ML18046B308

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Forwards Final Revised Evaluation of SEP IX-3, Station Svc & Cooling Water Sys. Revised Evaluation Reflects Results of SEP Topic III-5.B, Pipe Break Outside Containment, & re-exam of Multi-Plant Issue B-11,flooding Failure
ML18046B308
Person / Time
Site: Palisades 
Issue date: 02/22/1982
From: Wambach T
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To: Vandewalle D
CONSUMERS ENERGY CO. (FORMERLY CONSUMERS POWER CO.)
References
TASK-03-05.B, TASK-09-03, TASK-3-5.B, TASK-9-3, TASK-RR LSO5-82-02-093, LSO5-82-2-93, NUDOCS 8203010242
Download: ML18046B308 (26)
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OFFICE.

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Docket No. 50-255 LS05-82 093 Mr. David J. VandeHalle Nuclear Licensing Administrator Consumers Power Company 1945 W Parnall Road Jackson, Michigan 49201

Dear Mr. VandeWalle:

  • ~. :

February 22, 1982

SUBJECT:

SEP TOPIC IX-3, STATION SERVICE AND COOLING WATER SYSTEMS Pl\\LISAOES Enclosed is a copy of the revised final evaluation of Systematic Evaluation Program Topic IX-3, 11Station Service and Cooling Hater Systems.

11 This revised evaluation reflects the results of SEP Topic III-5.B, 11-Pipe Break Outside Containment 11 and a reexamination of multi-plant issue B-11, 11Susceptabi1 ity of Safety-Related Systems to Flooding From Failure of Non-Category 1 Systems.

11 Both indicate that the service water system, (S\\,JS) is potentially not in conformance with the requirements of GDC 4, because of the potential for direct spraying of the SWS pump motors or flooding of the intake structure.

This evaluation will be a basic input to the integrated safety assessment for your facility. This topic assessmentwmay be changed in the future if your facility design is changed or if NRC criteria relating to this topic are modified before the integrated assessment is completed.

Enclosure:

As stated cc w/enclosure:

See next page

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ee rev1ous ye 11 f

ow or SEPB:DL SEPB:DL SBrown:dk*

RHermann*

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s~o4 Si/I Sincerely, Thomas V. Wambach, Project Manager Operating Reactors Branch No. 5 Division of Licensing f)st.t ast £1 {o4) a l iona dd"t" concurrences.

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NRC FORM 318 (10-80) NRCM 0240 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY USGPO: 1981-335-960

Docket No. 50-255 LS05 Mr. David J. VandeWalle Nuclear Licensing Administrator Consumers Power Company l 945 W. Parnal l Road Jackson, Michigan 49201

Dear Mr. VandeWalle:

SUBJECT:

SEP TOPIC IX-3, STATION SERVICE AND COOLING WATER SYSTEMS PALISADES Enclosed is a copy of the revised final evaluation of Systematic Evaluation Program Topic IX-3, "Station Service and Cooling Water Systems".

This revised evaluation reflects the results of SEP Topic III-5.B, "Pipe Break Outside Containment" and a reexp.laination of multi-plant issue B.:.11, 11Susceptability of Safety-Related Systems to Flooding Froril Failure of Non-Category 1 Systems".

Both indicate that the service water system (SWS) is potentially not in conformance to the requirements of GDC 4, because of the potential for direct spraying of the SWS pump,motors or flooding of the intake structure.

This evaluation will be a basic input to the integrated safety assessment for your facility.

This topic assessment may be changed in the future if your facility design is changed or if NRC criteria relating to this topic are modified before the integrated assessment is completed.

Enclosure:

As stated cc w/enclosure:

See next page Sincerely, Thomas V. Wambath, Project Manager Operating Reactors Branch No. 5 Division of Licensing OFFICE. ***~-~~~~- ****~*~*:*~~~ ***~I~-~~~ff:. ****~-~-~~t~~*h***** o*~~*~{~*h-f°fe"fd' -~*~{~1-~*~t**.. **

SURNAME *************************.********************************************************************,................, **********************************

DATE *

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NRC FORM 318 (10-80) NRCM q240 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY USGPO: 1981-335-960

Mr. David J. VandeWalle

. cc.

M.- I. Miller, Esquire

  • Isham, Lincoln & Beale Suite 4200 One First National Plaza Chic~go, Illinois 60670 Mr.* Paul A. Perry, Secretary Consumers Power Company 212 West Michigan Avenue Jackson, Michigan 49201
  • Judd L. Bacon, £squire Consumers Power Company 212 West Michigan Avenue Jackson, Michigan 49201 Myron M. Cherry, Esquire Suite 4501
  • one IBM Plaza Chicago, Jllfnois 60611 Ms~ Mary P. Sinclair Great Lakes Energy Alliance 5711 Summerset Drive Mfdland, Michigan 48640

~alamazoo Public Library 315 South Rose Street Kalamazoo, Michigan 49006 Town.ship Supervisor Covert Townshi Route 1, Box 10 Van Buren County, Michigan 49043 Of ff ce of the Governor* ( 2)

Room 1 - Capitol Building Lansing, Michigan 48913

.William J. Scanlon, Esquire 2034 Pauline Boulevard Ann Arbor, Michigan 48103

.Palisades-. Plant ATTN:

Mr. Robert Montross Plant Manager Covert, Michigan 49043

  • .*./~-:8~\\\\~:.. : /

U. s: Envirorrnental Protection Agency Federal Actf vf tf es Branch Region V Office ATTN:

Regional Radf atfon Representative '*

230 South Dearborn Street Chicago, Illinois 60604

~:<**-

Charles Bechhoefer, Esq., Chairman Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel U. s. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, O. C.

20555 *..

Dr. George c. Anderson Department of Oceanography Universf ty of Washington Seattle, Washington 98195 Dr. M. Stanley Livingston 1005 Calle Largo Santa Fe, ~ew Mexico 87501 Resident Inspector c/o u. s. NRC Palisades Plant Route 2, P. O. Box 155 Covert, Michigan 49043

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James G. Keppier, Regional Administrator Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region III Office of Inspection and Enforcement 799 Roosevelt Road Glen Ellyn, lllioofs 60137 f*

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SEP REVIEW OF STATION SERVICE.AND COOLH~j

\\*!ATER SYSTEMS TOPIC IX-3 FOR THE

  • PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT

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I: I in:::ODUCTION The safety objective of Topic IY.-3 is to assure that the cooling wa~er systems ha.\\*e the.capability, \\*:ith adequate margin, to meet.dEsign objec-tiv~s and, in particular, to*assure that:

a.

systems are provided with adequate physical separation such 1

thaj: there are.no_ adverse interactions c.r.i::>ng those syste::s under any* m::i.de of operation;

b.

sufficient cooling water inventory has been provided or U.c.t adequate provisions for makeup are availabl~;

c. *tank. overflow cannot be released to the em*1ronrnent without m:mitorir:g and. ur;1ess the ~1 eve~ of radioactivity is within acce~table*limits~
d.

vital equ1pment necessary for achieving a controlled and safe shutdo~n is not flcioded due to the failure of the main condenser

  • The turrent criteria and guidelines used to deter~ine if the ~lant systems ri.eet the tcpic saf~t.Y.objectives 2re those p1*ov~,:'ed in Standard Review Plan (SRP) Sections 9.2.1, 11St2".:ion Service 1-:ater Syst2;n 11

, and 9.2.2

Reactor Aux i 11 a*ry Coo 1 i ng \\*!c.ter Sys teiiis 11 JI I.

REL.~TED Sfa.FETY TO?l cs A~:o rnTERFACES The scope of review for this topic 1*tc.s limited to avoi_d duplication of effort since so!"ile aspects of the* review were performed under related topics.

The related topics and the s~bject Matter are identified below.

tach of the r~lated topic reportsc5n!ains the acceptance ~riteria and

1.

I L*

e*.

2 review guidance for its subject matter.

/

ll-2.A - Severe ~eather ~heno~ena II-J.B.1 - Flooding of Equipment

... ~~.

111-3.B - Flocdi;.g of Equ.ip:r.ent (Failure of Llnclerdrain Sys:te:n) -.....

\\'l-7.D - Flocding cf Equip1..~nt (long Term ?2ssi\\'e F2il_ures) t!l-3.C - lnser\\'ice lnspection of ~ater Control Structures n l-4. c Internally Geneiated Missiles Ill !*~ass ar.d Energy Re1ec.ses (P.igh Energy Line Break)

  • vI-2.D -

t*~:ss an¢ Energy Releases IIJ Seismic Qualification Ill Envfronm:-nt.a1 Qualific.ation VI-7.C.1 - Independence of Onsite Power VI1 Syste~s Required for Safe Shutdown IX-1*- fuel Storage IX Fire Protecticn The following topics ~re dependent on the present to?~C infor~aticn for 1....

comp e... 1on:

. VI-3 Contain~ent Pressure and Heat Rem:Va1 Ca?ability IX-5 Ventilation Syste~s xv-7 Reactor Coolant ?u8p Rotor Seizure*

lV.

REVIEW. GUIDELINES In addition to the guidelines of SRP Sections 9.2.1 and 9.2.2, in deter-mining \\*:hich syste_ms to evclucte u*nder this topic the sta~~ used the cefi ni ti on of 11sys tet;s ir:-:;*artant to s c f'ety"* pro vi c*ed in R:7er:nce l ~*

The d r~n,*~,*on s~~~es cvs... c--

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L.C:11I.. to s.c.fety are

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ensure* (l) the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary*. (2)

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the capability to ~hutdoNn the reactor and mai.ntain it in*a safe cbndi-tio~~~ or (3) the capability to-prevent. or: mitigate the consequences of, accidents thc.t could result in potential offsite e>:posures com;>arable to tMe guidelines of 10 CFR Part 100, "Reactor ~ite Criteria". This definition,::as.used to determine which systems or portions of *systems were "essenti a 1 11 Sys ter;is or portions of sys terr-.s which perform functions important to ~afety were co~sidered to be essential. It should be

  • noted tha~ this topic wiil be updated if future SEP reviews identify additional cooling water syste~ that are important to safety.

V.

EVALUATION The syste1J1s reviewed under this topic: are _the Reactor Prirr.ary Shield.

Cooling *system, Charging Pum;:> Seal Lubrication System, Cornponen~* Cooling. -

\\*:ater Sys.tern, and the Service l*!ater System.

The Spent Fuel Pool Cooling

~~"$..i~~:

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*:!J*:~:.. $:'."-*-'- f;.~'>"J...-:*r~~1~: l!.: *:* ~-!i---~ ~*$tW ~.. ~~~,iAf;~~;.'~)!.:,_~.;:.._.~- :*'-~*~~.~~~;--;..~:;~~~~~-.

. - -. - --. sy~tem" fs-di scus-s.ed ; n. the-SEP 're vie\\','- 6'("i"opi c,-ix'-1::.. ***.rue1. Storage~-,j. *-... - - *--..., -.*

- V.L REACTOR PRH'.!:.RY SHJELD COOUNG SYSTEM The _Reactor Pri;:-,=.r.Y Shield Cooling Syste;n (RPSCS) is a closed loop sys.tern h'ith t1*:0 full-capacity sets of shield cooling coils, tv:o full-c'apacity pur.r;:>s,- a: he~t exchanger-an.d a surge tank (Reference 2,_*section 9.2).

The sjstem, which is located inside contain~~nt, transfers heat from the shield 1*:all to the Component Cooling \\*:ater System.

  • Reactor Coolint Pressure E~oundary is-defined i~)O CF?. Part 50_ §50.2('2.~

-i

-~:.t *'..

e*.... 4 The design function of 'the RPSCS is to limit thermal stresses in the concrete shield wall-surrounding the r~actor vess~l. Thermal stresses are the result of convect_ive and radiative heat losses from the. primary coolabt sys~em and heat ~enerated in the wall itself from th~ absorption of g::r:1:,a and neutron radiation.

Palisades technical specification 3.15 requires or.e RPSeS pu:::? and cooling coil to be in operation \\*:henever cooling is required to keep the shie.ld temperature below approxim_ately 16S°F.

The basis for this specification states that the RPSCS function

.prevents weak_ening of the shield wall through less of rrcisture.

V.11 *. CHARGJNG PUMP SEAL LUBRJeATlON SYSTEM Palisades has two constant speed and one variable speed chargi.ng pump.

The variable speed drive requires 26 gpm.

Each pump p~ckage requires

  • 5 gpm.

(The total cooling requirement for the var:iable s~eed pump is.

  • 31 gpm. )

. ~--=~~o;..."X::;)**-~~:~:~,~';"';:*._:;**~l~:i'.. :,.-r:r.~.'5-f'-<*:,:;, -***;~,~--:..*:'.'"7;.:C:-;~~c.~:~~*;3>;J.;.;-...,....~***-~~ *.-,:1i.,<.*--.~~<-.~~~.:?.~>.~J.::4~~*

Th~ consta~t speed charging _pumps can be operated i~~~rmittently without coolirig floh'.

!\\orr.1ally cooling flov.* is provided by the component co*oling

\\':ater syste:11.

V.lll.

COJ*:PO:xt:in eOOLil~G \\*!.li.TER SYSTEM The eo~?onent Cooling ~ster System (CeW) is described in Section 3.2 of the SEP:Revie1*,' of Safe Shutdoh*n Systems for the Pal.hades Plant {Reference

  • 3)'.

The system remJves heat from various components* and.transfers thi.. ~-*. _,

heat to the Service l*!ater Sys tern.

The components cooled by the cew system are:

1.. Rea*ctor Primary Sh*i el d Cooling Heat Exc~a ng_er
2.

Chemical *and Volume Control System (eves) Letdo1*:n Hee": Exchanger

3.

eves Ch~rging Pum?S

4.

Shutdown.Cooling System Heat Exchangers*

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  • e *.

5 e*

5.

Emergency ~ore Cc~ l°fr,g *Sys t~m High Pressure Safety Injection.*

_low. Pressure Safety Injection and Containment Spray Pumps (pr1mary

-cooling system, Service Water System is the backup cooling system)

6.

Spent F~el Pool Heat E>:changers

7.

Control Rod Drive Motors

8.
  • Pri rr.a ry. Coo 1 ant PLimps
9.

Primary Sample Cooler

10. Vacuum Degas Seal Water Cool~r
11. Haste Gas Compressors

. *12. Rad1*:aste Evaporators

  • During normal operation-, one (bf three) pum;:is and one (cf two) *ccw heat exchangers can accor.odate heat removal requirements.

Pum;is A and Care

  • po\\*,*ered by 2.. 4k\\I bus lC; pump B by 2.4k\\I bus lD.

\\*:hen the Shutdown

    • . ~.

Cooling System is placed in ope.rc.tion_dui:i_ng a_plar.i~.c~o1_cjow~~~~---

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~nd. both ~eat exchangers are nor~a11y used; ho~ever,.jf one ~eat exchanger were inoperable, the cooldown tould continue but at a slower rate.

The staff revie1*:ed the heat rei:'"r.iva1 require;-;-.:nts of the CCH system during pqst-accident c~n~itions. The accidents considered were ~he Loss of Coolant*

Accident.(LOCA) and the l*'.ain Ste2:m Line Break (MSLB)-*-.Inside Containr.ient because *these t1-m events result in the greatest pcte~tia1 accident heat....

lo~ds on the CCW system.

The containment air cooiers are also disc0~sed..

here because.they compler.:ent the CCW system in the post-accident contain-

~ent heat rem~va1 function.

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Section 14.13 of Reference 2 provides an analysis of the containment response to a LOCA..

Sc.me pai*t of the.energy re1 eased to containment fo l1 owing a LOC.A. must be. rem::>ved to prevent exceeding the design pressure l irr1it of the containr.ient.

Er.ergy is re1:1:ived by the containment spray (CS) system and the containment air coolers. The containraent spray system and" the air coo 1 ers are fully redundc.nt. methods of containment heat "removal.

The air coolers transfer heat from ~he containment atm::>sphere to the setvice water system (SWS).

The CS system removes heat from the containment atmosphere by spraying cool water directly into the atmosphere.

This water., no1*.1*heated, co11ects in Hie contain:nent s1.:r.ip.. The heat is then

  • transferred to the tcw syst:e:n through the Shutdown C_ooling System_ (SCS) heat exchangers when the S?tay system is aligned to re~ove watef from

. the contain~ent su~p during the recirculation rn~de of ECCS operation.

The

.CS system flo~ is piped to containment via the SCS heat exchan~ers (See *

  • -tnapte.. r
  • 6* *,of-- Ref ernce.*2h.. ;:Jhe* mini mum~ L:oii1Pi11atio.n.4f :con tp..i9ftle~.F)~e~-~~~-;*~,*-<<"rtj, ~ <<-'_..,,.

re;;1::>val systens occurs 2.S a*result of th2 assuil.ed l6~'s of o".ffsite poh*er c.~d the s~ngle f2~~~re cf cne cf the t~~ d~esel 9ener2tors.

Using the design par~meters of the CS, CCW, 2nd SWS froD R~ferenre 2, shown in Table 1, and the conta_i n:.1ent ma lys is presented in Sec ti on 14. 18 of Reference _2*,

th~ he~t lp~d ~hich nust be re~oved from.containment (229E6 BTU/hr) can

.ie ac*c:y::i:ocat~d by the CC\\*.' and S\\*,'S given the assi.:J.:e*d failu1-e of either diesel generitor.

However, to accomodate the heat load"when diesel generator 1-2 is*assuffied inoperable o~erator action i~ requi~ed to.

tedirect SWS flew from the inoperable containment air coolers, die~el generator,

  • The-SEP will reevaluate thE post-accident eDergy balance in cont~inment un~c:r Topi*c VI-2. D, "t*:ass and Ene*r9y Release fo1* Postulated Pipe Breaks lDside Containment 11

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and engineered safeguards air coolers heat exchangers.

If operator action is not taken, the design temperature of *the CCW system (140°F) will be exceeded.

The required operator actions for this scenario are not presently contained in plant operating procedures.

Thus, although the SWS and CCW system.

have s'uffic_ient heat removal capacity for post-acc1dent conditions and assumed single failures, opcirator action will be required to cope with the postulated single failure of diesel generator 1-2.

For the MSLB inside conta.inment event, the amount of energy added to the

  • contain~ent should be 3.4E6 BTU less than that added for the post-LOCA.

case.

(On~oing SEP revieh'S wi11 verify that the 2sst:Dptfons usd to

  • determine the magnitude of energy addition t6 the containment ar~

acceptable.) Because safety injection flow w:Juld not be availab~e as a heat sink*inside containment following a ~SLB, the containment

~ higher sump fluid te~?eiature would be achieved earlier in* the accident t~2~ fer t~e post-L~C~ case.

This ~J~1d Got affect the heat load on the CCW system however; bec~use if in. the unlikely event that recirculation of the containment sump fluid were necessary, it would not-be initiated

~

I until m:Jc.h later into* the l*:SLB accident sequence 1*;hen: contain:nent sump level would be approxioately equivalent to the lev~l ~hen recirculation

  • would be initiated fo1101*ling *a LOUL (Sur:-:p recirculc.tion.occurs autor:ia'tica11y on a low level in the Safety lnjectio*n and Refueling \\*later Storage Tank*
  • ~hich supplies water to the CS and sa.f~ty inj~ction pumpsJ Given the sir.iilar heat release to containr:-rent f911Di*.'ing a l-'.SLB and approxiliiately "7 *

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equal s t;ffi;:> levels at the start of reci rcul at ion f ~ 11 O\\*li ng both the

~SLB and LOCA, the heat.load on the CCW system is expected to be no greater than the heat load 'foll01".'ing a LOCA.

During normal and post accident operation, the CCW system is capable ~f being po\\*:ered from both onsite and offsite electrical sources.

During normal co: system operation, single failu.res could prevent flow.

t_o (1) the services inside. contain;nent (Letdown heat exchanger, Primary Coolant Pump (RCP) c~l coolers, Reactor Prir.,ary Shield Cooling System P.nd Con~rol Rod Drive Motor Seals). (2) the spent fuel pool cooling CCW header (spent fuel pool, rad1-:2ste evaporators, prilii:.ry sample cooler~

. waste gas cor.:;:>ressors a"nd vacuum degas. pu:::p), and (3) one ccw *heat e~changer~ Loss of flow to containment services.and the spent* fuel pool cooling head-er. does not present an im:nedi ate concern; hD\\*,*ever, the co.ntro 1

... ~~--~~\\~~::;~.~~!~.. ~.P~.;:;.~~-r~-:T~.% t* l~-~-~: *,a c_t,t_~~:.t9:,.~ -~:~.Y.~-~t.~e~~:~i :~-Pl~:-~-~-A~.~~.se. -.f.~~~- ~:ti ~.h~ -~~=*****~ *:~:* _,...:,* -~.:-~{:~ *.

te:::;ierature_s. *.The_ plant er,,2rgency procedure for los$-:of CC\\-J identifies the conditions requirir:9 _tir.iely plrnt shutdc:1*m.

The limiting components are PCPs and CRDMs; loss of the spent fuel pool cooling header does not require o~erator action for *a fe1-.* hours.

The *e>:tended loss. of c.ooling t~ a running PCP mey result in pu~p shaft seizure bec£u~e bf overheated bearings~

(The consequences of~ postulated PCP seiz~re are evaluated 2s 2n SEP Design Basis Event.)

The licensee has provided *infc_rmation *_.

l (Reference 4) regS;rding the loss of CCW* to the PC?s.

Loss of CC\\oJ flo\\::

to. and high CC-J temperature *from a PCP ere conditions alar;;;ed in the*

control ro_oli'!.

Fo11o.wing the receipt of either of these alarms, the operator has 1 O minutes to res tore CC\\-!. f1 o~,, to th~ purr.;:is ~efore the

9 -

puT:i?S r.::.ist be stopped.

f..pproximate1y the sar.ie ar.ount of time i.s available to rest_or*e flch' to the CRD!*~s prior to taking action to deenergize the_m (and thus tripping*the reactor).

By procedure, the operator is dire.cted to trip the reactor and turbine generator *if PCP seal ter;;;::>erature exceeds l/ODF, PCP bearing ter.1pt:rature exceeds 175DF, or if all (or most) CROM seal leakage ter::;:>ercl'tures exceed 200°F.

Plant shutdo\\*m follO\\-:ing reactor trip is in acco1'dance ~~ith established erT:ergency pro:edures *.

The renJtely operated valves in the CCW system are air~operated.

1

~pon a*

~ostulated failure cf th~ air supply, the valves fail in the appropriate positio.ns to supply CCW fl ov: to* all loads except the spent T'uel *cool irig system and the radwaste evaporators to which flow is-secured.'

During po~t-accident operation of the CCW system, flow to the containment services and ~pent fuel pool cooling supply is secured, and flow is started

~;**-.,h.* -~:.. :.:.~: : :t~~- the. ~Cf.~. p_~r..;l.s"!.:~***J~i.~.. i.~;*~~7c.Q~Rl.,i_l\\,~~!~~.~-tq~:~~*~a }~lt_,~E~~n. ~;fJlrt~i~~:~.. '" :.'.,,..-:;~~~*-.*.:

  • safety injecti.on sigi1a1. *Single failures could result" in n_o flow to the ECCS pu~~s or fail~re to secure flew to the spent fuel pool cooling system.

The first of these fai1:.:res is overco:-::e by shifting ECCS pump coo1ing to the backup s~pply - the SWS.

This can be perfor~ed from the control ro~m by the o;::erator* \\':ho is \\*:arnecl of this conditiol"! by 1Dh' ECCS.pump cooling f1ow alar~. Failure to secure CCW flow to:the spent fue1 pool

. 'r.'O ul d not result in purn;::is operating, the of CS re.circulation fue1 p_ool.

overl oc.d'i ng the CCI-! has enough to cope with the CC\\~ syste:n because, *with th*o CC\\~.. _.'*

h e at r e1.,o v a 1 capacit,y at the start post-accident 1 oads and the spent

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!so1.:.t~Ci1 Of iridivic;.;~l 1ealiing Cm CO::-.pnents is C:CCO:-:-.plished by manual vc.l*~es.

Also, c:1thou_gh the pur::;:is cnd h!:c:t exchc:r.9ers are redundant, they c.1*e connected by single pipe headers h'h~se failure could *cHs2ble

.~e c:**s... _"l *

... c:,:.

This wcs cc~sidered in the FOL review of Palisades, and s:Eff co::ch*ded that in 2 post-LOCJ.. sc~r.:.rio, the Safety !njecticn (SI) p~~~s cowld co~tin~e to recircu1c.te spi11ed reseter cc612nt with decc:y hec.t be*;ng reil1Jved by the cont.ain:7:2nt cir -toolers (Reference 5)

  • lf the CCW fcilure occurred during a cocldo~n of the plant, witb the reattor vessel hec:d installed, the plant w~uld return to hot shutdown end decay heat could be re;;-,bved via th..: stec:;:; ger.erctors as described in Reference 3.

The ple:nt c6u1d re~ain in hot shutdown while CCW repairs*

\\*:ere Dede.

For ~eci:y heat re~ove:l ~hen :he rec:ctor vessel hes~ is re~oved, ~dequate cool inc* cc.r1 be prodded b..Y keepir,9 the core f1o~ded. using various. systems-~

'*'**~-~>;:!:~.* -~'f. *; *..

  • .~ :' -~

~' "'-'~; -~~*.:*... _;,.-.,;,~... *-- i" -.> ~,~o;*.... ": ~.> -*-~:**.',::.4*.~:...:... *.,..., -~~"'.'..::>. :;f.. :: ~-;. :*~~** *. ' '_,,:.,..,'**.* *... *. * *. ****.,.1. '."-.~.... :.! **,:- ~

s:Jch 2s 5CS c.:,d C\\'CS c.nd t:*c:!~sferring the hec:t to the fL:el pcol 1*:hile repairs ai~e 1..c.ce to the cc;.: piping.

Therefore, c:ith:::.:;h tr.e.. CC\\-.'

syst::;~; 1*:ould t:e disa~~ed ~Ya ~ipe r~~tLJre, the Falisc.~es p~~~t hc.s c.ccept2ble alternate long-term cooling~*

During ~ormc.1 ~nd post accident C?eration, ther~!l expc.nsion 2nd contr2t-1 ti o n o f t h e CC\\*! s y s t E !il 1 i q u i d i s 2 c c c :n:i d a t e d by t he C rn, s u r g e t c. n k, a n d 1 c:c.kc.ge into or* out" of the system can be detected by surge tank level chc.rises.

Hig~ 2nd low surge tank levels are 2l2rm~d in the control roe~,

e**

r**

11 and a radiation monitor and alarra alerts the control room operator to the leakage of radioactive fluid into the CCW ~ystem from components which ccntain reactor coolant.

The surge tank also maintains a positive suctio~

head on the CCW ~umps du1*ing nor~sl and post accident operati~~* Since CC\\..' system pressures c.nd tes;:ieratures* for post accident operation are si-r.ii1ar to those for n:iri7ial operation, no reduction of net positive suction head below that nor~~lly present is expected for post accident conditions*~

The sa~ety related funct.ions of. the CCW system identified in this:review

-are to provide cooling for: the SCS heat exchangers (for post-accident and plant cooldown operations), CVCS charging pumps, ECCS pump cooling (post-accident), the CRDM seals, the PCPs, and the RPSeS.

Cooling of

..:.**~---,~ -~--~-~ ~-.... ~- ~ *.:--*: ** *~ *. :::-..;,..:.-.*,'~~... ~*~::.;,~&>'."*,; *p ;~

.. ;-.:/I--~..... ":_

\\._....:*~~~.. -~- -~---.t:._.. ~'i:* -... :.;-'"'.!'C:-.;*-~-"-~y*_:\\. ;~~~~... ;*.*""'~~.... ~;i.-::.".=~~-.-**. ~~;.:... :.:. --=~~~-~-~~~~

.. :...tr.}C:.*.:~*.1:-;,.~..,._**:-**

  • ~-* *. **the *ietdoi*:n* heat exchanger is not required because letdcn*m is not needed.to achieve boration for plant cooldo~n. and spEnt fu~l pool C -,..,~:r,.... c-n 1-._ *ccc-1 1 1*s:..-,.i r,,, r.-;.:..,.. ~1* svs-:-c:-.-..,s (sc:-P 5::-,_p -1*0::::;1*c IX-1, 11 Fuel Uv1 '"~
c.

Ut:

C.

  • ... r-1

.1::u

~*J v~ _

.;-~

/

Storage).

Of these functions. only the cooling of the SCS hec.t exchangers (fo'r plant cooldo1*m) and eves charging pur.q cooling (for reactor*systern rr,=keup and* boration) are considered essential.

The 'other safety related functions can be pe1*forr:-1ed by other systei'T:s, or operating procedures provide.adequate protection from the effects of losing the functi~n..

lt should be noted that, although the CCW functions for shutdown cool{ng and eves chargirig pu~? cooling are considered essential, loss of these functions ca.n be* tolerated for extended p,eriods of tine bec*ause (1) as detailed above, vpon less of shut~own cool*ing alternate means of removing core

~..

.... ~

.~

/

i

... e*.

12* -

cecay heat* are available* and (2) the t\\*::) constant.speed charging*pumps can be operated intermittently with 110 CCW cooling flow.

So, these fLmctions are more correctly considered to be essential only \\;:hen they are.required to be performed to achieve plant cold shutdown co~ditiqns within a certain period of time as required by Branch Technical Position RSB 3-1 which is the basis for the SEP Safe Shutdown Revie0 of Palisades

{Reference 3).*

V.IV.

~ERVICE ~ATER SYSTEM

  • The Servite Water System (SWS).circulates cooling water from Lake Michigan to various critical. and no~critical heat loads throughout-the plant.

The.

system has three ha1f-capaci.ty pumps, two of which are -pOi*,*er~d by 2.4 kV bus 1D.

The r~rn3ining pump is powere~ from 2.4.kV bus lC *

. Th~ SWS piping is split into two headers (A and 3) which supply redundant

  • *., *~*,.
  • *--~* **.* C,.:'-<.;'
    • .'.">:.' ! :~~'.,~:;*

.** ~:.-'.::.;_,..;~:~_,.:.~.*

~~-' :.,;;,,.~;;: *~*-*

  • criti'c:a*l loeti -tta; ns ' ( se~
  • 1alffe* '2 J*~* *.* He2*aer A*'*suppl~~*s. tra; n* *A 1 oads; -.

header B, trafo B loads.

Ariother header supplies various 11noncritica.1'1 isolated on a safety injection signal by an air operated valve 1*:hich also fails closed on lo~s of air or loss of power to its air control so Teno i.d. va 1 ve.

Du.ring norma1'p1ant operation, the Sl*.1S supplies flow to al.l lqads exce.p.t-*

the diesel* generators and the engine~re.d safeguards ro"Cim coolers.. During Shutdown Coo1i~g System operation, the system supplies the critical

  • 1oads (Table 2)(except diesel generators) and.the auxiliary building
  • See Section 3.2 of Reference 3.

1j*._

air conditioning condenser, and almost all noncritical loads (Table 3) are rem~ved from the system.

Following.a LOCA or MSLB, the *s~!S supplies*

the cri ti ca 1 l cads *only and, if necessary; supplies backup ecol Jng flow to the ECCS pump seals.

The flo\\*: requirements under c.11 operating *.

conditions \\*:oul d norrr;a lly be supplied by two S!*/S pumps.

As de.scribed fn the previous* CCW section, the failure of a diesel generatcir in a post-accident condition could Jead to a degraded SWS operating conditio~

with only one pump operable.* This is the most limiting configuration for

~he S\\*!S stnce one pump must. su~ply sufficient cooling flow to cool the**

containment and supoly cooling for SHS and CCI*/ sy~tem. post-acci'dent loads.

Al.though section 9. l.2.*2 of Reference 2 states that two pumps*

are required in the event of an accident, one. S~!S pump is capable_ of s upp1yi ng a 11 ~os t-acci dent requirements; however, the operator must

. adj us_t Sl*/S fl ow. as __ di.sc~~e.d "j ~,_.. the CCW.* sect.; on:_. to-: ~\\;*e*-ex'c'eedi"nf'~'*'~~~\\~~:~:...

~;':'~~~~v*.. ~~~

.. ;~:*..1..,:-!;:-c-~~*i".. ~***'-~..:.'-.....-.. *-

  • ccw the.rrnal limits.* The approximate required SWS flow rates a.re 1625 f

l gp.m to the one containment air cooler, 3300 gpm to each of the CCW heat exchangers, and 630 gpm to other required loads.

Assuming a CS heat load of 1SjE6 BTU/hr, which is the post-accident containment heat* load (Sect,on 14.. 18 of Reference 2) minus the desjg*n heat removal rate of' one containment air cooler,* the SWS temperature at the ~xit if the CCW.heat exchanger approaches_,

1Z0°F which is well below SWS de.sign temperature (300°F) but.which resu1ts:*:in CCW temperatures exceeding CCW design temperature.

To prevent thi~,. the.

operator must*divert additional SWS flow to the CCW heat exchangers as dis-cussed in the CCW section of this report.

.v....

r

~..

System/Reference Containment Spray (RefQ 2 Table 6-_4)

Component Cooling (Ref. 2 Table 9-5)

Service Water.

(Ref. 2.Table 9~2 and Section 6.3.2)

. *... e.

TABLE

  • ti; SYSTEM. DESIG.N PARAMETERS Parameters 3 pumps - 1800 gpm each 2 SCS heat exchangers -

83~5E6 BUT/hr. each (with 4000 gpm CCW @ 114° and 1420 gpm CS

@ 283°)

3 pumps - 6000 gpm each 2 CCW heat exchangers - 85E6 BTU/hr each (post LOCA) 94~8E6 BUT/hr each *

{at start of SCS operation) 3 pumps - 8000 gpm each 4 Containment Air Coolers - 76.6E6 BTU/hr each (with 1625 gpm SWS @ 75° and containment temperature @ 283°) _

I I

(

I I

I I

I e*.

TABLE 2 ~ CRITICAL.S\\~S LOADS

1.

Diesel Generators (lube oil and jacket water cooling)

2.

Control Room Air Conditioning Condensers

3.

trigineered Safeguards Room.Coolers

4.

~ir Compressor Aftercoolers and jackets (se~vice and instrument air)

5.

ECCS Pump S1=als (backup to CCW s*ystel!l)

6.

Containment Air Coolers

7.

Co~ponent Cooling Heqt Exchangers

. \\".

    • ~ r

~-

TABLE e* *N~N-CRITIC.t.L SWS LOADS la Condensate pump seals

2.

Oily waste back0ash

3.

Turbine e~citer coolers

4. G*er.erator Hydrogen coolers
5.

Isolated Phase Bus cooler 6~ Seal oil coolers

7.

Feed pump 1 ube oil and* gland sea*1 coolers

8.

Heater Drain Puliip seals

9.

Electr?hydraulic Oil coolers

10. Auxiliary Building* air conditioning condenser
11. Steam generator b1owdown heet exchanger I l
12. Turbine Plant Sample coolers I>***

I J3.

Room 128 air conditioning r. 14.

Turbine Lube.oil Coolers

.;:...~~:.'.::'~~:*~:i:.'t'-i&'-
    • . *:**~?~~*:{:*: *."'""*.{.... -.;..,~k,~.... ~~!-'.)t.... ::.. :-r.::.. >)~~*..
  • 15.. Radweste air compressor
16.

Aux. building addition air conditioning

17.

Ventilation Equipnent Roe~ air conditioning

18.

Intake Chlorinator

19.

Cooling Tow~t*pump cboling

20. *Cool i.ng* fov1er makeup
21.

Irrigation Discharge

22.

Makeup Water System feed

23.

Condenser Vacuum Pump cool i.ng

..e...

r.
-~..

.* *:*~.* -..

. e 1~ -

~

To O\\'t:rcome s'ingle. failures in the system. each train A load has a

-~ " :....

coun.~erpart in train B, with the exception of the containment air.

coolers (sup?lied by header B alone} and "the CCW heat exchanoers (supplied by header A alone}.

However, the ccn.:tainr.1entair coolers and CCH 'hec. t e>:cha ngers perform fully redundant ccntai nr.ient heat removal functions as previously described; and the SWS critical.

headers can be cross-connected in the screenhouse and in* the a.uxil iary building for additional.operational flexibility.*

The Sh'S is susceptible to thE single failure of the valve which isolates*

the noncritical header... in the.event of an accident \\-ihich leads to a

.safety i'Djection signal. If this valve should fail to close, th~

.. resulting sws flows would be approximately 4000 gpm e'ach to the*

containment air coolers and CCW heat exchangers, and 6000 *gpm to the

.~:.-:~'~f?:~,"J-~?;_.;.*<.

~:... *.:.... *:*.:,;.,~.,... -,;,!'....,..... -~

      • -:.-. i:*'

-~~.:.;~* *.::;,~--~*. *~;~~ **,~~-~~.~:.ii.~_:.~;...;_'2')~.. ~~>".~~~'~*~..

noncri ti ca 1 header.

These f1 owrates to the criti cal.. be2der vio.uld. net * - * * *.-.:;r *. *

  • present a problem based oh our previous discussion of the*flowrates res.u1ting from the postulated failure of a diesel generator. However, is-0lation valve for the noncritical header can be man~ally clos~d lo~ally -

to increase the.f1ovJ to the critical headers.

The staff evaluated potential passive failures in' the SWS.

Even though tne he:dt:rs are joined in the auxiliary building by* a double-valved:*~;

cross tie and header isolation valves which permit.. the :~solation of: either header ~pitream of the crosstie, a rupture of a header d~wnstre~m of the cross tie* could el irninate SWS flow* to either the CCW heat exchangers or the containrr~nt air coolers. depen.ding upon \\*:hi ch header failed.

This -syst**.1 design is* acceptc:,1e because (1') the conta~m;ient air coolers

. -~

a re fully. backed up in the pcst-acci dent scena'rio by the cs system,.. --..

e*.

-* 15 -

and (2) the CCW heat exchangers can be lost dtiring all plant operating conditions without significant consequences as described in CCW section of this report. Since the SWS is a moderate energy piping system, a pipe failure would p*robably result in a leak *rather than a complete pipe rupture.

Using the method described in Reference 6, *the staff estimates leakage* from the*24 11 header (in the screenhouse or auxiliary building) to be 980 gpm using a SWS pressure of 90 psig.

The SWS total flow would be reduced by this leak rate,_but would be greater than the minimum required for SWS function, i.e.,

loss of one pump *causes a greater flow reduction.

The capability of the Palisades *plant to withstand the effects of postuh-ted flooding _from pipe breaks was assessed in SEP Topic III-5.B, "Pipe.Break Outside of Contai'nment" and multiplant iss*ue B-11, "Susceptibility of Safety-Related Systems *to Flooding From Failure of Non-Category 1 Systems," The results of SEP Topic III-5.B indicate 'that the SWS pumps are susceptible to failure if sprayed directly fr.om a crack or break in the*sws piping.

Failure could also result from either a fire water system or circulating water system piping crack or break or the opening of a hose connection on the main ctrcul a ting* water pipes (two of which are atmed directly at the S_WS pump motors}.

The staff's safety evaluation dated April 30, 1981 for multiplant Issue B-11 did not evaluate flooding of the tntake structure due to' circulating water ptping failures.

You proposed in 1975 that pipe cracks or breaks in the cir*~..

culating water system.di.d not need to be postulated due to low stress*es.

By letter dated December 5, 1975, NRC agreed with your classification of the circulating water system. as a moderate energy system.

However, thi's low stress criteria pertains only to moderate energy fluid.system _piping located within; or outside and aqjacent to protecttve s*tructures.

The current Hcensing criteria

  • )

~~,..

~ 16 appropriate for flood protection of safety related systems due to failures of non-class 1 piping systems is contained in SRP Sections 9.2.1, 3.4.l and 3.6.1. Flooding of the safety systems located in the intake structure does not meet current criteria for the following reasons:

(1) Lack of flood alanns,* (2} Small capac1ty floor drain system, (3) Potential flooding sources (e.g., circulating water piping, dilution pumps and piping, *and fire water pumps and piping).

Leak detection for the SWS is provided by header pressure. switches, which start the standby SWS pump on low pressure, and by drain sump 1 evel alanns in the buildings which house the SWS,. with the exception of tbe screenhouse.

Each heat load on the SWS has either an air-operated or manual 1solati-on v~lve to pennit the load to be removed from the system without 1nterrupti.ng flow to other ~oads. The pump~discharge valves, header isolation and crosstie valves,~

and other valves which isolate SWS loads, as well as the SWS pumps, are operable frpm the control room.

All of the remotely operable valves in the SWS are air-operated> If a failure of the nonsafety grade air systern *;s postulated, these valves.fail in the appropriate positions to isolate the noncritical header, cressti~ headers A and B, and supply flow to all critical header loads except the'engineered safe*-guar~s pumps seal cooling supply which is the backup~*~*

supply to the CCW engineered safeguards pumps cooling flow.

Power for the SWS pumps is provided by the 2.4 KV buses which can be supplied by the emergency diesels or by offsite power.

At least one SWS pump.-iS.-started on each diesel ~uring po~t-accident diesel load sequencing.

1.7 licensee Event Reports have noted that CCW heat exchanger tube leaks have occurred on two occasions (4/22/71 and 1/22/75}, SWS pump ~ischarge check valves have failed shut on thre.e occasions (2/19/77, *9/20/77, and 4/28/78) and on one occasion the CCW heat exchanger heat transfer coefficients were found to be below the design valves becau~e of SWS-

r. l.

rr;10;-c:)

\\*,!1"7n'....

r "'"h I-k l

SiGe iOu 1ng \\c

~ ;..,

  • w 1.r1e exc:;h1on or.,_ ;e e:1scr1c.r9e_c11_ec_' va_vf;!

failures, these eve:;ts do not dei:l::mstrc.te c.ny sisni"ficc.:-1~ failure trends.

The lii:er.st::e discovered th-ese failures during c.tte-7.;:'tS to start S\\*.'S p:;;-r;?S. *Licer1see -Event Re;1:irt iS-15 r=ported thc.t._'i:'ew vc.1ve hinge pins

,::o:.ild be ir.stc.l1ed to correct this pr~:bleiil.

The nei*: hinge pin~ c.nd the r..:;nthly testing of the S\\*,1S pu1:.;:>s required by the licensee's *foservic*e Pu~~ c.nd Valve Testing Progrc.~ provide adequc.t~_c.ssurance that (1) the re~5in operc.~le, and (2) the effic~cy of the hinge pin rep l c. cemer, t is C:ern~ns trc. ted.

The Deans cf detecting rc.dicactive contc.~ination of the ~WS (and CCW

)

1

.i.

r 7

system a re e\\'c ua 1..EO 1 n r-.ererence Ec.sed on our r.~vie;..1 of the Sh'~, 1-:e cc-:-!sider the co;;-:;:>onerits supplied by_

the criti_cal headers (Tcble* 2) to !::e :::e 5~s'en:i:1 1o::cs on the s);*stem..

Although our evc.luetion-has shown that one SWS ~ump can supply all essential loads o~ the system. we we~e concerned that the successful functioning of both the S~*:S and the en: system r..~y depend on the capacity of one SWS pu~p if loss of offsite power and fai.lure of ~icisel generator 1-2 are assurr.ed.

To provide additional SWS pum?ing capacity, the fire

r.

(._. -

    • ~ {'"

l8 protection s.ystem p:.i:.;ps (t1-.*o diesel dl"iven, one electric r.ctor driven, 1500 gpm each) are available and can be connected to the SWS by.a manual 12" valv*e in the screenhouse.

Even though the flow from these pum;:is \\*.'ou1 d not approach that of cne s:-:s pum;:i. the fire. sys tern *pumps are 'capable of a~;~enting.the f~ow of an SWS pu~p if required.

VI.

COl~CLUS I ON Based on our review of the service and cooling water syitems for.Palisades*

we have concluded that the essenti a 1 sys terns and functions are:

RPSCS: Cooling for Reactor ?r1mc.ry Shield

  • \\**

CVCS:

Pump Seal Lubrication: tooling cf Chc.rging Pu~ps CCI~: ( 1 ) scs heat exchc.nger cooling for p12nt cool do1-m (2) C\\'CS c:;c.rdng pum;:i coolino

_, for rec.ctoi syste~ makeup

~

and boration Sl~S: ( 1 )

Al1 1 oads supplied by the critical S\\*!S headers.

He have* deterr.:i ned that the d-es i gn of the 2bove s.is teiils is in conformance with current regulc.tory guidelines and with General Design Criterion,

(GDC) 44 regarding capability and recur.dc.ncy of the essential functions of the* sys terns *\\'r'i th _the exception. of the CCI*! system suscepti bi1 i ty to loss of function fo11m.. *ing certain assL':::ed CCW *system pipe breaks.

HOl'.'ever, the essential functions of the CCW system can be performed by other sys tews under c.11 opera ti n_g conditions.

The above systems al~o ~eet the require~ents of GDC 45 a~d 46 regarding system design to permit periodic inspections* and testing.

l I

.~

1.9 To assure the capability of the SWS and CCW.systems in a post-accident condition requidng containment cooling a*nd with the postulated single failure of diesel generator 1-2~ the licensee should provide, i.n the plant operating procedures, the required guidance to the operator to prevent ex-ceeding CCW design temperature.

(Note, n.o credit should be taken for non-s~fety grade plant air systems.)

Finally, the staff has concluded that loss of service water pumps could occur as the result of unidentified leakage or flooding from piping located in the intake structure.

These ~ssues will be addressed in the integrated assessment.

VIL. P.EFEREl~CES

1. R2sulatory GJide l.105. "Instrur:;ent Setpoints.

11 2~

Consui71ers POl*:er Cor.ipcn.Y Palisades Plant Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR).

3.

Plcr:t (SEP Topics VII-3, V-10.8, V-11.A, V-II.B.,.. X)

4.

Amendment No. 14 to the Palisades Plant FSAR, July 17, 1969, Question 4.. 2.

s*:

Safet~ Evaluation by the Directorate of Licensing for the Palisades Plant~ Docket No. 50-255, Marcb 6, 1970.

6. 8 ranch Technical Position MEB 3-1 appended to Standard Review Pl an 3. 6. 2. *
7.

SEP Re vi eh' of Topic \\'-10. A, "Res 1dua1 Heat Remov2:l System Heat*

Exchanger Tube* Failures."

8.

Letter from R.B'. Server (CPCo), to *R.A.- Purple* (NRC), dated April 4, l 975.

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