05000387/LER-2017-008, Core Spray Inoperable Due to Not Meeting Seismic Requirements as a Result of a Human Performance Error
| ML18092B513 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Susquehanna  |
| Issue date: | 04/02/2018 |
| From: | Berryman B Susquehanna |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| PLA-7697 LER 2017-008-00 | |
| Download: ML18092B513 (4) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) |
| 3872017008R00 - NRC Website | |
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Brad Berryman Site Vice President U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 Susquehanna Nuclear, LLC 769 Salem Boulevard Berwick, PA 18603 Tel. 570.542.2904 Fax 570.542.1504 Brad.Berryman@TalenEnergy.com APR 0 2 2018 SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 50-387/2017-008-00 UNIT 1 LICENSE NO. NPF-14 PLA-7697 TALEN~
ENERGY 10 CFR 50.73 Docket No. 50-387 Attached is Licensee Event Report (LER) 50-3 87/2017-008-00. This LER reports the improper staging of equipment near a Core Spray Unit Cooler in the Unit 1 Division 2 Core Spray room without seismically restraining the equipment. This resulted in a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications and has been determined to be reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).
There were no actual consequences to the health and safety of the public as a result of this event.
This letter contains no new regulatory commitments.
Attachment: LER 50-387/2017-008-00 Copy:
NRC Region I Ms. T. E. Hood, NRC Project Manager Ms. L. H. Micewski, NRC Sr. Resident Inspector Mr. M. Shields, PA DEP/BRP
NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 03/31/2020 (02-2018) httg://W-N'W.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1 022/r30 the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.
- 13. PAGE Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Unit 1 05000387 1 OF3
- 4. TITLE Core Spray Inoperable due to not meeting Seismic requirements as a result of a Human Performance Error
- 5. EVENT DATE
- 6. LER NUMBER
- 7. REPORT DATE
- 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED SEQUENTIAL FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR REV MONTH DAY YEAR NUMBER NO.
05000 12 2017 2017
- - 008
- - 00 oL.f 2018 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 03 1!>2.
05000
- 9. OPERATING MODE
- 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply) 1 D 20.22o1(b)
D 20.2203(a)(3)(i)
D 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)
D 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
D 2o.22o1(d}
D 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)
D 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)
D 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
D 20.2203(a)(1)
D 20.2203(a)(4)
D 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 0 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
D 20.2203(a)(2)(i)
D 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)
D 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)
D 50.73(a)(2)(x)
- 10. POWER LEVEL D 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 0 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A) 0 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)
D 73.71(a)(4)
D 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 0 50.36(c)(2)
D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)
D 73.71(a)(5) 100 D 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)
D 50.46(a)(3)(ii)
D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)
D 73.77(a)(1)
D 20.2203(a)(2)(v)
D 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)
D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)
D 73.77(a)(2)(i)
D 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)
[8] 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) 0 50.73(a)(2)(vii)
D 73.77(a)(2)(ii) 0 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C) 0 OTHER Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A
- 12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER LICENSEE CONTACT l iLEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)
[Melisa Krick-Senior Engineer-Nuclear Regulatory Affairs
[(570) 542-1818
- 13. COMPLETE ONE UNE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT
CAUSE
SYSTEM COMPONENT MANU-REPORTABLE
CAUSE
SYSTEM COMPONENT MANU-REPORTABLE FACTURER TO ICES FACTURER TO ICES
- 14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED
- 15. EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR D YES (If yes, complete 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)
IZI NO SUBMISSION DATE ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)
On December 3, 2017, at approximately 1030, Operations identified materials staged in the Susquehanna Steam Electric Station (SSES) Unit 1 Division 2 Core Spray Room near the "B" Core Spray Pump Room Unit Cooler. The replacement piping materials were located on pipe roller stands approximately 6 inches from the unit cooler and were not seismically restrained. At the time of this condition, the SSES Unit 1 Division 2 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Low Pressure Core Spray (LPCI) Swing Bus MG voltage regulator was being replaced. As such, Unit 1 Technical Specification 3.5.1 condition A for the voltage regulator replacement had already been entered. With the U1 "B" Core Spray Unit Cooler inoperable due to the presence of the improperly stored materials, this would have required entry into TS 3.5.1 condition I which requires entry into TS LCO 3.0.3 immediately.
The cause of the condition was determined to be less than adequate procedure use and adherence. The staged piping was removed immediately and a communication was performed with site personnel on this issue.
This condition is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50. 73(a)(2)(i)(B) as a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications. There were no actual consequences to the health and safety of the public as a result of this event.
NRC FORM 366 (02-2018)
CONDITIONS PRIOR TO EVENT
Unit 1 - Mode 1, approximately 100 percent Rated Thermal Power Unit 2 - Mode 1, approximately 100 percent Rated Thermal Power There were no structures, systems, or components that were inoperable at the start of the event that contributed to the event.
EVENT DESCRIPTION
On December 3, 2017, Operations identified materials staged in the Susquehanna Steam Electric Station (SSES) Unit 1 Division 2 Core Spray [EllS: BG] Room near the "B" Core Spray Pump Room Unit Cooler [IEEE: CLR]. The replacement piping materials were located on pipe roller stands approximately 6 inches from the unit cooler and were not seismically restrained. At the time of this condition, the Unit 1 Division 2 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Low Pressure Core Spray (LPCI) [EIS: BO] Swing Bus MG voltage regulator [IEEE: RG] was being replaced. As such, Unit 1 Technical Specification (TS) 3.5.1 condition A for the voltage regulator replacement had already been entered. The following timeline demonstrates the sequence of events:
12/1/17-1300: Supplemental work force improperly staged replacement piping for upcoming work in the Unit 1 Division 2 Core Spray Room near the "B" Core Spray Pump Room Unit Cooler.
12/2/17-0748: Unit 1 TS 3.5.1 condition A was entered in support of the Division 2 RHR Low Pressure Core Spray Swing Bus MG voltage regulator replacement.
12/3/17 -1030: Operations identified the unrestrained replacement piping staged in the Unit 1 Division 2 Core Spray Room. A condition report was generated and Engineering was contacted.
12/3/17 -1335: Unit 1 TS 3.5.1 condition A was exited upon completion of the Division 2 RHR Low Pressure Core Spray Swing Bus MG voltage regulator replacement.
12/3/17 -1600: Maintenance removed the unrestrained replacement piping from the Core Spray Room.
Based on Engineering review of the information available with respect to the positioning of the materials staged in the Core Spray Room, it was determined that under a seismic event, the piping could potentially make contact with the Core Spray Pump Room Unit Cooler conduit resulting in a loss of power to the cooler and inoperability of one of the Core Spray Pumps in the room. With the U1 "B" Core Spray Unit Cooler inoperable due to the presence of the improperly stored materials, this would have required entry into TS 3.5.1 condition I which requires entry into TS LCO 3.0.3 immediately.
This condition is being reported in accorance with 10 CFR 50. 73(a)(2)(i)(B) as a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications. There were no actual consequences to the health and safety of the public as a result of this event.
NRC FORM 3668 (04-2017)
Page 2 of 3 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 3/31/2020 (04-2017)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
CONTINUATION SHEET (See NUREG-1 022, R.3 for instruction and guidance for completing this form http://WININ. nrc. g ov/read i ng-rm/doc-collections/nu regs/staff/sr1 022/r3D
- 1. FACILITY NAME Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Unit 1
CAUSE OF EVENT
Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours9.259259e-4 days <br />0.0222 hours <br />1.322751e-4 weeks <br />3.044e-5 months <br />. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Information Services Branch (T-2 F43), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by e-mail to lnfocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (31 50-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMS control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.
- 2. DOCKET NUMBER YEAR 05000387 2017
- 3. LER NUMBER SEQUENTIAL NUMBER
- - 008 REV NO.
- - 00 The cause of the event was determined to be less than adequate procedure use and adherence. The workers did not stage the material in accordance with station procedures which require storage of transient equipment in accordance with identified seismic requirements, including proper spacing from plant equipment and proper restraint.
ANALYSIS/SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE
The safety significance of a potential failure of the Core Spray Room Unit Cooler as a result of impact from the staged materials in a seismic event was completed by Engineering. Based on review of calculations associated with the temperature response of the core spray pump room with one core spray room cooler inoperable, it was determined that with one core spray cooler inoperable, the room temperatures would be maintained within the limiting qualified temperatures. Additionally, the actual Emergency Service Water (ESW) supply temperatures in winter are lower than summer which will dramatically increase the cooling capability of the remaining room cooler as well. Even neglecting this effect the results are acceptable.
Therefore, the Core Spray system would have performed its safety function with one unit cooler operable.
This event will not be counted as a safety system functional failure (SSFF) for the NRC performance indicator based on the Engineering analysis supporting the system's ability to fulfill the safety function.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
With respect to addressing the cause, the Maintenance department has reinforced the procedure requirements for staging equipment with the crews and the entire station. Additionally, the station will evaluate whether training is required with respect to properly staging materials at the station.
PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS
No previous similar events could be found.
NRC FORM 3668 (04-2017)