ML18152A100
| ML18152A100 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 09/27/1989 |
| From: | Fredrickson P, Holland W, Larry Nicholson, York J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18152A101 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-280-89-24, 50-281-89-24, NUDOCS 8910100061 | |
| Download: ML18152A100 (24) | |
See also: IR 05000280/1989024
Text
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323
50-280/89-24 and 50-281/89-24
Licensee:
Virginia Electric and Powef Company
5000 Dominion Boulevard
Glen Allen, VA
23060
Docket Nos.:
50-280 and 50-281
Facility Name:
Surry* 1 and 2
License Nos.:
Inspection Conducted:
Inspectors:
July 30 - September 2, 1989
Inspector
q -J.c,-39
Date Signed
J. W. York,
C/-2& **fY}
Date Signed
L.
Approved by:
1-::z_/t., -8y
Date Signed
-z --i1
P. E. Fredrickson, Section
Division of Reactor Project
Date
i gned
SUMMARY
Scope:
This routine resident inspection was conducted o.n site in *the areas of plant
operations, plant maintenance, plant surveillance, licensee event report
review, and followup on inspector identified items.
Certain tours were conducted on backshifts or weekends.
Backshift or weekend
tours were conducted on July 30, August 1, 6, 7, 13, 20, 25, 27, 31, and
September 2.
Results:
During this inspection period, three violations were identified.
The
violations identified were:
Failure to comply with the requirements of Technical Specification 3.0.1
with regards to the action statement (paragraph 3.f (4)).
Failure to follow
when
performing
operability test
(paragraph 6.a).
procedures as required by Technical Specification 6.4
periodic test 1-PT-15.lC,
involving
the
monthly
for the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater
pump
2
Failure to test station batteries within the specified intervals as
- required by Technical Specification 4.6.C (paragraph 6.b).
In addition, apparent violations were identified for:
Failure of personnel to follow procedures regarding high radiation area
access requirements (paragraph 3.b).
This apparent violation will be
reviewed by the NRC for appropriate enforcement action.
Failure to take appropriate corrective action for past problems identified
during performance of maintenance activities (paragraph 5.a).
This
apparent violation will be reviewed by the NRC for appropriat.e enforcement
. action.
One inspector followup item (paragraph 3.b) was identified for followup on
licensee evaluation of differences in dosimetry readout.
One inspector followup item (paragraph 5.b) ~was identified.for followup on
licensee review of electrical contractor breaker overhaul practices.
One inspector followup item (paragraph 8) was identified for followup on
the licensee's review of internal station communication issues. *
A weakness (paragraph 9) was noted in the licensee's process for determining
reportabil ity of events as required by 10 CFR 50. 72.
A strength (paragraph 3.d) was noted regarding the housekeeping and cleanliness
condition of the Unit 1 safeguards valve pit and pump pit areas .
REPORT DETAILS
1.
PERSONS CONTACTED
2.
Licensee Employees
- W. Benthall, Supervisor, Licensing
- R. Bilyeu, Licensing Engineer
- R. Blount, Superintendent of Technical Services
- E. Brennan, Supervisor, Mechanical Maintenanc~
- D. Christian, Assistant Station Manager
- 0. Erickson, Superintendent of Health Physics
- E. Grecheck, Assistant Station Manager
- M. Kansler, Station Manager
- J. McCarthy, Superintendent of Operations
G. Miller, Licensing Coordinator, Surry
- J. Ogren, Superintendent of Miintenance
- T. Sowers, Superintendent of Engineering
- A. Price, Site Quality Assurance Manager
Other licensee employees contacted included ctintrol room operators, shift
technical advisors, shift supervisors and other plant personnel.
- Attended exit interview .
Acronyms and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the
last paragraph.
Plant Status*
Unit 1 began the reporting period in power operation. The unit operated
at power for-the duration of the inspection period.
Unit 2 began the reporting period in a cold shutdown condition.
The
licensee completed the majority of maintenance activities in preparation
for heatup above 200 degrees F.
Operation activities accomplished during
this period included fill and vent of the RCS, establishment of proper
primary plant chemistry, and drawing of a pressurizer bubble.
In
addition, special testing of the
2H emergency electrical bus was
completed. At the end of the inspection period, the unit remained in cold
shutdown.
3.
Operational Safety Verification (71707)
a.
Daily Inspections
The inspectors conducted daily inspections in the following areas:
control room staffing, access, *and operator behavior; operator
adherence to approved procedures, TS and LCOs; examination of panels
containing instrumentation and other.RPS elements to determine that
required channels are operable; and review of control room operator
. I
I
2
logs, operating orders, plant deviation reports, tagout logs, jumper
logs, and tags on components to verify compliance with approved
procedures.
b.
Weekly Inspect_ions
The inspe~tors conducted-weekly inspections in the following areas:
verification of operability of selected ESF systems by valve
alignment, breaker positions, condition of equipment or components,
and operability of instrumentation and support items essential to
system actuation or- performance. Pl ant tours were
conducted which
included observation of general plant/equipment conditions, fire
protection and preventative measures-, control of activities - in
progress, radiation protection controls, physical security controls,
plant housekeeping conditions/cleanliness, and missile hazafds.
The
inspectors routinely monitored the temperature _of the AFW pump
discharge piping to ensure that increases in temperature were
properly m_onitored and evaluated by the licensee.
During this inspection period, th~ licensee identified two problems
- associated with.the radiological protection program at the station.
Both problems were identified by the licensee as violations of TS 6.4.B.
The license and regulatory requirments, a description of the
apparent violations, and the licensee's corrective actions are as
follows.
10 CFR 19.12 requires in part that all individuals working in or
frequenting any-portions of a restricted area shall be instructed to
observe, to the extent within the workers control, the applicable
provisions of the Commission *regulations for the protection of
personnel from exposure to radiation occurring in such areas.
- -
TS 6.4.8."l requires, in part, that con_trol of entry_ of personnel into
radiation* areas greater than
1 * rem/hr be provided by locked
barricades to prevent unauthorized entry.
The TS also requires that
any individual or group of individuals permitted to enter a high
radiation area be provided with a radiation monitoring device which
continuously indicates the dose rate in the area.
TS 6.4.D requires that radi~tion control procedures be followed.
The
licensee's Radiat_ion Protection Plan, Chapter II, Attachment 11-1
requires, in item 2, that individuals obey posted, verbal, and
written HP instructions.
HP procedure 5.3.20, Initiating, Using, Extending, and Terminating an
RWP, Section 4.3.1.d, requires checkout of a survey meter and high
radiation area keys for entry into a high radiation area, if required
by a RWP.
On Augu~t 7, *1989, licensee personn~l informed the inspector that an
individual was observed on the excess letdown flats, a locked, posted
t .
3
high radiation area in the Unit 2 containment.
The i~dividual was
performing work in the area without authorization from HP to eriter
the area.
Radiation levels in the area ranged from a 1.2 R/hr hot
spot to 80 mrem/hr general area dose rate. When questioned by an HP
technician, the individual related that he called the HP rover on the
- plant communication system but did not get any response.
The
individual then entered the excess letdown flats by circumventing the
locked high radiation barrier (a- ladder) via a charcoal filter
bunker, and climbed into the area. The HP rover directed the worker
to immediately exit the area and report to the HP control point.
determined the worker's dose for the entry to be 3 mrem.
Failure of
personnel to follow the station radiation protection procedures by
_ obtaining HP authorization * and access keys prior to entering a
locked, high radiation area, as required by 10 CFR 19.12 and TS 6.4.D,
is identified as
an
example
-Of
apparent violation
281/89-24-04.
When licensee management* became aware of the event, all work in the
RCA was halted.
On August 8, 1989, special 1 and 1/2 hour sessions
were conducted with all radiation wo.rkers at the station concerning
compliance with station HP requirements.
During the meetings, senior
station manigement made it clear to the station and contractor staffs
that adherence to procedures ,and attention to detail in all areas
wer~ required. Those who believed differently were told to consider
terminating their employment at the station.*
The second problem, whi~h occurred on August 9, involved two contract
workers entering a high radiation area in the Unit 2 containment
without a dose rate meter.
After approximately five minutes, the
workers realized their mistake and exited the area. Similar to the
first instance, when the problem became known to HP personnel,
immediate actions were taken. The licensee identified the violation
in a deviation report and excluded the workers that were involved
from the RCA.
HP determined that the two workers' doses were 3 mrem
and 5 mrem for the entry.* Dose r'ates in the area ranged from 5
mrem/hr to* 150 mrem/hr.
Addition*a1 corrective actions included
posting of watches at the entrance of each high radiation area to
- ensure that workers have proper instructions and radiological
equipment prior to entering the area.
Failure of personnel to have a
dose rate monitoring device when entering a high radiation area, as
required by HP procedure 5.3.20, 10 CFR 19.12, and TS 6.4.8.1 is
identified as another example of apparent violation 281/89-24-04.
Both violations were immediately identified to the inspector and
discussions were held with licensee management.
In each case, the
persons involved were terminated from working at the station.
Licensee management made it known to all employees that termination
would be the action taken for future violations of radiological
requirements. These two events are a continuation of four previously
identified NCVs (IR No. 280, 281/89-23).
The inspector also noted
- - - - -
- -
4
that a similar violation of high radiation access areas occurred in
May 1988 ..
On August 17, *. 1989, the licensee informed the inspector that a
maintenance worker received a radiation dose in
excess o.f his
assigned administrative limit when working on a c.heck valve. in the
Unit.2 containment._ The administrative overexposure was recorded on
the worker's gonad dosimetry as being approximately 821. mrem.
This
dose, when added to the worker's previous.e~posure, totaled 1802 mrem
for the. quarter; 52 mrem higher than the assigned administrative
limit of 1750 mrem.
The licensee conducted an investigation into the
administrative overexposure and concluded that all actions taken by
the mecha~ics and HP technicians on the job were appropriate. * The
licensee further concluded that all personnel involved were familiar
with the exp6~ure rates in the area and responded proactively to stay
time limits and SRO readings.* However, the licensee was in the
process of eva,luating the differences between the readings of the
SRDs and the TLDs when the report period ended.
This issue will be
reviewed by regional HP inspectors during subsequerit inspections and
is identified as
!FI 280,281/89-24-06,
followup
on
l~censee
evaluation of differences in dosimetry readouts.
c.
Biweekly Inspections
d.
The inspectors conducted biweekly inspections in the following are~s:
verification review and walkdown*of safety-related tagouts in effect;
review of samplin'g program (e.g., primary and secondary coolant
samples, boric acid tank samples, plant liquid and gaseous samples);
observation of control room shift turnover; review of implementation
of the_ plant problem identification system; verification of selected
portions of containment isolation lineups; and verification that
- notices to workers are posted as requi.red by 10 CFR 19.
Other Inspection Activities
Inspections included areas in the Units 1 and 2 cable vaults, vital
battery rooms, steam safeguards areas, emergency switchgear rooms,.
diesel generator rooms, control room, auxiliary building, Unit 1 *and
Unit 2 containments, cable penetration areas, independent spent fuel
storage facility, low level intake structure, and the safeguards
valve pit and pump pit areas. Reactor coolant system leak rates were
reviewed to ensure that detected or suspected leakage from the system
was recorded, investigated, and evaluated; and that appropriate
actions were
taken, if required.
The
inspectors
routinely
independently calculated RCS leak rates using the NRC Independent*
Measurements Leak Rate Program (RCSLK9).
On a regular basis, RWPs
were reviewed and specific work activities were monitored to assure
they were _being conducted per the
RWPs.
Selected radiation
.
protection ; nstruments were peri odi ca 1 ly checked, and *equipment
operability and calibration frequency were verified .
5
During the inspector's tour of the Unit -1 safeguards valve pit and
pump pit areas, it was noted that these areas had recently been
decontaminated and released -s* cleari areas.
Of particular note wis
the condition of the valve pit area where several safety-related MOVs
are located .. The inspe~tor noted that all components appeared to be
in good working order and that the general cleanliness in this
difficult-to-access area was excellent. The inspector believes that
the conditions observed during this tour is a positive indicator of
improvements in working and material condi~ions.
On August 22, 1989, during a routine walk.down of 'the Unit 1 SI
system, the inspectors noticed that the flow orifice for flow element
FE-1946 was installed backwards.
This is the flow element that
measures discharge flow from the low h.ead SI pump 1-SI-P-lB.
The
inspectors identified this discrepancy to the licensee-and expressed
concern over the operabi 1 i ty of * the pump and the method -for
installing fiow orifices. The licensee declared the pump inoperable
at- *1535 hours on August 22 and entered a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> LCO to reverse the
orifice and test the pump.
The pump was tested.satisfactorily and
returned to service at 0800 hours0.00926 days <br />0.222 hours <br />0.00132 weeks <br />3.044e-4 months <br /> on August 23.
Further discussion
regarding the installation of this Orifice is inclOded in paragraph
5.
e.
Physical Security Program Inspections
In the course of monthly activities, the inspectors included a review
of the licensee Is physical . security program.
The performance of
various shifts of the security force was observed in the conduct of
daily activities to include: protected and vital areas access
controls~ * searching of personnel, packages and vehicles; badge
issuance and retrieval; escorting of visitors; and patrols and
compensatory posts.
f.
Licensee 10 CFR 50.72 Reports
(1)
On July 31, 1989, the licensee made a report in accordan~e with
10 CFR 50. 72 concerning to the tripp;'ng of the auxiliary
building normal ventilation supply and exhaust fans. These fans
will trip on a SI signal so that the ventilation system is
realigned to filtered exhaust (emergency alignment); however, no
SI signal was present.
The licensee initially determined that
the fans tripped due to a decrease in air pressure in the fan's
pneumatic control header caused by the opening of four air
operated dampers.
At the time of the event, the dampers were
being opened by control room operators as* part of a normal
evolution.
Additional engineering investigation revealed that
the actuation occurred due to a combination of leaking
mechanical connections on the pneumatic control header, and the
operation of the four dampers, reducing the IA header pressure
below the trip setpoint.
An LER was submitted on this event on
August 30, 1989.
The inspectors will address the licensee's
corrective actions during closeout of the LER.
(2)
(3)
( 4)
6
On August 13, 1989, the licensee made a report in accordance*.
with 10 CFR 50.72 regarding an inadvertent ESF actuation of one
of the two auxiliary building emergency ventilation fans.* The
actuation was due to improper landing of electrical leads on.a
pressure swi.tch, causing* the automatic operation of the
11811
train emerg.ericy ventilation fan.
Immediate corrective actions
included proper retermination of the electrical leads and
returning the emergency ventilation fari
to service.
The
licensee initiated an HPES review of this problem and will
address the resultant findings * after management review.* The
licensee will also submit an LER.
The inspectors will review
the HPES findings and licensee's corrective actions during
closeout of the LER.
On August .14, 1989, the licensee made a report in accordance
with 10 CFR 50.72 concerning an automatic start of the Unit 2
118
11 charging pump (high head SI pump).
The event was caused by
a operator inadvertently bumping the pump start switch* out of
the
11 pull to lock" position (the switch was not properly engaged
in. that positi.on).
The pump auto-started due to low discharge
header pressure.
The low pressure indication was based on the
fact that no other pumps were running due to the unit being in a
cold shutdown condition. During the event, the charging pump
discharge flowpath was isolated.for other testing, preventing
fl ow to the RCS.
This. event occurred on August 13 and was
determined to not be reportable; however, a determi~ation was
made the next day that the. event should be reported as an
information call.
- On August 15, 1989, the licensee made a report in accordance
with 10 CFR 50.72 concerning the failure to accomplish the
required TS stirveillance testing on the Unit 1 RPS permissive
interlock P-10
prior to unit startup.
The
surveillance
- requirements are contained in TS 4.1.A.2 and TS Table 4.1-A.
The licensee discovered the problem during an ongoing review of
the TS surveillance requirements.
After identification of the
missed survei]lance to the SNSOC, the licensee entered TS 3.0.1,
which requires that the unit be placed in hot shutdown within
the . next six hours.
The licensee prep a red a JCO for the
discovered condition; and, after review and approval by .the
SNSOC,
the licensee exited TS 3.0.1.
Testing on the P-10
interlock logic was completed on August 16, and at that time a
SNSOC review determined that all required testing had been
accomplished.
The licensee made a followup call to the NRC.
After review of the event by the NRC on August 16, the licensee
was questioned with regards to their exiting TS 3.0.1 without
either taking the shutdown action required by TS 3.0.1, or
completing the P-10 surveillance requirement of TS 4.1.A.2.
The
licensee concluded that after the JCO had been prepared and
approved addressing compensatory measures,
the appropriate
g.
(5)
7
actions had been completed to exit TS 3.0.1.. After further*
discussion of this issue with the NRC, licensee senior manage-
ment
agreed that incorrect action was taken and the correct
action .in the case. would ha~e been to comply with TS 3.0.1 or
request discretionary enforcement.
Failure to comply with the
requirements
of
is
identified
as
_violation *
280/89-24-01.
On August 18, 1989,_ the licensee made a report in accordance
with 10 CFR 50.72 regarding an inadvertent ESF actuation of the
Unit 2
11A
11 train Phase 1 recirculation mode transfer system.
The **a.ctuation was
caused. by
inadvertent touching of an
electr.ical contact by an.electrician while connecting a jumper
to an adjacent circuit in accordance with a modification
procedure.
The licensee will submit an LER on this eyent.
Restart Readiness Assessment Review - Unit 2
During this
inspection
period, the
inspectors monitor~d
the
licensee 1 s managem~nt review of all functional areas associated with
the ret~rn to operation of Unit 2 .. These functional areas included
operations, maintenance,
surveillance, engineering, radiological
controls,
safety assessment,
and
quality
verification.
The
management team involved in these reviews included the Station
Manager, the two Assistant Stat ion Managers, the Quality assurance
ManagerL and th~ Assistant Vice President, Nuclear Operations.
The
initial reviews of each functional area were held on August 1, 1989.
The review~ consisted of the superintendents of the functional areas
addressing why their area of responsibility should be considered
ready for restart.
The following items were reviewed in each functional area:
Operations
-
Material
condition
walkdowns,
housekeeping
walkdowns, safety_system lineups, chemistry control readiness,
annunciator review,
system status log requirements, action
statement log requfrements, temporary modification log status,
post-maintenance testing, selected critical valve third checks,
and required startup training.
Maintenance"" Material condition walk.downs, work order backlog,
issues,
check valve iss~es,
steam generator issues, .
preventative maintenance status, and electrical 4160V and 480V
breakers.*
Surveillance -
Periodic testing program, American Society of
Mechnical
Engineers
Section
XI
program,
erosion/corrosion
program, and Type Band C testing.
Engineering -
EWR backlog review, Type 1 backlog review,
technical reviews of DCPs and EWRs, MOV issues, snubbers, root
8
cause evaluations, applicable JCOs, el~ctrical terminations, ESF
testing, IA system, and drawings update.
Radiological Controls -* Contaminated area reduct1on, personnel
contamination reports, exposure evaluation, hot spot reduction,
contamination
controls,
shielding,
technician
availability and effectiveness, and radiological engineering
controls.
. Safety Assessment - NRC commitments, commitment tracking system
items,
operational
events, . HPES * recommendations,
industry
experience, North Anna startup issues review for applicability,
, TS changes, and SNSOC reviews of deviation report backlog.
The inspectors attended this meeting and agreed with the licensee's
conclusion that, in general, there was too much work outstanding to
allow an effective restart decision process. Presentations by the QA
Manager and the HP _Superintendent were * noted to be thorough and
comprehensive.
Within the areas inspected, one violation and one
apparent violation were identified.
4.
Operational Readiness Assurance Program ~ev,ew - Unit 2 (71710)
During the inspection period, th~ inspectors conducted a review of ihe
licensee's QA organization's overview of activities associated with Unit 2
operational readiness assurance program implementation.
The inspectors
noted that the QA performance group conducted independent wa l kdowns on
portions of the IA, SI, AFW, and CCW systems located in U_nit 2
containment.
All of these systems were previously walked down by the
systems engineers.
The QA wa l kdowns were performed to provide an
assessment of the systems engineers. wa l kdowns.
A list of discrepant
conditions found by QA, some of which had been identified by engineering;
and others that appeared not to have been identified, was submitted to
engineering for review.
Some of the conditions noted by QA were as
fo 11 ows:
Valves not labeled - Of the ten valves identified by QA as not having
tags, one valve was missed by the systems engineer.
Incomplete bolting thread engagement - During the walkdown of Unit 1,
incomplete bolting thread engagement was also*found on some of the*
components, but all of these were evaluated by design engineering as
acceptable (full thread engagement is not required to _develop the
full strength of a bolt). The systems engineers us~d the experience
gained on Unit t to determine that similar thread engagements found
on Unit 2 were acceptable.* Evaluations_ were made by the systems
engineers but were not recorded on inspection documentation.
Teflon tape on threaded connections in the IA system and at solenoid
operated valves in the SI system - Engineering stated that the use of
9
teflon tipe is not an operational c6hcern and will not result in the
failure of a component to perform its intended fun~tlon.
Material. discrepancies. such as leaks, missing bolts on junction
boxes, br9ken electr1cal conduit connections, supports not painted,
and rust on some components -
Nine of the twenty-seven items
identified by QA were a1so identified and recorded by the systems
engineers.
Most of the 1 eaks -and rusty areas were eva 1 uated by the
systems engineers during the walkdowns as not being significant and
~ere therefore not recorded.
Some of the other discrepanci~s were
not pa rt of the wa 1 kdown criteria, nor the wa 1 kdown boundary, or
occurred due to work or some other activity after- the systems
engineers performed their walkdowns..
.
Two 1/2 inch diamet~r lines ~nd four level transmitters not a~pearfng
to meet seismic class I requirements - Instead of performing the
calculations to determine whether the supports or lack of in certain
areas would have been adequate in a seismic event, the decision was
made to add or modify supports.
Paint splatter on SI piping - Unit 1 also had paint splatter on some
of the piping and* the condition was evaluated, as not being
detrimental.
The painting work procedure was recently revised to
address splatter protection.
The systems engineers had been instructed to make some decisions during
the walkdown based on the experience gained in the review and resolu.tion
of Unit 1 walk.down items ..
The QA engineers had conducted their overview
walkdowns of selected systems based on original requirements stated in the
engineering package.
These original requirements were to identify ,all
di~crepancies and not to. use engineering judgement in deficiency
identificatio.n.
EWR 88-584A, which was used for walkdowns, had a field
.change added to clarify the systems engineers instructions for the Unit 2
walkdown.
On August 18, 1989, QA, systems engineering, and an NRC inspector entered
the Unit 2 containment to determine the status of the items identified in
the previous QA walk.down.
The items that engineering stated would be
corrected before startup were either completed or in the progress of being
completed. Another walkdown *by QA and systems engineering was performed
on August 21, 1989.
This walkdown was performed on the CCW system from
the containment penetratio~s to the reactor containment air recirculation
coolers.
This area was chosen because a QC inspector had written a
station deviation on rusted piping penetrations in this area.
No
additional significant issues were identified curing this walkdown.
The
inspectors concluded, based on review of the systems engineers and QA
walkdowns, that appropriate resolution of disparities identified in the
walkdowns for Unit 2 were adequate.
Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified .
5.
10
Maintenance Inspections (62703 & 42700)
During the inspection period, the .inspectors re~iewed maintenance
activities to assure -compliance with the appropriate procedures.
Additional effort. was focused on verifying that previously identified
problems had been adequately corrected.
a.
Maintenance Corrective Action Issues
'
.
A review of several work packages revealed inconsistencies in
maintaining system cleanliness and the methods for obtaining torque
va 1 ues for system fasteners.
These are two areas that have been
previously identified as being deficient.
For example, IR 280,
281/88-28 issued a violation identifying a pr6grammatic breakdown in
the controls and procedures used to maintain system foreign material
exclusion.
In addition, several examples of improper torquing were
identified during. the service water SSFI inspection (IR 280,
281/88-32), and a violation was issued in a letter dated May 18,
1989.
The inspectors focused on. these two areas of inconsistencies
and identified numerous examples, as detailed below, where the
corrective actions taken in response to the above violations were
ineffective. The inspectors also focused on installation of orifices
after identifying a case where an orifice was installed incorrectly.
Failure to take appropriate corrective actj6ns for previously
- identified.maintenance problems is tdentified as apparent violation
280, 281/89-24-05. .
-
Near the end of the inspection period, the licensee implemented a new
administrative procedu~e to address the cleanliness requirements.
Also, a new maintenance procedure for orifice plate inspections was
implemented.
These procedures were identified to the inspectors;
however, their effectiveness has not been determined and wil 1 be
reviewed during future inspections.
(1) Cleanliness Control
The licensee opened and repaired several SI check valves during
the inspection period. These check valves were worked because
of identified internal and/or body to bonnet* leakage concerns,
. Some of the valves identified as having internal leakage are
interface va 1 ves between the RCS and the SI system.
The
inspectors reviewed the work associated with several check
valves in the Unit 2 SI system.
This work was performed on 6
inch Velan check valves in accordance with maintenance procedure
MMP-C-Sl-195.
The specific valves and accompanying work orders
reviewed by the-inspectors are as follows:
2-SI-79
2;..SI-88
2-SI-91
2-SI;..226
2-SI-24"1 *
11
- Work Order #3800071696
During these reviews, the inspectors were informed that on
August 14, 1989, a bolt was inadvertently dropped into the body
of SI check valve 2-SI-79. The bolt was from a machine that was
being installed and adjustEid for lapping the valve seat.
The
bolt was later found and retrieved from the RCS primary loop
piping.
As a result of the above incident, the inspectors reviewed the
licensee's program for foreign material exclusion, including
compliance with their response to an NRC enforcement action
taken last year involving programmatic weaknesses in this area.
The licensee's response, dated December 9, 1988, stated that the
Superintendent of Maintenance issued a standing order to ensure
that foreign material is prevented from entering a system or
componerit during the performance of maintenance activities. The
inspectori reviewed maintenance standtng order 88-1, dated July
29, 1988, System Cleanliness, and concluded that implemen-tation
of this order has been ineffective. Specific deficiencies noted
are as follows:
Item 4 of the standing order mandates that requirements be
deviated into a procedure to either install a temporary
cover on all openings or an individual be assigned to
continuously monitor the openings and an
inspection
performed *to ensure ~leanliness immediately prior to
sealing the opening.
This was not accomplished in that
MMP-C-SI~l95 did not contain the specific requirements.
Item 7 of the standing order require~ that all personnel,
including contractors,
performing ~ork. that involves
opening a system or component sha 11
read and sign to
acknowledge that they have read the standing order.
Contrary to this requirement, personne 1 performing work
inside *the check valves did not read and sign to indicate
an understanding of the *standing order.
The inspectors concluded that the licensee has not effectively
implemented th.e corrective actions developed in response to
previous violations regarding
foreign material
exclusion.
Discussions with maintenance department personnel and a sampling
of other maintenance procedures indicates that this weakness was
widespread in most work involvin*g open systems. Additional
examples of this weakness are discussed in paragraphs 5.a(3) and
5.a(4).
Compliance with instructions specified in maintenance
standing orders is further hampered by the fact that the main~
tenance department does not have a procedu~e that defines the
12
implementation and use of standing orders.
In addition, the
maintenance department does not have a program in place to
ensure that craft personnel are aware of the standing order
requirements.
Although it was evident that an effort was made
to establish and maintain an accountability area for work on
check val~e 2-SI-79, a decision was made within the maintenance
department to proceed with the job in lieu of developing an
acceptable meth1?d of foreign material exclusion.
The dropped
b~lt into check valve resulted in expending 2.735 mrem to *find
and retrieve it, and also required the RCS water level to be
maintained for a longer period of time in a reduced inventory
condition.
The weaknesses in th~ implementation of the
cleanliness program for maintehance activities associated with
the preceeding check valve repairs are identified as an example
of apparent -violati~n 280, 281/89-24-05,
for failure to take
appropriate corrective action for past problems identified
during performance of maintenance activities.
(2)
Fastener Torquing Issues
During this inspection* period, the licensee identified several
problems associatE!d with appropriate materi.al identification/
torquing of the check valve fasteners. Based 6n these identified
discrepancies, the inspectors reviewed the follo~ing work
packages
with
regards
to the
licensee's
program
for
indentification and torquing of fasteners:
2-SI-79
2-SI-88
2-SI-91
1-SI-FE-1946
Work Order #3800076509*
The inspectors reviewed maintenance standing order 89-1, dated
May 22, 1989, Torque Values.
Upon examining the above listed
work packages, the inspector noted that the following items of
the standing ord_er were not being adhered to in some of the
packages:
Item 1 of the standing order states that all torque values
- listed in procedures wi 11
be verified by maintenance
engineering prior to torquing, and this individual will
initial the torque value* in the procedure. In the work
packages for 2-SI-91 and 1-SI-FE-1946, torquing values for
the flange bolts were not verified and initialed by
maintenance engineering as
required.
It was
later
deter.mined that the 2-SI-91 valve hinge bolts
were
overt_orqued without any reference in the procedure of the
required torque value.
13
Item 5 of the standing order states that if a maintenance
engineering representative is not available on sit~. torque
value verification may be made by telephone and noted on
the proce_dure or work order.
In work packages for 2-SI-91
and l-SI-FE-1946, tcirque value verification was not noted
on the procedure or work order.
Iri the package for check valve 2-SI-88, a maintenance
transmittal form stated that if the hinge bracket bolts
were ASTM SA 193 grade 86~ to torque the bolts to SO*to 75
ft-lbs, but if the bolts were grade 88, to torque the bolts
to 16 to 25 ft-lbs.
The transmittal further stated that if
the bolt material cannot be verified; torque to the lower
rang~ of values. Although the material for this valve was
not identified in the package, hinge bracket bolts inside
the valve were torqued to 50 ft-lbs .
. A review of the above work packages revea 1 ed an inadequate
implementation of the corrective actions specified in the
standing order dealing with torque values. Incorisistenci~s were
noted regarding the method for obtaining and documenting the
necessary torque values.
The inspectors selected additional
- maintenance flange and va 1 ve procedures and found numerous
examples of inadequate implementation of the standing order.
The licensee performed an ehgineering evaluation arid determined
th~t the ~pplted torque was acceptable for 2-SI-88 and 91.
The
eva 1 uat ion was documented in EWR 89-579 and reviewed by the
inspector. The weaknesses in the implementation of the torquing
requirements for maintenance* activities associated with the
preceeding check valves and orifice flange repairs is identified
as
an
additional* example
of
apparent
violation
280,
281/89-24-05.
(3)
Flow Orifice Installation
As noted in paragraph 3.d of this report, the inspectors
discovered that flow orifice for flow element FE-1946 was
installed backwards in the Unit 1 SI system. This orifice is a
bevelea-type plate that is used to measure the discharge flow
from a low head SI pump.
Installation of the orifice in a
reverse orientation introduces an indeterminate error in the
indicated flow value.
The licensee documented this discrepancy via station deviation
Sl-89-1869. The last time this orifice was worked was on June
12, 1989, per work order 3800076509, which invoked procedure
MMP-C-G-201.1;
Corrective Maintenance
Procedure
For
Blank
Flanges, Spectacle Flanges and Orifice Plate Flanges, dated June
10, 1988. Steps 5.4.6 and 5.4.7 of this procedure required the
mechanic to obtain orientation information from operations and
maintenance engineering prior to installation.
The procedure
( 4)
14
used on June 12 indicates that the mechanic obtained the correct
orientation information.
Step 5:4.9 of the procedure required
the
mechanic
to install
the orifice and document
the
orientation.
This step was signed as being performed, but the
orientation was not documented.
The inspectors also noted that
the maintenance procedure does not re qui re an independent
verification of the orifice installation.
Whil.e verifying the inspector's conclusion that the orifice was
installed backwards, the licensee's systems engineer noted that
flow orifice 1-SI-FE.-1941 was also installed backwards.
This
condition was documented via station, deviation Sl-89~1880.
The
licensee implemented a walkdown of selected safety-related
orifices and found one additional orifice installed backwards.
The licensee has had problems with properly installing flow
orifices.
The
inspectors
previously
identified
reversed
orifices in the AFW system as documented in IR 280, 281/88-18.
Further licensee inspections at that time revealed additional
orifices in safety-related systems installed backwards and
resulted in a violation dticumented in IR 280, 281/88-28, dated
August 12, 1988 .. The weaknesses in the* maintenance program for.
ensuring the correct installation of orifices are identified as
an_additional example of apparent violation 280, 281/89-24-05.
The inspectors also reviewed MMP-C-G-201.1 for compliance with
the cleanliness and torquing standards, and found additional
examples where corrective actions were inadequate.
For example,
the orifice flange was broken and remade without a vi sua 1
inspection and verification to ensure system cleanliness as
required by maintenance standing order 88-1.
In addition, the
torque values used were not verified by maintenance engineering
as required by maintenance standing order 89-1.
The weaknesses
in this procedure with regards to cleanliness and torquing
control are identified as an additional example of apparent
violation 280, 281/89-24-05,
PORV Block Valve Repair
The inspectors reviewed the failure of the pressurizer PORV
block valve 2-RC-MOV-2536 that occurred on July 24.
Mechan,cs
had
completed the installation of a new motor operator
(Limitorque) and had turned the valve over to the electricians
for wiring and testing. The wiring of the valve operator was
performed and the work was independently QC-verified prior to
clearing the tags for thrust testing.
A subsequent attempt to
cycle the valve resulted in the valve going hard into the seat,
cracking the ~pper bearing housing.
The cause was determined to
be incorrect wiring that resulted in the torque switch being
bypassed in the closed direction .
15
The inspectors reviewed the following dricumentation ~ertaining
to this event:
Work Orde~ #3800083005, authorizing disionnecting and
reconnecting the motor operator.
Maintenance Procedure EMP-C-MOV-11, Disconnect and Connect
MOV's.
Station Deviation S2-89-672, identifying the failure.
EWR 89-537, dated 8/6/89, Evaluate RC Valve
(2-RC-MOV-2536).
EWR 89-522, dated 7/29/89, Evaluate RC Valve Internals
(2-RC-MOV-2536).
EWR 89-137, dated 7/3/89, Evaluation/Standardization Of
Rising Stem MOVS.
Maintenance Procedure EMP-C-MOV-151- Testing MOVs Using
MOVATS System:
The corrective actions performed by the licensee involved
disassembly and inspection of the valve body. The valve i.s a 3
inch 1500 lb. Velan gate valve equipped with a SMB-00 Limitorque
motor operator.
Engineering estimated that the force exerted
during this event was between 39,000 and 43,000 lbs. The valve
has a one time allowable limit of betwee~ 19,000 and 20,000 lbs.
for the temperatures the valve was experiencing at the tim* of
ove~thrusting. The valve seats were liquid penetrant tested and
the indications were removed by grinding and/or lapping.
In.
addition, a new stem and wedge were installed.
The motor
operator was removed, diassembled and repaired by replacing the
damaged parts. Station engineering, with concurrence from the
valve manufacturer, concluded that a total valve replacement was
not required.
The licensee was unable to determine a definitive cause of the
wiring error. Interviews with the electrician and QC inspector
involved did not reveal any defective technique or cause for the
error.
Both individuals believed that the valve- operator was
properly wired when they left the job site.
The procedures
reviewed by the inspector appeared to be correct with no
apparent contribution to the problem.
The inspector did note,
however, that sev~ral additional problems were identified with
the wiring during an as-found inspection following the event.
Step 5 .11. 6 of procedure EMP-C-MOV-11 documented the as-found
inspectio*n, the findings* of which included defective control
wire lugs, excess1ve grease in the compartment, heat shrink
markers not shrunk, annunciator wiring loose, and a motor lead
connection less than hand tight.
The inspector discussed the
b.
16
specifics pertaining to these problems with the station
engineers and maintenance staff, and concluded that the cause
was
predominantly
a
result of poor
workmanship.
The
Superintendent of Mai ntenailce agreed and offered commen_ts that
indicated that this is an isolated case involving the poor
workmanship of a specific electrician. This is plausible given
the large number of Limitorque overhauls performed over the last
several months with rel~tively few
problems
noted,
The
inspectors will continue to monitor the performance of the
. electrical maintenrnce staff involved in MDV work.
The inspector reviewed the procedure (EWR 89-522) that inspected
and repaired the PORV block valve for compliance with the system
cleanliness requirements of maintenance department standing
order B8-1 (reference paragraph 5.a(l) for inftirmation on this
standing order).
The valve is located above the pressurizer,
just upstream of the PORV.
Although. step 4.2 of- EWR 89-:522
states that foreign material exclusion is i~portant and requires
temporary covers or constant surveillance, there was no evidence
that an independent visual inspection was performed prior to
system closure as required *by item 3 of the standing order.
In
addition, documentation that a~l a~plicable tndividuals had read
and und~rstood the standing order prior to beginning wcirk could
not be produced as required by i tern 7 * of the standing order;
The weaknesses in this procedure regarding cleahliness control
- is identified as an additional example of apparent violation
280, 281/89-24-05.
.
480 Volt Switchgear Failure
On August 13, the inspector witnessed starting of the Unit. 1 outside
recirculation spray pump 1-RS-P-2A in accordance with* surveillance -
procedure 1-PT-17.3.
The amber breaker disagreement light came on
indicating a problem.with the 480 volt breaker 1-RS-PM0-2A.
This
condition was documented via station devfation Sl-89-1834; and work
order 3800084724 was issued to investigate the failure.
Results of
this investigation indicated that the trip rod in the breaker control
device was not adjusted in accordance with the vendor manual.
The licensee reviewed the procedures and technique used by an outside
contractor that perfotmed overhauls on the breaker and found them to
be adequate.
Discussions with the breaker manufacturer indicated
that the trip rod adjustment is set and should not vary with age or
breaker. cycles. Corrective action performed by the l_itensee included
randomly selecting five breakers from Unit 2 and verifying the
correct trip rod adjustment. After inspection of three of the five
breakers, the licensee determined that some misadjustment was
apparent.
The licensee conducted a review in the training center of the steps
i nvo 1 ved in the adjustment process; the inspectors witnessed this
17
review.
From
the
review, the* licensee
concluded that the
misadjustment was not an jmmediate safety concetn due to the large
margin of tolerance available. The licens~e further determined that
if the misadjustment was in.one directton, the* breaker would still
perform its function if it* successfully passed post-maintenance
testing.
If the misadjustment was in the other direction, the
breaker would not operate -as required to make the adjustment.
Although the licensee was able to demonstrate that safe breaker*
operation was
not a concern,
the
inspector questioned the
contractor's overhaul practices* in assuring quality. The licensee was
1n the process of reviewing this issue when the inspection period
ended.
This issue is identified as !FI 280r 281/89-24-07, followup
on
licens~e review of electrical conttactor breaker overhaul
practices.
Within the areas inspected, one apparent violation was identified.
6.
Surveillance Inspections (61726 & 42700)
During the ~eporting peri~d, the inspectors reviewed various
surveillance acti*vities: to assure compliance with the appropriate
procedures as follows:
Test prerequisites were met.
-
Tests were performed in accordance with approved procedures.
Test- procedures appeared to perform their intended function.
Adequate coordination existed among personnel involved in the test.
Test data was properly collected and recorded.
Inspection areas included the following:
a.
AFW Testing
The inspectors reviewed the survei 11 ance test performed on AFW
turbine-driven pump l-FW-P-2, on August 1, 1989.
This test was
conducted using periodic test procedure l-PT-15.lC, Turbine Driven
Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (l-FW-P-2), dated July 25, 1989.
The
inspectors expressed concern that the turbine speed was adjusted from
3965 RPM to 4200 RPM prior to obtaining test data.
This situation
was the subject of previous concerns because of the potential to
overpressurize the downstream piping.
For example, if th~ turbine
speed is adjusted up during a pump run, the possibility exists that
during the * next pump start the turbine governor may a 11 ow enough
overshoot
to
overpressurize
the
downstream
components.
Overpressurization is of particular concern when considering the type
of governor used on the ~urbines and the lack of a relief valve in
the discharge piping.
Although it appears that the piping was not
18
overpres~urized during the above tase, the lic~nsee is planning to
replace the governor and add a relief valve.
An additional concern
of the inspectors was *that the adjustment of speed prior to *obtaining
pump data may mask the existence of an inoperable pump.
The
licensee agreed with the above inspector's concerns, and
documented the problem via station deviation report Sl-89-1791.
The
test was again performed on August 2 and determined to be acceptable.
The adjustment of the turbine speed on /August *1, is not a 11 owed by
procedure 1-PT-15.lC, and is identified as violation 280/89-24-02,
for failure. to follow procedures as required by TS 6.4.
The
inspectors discussed the issue with operations supervision and
believe that ~ppropriate sensitivity to concerns of this nature has
been fully disseminated to the operations staff.
b.
Battery Survei 11 ance Testing
C,
The
inspectors
reviewed
the
status
of electrical
battery
surveillances and
ex~ressed concern
regarding the number
of
surveillances performed outside the allowable grace period provided
by TS.
Discussions with the engineering group that* tracks the
. performance of periodic tests indicate that from August 1988, until
August 1989, 11 out of a total of 617 battery surveillances were not
performed within the period allowed by TS.
The inspectors reviewed
other selected tests and concluded that the battery tests are an
exception in that the remainder of surveillance tests are, as a ~ule,
performed as scheduled.
On
August 22, the inspector discussed the above concern with
a~plicable maintenance management.
It appears that although
engineering is notifying the correct _persons within the electrical
maintenance department of pending tests, these key personnel are not
ensuring compliance with the s~ecified test intervals.
TS. 4.6.C.1
requires cert_ain battery tests to be performed within specified time
intervals (every week, month, 3 months, etc .. ).
TS 4.0.2 further
allriws a 25 percent grace period for testing intervals to accommodate
normal test schedules.
The failure to comply with the allowable
TS intervals for station battery tests is identified as violation
280~281/89-24-03.
Unit 2
11H
11 Bus Special Testing
During the last week of this inspection period, the inspectors
witnessed performance of sel_ected portions of special tests 2-ST-238,
ESF Actuation wHh Instantane*ous UV - ,H Bus; and 2-ST-240, ESF
Actuation with Delayed UV (5 Min) - H Bus.
The purpose of the tests
was to verify loads sequencing onto the 2H electrical bus following
the injection of an ESF signal along with a simultaneous and a
delayed UV condition on the emergency bus.
The inspectors reviewed.
the official copy of the test procedures prior to performance of the
test. and witnessed the actual testing, including th~ actions of the
test directors. Testing was conducted in a satisfactory manner.
19
Within the areas *inspected, two violations were identified.
7.
Licensee Event Report Review (92700)
The inspector~ reviewed the LER's listed below to ascertain whether NRC
reporting requirements were being met and to determine appropriateness of,
the corrective actions. The inspector's review also included followup on
implementation of corrective actipn and review of licensee documentation
that all required corrective actions were complete.
LERs that identify
violations cif regulations and that meet the criteria of 10 CFR, Part 2,
Appe~dix C;Section V are identified as NCVs in the following closeout
paragraphs.
NCVs are considered firs.t-time occurre.nce violations which
meet the NRC Enforcement Policy for exemption from issuance of a Notice of
Violation.
These items are identified to allow for proper evaluations of
corrective actions in the event that similar events occ~r in the future.
(Closed) LER 280/88-07, Control/Relay Room Chillers Inoperable D_ue to
Inadequate Service Water Flow.
The issue involved tripping of one of the
subject chillers with a second chiller in a maintenance condition._ this
condition is contrary to TS 3.14.
The immediate corrective action
involved returning the chillir to service after manually adjuiting the SW
flow to the chiller condenser.
The manual adjustment was n*ecessary
because the normal
pressure control valves were out of servi~e.
Additional corrective actions included replacement of the SW pressure
control valv~s.
The inspector ~erified that the pr*ssyre control valves
had been replaced and that the system was operating satisfactorily. This
LER is closed.
8.
Allegation on Gai-tronics Communication Pa~ing Syste~ (RII !9~A-0056)
a.
Background:
b.
An anonymous individual, herein after referred to as the alleger,
contacted a Region II inspector on June 10, 1989, and reported that
50
percent of the
Gai-tronics
(paging/communication
system
throughout the plant) does not work, and that the trend over the last.
few yea~s has been to have more of the stations out of service.
Allegation Inspection:
The Gai-tronics system is a five channel public address and intercom
system.
The system is normally used in daily operational activities
to communicate messages between individuals in the station.
In the *
event of an emergency, the system is used to alert station personnel
of any abnormal occurrence or emergency situation and to communicate
emergency messages between individuals.
There are a total of four
communications systems, including Gai-tronics, that are used in the
station. The inspectors reviewed a number of work orders related to
the Gai-tronics system and the average number of days necessary to
complete these orders. A discussion with the head of the electrical
maintenance -group (group responsible for the maintenance on this
20
system) revealed that a problem does exist in maintaining the system.
Part of the problem is due to plant personnel stuffing rags in the
speakers*, *damaging the handsets, etc.
Currently, an effort is
underway to improve both the Gai-tronics and, the power telephone
systems .. A task group .is evaluatin*g locations for communications
units and state-of-the art improvements for the Gai-tronics system.
The task group will submit a report, along with recommendations, to
corporate management within ~he next three months.
c.
Conclusions:
Fifty percent of the Gai-tronics communication system being out of
order could not be substantiated.
However, the fact that problems
exist in maintaining the system*was admitted to by the licensee. The
- licensee has a task group that is scheduled to sub~it ~o corporate
management within the next three months, a proposal for improving
this communication. system. This situation does not constitute an
immediate safety. concern nor is it a restart item for Unit 2.
However, this item is identified as IFI 280, 281/89-24-08, followup
on the licensee's review of internal station communication issues.
9.
Actio~ on ~reviou~ Inspecti6h Findings (92701)
(Closed)
280/89-21-03,
Additional
review of reportability in
accordance with 10 CFR 50. 72 of two events which resulted in lass of
safety-related components.
The issues involved the tripping of the
control room air conditioning units, and the air binding of the charging
pump SW pumps.
The loss of the charging pump SW pumps resulted in the
charging pumps becoming technically inoperable.
Additional reviews by
the NRC concluded that these two events should have been reported in
accordance with 10 .CFR 50.72.
Since identification of the issue, the
licensee has redefined their reporting threshold. Therefore, the inspector
believes that this issue is resolved.
However, the item did identify a
weakness in the licensee's past process for determining reportability of
events in*accordance with 10 CFR 50.72.
10.
Exit Interview
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on September 5, 1989,
with those persons indicated in paragraph 1.
The inspectors described the
areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results listed
belo~.
The licens~e acknowledged the inspection findings with no dissent-
. ing comments.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the
materials provideo to or reviewed by the inspectors during this
inspection.
The following violations were identified:
Failure to comply with the requirements of TS 3.0.1 with regards to the
action statement (paragraph 3.f(4), 280/89-24-01) .
. .
21
Failure to follow procedures as required by TS 6.4 when performing.
periodic test 1-PT-15.lC, involving the monthly operability test for the
turbine driven AFW pump (paragraph 6.a., 280/89-24-02).
Failure to test station batteries within the specified intervals as
required by TS 4.6.C (paragraph 6.b; *280, 281/89-24-03).
-In addition, apparent violations were identified for:
Failure of personnel to follow procedures regarding high radiation
area access requirements (paragraph .3.b).
This apparent violation
will be reviewed by the * NRC for appropriate enforcement action
(281/89-24-04).
.
Failure to take appropriate corrective action for past problems
identified during performance of maintenance activities (paragraph
5.a).
This apparent violation will be reviewed by the NRC for
appropriate enfor2ement ~ction (280, 281/89-24-05).
One !FI (paragraph 3.b) was identified for followup on licensee evaluation
of differences in dosimetry readout (280, 281/89-24-06).
One !FI (paragraph 5.b) was identified for followup on licensee review of
electrical contractor breaker overhaul practices (280, 281/89-24-07).
One !FI (paragraph 8) was identified for followup on the licensee's review
of internal statio~ communication iss~es (280, 281/89-24-08).
A weakness (paragraph 9) was noted in the l icensee 1 s process for
determining reportability of events as required by 10 CFR 50.72.
A strength (parag~aph 3.d) was noted regarding housekeeping and
cle*anliness conditions of the Unit 1 safeguards valve pit and pump pit
areas ..
11~
INDEX OF ACRONYMS AND INITIALISMS
ccw
CFR
cw
EMP
F
FT-LB
HPES
COMPONENT COOLING WATER
CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS
CIRCULATING WATER
DESIGN CHANGE PACK.AGE
ELECTRICAL MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE
ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE
EMERGENCY SERVICE WATER
ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST
FAHRENHEIT
FOOT-POUND
HEALTH PHYSICS
HUMAN PERFORMANCE EVALUATION SYSTEM
-.
!
I FI
IR
JCO
LCD
LER
MDV
MREM/HR
NRC
OP
QC ,
SNSOC
TS
. URI
vs
22
INSTRUMENT AIR
INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
INSPECTOR F.OLLOWUP ITEM
INSPECTION REPORT
JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUED OPERATION
POUND
LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT
MOTOR OPERATErr VALVE
MI LU REM/HOUR
NON-CITED VIOLATION
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OPERATING PROCEDURE
PREVENTATIVE MAINTENANCE
POWER OPERATED RELIEF VALVE
POUNDS PER SQUARE INCH
POUNDS PER SQUARE INCH GAUGE
PERIODIC TEST
QUALITY ASSURANCE
QUALITY CONTROL
RADIOLOGICALLY CONTROLLED AREA
ROENTGEN EQUIVALENT MAN
REVOLUTIONS PER MINUTE
RADIATION WORK PERMIT
SAFETY INJECTION
STATION NUCLEAR SAFETY AND OPERATING COMMITTEE
SELF-READIN~ DOSIMETER
SAFETY SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL INSPECTION
THERMOLUMINESCENT DOSIMETER
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS
UNRESOLVED ITEM
VENTILATION SYSTEM