ML18152A321
| ML18152A321 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 12/30/1991 |
| From: | Branch M, Fredrickson P, Tingen S, York J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18152A322 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-280-91-33, 50-281-91-33, NUDOCS 9201280083 | |
| Download: ML18152A321 (15) | |
See also: IR 05000280/1991033
Text
- UNITED STATES
- NUCLEA.R REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II .
101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323
. Report Nos.:* 50-280/91-33 and S0-281/91-33
itcen~ee: Virginia Electric and Power Company
5000 Dominion Boulevard:
Glen Allen, VA
23060
Docket Nos.:
50-280 and 50-281
Facility Name:
Surry 1 and 2
License Nos.:
Approved by: lJ\\N ~
\\t-.vlL
Scope:
P. E. Fredrickson, Section thief
Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
I ~~/J ()/e; (
Date Signed * *
This routine resident inspection was *conducted on site in the areas of plant
operatio~s, plant maintenance, plant surveillance, meeting. with local
officials, and cold weather preparations.
During the performance of this
inspection, the resident inspectors conducted review of the licensee
1s *
backshift or weekend operations on November 10, 13, 14 and 29, 1991.
Results:
In the operations functional ar~a, an unresolved item was identified
concerning the lack of safety evaluations for changes made in the facility
(paragraph 3.a).
.
_
. -
In the operations functional area, with the ,exception of performing safety
evaluations, implementation of the Administrative Control Program was
considered effective (paragraph 3.a).
9201280083 911230
ADOCK 05000280
G
.
2
In the operations functional area, a Technical. Specification violation was
- identified involving administrative controls for containment isolation valves
(paragraph 3.c).
In the operations functional area, fire brigade and control _room staffing were
considered effective ( paragraph 3. b) ..
REPORT DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
L ken see *Enip 1 oyees * *
R~ Allen, Super~isor, Shift Operations
W. Benthall, Supervisor, Licensing
- R. Bilyeu, Licensing Engineer
.
D~. Christian, *Assistant Station Manager
- J. Downs, Superinte*ndent of -Outage and Planning
D. ~rickson, Superintendent of Health Physics
R. Gwaltney, Superintendent of Maintenance
M. Kansler, Station Manager
T. Kendzia, Supervisor, Safety Engineering
H. Kibler, Engineer, Testin~
- J. McCarthy, Superintendent of Operations
. *A. Price, Assistant Station Manager
.
R. Saunders, Assistant Vice.President, Nuclear Operations
- '.*E. Smith, *Site Quality Assurance Manager
- T. Sowers, Superintendent of Engineering
- G. Thompson, Supervisor Maintenance Engineering
NRC Personnel
M. Branch, Senior Resident Inspector
- S. Tingen, Resident Inspector
- J. York, Resident Inspector
- Attended ex-it interview.
Other l i cense*e emp l 9yees contacted included contra l room opera tors, shift
technical advisors, shift supervisors and other plant personnel *
. On November 29, 1991, the Chairman _of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Dr. Ivan Selin, visited the Surry_Power Station for a familiarization
tour, to _meet with licensee management and staff, a.nd to review the
current status of the station.
Chairman Selin was accompanied by the'
following pers~nnel: -
_J. Milhoan, Deputy ~egional Administrator, Region II
P. Fredrickson, Section Chief, Branch 2A, Region II
C. Peabody, Special Assistant to the Chairman
NRC Resident Inspectors
The Chairman met with the resident inspectors and selected station
perscinnel and was given a presentation on the status of the* station by
licensee management.
He also was taken on a tour of the station
.including the turbine building, control room, training simulator, and the
independent spent fuel storage installation. The Chairman held a press
2
conference at the Surry Nuclear .Infonnation Center at the end. of his
visit.
Acronyms and initial isms used throughout this report are listed in the
- 1ast paragraph.
2.
Plant Status
Unit 1 began the reporting period in power operation.
The unit was at
power at the end. of the inspection. period, day 349 of. continuous
operation.
Unit 2 began the reporting period at 60 percent power because of leaking
condenser tubes but attained full power 1 ater in the same day. , The unit
was at power at the end of the inspection period, day 34 of continuous
operation.
3.
Operational Safety Verification (71707,42700,64704)
The inspectors conducted frequent visits to the control room to verify
proper st'affing, operator attentiveness a*nd adherence to approved
prbcedures.
The inspectors attended plant status meetings and reviewed
operator logs on a daily basis to. verify operations safety and compliance*
with TS and to* maintain awareness of the overall operation of the
facility.
Instrumentation and ECCS lineups were periodically reviewed
from control room indication to assess operability. Frequent plant tours
were conducted to observe equipment status, fire protection programs,
radiological work practices, plant security programs and housekeeping.
Deviation reports were reviewed to assure that potential safety concerns
were properly addressed and reported.*
a.
Review of Administrative Control Program
Administrative Procedure SUADM-0-26, Administrative Control of
Operational Components, dated October 31, 1991, describes how to
implement AC of valves9 breakers, pumps and other components. Two
examples of the use of AC are when a manual action is required to
ensure that a specific component will operate correctly, and valves
that are required to be locked shut.
Administrative control for
safety-related equipment requires SNSOC approval prior to use. These
controls are req~ired to be specified on AC forms contained* in
SUADM-0-26 or in a procedure approved by SNSOC.
Procedure SUADM-0-26
requires that each AC evolution be screened for a safety analysis in
accordance with VPAP-3001, Safety Evaluations, dated April 1, 1991.
The inspectors reviewed the following SUADM-0-26 AC forms:
AC Sl-91-0825A, dated August 8, 1991, provided instructions for
shutting valve l-SA-226, ESGR pneumatic equipment air supply*
valve, if an SI or fuel handling accident occurred.
When
operating pneumatic equipment in the ESGR, *a special watch is
stationed to immediately shut valve l-SA-226.
This valve is
required to be shut so that a breach in.the SA system outside of
3
the ESGR would not depresslirize the ESGR during an accident
condition.
AC Sl-91-808B, dated August 22, 1991, provided instructions for
removing a temporary hose running through the ESGR door if. a
fire or pressurization cif the ESGR was required.
The ESGR door
is~ fire ba~rier and pressure barrier. A watch was required to
be stationed ai the door and be able tb close the door when
notified by the control room or fire watch.
AC SI-91-0808, dated August 8, 1991, provided instructions -for
establishing controls when the ESGR entrance door flood dike was
removed.
A roving flood watch was established. A second person
was stationed to reinstall the dike if turbine building flooding
was inminent.
Based on the latest flooding issues, the licensee
discon.tinued the use of all AC instructions for removal of
turbine building flood dikes.
AC S2-91-0708, dated July 9, 1991, provided instructions for
establishing controls for removing the A RSSW valve pit missile
_.*shield.
If adverse weather was approaching that could generate
.a missi1e, the missfle shield was required to be reinstalled.
.
.
Each AC form package contained a safety analysis. The inspectors
considered that the above ACs and safety analysis were adequate. The
inspectors also reviewed the following SNSOC approved procedures that
established ACs.
OP 6.2.3, Administrative Control of 1-EG-15, 2-EG-15 or 3-EG-15,
dated January 20, 1990, provided instructions for control of the
EOG air starting system crosstie valve for each EOG.
Each EOG
has two air start banks that are normally isolated from each
.other by valve EG-15~
Each airbank has its own air compressor
to supply pressurized air to the air flasks in the bank.
When
an airbank's compressor is not operable, the airbank must be
filled with air by crossconnecting with the other airbank by
opening EG-.15. * The 'inspectors monitored an evolution where
2-EG-15 was placed under AC in accordance with OP 6.2.3 and
concluded that all procedural requirements involving special
briefings, communications, and instructions were met.
Review of
the procedure's activity screening checklist indicated that a
safety evaluation was not required for this evolution.
The
inspectors reviewed section 8.5 of the FSAR which stated that
each EOG is designed for reliable operation through the use of
redundant components.
One of these redundant components
discussed in the FSAR was duplicate air starting systems with
independent compr~ssors, valves, and accumulators.
The
inspectors considered that crosstonnecting the airbanks
was a
method of operation not addressed in th~ FSAR and therefore a
safety evaluation may be required.
4
0-P 52.2.1, Administrative Control of 1-FP-36, dated October 27,
1989, provided instructions for c6ntr61 of the motor driven fire_
pump recirculation valve 1-FP-36.
This valve is _normally shut
so that the fire suppression system's motor driven fire pump is
able to provide full water flow when automatically started on
low fire-main pressure.
During certain plant evolutions, the
fire suppres$ion system fire pump is utilized to provide water
for non.fire related functions, such as hydrolazing heat
exchangers.
The m.otor driven fire pump is frequently operated
for long_ periods of time with the recirculation valve 1-FP-36
open, and a watch -stationed to en*sure that the valve is shut
within ten minutes if the system was required to combat a fire.
TSs and the FSAR state that* the motor drhen fire pump is
requited to provide 2500 gpm of water*to the fire suppression *
system.
When the pump is aligned in the recirculation -ode, it*
is unable to provide 2500 gpm to the fire suppression sy$tem~
The licensee considers the fire suppression system to- be
operable in this configuration.
The inspectors consider that a
safety evaluation may be required to evaluate whether this
activity will adversely affect the ability of the fire*
.. :suppression system to combat a fire. *
.
.
1-MOP-8.25, Overriding VVl-SW-263, dated No.vember 8, 1991,
-provided instructions for manually overriding the capability of*
VVl-SW-263 to automatically close on receipt of smoke or fire
alarm.
A watch would be stationed at VVl-SW-263 who would shut
the valve within. two minutes after control room notification.
There are two tr~ins of SW that provfde cooling for the* HHS!
pumps' lube oil and seal coolers.
Normally the suctions of the
two trains are cross-connected via VVl-SW-263.
When a smoke or
fire alarm occurs, VVl-SW-263 automatically closes to separate
the trains of SW to the HHS! pumps.
When VVl-SW-263 is under
AC, the fire watches are required to notify the control room of
a fire, and operators would notify the watchstander to shut
VVl-SW-263.
Although the function of VVl-SW-263 is not
discussed in the FSAR, the 1 icensee performed a safety
evaluation for this evolution as required.
2-0P-49.7, Filling And Draining RSHX Service Water Supply.*
Piping, dated September 18, 1991~ provided instructions. to open
normally shut vent and drain valves in the SW system in order to
Operators were
required to be stationed in the turbine and safeguards buildings
to shut the vent and drain valves if SW to the RSHXs.auto-
matically initiated.
Review of the procedure's activity
screening checklist i.ndicated that a safety evaluation was not
required for this evolution.
The licensee considers the SW
system operable in this configuration .. Operation of the -SW
system in this condition is not addressed in TSs or FSAR.* The
inspectors *consider that a safety evaluation may be required to
evaluate whether this activity will adversely affect the
operation of the SW ( i * e. , adequate SW fl ow) sys tern or other
~----
5
systems located iri the area of the open vent arid drain valves
(i.e., flooding or spraying).
1-0P-7.7.2, Filling SI Accumulators,_dated November 15, 1991,
provided instructions to operate valve 1-SI-32 when filling the
1-SI-32 is a manual containment i sol ati on
valve that is normally locked shut.
When 1-SI-32 is open to
fill the accumulatbrs, an op~rator is stationed to shut the
valve if_ containment isolation is required.
Review of the
procedure's activity screening checklist indicated that a safety
evaluation was not required for this evolution.
Because the
above AC for locked manual containment isolation valves are
addressed by TSs, the -inspectors concluded that a safety
evaluation.was not_required.
10 CFR 50.59 and VPAP-3001 state that a documented technical
evaluation of a proposed facility or procedure ,change as described in
the safety analysis be performed to determine whether an activity
wi_ll have an adverse affect on plant systems or constitute .an
unreviewed safety question.
Pending further NRC review of this
matter,-
the need to perform safety evaluations for - procedures
OP-6.2.3, OP-52.2.1, and 2-0P-49.7 is identified as UNR 50-280,
281/91-33-01, Safety Evaluations for Changes in the Facility'.
b.
Adequacy of Nuclear -Power Plant Backshift Staffing When the Fire
Brigade is Required
c.
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's minimum shift crew composition
to ensure that there were an adequate number of operators on shift to
combat a fire and safely shutdown the plant.
10 CFR 50.54 control roorri minimum staffing requirements, TS Table
6.l-lminimum shift crew composition requirements, and TS 6.1.B.7
fire brigade staffing requirements were compared to actual .shift
staffing.
The inspectors concluded that shift staffing was adequate.
The fire brigade was composed of ROs not assigned to control room -
duties, non-licensed operator~, and security force members.
Administrative Control of Containment Isolation Valves
At the end of the previous inspection period, the -C MSTV bypass
valve, 2-MS-155 could not b~ fully closed.
This is a manual
containm~nt isolation valve that is required to be locked shut in
-order to establis_h containment integrity.
Because containment
integrity was required at the time of the valve failure, the licensee
entered the action statement of TS 3.0.1 that requires the equipment
be returned to service or the unit be in hot shutdown within six
hours.
Operators were able to shut the valve utilizing a hydraulic
jacking device and e~ited the LCO action ~taiement.
During subse-
quent tours of the-plant, the inspectors noted that the MSTVs
1 bypass
6
valves 1/2-MS-84, l/2~MS-116, and 1-MS-115, altho~gh shut, were not
locked shut.
Discussion with the licensee indicated that the valv.es
- had never been locked shut..
TS 3.8.A. l requires that* containment
integrity as defined in TS section 1.0, be established ~nless the
reactor is in a cold shutdown condition. TS 1.H defines containment
integrity as existing when an non-automatic isolation valves, except
those required for intermittent operation in the performance of .
normal
operation* activities are locked closed* and under
administrative control.
The failure to lock closed and maintain
administrative controls for containment isolation valves 1/2-MS-84, .
- l/2-MS-116, and l/2-MS-155 in accordance with TS 3.8.A.1 is *
identified as Violation 50-280,281/91-33-02, Failure to Maintain *
- Administrative Control* For Containment Isolation Valves *.
As a result
of this issue, the licensee reviewed containment integrity
requirements and identified a~ditional valves that. were not being
properly control led.
At the end of the inspec;tion period, the
licensee was in the process of establishing the reqtiired controls;
Containment isolation valves *a*re spec;:ified in TS Table 3.8.1 and
Section 5.2 of the FSAR.
Per the licensee, 10 CFR 50, Appendix A*
. reactor containment design basis criteria are not applicable to the
plant.
The inspectors review of TS and FSAR indicated that in some
instances these documents. do not specify the same requirements or
requirements are not clearly stated. For example, TS's list the main
steam line isolation valve~ as the main steam trip val~es, while the
FSAR states that.the turbine throttle valves and non-return valves
are the mainsteam* isolation valves.
Neither TSs nor FSAR state that
the MSTVs
1 bypass valves are containment isolation valves, however
the licensee considers them containment isolation valves.
At the end
of the inspection period, the licensee was inittating a corrective
.. action plan to improve the TS and FSAR*ba:sis for containment
isolation valves.
WitMn the areas inspected, one violation was identified.
4.
Surry Internal Flooding IPE Corrective Action Review (71500)
As discussed in IR 50-280,281/91-29 and IR 50-280,281/91-31, the licensee
committed in their October 28 and 29, 1991 letters, to implement several
interim and short term corrective actions to reduce the vulnerability of
the Surry plant to core damage due to postulated flooding scenarios. At
the conclusion of the special team inspection documented in IR 50-280,281/
91-31, the licensee agreed to continue their interim* programs and to .
complete the modifications discussed in their October 29, 1991, letter.
The purpose of this inspection was to document the NRC review of those
modifications and to document recent equipment failures and personnel
errors that may impact assumptions made as part of the IPE.
7
a.
Modifications.
On November 19 and 20, the inspectors reviewed the status of the two
modifications discus~ed in the licensee's October 29, 1991 letter.
The modifications described in the licensee's letter were as follows:
(1)
(2)
Charging pump cubicl~ drain lines will be modified to preverit
backflow.
Planned installation of backflow devices or temporary
installation of blank flanges to close the drain. lines will' be
completed.
This modification eliminates core damage sequences
that initiate from RWST supply floods in either safeguarqs
building.
Flow shields on the six expansion joints in the service water
supply lines for the BC and CC heat exchangers will be
installed.
The inspectors verified the licensee's implementation of these two
modi fi cati ans by reviewing the completed design change packages91-031 and 90-178.
The licensee elected to install backflow devices
in the charging pump cubicles rather than blanking them -0ff.
b.
Recent Equipment Failures and Personnel Errors
(1)
While removing Unit 1 C waterbox from service in accordance with
MOP-48.5, l-CW-MOV-106C was deenergized and tagged prior to the
valve being closed from the control room.
The valve was tagged
shut but was actually in the open position.
The error was
rectified by the licensee's independent verification process.
- The probable cause of this error was failure to follow the MOP
procedure and a failure to properly implement the tagging
process.* The licensee's corrective action involved discussions
with the operator and evaluation of the event using the HPES
process.
(2) While attempting to throttle open the D waterbox outlet valve,
2-MOV-CW 200D, the licensee discovered the MDV would not move in
. the open direction.
Ari operator at the MOV power supply
verified that the breaker contactor closed and the MOV motor did
energize to 6pen the valve as verified by the. operator at the
MDV Operator attempts to manually (or locally) close the MDV
were also unsuccessful.
The licensee quarantined the valve and
subsequent investigation indicated that the problem was in the
valve operator.
Since the NRC's MDV team was on site the resident inspectors
requested that the team *evaluate the licensee's corrective
actions associated with this recent failure *
(3)
An approximate 10 GPM leak from a 1/2 inch diameter corrosion
pit developed on the outlet side of IC waterbox.
The leak was
5.
(4)
8
on the South side of th~ 96 inch CW outlet .pipe approximately 20
inches above floor.
The piping is designed AWWA class and the
licensee* installed a 1/4 inch thick patch on the external _
surfac~ of the 96 inch pipe.
The* licensee determined that the
corrosion pit appea~ed to be localized and probably resulted
from a failure of the internal coating.
Plans were made to
effect final repair~ during the next refueling outage. At that
time the internal surface can be* repaired by .welding and
relocating.
Inspection of portions of the 96 inch outlet pipes for all eight
water boxes revea 1 ed that there have been many s_uch failures and *
_ repairs in the past.
Additionally, the inspectors questioned
the licensee on the apparent external rusting of the outlet
-piping where it penetrates the conc_rete floor.
During operation of 2-CW-MOV-206D, the manual clutch engagement
. linkage was found to be stuck.
To free the clutch engage~ent
linkage, two operators were required, one on the mezzanine and
one in the* ciftulating water inlet valve pit, tri reposition the
- linkage.
This action was necessary to allow local manual
operation of 2-CW-MOV-206D.
The licensee's initial corrective-
action was to submit WR No. 801051, issue a deviation report ,and
notify the shift supervisor.
The previous events were discussed with the NRR risk assessment branch who
- were evaluating the licensee_' s IPE.
The NRR personnel indicated that the
recent events would be considered as part of their !PE review.
Another commitment made by the licensee was to perform a visual inspection
-of one of the circulating water expansion joints on Unit 1 and this*
activity is discussed in paragraph _5.a.
Within the areas inspected, no violation was identified.
Maintenance Inspections (62703, 42700, 71500)
During the reporting period, ttie inspectors *reviewed mafotenance
activities*to ass*ure compliance with the appropriate procedures.
.
.
The following maintenance activities were reviewed.
a.
Visual Inspection of CW Expansion Joints
During the NRC exit meeting on November 21, 1991, the licensee
committed to visually inspect the condenser outlet B waterbox rubber
expansion joint.
An engineering work request (EWR No. 91~139) was
written to cover this work. This EWR gave the following conditions
that needed to be reported and evaluated:
-e
e
9
Internal Inspection of Expans{on Joint
Areas that feel soft and spongy (indication cif break in rubber
cover and water saturation of underlying fabric)
Thin areas or exposed fabric (indicative of an abrasion problem)
Crackin~ or hardened rubber (indicative of excessive temperature
or heat).
.
External Inspection of Expansion Joint
Leaking at the flange
Cracking on the outside cover (could be environmental attack or
aging)
Cracking at the base of the flange (this is the most critical
stress point)
. *Soft spots/delamination .(indication of p_ly separation)
Bulge between arch and flange (indication of broken reinforcement
caused by overpressure)
.
The inspectors observed the visual examination of the B waterbox
expansion joint on November 25~
There was some bulging, concavity,
sponginess, and linear separations found during the internal visual
examination.
Examination of the outer surfaces of the expansion
joint revealed spongy areas, several thinned areas, an area where the
outer ply was separated (almost one quadrant in length) and exposing
two metal ree_nforcing rings.
One of the rings had rusted
approximately half through the diameter.
As a result of the Unit 1 inspection, the licensee decided to inspect
the same B waterbox on Unit 2.
Visual inspection of the inside of
this joint revealed only three tears that exposed the fabric.
The
external inspection revealed-a number of soft spots but only one area
approximately five inches long where the metal reenforcing ring was
exposed.
As a result of these inspections and discussions with the
vendor, the licensee concluded that significant degradation to these
expan~ion joints had occurred.
A justification for continued opera-
tion (No. C-91-0006 dated November 29, 1991) has been completed and
reviewed by the inspectors.
The licensee has dee i ded to. inspect the remaining six expansion
joints (three for each unit) and is modifying the bottom periphery of
the existing expansion joint shields. This modification would reduce
the flow from 13,000 gpm to approximately 3,000 gpm or less from*a
ruptured expansion joint. The inspectors will continue to follow the
modifications and the inspections of the remaining expansion-joints.
- -**
10
b.
Troubleshooting the First Stage P~essure Loop
c.
On October 6, during the performance of .1-PT-2.8, First Stage
Pressure P-1-446, dated September 18, 1986, the unit began to ramp
back approximately 10 to 20 megawatts.
This occurred *while testing
channel III of first stage pressur~ loop 446.
The inspectors were
present in the control room for the retest on October 8,
arid the
unit began to decrease in power again (the No. 2 governor valve *began
to close).
On November 7, troubleshooting operations were performed
by selectively lifting leads* on the modules for the P 250 computer,
the AMSAC system, and the steam dump system.
The indication was that*
steam dump module TM-l-408W was* affecting. the perodic *test.
Work
Order No. 3800119385 was written to do further troubleshooting to
determine the exact cause of the problem.
The inspectors will
continue to follow this maintenance activity. -
Review of Maintenance Backlog
During the previous SALP period, it was pointed out that a maintenance
backlog problem continued to exist.
This problem had_ also been
identified in several of the previous SALP periods.
In the previous
period, both the number and average age of the non-outage items
increased.
The inspectors reviewed the current status of the
no".1-outage maintenance backlog with the licensee.
The corrective
maintenance work order backlog was approximately 800 at the beginning
of the current SALP assessment period and had dropped to 451 during
this inipection period.
The average age of these work orders. was
approximately 220 days at the beginning of this SALP period a*nd had
dropped to 68 days during this inspection period.
Within the areas inspected, no violations were identified.
6. _ Surveillance Inspections (61726, 42700) *
- During the reporting period, the inspectors reviewed surveillance
~ctivities to assure compliance with the appropriate procedure ~nd TS
requirements.
The following surveillance activity was reviewed:
a.
Unit 2 Containment Door Air Leakage Test
On November 15, the inspectors witnessed the performance of periodic
test 2-0PT-CT-303, Personnel Airlock Leakage Test (Door Seal Test),
dated March .12,1991.
The purpose of this procedure is to .test the
personnel airlock inner and outer door seals within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> after
opening to verify that the door seals were not damaged during use in
accordance with TS 4.4.B.2.
The inspectors witnessed the testing of
the Unit 2 containment* door.
The test was accomplished satisfac-
torily with no deficiencies noted.
Within the areas inspected, no violations were identified.
,*
11
7.
Information -Meetings with Local Officials (94600)
The Senior Resident Inspector met with the Board *of Supervisors of Surry
County on November 7, at the Surry Courthouse Complex.
The purpose of
this meeting was to discuss with the board the results of the_NRC's
inspection of corrective actions associ~ted with internal flooding as
noted .in the IPE and to answer any questions concerning this matter.
8.
Cold Weather Preparations (71714)
During this inspection period, the inspectors reviewed the licensee's
. program for implementation of protective measures for extreme cold
- weather.
The program is .implemented by monthly performances (October
through March) of STP-52, Cold Weather Protection, dated February 27,
1990.
This special procedure is a detailed checklist of areas and
.components that need to be routinely inspected to ensure that there is
. adequate protection to prevent freezing.
The majority of* STP-52 is
performed by operations department personnel.
Maintenance department
personnel are required to verify that piping heater tape operates satis-
. factory.
Deficienc-ies that are noted during the performance of STP-52 are
documented* *and provided to planning to schedule corrective action.
The
inspectors reviewed the performance copy of STP-52 that was completed in
November, reviewed the list of deficiencies generated by the performance
of STP-52, and also checked the w6rk-status of these deficiencies.
The *
inspectors concluded that STP-52 contained adequate instructions to
prevent freezing, and that operations and maintenance department personnel
satisfactorily performed the procedure.
However, the inspectors noted that the deficiencies generated by the
performance of STP-52 were not being completed in a timely matter.
Specifically, the inspector monitored the status of the low-level intake
structure. and noted that the .completion of the insulation of the recent
heat tracing for the service water system was* not scheduled until the end
of December.
The inspectors discussed the late December completion of
heat tracing insulation with plant management.
The licensee has placed
- additional* attention* on the timely completion o.f the needed freeze
protection repairs as indicated by placing it .on the station priority
list.
The inspectors. did not consider this*. a significant deficiency
because extreme cold weather has not occurred, and if extreme cold weather
was forecast, the list of STP-52 deficiencies could be corrected in a .
short period of time if they are .assigned a higher priority on the POD ..
Additionally, installation of temporary insulation and space heaters could
also be used to correct the identified deficiencies.
Within ihe areas inspected, no ~iolations were identified *
12
9.
Exit Interview
The inspection scope and results were sununar.ized on ~ovember 8, 1991, with
those individuals identified by an *asterisk in paragraph 1. The following
sununary of inspection activity was discussed by the* inspectors during this
exit.
Item Number
URI 280,281/91~33-01
VIO 280,281/91-33-02
Status
Description and Reference
Open
Safety Evaluations for Changes in the
Facility, paragraph 3.a.
Open
Failure To Maintain Administrative
Controls For Containment Isolation
Valves, paragraph 3.c.
The licensee acknowledged the inspection conclusions.
However, the
1 icensee indicated that they did not agree that there was a need to
perform a safety evaluation for those procedures listed in UNR 280,281/
91-33..;.Ql.
The inspectors informed the 1 i censee that their position would
be co~sid~ted as part of the NRC review of this issue .. The licensee did
not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed
by the inspectors during this inspection.
11.
Index of Acronyms and Initialisms
AWWA
cc .
CFR
cw
EOG
GPM
HPES
LCO
LER
MER
MOP
MSTV
NRC
ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS
ATWAS MITIGATION SYSTEM ACTUATION CIRCUIT
AMERICAN WATER WORKS ASSOCIATION
BEARING COOLING
COMPONENT COOLING
CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS
CIRCULATING WATER
ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE
EMERGENCY SWITCHGEAR ROOM
ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST
FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT
GALLONS PER MINUTE
HIGH HEAD SAFETY INJECTION
HUMAN PERFORMANCE ENHANCEMENT SYSTEM
INDEPENDENT PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
LIMITING CONDITION OF OPERATION
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT
.
MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT ROOM
MAINTENANCE OPERATING PROCEDURE
MOTOR OPERATED VALVE
MAIN STEAM TRIP VALVE
NON-CITED VIOLATION
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
RSSW
SNSOC
SUADM
.sw
TS
-*
.,.
13
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
C PLAN OF THE DAY
RECIRCULATION SPRAY HEAT EXCHANGER
REACTOR OPERATOR
RECIRCULATION SPRAY SERVICE WATER
REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK
SERVICE AIR
SYSTEMATIC ASSESSMENT OF LICENSEE PERFORMANCE
SAFETY INJECTION
STATION NUCLEAR AND SAFETY OPERATING COMMITTEE
- SENIOR REACTOR OPERATOR
SURRY ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS
UNRESOLVED ITEM
\\ilORK REQUEST