ML18038B134

Forwards Proposed Insp Plan & Checklist for SWS Operational Performance Insp,Per 940202 Ltr Notifying NRC of Intent to Perform self-assessment of SWS

ML18038B134
Person / Time
Site:	Browns Ferry
Issue date:	02/16/1995
From:	Salas P TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
NUDOCS 9502230369
Download: ML18038B134 (44)

Text

PR.IC3R.I EY' gg (ACCELERATED RIDS PROCI'.SSIXG REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR:9502230369 DOC.DATE: 95/02/16 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET FACIL:50-259 Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1, Tennessee 05000259 50-260 Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2, Tennessee 05000260 50-296 Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3, Tennessee 05000296 p AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION SALAS,P. Tennessee Valley Authority RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION Document Control Branch (Document Control Desk)

SUBJECT:

Forwards proposed insp plan 6 checklist for SWS operational performance znsp,per 940202 perform self-assessment of SWS.

ltr notifying NRC of intent to DISTRIBUTION CODE: A065D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL ' SIZE:

NOTES:

RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL WILLIAMS,J. 1 1 INTERNAL: AEOD/SPD/RAB 1 1 EZEE CEN~TER 1 1 1 NRR/DOPS/OECB 1 1 RR/DOTS 1 1 NRR/DRPE/PD2-2 1 1 NRR/DSSA/SPLB 1 1 NRR/RSIB 1 1 EXTERNAL: NOAC 1 1 NRC PDR 1 1 D

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iNOTE TO ALL "RI DS" RECIPI E YTS:

PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE iVASTE! CONTACT'I'I.IE DOCL'WIEYTCONTROL DESK, ROGIiI PI -37 (EAT. 504- OS3 ) TO I;LIXIIX ATE YOI.'R I'RO!il DISTRIBU'I'ION LIS'I'S I'OR DOCI.'Ml'.X'I'S YOU DON"I'EED!

TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 10 ENCL 10

Tennessee Valley Authority, Post Oi(ice Box 2000, Oecatur, Alabama 35609 FEB I t'995 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555 Gentlemen:

In the Matter of ) Docket Nos. 50-259 Tennessee Valley Authority ) 50-260 50-296 BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT (BFN) - UNITS 1~ 2 ~ AND 3 SERVICE WATER SYSTEM OPERATIONAL PERFORMANCE INSPECTION (SWSOPI) SELF-ASSESSMENT PROPOSAL By letter dated February 2, 1994, TVA notified NRC of its intent to perform a self-assessment of the BFN Service Water systems. Accordingly, TVA hereby submits this self-assessment plan and requests NRC Staff acceptance of this plan as an alternative to the Staff conducting a SWSOPI inspection. Enclosure 1 to this submittal is a copy of the self-assessment plan.

TVA's self-assessment satisfies the requirements specified in NRC Temporary Instruction 2515/118, Revision 1, "Service Water Operational Performance Inspection," and NRC Inspection Procedure 40501, "Licensee Self-Assessments Related To Area-of-Emphasis Inspections." The assessment team consists of contract individuals who possess the appropriate level of expertise and experience. Enclosure 2 contains copies of the team members resumes. TVA's Nuclear Assurance and Licensing organization will provide oversight of the overall self-assessment activities.

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(fg P~Q 9502230369 'st50216 PDR ADOCK 05000259 9 PDR

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2 FEB f.6 l995 0

The self-assessment is tentatively scheduled to begin the week of April 17 and continue for approximately six weeks.

The final report is expected to be issued by July 1995.

To support this schedule,, TVA requests NRC approval of the proposed plan by March 15, 1995.

There are no new commitments contained in this submittal.

If you have questions regarding this submittal, please contact me at (205) 729-2636.

Sincerely, alas Manager of Site Licensing Enclosures cc: See page 3

h U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission FE8 $ 6 1993 cc (Enclosures):

Mr. Mark S. Lesser, Section Chief U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region 101 II Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323 NRC Resident Inspector Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Route 12, Box 637 Athens, Alabama 35611 Mr. J. F. Williams, Project Manager U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, Maryland 20852 Regional Administrator U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region 101 II Marietta Street NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323

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ENCLOSURE 1 TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORZTY BROGANS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT (BFN)

UNITS 1q 2q AND 3 PROPOSED INSPECTION PLAN AND CHECKLZST FOR THE SERVICE WATER SYSTEMS OPERATIONAL PERFORMANCE INSPECTION (SWSOPZ) 1 ' PURPOSE The purpose of this inspection plan is to provide guidance to reviewers for the review of plant design documentation and the conduct of walkdowns and personal interviews during the inspection of the BFN Service Water Systems (SWSs).

The inspection satisfies the guidance established in NRC Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/118, "Service Water System Operational Performance Inspection, Revision 1." The inspection plan is intended to supplement the TI. The plan is not intended to be a rigid format for the inspection.

As such, the plan is intended to serve as a starting point for the various directions that the inspection may take.

However, if any given area of the investigation results in the identification of potential weaknesses, efforts may be intensified in this area. The inspection will be performed for Unit 2 and include those portions of the SWSs on Units 1 and 3 which are necessary for operation of Unit 2.

2 ' SCOPE 2.1 The inspection will consist of an audit level review of the BFN Emergency Equipment Cooling Water (EECW) and the Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) systems design bases. The inspection consists of document reviews to ensure consistent application of the design bases throughout the licensing bases documents, such as the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), Technical Specifications (TS),

applicable plant drawings, operating and emergency procedures, test procedures, ASME Section XI and EQ programs.

2.2 The inspection will utilize "educated" selective sampling vertical slice inspection (SWSOPI/SSFI type) level review of the BFN SWSs (including document reviews, walkdowns and personnel interviews) to identify weaknesses or missing information in the design bases, operating, or design output documents.

The inspection will:

~ Assess planned or completed actions in response to GL 89-13, "Service Water Systems Problems Affecting Safety- Related Equipment, July 18, 1989."

~ Verify that the SWSs are capable of fulfilling their thermal and hydraulic performance requirements and are operated in a manner consistent with their design bases.

~ Assess the SWSs operational controls, maintenance, surveillance and other testing, and personnel training to ensure the SWSs are operated and maintained so as to perform required safety-related functions.

2.3 As stated above, the inspection will place a heavy emphasis on a review of BFN's response to and implementation of GL 89-13, "Service Water System Problems Affecting Safety-Related Equipment," as well as the review of recent modifications. The inspection will include:

~ EECW

~ RHRSW

~ Ultimate Heat Sink

~ Specific SWSs Component Electrical Requirements

~ HVAC Systems served by and Equipment Cooled by the SWSs El-2

In addition, a review of how the assumptions made in BFN's 10 CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluation process have been translated into procedures, instructions, etc., will be conducted (i.e., the validity of 50.59 conclusions may depend on implementing assumptions made). In addition, 50.59 evaluations will be reviewed to determine the adequacy of "unreviewed safety question" conclusions and that the approval process is appropriate.

2.4 The original design basis criteria, requirements, and commitments will be established for the design of these systems. Inspection and review will be intensified as appropriate to identify any weaknesses that may exist in the baseline design bases for these systems or in the design documentation developed to substantiate modifications performed. UFSAR statements related to the design of the SWSs will be verified and design basis documents reviewed.

2.5 NRC Information Notices, Bulletins, GL, NUREGs, and Regulatory Guides, will be reviewed to identify operating restrictions (e.g., operator actions, maintenance requirements, testing limitations, etc.),

Additionally, topical reports (e.g., Regulatory Guide 1.97, Appendix R, compliance reports, GE Topical Reports, etc.), reports on SWSOPIs conducted at other utilities, and TVA responses to Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) Significant Event Reports and Significant Operating Experience Reports will be reviewed to verify consistency with design requirements, design bases documents and incorporation into operating documents.

2.6 Refinements to the above scope may be made subsequent to the initial review of the SWSs design to include additional scope details if appropriate.

3~0 MECHANICAL SYSTEMS ENGINEERING DESIGN AND CONFIGURATION CONTROL 3.1 Initial Review In addition to the criteria in this section, the review of the mechanical systems aspects of SWSs will follow the specific criteria in Section 03.01, Mechanical Systems Engineering Design Review and Configuration Control, of TI 2515/118. Following is additional guidance for the mechanical inspector.

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Review original and UFSAR, Nuclear Steam Supply System design and interface requirements and criteria, and other documentation provided to identify regulatory commitments and design requirements for the SWSs. The review will include criteria and commitments for interfacing systems such as the HVAC System.

Review design documentation such as system design descriptions, applicable plant drawings, component specifications and other SWSs configuration drawings to establish how commitments and requirements were incorporated into the design documents.

Verify the proper identification of SWSs boundaries and interfaces.

Review SWSs calculations and analyses to verify consistency of design assumptions or assumed operator actions and acceptability of available margins. Additionally, review the calculation index to identify calculations related to compliance with design requirements and criteria (e.g., flow distribution in the SWS, minimum flow requirements, maximum flow and run-out, other hydraulic calculations). The capability to satisfy Regulatory Guide 1.27 requirements related to shutdown with maximum anticipated temperatures will also be reviewed.

Determine methods used to comply with design and regulatory guidance in the following areas:

o The type of cooling water supply

~ The ability to dissipate the total essential station heat load.

~ The effect of environmental conditions on the capability of the SWSs to furnish the required quantities of cooling water, at appropriate temperatures for extended times after shutdown.

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~ The effect of earthquakes, tornadoes, missiles, floods, and hurricane winds on the availability of the cooling water. The SWSs will also be reviewed to assure that adverse environmental conditions including freezing will not preclude the fulfillment of the safety function of the systems.

~ The sharing of cooling water sources between units.

~ The applicable design requirements such as the high-water and low-water levels of the source SWSs water determine their compatibility with the SWSs.

~ The effects of the failure of non-seismic Category I equipment, structures, or components on safety-related portions of the SWSs are taken into account during SWSs design.

Confirm that service water GL 89-13 design and licensing requirements (e.g., review of SWS single failures, biofouling, and silting controls) have been adequately addressed and implemented.

3.2 Review of Modifications Review plant design changes for assumptions/restrictions, consistency with equipment specifications, drawings, vendor manuals and, equipment databases. Individual modification packages are to be reviewed to determine the effect of modifications performed on the capability of the SWSs and interfacing systems to meet established commitments and design requirements.

3.2.2 Review field changes and temporary alterations to assure that system capability has not been degraded below established criteria and requirements.

3.2.3 Review calculations related to each modification package to assure that changes are adequately substantiated and documented.

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Confirm that calculations are completed and verified in accordance with the requirements of ANSI N45.2.11 changes made

'eview to applicable plant drawings to assure that appropriate nonsafety-related portions of the system have been adequately isolated from safety-related portions of the system where required. Confirm that nonseismic portions of the system and interfacing systems are designed such that the SWSs can perform their safety function under all modes of operation.

Perform a walkdown of accessible portions of the service water, and component cooling systems comparing the as-installed and as-built configuration with that reflected on the design drawings.

Review modifications to assure that provisions have been made to perform post-modification testing of those changes that affect the capability of the system to perform its safety function. Review appropriate operating procedures to assure that changes in procedures are properly incorporated where modifications affect system operational requirements. Confirm that the modified design can be operated as originally intended and that assumptions made in related analyqes concerning operator actions and response times are accurately incorporated into appropriate procedures.

Where necessary, review maintenance procedures to assure that special maintenance requirements established as a result of modifications made are properly documented.

Review 10 CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluations associated with modifications to assure that the modified design has been correctly evaluated for the identification of all safety issues and potential reductions in design margins.

Confirm that the modified design of the SWSs and interfacing systems are consistent with requirements specified in TSs.

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3.3 Supplementary Reviews 3.3.1 Review the Q-List to confirm that entries are being accurately recorded. Confirm that safety-related and nonsafety-related, Q and non-Q, components are correctly designated for modifications made to the SWS.

3.3.2 Review the basis for establishing motor-operated valve design parameters and their relationship to torque switch settings. Confirm that opening and closing settings are appropriately related to worst-case differential pressure for any mode of operation. Review the basis for maximum differential pressure to assure that all modes of plant operation have been adequately accommodated.

3.3.3 Review modified designs to assure that established setpoints have been appropriately revised to reflect any changes in the system functional design. Confirm that the bases for these setpoints have been adequately substantiated by documented analyses.

3.3.4 Review modified designs to assure that special considerations, e.g., seismic II/I and internally (or externally) generated missiles, have been adequately evaluated and documented.

4 ' OPERATIONS 4.1 Initial Review In addition to the criteria contained in this section, the review of the operation aspects of the SWSs the operations review will follow the specific criteria contained in section.03.02, Operations, of TI 2515/118. Following is additional guidance for the operations inspector.

4.1.1 Review UFSAR sections, system design descriptions, and one-lines related to the service water and interfacing systems, (e.g.,

Residual Heat Removal System) for correlation of system design with operating procedures.

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4.1.2 Review GL 89-13 commitments with regard to confirming the adequacy of the SWSs operating and emergency procedures.

4.1.3 Review TS to identify operational requirements related to the safe operation of the service water systems.

4.1.4 Review the procedures for normal and emergency operations of the SWSs and their interfacing systems to identify any areas of operational concern, such as inadequate procedural guidance or weaknesses.

4.1.5 Review selected modification packages to assure that changes which affect the service water and interfacing systems operations have been adequately addressed in operating procedures.

4.1.6 Verify that the SWSs are maintained in a state ready to respond to system demands with appropriate valve, breaker, and control lineups.

Verify that the procedures are sufficient for the proper operation and maintenance of the system.

4.2 Interaction with Plant Operations Personnel 4.2.1 Using the results of the above reviews as a basis, interview plant operations personnel to determine:

the effectiveness of the operating procedures in providing adequate guidance to personnel for the operation of the SWSs (and interfacing systems) in performing their safety functions;

~ the adequacy of operator familiarity with SWSs, normal and emergency procedures;

~ whether actions required by operator and specified response times for these actions are reasonable for postulated accident conditions; and

~ whether adequate information is available through existing safety-related instrumentation to execute actions required by operating procedures.

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4.2.2 During the interviews with operations staff, assess control of work and operations, and routine system status verification. Assess the qualifications and capability of the operations staff based on their experience, education, and training.

4.2.3 Through interaction with other inspection team members, assist in the assessment of the operations staff and procedures used relative to the design intent for the original service water systems design bases.

4.2.4 Walk through operating procedures identified during the initial review with licensed operators, when available, to identify any areas of weakness in the procedures. Concurrently, interview operating personnel to determine their opinions and input on these procedures relative to ease of performance and suggested changes that would improve weak areas.

4.2.5 During a walkdown of the SWSs and interfacing systems, determine if components are labeled and accessible to verify the components can be operated locally/manually.

4.2.6 Determine if as tested system lineups duplicate the required lineups for specific accident scenarios; or, that a change in system lineup is required and provided for in operating procedures.

4.3 Supplementary Reviews Confirm that human factors considerations are adequately addressed in the implementation of operating procedures. To assure that required actions can be executed using available instrumentation,, controls, and accessible components specified by the procedures.

4.3.2 Review the operational experience of the service water and interfacing systems, including Licensee Event Reports, Nuclear Plant Reliability Data Systems, enforcement actions, nonconformance reports, and maintenance work requests.

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5 ' SURVEILLANCE AND TESTING 5.1 Initial Review In addition to the criteria contained in this section, the review of operation aspects of the SWSs will follow the specific criteria contained in Section 03.04, Surveillance and Testing, of TI 2515/118. The following are additional guidance for the review:

5.1.1 Review UFSAR sections, design basis documents, TSs for service water and interfacing systems to identify requirements for surveillance and testing.

5.1.2 Review GL 89-13 commitments with regard to verifying the capability of SWS heat exchangers.

Additionally, review the plant's commitments for the controlling of biofouling.

5. 1.3 Review surveillance procedures for SWSs and interfacing systems to assure that surveillance requirements are adequately implemented. Verify the procedures reflect actual system and components function and design intent.

5. 1.4 Review surveillance procedures for service water and interfacing systems to confirm that. these systems and components are tested to demonstrate that they will perform their intended safety functions for all design bases conditions. For example, testing should demonstrate:

~ capability of automatically supplying cooling water to equipment that must operate during an emergency shutdown;

~ capability of automatically supplying cooling water to equipment required for normal plant operation in the case of a failure of the primary source of cooling water;

~ automatic initiation of SWSs pumps on receipt of an actuation signal.

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Review trending completed by the plant staff on surveillance data to determine if methods ensure that degradation will not result in components operating outside their design bases prior to next scheduled surveillance testing.

Identify selected modifications to the SWSs and interfacing systems for review to assure that appropriate surveillance and post-modification testing has been incorporated as required.

5.2 Plant Staff Interactions Walk through surveillance and test procedures with surveillance and test personnel, if available, to identify any procedural weaknesses or procedures that may not be consistent with the design basis intent.

5.2.2 Interview surveillance personnel in conjunction with review of surveillance tending data to determine whether the root causes of failures have been aggressively pursued, identified, and corrected.

5.3 Supplementary Reviews Review selected modification packages to confirm that post-modification testing, where necessary, has been provided to demonstrate that the modified design can perform its safety functions as required by the design bases.

5.3.2 Review actual in-service evaluation and testing data logs to confirm that data is being correctly logged and accurately documented in accordance with applicable procedures.

5.3.3 Review post-modification test procedures and actual post-modification testing data for testing conducted on the modified designs to confirm that:

~ accurate and appropriate acceptance criteria based on design bases documentation have been established and met;

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~ procedures are technically adequate and reflect the design basis intent to assure the modified design can perform intended safety functions; and

~ data is acCurately and correctly logged as required by test procedures.

5.3.4 Review modifications to identify SWSs surveillance inspection and test requirements to be implemented on modified design. Confirm that provisions have been made to incorporate these requirements into appropriate procedure, scheduled surveillance testing, and Inservice Inspections.

5.3.5 Review surveillance procedures to determine, the adequacy of inservice testing of SWSs pumps and valves in accordance with ASME Section XI requirements. Confirm that adequate acceptance criteria are specified and that they are consistent with design bases requirements (review in conjunction with mechanical, portion of inspection).

6 0 MAINTENANCE 6.1 Initial Review In addition to the'riteria contained in this section, the review of the maintenance aspects of the SWSs will follow the specific criteria contained in Section 03.03, Maintenance, of TI 2515/118. Following is additional guidance for the maintenance inspector(s).

6.1.1 Review UFSAR sections, design basis documents, and maintenance program documentation provided to identify maintenance commitments for the service water and interfacing systems.

6.1.2 Identify maintenance-related documentation to be reviewed, (e.g., maintenance procedures, work requests, and post-maintenance test procedures).

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6.2 Plant Staff Interactions Review selected SWSs maintenance and maintenance test procedures with maintenance staff personnel to identify weaknesses and inconsistencies with the design intent for the component or system function.

6.2.2 Interview maintenance staff personnel to determine technical adequacy of maintenance instructions provided by maintenance procedures.

Identify extent of maintenance instructions left to technician's capability in "skill of craft."

6.3 Supplementary Reviews Review selected modifications to the SWSs for maintenance-related requirements, post-maintenance testing, etc. Confirm that provisions have been made to incorporate these requirements into appropriate maintenance procedures and periodic maintenance test schedules.

6.3.2 Review SWSs maintenance work requests and maintenance records to determine whether required maintenance was properly executed as specified in maintenance procedures.

6.3.3 Review maintenance records to confirm that required post-maintenance testing was conducted as specified in maintenance test procedures and that the test adequately demonstrated that the system and components tested will perform their intended safety functions as defined in the design bases.

6.3.4 Review maintenance records to determine whether repeated maintenance problems with the same components are adequately tracked and the root cause of the problems resolved.

6.3.5 Review maintenance records to identify any portions of the system that were inoperable or found substantially degraded for long periods of time. Determine were performed and ifif adequate root cause analyses appropriate corrective actions were taken.

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7 0 MANAGEMENT 7.1 Reviews 7.1.1 Review the interface between Operations, Nuclear Engineering and Technical Support to determine that adequate support is provided to Operations.

7.1.2 Identify the degree of root cause analyses and component trending.

7.1.3 Select modifications to be reviewed to identify weaknesses in configuration control.

7.1.4 Review modifications to confirm that changes made to the service water and interfacing systems have been accurately reflected in timely revisions to the UFSAR, drawings, operating and maintenance procedures, calculations, Q-List, and training documents where required. Evaluate errors and inconsistencies identified, including those identified by other reviewers, to determine if a generic weakness exists.

7.1.5 Review the procedures for temporary alterations.

7.1.6 Review training of engineering personnel.

7.2 Quality Assurance (QA) and Corrective Actions Activity Initial Review In addition to the criteria contained in this Section, the QA and Corrective Actions review will follow the specific criteria contained in Section 03.05, Quality Assurance and Corrective Actions of TI 2515/118. Following is additional guidance for the QA and Corrective Actions reviewers.

7 2.1 Review audit reports issued in the past 24

~

months involving corrective processes, plant maintenance, operations, surveillance and testing, and design activities to evaluate the effectiveness of corrective measures for issues identified in SWSs.

7.2.2 Review surveillance reports issued in the past 24 months involving SWSOPI concerns. Assess the timeliness and effectiveness of the corrective actions taken for identified issues.

7.2.3 Evaluate the timeliness and effectiveness of the corrective action processes for identified concerns raised during the recent SWSOPI Project activities.

7.2.4 Review any self-assessment activities performed in SWS areas by individual line organizations.

Assess the timeliness and effectiveness of identified concerns.

7.2.5 Review the Licensing database for addressing NRC and any other commitments concerning SWS areas.

Assess whether the commitments are being effectively met.

8' ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS SUPPORTING SERVICE WATER SYSTEMS 8.1 Initial Review 8.1.1 Review original and updated FSAR sections, design basis documents, Technical Specifications, and interface requirements and criteria to identify regulatory and design requirements for electrical power systems which support service water systems.

8. 1.2 Review the index of modification design changes to the electrical systems and interfacing systems and interfacing systems during recent outages to identify packages that impact specific SWS components and should be inspected in detail.

8.2 Review of Modifications to the Electrical Systems 8.2.1 Review individual modification packages selected for inspection to determine effect of modifications performed on the capability of electrical systems and interfacing systems to meet established SWS commitments and design requirements.

8.2.2 Review selected modification packages or electrical design changes to assure that SWS capability has not been degraded relative to established criteria and requirements.

8.2.3 Review documentation substaining modifications to the service water systems to confirm that analyses are verified and completed in accordance with the requirements of ANSI N45.2.11.

8.3 Supplementary Reviews 8.3.1 Review the selection of SWS power sources, including separation requirements and availability.

8.3.2 Review SWS equipment control design.

8.3.3 Review the analyses for selected SWS motors and components, substaining the selected motor overcurrent and overload protection.

8.3.4 Review load sequencing, timing, and alignment of electrical power supplies that support the SWS.

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ENCLOSURE 2 TENNES8EE VALLEY AUTHORZTY BROGANS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT (BFN)

UNZTS 1i 2q AND 3 PROPOSED INSPECTION PLAN AND CHECKLIST FOR THE 8ERVICE MATER 8YSTEMS OPERATZONAL PERFORMANCE INSPECTION (SWSOPI)

TEAM MEMBER RESUMES

ROBERT W. DeNIGHT, JR.

EDUCATION B.S., Mechanical Engineering, Virginia Polytechnic Institute 8c State University, 1990 PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATIONS American Society of Mechanical Engineers Engineer in Training (EIT), Virginia

SUMMARY

OF QUALIFICATIONS Mr. DeNight provides engineering services for nuclear utility design-related projects. He has experience in preventive and corrective maintenance, surveillance and testing, and liaison engineering related to both nuclear plant and shipboard reactor systems. He has performed hydraulic transient analyses, design calculations, engineering evaluations, and modifications closeouts for utility engineering staffs. He has participated in numerous performance-based inspections (SSFls, SSFAs, and SWSOPls) as a mechanical design, maintenance, or surveillance and testing reviewer.

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE Ogden Environmental and Energy Services Co., Inc.

1993 - Present Engineer. Mr. DeNight served as the mechanical maintenance reviewer for a Service Water System Operational Performance Inspection (SWSOPI) of the salt water, service Owater, and component cooling water systems for BGE's Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant. He was responsible for the review and assessment of the effectiveness of the preventive and corrective maintenance programs, maintenance records and associated documentation, component failure trends, and implementation of the recommendations from Generic Letter 89-13.

Mr. DeNight served as the surveillance and testing and maintenance reviewer for the auxiliary feedwater Safety System Self-Assessment (SSSA) at Farley Nuclear Plant. He was 'responsible for the review and assessment of the auxiliary feedwater system's In-Service Testing (IST), performance testing, and preventive and corrective maintenance programs. He has also served as a mechanical design reviewer for the instrument air system SSSA at Farley.

Mr. DeNight was a mechanical design reviewer for a SWSOPI readiness review of the service water system for PSERG at Hope Creek and at Salem. He was responsible for the review and assessment of the service water system's design, which included hydraulic analyses, water hammer analysis, and single failure review. He provided engineering OeNight - 18

support to the engineering staff at Salem to resolve and close out SWSOPI issues, which included design calculations and engineering evaluations.

Mr. DeNight was the maintenance reviewer for a Safety System Functional Inspection (SSFI) of the low pressure core spray and reactor core isolation cooling systems at Grand Gulf Nuclear Plant and at Clinton Power Station. He was responsible for the review and assessment of the effectiveness of the preventive and corrective maintenance programs, maintenance procedures, and component failure trends.

Mr. DeNight participated as mechanical design reviewer in SSFIs of the main feedwater system at PECO Energy Company's Peach Bottom and Limerick Stations. He reviewed and assessed mechanical documentation supporting the system design, including design calculations, plant modifications, licensing commitments, and incorporation of design requirements into testing and maintenance procedures.

Mr. DeNight provided engineering services to BGE to perform a complete revision of their salt water (service water) flow model and hydraulic analysis. This task included a review of the original flow calculations and SWS drawings. In addition, this task included developing the supporting flow analysis and running all the normal operating and postulated accident scenarios.

Mr. DeNight was the Deputy Project Manager of Entergy Operations'rand Gulf Nuclear Plant calculation assessment program. He is responsible for reviewing mechanical design calculations for various safety-related systems, including the standby service water, component cooling water and control room HVAC.

Mr. DeNight provided engineering assistance to American Electric Power Service Corporation in support of a human factors engineering modification closeout project. His task was to close a major modification package and its associated subtasks, which made enhancements to the control room panels. The enhancements were developed from observations generated in accordance with the recommendations of NUREG-0700 during a detailed control room design review. The closeout included a review of maintenance orders, and modification packages to ensure all planned work was accomplished.

Newport News Shipbuilding 5. Drydock Company 1990 - 1993 Mechanical Maintenance Engineer. Mr. DeNight was involved with various nuclear reactor systems aboard U.S. Naval aircraft carriers. He was responsible for the maintenance and testing of all safety-related MOVs with Limitorque operators, and performed troubleshooting activities when system discrepancies were discovered. He wrote corrective and preventive maintenance instructions for various shipboard reactor systems. He performed stress analysis of piping to determine the acceptability of thinned pipe walls. He designed various shipyard tooling (e.g., purge gas equipment, freeze seal equipment, machine tooling, radiological containment design). He evaluated the acceptability of piping/system modifications and proposed these to the Navy. Mr.

DeNight held a confidential restriction data clearance and was radiation worker qualified.

DeNight - 19

JOHN M. KILDITCH, P.E.

EDUCATION B.S.E.E., Villanova University, Magna Cum Laude, 1983 Advanced Nuclear Power Training, U.S. Navy, 1984 PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATIONS Professional Engineer/1990/Rhode Island Tau Beta Pi Engineering Honor Society Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers

SUMMARY

OF QUALIFICATIONS Mr. Hilditch has over 11 years of experience as an engineer in the design, operation, and maintenance of naval and commercial power plants. While serving in the U.S. Navy, Mr.

Hilditch supervised and managed an engineering division tasked to maintain the ship' propulsion system which included major cooling water systems and the electrical distribution system. As an engineering watch officer, he actively integrated rapidly changing shipyard priorities with available personnel assets during several complex and lengthy engineering plant test programs, including the final closeout and hydrostatic testing of every major seawater cooling system on the ship. Mr. Hilditch gained first-hand experience in the proper equipment operating practices necessary to ensure critical plant equipment reliability in an industrial environment. Mr. Hilditch has served as maintenance reviewer for the Service Water System Operational Performance Inspection (SWSOPI) conducted for TVA at Sequoyah. He is familiar with cooling water system operating and maintenance issues, large motor operating and maintenance requirements, and valve operating and maintenance requirements. Mr. Hilditch has participated in over 10 utility-sponsored SSFls, including EDSFls and SSFls at Farley, Peach Bottom, Sequoyah, Calvert Cliffs, Quad Cities, and D. C. Cook.

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE Ogden Environmental and Energy Services Co., lnc.

1990 - Present Principal Engineer. Mr, Hilditch provides technical support to plant and system assessments and inspections, design engineering tasks, and design basis documentation (DBD) projects. He has participated in over 10 utility-sponsored SSFls, including EDSFls, investigating and evaluating the design, surveillance procedures, operating procedures, supporting calculations and other plant documentation including vendor equipment manuals at various sites for systems such as the feedwater system at Peach Bottom, the auxiliary feedwater system at Farley, the essential raw water system at Sequoyah, the auxiliary distribution system at Calvert Cliffs and Quad Cities, and maintenance practices Hilditch - 20

on the station batteries at D. C. Cook. Moreover, Mr. Hilditch provided direct engineering support to the utility EDSFI response teams at Quad Cities and D. C. Cook during their respective NRC inspections.

Mr. Hilditch is also the principal author of the electrical portion of the DBDs for HPCI, RHR service water, essential service water, and diesel generator service water systems for Detroit Edison and the Control and Protective Circuits Philosophy and battery system DBDs for American Electric Power. Mr. Hilditch has provided direct technical support to utility engineering staffs.

U.S. Navy 1983 - 1990 Class Director, Submarine Officer Basic Course, Naval Submarine School, December 1988 to June 1990. Mr. Hilditch directly supervised the progress of 75 officers in the completion of an intensive 12-week course of advanced instruction. He followed up on scheduled events involving several outside organizations to ensure proper execution of plans, thus averting crisis management.

Combat Systems Officer, USS Greenling (SSN 614), March 1987 to November 1988. Mr.

Hilditch supervised and managed a department consisting of 30 officers and technicians who maintained state-of-the-art electronic and mechanical equipment. He managed department training and planned maintenance system programs. He planned, scheduled, determined logistics, and directly supervised the testing of the sonar and fire control systems during an intensive 3-month post-overhaul evaluation. He personally organized and directed an integrated plan involving the entire ship's company to complete a myriad of post-overhaul inspections and certifications prior to an overseas deployment.

Main Propulsion Assistant, Electrical Officer, USS Greenling (SSN 614), October 1984 to March 1987. Mr. Hilditch served as principal assistant to the ship's Engineering Department Head for the operation and maintenance of the ship's main propulsion equipment during a shipyard overhaul, including the nuclear reactor plant, main and auxiliary steam plant, and radiological and water chemistry control. As an engineering watch officer, he actively integrated rapidly changing shipyard priorities with available personnel assets during several complex and lengthy engineering plant test programs including the final close out and hydrostatic testing of every major seawater cooling system on the ship. Mr. Hilditch gained first hand experience in the proper equipment operating practices necessary to insure critical plant equipment reliability in an industrial environment. This included conducting thorough research efforts in equipment technical manuals for manufacturers recommended operating routines and ensuring they were included in the established operating practices aboard ship, 1

Hilditch - 21

CHARLES C. JANSING EDUCATION'achelor of Mechanical Engineering, Auburn University, 1982 PROFESSIONAL AFFLILIATIONS American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 1982 to Present.

Engineer in Training, Alabama ETC 4172 SUMIVIARYOF QUALIFICATIONS:

12 years of engineering experience ranging from: systems arid startup, small projects engineer, operating plant, restart testing, and design basis engineering. Very experienced as a multi-disciplined system engineer.

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE Stone and Webster Engineering Corporation (SWEC), Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant 1994

- present In the Nuclear Assurance and Licensing Department Mr. Jansing is assigned to the Unit 3 recovery Assessment / Review group. Within this group Mr. Jansing is currently performing technical reviews for the various assessments and vertical slice activities Stone and WebsterEngineering Corporation, and Technical and Field Engineering, Bellefonte Nuclear Plant:

1991 - 1994 Mr. Jansing served as the System engineer for the service water, raw water chemical injection, and instrument air systems, developed, and hydraulically modelled, the service water system in all operating modes using computer nodal analysis program.

Performed system design reviews and cost estimates to complete engineering, construction, and startup on a system basis. Generated Design Basis Calculations, Design Basis Documents, System Descriptions, and made client presentations on required system modifications required for licensing and proper system operation.

Jansing - 22

ABB Government Services, Incorporated 1990 - 1991 Mr. Jansing was Assigned to K Reactor Startup and Completions Group. Where he was responsible for coordinating testing and providing technical assistance to maintenance and operations personnel on various systems ranging from the, cooling water, plant computer, plant switchgear systems.

NUS Corporation 'and Advance Technology, Incorporated 1989 - 1990 Assigned to the DOE Savannah River Site (SRS) Project Office to support restart requirements. Performed detailed engineering review of proposed SRS projects and wrote sections of the K Reactor Environmental Impact Statement.

With Advanced Technology Mr. Jansing was responsible for the re-creation of the Engineering Design Basis and Nuclear Safety Test requirements of assigned systems of the Savannah River Site's K, L, and P reactors.

Bechtel Power Corporation, Comanche Peak Steam Plant 1986-1989 At Comanche Peak Mr. Jansing was Assigned to provide project direction and motivation, on a systems completion level, to the engineering, startup and test, client, and construction personnel on assigned systems.

With Bechtel Power Corporation at Vogtle Units 1 and 2 Mr. Jansing performed systems completion work and startup testing on Unit 1 and Unit 2 system ranging from Condenser Circulating Water, Waste Gas, to 13.8 Kv Switchgear. He was the Lead test engineer on the Unit 2 initial condenser vacuum milestone. After unit start-up Mr. Jansing was assigned to the Plant System Engineering Group for 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluations, provide technical guidance on assigned systems, and preparation of required operating plant modifications.

Stone and Webster Engineering Corporation, River Bend Station, Nine Mile Point 1983-1985 Performed hydrostatic testing and assisted in ILRT activities. System Test Engineer assigned to various groups (BOP, NSSS, Hydrotest and Flush groups). Performed component level and system testing on assigned systems.

Daniel International Corporation, Callaway Nuclear Power Plant 1982 - 1983 Worked in various jobs from Piping Engineer, Hydro / Flush Engineer to Lead Hydrotest Engineer.

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I I STUART M. KLEIN, P.E.

EDUCATION B.S., Pennsylvania State University, 1960 PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATIONS Registered Professional Engineer, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania

SUMMARY

OF QUALIFICATIONS Mr. Klein's diverse experience spans more than 34 years of engineering design in such areas as nuclear power plant systems and mechanical equipment design, industrial mechanical design, design review, and project management. He has more than 12 years of nuclear power plant project assignments while employed with a major architect-engineering firm. His work has included the detailed design of mechanical systems with assignments of increasing supervisory and management responsibilities.

He has participated in numerous design inspections (SSFI) with the NRC as well as utility-sponsored SSFI programs and internal service water assessments (SWSOPls).

Mr. Klein was responsible for the development of studies related to configuration management controls at operating nuclear plants for the NRC.

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE Ogden Environmental and Energy Services Co., Inc.

1984 - Present Principal Engineer. Mr. Klein is responsible for overseeing and directing the activities related to mechanical engineering design and design review of power plant process systems. He has served as a consultant to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and participated in the design review of numerous safety-related nuclear plant systems with the NRC as well as utility-sponsored SSFls, including service water system inspections at Crystal River, Fermi 2, Farley, and Palo Verde. Mr. Klein served as lead mechanical reviewer for internal assessments performed on a number of Service Water Operational Performance Inspections (SWSOPI) at Salem Units 1 and 2, North Anna, Sequoyah, Surry, Calvert Cliffs, FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant, Vermont Yankee, Fort Calhoun, and Pilgrim. As a result, the NRC waived or performed reduced scope SWSOPls at several of the latter plants'where internal SWSOPls were completed.

Mr. Klein also participated in SSFls performed on other safety-related systems at Palisades, D. C. Cook, and Dresden (SSOMI). In addition, he served as the mechanical reviewer during an EDSFI at Clinton and performed an evaluation of the Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant safety-related salt water pumps.

Klein - 24

Mr. Klein directed activities for the development of a transient hydraulic model of a safety-related service water system. The model is used for the analysis of potential water hammer events. Modeling techniques used in the effort were described in a paper published by EPRI in the Proceedings of the Seventh Service Water Systems Reliability Improvements Seminar, 1994, Mr. Klein developed a training program for the NRC on vertical-slice inspection techniques used in SSFIs which he presented at the NRC Regional Offices and NRC Headquarters. He was involved in the development of studies related to configuration management at operating nuclear plants for the NRC. The results of these efforts have been published by the NRC in NUREG/CR-5147, "Fundamental Attributes of a Practical Configuration Management Program for Nuclear Plant Design Control." Mr.

Klein has provided support and consultation to the NRC and utilities (Arizona Public Service and Consumers Power Company) in the development of Design Basis Documents. He has served as Design Basis Program Coordinator directing all activities related to the development of Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Design Basis Documents for Arizona Public Service.

Mr. Klein has written and served as Project Manager to develop Design Basis Documents for several safety-related systems at Fermi 2 Nuclear Plant.

United Engineers R Constructors, Inc., 1972-1984 Supervising Engineer. Mr. Klein had lead responsibility for the Mechanical Group, Site Support Engineering for the Seabrook Nuclear Power Station. Activities included work in all areas of the plant, both safety-related and the balance of plant systems, e.g.,

main steam, circulating water, feedwater systems, and related auxiliary systems. Mr.

Klein's responsibilities included directing the work of the engineers and designers; reviewing and approving drawings, documents, and specifications for plant modifications; and supporting the construction and start-up efforts to complete the Seabrook project.

During this period, Mr. Klein originated the system designs for the safety-related station service water system and a number of other cooling systems, e.g., the ill component cooling water system. He completed extensive trade-off studies to determine optimum system concepts, equipment sizes and parameters for wet and dry cooling towers, heat exchangers, pumps, etc. He developed final detail designs and directed procurement activities associated with these systems. Much of the conceptual work for these activities was described in a paper entitled "Emergency Shutdown Cooling Towers - Considerations in the Evolution of an Optimum Tower D ig.'" lill p billl di Hf Mr. Klein appeared before the NRC Staff to substantiate the design of essential cooling water systems.

Westinghouse, Bettis Atomic Power Laboratory, 1969-1972 Klein - 25

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Senior Design Engineer. Mr. Klein was responsible for the design of nuclear reactor plant fluid systems for NIMITZ class nuclear aircraft carriers. He conducted design analysis to assure successful hydraulic and thermal performance of the systems.

United Aircraft Corporation, 1963-1969 Design Engineer. Mr. Klein was responsible for the design of aircraft propeller systems and components, pitch change mechanisms, and blade retention systems. He designed aircraft air inlet control systems, hydraulic actuators, and servomechanisms.

He was involved in design tradeoff studies to determine optimum control configurations.

North American Aviation, Inc., 1962-1963 Research Engineer. Mr. Klein was involved in the design of the engine actuation system for the Saturn II Space Vehicle.

United Aircraft Corporation, 1960-1962 Development Test Engineer. Mr. Klein was responsible for the development testing of jet engine fuel control systems and hydro-mechanical feedback control servo-mechanisms. He was involved in the development testing of precision control system components, e.g., flapper control valves, servo controlled linear throttle valves, linkages, pressure control valves, and force balance systems.

PUBLICATIONS "Service Water System Transient Hydraulic Modeling Techniques," Proceedings of Seventh Service Water Systems Reliability Improvement Seminar, Electric Power Research Institute, June 29-July 1, 1994 (Co-authored with Dr. E. V. McAssey and M.

J. Titone).

NUREG/CR-5147, "Fundamental Attributes of a Practical Configuration Management Program for Nuclear Plant Design Control," U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 1988.

"Emergency Shutdown Cooling Towers - Considerations in the Evolution of an Optimum Tower Design," Nuclear Safet 1976.

Klein - 26

STANLEY F. KOBYLARZ, P.E.

EDUCATION B.S., Electrical Engineering, Lehigh University, 1977 Drexel University, Courses in Electrical Power Engineering, 1979 PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATIONS Registered Professional Engineer, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 1978 Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers

SUMMARY

OF QUALIFICATIONS Mr. Kobylarz has 21 years of engineering and design experience with architect-engineer and consulting firms serving the power generation industry. He has conducted Service Water System Operational Performance Inspections (SWSOPls),

Safety System Functional Inspections (SSFls), Electrical Distribution System Functional Inspections (EDSFls), Maintenance Inspections (Mls), and Safety System Outage Modification Inspections (SSOMls) for both commercial utilities and the USNRC. He has performed design reviews and engineering assessments for restart and recovery activities for Department of Energy reactor facilities and the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) He has over 12 years of experience in supervising engineering

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activities associated with new construction projects, plant modifications, mechanical and electrical systems analysis, and design reviews and inspections.

Mr. Kobylarz is experienced in supporting design basis documentation and configuration control activities at nuclear power stations, as well as inspections and assessments of the programs, facilities, and effectiveness of plant maintenance activities.

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE Ogden Environmental and Energy Services Co., Inc.

1987 - Present Manager, Power Engineering. Mr. Kobylarz is responsible for the staffing and conduct of design, engineering, design review, and related engineering and consulting activities in Ogden's Philadelphia Operations office. As Team Leader, Mr. Kobylarz provided overall direction for the conduct of a full-team SWSOPI self-assessment sponsored by the Quality Assurance department at Baltimore Gas 8c Electric's (BGE's) Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant. The Calvert Cliffs SWSOPI was used to successfully petition NRC Region I for a reduced scope NRC SWSOPI. As a member of their response team, he provided technical support and advice to BGE during the NRC SWSOPI Mr. ~

Kobylarz also led an Ogden team that supported the New York Power Authority Kobylarz - 27

(NYPA) in their preparation and response to the NRC SWSOPI at Indian Point 3. He served as consultant on NYPA's SWSOPI Response Team, providing independent technical oversight and advice to management. Mr. Kobylarz was the Technical Team Leader for a full-team SWSOPI self-assessment for Public Service Electric and Gas Company's Salem Nuclear Generating Station. Mr. Kobylarz also led an Ogden team that assisted TVA in a SWSOPI Readiness Review for Browns Ferry 2. He also provided technical support to TVA as a member of their response team during the NRC SWSOPI at Sequoyah. Mr. Kobylarz recently served as Maintenance Reviewer on Con Edison's SWSOPI at Indian Point 2.

Mr. Kobylarz participated on team Maintenance Inspections at Calvert Cliffs and Palo Verde, and assisted Susquehanna in their preparations for an NRC Maintenance Inspection. He reviewed the adequacy of the'design basis documentation for Alabama Power Company and Consumers Power Company during safety system functional assessments and design basis confirmation reviews, respectively.

Mr. Kobylarz previously served as Chief Electrical Engineer, providing guidance and direction to the electrical engineering staff. He has participated on numerous SSFI teams as an electrical design reviewer having conducted SSFls at Robinson, Monticello, Cooper, D. C. Cook (2), Calvert Cliffs (2), Fermi 2, Palo Verde, Browns Ferry, Susquehanna, Surry, Farley, South Texas Project, and Grand Gulf; an Operational Safety Team Inspection (OSTI) at Crystal River; Safety System Design Confirmations at Palisades (2); Electrical Distribution System Functional Assessments and Inspections (EDSFA/EDSFI) at Calvert Cliffs (Team Leader), Big Rock Point, Surry (Technical Sub-Team Leader), and North Anna; and EDSFI Readiness Audits and Reviews at D. C. Cook and V. C. Summer. He has performed SSOMls at Calvert Cliffs 1 and 2.

Mr. Kobylarz assisted TVA as an independent member on a Bechtel SMART Team that reviewed the Electrical Issues Program for the restart of Browns Ferry 3. He also performed safety system design reviews for Pilgrim and for the Department of Energy "N" reactor, Hanford, and recovery planning for the "K" reactor, Savannah River.

Mr. Kobylarz was Project Manager of a technical support program for American Electric Power's Cook Nuclear Plant, which included preparing system technical notebooks, design basis documents, and comprehensive engineering analyses for the plant's electrical systems.

United Engineers 5. Constructors, Inc.

1974 - 1987 Supervising Electrical Engineer (Washington Public Power Supply System, Nuclear Project No. 1). Mr. Kobylarz supervised the electrical design and engineering for WNP Unit 1, a 1200-MWe pressurized water reactor generating station, Hanford Reservation, WA; he was responsible for reviewing and evaluating licensing Kobylarz - 28

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requirements, such as NUREG-0800, ATWS, Regulatory Guide 1.97, and Appendix "R," and implementing required design changes in the discipline. As discipline supervisor, he was in charge of approximately 15 engineers and designers.

Public Service Company of New Hampshire (Seabrook) Mr. Kobylarz provided

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technical review and direction for the electrical plant design modification group activities at the Seabrook Station site.

Tennessee Valley Authority (Watts Bar 1 and 2). Mr. Kobylarz performed calculations and evaluations of motor breakdown kilowatt requirements, assisting TVA engineering in the Watts Bar diesel generator loading analysis.

Tennessee Valley Authority (PIUS Reactor Evaluation Study). Mr. Kobylarz was responsible for the design review of the electrical and process system interface design for an ASEA-ATOM SECURE-P type reactor power generating station as part of the PIUS Reactor Evaluation Study on the cost and licensability to construct a SECURE-P plant in the United States.

Ente Nazionale Per L'Energia Electtrica (ENEL). Mr. Kobylarz checked electrical equipment design calculations for sizing the station battery and uninterruptible power supply (UPS), station auxiliary transformers, standby diesel generators, motor control centers, and power distribution centers for a 980-MWe pressurized water reactor generating station, acting as a consultant to ENEL for their national energy plan.

Electrical Engineer (Washington Public Power Supply System, Nuclear Project No. 1) ~

Mr. Kobylarz was responsible for electrical design and implementation of reactor (NSSS), engineered safety features, and non-NSSS safety-related control systems. He supervised the preparation of single-line and electrical schematic diagrams, and was responsible for procurement coordination with the related motor control equipment contractor. He was responsible for the electrical design of the main control room panels and auxiliary equipment, and was the liaison electrical engineer on the Control Room Human Factors Task Force for the main control room. Mr. Kobylarz was responsible for the layout of the 480-volt plant distribution system, including preparation of single-line diagrams and control schematic diagrams.

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GARY J. OVERBECK, P.E.

EDUCATION B.S., U.S. Naval Academy, 1969 Certificate, Graduate Level Course in Nuclear Reactor Theory 6 Operation, 1971 PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATIONS Registered Professional Engineer (Nuclear), Pennsylvania, 1976-present; State of Washington, 1979-1991 American Nuclear Society

SUMMARY

OF QUALIFICATIONS Mr. Overbeck has more than 24 years of engineering and project management experience, including 6 years with a major architect/engineering firm. He has participated in numerous utility- and NRC-sponsored functional, design, and maintenance inspections, including the Service Water System Operational Performance Inspection (SWSOPI). During these inspections, Mr. Overbeck acted both as team leader and project manager. Mr. Overbeck has experience in a broad spectrum of nuclear industry fields such as B5W reactors and support systems, high energy line breaks, fire protection, interaction of non-seismic equipment on safety-related equipment, water hammer, classification of safety components, and equipment qualification.

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE Ogden Environmental and Energy Services Co., Inc.

1980 - Present Mr. Overbeck has participated in numerous utility- and NRC-sponsored inspections.

He was a member of the Integrated Design Inspection teams for Byron, River Bend, Perry, and Shearon Harris; the Construction Assessment team for Waterford; the Independent Design Verification Program review teams for Limerick and Clinton; the Safety System Functional Inspection (SSFI) teams for Turkey Point, ANO, Pilgrim, Palisades, TMI, Trojan, Calvert Cliffs, Oconee, Rancho Seco, D. C. Cook, Crystal River, Fermi 2, Robinson, Vermont Yankee, Farley 2, and FitzPatrick; the Safety System Outage Modification Inspection (SSOMI) teams for Dresden, Fort Calhoun, and Indian Point 3; and the Maintenance Inspection team for Rancho Seco. In these efforts, he was the mechanical/nuclear design area leader, responsible for the development and implementation of inspection plans. He has also conducted assessments of technical audits performed by middle-level management of major architect-engineering organizations to establish their contribution to ensuring a quality design.

Overbeck - 30

Mr. Overbeck participated in the SWSOPI of NYPA's FitzPatrick plant. He served as team leader for the Sequoyah SWSOPI, as lead mechanical reviewer for the SWSOPls at Vermont Yankee and Indian Point 2, and as mechanical design reviewer on the Salem SWSOPI readiness review. He is currently Team Leader for a Pilgrim SWSOPI ~

Mr. Overbeck has a diverse knowledge of the nuclear field as evidenced by his conducting in-depth technical reviews of such topics such as high energy line breaks, fire protection, interaction of non-seismic equipment on safety-related equipment, water hammer, classification of safety components, and equipment qualification. He was the project manager responsible for preparing design modification of a containment polar crane at Point Beach 1 and 2 for Wisconsin Electric Power Company. For Niagara Mohawk Power Company's Nine Mile Point 1, he completed a detailed review of systems required to mitigate the consequences of an HELB or LOCA, documented system safety functions, and identified the electrical equipment required to support those functions.

Mr. Overbeck served as senior reviewer and task leader in various aspects of Ogden' activities supporting the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Systematic Evaluation Program. He provided overall plant system knowledge and an understanding of system safety function. In addition, he participated in evaluation of nuclear licensing submittals involving current plant designs and dealing with auxiliary feedwater automatic initiation and indication, control of heavy loads, containment leak testing, reactor coolant system pressure isolation, bypass and override features of containment purge and engineered safety feature systems, and reliability of primary relief valves.

United Engineers 5. Constructors, Inc.

1974 - 1980 Supervising Mechanical/Nuclear Engineer. Supervised 10 engineers and 22 designers, and was responsible for all engineering, design, and procurement of systems and components to support a Babcock 5. Wilcox 205 FA pressurized water reactor coupled to a Westinghouse turbine. Oversaw preparation of the Final Safety Analysis Report and associated licensing activities, including an extensive review of the Three Mile Island accident with respect to the plant design. Responsible for the review and implementation of the NRC Staff's Lessons Learned and industry's TMI-2 recommendations. Assisted in formulating the owner's response to the NRC's request for additional information concerning the sensitivity of the BRW once-through steam generator design to overcooling transients.

Final Safety Analyst Coordinator. Responsible for coordination and direction of nuclear engineers in the preparation of a Final Safety Analysis Report. Planned and scheduled engineering activities to support an 18-month preparation period, interpreted the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.70, Rev. 3, and reviewed all project designs with respect to the acceptance criteria of NRC Staff Standard Review Plans. Responsible for review of nuclear analyses supporting compliance with site Overbeck - 31

selection criteria. This included analysis of nuclear accidents for radiological release calculations in terms of compliance with the dose limitations of 10CFR50 Appendix I and activity releases of 10CFR20.

Project Nuclear Engineer. Responsible for five nuclear systems and two contracts, conducted design calculations, and prepared System Design Descriptions and Process and Instrumentation Diagrams for each system. Oversaw procurement of four nuclear cranes, including the reactor building polar crane, and participated in linear and non-linear seismic modal analyses. Prepared specifications and conducted bid evaluations and post-award negotiations for post-accident hydrogen recombiners. Responsible for all nuclear discipline responses to licensing issues, including preparation of amend-ments to the Safety Analysis Report and addressing NRC requests for additional information.

Coordinating Engineer. Coordinated the efforts of a staff of some 40 analysts with the needs of a two-unit nuclear project. Ensured the use of proper input and assumptions in all analyses. The analyses included all factors of nuclear power plant design, including selection of the ultimate heat sink, containment subcompartment pressure analysis, and accident analysis to demonstrate compliance with 10CFR50.

Coordinated the interpretations of NRC Regulatory Guides, and was responsible for the preparation of analysis to support responses to the NRC and testimony for the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board hearings.

Nuclear Analyst. Conducted analytical work consisting of both hand and computer calculations in the areas of shielding, radiation transport, dose calculations, and accident analysis. The analyses were performed for both a Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) and a High Temperature Gas Reactor (HTGR). Drafted the accident analysis and technical specification chapter of a Preliminary Safety Analysis Report for a HTGR.

United States Navy 1969 - 1974 Weapons Officer. Supervised four divisions of a nuclear attack submarine. Provided technical direction for the fire control system, maintenance, and casualty control, as well as training and management for supervision and technical personnel. Coordinated a one-year overhaul, interfacing with plant technicians, shipyard tradesmen, and vendors.

Main Propulsion Assistant. Responsible for operation and maintenance of propulsion equipment, which included a S5W naval reactor, two ship service turbine generators, two main turbine generators, air conditioning units, distilling systems, and various supporting auxiliaries. Trained and qualified personnel to operate and maintain the reactor and propulsion machinery.

Reactor Controls Division Officer. Responsible for operation and maintenance of nuclear instrumentation and reactor protection equipment and for the training and qualification of reactor operators.

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