05000387/LER-2014-001, Regarding Both Doors of a Secondary Containment Personnel Airlock Momentarily Open Due to a Personnel Error Resulting in Entry Into Secondary Containment Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation

Regarding Both Doors of a Secondary Containment Personnel Airlock Momentarily Open Due to a Personnel Error Resulting in Entry Into Secondary Containment Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation

ML15005A384
Person / Time
Site:	Susquehanna
Issue date:	12/31/2014
From:	Franke J Susquehanna
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
PLA-7270 LER 14-001-00
Download: ML15005A384 (4)

LER-2014-001, Regarding Both Doors of a Secondary Containment Personnel Airlock Momentarily Open Due to a Personnel Error Resulting in Entry Into Secondary Containment Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation

Event date:
Report date:
Reporting criterion:	10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications
3872014001R00 - NRC Website

text

Jon A. Franke Site Vice President PPL Susquehanna, LLC 769 Salem Boulevard Benvick, PA 18603 Tel. 570.542.2904 Fax 570.542.1504 jfranke@pplweb.com V

J 110 P P TM DEC 3 2014 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 50-388(387)/2014-001-00 UNIT 1 LICENSE NO. NPF-14 UNIT 2 LICENSE NO. NPF-22 PLA-7270 Docket Nos. 50-387 and 50-388 Attached is Licensee Event Report (LER) 50-388(387)/2014-001-00. The LER reports an event involving both doors of a secondary containment airlock being momentarily open resulting in a condition that met the reporting criterion for a condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function.

There were no actual consequences to the health and safety of the public as a result of this event.

This letter contains no new regulatory commitments.

J. A. Franke Attachment: LER 388(387)/2014-001-00 Copy:

NRC Region I Mr. J. E. Greives, NRC Sr. Resident Inspector Mr. J. A. Whited, NRC Project Manager Mr. L. J. Winker, PA DEP/BRP

NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 01/31/2017 (02-2014)

"Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours9.259259e-4 days <br />0.0222 hours <br />1.322751e-4 weeks <br />3.044e-5 months <br />.

Reported lessons leamed are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry.

Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and Information Collections LI E

EBranch (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to lnfocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and (See Page 2 for required number of Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC digits/characters for each block) 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, Sthe information collection.

PAGE Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Unit 2 05000388 1 of 3

4. TITLE Both Doors of a Secondary Containment Personnel Airlock Momentarily Open Due to a Personnel Error Resulting in Entry into Secondary Containment Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation

5. EVENT DATE

6. LER NUMBER

7. REPORT DATE

8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED SEQUENTIAL REV FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Unit 1 05000387 FACILITY NAMY YDOCKET NUMBER 11 05 2014 2014

- 001 00 j

0 FACILITY NAME 05000

9. OEPRATING MODE

11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply)

[1 20.2201(b)

[l 20.2203(a)(3)(i)

El 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)

El 50.73(a)(2)(vii)

El 20.2201(d)

[I 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)

El 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)

[I 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)

10. POWER LEVEL El 20.2203(a)(1)

El 20.2203(a)(4)

El 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)

[I 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)

El 20.2203(a)(2)(i)

[I 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)

El 50.73(a)(2)(iii)

[I 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)

El 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)

El 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)

[I 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)

El 50.73(a)(2)(x) 1E 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)

El 50.36(c)(2)

El 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)

El 73.71 (a)(4)

[I 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)

[I 50.46(a)(3)(ii)

El 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)

[I 73.71(a)(5)

El 20.2203(a)(2)(v)

El 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) 0 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)

El OTHER El 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)

El 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)

El 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)

Specify in Abstract below or in

CAUSE OF EVENT

The cause of the event was human performance error in that a self-check was not performed prior to opening the airlock door.

ANALYSIS/SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE

The actual consequence was inadvertent, prohibited crosstie of Secondary Containment Zones 2 and 3 requiring momentary entry into LCO 3.6.4.1 and an eight hour notification of the event to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).

An engineering evaluation was performed and concluded that secondary containment could have performed its safety function of isolating as assumed in the accident analysis and also of re-establishing 0.25 inches vacuum (drawdown) within the assumed accident analysis time (10 minutes). Therefore, the subject event did not cause a loss of safety function. This event will not be counted as a safety system functional failure (SSFF) for the NRC performance indicator based on the engineering analysis that shows there was no loss of ability to fulfill the safety function.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

The on-shift Shift Manager coached the NLO on the importance of self-check for verifying conditions are met prior to passage through a Secondary Containment airlock door.

A communication to all station personnel will be distributed reinforcing the significance of secondary containment airlocks, the conditions required for passage through an airlock, and how to verify these conditions. The communication will also highlight the need for personnel to verify that the opposite door is closed first and, if possible, locked in position before entering or exiting a personnel airlock (PAL).

PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS

No previous similar events were identified.