAs based on worst-case geometry and material reconfigurations under normal, off-normal, and accident conditions. The thermal analysis described in Chapter 4 limits the maximum allowable heat load per DSC storing damaged/failed fuel to be less than that for when storing only intact FAs. The shielding analysis described in Chapter 6 employs the bounding intact fuel source terms conservatively for damaged and failed fuel compartments.

Calculations were performed to determine the FA type that was most limiting for each of the analyses including shielding, criticality, thermal and confinement. These evaluations are performed in Chapter 6, 7, 4 and 5, respectively.

All Indicated Changes are in response to RSI 8-1

NUHOMS EOS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 01/18 June 2018 Revision 1 72-1042 Amendment 1 Page 2-24 CoC 1042 Appendix A, NUHOMS EOS System Generic Technical Specifications, 2-18 Amendment 1.

Updated Final Safety Analysis Report For The Standardized Advanced NUHOMS 2-19 Horizontal Modular Storage System For Irradiated Nuclear Fuel, 72-1029, Revision 6 DOE/RW-0184 Volume 1 of 6, Characteristics of Spent Fuel, High-Level Waste, and 2-20 Other Radioactive Wastes Which May Require Long-Term Isolation, December 1987, U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management.

All Indicated Changes are in response to RSI 8-2

NUHOMS EOS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 01/18 June 2018 Revision 1 72-1042 Amendment 1 Page 6-10 The EOS-DSC baskets are zoned by heat load. Heat load zoning allows hotter FAs, which generally have larger neutron and gamma source terms, to be placed in the inner zones and be shielded by FAs in the outer zone. The EOS-TC108 and EOS-TC125/135 have different heat load zone configurations because the EOS-TC125/135 is more heavily shielded than the EOS-TC108 and can therefore be loaded with stronger sources.

Nine HLZCs are available for the EOS-37PTH DSC and three HLZCs are available for the EOS-89BTH DSC. These HLZCs are defined in the TS, Figure 1A through Figure 2 [6-11]. All HLZCs may be transferred in the EOS-TC125/135, while the EOS-TC108 is limited to PWR HLZCs 2 and 3 and BWR HLZCs 2 and 3. The EOS-HSM may store PWR HLZCs 1 through 6 and all BWR HLZCs.

The bounding HLZCs are used for dose rate analysis. Dose rates are generally larger for higher heat loads, and radial dose rates are dominated by fuel in the peripheral regions. For BWR fuel, it is determined by inspection that HLZC 1 is bounding for the EOS-TC125/135 and HLZC 2 is bounding for the EOS-TC108. For PWR fuel, it is also determined by inspection that HLZC 2 is bounding for the EOS-TC108.

For PWR fuel in the EOS-TC125/135, the bounding HLZC cannot readily be determined by inspection, although the nine HLZCs may be reduced to three candidates based on head load considerations. HLZC 4 has the largest total heat load in the peripheral zone, HLZC 1 has a large heat load in an inner zone, and HLZC 5 has the largest heat load per fuel assembly. Therefore, each of these HLZCs is examined explicitly.

Based on MCNP scoping calculations, HLZC 4 bounds HLZC 1, and HLZC 4 and HLZC 5 result in similar peak dose rates for the EOS-TC125/135 and EOS-HSM.

However, HLZC 4 results in larger average dose rates on the EOS-TC125/135 side surface compared to HLZC 5 because HLZC 4 has the largest heat load in the peripheral zone. Therefore, HLZC 4 is used in design basis PWR calculations for the EOS-TC125/135 and EOS-HSM. Source terms for HLZC 4 are derived for 1.0 kW/FA in Zone 1 and 1.625 kW/FA in Zones 2 and 3 for a total DSC heat load of 52.0 kW.

This bounds the maximum DSC heat load of 50.0 kW.

Note that up to eight damaged or up to four failed PWR FAs are authorized for HLZC 6 and HLZC 8. Source terms are also developed for a damaged/failed fuel HLZC that bounds both HLZC 6 and 8. These source terms are derived for 1.0 kW/FA in Zone 1, 1.5 kW/FA in Zone 2, 1.5 kW/FA for intact fuel in Zone 3, and 0.85 kW/FA for failed fuel in Zone 3. The methodology for developing damaged/failed fuel source terms is the same as used for developing intact fuel source terms.

All Indicated Changes are in response to RSI 6-2

NUHOMS EOS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 01/18 June 2018 Revision 1 72-1042 Amendment 1 Page 6-13 During an EOS-TC accident, it is postulated that the water in the neutron shield is lost.

In this scenario, there is no hydrogenous neutron shield and the neutron dose rate dominates the primary gamma dose rate. Therefore, the burnup/enrichment/cooling time combination that results in the maximum neutron source is used in accident calculations with no neutron shield. In many cases, the normal condition and accident condition sources are the same.

PWR source terms are reported in the following tables:

x PWR sources terms for EOS-TC108 (HLZC 2):

Table 6-10 through Table 6-13 x PWR source terms for EOS-TC125/135 Intact fuel (HLZC 4): Table 6-14 through Table 6-16 Damaged/failed fuel (HLZC 6/8): Table 6-14, Table 6-16a through Table 6-16c x PWR source terms for EOS-HSM (HLZC 4):

Table 6-17 through Table 6-19 BWR source terms are reported in the following tables:

x BWR sources terms for EOS-TC108 (HLZC 2):

Table 6-20 through Table 6-22 x BWR source terms for EOS-TC125/135 (HLZC 1):

Table 6-23 through Table 6-26 x BWR source terms for EOS-HSM (HLZC 1):

Table 6-27 through Table 6-29 In these tables, the raw neutron source computed by ORIGEN-ARP is provided, as well as neutron sources that include neutron peaking factors and subcritical neutron multiplication. These factors are derived in Section 6.2.3. The scaled neutron sources are used in the detailed MCNP dose rate calculations. Only the total neutron source magnitude is reported because the Cm-244 spectrum is used in all dose rate calculations for simplicity because the neutron source is almost entirely due to Cm-244 decay. For example, for the 62 GWd/MTU, 10.25 year cooled PWR source, 95%

of the neutron source is due to spontaneous fission of Cm-244. Cm-244 is also the dominant neutron source for shorter cooling times. For instance, for a 36.178 GWd/MTU, three-year cooled PWR source, Cm-244 represents 97% of the total neutron source. The effect on the neutron spectrum of neutron source isotopes with shorter half-lives, such as Cm-242 and Cf-252, is negligible.

6.2.3 Axial Source Distributions and Subcritical Neutron Multiplication ORIGEN-ARP is used to compute source terms for the average assembly burnup.

However, an FA will exhibit an axial burnup profile in which the fuel is more highly burned near the axial center of the fuel assembly and less burned near the ends. This axial burnup profile must be taken into account when performing dose rate calculations, as the dose rate will typically peak near the maximum of this distribution.

All Indicated Changes are in response to RSI 6-2

NUHOMS EOS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 01/18 June 2018 Revision 1 72-1042 Amendment 1 Page 6-23 Table 6-1 does not include CC masses. For PWR fuel, the CC mass is also included in the plenum and bottom nozzle homo genizations because the CC source is always included in the MCNP models (no CC mass is credited in the active fuel region). As discussed in Section 6.2.4, the CC source is based on the BPRA B&W 15x15 in the top region (Zone 3), BPRA WE 17x17 Pyrex in the plenum region (Zone 3), and TPA WE 17x17 in both the top and plenum regions (Zones 1 and 2). The additional CC mass to be homogenized with the fuel is the minimum masses when comparing these CC types. This results in an additional 2.468 kg SS304 and 0.358 kg Inconel-718 in the top nozzle and an additional 2.85 kg SS304 in the plenum.

For BWR fuel, the mass of the channel is conservatively ignored because the channel may not be present. In the wet models, water with a density of 0.958 g/cm3 fills the void space within the FA. The homogenized PWR fuel compositions are provided in Table 6-43 and Table 6-44 for dry and wet analysis, respectively. The homogenized BWR fuel compositions are provided in Table 6-45 and Table 6-46 for dry and wet analysis, respectively.

Concrete used in the EOS-HSM is modeled without steel rebar at a conservatively low density of 140 pcf (2.243 g/cm3).

6.3.2 MCNP Model Geometry for the EOS-TC Intact Fuel, Normal and Off-Normal Conditions Detailed EOS-TC MCNP models are developed for the following four configurations:

x EOS-TC108 with EOS-37PTH DSC x EOS-TC108 with EOS-89BTH DSC x EOS-TC125/135 with EOS-37PTH DSC x EOS-TC125/135 with EOS-89BTH DSC All Indicated Changes are in response to RSI 6-2

NUHOMS EOS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 01/18 June 2018 Revision 1 72-1042 Amendment 1 Page 6-27 Damaged or Failed Fuel, Normal and Off-Normal Conditions Damaged or failed fuel may be transported in the EOS-37PTH DSC and EOS-TC125/135 using HLZC 6 or 8. Up to eight damaged fuel assemblies may be loaded in Zone 2, or up to four failed fuel assemblies in Zone 3. Damaged and failed fuel may not be present in the same DSC. Damaged or failed fuel is not authorized for storage in the EOS-89BTH DSC or transfer in the EOS-TC108.

All Indicated Changes are in response to RSI 6-2

NUHOMS EOS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 01/18 June 2018 Revision 1 72-1042 Amendment 1 Page 6-28 Accident Conditions Accident models are also developed for the four transfer configurations. In the accident models, the water neutron shield, neutron shield panel, and borated polyethylene bottom neutron shield are replaced with void, and the accident source terms are used. The dose rate is calculated at a distance of 100 m from the EOS-TC.

Ground is modeled to account for ground scatter at large distances.

6.3.3 MCNP Model Geometry for the EOS-HSM Detailed EOS-HSM MCNP models are developed for the following two configurations:

x EOS-HSM-Short with EOS-37PTH DSC x EOS-HSM-Medium with EOS-89BTH DSC The EOS-37PTH DSC and EOS-89BTH DSC models developed in Section 6.3.2 are used in the EOS-HSM models. Consistent with the EOS-DSC models, the Z-axis in the EOS-HSM models is along the length of the EOS-DSC. Because the DSC cavity has been reduced in length to match the length of the fuel, the EOS-37PTH DSC model is shorter than the EOS-89BTH DSC model. Short, medium, and long versions of the EOS-HSM may be used, depending on the length of EOS-DSC to be stored.

The EOS-HSM modeled is the smallest EOS-HSM that fits the EOS-DSC. Therefore, the EOS-HSM-Short is modeled with the EOS-37PTH DSC and the EOS-HSM-Medium is modeled with the EOS-89BTH DSC.

The EOS-HSM features two DSC support structure designs. The original design utilizes I-beams, while an alternate design utilizes a flat plate system. These options do not affect the bulk shielding provided by the EOS-HSM, and the I-beam supports are represented in the MCNP models.

PWR source terms (without CCs) are provided in Table 6-17 through Table 6-19, and the CC source provided in Table 6-37 is added to these PWR source terms for all FAs.

BWR source terms are provided in Table 6-27 through Table 6-29. For the active fuel regions, an axial source distribution is applied per Table 6-30 and Table 6-31 for PWR and BWR fuel, respectively. For the top nozzle, plenum, and bottom nozzle regions, the source is evenly distributed throughout the region.

All Indicated Changes are in response to RSI 6-2

NUHOMS EOS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 01/18 June 2018 Revision 1 72-1042 Amendment 1 Page 6-31 6.4 Shielding Analysis 6.4.1 Computer Codes MCNP5 v1.40 is used in the shielding analysis [6-5]. MCNP5 is a Monte Carlo transport program that allows full three-dimensional modeling of the EOS-TC and EOS-HSM. Therefore, no geometrical approximations are necessary when developing the shielding models.

6.4.2 Flux-to-Dose Rate Conversion MCNP5 is used to compute the neutron or gamma flux at the location of interest and the flux is converted to a dose rate using ANSI/ANS-6.1.1-1977 flux-to-dose rate conversion factors [6-10]. These factors are provided in Table 6-51. Results are computed in the units mrem/hr.

6.4.3 EOS-TC Dose Rates Intact Fuel, Normal and Off-Normal Conditions

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All Indicated Changes are in response to RSI 6-2

NUHOMS EOS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 01/18 June 2018 Revision 1 72-1042 Amendment 1 Page 6-32 Proprietary Information on This Page Withheld Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.390

NUHOMS EOS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 01/18 June 2018 Revision 1 72-1042 Amendment 1 Page 6-33 Proprietary Information on This Page Withheld Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.390

NUHOMS EOS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 01/18 June 2018 Revision 1 72-1042 Amendment 1 Page 6-55 Table 6-14 PWR Source Term for the EOS-TC125/135, HLZC 4/6/8 Zone 1, 1.0 kW/FA (Normal and Accident)

Burnup (GWd/MTU) 33.086 62 33.086 33.086 Enrichment (wt. % U-235) 2.0 3.8 2.0 2.0 Cooling Time (years) 5.00 20.13 5.00 5.00 Gamma Source Term, J/(sec*FA)

Emin, MeV to Emax, MeV Bottom Nozzle In-core Plenum Top Nozzle 1.00E-02 to 5.00E-02 2.168E+11 9.547E+14 1.468E+11 4.999E+10 5.00E-02 to 1.00E-01 1.735E+10 2.705E+14 1.125E+10 9.697E+09 1.00E-01 to 2.00E-01 1.626E+10 1.798E+14 1.055E+10 2.375E+09 2.00E-01 to 3.00E-01 1.067E+09 5.387E+13 6.968E+08 1.170E+08 3.00E-01 to 4.00E-01 3.136E+09 3.493E+13 2.042E+09 1.519E+08 4.00E-01 to 6.00E-01 6.461E+10 3.725E+13 4.206E+10 1.072E+07 6.00E-01 to 8.00E-01 3.483E+10 1.829E+15 2.764E+10 9.512E+08 8.00E-01 to 1.00E+00 1.144E+11 2.667E+13 2.477E+10 6.536E+10 1.00E+00 to 1.33E+00 4.803E+12 3.972E+13 3.109E+12 2.810E+12 1.33E+00 to 1.66E+00 1.356E+12 4.235E+12 8.780E+11 7.935E+11 1.66E+00 to 2.00E+00 7.184E+02 9.029E+10 1.354E+03 3.931E+02 2.00E+00 to 2.50E+00 3.245E+07 4.694E+09 2.101E+07 1.899E+07 2.50E+00 to 3.00E+00 2.773E+04 9.233E+08 1.795E+04 1.622E+04 3.00E+00 to 4.00E+00 8.044E-06 8.009E+07 3.995E-05 6.624E-06 4.00E+00 to 5.00E+00 2.247E-28 2.690E+07 1.463E-28 0.000E+00 5.00E+00 to 6.50E+00 6.475E-29 1.080E+07 4.215E-29 0.000E+00 6.50E+00 to 8.00E+00 8.236E-30 2.118E+06 5.361E-30 0.000E+00 8.00E+00 to 1.00E+01 1.099E-30 4.496E+05 7.154E-31 0.000E+00 Total Gamma, g/(sec*FA) 6.627E+12 3.431E+15 4.253E+12 3.732E+12 Total Neutron Source Term, n/(sec*FA)

Raw ORIGEN-ARP source for uniform burnup 7.848E+08 Treated with peaking factor 1.215 and keff=0.4 (dry) 1.589E+09 Treated with peaking factor 1.215 and keff=0.65 (wet) 2.724E+09 All Indicated Changes are in response to RSI 6-1

NUHOMS EOS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 01/18 June 2018 Revision 1 72-1042 Amendment 1 Page 6-56 Table 6-15 PWR Source Term for the EOS-TC125/135, HLZC 4 Zone 2, 1.625 kW/FA (Normal and Accident)

Burnup (GWd/MTU) 40 62 40 40 Enrichment (wt. % U-235) 2.5 3.8 2.5 2.5 Cooling Time (years) 3.860 6.831 3.860 3.860 Gamma Source Term, J/(sec*FA)

Emin, MeV to Emax, MeV Bottom Nozzle In-core Plenum Top Nozzle 1.00E-02 to 5.00E-02 3.276E+11 1.591E+15 2.209E+11 6.182E+10 5.00E-02 to 1.00E-01 2.168E+10 4.321E+14 1.423E+10 1.201E+10 1.00E-01 to 2.00E-01 2.312E+10 3.419E+14 1.506E+10 2.946E+09 2.00E-01 to 3.00E-01 1.536E+09 9.574E+13 1.005E+09 1.448E+08 3.00E-01 to 4.00E-01 4.685E+09 6.081E+13 3.053E+09 1.880E+08 4.00E-01 to 6.00E-01 9.580E+10 8.281E+14 6.237E+10 1.462E+07 6.00E-01 to 8.00E-01 5.127E+10 3.315E+15 3.903E+10 1.085E+09 8.00E-01 to 1.00E+00 3.027E+11 4.022E+14 5.742E+10 1.725E+11 1.00E+00 to 1.33E+00 5.940E+12 1.493E+14 3.901E+12 3.479E+12 1.33E+00 to 1.66E+00 1.678E+12 3.769E+13 1.102E+12 9.825E+11 1.66E+00 to 2.00E+00 3.531E+04 5.852E+11 7.627E+04 2.362E+04 2.00E+00 to 2.50E+00 4.014E+07 6.806E+11 2.636E+07 2.351E+07 2.50E+00 to 3.00E+00 3.430E+04 3.824E+10 2.252E+04 2.009E+04 3.00E+00 to 4.00E+00 1.015E-05 3.622E+09 5.042E-05 8.360E-06 4.00E+00 to 5.00E+00 5.952E-28 4.441E+07 3.874E-28 0.000E+00 5.00E+00 to 6.50E+00 1.715E-28 1.782E+07 1.116E-28 0.000E+00 6.50E+00 to 8.00E+00 2.181E-29 3.496E+06 1.420E-29 0.000E+00 8.00E+00 to 1.00E+01 2.911E-30 7.424E+05 1.895E-30 0.000E+00 Total Gamma, g/(sec*FA) 8.446E+12 7.256E+15 5.416E+12 4.712E+12 Total Neutron Source Term, n/(sec*FA)

Raw ORIGEN-ARP source for uniform burnup 1.295E+09 Treated with peaking factor 1.215 and k-eff=0.4 (dry) 2.622E+09 Treated with peaking factor 1.215 and k-eff=0.65 (wet) 4.496E+09 All Indicated Changes are in response to RSI 6-1

NUHOMS EOS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 01/18 June 2018 Revision 1 72-1042 Amendment 1 Page 6-57 Table 6-16 PWR Source Term for the EOS-TC125/135, HLZC 4 Zone 3, 1.625 kW/FA (Normal and Accident)

Burnup (GWd/MTU) 40 62 40 40 Enrichment (wt. % U-235) 2.5 3.8 2.5 2.5 Cooling Time (years) 3.860 6.831 3.860 3.860 Gamma Source Term, J/(sec*FA)

Emin, MeV to Emax, MeV Bottom Nozzle In-core Plenum Top Nozzle 1.00E-02 to 5.00E-02 3.276E+11 1.591E+15 2.209E+11 6.182E+10 5.00E-02 to 1.00E-01 2.168E+10 4.321E+14 1.423E+10 1.201E+10 1.00E-01 to 2.00E-01 2.312E+10 3.419E+14 1.506E+10 2.946E+09 2.00E-01 to 3.00E-01 1.536E+09 9.574E+13 1.005E+09 1.448E+08 3.00E-01 to 4.00E-01 4.685E+09 6.081E+13 3.053E+09 1.880E+08 4.00E-01 to 6.00E-01 9.580E+10 8.281E+14 6.237E+10 1.462E+07 6.00E-01 to 8.00E-01 5.127E+10 3.315E+15 3.903E+10 1.085E+09 8.00E-01 to 1.00E+00 3.027E+11 4.022E+14 5.742E+10 1.725E+11 1.00E+00 to 1.33E+00 5.940E+12 1.493E+14 3.901E+12 3.479E+12 1.33E+00 to 1.66E+00 1.678E+12 3.769E+13 1.102E+12 9.825E+11 1.66E+00 to 2.00E+00 3.531E+04 5.852E+11 7.627E+04 2.362E+04 2.00E+00 to 2.50E+00 4.014E+07 6.806E+11 2.636E+07 2.351E+07 2.50E+00 to 3.00E+00 3.430E+04 3.824E+10 2.252E+04 2.009E+04 3.00E+00 to 4.00E+00 1.015E-05 3.622E+09 5.042E-05 8.360E-06 4.00E+00 to 5.00E+00 5.952E-28 4.441E+07 3.874E-28 0.000E+00 5.00E+00 to 6.50E+00 1.715E-28 1.782E+07 1.116E-28 0.000E+00 6.50E+00 to 8.00E+00 2.181E-29 3.496E+06 1.420E-29 0.000E+00 8.00E+00 to 1.00E+01 2.911E-30 7.424E+05 1.895E-30 0.000E+00 Total Gamma, g/(sec*FA) 8.446E+12 7.256E+15 5.416E+12 4.712E+12 Total Neutron Source Term, n/(sec*FA)

Raw ORIGEN-ARP source for uniform burnup 1.295E+09 Treated with peaking factor 1.215 and k-eff=0.4 (dry) 2.622E+09 Treated with peaking factor 1.215 and k-eff=0.65 (wet) 4.496E+09 All Indicated Changes are in response to RSI 6-1

NUHOMS EOS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 01/18 June 2018 Revision 1 72-1042 Amendment 1 Page 6-58 Table 6-16a PWR Source Term for the EOS-TC125/135, HLZC 6/8, Zone 2 or 3, 1.5 kW/FA (Normal and Accident)

Burnup (GWd/MTU) 40 62 40 40 Enrichment (wt. % U-235) 2.5 3.8 2.5 2.5 Cooling Time (years) 4.148 7.817 4.148 4.148 Gamma Source Term, g/(sec*FA)

Emin, MeV to Emax, MeV Bottom Nozzle In-core Plenum Top Nozzle 1.00E-02 to 5.00E-02 2.994E+11 1.461E+15 2.025E+11 5.956E+10 5.00E-02 to 1.00E-01 2.082E+10 3.943E+14 1.368E+10 1.156E+10 1.00E-01 to 2.00E-01 2.165E+10 3.065E+14 1.410E+10 2.835E+09 2.00E-01 to 3.00E-01 1.434E+09 8.619E+13 9.387E+08 1.394E+08 3.00E-01 to 4.00E-01 4.321E+09 5.399E+13 2.816E+09 1.810E+08 4.00E-01 to 6.00E-01 8.906E+10 5.984E+14 5.798E+10 1.317E+07 6.00E-01 to 8.00E-01 4.774E+10 3.023E+15 3.674E+10 1.084E+09 8.00E-01 to 1.00E+00 2.401E+11 3.007E+14 4.680E+10 1.369E+11 1.00E+00 to 1.33E+00 5.720E+12 1.305E+14 3.757E+12 3.350E+12 1.33E+00 to 1.66E+00 1.615E+12 2.943E+13 1.061E+12 9.460E+11 1.66E+00 to 2.00E+00 1.273E+04 3.558E+11 2.738E+04 8.465E+03 2.00E+00 to 2.50E+00 3.865E+07 3.138E+11 2.538E+07 2.264E+07 2.50E+00 to 3.00E+00 3.302E+04 1.992E+10 2.169E+04 1.934E+04 3.00E+00 to 4.00E+00 1.009E-05 1.910E+09 5.011E-05 8.309E-06 4.00E+00 to 5.00E+00 5.952E-28 4.275E+07 3.874E-28 0.000E+00 5.00E+00 to 6.50E+00 1.715E-28 1.716E+07 1.116E-28 0.000E+00 6.50E+00 to 8.00E+00 2.181E-29 3.366E+06 1.420E-29 0.000E+00 8.00E+00 to 1.00E+01 2.911E-30 7.146E+05 1.895E-30 0.000E+00 Total Gamma, g/(sec*FA) 8.060E+12 6.385E+15 5.193E+12 4.508E+12 Total Neutron Source Term, n/(sec*FA)

Raw ORIGEN-ARP source for uniform burnup 1.247E+09 Treated with peaking factor 1.215 and k-eff=0.4 (dry) 2.525E+09 Treated with peaking factor 1.215 and k-eff=0.65 (wet) 4.329E+09 All Indicated Changes are in response to RSI 6-2

NUHOMS EOS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 01/18 June 2018 Revision 1 72-1042 Amendment 1 Page 6-59 Table 6-16b PWR Source Term for the EOS-TC125/135, HLZC 6/8, Zone 3, 0.85 kW/FA (Normal)

Burnup (GWd/MTU) 28.71 8.298 28.71 28.71 Enrichment (wt. % U-235) 1.8 1.3 1.8 1.8 Cooling Time (years) 5.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 Gamma Source Term, g/(sec*FA)

Emin, MeV to

Emax, MeV Bottom Nozzle In-core Plenum Top Nozzle 1.00E-02 to 5.00E-02 1.994E+11 1.916E+15 1.343E+11 4.636E+10 5.00E-02 to 1.00E-01 1.610E+10 6.245E+14 1.033E+10 9.001E+09 1.00E-01 to 2.00E-01 1.484E+10 6.301E+14 9.608E+09 2.205E+09 2.00E-01 to 3.00E-01 9.722E+08 1.570E+14 6.339E+08 1.086E+08 3.00E-01 to 4.00E-01 2.853E+09 1.237E+14 1.856E+09 1.410E+08 4.00E-01 to 6.00E-01 5.864E+10 4.554E+14 3.817E+10 9.964E+06 6.00E-01 to 8.00E-01 3.159E+10 7.470E+14 2.500E+10 8.492E+08 8.00E-01 to 1.00E+00 1.076E+11 1.011E+14 2.305E+10 6.149E+10 1.00E+00 to 1.33E+00 4.461E+12 5.810E+13 2.857E+12 2.608E+12 1.33E+00 to 1.66E+00 1.260E+12 2.090E+13 8.069E+11 7.365E+11 1.66E+00 to 2.00E+00 6.828E+02 3.440E+12 1.311E+03 3.843E+02 2.00E+00 to 2.50E+00 3.014E+07 1.414E+13 1.931E+07 1.762E+07 2.50E+00 to 3.00E+00 2.575E+04 2.225E+11 1.650E+04 1.506E+04 3.00E+00 to 4.00E+00 6.684E-06 1.983E+10 3.319E-05 5.504E-06 4.00E+00 to 5.00E+00 9.736E-29 1.138E+05 6.338E-29 0.000E+00 5.00E+00 to 6.50E+00 2.805E-29 4.558E+04 1.826E-29 0.000E+00 6.50E+00 to 8.00E+00 3.568E-30 8.929E+03 2.323E-30 0.000E+00 8.00E+00 to 1.00E+01 4.762E-31 1.894E+03 3.100E-31 0.000E+00 Total Gamma, g/(sec*FA) 6.153E+12 4.851E+15 3.907E+12 3.465E+12 Total Neutron Source Term, n/(sec*FA)

Raw ORIGEN-ARP source for uniform burnup 3.371E+06 Treated with peaking factor 1.215 and k-eff=0.4 (dry) 6.826E+06 Treated with peaking factor 1.215 and k-eff=0.65 (wet) 1.170E+07 All Indicated Changes are in response to RSI 6-2

NUHOMS EOS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 01/18 June 2018 Revision 1 72-1042 Amendment 1 Page 6-60 Table 6-16c PWR Source Term for the EOS-TC125/135, HLZC 6/8, Zone 3, 0.85 kW/FA (Accident)

Burnup (GWd/MTU) 28.71 50 28.71 28.71 Enrichment (wt. % U-235) 1.8 3.1 1.8 1.8 Cooling Time (years) 5.00 15.485 5.00 5.00 Gamma Source Term, g/(sec*FA)

Emin, MeV to

Emax, MeV Bottom Nozzle In-core Plenum Top Nozzle 1.00E-02 to 5.00E-02 1.994E+11 8.761E+14 1.343E+11 4.636E+10 5.00E-02 to 1.00E-01 1.610E+10 2.454E+14 1.033E+10 9.001E+09 1.00E-01 to 2.00E-01 1.484E+10 1.703E+14 9.608E+09 2.205E+09 2.00E-01 to 3.00E-01 9.722E+08 5.010E+13 6.339E+08 1.086E+08 3.00E-01 to 4.00E-01 2.853E+09 3.202E+13 1.856E+09 1.410E+08 4.00E-01 to 6.00E-01 5.864E+10 5.913E+13 3.817E+10 9.964E+06 6.00E-01 to 8.00E-01 3.159E+10 1.688E+15 2.500E+10 8.492E+08 8.00E-01 to 1.00E+00 1.076E+11 3.912E+13 2.305E+10 6.149E+10 1.00E+00 to 1.33E+00 4.461E+12 4.746E+13 2.857E+12 2.608E+12 1.33E+00 to 1.66E+00 1.260E+12 5.945E+12 8.069E+11 7.365E+11 1.66E+00 to 2.00E+00 6.828E+02 8.391E+10 1.311E+03 3.843E+02 2.00E+00 to 2.50E+00 3.014E+07 5.134E+09 1.931E+07 1.762E+07 2.50E+00 to 3.00E+00 2.575E+04 7.032E+08 1.650E+04 1.506E+04 3.00E+00 to 4.00E+00 6.684E-06 6.916E+07 3.319E-05 5.504E-06 4.00E+00 to 5.00E+00 9.736E-29 2.036E+07 6.338E-29 0.000E+00 5.00E+00 to 6.50E+00 2.805E-29 8.169E+06 1.826E-29 0.000E+00 6.50E+00 to 8.00E+00 3.568E-30 1.603E+06 2.323E-30 0.000E+00 8.00E+00 to 1.00E+01 4.762E-31 3.402E+05 3.100E-31 0.000E+00 Total Gamma, g/(sec*FA) 6.153E+12 3.214E+15 3.907E+12 3.465E+12 Total Neutron Source Term, n/(sec*FA)

Raw ORIGEN-ARP source for uniform burnup 5.891E+08 Treated with peaking factor 1.215 and k-eff=0.4 (dry) 1.193E+09 Treated with peaking factor 1.215 and k-eff=0.65 (wet) 2.045E+09 All Indicated Changes are in response to RSI 6-2

NUHOMS EOS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 01/18 June 2018 Revision 1 72-1042 Amendment 1 Page 6-61 Table 6-17 PWR Source Term for the EOS-HSM, HLZC 4 Zone 1, 1.0 kW/FA (Normal and Accident)

Burnup (GWd/MTU) 33.086 33.086 33.086 33.086 Enrichment (wt. % U-235) 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 Cooling Time (years) 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 Gamma Source Term, J/(sec*FA)

Emin, MeV to Emax, MeV Bottom Nozzle In-core Plenum Top Nozzle 1.00E-02 to 5.00E-02 2.168E+11 1.271E+15 1.468E+11 4.999E+10 5.00E-02 to 1.00E-01 1.735E+10 3.698E+14 1.125E+10 9.697E+09 1.00E-01 to 2.00E-01 1.626E+10 3.082E+14 1.055E+10 2.375E+09 2.00E-01 to 3.00E-01 1.067E+09 8.618E+13 6.968E+08 1.170E+08 3.00E-01 to 4.00E-01 3.136E+09 6.061E+13 2.042E+09 1.519E+08 4.00E-01 to 6.00E-01 6.461E+10 7.503E+14 4.206E+10 1.072E+07 6.00E-01 to 8.00E-01 3.483E+10 2.131E+15 2.764E+10 9.512E+08 8.00E-01 to 1.00E+00 1.144E+11 3.162E+14 2.477E+10 6.536E+10 1.00E+00 to 1.33E+00 4.803E+12 1.083E+14 3.109E+12 2.810E+12 1.33E+00 to 1.66E+00 1.356E+12 3.206E+13 8.780E+11 7.935E+11 1.66E+00 to 2.00E+00 7.184E+02 1.371E+12 1.354E+03 3.931E+02 2.00E+00 to 2.50E+00 3.245E+07 2.541E+12 2.101E+07 1.899E+07 2.50E+00 to 3.00E+00 2.773E+04 1.030E+11 1.795E+04 1.622E+04 3.00E+00 to 4.00E+00 8.044E-06 9.562E+09 3.995E-05 6.624E-06 4.00E+00 to 5.00E+00 2.247E-28 1.253E+07 1.463E-28 0.000E+00 5.00E+00 to 6.50E+00 6.475E-29 5.029E+06 4.215E-29 0.000E+00 6.50E+00 to 8.00E+00 8.236E-30 9.866E+05 5.361E-30 0.000E+00 8.00E+00 to 1.00E+01 1.099E-30 2.095E+05 7.154E-31 0.000E+00 Total Gamma, g/(sec*FA) 6.627E+12 5.438E+15 4.253E+12 3.732E+12 Total Neutron Source Term, n/(sec*FA)

Raw ORIGEN-ARP source for uniform burnup 3.599E+08 Treated with peaking factor 1.215 and keff=0.4 (dry) 7.288E+08 All Indicated Changes are in response to RSI 6-1

NUHOMS EOS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 01/18 June 2018 Revision 1 72-1042 Amendment 1 Page 6-62 Table 6-18 PWR Source Term for the EOS-HSM, HLZC 4 Zone 2, 1.625 kW/FA (Normal and Accident)

Burnup (GWd/MTU) 40 50 40 40 Enrichment (wt. % U-235) 2.5 3.1 2.5 2.5 Cooling Time (years) 3.860 4.887 3.860 3.860 Gamma Source Term, J/(sec*FA)

Emin, MeV to Emax, MeV Bottom Nozzle In-core Plenum Top Nozzle 1.00E-02 to 5.00E-02 3.276E+11 1.834E+15 2.209E+11 6.182E+10 5.00E-02 to 1.00E-01 2.168E+10 5.259E+14 1.423E+10 1.201E+10 1.00E-01 to 2.00E-01 2.312E+10 4.388E+14 1.506E+10 2.946E+09 2.00E-01 to 3.00E-01 1.536E+09 1.224E+14 1.005E+09 1.448E+08 3.00E-01 to 4.00E-01 4.685E+09 8.409E+13 3.053E+09 1.880E+08 4.00E-01 to 6.00E-01 9.580E+10 1.275E+15 6.237E+10 1.462E+07 6.00E-01 to 8.00E-01 5.127E+10 3.373E+15 3.903E+10 1.085E+09 8.00E-01 to 1.00E+00 3.027E+11 5.632E+14 5.742E+10 1.725E+11 1.00E+00 to 1.33E+00 5.940E+12 1.676E+14 3.901E+12 3.479E+12 1.33E+00 to 1.66E+00 1.678E+12 5.192E+13 1.102E+12 9.825E+11 1.66E+00 to 2.00E+00 3.531E+04 1.761E+12 7.627E+04 2.362E+04 2.00E+00 to 2.50E+00 4.014E+07 3.142E+12 2.636E+07 2.351E+07 2.50E+00 to 3.00E+00 3.430E+04 1.315E+11 2.252E+04 2.009E+04 3.00E+00 to 4.00E+00 1.015E-05 1.224E+10 5.042E-05 8.360E-06 4.00E+00 to 5.00E+00 5.952E-28 3.039E+07 3.874E-28 0.000E+00 5.00E+00 to 6.50E+00 1.715E-28 1.220E+07 1.116E-28 0.000E+00 6.50E+00 to 8.00E+00 2.181E-29 2.393E+06 1.420E-29 0.000E+00 8.00E+00 to 1.00E+01 2.911E-30 5.080E+05 1.895E-30 0.000E+00 Total Gamma, g/(sec*FA) 8.446E+12 8.442E+15 5.416E+12 4.712E+12 Total Neutron Source Term, n/(sec*FA)

Raw ORIGEN-ARP source for uniform burnup 8.782E+08 Treated with peaking factor 1.215 and k-eff=0.4 (dry) 1.778E+09 All Indicated Changes are in response to RSI 6-1

NUHOMS EOS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 01/18 June 2018 Revision 1 72-1042 Amendment 1 Page 6-63 Table 6-19 PWR Source Term for the EOS-HSM, HLZC 4 Zone 3, 1.625 kW/FA (Normal and Accident)

Burnup (GWd/MTU) 40 50 40 40 Enrichment (wt. % U-235) 2.5 3.1 2.5 2.5 Cooling Time (years) 3.860 4.887 3.860 3.860 Gamma Source Term, J/(sec*FA)

Emin, MeV to Emax, MeV Bottom Nozzle In-core Plenum Top Nozzle 1.00E-02 to 5.00E-02 3.276E+11 1.834E+15 2.209E+11 6.182E+10 5.00E-02 to 1.00E-01 2.168E+10 5.259E+14 1.423E+10 1.201E+10 1.00E-01 to 2.00E-01 2.312E+10 4.388E+14 1.506E+10 2.946E+09 2.00E-01 to 3.00E-01 1.536E+09 1.224E+14 1.005E+09 1.448E+08 3.00E-01 to 4.00E-01 4.685E+09 8.409E+13 3.053E+09 1.880E+08 4.00E-01 to 6.00E-01 9.580E+10 1.275E+15 6.237E+10 1.462E+07 6.00E-01 to 8.00E-01 5.127E+10 3.373E+15 3.903E+10 1.085E+09 8.00E-01 to 1.00E+00 3.027E+11 5.632E+14 5.742E+10 1.725E+11 1.00E+00 to 1.33E+00 5.940E+12 1.676E+14 3.901E+12 3.479E+12 1.33E+00 to 1.66E+00 1.678E+12 5.192E+13 1.102E+12 9.825E+11 1.66E+00 to 2.00E+00 3.531E+04 1.761E+12 7.627E+04 2.362E+04 2.00E+00 to 2.50E+00 4.014E+07 3.142E+12 2.636E+07 2.351E+07 2.50E+00 to 3.00E+00 3.430E+04 1.315E+11 2.252E+04 2.009E+04 3.00E+00 to 4.00E+00 1.015E-05 1.224E+10 5.042E-05 8.360E-06 4.00E+00 to 5.00E+00 5.952E-28 3.039E+07 3.874E-28 0.000E+00 5.00E+00 to 6.50E+00 1.715E-28 1.220E+07 1.116E-28 0.000E+00 6.50E+00 to 8.00E+00 2.181E-29 2.393E+06 1.420E-29 0.000E+00 8.00E+00 to 1.00E+01 2.911E-30 5.080E+05 1.895E-30 0.000E+00 Total Gamma, g/(sec*FA) 8.446E+12 8.442E+15 5.416E+12 4.712E+12 Total Neutron Source Term, n/(sec*FA)

Raw ORIGEN-ARP source for uniform burnup 8.782E+08 Treated with peaking factor 1.215 and k-eff=0.4 (dry) 1.778E+09 All Indicated Changes are in response to RSI 6-1

NUHOMS EOS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 01/18 June 2018 Revision 1 72-1042 Amendment 1 Page 6-97 Proprietary Information on This Page Withheld Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.390

NUHOMS EOS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 01/18 June 2018 Revision 1 72-1042 Amendment 1 Page 7-44 Table 7-3 EOS-37PTH Maximum Planar Average Initial Enrichment (Intact Fuels)

(2 Pages)

Fuel Assembly Class Maximum Assembly Average Initial Enrichment (wt. % U-235) as a Function of Soluble Boron Concentration and Basket Type (Fixed Poison Loading)

Minimum Soluble Boron (ppm)

Basket Type A

B w/o CCs w/ CCs w/o CCs w/ CCs CE 15x15 Assembly Class 2000 4.60 4.55 4.75 4.70 2100 4.70 4.65 4.85 4.85 2200 4.85 4.80 5.00 4.95 2300 5.00 4.90 5.00 2400 5.00 2500 CE 14x14 Assembly Class 2000 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 2100 2200 2300 2400 2500 14x14 Assembly Class(1)

(excludes CE 14x14) 2000 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 2100 2200 2300 2400 2500 Note:

1. The loading requirements apply to FAs listed in Table 2-2 and PWR FAs in Table 2-4 of Chapter 2.

All Indicated Changes are in response to OBS 8-1

NUHOMS EOS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 01/18 June 2018 Revision 1 72-1042 Amendment 1 Page 8-13 In addition, from Chapter 4, for normal conditions (applicable to long-term storage conditions) at the hottest cross-section of the EOS-37PTH and EOS-89BTH baskets, the average R90 transition rail temperature is not more than 469 °F, which is less than the above temperature of 470 °F for the hottest R90 rail. Similarly, from Chapter 4, for normal conditions, the hottest basket plate temperature is not more than 676 °F, which is less than the above temperature of 680 °F for the hottest aluminum plate.

Based on this favorable comparison of starting temperatures, and since the heat dissipation rate of the EOS-37PTH and EOS-89BTH baskets is better than the temperature data for the baskets evaluated in [8-28] (i.e. more favorable temperature versus time values), the allowable creep stresses given above are applicable to the aluminum components of the EOS-37PTH and EOS-89BTH baskets.

8.2.7 Bolt Applications There are no bolts in the NUHOMS EOS System associated with confinement, and no bolts performing quality category A functions. Bolts that perform ITS Category B and C functions are described here. No specific preload of any bolt is required by the design analysis. Therefore, all bolts are installed snug tight without a torque specification except as noted below.

[

]

The DSC support structure inside the EOS-HSM, or the rear DSC support on the HSM-MX, use SA-193 Gr B7 bolts. The heat shields are fastened to the HSM base and roof with SA-193 Gr B7 bolts. The roof, door and wall assemblies of the HSM use SA-193 Gr B7 bolts. These bolts are zinc-coated for corrosion resistance.

The top cover and bottom ram access port covers of the TC cask are retained by SA-540 Gr B23 bolts. The bolts may be plated or coated for corrosion protection. Torque values on the drawings in Chapter 1 are recommendations for assembly, not requirements based on the design analysis.

8.2.8 Protective Coatings and Surface Treatments No coatings are applied to the DSC surface. The top shield plug of the DSCs is coated with an electroless nickel [

] The HSLA steel plates of other 37PTH basket types have a coating or surface treatment to provide corrosion resistance for short-term pool immersion.

All Indicated Changes are in response to RSI 8-3

NUHOMS EOS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 01/18 June 2018 Revision 1 72-1042 Amendment 1 Page 8-14 The exposed carbon steel surfaces of the EOS-TCs are coated with a painting system suitable for spent fuel pool immersion, and withstanding long-term exposure to the elevated temperatures of the TC. Stainless steel surfaces, that is, trunnions, sliding rails, and the stainless steel overlay for the ram access port sealing surfaces are not coated. The removable aluminum neutron shield shell for the TC108 is painted only on the outer diameter. The following finish enamels are used on the transfer cask:

PPG Amerishield' enamel or Carboline Carboguard 890, color white, is used for the EOS-TC exterior surfaces.

PPG Amerishield', color white, is used for coating the exterior of the removable EOS-TC108 neutron shield. This neutron shield is not immersed.

Carboline Thermaline 450-EP PPG or Amercoat 91 is used for coating the EOS-TC interior surfaces, which are exposed to higher service temperatures up to 373 °F (Tables 4-26 and 4-27).

Manufacturer's recommendations are followed for surface preparation, primer coat selection, and coating application.

Alternate coatings that are accepted by licensees for spent fuel pool immersion, and whose short-term service temperature is above the normal condition TC surface temperatures may be used. For solar absorptivity, white color must be maintained where specified.

The DSC support structure in the EOS-HSM, or front and rear DSC supports on the HSM-MX, are coated with an inorganic zinc-rich primer and a high build epoxy enamel finish, for example, Carboline Carbozinc 11 primer with Carboguard 890 enamel. Embedments and fasteners are coated, plated, or galvanized.

Coatings are not important to safety except coating or surface treatment for 89BTH and 37PTH type 1, 2, 3, or 4H steel basket plate, which is ITS quality category C.

8.2.9 Neutron Shielding Materials During storage, all neutron shielding is provided by the concrete of the HSM. No polymeric neutron absorbers are used. Boron is not added to the concrete.

During transfer of the DSC from the pool to the HSM, neutron shielding is provided by water in a radial neutron shielding jacket of the TC. The bottom end and lid of the TC include a layer of solid neutron shielding consisting of borated high-density polyethylene, Quadrant Borotron types HD050 [8-9], UH050, and HM050 or similar material.

Because of the short duration of the transfer operations, this material is not subjected to significant thermal or radiation-induced degradation. The shielding analysis uses a reduced hydrogen content to bound any degradation as discussed in Section 8.2.2.4.

All Indicated Changes are in response to RSI 8-3

NUHOMS EOS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 01/18 June 2018 Revision 1 72-1042 Amendment 1 Page 8-34 Table 8-10 Material Properties, High Strength Low Alloy Steel Temp

(°F)

E(1)

(103 ksi)

Sy (1)(2)(3)

(ksi)

Su (1)(4) (ksi)

Thermal Expansion 10-6 in/(in-°F) (1)

Thermal Conductivity Btu/(hr-ft-°F) (1)

Specific Heat Btu/(lb-°F) (1)

Density lb/in3

-20 29.3 100.2 105.2 0.283(1) 70 29.0 96.4 101.2 100 28.9 95.4 100.2 6.60 23.8 200 28.4 91.6 96.2 6.90 24.4 0.110 300 28.0 87.7 92.1 7.20 24.6 400 27.6 83.9 88.1 7.40 24.4 0.120 500 27.0 80.0 84.0 7.55 24.0 600 26.2 76.1 79.9 7.70 23.3 0.130 700 25.2 71.3 74.9 7.80 22.7 800 24.1 66.0 69.3 7.88 22.0 0.145 Notes:

1. Listed values for yield stress calculated from rate of reduction provided in Figure 2.3.1.1.1, Figure 2.3.1.1.4 for modulus of elasticity, and Figure 2.3.1.0 for thermal properties from Reference [8-17].

2. Listed values based on Reference [8-17].

3. Yield stress values calculated based on 80 ksi at 500 °F.

4. Ultimate strength based on 1.05 Sy.

All Indicated Changes are in response to RSI 8-5

NUHOMS EOS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 01/18 June 2018 Revision 1 72-1042 Amendment 1 Page 9-20

25. Position the TC lifting yoke and engage the TC lifting trunnions, install eyebolts or other lifting attachment(s) into the shield plug, and connect the rigging cables to the eyebolts/lifting attachment(s).

26. Move the scaffolding away from the TC as necessary.

27. Lift the TC just far enough to allow the weight of the TC to be distributed onto the yoke lifting arms. Verify that the lifting arms are properly positioned on the trunnions.

28. Optionally, secure a sheet of suitable material to the bottom of the TC to minimize the potential for ground-in contamination. This may also be done prior to initial placement of the TC in the designated area.

29. Prior to the TC being lifted into the fuel pool, the water level in the pool should be adjusted as necessary to accommodate the TC/DSC volume, as necessary.

30. Position the TC over the TC loading area in the spent fuel pool.

31. Lower the TC into the pool. As the transfer TC is being lowered, the exterior surface of the TC should be sprayed with clean water.

32. Lower the TC into the fuel pool leaving the top surface of the TC above the surface of the pool water. Verify correct connections of the annulus seal and annulus/neutron shield tank, if used.

33. Disengage the lifting yoke from the TC and lift the shield plug from the DSC.

34. Remove the fuel from the DSC.

Note: Special attention should be given to unloading the FAs (especially for boiling water reactor (BWR fuel) to wait until any loose particles have settled and slowly move the FAs to minimize fuel crud dispersion in the spent fuel pool. The dry TC reflood process, during unloading of BWR fuel, has the potential to disperse crud into the pool and become airborne, creating airborne exposure and personnel contamination hazards.

If the DSC contains damaged fuel:

a. remove the top end caps.

b. remove the fuel using the standard fuel handling procedures.

If the DSC contains failed fuel:

a. remove the top end caps.

b. remove large pieces of fuel assembly, any rod storage baskets and/or debris containers/baskets using lifting devices similar to those used during loading operations that are consistent with their design.

All Indicated Changes are in response to RSI 8-4

NUHOMS EOS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 01/18 June 2018 Revision 1 72-1042 Amendment 1 Page 9-21

c. thread a long lifting rod into the bottom end cap and slowly raise the end cap toward the top of the basket to allow removal of larger pieces of loose debris that has fallen into the end cap.

d. Remove the bottom end cap and any remaining small debris from the DSC.

All Indicated Changes are in response to RSI 8-4

NUHOMS EOS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 01/18 June 2018 Revision 1 72-1042 Amendment 1 Page 10-10 Potential change effect Example Reduction of the yield or ultimate strength or the elongation Increase in nominal boron carbide content over that previously qualified Adverse effect on the uniformity of boron carbide distribution at the microscopic scale Increase in the boron carbide particle size Adverse effect on the uniformity of boron carbide distribution at the macroscopic level Change in the blending process Reduced density of the final product Change in the method of billet production or thermo-mechanical processing to plate Adverse reaction between the boron carbide and the matrix alloy under normal and off-normal service temperatures Change in the matrix alloy Lower corrosion resistance or higher rate of hydrogen generation Change in the matrix alloy Identification and Control of Key Process Changes The manufacturer provides the Certificate Holder with a description of materials and process controls used in producing the MMC. The Certificate Holder and manufacturer prepare a written list of key process changes that cannot be made without prior approval of the Certificate Holder.

10.1.6 Thermal Acceptance No thermal acceptance testing is required to verify the performance of each storage unit.

10.1.7 High-Strength Low-Alloy Steel for Basket Structure The basket structural material shall be a High-Strength Low-Alloy (HSLA) steel meeting one of the following requirements A, B, or C:

A. ASTM A829 Gr 4130 or AMS 6345 SAE 4130, quenched and tempered at not less than 1050 °F, 103.6 ksi minimum yield, and 123.1 ksi minimum ultimate stress. This material is qualified as described in [10-31].

B. ASME Code edition 2010 with 2011 addenda, SA-517 Gr A, B, E, F, or P.

This material is qualified by the material properties at elevated temperature in ASME Section II, Part D, which exceed the values of yield and ultimate strength in UFSAR Table 8-10.

C. Other HSLA steel, with the specified heat treatment, meeting these qualification criteria:

All Indicated Changes are in response to RSI 8-6

NUHOMS EOS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 1, 01/18 June 2018 Revision 1 72-1042 Amendment 1 Page 10-11

i.

If quenched and tempered, the tempering temperature shall be at no less than 1000 °F, ii.

Qualified prior to first use by testing at least two lots and demonstrating that the fracture toughness value KJIc 150 ksi ¥in at -40 °F with 95% confidence.

iii.

Qualified prior to first use by testing at least two lots and demonstrating that the 95% lower tolerance limit of yield and ultimate strengths the values in UFSAR Table 8-10.

The basket structural material shall also meet the following production acceptance criteria:

• Weld repair shall not be permitted.

• Impact testing shall be performed at -40 °F Charpy testing per ASTM A370, minimum absorbed energy 25 ft-lb average, 20 ft-lb lowest of three (modify these acceptance criteria for sub-size specimens per A370-17 Table 9), or Dynamic tear testing per ASTM E604 with acceptance criterion of a minimum 80% shear fracture appearance.

• Test specimen location, orientation, and sampling rate per ASTM A6 or ASTM A20 for production acceptance testing.

RSI 8-6 RSI 8-3 RSI 8-6 RSI 8-3

NUHOMS EOS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. TBD, TBD June 2018 Revision 1 72-1042 Amendment 1 Page A.1-3 Appendix A is newly added in Amendment 1.

A.1.2 General Description and Operational Features of the NUHOMS MATRIX A.1.2.1 NUHOMS MATRIX CHARACTERISTICS The NUHOMS MATRIX provides a staggered two-tiered self-contained modular structure for storage of spent fuel canistered in an EOS-37PTH or EOS-89BTH DSC.

The HSM-MX is constructed from reinforced concrete and structural steel. Contact doses for the HSM-MX are designed to be as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA).

The key design parameters of the HSM-MX are listed in Table A.1-1.

In lieu of a roof and side walls, sufficient shielding is provided by thick concrete side walls between compartments in the monolith and above the DSC to minimize doses in adjacent HSM-MXs during loading and retrieval operations.

The HSM-MXs provide an independent, passive system with substantial structural capacity to ensure the safe dry storage of spent fuel assemblies (SFAs). To this end, the HSM-MXs are designed to ensure that normal transfer operations and postulated accidents or natural phenomena do not impair the DSC or pose a hazard to the public or plant personnel. Postulated accidents and natural phenomena affecting the HSM-MX are described in detail in Chapter A.12.

The HSM-MX provides a means of removing spent fuel decay heat by a combination of radiation, conduction, and convection. Ambient air enters the HSM-MX through ventilation inlet openings located on the lower tier of the HSM-MX, circulates around the DSC and the heat shields, then exits through the outlets of the HSM-MX. The HSM-MX is designed to remove up to 50.0 kW of decay heat from the bounding EOS-37PTH DSC, when loaded in an HSM-MX lower compartment.

Decay heat is rejected from the DSC to the HSM-MX air space by convection and then removed from the HSM-MX by natural circulation airflow. Heat is also radiated from the DSC surface to the heat shields and HSM-MX walls and roof, where the natural convection airflow and conduction through the walls and roof aid in the removal of the decay heat. The passive cooling system for the HSM-MX is designed to preserve fuel cladding integrity by maintaining SFA peak cladding temperatures below acceptable limits during long-term storage. The outlet vent covers installed on the top of the HSM-MX are designed to mitigate the effect of sustained winds.

Configurations of systems to be stored in the HSM-MX are determined based on heat load, basket type, etc. These configurations are detailed in Table 1-2.

The HSM-MXs are installed on a load-bearing foundation, which consists of a reinforced concrete basemat on a subgrade suitable to support the loads. The HSM-MXs are not tied to the basemat.

All Indicated Changes are in response to OBS 4-1

NUHOMS EOS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. TBD, TBD June 2018 Revision 1 72-1042 Amendment 1 Page A.4-8 Appendix A is newly added for Amendment 1.

Proprietary Information on This Page Withheld Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.390