ML18152A454
| ML18152A454 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 10/28/1993 |
| From: | Belisle G, Branch M, Tingen S NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18152A455 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-280-93-23, 50-281-93-23, NUDOCS 9311160201 | |
| Download: ML18152A454 (14) | |
See also: IR 05000280/1993023
Text
Report Nos.:
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W., SUITE 2900
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323-0199
50-280/93-23 and 50-281/93-23
Licensee:
Virginia Electric and Power Company
5000 Dominion Boulevard
Glen Allen, VA
23060
Docket Nos.:
50-280 and 50-281
License Nos.:
Facility Name:
Surry 1 and 2
Inspection Conducted:
Sept~mber 5 through October 2, 1993
Inspectors:
Accompanying
Approved by:
Scope:
M. W. Branch, Senior Resident
Inspector
S. G. Tingen, Resldent Inspector
NRC Inspector: L. W. Garner
t:'\\J~-i.l'li,\\-LV-- '\\/ .. ~k-v.-G-
G. A. Belisle, Section Chief
Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
/ 0/ 2 *,_ / 7 3
Date Signed
/ti I,_,,, /T ?
Dat~ Signed
i C J_:'~ 1:S
Date Signe
This routine resident inspection was conducted on site in the areas of plant
status, operational safety verification, maintenance inspections, surveillance
inspections, licensee event review, action on previous inspection items, and
meeting with local officials. During the performance of this inspection, the
resident inspectors conducted reviews of the licensee's backshifts, holiday or
weekend operations on September 14 and 23, 1993.
Results:
In the operations area, the following items were noted:
Examples were identified where the tagout program was being used to
isolate equipment abandoned in place which circumvents the design change
process (paragraph 3.a).
9311160201 931028
ADOCK 05000280
B
2
In the maintenance area, the following items were noted:
The pre-job brief for removing a screw lodged in a reactor protection
relay was thorough.
Good co11111unication and coordination among
operations, maintenance, and engineering were evident during the
evolution (paragraph 4.a).
Although Kaman radiation monitor spiking has been identified by the
licensee as a recurring problem, corrective actions implemented to date
have not corrected the problem (paragraph 4.c).
Violation 50-280/93-23-0l was identified for activities affecting
quality not being accomplished in accordance with prescribed
instructions, in thijt,
(1) fuses l-EP-FUSE-EH-14H-6 and l-EP-FUSE-EJ-
14H-6 were removed instead of the specified fuses on Tagging Record No.
(S)l-93-EP-0053 and (2) the components' alignment was not properly
independently verified as required by OPAP-0010 step 6.4.6 (paragraph
4.d).
The seven day look ahead schedule did not identify that scheduled
maintenance on the steam driven auxiliary feed water pump conflicted
with, and therefore prohibited, the performance of a scheduled monthly
periodic test of the reactor protection system (paragraph 5.b).
REPORT DETAILS
I.
Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees
- W. Benthall, Supervisor, Licensing
- R. Bilyeu, Licensing Engineer
H. Blake, Jr., Superintendent of Nuclear Site Services
R. Blount, Superintendent of Maintenance
D. Christian, Assistant Station Manager
J. Costello, Station Coordinator, Emergency Preparedness
J. Downs, Superintendent of Outage and Planning
D. Erickson, Superintendent of Radiation Protection
A. Friedman, Superintendent of Nuclear Training
- M. Kansler, Station Manager
C. Luffman, Superintendent, Security
J. McCarthy, Superintendent of Operations
- A.Meekins, Supervisor of Administrative Services
- A. Price, Assistant Station Manager
- R. Saunders, Assistant Vice President, Nuclear Operations
- E. Smith, Site Quality Assurance Manager
- T. Sowers, Superintendent of Engineering
- J. Swientoniewski, Supervisor, Station Nuclear Safety
NRC Personnel
- M. Branch, Senior Resident Inspector
- S. Tingen, Resident Inspector
- Attended Exit Interview
Other licensee employees contacted included control room operators,
shift technical advisors, shift supervisors and other plant personnel.
Acronyms and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the
last paragraph.
2.
Plant Status
Unit 1 began the reporting period in power operation and was at power at
the end of the inspection period.
Unit 2 began the reporting period in power operation and was at power at
the end of the inspection period.
The unit operated at 98.5% power for
most of the period in order to minimize level oscillation in the C SG.
3.
Operational Safety Verification (71707, 42700}
The inspectors conducted frequent tours of the control room to verify
proper staffing, operator attentiveness and adherence to ~pproved
2
procedures.
The inspectors attended plant status meetings and reviewed
operator logs on a daily basis to verify operational safety and
compliance with TSs and to maintain awareness of overall facility
operations.
Instrumentation and ECCS lineups were periodically reviewed
from control room indication to assess operability.
Frequent plant
tours were conducted to observe equipment status, fire protection
programs, radiological work practices, plant security programs and
housekeeping.
Deviation reports were reviewed to assure that potential
safety concerns were properly addressed and reported.
a.
b.
c.
Tagout Review
During the inspection period, the inspectors reviewed the -
outstanding Op~rations Department Tagging Record List dated
September 17, 1993.
The inspectors noted several active tagouts
that were three years old or more.
Although most of these long
term tagouts were for non-safety related equipment (boron
recovery, condensate, etc.), several involved safety-related
equipment such as SW and electrical power.
Through the tagout
reviews and discussions with operations personnel, the inspector
determined that the tagout process was being used to isolate
abandoned equipment.
For example, the stated purpose on tagging
records 2-91-EP-0007 dated January 30, 1991, and 2-90-WT-0002
dated July 12, 1990, was to isolate equipment abandoned in place.
This method circumvents the design change process normally used to
facilitate permanent modification and eliminates/removes equipment
that is described in the UFSAR.
Several tagging records indicated
that a OCR had been initiated to permanently modify the plant
configuration. This issue was discussed with plant management.
The licensee acknowledged the inspectors concern and noted that
extended tagouts were not desirable and would be reviewed.
The
licensee also stated that, in accordance with procedures, safety
impact reviews were conducted every 30 day for these existing
tagouts.
Licensee 10 CFR 50.72 Report
On September 28, the licensee made a non-emergency four hour
10 CFR 50.72 report due to an ERFCS failure that rendered the SPDS
unavailable.
The ERFCS failed at 1:10 a.m. and was returned to
service at 5:15 a.m.
The failure was attributed to a failed data
link.
Plant tours
During routine plant tours of the facility on September 28, the
inspectors observed boric acid deposits around pump casing
studs/nuts on two charging pumps.
This was discussed with the
system engineer who showed the inspector that work orders to
correct the conditions had already been initiated.
In fact, one
charging pump was removed from service, as previously scheduled,
3
missing the stem cover plate. The condition was reported to
Operations personnel and a work order was initiated to correct the
condition.
Within the areas inspected, no violations were identified.
4.
Maintenance Inspections (62703) (42700)
During the reporting period, the inspectors reviewed the following
maintenance activities to assure compliance with the appropriate
procedures.
a.
Removal of Loose Screw From Unit 1 RP Relay
While performing a monthly periodic test on September 8, I&C
technicians discovered that a small screw had vibrated loose and
had fallen into relay 1-RP-REL-RT3YA's internals.
On high
pressurizer pressure, low pressurizer pressure, or high
pressurizer level this relay changes state and opens the A reactor
trip breaker. The screw was from a spare contact on the
Westinghouse BFD relay. Relay 1-RP-REL-RT3YA was declared
inoperable and an eight hour LCO to Hot Shutdown was entered in
accordance with TS Table 3.7-1, Item 19 due to the loss of one
channel of automatic trip logic. The technicians also identified
loose screws on spare contacts for seven other relays in the Unit
1 reactor protection racks.
The loose screws were still attached
to the terminals and therefore, these relays were considered
The inspectors witnessed the screw removal from relay 1-RP-REL-
RT3YA's contacts.
The screw was removed in accordance with
written troubleshooting instructions approved by SNSOC contained
in WO 268360.
Screw removal and relay contact inspections
involved an I&C technician, a system engineer, and an electrician.
The screw was removed with a magnet.
The inspector attended the
pre-job brief and reviewed the post maintenance test requirements.
The brief was thorough and good communication and coordination
between operations, maintenance personnel and engineering was
evident. After the screw was removed, the relay was
satisfactorily tested in accordance with 1-PT-8.1, Reactor
Protection Logic.
On September 10, the loose spare contact screws on the other seven
relays were tightened.
On September 20, the licensee inspected
the Unit 2 Reactor Protection Cabinets and identified one loose
screw.
The loose screw on the Train A relay 81-69AX was
subsequently tightened.
No additional discrepancies were
identified.
- *
b.
c.
4
Trouble Shooting Charging Pump TCV Inconsistent Stroke Time
On September 17, the inspectors witnessed troubleshooting on Unit
2 C charging pump lube oil SW TCV, 2-SW-TCV-20SC.
The licensee
was obtaining inconsistent stroke times for all six charging pump
The purpose of the troubleshooting was to identify the
cause of the TCVs inconsistent stroke times.
The stroke times for
these air operated valves varied from 5 to 74 seconds.
Valve 2-
SW-TCV-208C was the first valve to be investigated for
inconsistent stroke time.
The charging pump TCVs automatically regulate the SW flow though
each charging pump lube oil cooler.
The TCVs modulate open and
closed in order to maintain the lube oil within the desired
temperature range.
The charging pump lube oil temperature
regulates the TCVs' position.
AIRCET test equipment was installed on the valve and the valve was
cycled several times.
The AIRCET test equipment measures valve
stem travel, air operator dome pressure, control air pressure and
supply air pressure. Test results indicated several problems.
The controller's span needed adjustment and the valve was binding
slightly when initially opening.
The span was readjusted and the
valve was cycled satisfactorily. The licensee determined that the
binding did not affect valve operability and a WR was submitted to
investigate the binding at a later date.
No discrepancies were
identified. At the end of the report period, troubleshooting and
repair of the other valves were in progress.
Kaman Radiation Monitor Spikes
TS Table 3.7.6, specified operability requirements for accident
monitoring instrumentation.
Item 12 of this table specified that
the ventilation vent effluent monitor must be operable.
Kaman
vent monitors 1-VG-RI-131-1/2 fulfill this requirement.
Monitor 1-VG-RI-131-1 and 1-VG-RI-131-2 were low and high range
radiation monitors, respectively.
The high range radiation
monitor is normally deenergized and energizes automatically prior
to the low range radiation monitor exceeding its range.
Throughout the inspection period, the low range Kaman monitor was
spiking.
Four DRs were initiated.
On September 16, the radiation
monitor was declared inoperable due to spiking and remained
inoperable for the remainder of the inspection period.
As a
result, the high range monitor was also inoperable.
In accordance
with TS Table 3.7.6, an alternate method to monitor the
ventilation vent effluent was initiated.
The low range Kaman radiation monitor has a history of spiking.
In 1992, nine DRs were initiated due to spikes on the Kaman
radiation monitor.
On four occasions in 1992, the Kaman radiation
monitor was declared inoperable due to spikes.
The licensee's
d.
5
trending programs have identified this as a recurring problem and
corrective actions have been implemented.
During this inspection
period, additional corrective action has been initiated. Although
the Kaman radiation monitor spiking has been identified by the
licensee as a recurring problem, the corrective actions
implemented have not corrected this problem and has forced
reliance on compensatory measures.
Failure To Implement Unit 1 Tag-out Procedure
On September 28, 1993, an on-coming Unit 1 SRO observed that the A
LHSI pump breaker indication was not lit. Investigation revealed
that the breaker t~p/position indication*circuit control fuses
for the pump had been inadvertently removed during a tag-out.
Furthermore, the breaker closing circuit control fuses for the A
ISRS pump had also been removed.
The fuses were immediately
replaced.
The total time the pumps were degraded, i.e., the fuses
were not in the circuits, was less than 30 minutes.
During this
time; the A ISRS pump was unavailable for automatic or remote
starting. The A LHSI pump was available for automatic or remote
starting but the pump could not be shut down remotely.
During the
event, both the redundant ISRS and LHSI train B pumps were fully
functional.
These minimized the event's safety significance.
However, the human performance problems which precipitated the
event were significant.
Through document reviews and interviews with the SRO, the involved
electricians and the HPES investigator, the inspectors constructed
the following event sequence.
At 1:50 p.m. approval was granted
to perform Tagging Record No. (S)l-93-EP-0053.
This tag-out form
directed that fuses l-EP-FUSE-EH-14Hl-6 and l-EP-FUSE-EJ-14Hl-6 be
removed to allow a new breaker to be installed per DCP 90-07-3
(new control room HVAC unit additions). At approximately 3:10
p.m., two electricians were assigned the task to perform the tag-
out and proceeded to the electrical switchgear room.
Both 14Hl
and 14H switchgear were located in this room.
The electricians
opened the panel to breaker cubicle 6 in 14H, located fuses marked
EH and EJ, removed these fuses and attached the red danger tags.
The electricians did not independently verify component alignment
for the fuses listed on the tagging record.
Independent
verification was required by step 6.4.6 of OPAP-0010, Tag-Outs,
dated March 1, 1993.
The tagging record indicated that this task
was completed at 3:15 p.m.
The electricians noted that the
removed 15 amp fuses were a different rating than the 30 and 35
amp rating provided in the component description.
The
electricians returned to the shop and, at approximately 3:30 p.m.,
left the site for the day.
Shortly before 3:30 p.m., the on-
coming SRO performed his pre-shift control board walkdown and
observed no A LHSI pump breaker indication. Attention was
immediately focused on tag-out (S)l-93-EP-0053 as a possible
cause.
This was substantiated, and at 3:30 p.m. authorization was
6
granted to remove the danger tags and re-install the pulled fuses.
At 3:45 p.m., the tagging record was signed verifying the fuses
were properly reinstalled.
Several human performance, deficiencies were identified. Directly
contributing to the event was a failure to properly perform self-
checking, in that, the electricians went to switchgear 14H whereas
14Hl was the specified switchgear. A secondary casual factor was
a time restraint perception by the two electricians. The
electricians had surmised from operations that this tagout was
needed invnediately. This perception arose from the operations
person's vocal tone, .a task assignment near the end of the shift,
and the need to provide the completed paperwork to Operations
before the one~hour shift turnover "quiet time" that began at 3:30
p.m.
This time restraint apparently resulted in the task being
performed in a rapid manner with minimal preparation.
No pre-job
walkdown was performed, a cabinet drawing was not obtained to help
locate the fuses inside the switchgear, and the fuse size
discrepancy was not adequately pursued.
10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion V requires that activities
affecting quality be prescribed by documented instructions,
procedures, or drawings, of a type appropriate to the
circumstances and be accomplished in accordance with these
instructions, procedures, or drawings.
Failure to remove the
fuses specified on the tagging record and perform independent
alignment verification is a violation of Criterion V.
This is
identified as VIO: Fuse removal not accomplished in accordance
tagging record and OPAP~OOlO, 50-280/93-23-01.
Although the events associated with this violation were self-
disclosing, the violation was cited because the following similar
occurrences of electricians not following instructions were
identified in IRs in the past year:
NCV 50-280/92-22-02, Maintenance Personnel Failed To
Independently Verify Danger Tags.
NCV 50-281/93-11-01, Maintenance Personnel Lifted Incorrect
Lead Rendered RHR Inoperable.
NCV 50-281/93-11-02, Failure to Follow Maintenance
Procedure.
As discussed above, the tagging record identified the fuses to be
removed as 30 and 35 amps.
This information was obtained from
drawing 11448-FE-9BS revision 3, dated July 29, 1993.
However,
the Power Fuse Schedule, l-DRP-015, revision 0, dated April 16,
1992, identified the fuses as spares and as 15 amps.
Drawing
11448-FE-9BS revision 2, dated September 8, 1989 was subsequently
reviewed.
This previous revision, in effect at the time the Power
7
Fuse Schedule was developed, also showed the fuses as 30 and 35
amps.
At the end of the report period, the licensee was
investigating the cause for this discrepancy.
Within the areas inspected, one violation was identified.
5.
Surveillance Inspections (61726, 42700}
During the reporting period, the inspectors reviewed surveillance
activities to assure compliance with the appropriate procedure and TS
requirements.
a.
l-SI-MOV-18628 Stroke Test
During the previous inspection period, the inspectors identified a
concern with valve l-SI-MOV-1862B's operation.
The valve had a WR
tag attached that stated that the MOV would not automatically
return to the electrical mode of operation after the handwheel was
manually declutched.
The inspectors were concerned that-if l-SI-
MOV-18628 declutch lever was inadvertently moved, the MOV would
become disengaged from the motor and not operate electrically when
required.
During this inspection period, the inspectors witnessed
stroke testing of the valve in accordance with l-OPT-SI-003,
Quarterly Test of SI MOVs and RWST XTie TVs, dated May 27, 1993.
The evolution was thoroughly briefed prior to its performance.
The valve was initially stroked electrically to verify that it was
operable in the as-found condition.
The MOV was then manually
clutched and operated.
During this evolution, the inspectors
noted that in order to clutch and engage the manual operator the
clutch lever and handwheel had to be operated simultaneously.
The
inspectors concluded that it was not probable to inadvertently
disengage the motor from the operator because the clutch lever and
handwheel had to be operated simultaneously. Afterwards, the
valve was cycled electrically in accordance with l-OPT-SI-003 to
demonstrate that it was left in an operable condition.
The inspectors reviewed the results of l-OPT-SI-003 performed on
September 17.
No discrepancies were identified.
b.
2-PT-8.1
On September 22, the inspectors attended the pre-job brief for
monthly periodic test 2-PT-8.1, Reactor Protection Logic.
During
the pre-job brief, the SRO identified that the test, scheduled for
September 22, could not be performed because the conditions
specified in procedure step 4.10 could not be met at the present
time.
Step 4.10 cautioned that during part of the test, the
control switch for the motor driven AFW pump in the train being
tested must be placed in the pull-to-lock position to prevent the
pump from automatically starting.
On that same day, the steam
..
" *
a
driven AFW pump was tagged out and was inoperable for planned
maintenance. Since TSs prohibit more than one AFW pump in a unit
to be inoperable, 2-PT-8.1 had to be rescheduled.
The seven day
look ahead schedule process was established to preclude these
types of conflicts. The inspectors discussed with management the
seven day look ahead schedule process' failure to identify that
maintenance on the steam driven AFW pump prohibited performing
2-PT-8.1.
Within the areas inspected, no violations were identified.
6.
Licensee Event Review (92700)
The inspectors reviewed the LERs listed below and evaluated the
corrective action's *adequacy and implementation.
a.
b.
(Closed) LER 281-92-06, Auxiliary Ventilation Exhaust Filter
System Train Rendered Inoperable When Fan Tripped Due to Filters
Being Near The End of Their Service Life. This issue involved
both auxiliary ventilation exhaust fans being inoperable which
required entry into a six hour LCO to Hot Shutdown in accordance
with TS 3.0.I. While the A exhaust fan was inoperable due to
planned maintenance, the B fan was operating and tripped on
excessive vacuum.
The excessive vacuum that caused the B fan to
trip was attributed to dirty auxiliary ventilation exhaust
filters.
As corrective action to prevent recurrence, procedures
were to be revised to replace auxiliary ventilation exhaust
filters at a lower differential pressure value.
The inspectors
reviewed quarterly surveillance procedure O-OPT-VS-002, Auxiliary
Ventilation Filter Train Test, dated September 24, 1993, and the
auxiliary building operator logs and verified that these documents
placed reduced differential pressure limits on the auxiliary
ventilation exhaust filters.
(Closed) LER 280-91-03, Station Record Storage Vault Halon System
Inoperable. This issue was reported when the licensee's QA review
identified that several previous surveillance test had been
determined acceptable even though the Halon system bottle pressure
was outside its limits. The licensee's report indicated that the
bottle pressure was corrected and that confusion in the procedure
may have led to the personnel error. The licensee revised
procedures to prevent recurrence.
The inspectors reviewed this issue and determined that the actions
described above were completed.
However, the procedure and
equipment described in the LER was subsequently deleted in 1992
when the licensee moved the station records vault to the new
administrative building.
The new records vault fire suppression
system is a dry standpipe water system that is actuated by a
,.
9
combination of smoke and heat. Since the new facility fire
suppression system represented a change in design, the inspectors
verified that the licensee's QA topical report co11111itments for
fire protection of QA records were satisfied.
Within the areas inspected, no violations were identified.
7.
Action on Previous Inspection Items (92701,92702)
a.
(Closed) VIO 50-280/92-07-02, Failure to Establish Containment
Integrity in Accordance with TS 3.10.A.l. While moving fuel
during the Unit 1 spring 1992 RFO, the licensee failed to maintain
containment integrity as required by TSs.
The failure occurred
because SG and MS maintenance activities were not properly
controlled.
The licensee-responded* to this vicilation in a letter
dated May 29, 1992.
In the letter, the licensee stated that the
following corrective actions would be implemented:
Revise procedures to provide more detailed and specific
requirements for establishing refueling integrity.
Plan for refueling integ~ity windows during outages. During
periods when refueling integrity is required, modifications
to containment boundary will be administratively restricted.
Notify operations when restarting work on an extended job to
ensure work is not performed on a component which has become
part of the refueling integrity boundary.
Place precautions on work orders when working refueling
integrity boundary components.
The inspectors reviewed 2-0PT-CT-210, Refueling Containment
Integrity, revision 3, and verified that the procedure was
enhanced to provide more detailed and specific requirements for
establishing refueling integrity. During the previous Unit 2 RFO,
the inspectors periodically monitored containment integrity during
refueling operations. The inspectors noted that maintenance
effecting containment integrity was properly controlled during
periods when refueling integrity was required.
The inspectors
also selected approximately ten containment isolation valves to
verify that the model work orders for the valves contained special
instructions identifying the valves as containment integrity
components.
The inspectors noted that the licensee was in the
process of initiating a new program, PASSPORT, for planning WOs.
This program currently does not identify components which may be
used to establish containment integrity. During the inspection
10
period, the licensee was in the process of evaluating methods to
inform maintenance personnel that they were working on a
containment integrity component.
The previous program for
planning WOs, WPTS, did identify which valves were required to
establish containment integrity.
Within the areas inspected, no violations were identified.
8.
Meeting With Local Officials
On September 14, 1993, the NRC and Virginia Power met to discuss the
SALP Report for the Surry Facility. Local officials and the media were
invited to this meeting and were also invited to meet with the NRC
afterwards.
The following local officials and members of the media met
with the NRC on September 14 at the Surry Facility:
G. Urquhart, Conunonwealth of VA, Department of Emergency Services
M. Weaver, Reporter (Virginian Pilot}
B. Marriott, Director of Newport News Emergency Services
R. Lowry, Jr., James City County Emergency Service Coordinator
B. Geddy, Williamsburg Emergency Service Coordinator
T. Lewis, Surry County Administrator
During this meeting, the local officials stated that cooperation between
the local governments, Virginia Power and NRC was good.
G. Urquhart
discussed the local governments' recent emergency response to impending
Hurricane Emily and requested local officials to document what emergency
actions were taken.
The state plans to evaluated whether the emergency
actions taken for the impending hurricane could be substituted for the
states participation in the Surry annual emergency exercise scheduled
for December 8, 1993.
The NRC officials informed the participants that
timely letters to FEMA and the NRC would be necessary to receive credit
for hurricane response and partial or full relief from participation
during the annual exercise.
Within the areas inspected, no violations were identified.
9.
Exit Interview
The results were sununarized on October 6, 1993, with those individuals
identified by an asterisk in Paragraph 1.
The following summary of
inspection activity was discussed by the inspectors during this exit:
Item Number
Status
VIO 50-280/93-23-01
Open
Description
(Paragraph No.}
Fuse removal not accomplished
in accordance tagging record
and OPAP-0010 (paragraph 4.d) .
LER 281-92-06
11
Closed
Auxiliary Ventilation Exhaust
Filter System Train Rendered
Inoperable When Fan Tripped
Due to Filters Being Near The
End of Their Service Life
(paragraph 6.a).
LER 280-91-03
Closed
Station Record Storage Vault
Halon System Inoperable
(paragraph 6.b).
VIO 50-280/92-07-02
Closed
Failure to Establish
Containment Integrity in
Accordance with TS 3.10.A.l
(paragraph -7.a).
Proprietary information is not contained in this report. Dissenting
comments were not received from the licensee.
10.
Index of Acronyms and Initialisms
DR
ECCS -
ERFCS -
FEMA -
HPES -
-
IR
ISRS -
LCO
LER
LHSI -
MS
NRC
RWST -
SALP -
SNSOC -
SPDS -
DESIGN CHANGE PACKAGE
DESIGN CHANGE REQUEST
DEVIATION REPORT
EMERGENCY RESPONSE FACILITY COMPUTER SYSTEM
FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY
HUMAN PERFORMANCE EVALUATION SYSTEM
HEATING VENTILATION AND AIR CONDITIONING
INSTRUMENTATION AND CALIBRATION
INSPECTION REPORT
INSIDE RECIRCULATION SPRAY SYSTEM
LIMITING CONDITION OF OPERATION
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT
LOW HEAD SAFETY INJECTION
MOTOR OPERATED VALVE
NON-CITED VIOLATION
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
QUALITY ASSURANCE
REFUELING OUTAGE
REACTOR PROTECTION
REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK
SYSTEMATIC ASSESSMENT OF LICENSEE PERFORMANCE
SENIOR REACTOR OPERATOR
SAFETY INJECTION
STATION NUCLEAR SAFETY AND OPERATING COMMITTEE
SAFETY PARAMETER DISPLAY SYSTEM
TS
TV
UFSAR -
WPTS -
TEMPERATURE CONTROL VALVE
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION
TRIP VALVE
UPDATED FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT
VIOLATION
WORK ORDER
WORK PLANNING AND TRACKING SYSTEM
WORK REQUEST