ML18086B439
| ML18086B439 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 04/08/1982 |
| From: | Norrholm L, Roxanne Summers, Lester Tripp NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18086B437 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-272-82-05, 50-272-82-5, 50-311-82-08, 50-311-82-8, NUDOCS 8204270162 | |
| Download: ML18086B439 (14) | |
See also: IR 05000272/1982005
Text
Report Nos.
Docket Nos.
License Nos.
Licensee:
e
U.S. _NUCLEAR REGULA"{ORY CQM!'HSSION
REGION I
50-272/82-05
50-311/82-08
50-272
50-311
050272-820118
050272-820125
050272-820126
050272-820201
050272-820211
050272-820215
050311-820128
050311-820129
050311-820201
050311-820205
050311-820209
050311-820211
050311-820215
Public Service Electric*and*Gas*company*
80 Park Plaza
Newark, New Jersey
07101
F ac i 1 i ty Name: ____
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Inspectors:
f/f/17-
date
- Norrholm, Senior Resident Inspector
2. b ,\\.. -- I.A I>
.
Inspection Summary:
Inspections on March 9 - April 5, 1982 (Combined Report Numbers 50-272/82-05
and 50-311/82-08)
Unit 1 Areas Inspected: Routine inspections by the resident inspectors of
plant operations including tours of the facility; conformance with Technical
Specifications and operating parameters; log and record reviews; reviews of
licensee events; procurement; audits; and followup on previous inspection
items.
The inspection involved106 inspector hours by the resident and
regional NRC inspectors.
Results:
One item of noncompliance was identified (Failure to follow pro-
cedures - Paragraph 3).
Unit 2 Areas Inspected: Routine inspections by the resident inspectors of
plant operations including tours of the facility; conformance with Technical
Specifications and operating parameters; log and record reviews; reviews of
licensee events; procurement; audits; and followup on previous inspection
items.
The inspection involved108inspector hours by the resident NRC
inspectors.
Results:
One item of noncompliance was identified (Failure to follow pro-
cedures - Paragraph 3) *
DETAILS
1. Persons Contacted
J. Driscoll, Assistant General Manager - Salem Operations
L. Fry, Operations Manager
J. Gallagher, Maintenance Manager
H. Midura, General Manager - Salem Operations
L. Miller, Technical Manager
J. O'Connor, Radiation Protection Engineer
F. Schnarr, Reactor Engineer
R. Silverio, Assistant to the General Manager
J. Stillman, Station QA Engineer
The inspector also interviewed other licensee personnel during the course
of the inspections including management, clerical, maintenance, operations,
perfonnance and quality assurance personnel.
2. Status of Previous Inspection Items
(Closed) Unresolved Item (311/81-25-03) Diesel support systems opera-
bility. The inspector reviewed Operations Directive 12, dated
February 4, 1982 which provides detailed guidance to operators
relating to the length of time the pre-lubrication pump can
be inoperable without impacting on operability of the diesels.
Additional guidance for periodic operation of the engine to
maintain temperatures under these conditions is also provided.
The licensee is further evaluating the impact, if any, of
inoperable jacket water heaters. The inspector had no fµrther
questions on this item.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (272/80-32-01) Tennination criteria for charging
pump following a steamline break (reference IE Bulletin 80-18).
The licensee has modified the isolation logic for mini-flow
valves 1CV139 and 1CV140 such that the valves will not shut on
initiation of safety injection, thus affording a recirculation
flow path in the event the reactor coolant system does not
depressurize.
Emergency instructions have been modified to
alert the operator to shut the valves if pressure drops to 1500
psig. Manual safety injection testing has confirmed that the
valves will stay open. Operators interviewed were aware of
the change in control design.
The inspector had no further
questions on this item.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (311/81-11-04) Pressure boundary isolation
valve testing. The inspector reviewed the completed test
results for procedure SP(O) 4.4.7.2.2, Emergency Core Cooling.
This procedure measures leak rate through isolation valves
which separate the reactor coolant system from lower pressure
injection systems.
3
Results of this testing were documented in NRC Inspection Report
50-311/81-11. All leakage, including multiple valve tests, was
less than 1 gallon per minute. License DPR-75, condition 2.C.
(15)(c), allows multiple valve testing until the first refueling
outage with acceptance criteria given as l.gpm for single valves,
2 gpm for two parallel valves, and 3 gpm for three parallel valves.
These acceptance criteria are in the licensee's procedure~.
Several retests as a result of flow due to inadvertent safety
injections are also documented.
The inspector had no further
questions on this-item.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (272/81-14-05} Calibration of flow meter used
for boundary check valve leak rate testing. The above testing
used installed mechanical leak detectors which are graduated in
gallons per minute in two scales; 0-1 and 0-10 gpm.
Since the
devices were not originally intended for application as quanti-
tative leak measuring devices, no certification of accuracy or
in-place calibration capability was provided.
The inspector
reviewed results of single point calibration checks conducted
on March 27 and 29, 1982 which validated the accuracy at 1.0
gpm for the low scale and 1.95 gpm for the high scale. Since
these verification points are considerably in excess of the
measured values, confonnance to the Technical Specification
acceptan*ce criteria was demonstrated.
The 1 icensee stated that
the-flow devices will be replaced or supplemented by more readily
verifiable instruments.
The inspector had no further questions
on this item.
(Closed}
Follow Item (272/80-20-05} Annual employee training. The in-
spector, based on interviews with station personnel and regional
inspectors' input, confinned that the licensee is providing
adequate indoctrination in the use of radiation exposure permits
and applicable exposure limits.
(Closedl Follow Item (272/81-14-02} Completion of modifications to
mitigate instrument bus failures.
By inspection of instrument
power distribution panels and review of design change documen-
tation, the inspector confirmed that the distribution changes
for diesel generator, auxiliary feedwater, and steam generator
level indications had been completed as stated in the response
to IE Bulletin 79-27. Modifications to Unit 2 are scheduled for
the first refueling outage.
4
3.
Review of Plant Operations
A.
Daily Inspection _
The inspector toured the control room area-to verify proper manning,
access control, adherence to approved procedures, and compliance with
LCOs.
Instrumentation and recorder traces were observed. Status of
control room annunciators was reviewed.
Nuclear instrument panels
and other reactor protective systems were examined.
Control rod in-
sertion limits were verified. Containment temperature and pressure
indications were checked against Technical Specifications. Effluent
monitors were reviewed for indications of releases. Panel indications
for onsite/offsite emergency power sources were examined for automatic
operability. During entry to and egress from the protected area, the
inspector observed access control, security boundary integrity, search
activities, escorting, badging, and availability of radiation monitoring
equipment.
The inspector reviewed shift supervisor, control room, and field
operator logs covering the entire inspection period. Sampling reviews
were made of tagging requests, night orders, the jumper/bypass log,
incident reports, and QA nonconfonnance reports.
The inspector also
observed several shift turnovers during the period.
The above daily inspections, which included back shifts, were made on
March 9-12, 15-19, 22-27, 29-31, April 1, 2, and 5.
No unacceptable conditions were identified.
B.
Plant Tours
The inspector toured accessible areas of the plant at least once per
week.
The tours included the control rooms, relay rooms, switchgear
rooms, penetration areas, auxiliary building (elevations 122', 100',
84', 64', 55'}, fuel handling building, turbine building, service
water intake structure, plant perimeter and containment. During these
tours, observations were made relative to equipment condition, fire
hazards, fire protection, adherence to procedures, radiological con-
trols and conditions, housekeeping, security, tagging of equipment,
ongoing maintenance and surveillance, and availability of redundant
equipment.
5
Operability of the following Unit 2 ESF subsystems was verified by
confirming flowpath valve positions, breaker alignment, instrumen-
tation and equipment condition,;: Containment Spray (both trains -
Auxiliary Building), Auxiliary Feedwater (3 trains - Auxiliary
Building and Penetrations), Safety Injection (both trains - Yard,
Auxiliary Building and Penetrations), Service Water (both trains -
Yard, Auxiliary Building). Current tagouts of the Unit 1 Auxiliary
Feedwater System, Safety Injection System and a portion of the RHR
system were verified in effect as specified. Records of current
surveillance for tank boron concentrations, shutdown margin and pump
testing were reviewed.
The inspector conducted a complete walkdown
of the Safety Injection system, to examine conformance with as-built
drawings, lineups, supports, instrumentation, electrical and controls
cabinets and to confinn availability of the system.
The following Limiting Conditions for Operation, not directly verifi-
able in the control room, were confirmed by field inspection or record
review;:* service water availability to Auxiliary Feedwater (3.7.1.3),
Fire barriers (3.7.11), Diesel fuel inventory (3.8.1.1), and CARDOX
system availability (3.7.10.3).
The inspector witnessed selected portions of radioactive liquid and
gaseous *releases to confirm procedure adherence, approvals, sampling
and instrumentation. The following release was observed;* l-_LL-054-82
(11 CVCMT on March 25, 1982). Post-release documentation for release
l-LL-058-82 (.12 CVCMT on March 31, 1982) was also reviewed.
During these plant tours, minor problems associated with unsecured
compressed gas bottles, apparent fire hazards, and poor housekeeping
were identified and were discussed with facility management.
In
addition, several instances of fire doors left or blocked open with
no evident compensatory fire watches or patrols were identified.
This issue is detailed in NRC Inspection Report 50-272/82-06 as an
apparent violation.
While verifying tagouts on a plant tour on March 15, the inspector
noted that the motor breaker for valve 2 RH 26 was in the
110ff
11
position with a red danger tag applied.
The tag, generated for tag-
. out number 3875, was prepared for valve 1 RH 26, but had been applied
to the corresponding breaker in Unit 2. 2 RH 26 is the RHR discharge
valve to the hot legs and is opened well into the recirculation phase
following an accident. Technical Specifications for both units
require that the valve be kept shut with motive power removed during
operation.
Power is removed by means of lockout switches in the
respective control rooms. Therefore, turning the breaker off and
applying the tag did not prevent safety system function in Unit 2.
However, applying the tag to the wrong valve contributes to non-
compliance with Technical Specification 6.8.1 and station Administra-
tive Procedure AP-15.
6
WhH>e observing maintenance on the 12 Safety Injection ff.:ump, the
inspector noted the lack of blocking tags on the suction and alternate
suction isolation valves, 12SJ30 and 11SJ45 respectively~ To perform
the maintenance the component had to be isolated. It was determined
that the breakers for the valves' motor operators had been properly
tagged but the handwheel operators had not been tagged to prevent
local manual operation. Thus,_ isolation of the component was not
assured. Station Administrative Procedure, AP-15, requires that the
supervisor in charge of the work confirm complete isolation of equip-
ment prior to starting work.
In aggregate these two violations of
tagging requirements constitute a violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1 l272/82-05-01)(311/82-08-0l).
A tour of.the yard area identified an additional tagging problem
involving valves 11LW16 and 12LW16; a valid tagging request was filed
in the control room to keep the valves closed but no tags were in
place. These valves isolate the liquid waste discharge from the Unit
1 circulating water system which is shut down during the outage. The
valves were, in fact, closed and are verified closed prior to each
radioactive liquid discharge.
The licensee postulated that, since
the valves are outdoors, the tags were lost due to weather. They
were placed on January 6, 1982. The tags were replaced.
The inspector had no further questions relative to observations during
plant tours.
4.
Review of Periodic and Special Reports .
Upon receipt, periodic and special reports submitted by the licensee
pursuant to Technical Specifications 6.9.1 and 6.9.2 were reviewed by
the inspector.
The reports were reviewed to detennine that the report
included the required information; 0that test results and/or supporting*
information were consistent with design predictions and performance
specifications; that* planned corrective action was adequate for resolu-
tion of identified problems; and, whether any information in the report
should be classified as an abnormal occurrence.
The following periodic and special reports were reviewed:
Unit 1 Monthly Operating Report - February 1982
Unit 2 Monthly Operating Report - February 1982
Safety Evaluation of the PSE&G Rod Exchange Measurement Procedure
dated February 2, 1982
Salem Unit 2 Startup Report - 10% to 100% Power Range Testing
dated February 2, 1982
7
No unacceptable items were identified. The rod exchange procedure is
undergoing additional staff review by NRC Region I and NRR.
However,
use of this method during cycle 4 is acceptable.
5.
Training
The inspector examined several aspects of licensee training programs,
including licensed operator requalification training, effectiveness of
employee orientation, and training of contractor personnel.
To confirm adherence to procedures and commitments, the inspector
attended one operator requalification class dealing with recent operating
plant events, interviewed recently hired temporary employees, and re-
viewed selected records of training for maintenance contractor super-
visors.
With respect to licensed training, the inspector confirmed that the class
attended was consistent with the program and schedule outlined and met
the objectives specified. With respect to employee indoctrination, the
inspector confirmed, within the scope of review, that employees received
instruction, consistent with their function and responsibility, in
administrative procedures, quality assurance, radiation protection,
safety and security, and emergency plan procedures.
No unacceptable conditions were identified.
6.
Maintenance Activities
The inspector observed portions of maintenance activities to determine
that the work was conducted in accordance with approved procedures,
regulatory guides, Technical Specifications, and industry codes or
standards.
The following items were considered during this review:
limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems
were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating
the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and
were inspected as applicable; functional testing was performed prior to
declaring that particular component as operable; activities were
accomplished by qualified personnel; radiological controls were imple-
mented; and fire prevention controls were implemented.
Activities observed included:
No. 12 Safety Injection Pump - Failed pump seal
No. 2 Fire Pump - Failed to operate
Solid State Protection System - Faulty sequence indication
No. 11 Charging Pump - Replaced speed changer
No. 22 RHR Pump Motor - Failed to operate
8
With respect to the maintenance on the No. 22.H!tR pump motor, the licen$ee
perfonned troubleshooting activities after Jts,.fai*lure during a functfonal'
test on April 2, 1982.
The motor had tripped twice -oh overcurrent; 6ITT:e
on the
11A
11 phase and once on the
11 C" phase. After investigating the
problem, the licensee replaced the tenninal leads on the motor which
evidenced some minor fraying.
No other problem was indicated. The pump
then passed a functional test and was declared operable.
In discussions
with the resident inspectors the licensee agreed to perfonn increased
surveillance on this component (daily for several days, weekly for the
next 3 weeks} to assure that the problem was identified and corrected.
At the end of the report period the pump-had been started on three occa-
sions without tripping.
7. Surveillance Testing.
The inspector observed the perfonnance of surveillance tests to confinn
the following:
testing was performed in accordance with adequate pro-
cedures; test instrumentation was calibrated; limiting conditions for
operations were met; removal and restoration of the affected components
were properly accomplished; test results conformed with Technical Specifi-
cation and procedural requirements and were reviewed by personnel other
than the individual performing the test; deficiencies noted were reviewed ..
and appropriately resolved; personnel performing the surveillance activities
were knowledgeable of the systems and the test procedures and were qualified
to perform the tests.
These observations included:
SP(FF} 4.7.10.1.1.f, Fire Pump Functional Test, Revision 5, dated
September 15, 1980
2 PD 4.2.064, Channel Functional Test 2R41A, Plant Vent Particulate
Process Monitor, Revision 1, dated September 26, 1980
The inspector also reviewed the results of Surveillance Procedure SP(O)
4.5.2H, Throttling Valve Flow Balance Verification, which demonstrates
charging and safety injection pump flow rates and establishes throttle
valve positions for flow distribution to the four loops. Valve positions
were recorded and the valve stems marked.
The inspector had no questions regarding the performance of surveillance
activities.
..
9
8~ Procurement
The inspector toured the licensee's Warehouse and Storeroom to confirm
that storage of safety related material and spare parts conformed to
procedure.
The inspection included verification of receipt inspection
by qualified personnel, storage in accordance with defined requirements,
applicable preventive maintenance, traceability to purchase order and
part definition, and appropriate consideration for shelf life.
With respect to shelf life items, the licensee has instituted a periodic
review through the Inspection Order system to require inspection of
shelf life perishable items and to remove those items which are dated.
However, no list of such items has been prepared. Stock room personnel
conducting this review acknowledged only reagent chemicals as being in
this category.
As a result, only chemicals, which are stored separately,
are reviewed for dating. The inspector inquired about two-part penetra-
tion sealant kits (Sem-kits) which also carry expiration dates. The
items were located in the warehouse and had an expiration date of July
1982.
The licensee acknowledged that these items would not have been
detected by the present system. Further, no other items had been so
designated, including valve diaphragms which carried stamped 1975 dates.
One vendor has provided a 5 year shelf life for diaphragms.
The licensee
stated that tbe system will be modified to include other items which may
be identified as having a defined shelf life. This item is unresolved
penging further review of time sensitive items by the inspector (272/82-
05-02).
9. Audit Program
The inspector examined several aspects of the licensee's Quality Assurance
audit program, including frequency, reports, followup, responsiveness,
independence, and qualifications of auditors. This examination included
observation of an audit in progress and review of recently completed audit
reports.
A QA Department audit of nuclear training, conducted on behalf of the
Nuclear Review Board, was observed during the period March 15-19. The
inspector attended the entrance and exit interviews and periodically
observed the auditors. The inspector also reviewed follow up documentation
from 1981 audits of training, administration and design changes.*
Within the scope of this review, the inspector found that audit scope was
adequately defined and followed, that appropriate followup and escalation,
when necessary, were conducted.
With respect to qualification of auditors,
the licensee stated that the auditors were qualified as required by ANSI
N45.2.12 and N45.2.23.
The records and certifications are maintained at
tha corporate office. These certifications address qualification ~s an
auditor but do not provide evidence of requisite experience and training
commensurate with the complexity of the activity being audited. Qualifi-
.cation records and auditor selection criteria will be examined during a
subsequent inspection at the corporate office (272/82-05-03).
10
10. Licensee Events
a.
In Office Review of Licensee Event Reports
The inspector reviewed LERs submitted to the NRC:RI office to verify
that details of the event were clearly reported, including the
accuracy of the description of cause and adequacy of corrective
action.
The inspector determined whether further information was
required from the licensee, whether generic implications were in-
volved, and whether the event warranted onsite followup.
The
following LERs were reviewed:
UNIT 1
82-07/0lT
Engineering Seismic Analysis - Auxiliary Feed
Water System
- - --
82-08/03L
Boric Acid Storage Tanks - Concentration Out of
Specification
82-09/03L
82-10/03L
82-11/03L
UNIT 2
82-06/03L
82-07/0lT
82-08/03L
82-09/03L
82-10/03L
82-11/03L
82-12/03L
82-13/03L
Cardox Fire Suppression System Inoperable Greater
Than 14 Days
Temporary Spent Fuel Cooling Crosstie - Leak
Fire Detection Instrumentation - Inoperable
Containment Fan Coil Unit - Low Flow
Engineering Seismic Analysis - Auxiliary Feed
Water System
Reactor Protection System Instrumentation -
Air Particulate Detector Pump - Low Flow Alarm
Individual Rod Position Indication - 2C2 - Inoperable
Unplanned Radioactive Release - Hot Laundry Area
No. 21 Steam Generator Level Channel 2 - Inoperable
Fire Barrier Penetrations - Lack of Fire Watches
11
b. Onsite Licensee Event Followup
For those LERs selected for onsite followup (denoted by.asterisks
in detail paragraphlO~, the inspector verified the reporting
requirements of Technical Specifications and Regulatory Guide 1.16
had been met, that appropriate corrective action had been taken,
that the event was reviewed by the licensee as required by AP-4
and 6, and that continued operation of the facility was conducted
in accordance with Technical Specification limits. The following
findings relate to* the LERs reviewed on site:
UNIT 1
--
82-07 /01 T
--
82-08/03L
--
82-09/03L
--
82-10/03L
This event is discussed in NRC Inspection Report
50-272/82-06.
The inspector confirmed that modifi-
cations to account for the postulated loss of
auxiliary feedwater have been made in both units.
The modifications consist of a support and shield
for the piping and check valves mounted from the
seismic auxiliary building wall.
The structural
steel enclosure and trench location of the valve
provide adequate protection from seismically
induced debris.
The inspector had no further
questions.
The report contends that dilution of the boric acid
tanks resulted from a non-repetitive evolution;
refilling following maintenance.
The inspector,
in reviewing operating procedures for filling these
tanks, concluded that established routine procedures
existed which should have precluded dilution. The
licensee is investigating the sequence of events
further and will submit a supplemental report. ThiS
item is unresolved (272/82-05-Q4). -
For the safety of personnel working in CARDOX-
protected areas during the refueling outage, the
system was placed in the manual mode.
Appropriate
fire watches were stationed and the systems will be
returned to automatic when outage work is completed
and the rooms no longer routinely occupied.
This event is detailed in NRC Inspection Report
50-272/82-01. The temporary hose is no longer in
service. The inspector confirmed that the temporary
connection had been properly reviewed and approved
by SORC.
The safety analysis bounded the loss of
water and radiological significance actually observed
during this failure. The inspector had no further
questions.
--
82-ll/03L
UNIT 2
--
82-06/03L
82-07/0lT
82-08/03L
82~09/03L
--
82-ll/03L
, I
12
This fire alarm failure affected only the audible
alarm sounded on the plant page system.
Detectors
remained operable and provided visual alar.ms.
The
licensee posted a watch at the annunciator panel
to ensure timely response by the fire brigade.
Valve 22SW223 was freed by exercising to restore
operability of CFCU 22 on January 28, 1982. A
subsequent failure to achieve required flow on
March 4 was attributed to the same valve and will
be reported in a subsequent LER.
Following the
later problem, the valve was disassembled and the
valve bushing found to be seized.
The valve was
repaired and tested satisfactorily.
Comments above with respect to Unit 1 LER 82-07
apply to this report as well.
The inspector witnessed portions of the trouble-
shooting and repair of Overpower Delta T Channel 21.
No unacceptable conditions were identified.
Following receipt of an Air Particulate Detector
Pump Low Flow alarm, valve 2VC908 in the suction
line to the detector was found partially closed.
Subsequent investigation by the inspector revealed
that a containment atmosphere sample had been taken
shortly before the low flow alarm came up.
The
sample procedure requires insertion of the sample
holder in a bypass loop and, throttling of valve
2VC908 to obtain 20 to 30 ~/min flow through the
sample rig. Although the procedure specifically
calls for fully opening the valve following sampling,
this was apparently not done. Additional counseling.
of individuals involved, memorandum notification
to all sampling personnel, and procedural addition
of a specific caution have been accomplished to
prevent recurrence.
The inspector had no further
questions.
This event is discussed in NRC Inspection Report
50-311/82-01.
-- 82-12/03L
-- 82-13/03L
13
On February 9, 1982 Steam Generator 21 Level Channel
2 went high for a period of less than five minutes
and returned to normal indication. Since this is
the controlling channel, the feedwater system was
placed in manual and returned to automatic after
normal indication was restored. Lacking a distinct
failure, the channel remained in service while
monitoring instrumentation was connected to evaluate
performance. Analysis of recorder traces led to an
initial conclusion that the transmitter had failed.
The channel was tripped at 11:10 p.m. when this
conclusion was reached.
Replacement of the t~ans
mitter did not resolve the problem, which was later
traced to a shield double ground.
Once the shield
ground was lifted, no further problems with the channel
were noted.
This event is detailed in NRC Inspection Report 50-
311/82-05.
The inspector had no further questions relative to LERs reviewed during
this report period.
11. Operating Events
UNIT 1
The plant remained in Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown} through most of the report
period, with outage work being completed.
On April 3, Mode 4 was
achieved at 10:00 p.m.
Mode 3 (Hot Standby} was entered at 4:20 a.m.
on April 5 with about one week scheduled for testing and work completion
prior to criticality.
Three events were reported to NRC via the Emergency Notification System
during the report period:
At 8:24 p.m. on March 14, with the lA Vital 4 KV bus already out
of service for maintenance, surveillance testing of the
11C
11 Safe-
guards Equipment Cabinet (SEC) resulted in initiation of a station
blackout signal and loss of all Vital 4 KV busses.
lB and lC
diesel generators started and loaded as designed to pick up loads
of the two available vital busses.
Nonnal shutdown electrical
alignment was restored by 8:31 p.m.
At approximately 6:00 p.m. on March 18, operator inspection iden-
tified a service water leak in containment. The flange and packing
on valve 11SW65 were leaking about 1 gpm.
The leak was isolated
and repaired. The plant was in Mode 5 with no requirement for
containment integrity.
UNIT 2
14
At about 11:00 p.m. on April 3, visual inspection identified a
containment service water leak from the flange of valve 14SW65.
Containment Fan Coil Unit (CFCU) 14 was isolated and the leak
repaired by tightening flange bolts. Leak rate was about 0.5 gpm.
The unit operated at full power for almost the entire period with no trips
and no events requiring one-hour notification of NRC.
Power reductions
were made for turbine valve tests, transmission line maintenance, circu-
lating water system problems, and a repair to Steam Generator Feedwater
Pump 21 controls.
No unacceptable conditions were identified during review of operating
events.
12. Unresolved Items
Areas for which more information is required to detennine acceptability
are considered unresolved. Unresolved items are contained in Paragraphs
8 and 10.
13.
Exit Interview
At periodic intervals during the course of this inspection, meetings
were held with senior facility management to discuss inspection scope
and findings.