ML18101A457
| ML18101A457 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 01/03/1995 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18101A456 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-272-93-99, 50-311-93-99, NUDOCS 9501110145 | |
| Download: ML18101A457 (11) | |
See also: IR 05000272/1993099
Text
SYSTEMATIC ASSESSMENT OF LICENSEE PERFORMANCE (SALP)
SALEM UNITS 1 AND 2
REPORT NO. 50-272/93-99 l 50-311/93~99
I *
BACKGROUND
The SALP Board convened on December 1, 1994, to assess the nuclear safety
performance of the Salem Units 1 and 2 for the period June 20, 1993, to
November 5, 1994. The board was convened pursuant to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) Management Directive (MD) 8.6, "Systematic Assessment of
Licensee Performance
(SALP)" (see NRC Administrative Letter 93-02).
Board
members were Richard W. Cooper, (Board Chairman), Director, Division of
Reactor Projects, NRC Region I (RI); James T. Wiggins, Director, Division of
Reactor Safety, NRC RI; Charles W. Hehl, Director, Division of Radiation
Safety and Safeguards, NRC RI; and John F. Stolz, Director, Project
Directorate I-2, NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
The board
developed this assessment for approval by the Region I Administrator.
The following performance category ratings and the assessment functional areas
are defined and described in NRC MD 8.6.
II.
PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS - OPERATIONS
The Operations functional area was rated category 2 in the last SALP period.
The licensee's performance was characterized by excellent operator response to
trips and other operational transients. Supervision and management oversight
of refueling and day-to-day operations was very good.
However, the operators'
attempt at several *startups of Unit 2 without sufficiently determining the
cause of repetitive rod control problems and effectively resolving the
problem, was identified as a significant management control and oversight
weakness.
Throughout the current SALP period, operators were often challenged by plant
trips and other operational transients. Operators exhibited generally good
command and control of the response to these events.
For example, on June 10,
1994, operators demonstrated appropriate command and control in response to an
automatic trip caused by failure of a main generator potential transformer.
Likewise, on August 30, 1994, Unit 2 operators responded well to a condenser
water box manway failure and reduced power to 75 percent.
However, during
the April 7, 1994, grass intrusion event, shift management personnel did not
remain free to survey and analyze all operating parameters and, for a short
period of time, lost control and perspective of the overall operations in the
midst of attempting to stabilize plant conditions.
Operations and plant management made operating decisions that generally led to
conservative operation of the plant. For example, in June 1994, plant staff
performed a methodical, controlled, safe startup of Unit 1 following the April
7, 1994 trip, after delaying startup in order to repair small leaks in the
reactor head vent valves and a pressurizer safety valve. Additionally,
9501110145 950103
ADOCK 05000272
G
operators exhibited proficiency in making conservative, proper, and timely
emergency declarations for six actual events that necessitated consideration
of entering an emergency action level.
Notwithstanding the performance noted above, overall operations performance
during this assessment period was characterized by significant weaknesses in
several areas. Slow or inadequate resolution of equipment problems by other
plant departments caused operators to become accustomed to working around or
living with problems that created additional challenges to them in operating
the plant in normal and upset conditions. For example, the licensee provided
inadequate training, guidance, and procedures to the operators to cope with
plant transients resulting from grass intrusion events that had occurred
frequently at Salem.
Operator response to the April 7, 1994, grass intrusion
event was also complicated by a safety injection that was caused by a spurious
high steam flow signal of short duration that had been observed during three
previous reactor and turbine trips, but had never been fully investigated and
resolved.
In addition, during the transient, the atmospheric relief valve
control system exhibited a recurring problem in which it had to be shifted to
manual, then back to automatic after a short time delay to ensure proper
operation. Although this condition was known and existed for several years,
plant management accepted and accommodated the situation without any
resolution. Operators also did not aggressively pursue correction of
longstanding problems with the rod control system that caused numerous
occurrences of rods stepping into the core in half steps without appropriate
process demand signals.
Some events that occurred during this assessment period demonstrated a weak
questioning attitude by operators.
For example, in April 1994 with the plant
shut down, Unit 1 operators did not question a reading of 93% on the reactor
vessel water level indication system (RVLIS).
When brought to their attention
by NRC, operators attributed the reading to a calibration problem instead of
an actual decrease in reactor vessel water inventory. Subsequently, the
condition was confirmed and eliminated by venting.
Earlier in the SALP
period, a cold leg accumulator's level was recorded in the control room logs
as being above the upper technical specification limit without a corresponding
technical specification entry. However, this deficiency was not identified by
either self checking or supervisory review, and, consequently, not corrected
in a timely manner.
Operability decisions made by the Operations staff were often weak due to a
poor understanding of the design basis of safety related equipment and
systems, as well as, a lack of clear guidance and training on Generic Letter 91-18.
The engineering organization was not consistently consulted on many of
these more difficult operability determinations.
For example, an initial
operability evaluation for 1PR25 (a check valve between the thermal relief
valves on the Safety Injection System and the Pressurizer Relief Tank) did not
involve any consultation with the engineering*organization and failed to
consider the design basis requirements of the valve. Other noteworthy
examples involving weak operability determinations include the degraded
performance of the IA emergency diesel generator, closure of the power
operated relief block valves, and safety injection relief valve leakage.
In
addition, there were several examples over the assessment period in which
operators took a non-conservative approach to entering and exiting Technical
Specification limiting conditions for operation (LCOs) for the same underlying
3
problem.
For example, in May 1994, during a Unit 1 startup, operators made
repeated entries into the Technical Specification (TS) LCO for the pressurizer
vent path in response to minor leakage through two head vent valves, but
inappropriately re-initialized the LCO entry each time. Operators also
entered and exited a containment isolation TS LCO for the service air system
twice in the same shift to perform maintenance that would have exceeded the
original LCO time period.
Operations also exhibited difficulty managing and controlling outage
activities. For example, operators created or contributed to a number of
tagging errors. These included an operator who removed tags from a bleed
steam coil drain tank pump, which allowed steam to escape through an unsecured
drain line, and an operator who erroneously opened a boundary valve that
allowed water to flow to a downstream valve that was undergoing a maintenance
activity. Subsequently, the licensee established corrective measures and
similar occurrences have not been observed. Also, during the refueling outage
in October 1993, with the spent fuel pools cross connected, operators did not
identify that a pre-existing high level condition in the Unit 2 spent fuel
pool masked further increases in pool level which, when such an increase
occurred, resulted in an overflow of the spent fuel pool water into the fuel
handling building ventilation exhaust ductwork.
Inspection activities late in the SALP period revealed that Quality Assurance
& Nuclear Safety Review organization's surveillance of Operations was not
performance-based and was ineffective in identifying significant previously
existing weaknesses in the Operations department.
The lack of self assessment
activities within the Operations organization, coupled with ineffective
independent oversight by the Quality Assurance and Nuclear Safety Review
organization, resulted in minimal feedback to the operators and their
management relative to the existence of significant performance problems in
Operations.
In summary, operators generally responded appropriately with good command and
control to the many plant trips and operational transients that occurred over
- the SALP period. Likewise, they demonstrated good proficiency in making
emergency declarations for events for which such declarations should have been
considered. However, performance over the assessment period demonstrated
significant weaknesses in several areas. Operators did not practice ownership
of the plant and did not aggressively enlist other plant departments to
resolve longstanding equipment problems which frequently challenged them in
normal and upset plant conditions. A lack of an appropriate questioning
attitude by operators resulted in anomalous indications, or conditions being
unnoticed or not understood and not being acted upon.
A lack of guidance for
and training of operators on operability decisions resulted in some decisions
being nonconservative or having weak technical bases.
Examples of
nonconservative approaches to entering and exiting LCOs occurred over the
period.
Some difficulties were experienced managing and controlling outage
activities. Poor self assessment within the Operations department coupled
with ineffective independent assessment of Operations by the Quality Assurance
and Nuclear Safety Review organization contributed to the continuation of
performance problems throughout most of the period .
The Operations functional area is rated as Category 3.
4
III.
PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS - MAINTENANCE
In the previous assessment period, the maintenance and surveillance functional
area was rated Category 2.
Personnel errors had decreased, but still caused
three reactor trips and four engineered safety features actuations. Three
refueling outages were performed with strong planning and implementation.
Improvements were noted in the preventive maintenance program, procurement,
material control, and surveillance procedures quality through the procedures
upgrade program.
During the latter part of this assessment period, management improved its
safety focus in prioritizing and scheduling maintenance activities.
In the
plan-of-the-day meetings and other work planning meetings and activities
involving both operations and maintenance personnel, the emphasis was on
safety rather than production. Interdepartmental communication, especially
between maintenance and systems engineers, improved.
However, supervisors did
not always communicate effectively with workers while they were in the field
and during pre-job briefings, as evidenced by maintenance errors involving the
governor gear box oil change and turbine overspeed trip test device made
during preventive maintenance work on the Number 23 auxiliary feedwater (AFW)
pump.
Failure to use the vendor drawing during the pre-job briefing led to
subsequent errors where the mechanics mistakenly added gear box oil to the
turbine governor and disturbed the adjustment of the turbine overspeed trip
test device.
The AFW pump tripped twice during post-maintenance testing
before appropriate supervisory guidance was obtained for returning the pump to
service.
Salem had a high recurrent equipment failure rate indicating continuing
problems with corrective action effectiveness and inability to effectively
resolve longstanding equipment and system deficiencies.
For example,
inadequate root cause analysis and the need for training contributed to the
delay in correcting long-term deficiencies in the various radiation monitoring
systems; inadequate root cause analysis also contributed to repetitive
failures of the automatic control of the steam generator feedwater regulating
valves (BF19) over a two year period.
Supervisory control and management oversight were lacking for the numerous
groups and organizations that perform maintenance work on the site. For
example, a contractor employee conducted maintenance on a breaker for an
electro-hydraulic pump without the job supervisor ensuring that the equipment
first was tagged out. There were also several examples where contractors
performed outage maintenance items without detailed maintenance procedures.
Most recently, the licensee found that a contractor electrician cut into the
wrong 4160 VAC cable. A fatality was avoided only because the affected cable
was tagged out of service to support other unrelated work.
In the area of problem identification and resolution, the licensee has
implemented an effective way of tracking equipment problems using a process
called the equipment malfunction identification system (EMIS).
However, the
feedback process regarding problems that occur during maintenance activities
was not effectively implemented by field maintenance personnel. This
primarily delayed or prevented the timely correction of deficient procedures
5
and work packages.
Feedback did not always get into the planning system and
in some instances the initiator of the feedback form was not informed as to
the resolution of the problem.
Further, troubleshooting and implementation of
the root cause program was inconsistent, even though the licensee has
established a good root cause capability. For example, the licensee did a
good job of troubleshooting and determining the root cause of intermittent rod
stepping and oscillations on the AFW pump.
However, in addition to inadequate
root cause analysis and failure to resolve longstanding problems cited
earlier, the licensee performed inadequate troubleshooting and root cause
analysis on the four electro-hydraulic control power supply failures before
determining the fundamental root cause of the failures.
Finally, some of the
maintenance performance problems were related to conducting troubleshooting
without a procedure such as the example where the ability to capture as-found
defects was lost during removal of a failed emergency diesel generator
cylinder liner.
The material condition of the plant improved following the licensee's
establishment of the Salem Material Condition Revitalization Project.
However, there remains evidence of degraded conditions in the service water
intake structure and the Residual Heat Removal pump rooms.
Personnel errors, problems with procedural adherence, and excessive reliance
upon "skill of the craft" contributed to inconsistent implementation of the
maintenance program.
For example, there were a significant number of tagout
errors where maintenance was performed without appropriate tagging of
equipment to ensure that it was safe to work on, or improper removal of tags
that should have been maintained.
In addition to the examples cited earlier,
some of the other errors involved an electrician cutting into an energized 125
Volt DC distribution cable and an equipment operator removi~g tags and
subsequently opening vent and drain valves in an incorrect order allowing
steam to blow out drain fittings and a drain hose to whip about due to steam
pressure.
In general, surveillance testing activities were effective with respect to
meeting the surveillance program objectives.
The high risk surveillance
testing of the reactor trip breakers was performed well.
However, the
licensee failed to demonstrate the design basis capability of the emergency
diesel generators to start on a single air start system while performing
maintenance on the remaining air start system.
Also during this period, a
surveillance procedure deficiency resulted in the inadvertent discharge of a
safety injection accumulator into the reactor coolant system while at low
pressure.
Although the licensee completed a formal procedures upgrade program (PUP) in
1993, procedure adequacy continues to be a problem.
For example, an excellent
troubleshooting procedure was developed and implemented in the controls area,
but a similar procedure in the mechanical maintenance area was not
implemented.
There were recurring maintenance problems that needed specific
procedure changes which were being delayed because of an excessive procedure
change backlog.
In several instances, there was a planning failure to
specify appropriate post-maintenance testing requirements in work order
l
6
packages. This was attributed to the inadequacy of the controlling procedures
for the planning process and training of planners in post-maintenance testing
requirements.
The Salem in-service testing program was adequate. The use of spectrum
analysis for vibration and high quality procedures were noteworthy.
However,
several shortcomings were identified in program oversight by station
management.
Many program weaknesses were identified by comprehensive and
self-critical audits, but were not acted upon.
The programs for in-service
inspection, erosion/corrosion and steam generator leakage monitoring were
adequately implemented.
In summary, performance weaknesses were evident in maintenance programs and
activities, such as procedural adherence and adequacy, the feedback process,
specification of post-maintenance testing. requirements, and control of work
activities by numerous onsite groups.
Management has improved its safety
focus in prioritizing and scheduling maintenance activities. However,
management oversight of corrective action program activities has been weak as
evidenced by the high recurrent equipment failure rates.
Inconsistencies in
troubleshooting activities and root cause analysis contributed to the delay in
correcting recurring problems. Material condition of the plant continues to
improve, but there remain several areas that need improvement.
Although the
in-service testing program was adequate, management did not effectively
resolve self assessment findings.
Programs for in-service inspection,
erosion/corrosion and steam generator leakage monitoring were adequately
implemented.
The Maintenance functional area is rated Category 3.
IV.
PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS - ENGINEERING
In the last SALP, engineering was rated Category 2.
Engineering provided good
support for refueling and maintenance outages and strong performance was noted
in addressing day-to-day activities. The training programs for engineering
personnel were excellent. Weaknesses were noted in handling of engineering-
related nonconformances, in the erosion/corrosion program implementation and
in fire protection programs. Also, while the root cause training program was
found to be strong, the threshold for initiating root cause analyses was not
clear or consistent.
During this period, the quality of engineering activities was inconsistent and
varied significantly from activity to activity. Quality depended on the issue
involved and the perceived importance of that issue by engineering and plant
management and staff. Management expectations for engineering performance
were clearly articulated but were implemented inconsistently throughout the
organization.
Communication and coordination among the Engineering and Plant Betterment
(E&PB) organization, the Technical Department of the plant staff and the
balance of the plant staff were not always effective. While there was good
communication and coordination of highly-visible problems, day-to-day
7
interactions were ineffective in resolving some repetitive equipment problems
that continued to challenge the operation of the facility. While close
interactions occurred between the Maintenance organization and Technical
Department system engineers, the engineering expertise of the E&PB
organization was not always effectively engaged.
Engineering did not always
proactively seek out and correct system and component deficiencies before they
led to increasingly challenging plant events.
Further, E&PB did not
effectively involve itself in support of plant operations as demonstrated by
the fact that, while backlogs of its activities were well controlled, its work
priorities were not well-integrated with those of the operating organization.
For example, the "Engineering Critical Issues List" did not match the plant's
critical issues list and was not prioritized by safety significance. Further,
even subsequent to the April 7 grass intrusion event, none of the items that
were being tracked as operator work-arounds by the Operations organization
were included on the engineering list. Notwithstanding, significant positive
engineering leadership and good quality engineering work were demonstrated in
the recovery from the rod control systems problems, in the main steam line
flow monitoring modifications, and in the commitment of resources toward the
switchyard betterment and radiation monitoring system upgrade programs.
Design engineering procedures were comprehensive and their quality was good.
Work instructions associated with modification installation were generally
good.
Temporary modification activities were well controlled, with installed
temporary modifications tracked and periodically assessed by the system
engineer.
The quality of technical support provided to the Operations and Maintenance
organizations was mixed.
Engineering support was good in a number of
instances, such as those associated with indications of condensate pump
pedestal damage, with the identification of thermal fatigue cracks in Unit 1
steam generator feedwater nozzles, and with a leaking flange joint associated
with the #22 reactor coolant pump.
Further, the engineering evaluation of
emergency diesel generator cylinder liner cracks was comprehensive and of high
quality.
However, several instances were noted where engineering support in
response to equipment problems was poor.
Examples included the ineffective
response to control air compressor problems and the lack of a timely and
effective review of the main steam line pressure pulse phenomenon prior to the
April 7, 1994 event.
In a number of programmatic areas, performance was good.
The motor-operated
valve testing program was found to be progressing well toward its planned
completion date. The erosion/corrosion program improvements achieved at the
end of the last SALP period were maintained in effect. The steam generator
inspection program was well controlled and implemented.
Engineering support
to maintenance troubleshooting activities was, in general, good.
The
Environmental Qualifications Master List was appropriately maintained.
In
addition, the engineering assurance program was revised and improved during
this period.
Configuration baseline documents were found to be of good
quality, but a licensee self-assessment noted opportunities to improve their
use.
In the procurement area, commercial grade dedication packages were
complete and the warehouse storage areas were well maintained; however the
material issuance process failed to prevent issuance of the incorrect
8
materials to support a modification of Unit 2 power-operated relief valves and
to support emergency diesel generator fuel injector stud changeouts. Also,
notwithstanding the problems identified in the licensee's reaction to the
April 7, 1994, event, the licensee performed an excellent and comprehensive
investigation and implemented a monitoring program for grass intrusion into
the circulating water/service water intake structures.
Problems with root cause analyses continued from the last SALP period and
contributed to weaknesses in resolution of long-standing problems.
In several
instances, such as in response to indications of ground-water leakage near
auxiliary feedwater system piping penetrations, to indications of operation at
greater than 100% power, and to repeated steam generator feedwater pump
control oil power unit problems, root cause analyses performed by the plant
maintenance and technical organizations tended to focus narrowly on the
symptoms of equipment problems at hand.
In reaction to NRC interest or as a
result of an event, senior licensee management focused on specific issues and
commissioned more in-depth root cause activities, such as Significant Event
Review Teams. The outcomes of these focused efforts were markedly better than
those done routinely by the line organizations, indicating the licensee had
the capability to perform these assessments and suggesting that the
performance problem continued to be associated with the threshold established
for initiating root cause evaluations.
Engineering personnel, particularly reactor engineering personnel, were found
to be very knowledgeable of their discipline, however system engineers were
not trained in current NRC operability guidance despite the fact that they are
routinely engaged in operability assessments.
Personnel performance was
generally good, however two noteworthy contractor control problems were noted
associated with the auxiliary feedwater system controller and the primary
water oxygen reduction modifications where the contractors engaged in
installation activities failed to follow established station work process
control procedures.
In summary,
Engineering performance was inconsistent, with substantial
variation in quality.
The quality of the discipline design work was good,
with significant engineering management focus shown in several modification
activities. However, engineering work priorities did not always reflect plant
needs.
In several significant programmatic areas in which the Engineering
organization had an important role, performance was, on balance very good.
Significant problems, nonetheless were noted associated with root cause
assessments and with equipment problem resolution.
The fact that there
existed engineering capability, that when focused by station management and
brought to bear on important issues, demonstrated the ability to achieve very
good performance, suggested that a significant aspect of the problem was
associated with the effective engagement of available engineering expertise in
activities important to safe plant operations, such as in root cause
assessment and equipment problem resolution.
The Engineering functional area is rated as Category 2 .
9
V.
PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS - PLANT SUPPORT
This functional area is new; representing a significant change from the
previous SALPs.
The plant support functional area covers all activities
related to plant support functions, including radiological controls, emergency
preparedness, security, chemistry, fire protection, and housekeeping controls.
In the previous SALP the radiological controls, emergency preparedness and
security functional areas were all rated as Category 1; however a declining
trend was assigned to the emergency preparedness area. Performance
observations in the radiation protection area included: strong management
involvement, as shown by excellent as-low-as-reasonably-achievable {ALARA)
oversight; effective supervision of on-going work; and challenging
occupational exposure goals.
The licensee demonstrated continued strong
performance in activities involving radioactive waste handling and
transportation, and contamination control. The chemistry, effluent and
environmental monitoring programs remained highly effective. Performance in
the emergency preparedness area was excellent with a high quality drill and
exercise program, and extensive management involvement. Although the
emergency plan was effectively implemented for four events requiring
declarations of Unusual Events, weaknesses were identified in classifying and
reporting the December 1992 loss of control room annunciator event at Salem 2.
Additionally, problems with formulation of event classification and protective
action recommendations during exercises were identified. The licensee
maintained a very effective security program, with good management support,
high quality maintenance support, excellent rapport with other plant groups,
and effective audit and self-assessment programs.
Although rated in
conjunction with the Operations Area during the last SALP, the fire protection
program exhibited some programmatic and personnel performance problems.
During the current SALP period, the licensee's radiation protection program
performance continued to be a significant strength. Effective external and
internal exposure control programs continued to be implemented.
Effective
application of engineering controls to control contamination resulted in
commendably low air activity levels, resulting in low internal exposures.
Continued effective ALARA program implementation was evidenced by dose
reductions achieved through extensive application of temporary shielding
during both unit outages, good radiation safety work coverage and pre-job
briefings, and appropriate work area postings.
The licensee effectively
implemented the revised 10 CFR Part 20 by integration of the new requirements
in applicable radiation protection procedures and in timely training of the
work force.
High quality training for radiation protection technicians and
staff was evident. A very effective radioactive material and contamination
control program was implemented.
Radiological housekeeping was generally very
good.
Audits and surveillances of the radiation protection area were
performance-based, performed by appropriately qualified individuals, and were
effective in identifying performance problems.
Corrective actions taken in
response to identified problems were effective. The radioactive waste
handling, processing, packaging, storage, and transportation programs
continued to be very good.
The licensee completed construction of a state-of-
j
10
the-art radwaste storage facility. Radwaste generation reduction efforts were
very effective as evidenced by the continuing downward trend in radwaste
produced.
Performance in the radiological environmental monitoring and effluent control
programs continued to be strong. Effective programs for measuring
radioactivity in process and effluent samples were implemented as well as an
effective program for the radiation environmental monitoring. Quality
assurance audits were thorough and of good t.echn i ca 1 qua l i ty. Responses to
audit findings were timely and identified appropriate corrective actions.
Excellent emergency preparedness (EP) program performance was noted during
drills and exercises. However, the licensee's initial notification to the NRC
of an Unusual Event involving the April 7, 1994, Salem Unit 1 trip was poor
relative to communication of the complications that were known to, and
experienced by, the operators during the transient.
An exercise strength was
highlighted regarding Emergency Response Manager command and control.
Effective management support was evidenced by active involvement of upper
level management in the emergency response organization (ERO) qualification
and drills, and rapid replacement of ERO members following recent employee
layoffs. Several improvements were implemented during the period, including
development of a radiologically-based protective action recommendation flow
chart and improved containment boundary emergency action levels, which
enhanced response capability. The emergency response facilities were well
equipped and generally well maintained, however, problems were identified
regarding periodic efficiency tests on the high efficiency particulate filters
associated with the Emergency Operations Facility and radiation monitors for
the Technical Support Center heating and ventilation system being out of
service for 18 months.
The licensee continued to implement a very effective security program.
Management attention and involvement generally continued at a high level.
Support of security equipment by the maintenance staff was effective in
minimizing the need for compensatory measures.
However, some assessment aids
had deteriorated to a point that even aggressive maintenance was not entirely
effective in maintaining this equipment.
The licensee continued to implement
a good performance-oriented training and qualification program.
However,
personnel performance issues raised questions regarding complacency of
security force members and supervisor oversight of routine security program
implementation.
The licensee initiated actions to address problems in this
area.
The fire protection and prevention program was effectively implemented.
Corrective actions put in place to address equipment and personnel performance
problems highlighted in the previous SALP were effective. There was good
fire-fighting equipment maintenance and surveillance. Responses to emergent
equipment conditions were appropriate. Combustibles and ignition sources were
well controlled.
Performance during drills demonstrated the licensee's
readiness and fire fighting capabilities. Audits were detailed and of
appropriate depth.
11
In summary, the plant support functions contributed effectively to safe plant
performance.
Performance in the radiation protection area continued to be a
significant licensee strength. Well trained technicians and staff coupled
with effective management resulted in aggressive ALARA program implementation
with significant dose savings realized.
Excellent performance in the
radiological environmental monitoring and effluent control programs was again
noted. There was continued good performance in the emergency preparedness
area. Security program performance continued to be a strength.
Fire
protection program implementation was substantially improved.
The Plant Support functional area is rated as Category 1 .