ML18038A159
| ML18038A159 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Nine Mile Point |
| Issue date: | 05/09/1986 |
| From: | Mangan C NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORP. |
| To: | Adensam E Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| (NMP2L-0709), (NMP2L-709), NUDOCS 8605140057 | |
| Download: ML18038A159 (158) | |
Text
REQULA1U Y INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION YSTEN (RIDS)
ACCESSION NBR: 8605140057 DOC. DATE: 86/05/09 NOTARIZED:
NO FACIL: 50-410 Nine Nile Point NucleaT Stationi Unit 2.
Niagara Noha AUTH. Nhl'jE AUTHOR AFFILIATION NANQANiC. V.
Niagara t'tohawk Power Corp.
REC IP. NAl'1E RECIPIENT AFFILIATION ADENSANi E. Q.
BWR ProJect Directorate 3
1)~M<<QS
SUBJECT:
Forwards addi clarifications to Fire p otection program.
Revised pages will be included in Amend 26 to FSAR. N/3i overs'e enc ls.
DISTRIBUTION CODE:
B002D COPIES RECEIVED: LTR ENCL SIZE:
TITLE: Licensing Submittal: Fire Protection NOTES:
DOCKET 05000eiO RECIPIENT ID CODE/MANE BNR ADTS HAUQHEYiN 01 INTERNAL: ACRS 10 3
REQ FIL 04 COPIES LTTR ENCL 1
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1 EXTERNAL: 24X NRC PDR 02 1
1 LPDR NSIC 03 05 1
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i TOTAL NUNBER OF COP lES REQUIRED:
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NIAGARAMOHAWKPOWER CORPORATION/300 ERIE BOULEVARDWEST, SYRACUSE, N.Y. 13202/TELEPHONE (315) 474-1511 May 9, 1986 (NMP2L 0709)
Ms. Elinor G. Adensam, Director BWR Project Directorate No.
3 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 7920 Norfolk Avenue Washington, DC 20555
Dear Ms. Adensam:
Re:
Nine Mile Point Unit 2 Docket No: 50-410 Enclosed are additional clarifications to the Nine Mile Point Unit 2 Fire Protection Program.
The Final Safety Analysis Report updated pages are attached.
Changes are indicated by a line in the right-hand margin.
The revised pages will be included in Amendment 26 of the Final Safety Analysis Report.
Very truly yours, C. V. Mang Senior Vice President NLR:ja 1598G Enclosures xc:
R. A. Gramm, NRC Resident Inspector Project File (2)
BSOS>40057 aeoSO9 Pl'DR ADQCK 050004i0 F
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION In the Hatter of Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation
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(Nine Mile Point Unit 2)
Docket No. 50-410 AFFIDAVIT C. V. Han an
, being duly sworn, states that he is Senior Vice President of Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation; that he is authorized on the part of said Corporation to sign and file with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission the documents attached hereto; and that all such documents are true and correct to the best of his knowledge, information and belief.
Subscribed and sworn to before me, a Notary Public in and for the State of New York and County of th/a ~ day of 1986.
Notary Public in and for
- County, New York My Commi ~~Npyggps:
~ Pubhc in the State of Ney Y~
aied in Onondaga Co. No. 4787687 y Commiaaron. Expirea March 30, lQf7
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Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR 26 26 Combustible Electrical cables Motor insulation Lube oil General combustibles Hydrogen Clothing Hydraulic fluid Resin Fiberglass Charcoal Styrene Wood Paper Diesel fuel Asphalt Plastic Calorific Values Btu lb 9, 500-12, 000 10,000 19, 000 8, 000 65,000 8,000 18,000 18,000 18,000 14,100 18,000 8,000 8,000 19,000 18,000 18,000 The construction materials used for roofing were not included in the fire load.
Metal deck roofs are Factory Mutual Class 1
and considered noncombustible for the purposes of this analysis.
Each fire area was investigated for fire loading.
Further delineation of the hazards analysis into fire zones provides a closer estimation of fire loads within the fire area.
The total Btu content of each area or zone is the sum of all combustibles in that zone.
Average Fire Load = Total Btu content Btu Area of Zone (ft
) x,80,000 Btu/ft hr
= Hours of fire load 9A.3.1.2.4 Summary of Conclusions Calculated fire loadings for major plant areas are as follows (see Tables 9A.3-1 through 9A.3-11 for a
complete listing).
Amendment 26 9A.3-6 May 1986
0 p
Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR Area Average Fire Ioadin Reactor building Reactor building auxiliary bays Standby gas treatment building Control building, except cable chases Cable chases Electrical tunnels Turbine building 34 min 28 min 8 min 43 min 3 hr 1 hr, 52 min 26 min J 26 I
26
) 26
) 26
/ 26 I 26 Switchgear rooms Oil storage rooms Diesel generator building Oil day tank room Screenwell building Service water pump room "A" Service water pump room "B" Diesel fire pump room Radwaste building Normal switchgear building Auxiliary boiler building Condensate storage tank building Steam tunnel 2 hr, 30 min 18 hr, 6 min 1 hr, 22 min 10 hr, 21 min 19 min
'7 min 24 min 52 min 1 hr, 36 min 1 hr, 26 min 1 hr, 18 min 1 hr, 12 min 7 min 26
) 26
) 26
) 26 26 I
26
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)
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26 The oil day tank rooms have high fire loadings because total f 26 volume burning has been assumed.
This calculation also takes no credit for fixed extinguishing systems provided for all oil hazards.
- Also, a free influx of air is assumed.
If the fire barrier remains
- intact, a significantly reduced fire exposure can be expected.
26 Amendment 26 9A.3-7 May 1986
O'M
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Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR The next highest fire loadings are heavy cable tray concentrations in the control building and electrical tunnels.
Calculations for these areas are also conservative.
All trays are considered to be loaded to the Amendment 26 9A.3-7a May 1986
h
Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLYBLANK Amendment 26 9A.3-7b May 1986
0 Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR maximum allowable.
In any case, cable tray water sprinkler systems are provided for these areas.
26 The next highest fire loadings are in the radwaste building.
The calculation for this area is also conservative.
In calculating fire loading for the diesel generator room, 'a fuel oil pipe rupture has been assumed with the entire contents of the fuel oil day tank spilled on the floor. It was also considered that all of the lube oil contained in the crankcase of the engine would leak out.
These assumptions resulted in a fire loading of 1 hr 22 min, which is still less than the 3-hr walls that. have been provided.
Automatic pre-action water sprinkler systems have been provided for the diesel generator building.
The normal switchgear building also has a high fir'e loading, but it is less than the 3-hr fire walls that have been provided.
Automatic total-flooding CO> systems have been used in this building and in other switchgear rooms.
Fire loading for all other areas is approximately 2 hr or less.
In spite of the low'fire
- loading, 3-hr fire walls have been provided wherever separation is required or desirable.
9A.3.1.2.5 Detailed Fire Hazards Analysis by Building The following sections provide the detailed fire hazards analysis and a summary of the effects of fires in fire zones.
This summary shows that the fire protection system will provide adequate ability to
- detect, prevent, and suppress postulated fire outbreaks in and around the plant.
9A.3.1.2.5.1 Standby Gas Treatment Building Introduction The standby gas treatment (SGT) building is ad)acent to the reactor building.
It houses the SGTS
- units, reactor building ventilation supply unit, and railroad access
- bay, all of which are separated from each other by 3-hr fire walls and floors.
Construction of the SGT building is detailed in Section 3.8.4.1.9.
Safet -Related S stems The SGTS units are the only safety-related equipment in this building.
Amendment 26 9A.3-8 May 1986
Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLYBLANK Amendment 23 9A.3-41b December 1985
yl
Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FS 9A.3.5. 1.3 Penetration Openings for Ventilation Systems Openings through fire barriers for ventilation'ystems are'rotected
" by UL-labeled fire dampers with
'a rating equivalent to that required of the barrier.
Flexible air duct coupling in ventilation and filter system is non-e ombus tib le.
9A.3.5.1.4 Door Openings With the exception of special doors such as pressuretight, watertight, radiation shield,
- tornado, and railroad
- access, the doors installed in the fire-rated assemblies are UL-labeled fire doors.
Table 9A.3-16 lists pressuretight, watertight, radiation shielded,
- tornado, and railroad access doors to be install,ed in fire barriers and the corresponding fire loading on either side of each door.
Figures 9A.3-14 through 9A.3-17 show typical sections and details and demonstrate by engineering analysis that the door panels and
- hardware, when subjected to heat (up to 2000~F) for 3 hr on one
- side, will be free to expand in all directions and maintain the doors in the closed position.
No significant deformation or warping of door panels which could allow fire propagation is excepted.
Table 9A.3-17 provides a
comparison between UL-labeled Class A rated fire doors and Unit 2 nonlabeled doors.
Fire door position will be monitored and verified to be maintained in accordance with BTP CNEB 9.5-1 Section C.S.a(5).
Installation of fire doors is in accordance with NFPA-80 and applicable UL requirements.
9A.3.5.1.5 Personnel Access and Escape Routes Two means of egress are provided from each fire area.
Stairways required for egress are enclosed and ventilated to minimize smoke infiltration and to provide a safe means of egress in the event of a fire.
Exit routes are clearly marked.
The enclosures are designed for a 2-hr fire rating and equipped with UL-listed, self-closing Class B fire doors.
Elevator enclosures and chutes are similarly designed.
9A.3.5.1.6 Sharing of Cable Spreading Rooms Unit 2 does not share a cable spreading room with Unit 1.
Amendment 26 9A.3-42 May 1986
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Nine Mile Point Unit 2 F
TABLE 9A.3-16 AUERAGE FIRE LOADING ON EITHER SIDE OF NON-UL LABELLED DOORS Door No.
SA175-3 SA175-4 NA175-2 R175>>4 R175-5 R175-7 T277-20 T277-21 T277-22 ET214>>2 ET237-1 SW261-14 DG272-4 C288-1 C306-1 C261-1 R240-7 AB261>>3 NA240-1 NA240-2 R240-3 SA240-1'R261-2 C239-1 SW280-1 Average Fire Loading On Either Side of Door 0 min/17 min 17 min/21 min 17 min/17 min 1 min/42 min 1 min/42 min 2 min/50 min 4 min/9 min 4 min/9 min 4 min/9 min 0 min/1.1 hr*
0 min/0 min 17 min/13 min 0 min/6.9 hr*
0 min/0 min 1 min/0 min 2.8 hr*/1.6 hr 48 min/(Ltr) 26 min/0 min 0 min/0 min 0 min/0 min 48 min/1.1 hr 1.1 hr/0 min 49 min+/0 min 0 min/0 min 31 min/4 min 26 26 26
- Automatic suppression provided on this side of door.
Amendment 26 of 1 May 1986
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CALCULATIONOF THE EXPANSION OF WATERTIGHTDOORS DUE TO FIRE EXPOSURE DOOR NUMBERS: SA 175-3; SA 175-4; NA 175-2; R 175-4; R 175-5; R 175-7 AND C 239-1 OVERALLDOOR DIMENSIONS TOTAL DOOR/FRAME GAP 34-5/8" X 85"
- 38" X 87-7/8" HORIZONTAL 0.875 0.875 VERTICAL 1.250 1.250 THE FOLLOWING CALCULATIONSVERIFYTHATTHERE WOULD BE NO INTERFERENCE (CONTACT FORCE) BETWEEN THE DOOR AND FRAME DURING A FIRE WHERE A TEMPERATURE RISE OF 1930'F (2000'F 70'F
= 1930'F) IS EXPERIENCED BY THE DOOR.
THE METHOD OF CALCULATINGEXPANSION IS BASED ON THE LARGEST SIZE OF THE DOOR TIMES THE TEMPERATURE RISE TIMES THE COEFFICIENT OF STEEL EXPANSION (0.0000065)
WIDTH OF DOOR = 38" TOTAL CLEARANCE = 0.875" (CLEARANCE ON ONE SIDE OF DOOR)
EXPANSION IN WIDTH = 38 X 1930 X 0.0000065 = 0.48 NOTE: 0.48" IS LESS THAN 0.875" HEIGHT OF DOOR =87.875" TOTAL CLEARANCE = 1.250" (CLEARANCE ON TOP AND BOTTOM OF DOOR)
EXPANSION IN HEIGHT = 87.875 X 1930 X 0.0000065 = 1.1" NOTE'.1" IS LESS THAN 1.250"
- DOOR C-239-1 ONLY FIGURE 9A.3-14 WATERTIGHT DOORS PAGE 2 OF 2 NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION NlNE MlLE POlNT-UNIT 2 FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT h Wdgh IANNA PETIT 9A hah V 0 Ogle
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Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR Drains are discussed in Section 9A.3.5.1.12.
Smoke removal is provided by normal ventilation and portable smoke removal units.
9A.3.1.2.5.10 Reactor Building Introduction Due to the presence of floor openings, the entire reactor building is considered a
single fire area.
Each floor elevation is considered a separate fire zone and each half of the building is considered as a
fire subarea.
The analysis of the contained hazards indicates that the average fire loading for each zone, with the exception of the HPCS room and 600-V switchgear
- room, is less than 1 hr.
A 20-ft-wide zone is provided between the north and south halves on the 0- to 180-deg line.
The 20-ft zone consists of two adjacent. 10-ft zones with detection and automatic suppression systems.
26 To reduce the potential for the vertical spread of fire along cable tray risers, penetration seals are provided for cable tray risers.
Refer to Figures 9A.3-2 through 9A.3-8 for the actual configuration of the fire stops.
Elevation 353 ft 10 in is a nonrated barrier which separates fire subareas FSA 34 and FSA 35.
There is no fire loading or safe shutdown equipment:
located on elevation 353 ft 10 in; therefore, safe shutdown capability is not affected.
The reactor building has a
ventilation system utilizing 100 percent outside air for normal operation.
This system will remove smoke in the 'event of a
- fire, as long as radiation levels remain below acceptable levels.
The primary containment is also considered one fire area.
- However, due to the low fire
- loading, primary containment
- inerting, and lack of continuity of combustibles, a fire that would spread from one hazard to another is not postulated.
Safet -Related and Reactor-Associated S stems The following table includes both safety-related and reactor-associated systems and gives their locations in the reactor building.
Amendment 26 9A.3-23 May 1986
f l"
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Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR
~Sstem RDS*
Control rod drive hydraulic control units RDS Control rod drive pumps CSH*
High-pressure core spray SFC*
Fuel pool cooling pumps Heat exchangers SLS*
Standby liquid cooling CCP Reactor plant component cooling water Division I el 261'N) 289'(S) 215'(N) 289'(N)
Division II el 261'S) 289'(S) 215'(S) 289'(N)
HVR*
Reactor building ventilation recirculation fans Unit coolers WCS Reactor water cleanup 289'(N) 289'(N)
Multiple (N)
Multiple (S)
ICS*
Reactor core isola-175'(N) tion cooling HCS*
Hydrogen recombiner 240'(N)
RCS Reactor recirculation pumps RDS*
Control rod drive hydraulic control units RDS Control rod drive pumps CSH*
High-pressure core 175'(S) spray 240'(S) 215'N)
Amendment 6
9A.3-24 December 1983
t
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Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR Redundant fire pumps are provided.
One pump is electric driven and the other is diesel driven.
9A.3.1.3.3 Seismic Design Basis Standpipes and hose connections for manual firefighting are se1sm1cally supported in safety-related areas and in areas containing safety-related equipment.
The design bases do not contemplate simultaneous earthquake and fire conditions; additionally, Unit 2 is not in an area of high seismic activity, therefore these requirements were not incorporated into the design.
9A.3.1.3.4 Design Basis Analysis 26
)
GDC-3 requires that firefighting systems be designed to ensure that rupture or inadvertent operation does not significantly impair the safety capability of structures,
- systems, and.
components important to safety.
Redundant trains of components required for safe shutdown that are susceptible to damage from water spray are physically separated so that manual fire suppression activities will not adversely affect the operability of components not involved in the postulated fire.
Where necessary, appropriate protection is provided to prevent impingement of water spray on components required for safe shutdown.
Section 3C.4 provides further details regarding the effects of spraying on safe shutdown components.
Automatic suppression systems have been designed and located so that.
operation of the
- systems, either intentionally or inadvertently, will not cause damage to redundant trains of components required for safe shutdown.
26 The fire hazards analysis that is included as part of the FSAR defines the effects of postulated fire outbreaks.
Details for the effects and analyses for wind and tornado loading, water level (flood),
and missile protection are described in Sections 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5.
9A.3.1.3.5 Moderate Energy Line Break Analysis The consequences of a crack in a moderate energy line in the fire suppression system are included in the energy pipe break analysis for Unit 2 (refer to FSAR Section 3.6A).
9A.3.1.4 Alternative or'Dedicated Shutdown Refer to FSAR Appendix 9B.
Amendment 26 9A.3-30 May 1986
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Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR 9A.3.6.4 Halon 1301 Suppression Systems (NFPA Standard 12A)
Fixed Halon 1301 suppression systems have been installed in the PGCC floor modules in the control room (in accordance with GE NEDO 10466-A, Rev.
2, dated February 1979),
Radwaste Control Room, Relay
- Room, and Computer Room.
Halon systems comply with NFPA Standard
- 12A, and the requirements of BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.6.d.
Disarming of Halon suppression systems will comply with the requirements of BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.2.).
9A.3.6.5 COq Suppression Systems (NFPA Standard 12)
CO> systems are used in all switchgear
- rooms, the alternator exciter enclosure, turbine
- bearings, and the lube oil reservoir.
CO<
systems comply with NFPA Standard 12, and the requirements of BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.6.e.'isarming of CO> suppression systems will comply with the requirements of BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.2.).
9A.3.6.6 Portable Extinguishers Unit 2 portable extinguishers are in compliance with the requirements of NFPA Standard 10.
Adverse effects of portable extinguishing agents have been considered in the placement of extinguishers.
Portable fire extinguishers applicable to the hazard and the guidelines of NFPA Standard 10 will be provided in all areas of the plant.
An inspection and maintenance program will be written; performance of same will be fulfilled by the onsite fire department.
9A.3.7 Guidelines for Specific Plant Areas 9A.3.7.1 Primary Containment and Reactor Building 9A.3.7.1.1 Normal Operation General area coverage smoke detectors have been provided in the reactor building, to alarm and annunciate in the control room and to alarm locally.
The primary fire hazard in the reactor 'building is cable trays.
Automatic sprinkler systems are provided for single cable tray stacks containing Amendment 26 9A.3-53 May 1986
o e
Nine Mile Point Unit. 2 FSAR five trays or more (vertically) and for multiple tray stacks containing m're than three trays.
Motor control centers in areas where water spray protection is provided are NEMA Type 3R (raintight).
9A.3.7.1.1.1 Operation of Fire Protection Systems The operation of fire protection systems will not compromise safety-related equipment due to the separation,
- barriers, and protection provided for redundant trains of safety-related equipment.
9A. 3. 7. l.l. 2 Primary Containment Fire Protection ze The Unit 2 containment is inerted during normal operation; therefore, this requirement does not apply.
9A.3.7.1.1.3 Primary Containment Fire Detection 26 The Unit 2 containment is inerted during normal operation.
General area smoke detectors will be provided in the primary containment only during refueling and major maintenance periods.
9A.3'.7.1.1.4 Primary Containment Standpipe and Hose Stations Continuous flow hose reels with 1-inch hose reels with spray nozzles are provided in the primary containment for use during refueling and major maintenance.
9A.3.7.1.1.5 Oil Collection System for Recirculation Pumps Refer to Section 9A.3.7.1.1.2.
9A.3.7.1.1.6 Reactor Building Fire Protection Fire detection and suppression is provided for fire hazards in the reactor building as identified by the fire hazards analysis.
Refer to Section 9A.3'.6 for details.
9A.3.7.1.2 Refueling and Maintenance The primary containment general area coverage detection system mentioned previously will be in operation during
~
refueling and major maintenance.
Portable fire extinguishers will be strategically located within the primary containment when the containment is open.
Hose reel Amendment 26 9A.3-54 May 1986
~ ~
Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR TABLE 9A.3-15 SUPERVISION OF FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM VALVES FSAR Fi re No.
Valve No.
Electric Administrative 9.5-1a 9.5-1b Amendment 26 2FPW-V2 2FPW-V3 2FPW-V4 2FPW-V18 2FPW-V19 2FPW-V20 2FPW-V21 2FPW-V22 2FPW-V25 2FPW-V26 2FPW-V28 2FPW-V29 2FPW-V31 2FPW-V35 2FPW-V36 2FPW-V41 2FPW-V48 2FPW-V49 2FPW-V50 2FPW-V53 2FPW-V57 2FPW-V355 2FPW-V554 2FPW-V555 2FPW-V103 2FPW-V104 2FPW-V105 2FPW-V106 2FPW-V107 2FPW-V108 2FPW-V109 2FPW-V110 2FPW-V111 2FPW"V112 2FPW-V113 2FPW-V114 2FPW-V118 2FPW-V119 2FPW-V120 2FPV-V121 2FPW-V122 2FPW-V123 1 of 6 X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X X
May 1986 I
26 I 26
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Nine Mile TABLE 9A.3-15 (Cont)
FSAR Fi re No.
9.5-1c Valve No.
2FPW-V177 2FPW-V178 2FPW-V179 2FPW"V180 2FPW-V181 2FPW"V182 2FPW-V183 2FPW-V184 2FPW>>V438 2FPW-V439 2FPW-V499 2FPW-V548 2FPW-V571 2FPW-V572 2FPW-V581 2FPW-V582 2FPW"V185 2FPW-V186 2FPW-V187 2FPW-V188 2FPW"V189 2FPW<<V190 2FPW-V191 2FPW-V195 2FPW-V196 2FPW-V197
. 2FPW-V199 2FPW-V200 2FPW-V201 2FPW-V202 2FPW-V207 2FPW-V208 2FPW-V210 2FPW-V211 2FPW-V779 2FPW-V780 Electric Administrative X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X, X
X 9.5-1d Amendment 26 2FPW-V32
~2FPW-V34 2FPW-V213 2FPW-V214 2FPW"V215 2FPW-V216 2FPW"V217 2FPW-V2 18 3 of 6 X
X X
X X
X X
X May 1986
Nine Mile Point Unit '2 FSAR TABLE 9A.3-15 (Cont)
FSAR Fi re No.
Valve No.
Electric Administrative 9.5-1e 2FPW-V220 2FPW-V225 2FPW"V23 1 2FPW-V235 2FPW-V239 2FPW"V251 2FPW-V253 2FPW-V255 2FPW-V442 2FPW-V445 2FPW-V448 2FPW"V500 2FPW-V502 2FPW"V504 2FPW-V620 2FPW-V257 2FPW-V260 2FPW-V262 2FPW-V264 2FPW-V265 2FPW-V266 2FPW<<V268 2FPW-V269 2FPW-V270 2FPW-V271 2FPW-V272 2FPW-V276 2FPW-V280 2FPW-V281 2FPW-V282 2FPW-V283 2FPW-V284 2FPW-V287 2FPW-V288 2FPW>>V289 2FPW-V297 2FPW-V303 2FPW-V304 2FPW-V305 2FPW-V306 X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X X
26 26 Amendment 26 4 of 6 May 1986
Ni Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR TABS E 9A.3-15 (Cont)
FSAR Fi re No.
Valve No.
Electric Administrative 9.5-lf Amendment 26 2FPW-V307 2FPW-V453 2FPW-V455 2FPW-V460 2FPW-V462 2FPW-V486 2FPW-V487 2FPW-V492 2FPW-V493 2FPW-V495 2FPW-V496 2FPW-V506 2FPW-V579 2FPW-V623 2FPW-V775 2FPW-V301 2FPW-V302 2FPW-V314 2FPW-V316 2FPW"V317 2FPW-V318 2FPW-V352 2FPW-V353 2FPW-V354 2FPW-V356 2FPW-V357 2FPW-V358
. 2FPW-V382 2FPW-V390 2FPW-V395 2FPW-V400 2FPW-V401 2FPW-V402 2FPW-V403 2FPW>>V404 2FPW-V405 2FPW-V406 2FPW-V407 2FPW-V408 2FPW-V410 2FPW-V469 2FPW-V583 2FPW"V608 2FPW-V773 2FPW-VB11 5 of 6 X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X X
May 1986 26
/26 I 26
Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR TABfE 9A.3-15 (Cont)
FSAR Fi re No.
Valve No.
Electric Administrative 9.5-1g 9.5-1h 2FPW-V206 2FPW-V421 2FPW-V422
'FPW-V423 2FPW-V424 2FPW-V427 2FPW-V428 2FPW-V429 2FPW-V430 2FPW-V431 2FPW-V474 2FPW-V475 2FPW-V476 2FPW-V477 2FPW-V529 2FPW-V530 2FPW-V531 2FPW-V532 2FPW-V553 2FPW"V596 2FPW-V597 2FPW-V629 2FPW-V662 2FPW-879 2FPW-888 2FPW-V691 2FPW-V692 2FPW-V693 2FPW-V695 2FPW-V696 2FPW-V697 2FPW-V716 2FPW-V717 2FPW-V718 2FPW-V719 2FPW-V720
~2FPW-V721 2FPW-V770 X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X
~26
)26 26 Amendment 26 6 of 6 May 1986
g I 1
Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR
~Sstem Division III Nondivisional SFC*
Fuel pool cooling Pumps Heat exchangers SIS*
Standby liquid cooling CCP Reactor plant component cooling water 328'(N)(S)
HVR*
Reactor building ventilation Recirculation fans 175'(S)
Unit coolers WCS Reactor water cleanup 215'(N)
ICS*
Reactor core isolation cooling HCS*
Hydrogen recombiner RCS Reactor recirculation pumps Containment
- Category I equipment Post Fire Anal sis The preceding table shows
- that, with the following exceptions, Division I equipment is located in the north half of the reactor building and Division II equipment is located in the south half.
Wiring for the following
- pumps, unit coolers, and valves is run in conduit and buried in the concrete floor slab, except at the connection point to the piece of equipment:
Both fuel pool cooling pumps are located in the south half; however, they are separated from each other and from the remainder of the plant by 3-hr fire walls and protected by fire detectors.
2.
Both standby liquid control pumps are located in the north half.
This system is functionally Amendment 6
9A. 3-25 December 1983
1 J
Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR redundant to the control rod drive (CRD) system.
Cable trays in the area are protected by a
sprinkler system and fire detectors.
3.
Both reactor building ventilation emergency recirculation unit coolers are located in the north half at el 289 ft 0 in.
The unit coolers are separated from each other by a concrete fire stop.
Cable trays in the area are protected with a sprinkler system and fire detectors.
26 4.
There are approximately 12 safety-related, motor-operated isolation valves in the reactor building that must be located out of their division.
The analysis of FSAR Appendix 9B shows that Sufficient
~
equipment remains free of damage from a single fire to achieve safe shutdown of the plant.
The Division III pump (HPCS) is located in the south half of the reactor building; however, it is completely isolated by 3-hr rated fire walls.
The Division III cables are provided from a
separate buried duct bank outside the reactor building.
'ith tha fire protection systems out of service, the low fire load, lack of continuity of combustibles, and the 20-ft fire break along the 0- to 180-deg line in the reactor building support the implausibility of fire spreading from the north half to the south half.
With the fire protection systems in service, it is unlikely that the fire would spread beyond the point of origin.
Radioactive Release Anal sis The reactor building ventilation consists of a
normal ventilation system and an emergency recirculation air system.
The normal ventilation exhaust from the reactor building is monitored for radiation by radiation monitors located in the exhaust.
duct.
These monitors stop the. normal ventilation syst: em and activate the standby gas treatment system (SGTS) and the emergency recirculation system unit coolers.
Redundant trains are provided for the SGTS and emergency r'ecirculation unit coolers.
Standby gas treatment units are separated from each other by 3-hr rated fire walls, and recirculation unit coolers are separated from each other by Amendment 26 9A.3-26 May 1986
~
~
Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR sprinkler heads operating and 300 gpm hose stream discharge, the buildup would be contained by the curbs provided at, the doorways.
The maximum firefighting water flow for the diesel generator building exceeds the maximum firefighting water flow (and subsequent buildup due to compartment size) for all other safety-related areas.
Based on an evaluation of this water flow and the results of the analysis described in Section,3C.5, Compartment Flooding as a Result of Breaks or Cracks, firefighting water flow and subsequent buildup will be removed by floor drains and not cause the loss of redundant trains of equipment required for safe shutdown for all other safety-related areas.
In areas containing combustible liquid storage and piping, traps are provided in the floor drains and curbs.
Dikes are provided and sized to contain the largest spill, in addition to the expected firefighting water flow, for a duration of 10 minutes.
Floor drains in areas protected by total flooding gaseous suppression systems incorporate a
liquid seal or the suppression system is sized to include agent loss through the drains.
9A.3.5.2 Safe Shutdown Capability 9A.3.5.2.1 Safe Shutdown Fire Protection Features Fire protection
- features, including separation, rated
- barriers, and suppression and detection
- systems, are provided for structures, s'ystems, and components important to safe shutdown.
Refer to Section 9A.3.6 for details on fire suppression and detection equipment.
Appendix 9B describes the methodology used to assemble,
- analyze, and document the ability of Unit 2 to conduct a
safe shutdown following a fire.
9A.3.5.3 Alternative or Dedicated Shutdown Capability Refer to Appendix 9B.
Amendment 26 9A.3-44 May 1986
J I
Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR
- detect, prevent, and suppress postulated fire outbreaks in and around the plant.
9A.3.1.2.2 Organization of Fire Hazards Analysis In order to develop data meaningful to the analysis, the plant has been divided into numerous fire areas, and these areas are further subdivided into fire zones.
The fire areas and zones are shown on Figures 9A.3-1 through 9A.3-8, 9A.3-12, and 9A.3-13.
Fire areas are those areas separated from adjacent areas by rated fire barriers.
A comparison between Unit 2 fire barr'iers and tested fire barriers is provided in Section 9A.3.5.1.1.
Calculation of fire loading for each fire zone is included in Tables 9A.3-1 through 9A.3-11.
The basis of calculation is shown below.
9A.3.1.2.3 Basis of Calculation In Tables 9A.3-1 through 9A.3-11, all known combustibles are identified for each fire zone.
The calorific content of the combustibles and the Btu/sq ft loading for each fire area have been calculated.
In order to
'determine the fire
- loading, it was necessary to make some assumptions concerning the amount of combustibles in such equipment as motors and control cabinets.
The following assumptions, which are based on engineering
- judgment, were utilized to estimate the weight. of combustibles:
26 E i ment Weight of Combustible Motor-operated valves, motors, starters, and electrical equipment Electric panels and control cabinets 1% of overall weight 2% of overall weight Cable 17% to 32% of overall weight The following calorific values are used for combustibles.
These values are based on vendor data or the NFPA Fire Protection
- Handbook, 14th edition:
Amendment 26 9A.3"5 May 1986
g
~
Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR Construction of the diesel generator building is discussed in Section 3.8.4.1.3.
Safet -Related S stems The diesel generator building contains the Division I and II and HPCS (Division III) diesel generators.
These three generators provide power to essential equipment if both normal and preferred station service power are lost.
Post Fire Anal sis The fire loading for the diesel generator room in the diesel generator building is 2 hr 24 min.
This is based on a
postulated fuel oil line rupture and the spilling of the entire contents of the fuel oil day tank into the diesel generator room.
Fire wall separation of diesel generators and fuel oil day tanks precludes a fire in one section from disabling other systems.
Therefore, safe shutdown capability is assured.
If fire protection systems were in service, a fire would be extinguished.
Radioactive Release Anal sis There is no source of radioactivity in this building.
Fire Detection and Su ression All diesel generators are protected with preaction sprinkler systems.
The deluge valves for these systems open automatically on a
signal from photoelectric detectors in the respective diesel generator rooms.
Division I and II diesel generators as well as the HPCS (Division III) diesel generator have been modified to allow water spray without damaging the engine or generator.
) 26 26 The backup systems for the diesel generators are manual water and CO+ hose reels and portable extinguishers.
C The diesel generator day tank room has a fire loading of 6 hr 54 min.
Raised thresholds are provided so that the entire contents of the tank would be contained in the event of a tank rupture.
As was discussed previously, if the entire contents of the fuel oil day tank were spilled in the diesel generator room, the fire loading would be 2 hr 24 min and a
fire would be contained within that area.
The floor Amendment.
26 9A.3-17 May 1986
0 0
Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR drainage 'ystem is designed to drain oil to the oil separator outside the building.
Amendment 23 9A.3-17a December 1985
Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR Radioactive Release Anal sis The auxiliary bays are served by the reactor building ventilation system.
Further details are provided in Section 9A.3.1.'2.5.10.
Fire Detection and Su ression All areas of the auxiliary bays are protected by a zoned, early warning detection system arranged to alarm locally and in the control room.
Cable trays in the auxiliary bays are protected by the two automatic closed-head cable tray sprinkler systems that serve the reactor building.
Water hose reels are provided at each elevation in both the north and south auxiliary bays.
Piping is designed so that cable tray systems and hose reels can be fed from separate connections to the yard main.
CO>
hose reels are provided at el 240 ft 0 in to protect 13.8-kV switchgear and motor control centers.
Portable extinguishers are provided throughout the building.
Drains are discussed in Section 9A.3.5.1.12.
9A.3.1.3 Fire Suppression System Design Basis 9A. 3. 1. 3. 1 Backup Total reliance is not placed on any single fire suppression system.
Water fire hose stations and portable extinguishers are provided throughout the plant as a
backup to fixed suppression systems.
In areas where hazards are switchgear or electrical cabinets, CO< hose reels and extinguishers are also provided.
9A.3.1.3.2 Single-Failure Criteria All buildings housing safety-related equipment, except the diesel generator building, have a double connection to the fire loop.
Piping is arranged so that a single pipe break would not impair both the fixed suppression system and the hose reels.
In the event of a pipe break and subsequent fire in the diesel generator building, manual firefighting tactics using yard hydrants would be employed.
The yard 26 Amendment 26 9A.3-29 May 1986
Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR main is a loop with isolation valves located so that a
single break in the loop does not impair fire protection systems in any building housing safety-related systems.
Amendment 26 9A.3-29a May 1986
~
0 Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLYBLANK Amendment 26 9A. 3-29b May 1986
Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLYBLANK Amendment 9
9A.3-45b March 1984
Nine Mile Point Unit 2 F
available throughout the plant.
Portable extinguishers provide additional backup protection.
9A.3.5.5.4 Electric Cable Construction Electrical cable construction is in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.32 and the IEEE-383-1974 flame test.
9A.3.5.5.5 Cable Trays and Raceways Cable trays,
- raceways, and conduit are used only for cables.
Buried cable is in conduit/duct systems in trenches used only for this purpose.
Safety-related cable is not exposed to flammable or combustible liquids or gases or other combustible storage.
Refer to section 9A.3.2 for administrative controls.
9A.3.5.6 Ventilation 9A.3.5.6. 1 Products of Combustion 26 All safety-related areas use the installed once-through ventilation to remove products of combustion.
The electrical
- tunnels, the control
- building, and the normal switchgear building have separate smoke exhaust
- fans, isolation
- dampers, and controls dedicated to smoke removal.
Portions of the normal ventilation system components are used in certain areas for smoke removal.
Fire dampers are provided where ventilation ductwork penetrates fire barriers.
For large (high-heat) fires, the fire dampers would close.
These dampers can be manually reopened by plant personnel for smoke removal.
Location and operation of smoke removal dampers will be shown on individual preplan procedures for each area of the plant.
Monitors are provided in the reactor
- building, turbine
- building, and radwaste building exhaust ductwork to determine if the release is within the permissible limits of radioactivity to prevent an unacceptable release to the atmosphere.
Additional heat removal capability is supplied by roof-mounted heat vents installed in the turbine building, electrical bay, heater
- bays, service
- building, screenwell
- building, auxiliary service
- building, clean access
- area, demineralirer storage tank building, standby gas treatment
- building, chilled water building, and intake and discharge shafts building.
Portable fans would be used to further aid in the removal of smoke.
9A.3.5.6.2 Smoke or Corrosive Gases The inadvertent operation or single failures of ventilation systems designed to exhaust smoke and/or corrosive gases Amendment 26 9A.3"46 May 1986
C
Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR extinguishers,
'wrenches,
- adapters, axes, hand-held lights, bolt cutters, etc.
9A.3.6.2.8 Reliable Water Supplies The source of water supply to the fire pumps is Lake Ontario.
Each pump takes suction from the seismically designed service water intake tunnel.
Nine Mile Point Unit 1 fire pumps (rated at 2,500 gpm at net discharge pressure of 125 psig) also take suction from Lake Ontario through a separate and remote intake tunnel.
The fire main loops for Nine Mile Point Units 1 and 2 are interconnected in two places with normally closed
- valves, one remotely operable from the Unit 1 control room.
9A.3.6.2.9 Fire Water Supply The fire water supply (Lake Ontario) is a fresh water supply and is essentially unlimited.
The flow rate with one pump out of service is a
nominal 2,500 gpm at net discharge pressure of 125 psig; this is ample for the largest deluge system plus 500 gpm for manual hose stream.
The largest design demand would result from the simultaneous operation of the two largest deluge systems (water/foam systems F-1 and F-2) and the turbine generator bearing water spray system (W-25),
which are located in the turbine building.
The design demand for water/foam system F-1 (zone 734 SF) is 1,048
- gpm, for water/foam system F-2 (zone 735 SF) is 655
- gpm, and for turbine generator bearing water spray system W-25 is 590 gpm.
All design demand pressures are below 100 psi at elevation 261 ft-0 in.
The total flow
- rate, including 500 gpm for hose
- streams, is 2,800 gpm.
This demand can be met with either fire pump out of service.
This exceeds the demand in any safety-related area.
9A.3.6.2.10 Lakes of Freshwater Ponds See Section 9A.3.6.2.8 concerning two intakes.
The intake tunnel from Lake Ontario also feeds the service water system.
Sufficient water is available for both systems, and a failure of the fire protection system does not affect the service water system.
9A. 3. 6. 3 Water Sprinkler and Hose Standpipe Systems 9A. 3. 6. 3. 1 Automatic Sprinkler System Sprinkler systems and manual hose station standpipes are connected to the underground yard main and arranged so that a single failure will not impair both the automatic fire Amendment 26 9A.3-51 May 1986
Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR protection system and the hose reels that provide backup protection.
Fire mains are provided in the turbine building, control building, and reactor building, which are fed from the yard main at both ends.
This is considered to be an extension of the yard main.
Automatic sprinkler flow alarms are provided.
Amendment 10 9A.3-51a April 1984
)/
I'
Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR Fire Area Amendment 26 Fire Zone 252SW 261NZ TABLE 9B.8-1 (Cont)
Required E i ment 2ISC*LT9A 2 ISC*LT9C 2ISC*PT15D 2ISC*PT17A 2ISC*PT17C 2ISC*PT2A 2ISC*PT2B 2ISC*PT4C 2ISC*PT4D 2ISC*PTSA 2ISC*PT5D 2ICS*PT6A 2RHS*PDT24A 2RSS*LT114 2RSS*PT102 2*JB0064 2*JB0067 2*JB0121 2*JB0122 2*JB0123 2*JB0340 2*JB0346 2*JB0814 2CSL*MOV104 2HVR*AOD1A 2HVR*AOD204 2HVR*AOD34A 2HVR*AOD6A 2HVR*AOD9A 2HVR*SOVlA 2HVR*SOV204 2HVR*SOV34A 2HVR*SOV6A 2HVR*SOV9A 2HVR*TIS31A 2HVR*UC413A 2ICS*AOV156 2ICS-LT221 2RHS*MOV24A 2RHS*V143 2RHS*V70 2SWP*AOV97A 2SWP*SOV97A 2HVR*UC413B 2*JB0600 2SFC*V227A 66 of 75 Train 1,3 1
3 1,3 1.3 1,3 1.3 1,3 1.3 1.3 1,3 1,3 1,3 1,3 1,3 1.3 1,3 1.3 1,3 1,3 1,3 1,3 1,3 1,3 3
1,3 1.3 1.3 1,3 1
3 1,3 1,3 1,3 1,3 1.3 1,3 1,3 1
1 1I 3 2,4 1,3 1,3 1.3 1,3 1,3 Remarks NOTE 6 NOTE 15 May 1986
I k"
Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR TABLE 9B.8-1 (Cont)
LEGEND OF NOTES NOTE 9 This equipment is failsafe design; therefore, safe shutdown capability exists.
NOTE 10 The junction box feeds failsafe design equipment; therefore, safe shutdown capability exists.
NOTE 11 The equipment is not required for safe shutdown in case of a fire in this fire area.
It is required only during operation from the remote shutdown room.
Therefore, safe shutdown capability exists.
NOTE 12 In case of a fire in this fire subarea, this equipment will be operated manually through proper administrative procedure.
NOTE 13 In case of a fire in this area, pool cooling will be initiated through proper administrative procedure.
NOTE 14 In case of loss of these outboard isolation valves, inboard isolation valves are available to close the main steam lines.
NOTE 15 The unmitigated fire load in fire zone 252SW is
<1 min.
A concrete radiant energy shield is provided between 2HVR*UC413A and 2HVR*UC413B, which meets the intent of Appendix R.
26 Amendment 26 75 of 75 May 1986
I 1
VJ
~
Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR locally and
. in
- the main control room.
Additional details are included in Appendix 9A.
9.5.1.2.7 Preaction Sprinkler Systems Preaction sprinkler systems comply with NFPA Standards 13 and 15, as applicable.
Preaction systems with closed-fusible link operated heads and deluge valves are provided in the diesel generator
- rooms, turbine building (el 277 ft 6 in and 250 ft, general
- area, and cable tray protection),
radwaste building (dry compacted waste storage and gear lube oil areas),
and reactor building (cable tray protection).
Operation of preaction sprinkler systems is signaled locally and in the main control room.
Additional details are included in Appendix 9A.
9.5.1.2.8 Water Deluge Systems Water deluge systems comply with NFPA Standards 13 and 15 as applicable.
Water deluge systems are hydraulically
- designed, utilizing open directional solid cone spray nozzles and are actuated automatically or manually.
These systems are provided as follows:
1.
Automatically
- actuated, open nozzle water deluge systems are provided to protect yard transformers, reactor feed
- pumps, RCIC room in the reactor building, hydrogen seal oil unit, turbine building truck aisle, and radwaste extruder.
2.
Manually actuated, open nozzle water deluge systems are provided to protect charcoal filters in the control
- building, and standby gas treatment building and turbine generator oil piping and bearings in the turbine building.
Operation of each water deluge system is signaled locally and in the main control room.
Additional details are included in Appendix 9A.
9.5.1.2.9 Carbon Dioxide Systems Carbon dioxide systems comply with NFPA Standard 12.
The low pressure carbon dioxide system consists of two 13-ton storage tanks (300 psig, 0 F), refrigeration unit, valves, and piping that conveys CO> to fixed nozzles at individual hazards.
Total flooding carbon dioxide systems are automatically actuated by cross-zoned smoke detectors (unless otherwise stated).
Total flooding systems are provided for:
1.
Switchgear
.rooms located in the normal switchgear and turbine buildings.
Amendment 26 9.5-5 May 1986
aP
Nine Mile Point Unit 2 F
2.
Standby switchgear rooms A
and B,
and HPCS
.switchgear room in the control building.
3.
600-V switchgear room in the reactor building.
26 4.
Radwaste switchgear room in the decontamination building.
26 5.
Lube oil reservoir in the turbine building (manually actuated system used for inerting the vapor space in 2LOS-TKl).
6.
Alternator-exciter enclosure in the turbine building (extended discharge
- system, automatically actuated by thermal detectors in conjunction with the local application system for turbine generator bearing No.
11 and 12).
Manually actuated local 'application systems are provided to protect turbine generator bearings and oil piping in the turbine building.
Carbon dioxide hose stations are provided in the turbine, control, reactor, normal switchgear, and diesel generator buildings.
Operation of each carbon dioxide system is signaled locally and in the main control room.
Initiation of a
total flooding system also energizes an alarm at the hazard.
Additional details are included in Appendix 9A.
- 9. 5. 1. 2. 10 Halon 1301 Systems Halon 1301 systems conform to the requirement of NFPA Standard No.
12A.
These systems are provided to protect against cable fires in the floor sections of the power generation control complex (PGCC) and the computer
- room, beneath the raised floor sections of the computer
- room, and radwaste control room.
Halon 1301 discharge is actuated either automatically by thermal detectors or manually from the main control room or at local fire panels.
Operation of
~
each Halon system is signaled locally and in the main control room.
Additional data are included in Appendix 9A and NEDO-10466-A.
I 9.5.1.2.11 Portable Extinguishers Portable extinguishers conform to the requirements of NFPA Standard 10.
Type, size, and placement of extinguishers are determined after evaluation of the combustible present in each area.
Additional details of portable extinguishers are included in Appendix 9A.
Amendment 26
- 9. 5-6 May 1986
Nine Mile Point Unit 2 F
9.5.1.2.12 Breathing Apparatus Self-contained breathing apparatus is provided in accordance with the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) guidelines.
An onsite compressor is avail-able to replenish exhausted air bottles.
9.5. 1.2. 13 Fire Detection Systems Fire detection systems conform to the requirements of NFPA Code Standards 72D and 72K.
Amendment 26 9.5-6a May 1986
I
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Nine Mile Point; Unit 2 FSAR THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLYBLANK Amendment 26 9..5-6b May 1986
Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR During normal operation, the opening of one heat vent does not result in a release of radioactivity because the 'exhaust fan maintains the turbine building at a negative pressure.
In the event of a fire with multiple operation of the heat
- vents, the design objectives of 10CFR100 would not be exceeded.
Fire Detection and Su ression S stems Each area of the turbine building is protected by a zoned, early warning smoke detection system arranged to alarm locally and in the control room.
Automatic wet-pipe sprinkler systems are provided for protection of general areas at el 250 ft 0 in and 277 ft 6 in.
A system of six automatically operated foam water sprinkler systems (foam injection is manually controlled) covers the area under the turbine generator below el 306 ft 0 in.
These systems would lay a blanket of foam on the floor under the turbine generator at el 277 ft 6 in to cover any accumulation of burning or unburned oil being discharged from a leak on the machine and to flow down the sides of the machine and lay a blanket of foam in the condenser
- pit, at el 239 ft 4 in.
The foam water sprinkler systems utilize open foam water sprinkler heads spaced to achieve area
- coverage, and the water phase is actuated automatically by heat detectors.
The water supply. to the systems is controlled by automatic flow control valves.
The foam concentrate pump is manually started.
Two equal capacity foam pumps are provided for the foam water sprinkler systems.
One is on automatic standby.
Two foam concentrate tanks are provided for foam water sprinker systems and foam hose reels.
To assist manual firefighting around the turbine generator, the water hose stations in the vicinity of the unit are provided with piped foam concentrate so that either water or foam streams are available at these stations.
COq hose reels are also provided.
Carbon dioxide total-flooding systems are provided for switchgear
- rooms, the alternator exciter enclosure, and the lube oil reservoir (manual system for inerting vapor space).
Manual local application CO<
systems are provided for turbine bearings and turbine lube oil piping.
Manual water Amendment 26 9A.3-15 May 1986
Nine Mile Point Unit, 2 FSAR spray systems are also provided for these hazards as a
backup to the local application CO< systems.
Water deluge systems are provided for the reactor feed pumps Cable tray water sprinkler systems are provided for turbine building cable trays except those in switchgear rooms and those that are protected by general area sprinkler systems.
The clean and dirty oil storage room and the lube oil reservoir have fire loadings of 16 hr 24 min and 14 hr 42
- min, respectively.
(The oil storage rooms have high fire loadings due to the fact that total volume burning has been assumed.
With fire barriers
- intact, the influx of combustion air would be restricted, which would limit the amount of oil actually burned.)
The doorways are elevated to contain the oil in the event of a tank rupture.
Because of the high fire loading, sprinkler systems have been provided for these areas.
Backup protection is provided by manual water hose reels and portable extinguishers.
Drains are described in Section 9A.3.5.1.12.
The hotwell pit has ample ponding capability to hold lube oil line break and expected water from firefighting.
9A.3.1.2.5.5 Diesel Generator Building Introduction The diesel generator building is a single-floor, concrete structure.
It contains the two standby diesel generators and the HPCS diesel generator that provide power if both normal and preferred station service power are lost.
Diesel generators are separated from each other by 3-hr fire walls.
Diesel generator day tanks are also located in separate rooms surrounded by 3-hr walls.
Doorways to day tank rooms have raised thresholds sized to contain the entire contents of the tank and water discharged for fire fighting purposes in the event of a
leak and subsequent fire.
A common ventilation exhaust chase is located on elevation 272 ft 0 in of the north end of the building.
Discharge grills from each diesel generator room exhaust into the chase.
Amendment 24 9A.3-16 February 1986
~
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Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR QUESTION F280.10 Identify those areas of the plant that will not meet the guidelines of Section C,5.b of BTP CMEB 9.5-1
- and, thus alternative shutdown will be provided.
Additionally provide a statement that, all other areas of the plant will be in compliance with Section C.5.b of BTP CMEB 9.5-1.
For each of those fire areas of the plant requiring an alternative shutdown system(s) provide a
complete set of responses to the following requests for each fire area:
(1) Iist the system(s) or portions thereof used to provide the shutdown capability with the loss of offsite power.
(2)
For those systems identified in (1) for which alternative or dedicated shutdown capability must be
- provided, list the equipment and components of the normal shutdown system in the fire area and identify the functions of the circuits of the normal shutdown system in the fire area (power to what equipment, control of what components and instrumentation).
Describe the system(s) or portions thereof used to provide the alternative shutdown capability for the fire area and provide a
table that lists the equipment and components of the alternative shutdown system for the fire area.
For each alternative
- system, identify the function of the new circuits being provided.
Identify the location (fire zone) of the alternative shutdown equipment and/or circuits that bypass the fire area and verify that the alternative shutdown equipment and/or circuits are separated from the fire area in accordance with Section III.G.2.
(3)
Provide drawings of the alternative shutdown system(s) that highlight any connections to the normal shutdown systems (PGIDs for piping and components, elementary wiring diagrams of electrical cabling).
Show the electrical location of all breakers for power
- cables, and isolation devices for control and instrumentation circuits for the alternative shutdown systems for that.
fire area.
(4)
Verify that procedures have been or will be developed that describe tasks to be performed to effect the shutdown method.
Provide a summary of these procedures outlining operator actions.
Amendment 5
QE(R F280.10-1 October 1983
f
Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR (5)
Verify that the manpower required to perform the shutdown functions using the procedures of (4) as well as provide fire brigade members to fight the fire is available as required by the fire brigade technical specifications.
(6)
Provide a commitment to perform adequate acceptance tests of the alternative shutdown capability.
These tests should verify that:
equipment operates from the local control station when the transfer or isolation switch is placed in the "local" position and that the equipment cannot be operated from the control room; and that equipment operates from the control but cannot be operated at the local control station when the transfer isolation switch is in the "remote" position.
(7)
Verify that repair procedures for cold shutdown systems are developed and material for repairs is maintained onsite.
Provide a
summary of these procedures and a list of the material needed for repairs.
26
RESPONSE
(1) This information is provided in revised Appendix 9B.
(2) This information is provided in revised Appendix 9B.
(3) Alternate shutdown equipment is described in Appendix 9B, Section 9B.9.
Drawings for this equipment were reviewed onsite by the NRC during the Appendix R
audit.
(4) Procedures are developed to describe operator actions to affect shutdown after a fire.
(5) Unit 2 will have an independent fire department, separate from the minimum number of shift operators, to shut down the reactor.
(6) The tests for alternate shutdown capability are described in Table 14.2-104.
(7) Repair procedures are not required.
Amendment 26 QSR F280.10-2 May 1986
I
,g)
Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR Associated Circuits Cables (safety-related, nonsafety-
- related, Class lE, and non-Class 1E) that have a
physical separation less than that required by Section IIE.G.2 of Appendix R, and one of the following:
A common power source with the shutdown equipment (redundant or alternative) and the power source is not electrically protected from the circuit of concern by coordinated breakers,
- fuses, or similar devices.
2.
A connection to circuits of equipment whose spurious operation would adversely affect the shutdown capability.
3.
A common enclosure with the shutdown cables that is not protected by circuit breakers, fuses or similar
- devices, or that will allow propagation of the fire into the common enclosure.
Automatic Self-acting, operating by its own mechanism when actuated by some impersonal influence such as a
change in
- current, pressure, temperature, or mechanical configuration.
Combustible Material Material that does not meet the definition of noncombustible.
Control Room Com lex The zone served by the control room emergency ventilation system (see SRP Section 6.4, Habitability Systems)
Ex osure Fire An exposure fire is a fire in a given area that involves either in situ or transient combustibles and is external to any structures,
- systems, or components located in or adjacent to that same area.
The effects of such fire (e.g.,
- smoke, heat, or ignition) can adversely affect those structures,
- systems, or components important to safety.
- Thus, a fire involving one train of safe shutdown equipment may constitute an exposure fire for the redundant train located in the same
- area, and a
fire involving combustibles other than either redundant train may constitute an exposure fire to both redundant trains located in the same area.
26 Fire Area Areas within the plant that are totally enclosed by 3-hr fire barriers.
Structural steel forming a part or supporting such fire barriers to be protected to provide fire resistance equivalent to that required of the barrier.
Exterior walls, unless shown on FSAR Figures 9A.3-2 through 9A.3-8, are not fire rated.
Amendment 26 9A.2-2 May 1986
I
Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR 9A.3.5.1.8 Roof Construction Metal deck roof construction, where used, is designed as a
. Factory Mutual Class 1 roofing system.
9A.3.5.1.9 Suspended Ceiling Any suspended ceilings in safety-related areas are of noncombustible construction.
Concealed spaces are void of combustibles except for electrical
- cable, which is in metallic conduit.
9A.3.5.1.10 Transformers Transformers located within safety-related areas are of the dry type.
9A.3.5.1.11 Oil-Filled Transformers The plant has an open transformer yard, which contains all the oil-filled transformers applicable to BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.5.a(13).
The west wall of the control building is located within 50 ft, has one protected HVAC air intake
- opening, and is constructed in excess of the 3-hr fire-resistive requirements.
Protection consists of a
fire damper (located 6 ft, upstream of the opening) and fire barrier wrap for the exposed duct.
Additional unprotected openings exist that are in excess of 50 ft from the transformers.
9A.3.5.1.12 Floor Drains Floor drains are conservatively sized in accordance with the National Plumbing Code.
Floor drains in safety-related and nonsafety-related areas are approximately spaced at one drain per 575 sq ft, each with a capacity of approximately 70 gpm.
Actual drainage capability would depend on drain
- spacing, location, and area involved.
Firefighting water flow depends on the type of suppression system
- provided, system design
- density, and area of involvement.
Unit 2 fixed water suppression systems incorporate the use of closed-heads and closed-water spray nozzles which limit the amount of water discharged to the area of involvement during a fire.
An evaluation to determine the degree of buildup and its effect was conducted for the diesel generator rooms (the most conservative case).
The result showed that with all Amendment 26 9A.3-43 May 1986
Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR constructed of a minimum of 8-in thick reinforced concrete.
- Concrete, in addition to its capability to support
'various
- loads, also possesses insulating and fire-resistive properties.
Nationally known and recognized Uniform Building Code (1982 edition)
(herein called UBC) lists the required minimum thicknesses of various insulating materials for fire-resistive periods of 1 hr through 4 hr listed in Tables 9A.3-1 through 9A.3-3.
Based on these tables, it can be concluded that all fire barriers provide a
minimum of 3 hr of fire resistance rating as specified for certain plant areas.
The reinforcing steel with a minimum of 1 in of concrete cover also provides 3 hr of fire resistance rating.
American Concrete Institute (ACI) codes and quality assurance requirements of ANSI N45.2.5, as invoked by NRC Regulatory Guides 1.55 and 1.94, respectively, are used in the design, procurement, and construction of these barriers.
Penetration seals are discusseed in Section 9A'.3.5.1.2.
Comparisons are performed for:
1.
Typical floor system versus corresponding UI-rated sections 2..
Typical steel beam versus corresponding UL-rated beam 3.
Typical wall section versus corresponding UL-rated sections The details of UL-rated sections are 'obtained from the Fire Resistance Directory, published by the Underwriters Laboratories, dated January 1983.
Tables 9A.3-12, 9A.3-13, and 9A.3-14 provide the comparison.
Therefore, while fire testing is not done, the required 3-hr fire resistance is provided.
9A.3.5.1.2 Penetration Seals Openings through fire barriers for pipe, conduit, and cable
- trays, which separate fire areas, are sealed to provide a
fire rating equal to the rating of the barrier itself.
Openings inside conduits penetrating fire barriers are sealed at the barrier or at the first opening on both sides of the barrier regardless of the conduit size or distance to the first opening.
The seal materials are ASTM E-119 Amendment 23 9A.3-41 December 1985
o.
e Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR ANI/MAERP tested, provide three hour rating, and demonstrate the following:
~
No significant smoke or hot gas preparation 26
~
No large areas of
- heat, rise greater than 3254F above ambient on the cold side.
(In most
- cases, maximum cold side temperature did not exceed 325 F).
~
No hot spots that could ignite nearby cable on the code side.
~
Capability to withstand the design differential pressure which is not concurrent with fire.
The following materials may be used:
~
Dow Corning'3-6548 silicone RTV foam.
~
Dow Corning 170 products A and B, Elastomer.
4 To facilitate installation, a fire rated damming material is used when required, Installation of the conduit internal seals is performed by ANI-approved installers based on procedures consistent with the tests conducted.
Threaded unused conduits are capped or plugged on both sides of the fire barrier with a 1/8 in vent hole provided on one side.
Cable trays are supported in a manner similar to the UL test.
Unit 2 penetration seal designs are either the same as Unit 1
- designs, which were tested and qualified by Underwriters Laboratories for a 3-hr
- rating, or are UL-
- listed, 3-hr rated penetration seals (such as link-seals).
This is verified in accordance with the quality assurance requirements.
Cable trays are supported in a manner similar to the UL test.
Unit 2 penetration seal designs are either the same as Unit 1 designs, which were tested and qualified by Underwriters Iaboratories for a 3-hr rating, or are UL-
- listed, 3-hr rated penetration seals (such as link-seals).
This is verified in accordance with the quality assurance requirements.
Amendment 26 9A.3-41a May 1986
Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSlddP-TABLE 9A 3-17 COMPARISON BETWEEN UL-LABELED CLASS A DOORS AND UNIT 2 NONLABELED SPECIAL PURPOSE DOORS Z
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, sheets. vith 6"..Thick fiher glass.
insulation and:C6 "x.8..2:-..A36. >teel channels in the.-skeleton and-
azound the periphery of the door.
Lock bolts Mortised lock or one single point
- bolt, (5/8<< x 1<<)
inserts (5/8<< or latch sets vith spring-actuated
, notched for nylon 3/4<< throw)
Six 1 1/4<<square CF1018 stee1 bolts with a 2 1/2<< throw; two at each jamb and one each at head and sill.
Bolt housings of 3<<x4 3/4<<x2<<A36 steel stock Tvo 1<< lock bolts, ASTM A12'l9 UNSG1215 steel min. tenible 76 ksi, 1<< throw.
Latch strike made of super oilite at operating temperature of up to 2000P.
Bushings on the lock are bronze in excess of 50 ksi Tvo 1 1/2<<diameter locking pins, AISI CP1018 steel, with four 1/2<< diameter ASTM A490 hex bolts on mounting brackets, one each at head and sill Hinges Pzame 1
1/2 or 2 pairs of 4 1/2<<x4 1/2<<x0 180<<
ball bearing butt hinges with 1/4<<
.-or 5/16<<pins with bolts 14 gauge pressed steel frame with adjustable anchors-2 hinges with 1<< diameter pin and thrust bearing, velded to structural steel angle frame A36 steel angles for sill, head-,
and jambs velded together and stiffened vith gusset plates, as required.
Tvo heavy duty hinge asemblies, welded to the door frame and secured to the doors A3'6 steel channels three sides vith bar stops veld to the channels to prevent flame propagation.
Six hinges vith 2<<diameter steel pin and thrust hearing welded to the structural steel angle frame.
A36 steel angles and plates for jamb velded to the embedded plates in the Field Pressed=steel frame anchored to vali installation vith 14 gauge adjustable jamb anchors at 24 in O.C.
A-36 steel angle frame continuously fillet welded to existing embedded frame.
Channel frame intermittent welded to the existing embedded frame.
A36 steel frame intermittent fillet welded to existing embedded frame.
'lI XPERTURIE CARD SbMlgdo57 gI-Amendment 26 1 of 1
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- t. FOA 004415 IvOICS LCOCIO L ACfCFSICCS Os0 54.22A tffIA214124 CONTROL BUll.DING PLAN EL 2I4.D L 215 0 Sh 5/ M57-8 FIGURE 9A.3-3 FIRE PROTECTION ARRANGEMENT UNIT NO.2 STATION BUILDINGS PLAN EL 214'-0" & 215'-0" NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION NINE MILE POINT-UNIT 2 FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT AMENDMENT26 MP'
- 2. Ioaoc'sltsa letla Iiscsoatcsttlscls ossro cotta d5/4885/" 0 FlGURE 9A.3-4 PART PLAN EL 2SD'-(S FIRE PROTECTION ARRANGEMENT UNIT NO.2 STATION BUILDINGS PLAN EL 237'-0" 8 240'-0" NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION NlNE MILE POlNT-UNlT 2 FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT AMENDMENT26 MAY1.'0
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> II 1 ~ ~I I 0> 9 ~ ~ ~ t>AL ~ 1 tavt D >ea.d~ soot D t>DS'aa>t D tlr ~ IIISTR SIC)P aoor ~00> Ca tss 0EMINERAL)2ED WATER d waSTE >IEUTRAU ING TANK BLALDING @I II'Qo , MATCH I >RE II.IO) j I l4J41 waTER tNTAKE d D5CHARGE BLDG Ai A>>.< u>~ taa>>DT SRD,c 'lS'0' I P CI-Q atcj I ISI ~LA>r CL tss'ro FIRE PUMP RM tavt D terr . ERREE~tg BIKLDING lI D >sod 1>tt N) 3jil D t¹rd ta CLt¹0 ~~f.f >L AUK BOILER ~~a+LC BUILDING ttt ~ 9> I l TR) IEIQE ~TE >Jat>P ~ coNDENsaTE sTDRAGE TANK BVKDING ~001 l QQ CHILLWATER 'STRUCTURE 9 400> ta tetr i pa rg~ taa>1 CE tlt ~
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- ~Q'IA>9 ii )Ssaf 1
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- ,'. jest(ddi!",
- . Pire
- 1. card uanti ti.
- Insul, Fiber Insul.
- 12,000 12,000 8,778 5,436 466,740 7r722 50 488,726 810 4,440 29~0976 296,226 74, 128
- 21. 006
- area, and control room Zl 250'-0" Heater bay (typical for heater bays B and C)
- 10. 3 hr Smoke detection Automatic preaction sprinkler system 9A.3-5 PA 29 401 NZ Div II diesel 416 generator control room Division II diesel generator controls Bise Equip Rotors Insul Insul.
- 10. 3 hr Saoke detection Automatic preaction sprinkler system
- e Pire Barrier Required
- Oil, RSS piping
- Oil, RSS extruder Asphalt Asphalt Asphalt Lube oil Lube oil 4008 1489 325 170 37 18,000 18,000 18,000 19,000 19,000 72000 26802 5850 3230 703 108585 19,232 15 min smoke detection Smoke detection Automatic sprinkler system Automatic sprinkler system
- Demin, vater storage tank
- 6. 5 min Smoke detection Beat detection Amendment 26 1 of 1