05000280/LER-1980-074-03, /03L-0:on 801218,power Leads to MOV-1867A & C Discovered to Have Been Reversed.Cause Undetermined.Power Leads Returned to Normal & Valves Tested

/03L-0:on 801218,power Leads to MOV-1867A & C Discovered to Have Been Reversed.Cause Undetermined.Power Leads Returned to Normal & Valves Tested

ML18139B012
Person / Time
Site:	Surry
Issue date:	01/15/1981
From:	VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.)
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML18139B010	List: 05000280/LER-1980-050-03, /03L-0:on 801228,amp Reading for Circuit 13A Boron Injection Recirculation to Boric Acid Tank Panel 8 Was Below Acceptance Criteria.Caused by Failure of Heat Tracing Tape Due to Excessive Heat.Heat Tracing Design Change Init 05000280/LER-1980-074-03, /03L-0:on 801218,power Leads to MOV-1867A & C Discovered to Have Been Reversed.Cause Undetermined.Power Leads Returned to Normal & Valves Tested ML18139B009
References
LER-80-074-03L-02, LER-80-74-3L-2, NUDOCS 8101200348
Download: ML18139B012 (3)

LER-1980-074, /03L-0:on 801218,power Leads to MOV-1867A & C Discovered to Have Been Reversed.Cause Undetermined.Power Leads Returned to Normal & Valves Tested

Event date:
Report date:
2801980074R03 - NRC Website

text

P~"*c~~rnO~L= ;-.. - --~ I ~~c~--N-S=~-~ EV E_,:_:_EA-:'""':~:=~'"".::OR :y:.,:.-0-U-IR_E_D_I_NFORMATION~

" *... =~

e EJ I V I A I s I p Is I 1101 0 I O I - I O IO IO IO IO I - I O I O 101 4 I 1 11 11 I 1 101 I I 0 8

g LICENSEE CODE 14 15 LICENSE NUll.'.SEA 25 26 LICE.NSE TYPE

JO 57 CAT 58

\\:'T D

~~~~~ w©lo IS IO IO lo 12 Is lo 1011 12 11 I SI SI o JG)lo 1111 Is Is 11 IG)

EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80 8

60 61 DOCKET NUMBER 68 69 EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES@

II] I With the unit at cold shutdown and defueled, it was discovered that t~e power J eads ill EJ ill ill to MOV-1867A & Chad been reversed.

This condition existed only after unit was shutdown. It has been concluded that this event may possibly be a lack of administra-tive control and hence reportable per T.S. 6.6.2.b.(3).

The MOV's were operable when J

the unit was critical and these valves wou-ld haye been tested during the startup E] LI _t_e_s_t_in_:_g_::_p_r_o....:g:_r_am

__ P:..r_i_o_r_t_o_u_n_i_t_s_t_a_r_t_u::....p...:.,_t_h_e_r_e_f_o_r_e __

th_e_h_e_a_l_t_h_a_n_d_s_a_f e_t:_y_b_<.fi_t_h_e __ p:_u_b_l_i_c_......

were not affected.

ill -L-----"-~..;:__-~----------~-------------------,,,-:--~so 8 9 SYSTEM CODE Is I Fl@

9 10 0,. t.E;:; R_ o CVENT YEAR

'0 :=:~.~~*~~ I 8 I O I

n f:F r=E*:r C", Fi..;..:;,

CAUSE

CAUSE CODE SUB CODE COMPONENT CODE COMP.

SUBCODE VALVE SUBCODE w@ tu@ 1 v, A, L, v IE Ix,e ~ w@

12 13

' 18 SEQUENTIAL OCCURRENCE REPORT NO.

CODE I o I 1 I 4 I l..,I Io I 3 I

"),;,

26 26 19 REPORT TYPE w 30 20 31 S'-:.i7DO\\"."'.,

~ ATIACH:.iENT NPRD-4 FOAi.i :.UB.

PRl~IE cm.,P.

SUPPLIER REVISION NO. w ii 32 COMPONENT MANUFACTURER

!.,:'.THO:*

HOURS ~ SUBI\\IITIED l::B l@Lzl@

l=z I@

• li,zl r O IO IO I OJ Ly I@ Du§ lU@ I DI O I 2 IO I CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS @

42 43 44 47

.ITJ J A review of the construction and maintenance activities in the surrounding area has_119.t__J JJJ 1revealed a reason why the power leads were reversed.

The extent of major modifjcation JJJ _!and construction work in progress percludes a thorough review of all documentation.

The I)) l power leads were returned to a normal condition and the valves tested.

ill 8

9 F ACILJTV r:;;::;...

STA TU!:

'. ?:J'.'.'ER OTHER ST,:..Tus Q TIJ ~@ I O I O I O !@)L...I _E_x_te_n_d_ed---'-O_u t.....;;a_..,_g*e___.

80 METHODOI' A

DISCOVERY DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION '2.:;

w@L.I ~R:::O:..:U:..:t:.::i:.:n.:.:e:__T::.:e:::;S:::;*.::t..:.* _____________ __,

6 S

,c.,

11 ACTIVITY co,;Tp;-:-

Q\\

RELEASED OF F.!:LE"-SE A:.,our;T OF ACTIVITY~

ill ~

@) ~(01-I ___

N /;.__A ____ --'!

E 9

1C*

11 45 46 80 N/A LOCATION OF RELEASE@

45 80 PERSC';"E~ EXPOSURES Q..

r;u:.:;;.E;:.

TYPE DES:::R1F710:<.i El 1 0 I O IO J@)~@L_~N!..!c;/ A:._ ___

E 9

11 12 13 PEP.SO:;*JEL 1:;;URIES Q

r~u:.*sER DESCRIPT10:~o LJ I O I O j O 'l@L__ ___ __::_N!...::./A~-------------------~

80 2

9 12 so Lr,-< o-o- - * ** *~-TO f. -ILITY ~

1~~-E

~

~.(~~~::~~O"

-~

Cl ITJ ~@L-_______

N_;./_A ______________________ _,

e 9

j~.

so F\\..:S:..1,:.:y

~

,r:s* *~:-.

..:~:=.~7,o?. ~

NRC: USE ONLY C

I~J 'f fff@i__ ______

N_/A _____________

~ 1111111111111:

• ;,:. *: E OF Fr.::F.:.R::P ___

8_1_0_1_2_0_0_. *_

~~.L.~-=---

so ;;

PHO!\\!E*-------------

0 C.

~

e e

ATTACHMENT:

1 SURRY POWER STATION UNIT 1 DOCKET NO:

50-280 REPORT NO:

80-074/03L-O EVENT DATE:

12-18-80 MOV-1867A & C MALFUNCTION

1.

EVENT DESCRIPTION

With Unit 1 at cold shutdown and defueled, the electrical preventative maintenance procedure for motor operated valves, demonstrated that MOV-1867 A and C (BIT inlet and outlet) stroked in the wrong direction. If this condition had existed when the unit was critical, it would have been a degraded mode of operation.

The extent of the major modification and construction work in progress precludes a through review of all documentation, thus this event is being reported as a possible lack of administrative con.trol in accordance with Technical Specification 6.6.2.b(3).

. 2.

PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES and STATUS OF REDUNDANT EQUIPMENT:

The Boron Injection Tank (BIT) inlet and outlet valves open upon receipt of a Safety Injection signal to inject the tank's contents into the Reactor Coolant System (RCS).

Both pairs of inlet and outlet valves were verified operable prior to unit startup on 4-27-80 using PT-18.10.

On 9-14-80, the unit w*as shutdO""wn to replace the steam generators and to perform other major modifications & construction work.

When the unit was shutdown, the BIT was injected into RCS tc borate the RCS and to prepare th8 BIT for long term layup.

At this time, the BIT inleL and outlet valves were operable.

Therefore, the BIT would have performed it's intended function, if required, between 4-27-80 and 9-14-80.

It should be noted

_that JechpLc.al Spe,~;i.fication does not require the BIT to be operable when the reactor is shutdown.

As stated above, Unit No.1 is cur.:ently undergoing extensive modifications to many systems.

Although these valves are not scheduled to be affected by construction activities, they are located in an area where systems and/or components are being disassembled, modified, installed, etc. At the end of the current unit outage, a detailed and broad startup testing program on a component and system level will be conducted.

In addition to those systems and components that were affected by construction and maintenance activities, systems and components that may have been affected will also be covered by the startup testing program.

A similar testing program was utilized during thestartup of Unit No.2 following the replacement of the steam generators.

PT-18.2 "Safety Injection Functional Testing",

w ich functionally test the BIT inlet and outlet valves, is normally performed at the beginnir:g of a 30 day refueling :e>,ut~_ge.

~~wever, due to the scope and duration of the current outage, this PT has been intentionally scheduled at the end of the outage.

Thus it will verify that the Safety Injection system is functional prior to startup.

Since the BIT Valves were operable when the reactor was critical and

..., t.

---

*--*-~*-*---* -***--*------------

e

.;_z_

Previously scheduled administrative control program (startup testing) will be implemented, the health and safety of the public were not affected.

3.

CAUSE

A review of the construction and maintenance activities in the surrounding area has not revealed a reason why the power leads were reversed.

The extent of major modification and construction work in progress precludes a thorough review of all documentation.

The power leads were returned to a normal con-dition.

The power leads were returned to a normal condition and the valves tested.

4.

IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION

Initiate actions to return the affected MOV's to an operable condition.

5.

SUBSEQUENT CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The MOV's were verified operable and will be again verified operable prior to startup.

6.

ACTION TAKEN TO PREVENT RECURRENCE:

Other than the scheduled startup testing program, no additional actions are deemed necessary.

7.

GENERIC IMPLICATIONS:

None.