Text

Forwards Addl Clarifications to Fire Protection Program. Revised Pages Will Be Included in Amend 26 to FSAR.W/31 Oversize Encls
	ML18038A159
Person / Time
Site:	Nine Mile Point
Issue date:	05/09/1986
From:	Mangan C; NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORP.
To:	Adensam E; Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
	(NMP2L-0709), (NMP2L-709), NUDOCS 8605140057
	Download: ML18038A159 (158)
	v • d • e

REQULA1U Y INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION YSTEN (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR: 8605140057 DOC. DATE: 86/05/09 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET FACIL: 50-410 Nine Nile Point NucleaT Stationi Unit 2. Niagara Noha 05000eiO AUTH. Nhl'jE AUTHOR AFFILIATION NANQANi C. V. Niagara t'tohawk Power Corp.

REC IP. NAl'1E RECIPIENT AFFILIATION ADENSANi E. Q. BWR ProJect Directorate 3 1)~M<<QS

SUBJECT:

Forwards addi clarifications to Fire p otection program.

Revised pages will be included in Amend 26 to FSAR. N/3i overs'e enc l s.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: B002D COPIES RECEIVED: LTR ENCL SIZE:

TITLE: Licensing Submittal: Fire Protection NOTES:

RECIPIENT COPIES REC IP I ENT COP~ES ID CODE/MANE LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAI'tE LTTR ENCL BNR ADTS 1 1 BWR PD3 PD HAUQHEYi N 01 1 INTERNAL: ACRS 10 6 6 ADN/LFNB 0 3 0 NRR STANQi J 3 3 REQ FIL 04 1 1 RQNi 1 EXTERNAL: 24X 1 1 LPDR 03 1 i NRC PDR 02 NSIC 05 1 i TOTAL NUNBER OF COP lES REQUIRED: LTTR 20 ENCL 18

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NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION/300 ERIE BOULEVARD WEST, SYRACUSE, N.Y. 13202/TELEPHONE (315) 474-1511 May 9, 1986 (NMP2L 0709)

Ms. Elinor G. Adensam, Director BWR Project Directorate No. 3 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 7920 Norfolk Avenue Washington, DC 20555

Dear Ms. Adensam:

Re: Nine Mile Point Unit 2 Docket No: 50-410 Enclosed are additional clarifications to the Nine Mile Point Unit 2 Fire Protection Program. The Final Safety Analysis Report updated pages are attached. Changes are indicated by a line in the right-hand margin.

The revised pages will be included in Amendment 26 of the Final Safety Analysis Report.

Very truly yours, C. V. Mang Senior Vice President NLR:ja 1598G Enclosures xc: R. A. Gramm, NRC Resident Inspector Project File (2)

BSOS>40057 aeoSO9 ADQCK 050004i0 Pl'DR F PDR

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION In the Hatter of Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation ) Docket No. 50-410 (Nine Mile Point Unit 2)

AFFIDAVIT C. V. Han an , being duly sworn, states that he is Senior Vice President of Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation; that he is authorized on the part of said Corporation to sign and file with the Nuclear Regulatory ,

Commission the documents attached hereto; and that all such documents are true and correct to the best of his knowledge, information and belief.

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a Notary Public in and York and County of th/a ~ day of for the State of New 1986.

Notary Public in and for County, New York

~ ~~Npyggps:

My Commi aied Pubhc in the State of Ney Y~

in Onondaga Co. No. 4787687 y Commiaaron. Ex pirea March 30, lQf7

f Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR Calorific Values Combustible Btu lb Electrical cables 9, 500-12, 000 Motor insulation 10,000 Lube oil 19, 000 General combustibles 8, 000 Hydrogen 65,000 Clothing 8,000 26 Hydraulic fluid 18,000 Resin 18,000 26 Fiberglass 18,000 Charcoal 14,100 Styrene 18,000 Wood 8,000 Paper 8,000 Diesel fuel 19,000 Asphalt 18,000 Plastic 18,000 The construction materials used for roofing were not included in the fire load. Metal deck roofs are Factory Mutual Class 1 and considered noncombustible for the purposes of this analysis.

Each fire area was investigated for fire loading. Further delineation of the hazards analysis into fire zones provides a closer estimation of fire loads within the fire area. The total Btu content of each area or zone is the sum of all combustibles in that zone.

Average Fire Load = Total Btu content Btu Area of Zone (ft ) x,80,000 Btu/ft hr

= Hours of fire load 9A.3.1.2.4 Summary of Conclusions Calculated fire loadings for major plant areas are as follows (see Tables 9A.3-1 through 9A.3-11 for a complete listing).

Amendment 26 9A.3-6 May 1986

0 p Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR Average Area Fire Ioadin Reactor building 34 min 26 Reactor building auxiliary bays 28 min J 26 Standby gas treatment building 8 min I 26 Control building, except cable 43 min )

chases 26 Cable chases 3 hr )

26 Electrical tunnels 1 hr, 52 min /

26 Turbine building 26 min I Switchgear rooms 2 hr, 30 min 26 Oil storage rooms 18 hr, 6 min Diesel generator building 1 hr, 22 min )

26 Oil day tank room 10 hr, 21 min )

26 Screenwell building 19 min

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26 Service water pump room "A" min 26 Service water pump room "B" 24 min Diesel fire pump room 52 min 26 Radwaste building 1 hr, 36 min I Normal switchgear building 1 hr, 26 min /

26 Auxiliary boiler building 1 hr, 18 min )

26 Condensate storage tank 1 hr, 12 min I 26 building Steam tunnel 7 min )

26 The oil day tank rooms have high fire loadings because total f 26 volume burning has been assumed. This calculation also takes no credit for fixed extinguishing systems provided for all oil hazards. Also, a free influx of air is assumed. If the fire barrier remains intact, a significantly reduced fire exposure can be expected. 26 Amendment 26 9A.3-7 May 1986

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Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR The next highest fire loadings are heavy cable tray concentrations in the control building and electrical tunnels. Calculations for these areas are also conservative. All trays are considered to be loaded to the Amendment 26 9A.3-7a May 1986

h Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK Amendment 26 9A.3-7b May 1986

0 Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR maximum allowable. In any case, cable tray water sprinkler systems are provided for these areas.

The next highest fire loadings are in the radwaste building.

26 The calculation for this area is also conservative.

In calculating fire loading for the diesel generator room, 'a fuel oil pipe rupture has been assumed with the entire contents of the fuel oil day tank spilled on the floor. It was also considered that all of the lube oil contained in the crankcase of the engine would leak out. These assumptions resulted in a fire loading of 1 hr 22 min, which is still less than the 3-hr walls that. have been provided.

Automatic pre-action water sprinkler systems have been provided for the diesel generator building.

The normal switchgear building also has a high fir'e loading, but it is less than the 3-hr fire walls that have been provided. Automatic total-flooding CO> systems have been used in this building and in other switchgear rooms.

Fire loading for all other areas is approximately 2 hr or less. In spite of the low'fire loading, 3-hr fire walls have been provided wherever separation is required or desirable.

9A.3.1.2.5 Detailed Fire Hazards Analysis by Building The following sections provide the detailed fire hazards analysis and a summary of the effects of fires in fire zones. This summary shows that the fire protection system will provide adequate ability to detect, prevent, and suppress postulated fire outbreaks in and around the plant.

9A.3.1.2.5.1 Standby Gas Treatment Building Introduction The standby gas treatment (SGT) building is ad)acent to the reactor building. It houses the SGTS units, reactor building ventilation supply unit, and railroad access bay, all of which are separated from each other by 3-hr fire walls and floors. Construction of the SGT building is detailed in Section 3.8.4.1.9.

Safet -Related S stems The SGTS units are the only safety-related equipment in this building.

Amendment 26 9A.3-8 May 1986

Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK Amendment 23 9A.3-41b December 1985

yl Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FS 9A.3.5. 1.3 Penetration Openings for Ventilation Systems Openings through fire barriers for ventilation'ystems le.by UL-labeled fire dampers with 'a rating are'rotected equivalent to that required of the barrier. Flexible air duct coupling in ventilation and filter system is non-e ombus tib 9A.3.5.1.4 Door Openings With the exception of special doors such as pressuretight, watertight, radiation shield, tornado, and railroad access, the doors installed in the fire-rated assemblies are UL-labeled fire doors. Table 9A.3-16 lists pressuretight, watertight, radiation shielded, tornado, and railroad access doors to be install,ed in fire barriers and the corresponding fire loading on either side of each door. Figures 9A.3-14 details through 9A.3-17 show typical sections and and demonstrate by engineering analysis that the door panels and hardware, when subjected to heat (up to 2000~F) for 3 hr on one side, will be free to expand in all directions and maintain the doors in the closed position. No significant deformation or warping of door panels which could allow fire propagation is excepted. Table 9A.3-17 provides a comparison between UL-labeled Class A rated fire doors and Unit 2 nonlabeled doors. Fire door position will be monitored and verified to be maintained in accordance with BTP CNEB 9.5-1 Section C.S.a(5). Installation of fire doors is in accordance with NFPA-80 and applicable UL requirements.

9A.3.5.1.5 Personnel Access and Escape Routes Two means of egress are provided from each fire area.

Stairways required for egress are enclosed and ventilated to minimize smoke infiltration and to provide a safe means of egress in the event of a fire. Exit routes are clearly marked. The enclosures are designed for a 2-hr fire rating and equipped with UL-listed, self-closing Class B fire doors. Elevator enclosures and chutes are similarly designed.

9A.3.5.1.6 Sharing of Cable Spreading Rooms Unit 2 does not share a cable spreading room with Unit 1.

Amendment 26 9A.3-42 May 1986

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Nine Mile Point Unit 2 F TABLE 9A.3-16 AUERAGE FIRE LOADING ON EITHER SIDE OF NON-UL LABELLED DOORS Average Fire Loading Door No. On Either Side of Door SA175-3 0 min/17 min SA175-4 17 min/21 min NA175-2 17 min/17 min R175>>4 1 min/42 min R175-5 1 min/42 min R175-7 2 min/50 min T277-20 4 min/9 min T277-21 4 min/9 min 26 T277-22 4 min/9 min ET214>>2 0 min/1.1 hr*

ET237-1 0 min/0 min SW261-14 17 min/13 min DG272-4 0 min/6.9 hr* 26 C288-1 0 min/0 min C306-1 1 min/0 min C261-1 2.8 hr*/1.6 hr R240-7 48 min/(Ltr)

AB261>>3 26 min/0 min NA240-1 0 min/0 min NA240-2 0 min/0 min R240-3 48 min/1.1 hr SA240-1'R261-2 1.1 hr/0 min 49 min+/0 min 26 C239-1 0 min/0 min SW280-1 31 min/4 min

Automatic suppression provided on this side of door.

Amendment 26 of 1 May 1986

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g f CALCULATIONOF THE EXPANSION OF WATERTIGHT DOORS DUE TO FIRE EXPOSURE DOOR NUMBERS: SA 175-3; SA 175-4; NA 175-2; R 175-4; R 175-5; R 175-7 AND C 239-1 OVERALL DOOR DIMENSIONS TOTAL DOOR/FRAME GAP 34-5/8" X 85" HORIZONTAL VERTICAL 0.875 1.250

38" X 87-7/8" 0.875 1.250 THE FOLLOWING CALCULATIONSVERIFY THAT THERE WOULD BE NO INTERFERENCE (CONTACT FORCE) BETWEEN THE DOOR AND FRAME DURING A FIRE WHERE A TEMPERATURE RISE OF 1930'F (2000'F 70'F

= 1930'F) IS EXPERIENCED BY THE DOOR.

THE METHOD OF CALCULATINGEXPANSION IS BASED ON THE LARGEST SIZE OF THE DOOR TIMES THE TEMPERATURE RISE TIMES THE COEFFICIENT OF STEEL EXPANSION (0.0000065)

WIDTH OF DOOR = 38" TOTAL CLEARANCE = 0.875" (CLEARANCE ON ONE SIDE OF DOOR)

EXPANSION IN WIDTH = 38 X 1930 X 0.0000065 = 0.48 NOTE: 0.48" IS LESS THAN 0.875" HEIGHT OF DOOR =87.875" TOTAL CLEARANCE = 1.250" (CLEARANCE ON TOP AND BOTTOM OF DOOR)

EXPANSION IN HEIGHT = 87.875 X 1930 X 0.0000065 = 1.1" NOTE'.1" IS LESS THAN 1.250"

DOOR C-239-1 ONLY IANNA FIGURE 9A.3-14 WATERTIGHT DOORS PAGE 2 OF 2 NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION NlNE MlLE POlNT-UNIT 2 FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT h

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Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR Drains are discussed in Section 9A.3.5.1.12. Smoke removal is provided by normal ventilation and portable smoke removal units.

9A.3.1.2.5.10 Reactor Building Introduction Due to the presence of floor openings, the entire reactor building is considered a single fire area. Each floor elevation is considered a separate fire zone and each half of the building is considered as a fire subarea. The analysis of the contained hazards indicates that the average fire loading for each zone, with the exception of the HPCS room and 600-V switchgear room, is less than 1 hr. A 20-ft-wide zone is provided between the north and south halves on the 0- to 180-deg line.

The 20-ft zone consists of two adjacent. 10-ft zones with 26 detection and automatic suppression systems.

To reduce the potential for the vertical spread of fire along cable tray risers, penetration seals are provided for cable tray risers. Refer to Figures 9A.3-2 through 9A.3-8 for the actual configuration of the fire stops.

Elevation 353 ft 10 in is a nonrated barrier which separates fire subareas FSA 34 and FSA 35. There is no fireelevation loading or safe shutdown equipment: located on 353 ft 10 in; therefore, safe shutdown capability is not affected.

The reactor building has a ventilation system utilizing 100 percent outside air for normal operation. This system will remove smoke in the 'event of a fire, as long as radiation levels remain below acceptable levels.

The primary containment is also considered one fire area.

However, due to the low fire loading, primary containment inerting, and lack of continuity of combustibles, a fire that would spread from one hazard to another is not postulated.

Safet -Related and Reactor-Associated S stems The following table includes both safety-related and reactor-associated systems and gives their locations in the reactor building.

Amendment 26 9A.3-23 May 1986

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Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR Division I Division II

~Sstem el el RDS* Control rod drive 261'N) 261'S) hydraulic control units RDS Control rod drive pumps CSH* High-pressure core spray SFC* Fuel pool cooling pumps 289'(S) 289'(S)

Heat exchangers 215'(N) 215'(S)

SLS* Standby liquid 289'(N) 289'(N) cooling CCP Reactor plant component cooling water HVR* Reactor building 289'(N) 289'(N) ventilation recirculation fans Unit coolers Multiple (N) Multiple (S)

WCS Reactor water cleanup ICS* Reactor core isola- 175'(N) tion cooling HCS* Hydrogen recombiner 240'(N) 240'(S)

RCS Reactor recirculation pumps RDS* Control rod drive hydraulic control units RDS Control rod drive 215'N) pumps CSH* High-pressure core 175'(S) spray Amendment 6 9A.3-24 December 1983

t e Nine Mile Point Unit 0 2 FSAR Redundant fire pumps are provided. One pump is electric driven and the other is diesel driven.

9A.3.1.3.3 Seismic Design Basis Standpipes and hose connections for manual firefighting are se1sm1cally supported in safety-related areas and in areas containing safety-related equipment. The design bases do not contemplate simultaneous earthquake and fire conditions; additionally, Unit 2 is not in an area of high seismic activity, therefore these requirements were not incorporated into the design.

9A.3.1.3.4 Design Basis Analysis GDC-3 requires that firefighting systems be designed to ensure that rupture or inadvertent operation does not significantly impair the safety capability of structures, systems, and. components important to safety. Redundant trains of components required for safe shutdown that are susceptible to damage from water spray are physically 26 separated so that manual fire suppression activities will not adversely affect the operability of components not

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involved in the postulated fire. Where necessary, appropriate protection is provided to prevent impingement of water spray on components required for safe shutdown.

Section 3C.4 provides further details regarding the effects of spraying on safe shutdown components. Automatic suppression systems have been designed and located so that.

operation of the systems, either intentionally or inadvertently, will not cause damage to redundant trains of components required for safe shutdown.

The fire hazards analysis that is included as part of the 26 FSAR defines the effects of postulated fire outbreaks.

Details for the effects and analyses for wind and tornado loading, water level (flood), and missile protection are described in Sections 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5.

9A.3.1.3.5 Moderate Energy Line Break Analysis The consequences of a crack in a moderate energy line in the fire suppression system are included in the energy pipe break analysis for Unit 2 (refer to FSAR Section 3.6A).

9A.3.1.4 Alternative or'Dedicated Shutdown Refer to FSAR Appendix 9B.

Amendment 26 9A.3-30 May 1986

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Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR 9A.3.6.4 Halon 1301 Suppression Systems (NFPA Standard 12A)

Fixed Halon 1301 suppression systems have been installed in the PGCC floor modules in the control room (in accordance with GE NEDO 10466-A, Rev. 2, dated February 1979), Radwaste Control Room, Relay Room, and Computer Room. Halon systems comply with NFPA Standard 12A, and the requirements of BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.6.d. Disarming of Halon suppression systems will comply with the requirements of BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.2.).

9A.3.6.5 COq Suppression Systems (NFPA Standard 12)

CO> systems are used in all switchgear rooms, the alternator exciter enclosure, turbine bearings, and the lube oil reservoir. CO< systems comply with NFPA Standard 12, and the requirements of BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.6.e.'isarming of CO> suppression systems will comply with the requirements of BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.2.).

9A.3.6.6 Portable Extinguishers Unit 2 portable extinguishers are in compliance with the requirements of NFPA Standard 10. Adverse effects of portable extinguishing agents have been considered in the placement of extinguishers. Portable fire extinguishers applicable to the hazard and the guidelines of NFPA Standard 10 will be provided in all areas of the plant. An inspection and maintenance program will be written; performance of same will be fulfilled by the onsite fire department.

9A.3.7 Guidelines for Specific Plant Areas 9A.3.7.1 Primary Containment and Reactor Building 9A.3.7.1.1 Normal Operation General area coverage smoke detectors have been provided in the reactor building, to alarm and annunciate in the control room and to alarm locally. The primary fire hazard in the reactor 'building is cable trays. Automatic sprinkler systems are provided for single cable tray stacks containing Amendment 26 9A.3-53 May 1986

o Nine Mile Point Unit. e2 FSAR five trays or more (vertically) and for multiple tray stacks containing m're than three trays. Motor control centers in areas where water spray protection is provided are NEMA Type 3R (raintight).

9A.3.7.1.1.1 Operation of Fire Protection Systems The operation of fire protection systems will not compromise safety-related equipment due to the separation, barriers, and protection provided for redundant trains of safety-related equipment.

9A. 3. 7. l. l. 2 Primary Containment Fire Protection The Unit 2 containment is inerted during normal operation; ze therefore, this requirement does not apply.

9A.3.7.1.1.3 Primary Containment Fire Detection The Unit 2 containment is inerted during normal operation.

26 General area smoke detectors will be provided in the primary containment only during refueling and major maintenance periods.

9A.3'.7.1.1.4 Primary Containment Standpipe and Hose Stations Continuous flow hose reels with 1-inch hose reels with spray nozzles are provided in the primary containment for use during refueling and major maintenance.

9A.3.7.1.1.5 Oil Collection System for Recirculation Pumps Refer to Section 9A.3.7.1.1.2.

9A.3.7.1.1.6 Reactor Building Fire Protection Fire detection and suppression is provided for fire hazards in the reactor building as identified by the fire hazards analysis. Refer to Section 9A.3'.6 for details.

9A.3.7.1.2 Refueling and Maintenance The primary containment general area coverage detection system mentioned previously will be in operation during ~

refueling and major maintenance. Portable fire extinguishers will be strategically located within the primary containment when the containment is open. Hose reel Amendment 26 9A.3-54 May 1986

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Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR TABLE 9A.3-15 SUPERVISION OF FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM VALVES FSAR Fi re No. Valve No. Electric Admini strative 9.5-1a 2FPW-V2 X 2FPW-V3 X 2FPW-V4 X 2FPW-V18 X 2FPW-V19 X 26 2FPW-V20 X I 2FPW-V21 X 2FPW-V22 X 2FPW-V25 X 2FPW-V26 X 2FPW-V28 X 26 I

2FPW-V29 X 2FPW-V31 X 2FPW-V35 X 2FPW-V36 X 2FPW-V41 X 2FPW-V48 X 2FPW-V49 X 2FPW-V50 2FPW-V53 X 2FPW-V57 X 2FPW-V355 X 2FPW-V554 X 2FPW-V555 X 9.5-1b 2FPW-V103 X 2FPW-V104 X 2FPW-V105 X 2FPW-V106 X 2FPW-V107 X 2FPW-V108 X 2FPW-V109 X 2FPW-V110 X 2FPW-V111 X 2FPW"V112 X 2FPW-V113 X 2FPW-V114 X 2FPW-V118 X 2FPW-V119 X 2FPW-V120 X 2FPV-V121 X 2FPW-V122 X 2FPW-V123 X Amendment 26 1 of 6 May 1986

g t Nine Mile TABLE 9A.3-15 (Cont)

FSAR Fi re No. Valve No. Electric Administrative 2FPW-V177 X 2FPW-V178 X 2FPW-V179 X 2FPW"V180 X 2FPW-V181 X 2FPW"V182 X 2FPW-V183 X 2FPW-V184 X 2FPW>>V438 X 2FPW-V439 X 2FPW-V499 X 2FPW-V548 X 2FPW-V571 X 2FPW-V572 X 2FPW-V581 X 2FPW-V582 X 9.5-1c 2FPW"V185 X 2FPW-V186 X 2FPW-V187 X 2FPW-V188 X 2FPW"V189 X 2FPW<<V190 X 2FPW-V191 2FPW-V195 X 2FPW-V196 X 2FPW-V197 X

. 2FPW-V199 X 2FPW-V200 X 2FPW-V201 X 2FPW-V202 2FPW-V207 X 2FPW-V208 X 2FPW-V210 X 2FPW-V211 X, 2FPW-V779 X 2FPW-V780 X 9.5-1d 2FPW-V32 X

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2FPW-V34 X 2FPW-V213 X 2FPW-V214 X 2FPW"V215 X 2FPW-V216 X 2FPW"V217 X 2FPW-V2 18 X Amendment 26 3 of 6 May 1986

Nine Mile Point Unit '2 FSAR TABLE 9A.3-15 (Cont)

FSAR Fi re No. Valve No. Electric Administrative 2FPW-V220 X 2FPW-V225 X 2FPW" V23 1 X 2FPW-V235 X 2FPW-V239 X 2FPW"V251 X 2FPW-V253 X 2FPW-V255 X 2FPW-V442 X 2FPW-V445 X 2FPW-V448 X 2FPW"V500 X 2FPW-V502 X 2FPW"V504 X 2FPW-V620 X 9.5-1e 2FPW-V257 X 2FPW-V260 X 2FPW-V262 X 2FPW-V264 X 2FPW-V265 X 2FPW-V266 X 26 2FPW<<V268 X 2FPW-V269 X 2FPW-V270 X 2FPW-V271 X 2FPW-V272 X 2FPW-V276 2FPW-V280 X 2FPW-V281 X 2FPW-V282 X 2FPW-V283 X 2FPW-V284 2FPW-V287 X 2FPW-V288 X 2FPW>>V289 2FPW-V297 X 26 2FPW-V303 X 2FPW-V304 X 2FPW-V305 X 2FPW-V306 X Amendment 26 4 of 6 May 1986

Ni Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR TABS E 9A.3-15 (Cont)

FSAR Fi re No. Valve No. Electric Administrative 2FPW-V307 X 2FPW-V453 X 2FPW-V455 X 2FPW-V460 X 2FPW-V462 X 26 2FPW-V486 X 2FPW-V487 X 2FPW-V492 X 2FPW-V493 X 2FPW-V495 X 2FPW-V496 X 2FPW-V506 X 2FPW-V579 X 2FPW-V623 X 2FPW-V775 /26 9.5-lf 2FPW-V301 X 2FPW-V302 X 2FPW-V314 X 2FPW-V316 X 2FPW"V317 X 2FPW-V318 X 2FPW-V352 X 2FPW-V353 X 2FPW-V354 2FPW-V356 2FPW-V357 2FPW-V358 X 26 2FPW-V382 X I 2FPW-V390 X 2FPW-V395 X 2FPW-V400 X 2FPW-V401 X 2FPW-V402 X 2FPW-V403 X 2FPW>>V404 X 2FPW-V405 X 2FPW-V406 X 2FPW-V407 X 2FPW-V408 X 2FPW-V410 X 2FPW-V469 X 2FPW-V583 X 2FPW"V608 X 2FPW-V773 X 2FPW-VB11 X Amendment 26 5 of 6 May 1986

Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR TABf E 9A.3-15 (Cont)

FSAR Fi re No. Valve No. Electric Administrative 9.5-1g 2FPW-V206 ~26 2FPW-V421 X 2FPW-V422 X

'FPW-V423 X 2FPW-V424 X 2FPW-V427 X 2FPW-V428 X 2FPW-V429 X 2FPW-V430 X 2FPW-V431 X 2FPW-V474 X 2FPW-V475 X 2FPW-V476 X 2FPW-V477 X 2FPW-V529 2FPW-V530 X 2FPW-V531 X 2FPW-V532 X 2FPW-V553 )26 2FPW"V596 X 2FPW-V597 X 2FPW-V629 X 2FPW-V662 X 2FPW-879 X 2FPW-888 X 26 9.5-1h 2FPW-V691 X 2FPW-V692 X 2FPW-V693 X 2FPW-V695 X 2FPW-V696 X 2FPW-V697 X 2FPW-V716 X 2FPW-V717 X 2FPW-V718 X 2FPW-V719 X 2FPW-V720

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2FPW-V721 X 2FPW-V770 X Amendment 26 6 of 6 May 1986

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Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR Division III Nondivisional

~Sstem SFC* Fuel pool cooling Pumps Heat exchangers SIS* Standby liquid cooling CCP Reactor plant 328'(N)(S) component cooling water HVR* Reactor building ventilation Recirculation fans 175'(S)

Unit coolers WCS Reactor water cleanup 215'(N)

ICS* Reactor core isolation cooling HCS* Hydrogen recombiner RCS Reactor recirculation Containment pumps

Category I equipment Post Fire Anal sis The preceding table shows that, with the following exceptions, Division I equipment is located in the north half of the reactor building and Division II equipment is located in the south half. Wiring for the following pumps, unit coolers, and valves is run in conduit and buried in the concrete floor slab, except at the connection point to the piece of equipment:

Both fuel pool cooling pumps are located in the south half; however, they are separated from each other and from the remainder of the plant by 3-hr fire walls and protected by fire detectors.

2. Both standby liquid control pumps are located in the north half. This system is functionally Amendment 6 9A. 3-25 December 1983

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Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR redundant to the control rod drive (CRD) system.

Cable trays in the area are protected by a sprinkler system and fire detectors.

3. Both reactor building ventilation emergency recirculation unit coolers are located in the north half at el 289 ft 0 in. The unit coolers are separated from each other by a concrete fire stop.

Cable trays in the area are protected with a sprinkler system and fire detectors.

4. There are approximately 12 safety-related, motor-operated isolation valves in the reactor building that must be located out of their division. The 26 analysis of FSAR Appendix 9B shows that Sufficient

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equipment remains free of damage from a single fire to achieve safe shutdown of the plant.

The Division III pump (HPCS) is located in the south half of the reactor building; however, 3-hr rated fire walls. The it is completely isolated by Division IIIoutside cables are provided from a separate buried duct bank the reactor building.

'ith fire load, tha fire protection systems out of service, the low lack of continuity of combustibles, and the 20-ft fire break along the 0- to 180-deg line in the reactor building support the implausibility of fire spreading from the north half to the south half.

With the fire protection systems in service, that the fire would spread beyond the point of itorigin.

is unlikely Radioactive Release Anal sis The reactor building ventilation consists of a normal ventilation system and an emergency recirculation air system.

The normal ventilation exhaust from the reactor building is monitored for radiation by radiation monitors located in the exhaust. duct. These monitors stop the. normal ventilation syst: em and activate the standby gas treatment system (SGTS) and the emergency recirculation system unit coolers.

Redundant trains are provided for the SGTS and emergency r'ecirculation unit coolers. Standby gas treatment units are separated from each other by 3-hr rated fire walls, and recirculation unit coolers are separated from each other by Amendment 26 9A.3-26 May 1986

~ Nine Mile Point Unit ~ 2 FSAR sprinkler heads operating and 300 gpm hose stream discharge, the buildup would be contained by the curbs provided at, the doorways.

The maximum firefighting water flow for the diesel generator building exceeds the maximum firefighting water flow (and subsequent buildup due to compartment size) for all other safety-related areas.

Based on an evaluation of this water flow and the results of the analysis described in Section,3C.5, Compartment Flooding as a Result of Breaks or Cracks, firefighting water flow and subsequent buildup will be removed by floor drains and not cause the loss of redundant trains of equipment required for safe shutdown for all other safety-related areas.

In areas containing combustible liquid storage and piping, traps are provided in the floor drains and curbs. Dikes are provided and sized to contain the largest spill, in addition to the expected firefighting water flow, for a duration of 10 minutes.

Floor drains in areas protected by total flooding gaseous suppression systems incorporate a liquid seal or the suppression system is sized to include agent loss through the drains.

9A.3.5.2 Safe Shutdown Capability 9A.3.5.2.1 Safe Shutdown Fire Protection Features Fire protection features, including separation, rated barriers, and suppression and detection systems, are provided for structures, s'ystems, and components important to safe shutdown. Refer to Section 9A.3.6 for details on fire suppression and detection equipment.

Appendix 9B describes the methodology used to assemble, analyze, and document the ability of Unit 2 to conduct a safe shutdown following a fire.

9A.3.5.3 Alternative or Dedicated Shutdown Capability Refer to Appendix 9B.

Amendment 26 9A.3-44 May 1986

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Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR detect, prevent, and suppress postulated fire outbreaks in and around the plant.

9A.3.1.2.2 Organization of Fire Hazards Analysis In order to develop data meaningful to the analysis, the plant has been divided into numerous fire areas, and these areas are further subdivided into fire zones. The fire areas and zones are shown on Figures 9A.3-1 through 9A.3-8, 9A.3-12, and 9A.3-13. Fire areas are those areas separated from adjacent areas by rated fire barriers. A comparison between Unit 2 fire barr'iers and tested fire barriers is provided in Section 9A.3.5.1.1.

Calculation of fire loading for each fire zone is included in Tables 9A.3-1 through 9A.3-11. The basis of calculation is shown below.

9A.3.1.2.3 Basis of Calculation In Tables 9A.3-1 through 9A.3-11, all known combustibles are identified for each fire zone. The calorific content of the combustibles and the Btu/sq ft loading for each fire area 26 have been calculated. In order to 'determine the fire loading, it was necessary to make some assumptions concerning the amount of combustibles in such equipment as motors and control cabinets. The following assumptions, which are based on engineering judgment, were utilized to estimate the weight. of combustibles:

Weight of E i ment Combustible Motor-operated valves, 1% of overall motors, starters, and weight electrical equipment Electric panels and 2% of overall control cabinets weight Cable 17% to 32% of overall weight The following calorific values are used for combustibles.

These values are based on vendor data or the NFPA Fire Protection Handbook, 14th edition:

Amendment 26 9A.3"5 May 1986

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Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR Construction of the diesel generator building is discussed in Section 3.8.4.1.3.

Safet -Related S stems The diesel generator building contains the Division I and II and HPCS (Division III) diesel generators. These three generators provide power to essential equipment if both normal and preferred station service power are lost.

Post Fire Anal sis The fire loading for the diesel generator room in the diesel generator building is 2 hr 24 min. This is based on a postulated fuel oil line rupture and the spilling of the entire contents of the fuel oil day tank into the diesel generator room.

Fire wall separation of diesel generators and fuel oil day tanks precludes a fire in one section from disabling other systems. Therefore, safe shutdown capability is assured.

If fire protection systems were in service, a fire would be extinguished.

Radioactive Release Anal sis There is no source of radioactivity in this building.

Fire Detection and Su ression All diesel generators are protected with preaction sprinkler systems. The deluge valves for these systems open automatically on a signal from photoelectric detectors in 26 Division I and II

)

the respective diesel generator rooms.

diesel generators as well as the HPCS (Division III) diesel 26 generator have been modified to allow water spray without damaging the engine or generator.

The backup systems for the diesel generators are manual water and CO+ hose reels and portable extinguishers.

C The diesel generator day tank room has a fire loading of 6 hr 54 min. Raised thresholds are provided so that the entire contents of the tank would be contained in the event of a tank rupture. As was discussed previously, if the entire contents of the fuel oil day tank were spilled in the diesel generator room, the fire loading would be 2 hr 24 min and a fire would be contained within that area. The floor Amendment. 26 9A.3-17 May 1986

0 Nine Mile Point Unit 02 FSAR drainage 'ystem is designed to drain oil to the oil separator outside the building.

Amendment 23 9A.3-17a December 1985

Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR Radioactive Release Anal sis The auxiliary bays are served by the reactor building ventilation system. Further details are provided in Section 9A.3.1.'2.5.10.

Fire Detection and Su ression All areas of the auxiliary bays are protected by a zoned, early warning detection system arranged to alarm locally and in the control room.

Cable trays in the auxiliary bays are protected by the two automatic closed-head cable tray sprinkler systems that serve the reactor building.

Water hose reels are provided at each elevation in both the north and south auxiliary bays. Piping is designed so that cable tray systems and hose reels can be fed from separate connections to the yard main.

CO> hose reels are provided at el 240 ft 0 in to protect 13.8-kV switchgear and motor control centers.

Portable extinguishers are provided throughout the building.

Drains are discussed in Section 9A.3.5.1.12.

9A.3.1.3 Fire Suppression System Design Basis 9A. 3. 1. 3. 1 Backup Total reliance is not placed on any single fire suppression system.

Water fire hose stations and portable extinguishers are to fixed provided throughout the plant as a backup suppression systems. In areas where hazards are switchgear or electrical cabinets, CO< hose reels and extinguishers are also provided.

9A.3.1.3.2 Single-Failure Criteria All buildings housing safety-related equipment, except the diesel generator building, have a double connection to the fire loop. Piping is arranged so that a single pipe break would not impair both the fixed suppression system and the hose reels. In the event of a pipe break and subsequent fire in the diesel generator building, manual firefighting The yard 26 tactics using yard hydrants would be employed.

Amendment 26 9A.3-29 May 1986

Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR main is a loop with isolation valves located so that a single break in the loop does not impair fire protection systems in any building housing safety-related systems.

Amendment 26 9A.3-29a May 1986

~ Nine Mile Point Unit 0

2 FSAR THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK Amendment 26 9A. 3-29b May 1986

Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK Amendment 9 9A.3-45b March 1984

Nine Mile Point Unit 2 F available throughout the plant. Portable extinguishers provide additional backup protection.

9A.3.5.5.4 Electric Cable Construction Electrical cable construction is in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.32 and the IEEE-383-1974 flame test.

9A.3.5.5.5 Cable Trays and Raceways Cable trays, raceways, and conduit are used only for cables.

Buried cable is in conduit/duct systems in trenches used only for this purpose. Safety-related cable is not exposed to flammable or combustible liquids or gases or other combustible storage. Refer to section 9A.3.2 for administrative controls.

9A.3.5.6 Ventilation 9A.3.5.6. 1 Products of Combustion All safety-related areas use the installed once-through ventilation to remove products of combustion. The electrical tunnels, the control building, and the normal switchgear building have separate smoke exhaust fans, isolation dampers, and controls dedicated to smoke removal.

Portions of the normal ventilation system components are used in certain areas for smoke removal. Fire dampers are provided where ventilation ductwork penetrates fire barriers. For large (high-heat) fires, the fire dampers would close. These dampers can be manually reopened by plant personnel for smoke removal. Location and operation of smoke removal dampers will be shown on individual preplan procedures for each area of the plant. Monitors are provided in the reactor building, turbine building, and radwaste building exhaust ductwork to determine if the release is within the permissible limits of radioactivity to prevent an unacceptable release to the atmosphere.

Additional heat removal capability is supplied by roof-mounted heat vents installed in the turbine building, electrical bay, heater bays, service building, screenwell 26 building, auxiliary service building, clean access area, demineralirer storage tank building, standby gas treatment building, chilled water building, and intake and discharge shafts building. Portable fans would be used to further aid in the removal of smoke.

9A.3.5.6.2 Smoke or Corrosive Gases The inadvertent operation or single failures of ventilation systems designed to exhaust smoke and/or corrosive gases Amendment 26 9A.3"46 May 1986

C Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR extinguishers, 'wrenches, adapters, axes, hand-held lights, bolt cutters, etc.

9A.3.6.2.8 Reliable Water Supplies The source of water supply to the fire pumps is Lake Ontario. Each pump takes suction from the seismically designed service water intake tunnel. Nine Mile Point Unit 1 fire pumps (rated at 2,500 gpm at net discharge pressure of 125 psig) also take suction from Lake Ontario through a separate and remote intake tunnel. The fire main loops for Nine Mile Point Units 1 and 2 are interconnected in two places with normally closed valves, one remotely operable from the Unit 1 control room.

9A.3.6.2.9 Fire Water Supply The fire water supply (Lake Ontario) is a fresh water supply and is essentially unlimited. The flow rate with one pump out of service is a nominal 2,500 gpm at net discharge pressure of 125 psig; this is ample for the largest deluge system plus 500 gpm for manual hose stream. The largest design demand would result from the simultaneous operation of the two largest deluge systems (water/foam systems F-1 and F-2) and the turbine generator bearing water spray system (W-25), which are located in the turbine building.

The design demand for water/foam system F-1 (zone 734 SF) is 1,048 gpm, for water/foam system F-2 (zone 735 SF) is 655 gpm, and for turbine generator bearing water spray system W-25 is 590 gpm. All design demand pressures are below 100 psi at elevation 261 ft-0 in. The total flow rate, including 500 gpm for hose streams, is 2,800 gpm.

This demand can be met with either fire pump out of service.

This exceeds the demand in any safety-related area.

9A.3.6.2.10 Lakes of Freshwater Ponds See Section 9A.3.6.2.8 concerning two intakes. The intake tunnel from Lake Ontario also feeds the service water system. Sufficient water is available for both systems, and a failure of the fire protection system does not affect the service water system.

9A. 3. 6. 3 Water Sprinkler and Hose Standpipe Systems 9A. 3. 6. 3. 1 Automatic Sprinkler System Sprinkler systems and manual hose station standpipes are connected to the underground yard main and arranged so that a single failure will not impair both the automatic fire Amendment 26 9A.3-51 May 1986

Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR protection system and the hose reels that provide backup protection. Fire mains are provided in the turbine building, control building, and reactor building, which are fed from the yard main at both ends. This is considered to be an extension of the yard main. Automatic sprinkler flow alarms are provided.

Amendment 10 9A.3-51a April 1984

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Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR TABLE 9B.8-1 (Cont)

Fire Fire Required Area Zone E i ment Train Remarks 2ISC*LT9A 1,3 2 I SC*LT9C 1 3 2ISC*PT15D 1,3 2ISC*PT17A 1.3 2ISC*PT17C 1,3 2ISC*PT2A 1.3 2ISC*PT2B 1,3 2ISC*PT4C 1.3 2ISC*PT4D 1.3 2ISC*PTSA 1,3 2ISC*PT5D 1,3 2ICS*PT6A 1,3 2RHS*PDT24A 1,3 2RSS*LT114 1,3 2RSS*PT102 1.3 252SW 2*JB0064 1,3 2*JB0067 1.3 2*JB0121 1,3 2*JB0122 1,3 2*JB0123 1,3 2*JB0340 1,3 2*JB0346 1,3 2*JB0814 1,3 2CSL*MOV104 3 2HVR*AOD1A 1,3 2HVR*AOD204 1.3 2HVR*AOD34A 1.3 2HVR*AOD6A 1,3 2HVR*AOD9A 1 3 2HVR*SOVlA 1,3 2HVR*SOV204 1,3 2HVR*SOV34A 1,3 2HVR*SOV6A 1,3 2HVR*SOV9A 1.3 2HVR*TIS31A 1,3 2HVR*UC413A 1,3 2ICS*AOV156 1 2ICS-LT221 1 2RHS*MOV24A 1I 3 2RHS*V143 2,4 NOTE 6 2RHS*V70 1,3 2SWP*AOV97A 1,3 2SWP*SOV97A 1.3 2HVR*UC413B NOTE 15 261NZ 2*JB0600 1,3 2SFC*V227A 1,3 Amendment 26 66 of 75 May 1986

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Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR TABLE 9B.8-1 (Cont)

LEGEND OF NOTES NOTE 9 This equipment is failsafe design; therefore, safe shutdown capability exists.

NOTE 10 The junction box feeds failsafe design equipment; therefore, safe shutdown capability exists.

NOTE 11 The equipment is not required for safe shutdown in case offrom a fire in this fire area. It is required only during operation the remote shutdown room. Therefore, safe shutdown capability exists.

NOTE 12 In case of a fire in this fire subarea, this equipment will be operated manually through proper administrative procedure.

NOTE 13 In case of a fire in this area, pool cooling will be initiated through proper administrative procedure.

NOTE 14 In case of loss of these outboard isolation valves, inboard isolation valves are available to close the main steam lines.

NOTE 15 The unmitigated fire load in fire zone 252SW is <1 min. A 26 concrete radiant energy shield is provided between 2HVR*UC413A and 2HVR*UC413B, which meets the intent of Appendix R.

Amendment 26 75 of 75 May 1986

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Nine Mile Point Unit

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2 FSAR locally and . in the main control

- room. Additional details are included in Appendix 9A.

9.5.1.2.7 Preaction Sprinkler Systems Preaction sprinkler systems comply with NFPA Standards 13 and 15, as applicable. Preaction systems with closed-fusible link operated heads and deluge valves are provided in the diesel generator rooms, turbine building (el 277 ft 6 in and 250 ft, protection), radwaste building (dry general area, compacted and waste cable tray storage and gear lube oil areas), and reactor building (cable tray protection). Operation of preaction sprinkler systems is signaled locally and in the main control room. Additional details are included in Appendix 9A.

9.5.1.2.8 Water Deluge Systems Water deluge systems comply with NFPA Standards 13 and 15 as applicable. Water deluge systems are hydraulically designed, utilizing open directional solid cone spray nozzles and are actuated automatically or manually. These systems are provided as follows:

1. Automatically actuated, open nozzle water deluge systems are provided to protect yard transformers, reactor feed pumps, RCIC room in the reactor building, hydrogen seal oil unit, turbine building truck aisle, and radwaste extruder.

2. Manually actuated, open nozzle water deluge systems are provided to protect charcoal filters in the control building, and standby gas treatment building and turbine generator oil piping and bearings in the turbine building.

Operation of each water deluge system is signaled locally and in the main control room. Additional details are included in Appendix 9A.

9.5.1.2.9 Carbon Dioxide Systems Carbon dioxide systems comply with NFPA Standard 12. The low pressure carbon dioxide system consists of two 13-ton storage tanks (300 psig, 0 F), refrigeration unit, valves, and piping that conveys CO> to fixed nozzles at individual hazards. Total flooding carbon dioxide systems are automatically actuated by cross-zoned smoke detectors (unless otherwise stated). Total flooding systems are provided for:

1. Switchgear .rooms located in the normal switchgear and turbine buildings.

Amendment 26 9.5-5 May 1986

aP Nine Mile Point Unit 2 F

2. Standby switchgear rooms A and B, and HPCS

.switchgear room in the control building.

3. 600-V switchgear room in the reactor building.

4. Radwaste switchgear room in the decontamination 26 building.

5. Lube oil reservoir in the turbine building 26 (manually actuated system used for inerting the vapor space in 2LOS-TKl).

6. Alternator-exciter enclosure in the turbine building (extended discharge system, automatically actuated by thermal detectors in conjunction with the local application system for turbine generator bearing No. 11 and 12).

Manually actuated local 'application systems are provided to protect turbine generator bearings and oil piping in the turbine building.

Carbon dioxide hose stations are provided in the turbine, control, reactor, normal switchgear, and diesel generator buildings. Operation of each carbon dioxide system is signaled locally and in the main control room. Initiation of a total flooding system also energizes an alarm at the hazard. Additional details are included in Appendix 9A.

9. 5. 1. 2. 10 Halon 1301 Systems Halon 1301 systems conform to the requirement of NFPA Standard No. 12A. These systems are provided to protect against cable fires in the floor sections of the power generation control complex (PGCC) and the computer room, beneath the raised floor sections of the computer room, and radwaste control room. Halon 1301 discharge is actuated either automatically by thermal detectors or manually from the main control room or at local fire panels. Operation of

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each Halon system is signaled locally and in the main control room. Additional data are included in Appendix 9A and NEDO-10466-A.

I 9.5.1.2.11 Portable Extinguishers Portable extinguishers conform to the requirements of NFPA Standard 10. Type, size, and placement of extinguishers are determined after evaluation of the combustible present in each area. Additional details of portable extinguishers are included in Appendix 9A.

Amendment 26 9. 5-6 May 1986

Nine Mile Point Unit 2 F 9.5.1.2.12 Breathing Apparatus Self-contained breathing apparatus is provided in accordance with the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) guidelines. An onsite compressor is avail-able to replenish exhausted air bottles.

9.5. 1.2. 13 Fire Detection Systems Fire detection systems conform to the requirements of NFPA Code Standards 72D and 72K.

Amendment 26 9.5-6a May 1986

I

~ Nine Mile Point; Unit ~

2 FSAR THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK Amendment 26 9..5-6b May 1986

Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR During normal operation, the opening of one heat vent does

'exhaust not result in a release of radioactivity because the fan maintains the turbine building at a negative pressure.

In the event of a fire with multiple operation of the heat vents, the design objectives of 10CFR100 would not be exceeded.

Fire Detection and Su ression S stems Each area of the turbine building is protected by a zoned, early warning smoke detection system arranged to alarm locally and in the control room.

Automatic wet-pipe sprinkler systems are provided for protection of general areas at el 250 ft 0 in and 277 ft 6 in.

A system of six automatically operated foam water sprinkler systems (foam injection is manually controlled) covers the area under the turbine generator below el 306 ft 0 in.

These systems would lay a blanket of foam on the floor under the turbine generator at el 277 ft 6 in to cover any accumulation of burning or unburned oil being discharged from a leak on the machine and to flow down the sides of the machine and lay a blanket of foam in the condenser pit, at el 239 ft 4 in.

The foam water sprinkler systems utilize open foam water sprinkler heads spaced to achieve area coverage, and the water phase is actuated automatically by heat detectors.

The water supply. to the systems is controlled by automatic flow control valves. The foam concentrate pump is manually started. Two equal capacity foam pumps are provided for the foam water sprinkler systems. One is on automatic standby.

Two foam concentrate tanks are provided for foam water sprinker systems and foam hose reels.

To assist manual firefighting around the turbine generator, the water hose stations in the vicinity of the unit are provided with piped foam concentrate so that either water or foam streams are available at these stations. COq hose reels are also provided.

Carbon dioxide total-flooding systems are provided for switchgear rooms, the alternator exciter enclosure, and the lube oil reservoir (manual system for inerting vapor space).

Manual local application CO< systems are provided for turbine bearings and turbine lube oil piping. Manual water Amendment 26 9A.3-15 May 1986

Nine Mile Point Unit, 2 FSAR spray systems are also provided for these hazards as a backup to the local application CO< systems.

Water deluge systems are provided for the reactor feed pumps Cable tray water sprinkler systems are provided for turbine building cable trays except those in switchgear rooms and those that are protected by general area sprinkler systems.

The clean and dirty oil storage room and the lube oil reservoir have fire loadings of 16 hr 24 min and 14 hr 42 min, respectively. (The oil storage rooms have high fire loadings due to the fact that total volume burning has been assumed. With fire barriers intact, the influx of combustion air would be restricted, which would limit the amount of oil actually burned.) The doorways are elevated to contain the oil in the event of a tank rupture. Because of the high fire loading, sprinkler systems have been provided for these areas. Backup protection is provided by manual water hose reels and portable extinguishers. Drains are described in Section 9A.3.5.1.12.

The hotwell pit has ample ponding capability to hold lube oil line break and expected water from firefighting.

9A.3.1.2.5.5 Diesel Generator Building Introduction The diesel generator building is a single-floor, concrete structure. It contains the two standby diesel generators and the HPCS diesel generator that provide power normal and preferred station service power are lost.

if both Diesel generators are separated from each other by 3-hr fire walls. Diesel generator day tanks are also located in separate rooms surrounded by 3-hr walls. Doorways to day tank rooms have raised thresholds sized to contain the entire contents of the tank and water discharged for fire fighting purposes in the event of a leak and subsequent fire.

A common ventilation exhaust chase is located on elevation 272 ft grills 0 in of the north end from each diesel of the building.

generator Discharge room exhaust into the chase.

Amendment 24 9A.3-16 February 1986

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Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR QUESTION F280.10 Identify those areas of the plant that will not meet the guidelines of Section C,5.b of BTP CMEB 9.5-1 and, thus alternative shutdown will be provided. Additionally provide a statement that, all other areas of the plant will be in compliance with Section C.5.b of BTP CMEB 9.5-1.

For each of those fire areas of the plant requiring an alternative shutdown system(s) provide a complete set of responses to the following requests for each fire area:

(1) Iist the system(s) or portions thereof used to provide the shutdown capability with the loss of offsite power.

(2) For those systems identified in (1) for which alternative or dedicated shutdown capability must be provided, list the equipment and components of the normal shutdown system in the fire area and identify the functions of the circuits of the normal shutdown system in the fire area (power to what equipment, control of what components and instrumentation). Describe the system(s) or portions thereof used to provide the alternative shutdown capability for the fire area and provide a table that lists the equipment and components of the alternative shutdown system for the fire area.

For each alternative system, identify the function of the new circuits being provided. Identify the location (fire zone) of the alternative shutdown equipment and/or circuits that bypass the fire area and verify that the alternative shutdown equipment and/or circuits are separated from the fire area in accordance with Section III.G.2.

(3) Provide drawings of the alternative shutdown system(s) that highlight any connections to the normal shutdown systems (PGIDs for piping and components, elementary wiring diagrams of electrical cabling). Show the electrical location of all breakers for power cables, and isolation devices for control and instrumentation circuits for the alternative shutdown systems for that. fire area.

(4) Verify that procedures have been or will be developed that describe tasks to be performed to effect the shutdown method. Provide a summary of these procedures outlining operator actions.

Amendment 5 QE(R F280.10-1 October 1983

f Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR (5) Verify that the manpower required to perform the shutdown functions using the procedures of (4) as well as provide fire brigade members to fight the fire is available as required by the fire brigade technical specifications.

(6) Provide a commitment to perform adequate acceptance tests of the alternative shutdown capability.

These tests should verify that: equipment operates from the local control station when the transfer or isolation switch is placed in the "local" position and that the equipment cannot be operated from the control room; and that equipment operates from the control but cannot be operated at the local control station when the transfer isolation switch is in the "remote" position.

(7) Verify that repair procedures for cold shutdown systems are developed and material for repairs is maintained onsite. Provide a summary of these procedures and a list of the material needed for repairs.

RESPONSE

(1) This information is provided in revised Appendix 9B.

(2) This information is provided in revised Appendix 9B.

(3) Alternate shutdown equipment is described in 26 Appendix 9B, Section 9B.9. Drawings for this equipment were reviewed onsite by the NRC during the Appendix R audit.

(4) Procedures are developed to describe operator actions to affect shutdown after a fire.

(5) Unit 2 will have an independent fire department, separate from the minimum number of shift operators, to shut down the reactor.

(6) The tests for alternate shutdown capability are described in Table 14.2-104.

(7) Repair procedures are not required.

Amendment 26 QSR F280.10-2 May 1986

I

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Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR Associated Circuits Cables (safety-related, nonsafety-related, Class lE, and non-Class 1E) that have a physical separation less than that required by Section IIE.G.2 of Appendix R, and one of the following:

A common power source with the shutdown equipment (redundant or alternative) and the power source is not electrically protected from the circuit of concern by coordinated breakers, fuses, or similar devices.

2. A connection to circuits of equipment whose spurious operation would adversely affect the shutdown capability.

3. A common enclosure with the shutdown cables that is not protected by circuit breakers, fuses or similar devices, or that will allow propagation of the fire into the common enclosure.

Automatic Self-acting, operating by its own mechanism when actuated by some impersonal influence such as a change in current, pressure, temperature, or mechanical configuration.

Combustible Material Material that does not meet the definition of noncombustible.

Control Room Com lex The zone served by the control room emergency ventilation system (see SRP Section 6.4, Habitability Systems) .

Ex osure Fire An exposure fire is a fire in a given area that involves either in situ or transient combustibles and is external to any structures, systems, or components located in or adjacent to that same area. The effects of such fire (e.g., smoke, heat, or ignition) can adversely affect those structures, systems, or components important to safety. Thus, a fire involving one train of safe shutdown equipment may constitute an exposure fire for the redundant train located in the same area, and a fire involving combustibles other than either redundant train may constitute an exposure fire to both redundant trains located in the same area.

Fire Area Areas within the plant that are totally enclosed by 3-hr fire barriers. Structural steel forming a part or supporting such fire barriers to be protected to provide fire resistance equivalent to that required of9A.3-2 the barrier.

26 Exterior walls, unless shown on FSAR Figures through 9A.3-8, are not fire rated.

Amendment 26 9A.2-2 May 1986

I Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR 9A.3.5.1.8 Roof Construction Metal deck roof construction, where used, is designed as a

. Factory Mutual Class 1 roofing system.

9A.3.5.1.9 Suspended Ceiling Any suspended ceilings in safety-related areas are of noncombustible construction. Concealed spaces are void of combustibles except for electrical cable, which is in metallic conduit.

9A.3.5.1.10 Transformers Transformers located within safety-related areas are of the dry type.

9A.3.5.1.11 Oil-Filled Transformers The plant has an open transformer yard, which contains all the oil-filled transformers applicable to BTP CMEB 9.5-1 Section C.5.a(13). The west wall of the control building is located within 50 ft, has one protected HVAC air intake opening, and is constructed in excess of the 3-hr fire-resistive requirements. Protection consists of a fire damper (located 6 ft, upstream of the opening) and fire barrier wrap for the exposed duct. Additional unprotected openings exist that are in excess of 50 ft from the transformers.

9A.3.5.1.12 Floor Drains Floor drains are conservatively sized in accordance with the National Plumbing Code. Floor drains in safety-related and nonsafety-related areas are approximately spaced at one drain per 575 sq ft, each with a capacity of approximately 70 gpm. Actual drainage capability would depend on drain spacing, location, and area involved.

Firefighting water flow depends on the type of suppression system provided, system design density, and area of involvement. Unit 2 fixed water suppression systems incorporate the use of closed-heads and closed-water spray nozzles which limit the amount of water discharged to the area of involvement during a fire.

An evaluation to determine the degree of buildup and its effect was conducted for the diesel generator rooms (the case). The result showed that with all most conservative Amendment 26 9A.3-43 May 1986

Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSAR constructed of a minimum of 8-in thick reinforced concrete.

Concrete, in addition to its capability to support 'various loads, also possesses insulating and fire-resistive properties.

Nationally known and recognized Uniform Building Code (1982 edition) (herein called UBC) lists the required minimum thicknesses of various insulating materials for fire-resistive periods of 1 hr through 4 hr listed in Tables 9A.3-1 through 9A.3-3. Based on these tables, it can be concluded that all fire barriers provide a minimum of 3 hr of fire resistance rating as specified for certain plant areas. The reinforcing steel with a minimum of 1 in of concrete cover also provides 3 hr of fire resistance rating.

American Concrete Institute (ACI) codes and quality assurance requirements of ANSI N45.2.5, as invoked by NRC Regulatory Guides 1.55 and 1.94, respectively, are used in the design, procurement, and construction of these barriers.

Penetration seals are discusseed in Section 9A'.3.5.1.2.

Comparisons are performed for:

1. Typical floor system versus corresponding UI -rated sections 2.. Typical steel beam versus corresponding UL-rated beam

3. Typical wall section versus corresponding UL-rated sections The details of UL-rated sections are 'obtained from the Fire Resistance Directory, published by the Underwriters Laboratories, dated January 1983. Tables 9A.3-12, 9A.3-13, and 9A.3-14 provide the comparison.

Therefore, while fire testing is not done, the required 3-hr fire resistance is provided.

9A.3.5.1.2 Penetration Seals Openings through fire barriers for pipe, conduit, and cable trays, which separate fire areas, are sealed to provide a fire rating equal to the rating of the barrier itself.

Openings inside conduits penetrating fire barriers are sealed at the barrier or at the first opening on both sides of the barrier regardless of the conduit size or distance to the first opening. The seal materials are ASTM E-119 Amendment 23 9A.3-41 December 1985

o. Nine Mile Point Unit e 2 FSAR ANI/MAERP tested, provide three hour rating, and demonstrate the following:

~ No significant smoke or hot gas preparation

~ No large areas of heat, rise greater than 3254F above ambient on the cold side. (In most cases, 26 maximum cold side temperature did not exceed 325 F).

~ No hot spots that could ignite nearby cable on the code side.

~ Capability to withstand the design differential pressure which is not concurrent with fire.

The following materials may be used:

~ Dow Corning'3-6548 silicone RTV foam.

~ Dow Corning 170 products A and B, Elastomer.

4 To facilitate installation, a fire rated damming material is used when required, Installation of the conduit internal seals is performed by ANI-approved installers based on procedures consistent with the tests conducted. Threaded unused conduits are capped or plugged on both sides of the fire barrier with a 1/8 in vent hole provided on one side.

Cable trays are supported in a manner similar to the UL test. Unit 2 penetration seal designs are either the same as Unit 1 designs, which were tested and qualified by Underwriters Laboratories for a 3-hr rating, or are UL-listed, 3-hr rated penetration seals (such as link-seals).

This is verified in accordance with the quality assurance requirements. Cable trays are supported in a manner similar to the UL test. Unit 2 penetration seal designs are either the same as Unit 1 designs, which were tested and qualified by Underwriters Iaboratories for a 3-hr rating, or are UL-listed, 3-hr rated penetration seals (such as link-seals).

This is verified in accordance with the quality assurance requirements.

Amendment 26 9A.3-41a May 1986

Nine Mile Point Unit 2 FSlddP-TABLE 9A 3-17 COMPARISON BETWEEN UL-LABELED CLASS A DOORS AND UNIT 2 NONLABELED SPECIAL PURPOSE DOORS

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insulation thick, 11" gauge:cover.

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.8..2:-..A36. >teel and 1 1/2<<x 9/16 x 3/16<< channels in the.-skeleton and-=

channels all around the

'ar azound the periphery of the periphery of the doors door.

Lock bolts Mortised lock or latch sets vith Six 1 1/4<<square CF1018 stee1 Tvo 1<< lock bolts, ASTM A12'l9 Tvo 1 1/2<<diameter locking one single point spring-actuated . bolts with a 2 1/2<< throw; two at UNSG1215 steel min. tenible pins, AISI CP1018 steel, with bolt, (5/8<< x 1<<) , notched for nylon each jamb and one each at head and 76 ksi, 1<< throw. Latch four 1/2<< diameter ASTM A490 inserts (5/8<< or 3/4<< throw) sill. Bolt housings of strike made of super oilite hex bolts on mounting brackets, 3<<x4 3/4<<x2<<A36 steel stock at operating temperature of one each at head and sill up to 2000P. Bushings on the lock are bronze in excess of 50 ksi Hinges 1/2 or 2 pairs of 4 1/2<<x4 1/2<<x0 180<< 2 hinges with 1<< diameter Tvo heavy duty hinge asemblies, Six hinges vith 2<<diameter steel 1

ball bearing butt hinges with 1/4<< pin and thrust bearing, velded welded to the door frame pin and thrust hearing welded to

.-or 5/16<<pins with bolts to structural steel angle frame and secured to the doors the structural steel angle frame.

14 gauge pressed steel frame with A36 steel angles for sill, head-, A3'6 steel channels three A36 steel angles and plates for jamb Pzame adjustable anchors- and jambs velded together and sides vith bar stops veld velded to the embedded plates in the stiffened vith gusset plates, to the channels to prevent as required. flame propagation.

Field Pressed=steel frame anchored to vali A-36 steel angle frame Channel frame intermittent A 36 steel frame intermittent fillet installation vith 14 gauge adjustable jamb anchors continuously fillet welded to welded to the existing welded to existing embedded frame.

at 24 in O.C. existing embedded frame. embedded frame.

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CL l<<04> fL tL 195% fakir cl 145.4' INXXe CL lof D 4 <<1$ 1 SIILCC ~ <<fakir eh I Stair Ca Ca rltTof O SLATS Cl 195-d~ SL SLATS'L I<<t 0 5 SIAIOI 0'fIM re TIE . ~e~ 'h. SOU T I I AUX BAY AUX EIAY fekf ~ fl 125 1 MAIS Cl 205N5>> PLAN EL 575K) ~ Lkff CLILSHS ~ PI.AN EL 19IHO 2 raATF CL I $ 98& 20S.D'4 LEGEND REFERENCES GENERAL NOTES FIRE ZONE L E G EN D L SCALC, HOT To SCIIC ILDG L IAAIN51CAM TUNNEL S HR SIRC AATCD WALl CA fall% 'IARD WAICA L SIRC MCRCCTON FSG C4.2 SEA>>5 220 RCACTDR 2 fe<<t SIOS5 AAC RTCIII<<tD M Ala <<Adit TAAT RI5CA 900 CLCORCAL TIMNCL5CONTIOL FACCLHft TUNNELS 2 HA fl<<t AATCD WAlL DA flOOA TARD reAC FADICCTON ARRI>>DEMENT E S.TA OATH>>OS HO kll KIICIRAION5 TICKER<<ka kho MCCHkeatka IHROVGH Hoer RAIEO SITORS AAO e00 Det5CL Gte CRATON ILOGr SLDG 5c<<SCC SICSTL ORE aefeoUSC C4.4 SERIES CteaNOS WIIHI, Drl A<<0AM II INCRCOS, (WHIIC ~ <<xe FIRE AAICD wklL OR FLOOR I ~ ccAIcD ~ 5cc LEGEI<<4 fRkhro<<MC R TARO FIRC SAOTCCTOV Atk<<IDR SLDO Cdal SCIICS IeeC MHN 51AIX AIO SCATCNOVIC SIAUCTURCS ARE 900 400 IOAeeka SIHICHGCAA t DG fe<<E IOSC RECL SIRC A<<Oft<<ION 4/I<<INC dlDG Cd 2$ SCRICS ~ Ol 5HOWN ON leeC5t Daa>>eh 5 WalL5,flooe5 L ccLINGS weiHIN THC5t SiklclU<<c$ DO Ial'I RIXLCIC Attl FIRE FAOICCILH TANSIDRNCA TaAD C d-220 fIRC Rkle'l05 Ms@ Xvdhhle.os. Too ~ $0 lue <<eut daoo Stkflh*laL4loo AN AALICDaDGLCDNDCNSATC 510<<IOClahadaoo ~ ~<<IHR FNL rfw IDW FRCSTVRC CDS FIRC HOSC fl<<C SRIIICCICII HVCL IDAKSwkfER SIRE Hose Rtta Flat FACIECI<<ee 5CINCC SLDG ~ . foAM AD<<ca SIRC SNOIECTON $ <<rtCN>>CLL SVLDING C DOTA td ee SCSICS ~ FDA oeeteeaoe<<D locaTo>>5 Dr seat raeca5 scc tc ~ 10 5lreal $ >>aen>>GS r<<01ccloN ALL IDRLSS SIMAWCILLTIN NNLO KA Afo>>ateeCN15 Dr dli' 9 REV 2 I, 5 gkperiare Cm'8 F IRC MOIECION'RADWASIC 4 DC<<ON SLDGS Cd 51 LCAC5 ZONE SUFFIX LEGEND ~III Ak flat TONC MIMSCA daoo 5TRUCC e<<x<<AIL SHIIEHGCAR taraoro Cd<<2k.S.CDU axah>> 'hkifk SrerktSSONINOASIUATON ~ek efl fl<<C AREA IARARCA dado STR/Ct.eua SCRVCC FAIXr ~ 50VIH Cd SIT SLDG SCAVCC COIO 510<<AGC laeN SLOG C 4.11 AC La\5>> WATER SUSSRCSSONIA Iukleoh feht SU4 AREA Iaaedt<< Lax 5G eu'h Svkk<<CSSoNI SAN Get @tet Ac TuATcee DIDO SERVCC SIAIOST GAS I<<MT SULDSO Cd TTH ~~~ eS Hk ONSVAARESSONIC<<0$ 5 10hC ACIUAION 6 ALARM CHCCX VILVC Sloo 5CRVCt.NA SOLE<< SVLCReo C 4.1<<A DCLUGC teart SIAC SNOICCI<<H CCIIIACA daAtsiO Cd <<T SEATS aae5 CGSSURARCSSONI Seek>>F1 I CA IWION Xeaa CDS 5'Jar<<CSSONI C<<055 10NC JCfuAION Z ISOIAIION VALVE ClCCTRCAL CDNDVIT AIHANGCMCNTS C t . a 10 5C AC 5 SI AAINCA ra e4 Lt ICCTONOe<<T IND SUAARCSSONI 9IOVR fiat AAICD Cole>>0 IAIOMRCS leo)ae A~el IHgfh~kf LEGEND (COTTA) FIGURE 9A 3-2 3 P 9 e<<ere leaf Nail fe SIDVN IRTOIIRCS SeOUA AAICD ILIClelkl<<MSLAal 9 eat ~ II<<I'ATCD Cfear>> L Sloot DA + DC>>LION IO ICOARIMLNI5Cr SIR 1 9 I Alt 2 CCMka<<$ 10 ACOARTMCN15OS FIRE PROTECTION ARRANGEMENT Q< OlOLIRCL 9 HOUR rkito SCICIRAION 5Ckal OR Q<< ~ If 19a ACV 2 FIAT STCW T<<XROLRI ANXSO CMAC Irar NSCAS L ILDCA DICIMCS IICC I<<IIC 2) flat HfktCA MM<<CA STATION BUILDINGS. lef NO EDMR/IINatl!I roric<<~@ac PLAN EL 175'-0", 196'-0" & 198'-0" NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION NINE MILE POINT-UNIT 2 FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT AMENDMENT26 MAY 1986 L, / 'I W S 4 f P $ 4,J I h f H pg i ~t ~g ay&gz. TUNNEL, t FL CL tlA 4 Sd OVC I: ~a pit IZ I 5 Z p ~ ~azax> ttDRTH ~ LAIF cl ttr.d ! rL cL tls.d AUX BAY I I I IL Cl 2 5 rLAIF CL tlS 0 fL CL ttl 4' CL 2ICO , i)I.;i FL CL tldd rl CL ttr-6 FL Tl llr SL ttc-4 NS.O REACTOR REACTOR I BUILDING BUILDING TUNNEL Fl CL 22154 fL Cl, 210 0 6 FIAIF CL 22F.4 fl 216.6 CL rl cl 222' ~ CALI 5FACC fl CL ttl ~ ILA'IF CL ttr'4 NOVI SIACC CL IIS 6 rrCICCICASO 4 rl Cl IIL 4 FLA'll'lttC 0 flA1r CL ttt 0 FL CL 2IC SO rl SL 215 0 TK SOUTH AUX BAY 4'FL Cl 220'C C I l FLAIF cl ttddj ILAtr cl 2tc-d ' FAAIF Cl 227& APER'FURR IL CL22Cd 400f Cl tld 6 CARO IS Cl 210 0 FIAI 1 'IUNNEI, fl CL 21 ~ -4 fL CL tl6W IL CL 1IC 4 @ho k~~le 0> 210 PLAN EL 227LD 'Kpmhue Cara leOICS: L SCALC F01 %1 SCALCt. FOA 004415 IvOICS LCOCIO L ACfCFSICCS Os0 54.22A tffIA 214124 CONTROL BUll.DING Sh 5/ M57- 8 PLAN EL 2I4.D L 215 0 FIGURE 9A.3-3 FIRE PROTECTION ARRANGEMENT UNIT NO.2 STATION BUILDINGS PLAN EL 214'-0" & 215'-0" NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION NINE MILE POINT-UNIT 2 FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT AMENDMENT26 MP'E r, ~ A@1 ~t t4 S it>.'aq '%Cd sfj '~3 Pg 1 Ql (eP /jeer,'t,'r"" f'""' 0(sa a or~a ~S ti ~ ia) 1 ) fa Ca iacd L Cs lg I La ( \ Vrga ~ salf Cl S- ~s IL Ca A 1$ 0 C /.1 taffy'a 'il. Lt I I X< CL iatl6 I13RTH Il Cl taC 6>> ~ tlf d ~ I AVX BAY +41 I ~ isa'C I f IOt Or Tsssssoa Cl tl IQL ass lI ..iSodJ C I I Orwsl 111 Sf ~hBK>, I ~ Lair Ca itc 0 rs IT> EE2B I 2 tat ~ ta QTgg I --Qi CONC alto q CIQT3 I flair CL tsd. ~ Ii illI Tot Ll taaad IL cL tlf6 I C ill.C Isss as fl CL ttdd ~ Tas rsV tl I I I D)ER I 1 L MATC LINE (2 3) 0'>> I fL CL tao alr ca ttf.a a cl iao'o I l IIVICL 1$6 QY tatlr ~ QG tatlr a ttc. ~ Cl iad ttl avr n tla-ctfsti I CL tiC.lt MATCH UNE(E 8) tavr cl jaf C ILLTI Iliad 6 ~ tlrIfa 1SI RADWASTF BVILDO(G CNDS STORAGE TANK 8(ALBO(G ILCL tla'4 aoct Ca 2$ 6.C SCREENWELL BNLDING Lraasr Z~> CLISCd PLAtt BELCTW EL2(IT(f EL 2452 8 245'W EL 2SPO fl Cl islf 0'~ Lt)tt <<d 5 IV tatlr Ca 11C.O'CssOOOLC OILTtso fl CL jadd REACTOR ~ TATI cl 2st.d~ BVTLDING fa a iadd Tsoor Cl 1ST d'l tilt.d fakir a, ~1~ 0 TI tlf.d'attd CL faa tadd CEKRQ IILL I I- 0 0 trtv tssa asa ZPERmmUE i ~ra n it~sad Ig I CL a S 0 ra a. K5ZBi CARD SOVTH tavr ca iso'-d s s AVX BAY ra cl 2 Io TIOJIFI iMATCI( (IN('(II.9) TVNTIEL ~ a ~L ias'0'r Is I~ r rr A~~re 0, g ~ saa ~pmhare Card rl Cital lf tttld~ s 1 aa $ it0 lot Or Iasstsca ca jlccf tasstr cL 2$ 1 S flair CL jtTSTf ~ LVI Cl 2$ MATCH LINET(C-5) 0.4'l VSTCS'. Ictavssos lo Scale CH5ZI (K%3 2. Ioaoc'sltsa let la Iiscsoatcsttlscls ossro cotta NORMAL SWI TCHGEAR 8(R3XNG Cl 217& EL 237-(S ISod 321NW ~A <CL 2TO 0 C Tso 1(IA((t(>> a~ GZKInt-t I tstlatssa I II sita TVNNEL MATCH LINE(A8) aa Wtatlr nf cr fLCL tll.d tc ~CL jad 0 CL jlf isc 0'a cr a, 1I Car CONTROL tl fa Ca f41 BVIL(XI23 d5/4885/" 0 ~ ~AL FlGURE 9A.3-4 FIRE PROTECTION ARRANGEMENT PART PLAN EL 2SD'-(S UNIT NO.2 STATION BUILDINGS PLAN EL 237'-0" 8 240'-0" NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION NlNE MILE POlNT-UNlT 2 FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT AMENDMENT26 MAY 1.'0 <<4 > ") fy rJ f' 4-~g ~ g Qt "p keg e. DIESEL ENGINE Flkf PLJM)4 )04 WATER 1REATMENT d <M&irD STORAGE TANK BLDG I 14A)cH LINE II xg 104 fr IELLL Car)P ~A'UX ' aa )a)I a~ SOBER BLDG CKKD-tf444 rN.I)l/ ~f~fff )4144 N S a.~) I ~ ) wl yf e kr(4 Il ta)4'Iwaa EIK!l a )SC-ISS (66j Q7) 32 i 51 (u 272 0 ':'5. .-<P r ~42ECO AN tlf-0'AOWASTE BLDG PART PLAN EL 4 / ~KA20 P ~6~ frfr Na I)S QQQ ra ca )0)'~'@ f dr fr wILLW 421f If Sfr ffr 8 0-- Lta tl" ~ 441114/f gi 8 I Ih I ~ ~I Caw) EL)lcl I 4 Iaaf ~ El )II 0 12 ~~34 Fl C ~ Lj RTGENFRADON DEMIIERALIZER d~ I / 4 ~ ~ "-'.rr LIIh: CONDENSATE STORAGE O'G I ~ ARIEA 44M tad. If ~34 3N~ Qd ~ 414 Q ~$ Ti)~II ~ C E Qr 4 OFFGAS AREA PARt I" At)S CONTROL BUILDING EL 274.0 txESEL GENEL'JOR BLDG SQ Q c C EL 25tf0 d EL25)10 4I,I wwag ?~ . tattdai Ql I "r/7 i")r a Ca T)4 0 I Nwll 0'93ZI ~I~OECCCITAMINATIONAREA ra Ca Hl'4Y CHLL WATER 51RUC'lURE I I HEATER BAYS fl ~L )ldd Ia tldl K .I ~ STANDBY GAS 1REATMENT BLDG QE-- c NORTH ANC BAY ,'g cf "8~E I Ofa 0 I\ 2aw 4 PRY Qo-- I I' rL E ra ca )SCVC ~ I .I )SSO) I /'/ r ovtfld QZHD Cl 2))40j Lw scclcnaa 0004 : ii'gs FOAM PUMP RM ca IIC) j Ia)IC d tfM Hall)+,10 Ikta taad Qy ~ fw I04 tr wall /fw IL tff d I Ifa cl taft~ JC I ~ 0 2'dw lI IL 0 Aha Ava8able on I~ X ~ L4)s ca 2)dtf 0'E)CTOR Aperture CarR IsER.scE BUILDING BLDG 104 Cl tr 444L tfd.cr ~roof CL 211 ~24 nwfwa100 0) Itb7 N)IES I II SOLLC WOI 10 ICLLC /rr/4 ~ Iw IIw I 404 olfcara lofti Ltotfcl 4 avslocts t 1 I ONO E00)4 lOOI'L t)CO I 244 INI 21 ItfMNLUO ~ SOUTH AUI( BAY WOd sV-ia I~sT \ SERVCE'ATER VALVE Pit rw SWIT% EAR MAnn FI.GURE 9A.3-5 YARD 1RAN SFORME R BLDG fa utaf4f AUx SERL)CE BLDG fa Ca )SOOf )~or CL lfd ~ COI ~ Ca AREA FIRE PROTECTION ARRANGEMENT 0'ONTRCL BLDG MATCH UN'B I) 4 awf Ia ta tlf UNIT NO.2 STATION BUILDINGS 0'iy RZLD PLAN EL 250'0 d 26150 EZKI PLAN EL 250'-0", 261'-0" BL 274'-0" NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION NINE MILE POINT-UNIT 2 FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT . AMENDMENT26 MAY 198 / IB I~ r,g ~E ~ A~wl eg 'I ~ g A II Clg V ~ e J l M tN tQ

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39 I,, 8 65 ~ 5 GNI Btu r. 10,000 12, OC:. 12,00'. iotal (th O'. Sr r 5 > r91 L,G, ~59 l'. 2 Btu 1 Pire Load ihtt, f' Jr ... 1.1..': =:.e 8 Oli pci L- Emit TABLE gt.3-1 Eztlm==.' 2 FSAl (Cc:nt} n J.rl-, FSA 34 271 SN El 328' 10',075 Northuest generrl Spent filters fuel pool Eot G Cabie tra:s ILSuc. c 10,0(0 501 ',779 3 azet Insul. 10, 393 12,000 I'. I IIILL Smoke Cable tray Division I cahir Bise ego='p Insul. 15 12,0QO 124, 7.'1 6 detection vates spray trave 180 9A.3-6 FSA 34 ,396 273 Sg El 328' 10" 2, 776 Division I cable Noztheast geliezal trays .". G r to Insul. 3 10, 0'32 -30 28,GZ= 21 oke area able t.ray J 1 6,43c 12, 7 I, \1: S C>>.. Bise eguir Ir.r': 48 0'f'2, 0(t 3 576 uetectior. eater 3-8 PS! 34 (liorth of NZ Ei 3531 s;4"'1 0-180o line) 1011 20,992 None 77.790 I '. (Sou+h ofline'81 ot-- 10, 000 0-180o Smoke detection iS'5 213 El 175'ou' 5,930 ljc Notors Insul. genera are Bise eguip 10,0' 90 Sroh: St'05 Insul. 1 oCCQ If 6110 8 ! 9!. 3-2 ea'c c- Lioz F!. 4 N El 1 l5' "" 650 HOGS pu 2, Flpcs roon Inst 73'r C.': 10, OCO -'- ~ 13, 188 S. Oke 19 OCO d'etection 9A 3-2 3'S! 35 196'-"'Gr 213 SE El generr'1 ati'. h 6, 125 Division CL >>1 '. cco3 II lr rotozs Cable tr '. I>>su'liSLtl. 30, 87200 20 3 3 IV,ri6c 200 ti,6c-60,517 45 mir Smoke detectio Cahic v ttz 35 223 SV El clg -Or South 6,775 Spei I general area Insul. 7,1 Divisi ttav. n= . \ Cab3e tray= Insul. Pibe-44, 355 773 12,0 1'1 152)r 13 c ci. I 81,986 1 h" Smoke detect ton Cah =. vate= sp tr=.. Dnit. Gc Insu: 3 BC 5 w -'. OCCke(>> ~~ (: N((0(>> ~,~O ~+~o' 0()te I ~ 9( Nf Sac((E)sn(h fc RE(lUQT RY 0()CKEf ALE Nine Nile Point Vnit 2 PSAR TABLE 9A. 3-1 (Cont) Figure Pire Area (PA) or Safety- Fire No Fire Suh A~rea FS~AR Pire Zone Related Pire Hazard Pire Barrier ~uant~it Number Name Area ~ft v) Equipment in Azeaee> Combus-tible Lb Oal r tit It Total Btu I Loading QB~tu ftzQ Required +hr~minL Detection t Extinguishing ~Sste m 9A. 3- 4 PSA 35 238 SR El 240'-0" South 6r 071 Rpdrogen recomhiner Risc equip Insul 67 12,000 804 89,594 1 1 hr Snoke 6 heat Cable tzay general area train Cable traps Insul. 45,257 12, 000 543,084 detection vater spray Division traps E II cable Botors Insul. 4 1(l, 000 543,928 40 Vnit coolers 9A 3-5 FSA 35 245 SN El 261 -0" South ~ 6, 593 Contzol rod drive Hydro fluid oil 1, 140 120 7r700 8,778 74, 128 56 mi.n Smoke 6 heat Cable tray detection vater spray I ee general area hpraulic units Risc equip Insul 453 12,000 5,436 Division II cable Cable trays Insul, 38,895 12 F 000 466,740 traps Rotor control Fiber 429 18,000 7r722 Vnit cooler center Rotors Insul. 10,000 50 488,726 9A.3-6 FSA 35 255 SR El 289'-0" South 7,322 Spent fuel pool Rotors Insul. 81 10,000 810 40,457 30 min Smoke 6 heat Cable tray lee general area circulating pumps Disc equip Insul. 370 :12,000 4,440 detection vater spray Division II Cable trays Insul 24 '48 12,000 29~0976 cable trays 296,226 9A. 3-6 PA 81 253 IL El 289'-0" South 440 None Bise equip Insul. 330 12,000 3,960 74,318 56 min Smoke Total flooding 600-V svitchge'ar cable trays Insul,. 2, 395 12,000 ~28 740 detection Carbon diozide room 32,700 9A 3-7 FSA 35 262 SR El 306'-6" South 5,977 Reactor vater cleanup Cable trays Insul. 25,658 12,000 307,896 52,006 39 min Smoke Cable tray l ee general area heat exchanger Risc equip Insul. 212 12,000 2,544 detection vater spray hotors In su 1. 40 12,000 400 310,840 9 A. 3-8 PA 86 274 SM El 328 ~ 10m 192 None Resin Resin 450 18,000 8, 100 42, 188 32-min Smoke Resin storage area detection 9A.3-8 FSA 35 272 SR El 328'- 10" 3r075 Spent fuel pool Rotors Insul. 31 10,000 310 28 min Smoke Cable tray ee Southvest general coolzng demxner Cable trays Insul. 9, 518 12,000 114,216 detection vater spray l area including alizer Bise equip Insul. 72 12,000 864 transient storage Charcoal filter charcoal 510 14,100 ~719 1 area 115,390 Amendment 26 3 of 4 Bay 1986 0efEBI ep COB(ral e)e M6 0 5 /9 e oo ~ 08IB&sF4-.~of 0ec((memh RENIIAT(NY0IOIEI FILE '()'4D Bloc ops jp JTI ZRTQgg ,CARD Nine Nile ooint Unit 2 PSAR TABLE 9A. 3-1 (Cont) Sa'fety- Pire Pigure Fire Area (FA) or Related Pire Hazard Pire Barrier No. Fire Sub Area (PSAI Pire Zone Combus- ~uanti~t Total Btu Loading Required Detection Extinguishing Number Name Area Equipment in Area<<> Name tible Lb Gal BtugLb ~thousa~nds Q~Btu ~ftz ~hr~minQ n System 9A 3-8 PSA 35 274 SN El 328' 10" 2,776 Division II cable trays Cable trays Notors Insul. Insul. 9,451 12,000 10,000 113, 412 50 41,210 31 min Smoke detection Cable tray mater spray Southeast general 5 area Risc equip Insul. 78 12,000 936 114,398 9A,3-7 FSA 34 261 SN El 306'-6" 3,645 North general No combustible Smoke and Cable tray area heat rater spray detection Amendment 26 of 4 Nay 1986 g4 05(fours gz ~xav vag CAgg Nine Rile Point Unit 2 PSAR TABLE 9A-.3-2 ~milan REACTOR BUILDING (AUIILIARI BATS) Pigure No, Fire Area (EA) or Fire Sub Area rPSA) Number Name Fire Zone Area Safety-Related Eguipment in Area<zZ Name Combus-tible Pire Razard Lb 'al ~uantit~ Mtu/Lb Total Btu /thousands Pire Loading LB~tu ft~z Fire Barrier Requireu ~hr Detection Extinguishing Svstem 9A 3-2 FA 1 201 SR El 175'-0" north 1,290 None Rotors Insul. 10,000- 10 8 lze Reactor plant component cooling heat exchange room 9A. 3-2 201 SN El 175 -0" north ~ 864 LPCS Bo'tora Insul. 85 10,000 850 24,326 18 min Smoke Cable tray lzz Lou-pressure Division I Oil Oil 212 28 19,000 4,028 detection mater sprav core spray room cable trays Cable trays Insul. 1,345 12,000 ~16 1 40 Unit cooler 21,018 9A 3-2 FA 1 202 SN Residual heat 720 Unit coolers Rotors . Insul 73 10,000 730 29,528 22 min Smoke Cable tray (zz removal pump A Residual heat Oil Oil 106 14 19,000 2, 014 detection eater spray removal pump A Cable trays Insul. 1543 12,000 18 516 Division I 21,260 cable trays 9A-3-2 203 SW Residual heat 1,068 Residual heat tibless trays Cable Insul. 831 12,000 9,972 9, 346 7 min Smoke Cable tray removal heat removal heat Rotors Insul. 1 -. 10, 000 10 detection vater spray lzz'A. exchanger A exchanger A 9, 982 3-2 211 SR El 198'-0" north 4,065 Unit cooler cable trays Insul. 4230 12,000 50,760 12,490 10 min Smoke Cable tray l ze Division I Rotors Insul. 1 10,000 10 detection vater spray cable trays 50,770 Smoke 9A 3-3 FA 1 221 SM El 215'-0" north 1, 250 None No combus-detection Access area A 3-3 221 El 215'-0" north 1,980 Division I Cable trays Insul 17,226 12,000 206 712 104,400 1.3 hr Smoke Cable tray 9A PA SR 1 Access area B cable trays detection mater spray 9A. 3-3 PA 1 221 SN El 215'-0" north 835 No combus- ) zz Access area C tiblBs // 4'f f)ocl(of zn Control RE(;ULAT u@a > r ffooNIB(r(o f DÃKG fili + cz~ Amendment 26 of 3 Nay 1 986 3405i4OOrDq GATI rt)JA ERYUQIz CARD Nine Bile uoint Unit 2 PSAR ~ ABLE 9A. 3-2 (Cont) Figure Fire Area (PA) or Safety- Fire No Fire Sub Area (FSA1 Pxre Zone Related Pire Hazard 1'ire Barrier Area Equipment Combus- Quan~tit Btu/Lb Total Btu Loading Required Detection Extinguishing Number Name fftQv in Area<e> Name tible Lb Gal ~thousan~ds gBt~uft+z +hrzrmln) Svste" Svstem 9A 3-4 231 SR El 240 '0v Hater control north 3,626 Emergency svitchgear Risc. Equip. Insul 1, 185 12,000 14, 220 122,678 1 5 hr Smoke Cable tzay Notor lnsul. 2 10,000 20 detection mater spray center Division 1 Notor control cable trays center Piber 1, 167 18r000 21. 006 Unit coolers Cable trays Insul. 34,132 12,000 ~409 584 444,830 9A 3-4 PA 231 El 240 -Qu north 748 No combustibles Smoke r~lr ~ 1 SW Access area detection 9 A. 3-2 FA 3 206 SN El 175'-0" 950 RHS heat Cable trays Insul 99Q 12,000 11, 880 32r 516 10 min Smoke Cable tray ze Residual heat exchanger B Hotozs Insul. 1 12,000 10 detection vater spray f removal heat Division Iy. 11,890 exchanger room B cable trays 9A-3-2 207 SR 175r Qu 960 Unit coolers . Notoz Insul. 77 10,000 770 27, 125 21 min Smoke Cable tray Residual heat Resxdual heat Lube Oil Oil 106 19,000 2,014 detection vater spray removal pump removal pump B Cable trays Insul. 1,938 12, 000 ~23 256 room B Division II 26,040 cable trays 9 A- 3-2 PA 3 208 SW El 175'-0" 1,698 Unit coolers 11 et or. Insul. 74 10,000 740 12,802 7 ml.n Smoke Cable tzay ze Residual heat Residual heat Lube oil Oil 106 14 19,000 2,014 detection vater. spray f removal pump removal pump C Cable trays Insul. 12,000 ~18 984 zoom C Division II 1, 582 21,738 cable trays 9A 3-2 PA 3 214 SR El 198' 0" 3,552 Division II Cable trays Insul. 4,229 12,000 50,748 14,331 11 min Smoke Cable tray c ble trays "otors Insul. 1 10, 000 10 detection vater- spray Unit cooler Risc. Equip Insul. 12 12 000 144 50,902 9A 3-3 224 SR El 215'-0" 896 None No combustxbles Smoke Access area A detectiou Doc)(ot>> <zz-~r~ COO(IOI>> oe ~ n Ay'Z7 Amendment 26 2 of 3 Nay 1986 DO(O 9~ OfpOOONO(tt), +Ntltt 9 DDNaT Rg 3b C 5l(zJ-QQ57 ]C) TI APERTURE( ego Nine bile Point Unit 2 psAR TABLE 9A. 3-2 (Cont) Pire Area (PA) or Safety- Pire Fife Suh Area (PSA) Pire Zone Related Pire Barrier Area Equipment Pire Hazard Required Detection Extinguishing ~uanti~t Btu/Lh Total Btu Loading Number Name ~ft z in Area< la Name Combus-tible - Lb Gal 5n~d ~Btu ft~a +hrgmin) . System 218,016 100,191 1.3 hr Smoke Cable tray )te 224 Sg El 245 ~ Dv 2, 176 Division II Cable trays Insul 18< 168 12,000 detection vater spray Access area B cable traps 10,000 50 72, 525 55 min Smoke Cable tray ( tr, FA 3 239 SR El 240 -0>> ~ 4,059 Unit coolers Botor Insul. 5 64r 170 detectxon vater spray hotor control Emergency Motor control ctr Fiber 3, 565 18,000 12,000 196, 032 centers svitchgear Cable traps Insul. 16,336 Division II B isc Eguip. Insul. 2, 844 12,000 3~4128 294,380-cable traps e Amendment 26 3 of 3 Nay 1986 OBCket 61 CoD((8) ~ <~9 8')ate "< ()fS()eeaWh 94 05(foe g7 g y TI APER TUIN CARD 0 Nine Nile ooint Unit 2 FSAR TABLE 9A.3-3 STANDBI GAS TREATNENT BUILDING Fire Figure Pire Are= (FA) or Safety- Fare Hazard 1'ire Barrier No Pire = - Area /PSALM Pire Zone Related Combus- ~uantity Total Btu- Loading ft~z Required Detection Ertinguishing Area Equipment in Areazei. Name tible lb Gal Btu/Lb ~thousandsg Q~Btu +hr/mint Svstem Number Name 9A.3-6 251 El 286'-0" 5,560 None Rotors Insul. 72 10,000 720 10,463 8 min Smoke Dry pipe j PA 85 NW . HVAC equipment Cable tzays Insul. 4,716 12, 000 56,592 detection system room Risc equip. Insul.. 72 12,000 864 58, 176-9A.3 5 FA 73 247 NZ El 261' 0" 792 SGTS train A N 0'to zs Insul,. 5 10, 000 50 22r495 17 min Smoke Rater spray Standby gas Chazcoal Charcoal 1,260 14, 100 ~17 766 detection for charcoal treatment room A filter - 17,816 filters 9A.3-5 FA 74 248 NZ El 261 ~ -0" 961 SGTS train 8 Rotors Insul. 5 10,000 50 18,539 14 min Smoke Rater spray Standby gas Charcoal Charcoal 1, 260 14, 100 ~17 766 detection for charcoal ze treatment room -B filters 17,816 filters 9A 3 5 FA 4 242 NR El 261! Orr 2, 125 None -11 o t or s Ir. sul. 10,000 10 Negligible Smoke Dry pipe ze Reactoz building detection system J railroad access area Amendment 26 1 of 1 Nay 1986 DDCttetk ~c'- Vzo CNRtrolNi-"6 cz s>e~zD s 7 DatR ~ Bf DRCReetttt REt'zDlA Y DOCKKI ftt.E g~ogppoa57- zi TI APERTURE Nine Mile Point Unit 2 PSAP TABLE 9A.3 Pigure Fire Area (FA) or Safety- CONTROL BUILDING No Fire Sal Area QPSAj Pire Zone Pelated Area Equipment Pire Number Name in Area<'I Fire Hazard Fire Barrier Combus- Total Btu Loading Required Detection Extin gui shing El 214 -0<< ~ Name tible Lb Btue<Lb ~thousands) g B~tu ft~z ghrgmin) Svstem System 9A 3 3 FA 18 309 NN Cable chase east 920 Division II Cable trays Insul. 9,783 12,000 117,396 127,607 1.6 hr Smoke C able tra y ize cable trays detection vater spray 9A 3 3 PA 17 305 NN Cable chase vest 1 '02 None Cable trays Insul. 10,489 12,000 125,870 104,717 1-3 hr Smoke Cable tray ) ze detection vater sprap and ceiling sprinkler 9A 3 3 FA 16 306 NN General area 1,678 Division I Bise Equip Insu1.. 296 12,000 3,552 49,423 37 min Smoke Cable tray ze (closed trays) Cable traps Insul. 6,615 12,000 ~79 3 80 detection vater'spray ) cable traps 82,932 9-A. 3-3 FA 39 307 NZ 2u/48-V Batterp 100 None Batteries Stprene 105 18,000 1,890 33,540 25 min Smoke ze room vest Cable traps Insul. 122 12r 000 ~1464 detection J 3r354 -9A-3-3 PA 40 308 NZ 24/48-V Battery 100 None Batteries Styrene 105 18,000 1,890 33, 540 25 min Smoke ze room east Cable traps Insul. 122 12,000 ~146 4 detection f 3,354 9A 3-3 FA 38 311 NZ Computer battery 1,040 None Batteries Stprene 1,900 18,000 34,200 44,735 34 4<iIi Smoke i=e .room Cable traps Insul. 1,027 12,000 12~324 detection 46,524 9A.3-3 FA 16 312 NZ Division II cable 1,914 Division II Cable traps Insul. 1,600 12,000 19, 200 1'1, 661 9 min Smoke area cable trays Risc Equip Insul. 260 12,000 ~31 20 22,320 Amendment 26 1 of 6 Nay 1966 ()Drk8(<N so -I'ro Con'(0) 4< (ate S 9 p(()<<00m'K(zUULT Y U()CKV r(LE 8&05~P Qc 57 g~ TI APERTtJRE CARD Nine Nile Point Unit 2 FSAB TABLE 9A 3-4 (Cont) Pire Fire Area (FA) or Pire Hazard Pire Barrier Pigure Extinguishing No, Pire Sub Area (PSA') Fire Zone Area Belated Equipment Combus-tible ~uantit~ lb Gal Btufl.b Total Btus d~hd Loading ~Btu ft~a Bequired Qhr Qm~in Detection ~sste m Number Name 237'nd'2QQ'afety- in Area<1> Name El 20,456 12r 000 245, 472 148,861 1 9 hr Cable tray 9A. 3-4 321 ZI 237'-0" 1,649 Division I Cable trays detection hr'moke vater sprap 8 PA 16 NN ceiling sprinklers Cable chase vest cable trays trays'nsul. 235,200 2 9 Smoke Cable tray 235,200 3-4 324 Zl 237'-0" 1,000 Division II Cable Insul. 19,600 12,000 detection vater spray 8 re 9A FA 18 NN Cable chase east cable trays ceiling sprinklers 79 r 380 104, 173 1.3 hr Smoke Cable tray 12d 000 9A.3-4 325 NN 244d Ov 762 Division I Cable trays Insul. 6,615 .detection vater spray Division I cable FA 22 cable trays routing area 18,920 119,897 1-5 hr Smoke Cable tray ee Division I Insul. 12,000 l 322 El 237 ~ Or> 3,494 Cable trays 34,9 10 4 detection mater spray 3-4 FA 17 NN 9A Division I cable cable trays routing area Unit cooler Svitchgear lee Fl 244d-0v 798 Division II Cable trays Insul. 6,601 12,000 79,212 99,263 1.3 hr Smoke Cable tray 9A.3-4 PA 23 326 NN Division II cable cable traps detection vater spray routing area 9A.3-4 323 NN Zl 237'-0" 3, 864 Division II Cable trays Insul 39,740 12,000 476,880 123 416 1 6 hr Smoke Cable tray l ee FA 19 Division II cable - cable trays detection vater sprap routing area Unit cooler l re 327 El 244d Odd 1, 178 HPCS cable Cable traps Insul. 10d371 12,000 124,452 105 ~ 647 1-3 hr'moke detection Cable tray vater spray l ee 9A. 3-4 FA 21 NN trays HPCS cable routing area Amendmsnt 26 2 of 6 Nay 1986 DOCRet-eo Control Nr Date Of t)m(nr)neeL ((C(eUU(TMY WCKEl Fly @&5/Y'QQ57 gg APERTURE Nine Nile Point Unit 2 FSAR TABLE 9A.3-4 (Cont) Pire f Pigure Fire Area (FA) or Safety- Fire Hazard Pire Barrier No Fire Sub Area (FSA) Fire Zone Related Combas- ouant~it -- Btu/Lb Total Btus Loading Required Detection Ex inguishing Area Equipment tible Lb Gal. thousands $ ~8tu ft~a ~hr m in} Svstem Svctem Number Name gft+z in Area<1> 8 aBe f le. El 261"-0" tray le Cable traps Insul. 53,005 12,000 636,060 175r 264 2 2 hr Smoke Ca.ble 3-5 3 31 N'N Corrldoz 3,646 None 12,000 ~2 952 detection va ter s pr ay 9A FA 17 Nl.sc egal.p Insul. 246 639,012 500,335 6 3 hr snoke Cable tray )ze Insul. 12,000 566,880 PA 16 332 NN Cable chase vest 1,133 Division I Cable trays 47r240 detection vater spray 9A 3 5 cable trays 467,316 413,221 5.2 hr Smoke Cable. tray jze 9A.3-5 337 NN Cable chase east 1,133 Division II Cable trays Insul. Insul. 38 943 72 12,000 12,000 864 detection vater spray PA 18 cable trays -Risc equip I 468, 180 Insul. 523 12, 000 102, 276 97,861 1.2 hz Smoke Total flooding fee Dlvlslon I Division I Risc eauip 8 detection Col 9A 3 5 - FA 17 333 IL 2r 440 cable trays Rotor control standby svitch- centers Piber. 1,769 18,000 31, 842 )ze gear. room Division I eI Insul 8,722 12,000 ~104 664 standby Cable traps 238,782 svitchgear 12,000 102,348 112,715 1.4 hr Smoke Total flooding 9 A. 3-5 336 XL Division II 2, 470 Division II Risc equip Insul. 8,529 detection Ccz FA 19 standby svitch- cable trays Rotor control 31, 842 )ze gear room Division II centers Fiber. Insul. 1,769 12,018 18,000 12,000 a 144 21 6 standby Cable trays 278,408 svitchgear . 18,00O 18 ~ 360 49,368 37 ml n Smoke 334 Division I 500 Division I B at ter ies Styrene 1, 020 12,000 ~63 24 aetection 9A. 3-5 PA 17 NZ battery zoom batteries Cable trays Insul. 527 24r684 46 min Smoke ze 1,020- 18,000 18,360 61,710 ) 9A. 3-5 FA 19 335 NZ Division II 400 Division II Batteries Cable trays Styrene Insul 12,000 6 C 324 detection batterp room batteries 24,684 39 min Smoke )ze Insul. 648 12,000 7,776 51,840 Remote shutdovn 150 'Remote shutdovn Bise equip detection 9 A. 3-5 PA 44 343 NZ room "Av panel ze Insul. 480 12 000 5 760 38,400 29 min Smoke I Remote shutdovn 150 Remote shutdovn Nl.sc egulp detection 9A.3-5 FA 43 338 NZ room "8" panel 18,000 3r654 32,625. 25 min Smoke 9A.3-5 PA 75. 339 NZ Division III 112 Division II Batteries Styrene 203 detect lon 000)}et e)e (HPCS) battery batteries ()00ty0l 4 room Ilrtr llemeem el eeeesma errmrrm Amendment 26 3 Tl AP Enny .CARO ~LL ))NN)(et~- CUII)PN( NI ON'8 mvz~uzmzLm mmzttvL Neer~ Nine Mile Point Unit 2 PSAR TABLE 9A 3-4 (Cont) Pigure lio Fire Area (FA) or Pire Sub Area IPSA'I Number 342 XL Name Pire Zone Division III Area Qf t+z 908 Safety- -Related Equipment .in Area< >> Division III Name Misc eguz.p t tible Insul. - ~t Pire Hazard Lb 680 Gal Btu/Lb 12,000 Total Btus ~thousa~nds 8, 160 Pire Loading ~Btu ft+z 12t473 16 Fire 84111er Reuuired ~hr min) min Detection Smoke detection Extinguishing Total flooding ) ze 9A.3z5 FA 21 Motor control COz (HPCS) standby cable trays svitchgear room Division III centers Fiber. 150 18,000 2,700 standby 8,628 svitchgear Cable trays Insul. 719 12,000 Transformer Motors Insul. 1 10,000 10 19,498 308 min Smoke zz 22 340 NZ Division I 746 Division I Motors Insul. 23 10,000 230 1 detection ) 9A. 3=5 FIL whiller room HVILC equipment 9A.3-5 FA 23 341 NZ Division II 560 Division II Motors Insul. 22 10, 000 220 393 1 min Smoke detect io n )ze chiller room HVAC equipment El 274'-0" 9A.3-5 PA 17 334 NZ Division ventilation I room LI60 Division HVAC I equipment Motozs Insul. 10, 000 30 65 Smoke detection f zz 9A. 3-5 PA 19 335 NZ Division II room 460 Division II , Motors Insul. 10, 000 30 65 Smoke detection / zz ventilation HVAC eguipment 343 Remote shutdovn 192 Division I Motors Insul 10, 000 10 52 Smoke 9A 3 5 PA 44 NZ ventilation-room A HVAC equipment detection 9A.3-5 PA 43 338 NZ Bemote shutdovn ventihmtion room 8 192 Division HVAC II equipment Motors Insul 10,000 10 52 Smoke detection 9A 3 5 FA 21 342 XL High pressure 200 Unit cooler Motors Insul. 10,000 10 50 Smoke core spray detection ventilation room Amendment 26 4 of 6 May 1986 )ILe I'-) 5 (96057 TI Earvm CARD ()Ocke( 4 COnt(ol f)6 df Vrdevree 6666 lelezf Veeen Fez Nine Nile Etoint Unit 2 PSAR TABLE 9A 3-4 (Cont) 'b~* Pire Figure Fire Area (PA) or Safety- Fire Barrier Nc Fire Sub~Area PS A) Number Name Pire Zone Area ~ftz Belated Equipment in Area<1> Name C t tible PiXe Hazard Gal Btu/Lb ~td Total. Btus ..Loading E~tft* ~t Required Detection Extxnguxshxng El 288'-6" ze Insul. 51 12,000 612 440 1 min Smoke 9A.3-6 72 351 NZ Corridor 1,392 None Misc equip detection PA Sprinkler system ze Insul. 12r 000 292,452 319,213 4.0 hr Smoke 9 A- 3-6 FA 16 352 'NN Cable chase vest 920 Division I cable trays Insul. 24,371 102 12,000 ~1224 detection 6 cable tzay cable trays Misc equip vater spray 293, 676 2-2 hr Sprinkler system ze Division II '179,026 Insul. 12,000 163, 480 Smoke ) 91.3-6 .359 Cable chase east 920 cable trays 13, 623 detection 6 cable tray FA 18 NN cable trays Misc equip Insul. 102 12r000 ~1224 vater spray 164, 704 Insul. 883 12,000 10,596 8, 027 6 min Smoke Total flooding ( ze Computer zoom 1,320 None Misc equip detectxon Halon 9A. 3-6 Fll 24 358 XG 357 XG ize 9 A. 3-6 PA 24 356 355 NZ NZ Pover generation control complex 5,204 PGCC panels Misc eguip Insul. 4,070 12,000 48,840 9, 385 7 ml.fl 'moke detection Total flooaing Halos in floor ) ze 354 SG (PGCC) relay room 6 heat modulea and 353 SG detectors raised floor 362 SG section Mater spray ze Division I HVAC 2,451 Division I Motors In sul. 20 10,000 200 11,472- 9 min Smoke ) 9A. 3-4 FA 25 360 NZ Charcoal detection for tvo charcoal room HVAC equipment filters Charcoal 1 ~ 980 14 ~ 100 276 9 18 filters 28, 118 Smoke )ze 9A.3-6 351 NZ Instrument shop 1,247 Nore No combus-PA 72 tibles uetection El 306 E On min Snake i ze Corridor 1,403 None Misc eguip Insul. 36 12,000 432 308 1 9A.3-7 PA 76 380 NZ detectxon Amendment 26 5 of 6 Nay 1986 ')7(p 0 5i y'oa5( 'EI UBZ Ooeknt 4 mee~ Control d) IKGuLATNY NNV eeceeecm Fax Nine Nile Point Dnit 2 PSAR TABLE 9A 3-4 (Cont) Pigure Pire Area (PA) or Safety- Pire No. Fire Sub A~rea ~PSA Pire Zone Related Pire Hazard Pire Barrier Area Eouipment Btu/Lb Total Btus Loading Required Detection Ertinguishing I Number Name gf t~v in Area<1> Name C C tible - Lb Gal C~f Qhrccnin) Svstem Svstem .,9A.3-7 FA 16 371 NN Cable chase vest 920 Division I Cable trays Insul 19, 570 12,000 234,840 261,130 3.3 hr Smoke Sprrnkler system l le cable traps Bise equip Insul. 450 12,000 ~5400 detection 8 cable trap 240, 240 mater spray FA 18 377 NN Cable chase east 540 Division II cable trays Cable trays Hlsc equip Insul. Insul. 9,414 360 12,000 12, 000 112, 970 320 21 7 ~ 203 2.7 hr Smoke detection Sprinkler system 8 cable tray l le 117, 290 mater sprap 373 Control room 6,365 -FGCC panels Bise equip Insul. 4,951 12,000 59,412 9, 334 7 min Smoke Total flooding lee 9A.3-7 FA 26 NZ detection Salon in floor 372 NZ heat. modules and 8 374 SG detectors raised floor 375 SG sections 376 XG 381 SG 9A.3-7 FA 27 378 NZ Division II HVAC 2,396 Division II equipdent Hotors Charcoal Insul. Charcoal 17 1,980 10,000 14, 100 170 11,723 9 min Smoke detection Rater spray for charcoal lee roon HVAC ~27 9 18 filter 28,088 filters le / 1 e 9A37PA 76 380 NZ Instrument shop 1,388 None No combus-tibles Smoke detection le 9A37FA26 373 NZ Supervisor 487 None No combus-tibles smoke detection l office, training room, toilet, and kitchen Amendment 26 6 of 6 Hay 1986 ))oo)<ot 4 Controls edmedde e eeunev Nine Nile Point unit 2 FSAR TABLE'A 3-5 ELECTRICAL TVNNELS Fiaure Pire Area (FA) or Safety- P'e Na Pire Suh Area <FSA\ Pire Zone Related Pire Hazard Pire Barrier Area Equipment Combus- Ouan~tit Btn/Ib Total Btu Loading Required Detection Extinguishing Number Name in Area<e> ti-bl e lh Gal nddd* fB~tu ft~z ghrgmin) Svstem 9A.3-3 FA 8 301 NN Tunnel 140 deg 6,386 Divxsxon cables I Cable trays Insul 100, 325 12 000 1 203 900 188,521 2.4 hr Smoke cable tray l ee detection vater spray PA 18 304 NR Tunnel 230 deg 2, 360 Division cables II cable trays Insul 43,609 12,000 523,308 221,740 2e8 hr Smoke Cable tray l ee detection vater spray 9A.3-3 PA 10 303 NN Tunnel 315 deg 969 None Cable trays Insul 9, 859 12,000 118,308 122,093 1.5 hr Smoke Cable tray l ee detection vater spray 9A.3-3 FA 7 302 NV Tunnel 35 deg 4,273 cable trays Insul. 46,950 1.7 hr None 12,000. 563d400 131,851 smoke Cable tray f ze detection vater spray CI I 9A.3 FA 48 236 NZ El 237 '0" Division I-1, 124 HVAC for electrical d Sotars Insul. 10,000 20 12 Negligible Smoke l ee HVAC room tunnels detection I 9A 3 4 PA 237 NZ El 237'-0" 957 HVAC for Haters Insul. 10, 000 10 Negligible Snake lee Division II electrical detection HVAC room tunnels Amendment 26 Nay 1986 mv~ OUU((et% CUB(tOI 4 erre4rme RE(alklNYNNEraE Nine Nile ooint Unit 2 PSAM TABLE 9A.3-6 TURBINE BUILDING Figure Pire Area (FA) or Safetp-No Fire Sub Area (PSA) Pire Zone Related Pire Area Pire Hazard Fire Barrier Number Name ~ftz) Equipment in Area Name Combus-tible ~uantitl Total Btu Loading Required Detection 8 itingo i s hi n g Lb Gal BtugLb ~thousands ~8ta/aft z Lhr/mi+n Svstem 9A 3-6 PA 84 740 XL El 277' 6" Turbine building 1,848 None Misc equip Insul. 706 12,000 8,472 169, 169 2 hr Smoke Total flooding ee Cable traps Insul. 25,346 12,000 304 152 1 detection f normal svitchgear COz spsvem-room vest 312,624 cross-zoned 9A.3-6 PA 83 726 XL El 277 699 2,664 9 Turbine building None Misc equip Insul. 979 12,000 11,748 223,387 2.8 hr Smoke Total flooding re Notor control detection I normal svitchgear centers Fiber 402 COz system room east 18,000 7, 236 cross Cable trays Insul 48,010 12,000 57~6120 zoned 595r104 9A 3-6 FA 50 752 El 288'-6v NZ Ventilation room 4, 856 None Misc eguip Insul. 156 12,000 1, 872 26,300 20 min Smoke [ee Motors Insul. 36 10,000 360 detection Cable trays Insul. 10,457 12,000 12~54 84 127,716 9A.3-6 PA 50 722 NZ El 277'-6" 4,675 Mone Motors Insul. 72 10,000 Condensate demin- 720 16,510 12 min Smoke / ze Cable traps Insul 6r372 12,000 7~6464 detection eralizer 77, 184 9A-3-6 FA 50 721 NZ El 288'-6" 2,244 None Motors Insul. 3 10 r 000 30 28,195 21 min smoke Off-gas room Misc equip Insul; 208 12,000 2,496 detection lee Cable trays Insul. 5,062 12,000 6~0744 63,270 9A.3-6 FA 50 723NZ (A) El 277'-6" 3,570 None Motors Insul. 724NZ (8) Heater bay 1 10r000 10 13,959 11 min Smoke A zoom 3,570 Cable trays Insul. 4, 152 12,000 9 92 detection 725NZ (C) (similar for 3,570 49. 2 heatez baps B and C) Amendment 26 1 of 5 May 1986 505(v'ooSp ~~ TI APERTURE DHEkete 'pirrfee II. 6 I eeumeeeem46666 Nine Nile Point Unit 2 PSAR TABLL 9A..3-6 (Cont) Figure Fire Area (PA) or Safety- 1'ire Ho. Pire Zone Related Fire Razard vire Barrier Area Equipment Combus- Total Btu Loading Required Detection Extinguishing Number Name ~ft z in Area Name tible Lb . Gal -Btu/Lb ~tho~usands ~Pf ~hr min+ Slstem 9A 3-6 PA 82 732 NR El 277'-6" 1,320 None Turbine Oil 83,562 10,995 19,000 1,587,678 1,282,697 16.0 hr Saoke Sprinkler system Lube oil storage lnbe oil detection 8 COz spstem room reservoir (for inerting Cables Insul 8,776 12,000 105,312 vapor space Rotor's Insul. 17 12,000 170 on 2LOS-TR1) 1,693, 169 No combus- Snore Pe 9A 3-6 PA 50 728NZ (A) El 277'-6" 875 Hone tibles detection ) 7 29NZ (8) Air ejector room A 875 (typical for room B) Insul. 489 2r 000 5,868 65,211 49 min Smoke Six foam vater 26 9A 3-6 FA 50 727 S'R El 277 -6a ~ 44,093 None Risc eguip 1 1, 587, 678 detection deluge spstems ) 730 SR Turbine building Turbine gen- Oil 83,562 10,995 19,000 6 heat manual operation 731 SR general area erator lube detectors oil Insul. 24 10,000 240 Hotors Cable traps Insul 106,799 12,000 ~128~1588 2,875,374 9A.3-5 FA 80 611 N'R El 261'" 7,674 Hone Cable traps Insul. 81,666 12,000 979,992 127,702 1 6 hr Smoke Cable tray 66 Turbine buileling detection water sorav svstems ) electrical bay and personnel accessvap 3-5 246 El 250'-0" 2,056 None Clothing Cloth 100 8,000 800 41,811 32 min Smoke 9A PA 80 NR detection Turbine building Cable traps Insul. 7,082 12,000 84,984 locker room Risc equip Insul. 15 180 85,964 9A.3-5 PA 65 714 NR El 261'-0" 'l,450 None Rotors Insul. 10,000 30 25 Negligih le Smoke Turbine building detection service room 3-5 701 El 261'-0" 2,500 None Rotors -Insul, 10,000 40 15 Nogligible Dry pl fe ) le 9A PA 50 N'R Turbine building sprinkler system railroad access Insul 10,000 24,192 min Smoke 91.3-5 FA 50 702 HZ El 261'-0" 4,352 None Rotors 7 70 18 detection ( ee Off-gas area Bise equip Insul. 68 12,000 816 Cable traps Insul. 8,700 12,000 10~4400 105,286 Amendment 26 2 of 5 Hay 1986 TI 'APERTUgp CARD ecto> ~ Cate NfNNEr Ag ee eee Nine Seile POint 3am' 2 PSAN TABLE 9A.3-6 (Cont) Figure Pire Area (PA) or Safety- Fire No Fire -Zone Belated Bazrier Area Equipment Pire Hazard Fize Total Btu Loading Beqaired Detec=on Extinguishing Number Name ~ft a in Area Combus-dm f~ta ~hz ming 9 ste ~Sste Name tible Lb Gal- ~Btu Lb 3 3 f~Bt u 33 m 10,000 180 40,850 31 min Saoke ee 9A 3-5 FA 50 703 NZ Zl 25P Pa~ 3,956 None actors Insal. 18 , '12, 000 dete=-ion Regenezation, Cable trays Insul,. 12, 830 153, 960 demineralizer area, Bise equip Insul 622 12,000 3 36 and control room 161,604 2,980 12 742 10 man smoke 9A.3-5 PA 50 704NZ (A) Zl 250'-0" 3,700 None Notors Insul. 298 10,000 dete-~ Heater bay 3,700 cable traps Insal. 11,538 12,000 133 336 705HZ (B) 706 NZ (C) (typical for heater 3,700 141 436 bays B and C) 9A.3-5 FA 50 707 SN El 2SO3-O33 1,350 None Cable traps Insul 15,122 12,000 181,464 134 418 1 7 hr Snore Automatic deluge t ee Truck aisle detec=eon system 6 he detection oil storage Oil 102,975 13,500 19,000 1,956,525 1 ~ 630, 437 20 4 hr Smoke Automatic sprin- ee 9A 3 5 PA 42 708 NN El 2513-0" 1,200 None detec~n kler spstem t Clean and dirty oil storage room Insul 70 10,000 700 321 1 min Saoke 9A.3-5 FA 50 709 NZ El 2SO3-O33 2,180 None Notors dete~ Instrument air room Amendment 26 3 o 5 Nay 1986 N o5/faoa7 g~ TI APERTIE CARD >Oeteta .~1 4eot~ OP)N mQI~Qggy tmmSOrrrrrrre ,QE Nine Nile Point Unit 2 FSAP. TABLE 9A.3-6 tCont) Safety- Pire Figure Pire Area (FA) or Fire Zone Related Pire Barrier No, Fire Sub Area )PS+A Area Equipment Pire Hazard Required Detection Extinguishing fta ). in Area Combus- Total Btu Loading Number Name Name tible Lb Gal Btu/Lb ~thousand~s $ ~8t u ft e) +homin) Svstem ~Sstem Insul. 3, 509 10r 000 35,090 59,834 45 min Smoke Automatic sprin- z6 None Notors detection kler systems ~ 3-5 FA 50 716 SW El 250'-0" 39 r 412 Bise. equip. Insul. 1,743 12,000 20, 916 9A 717 Sv General area Insul. 174,696 12,000 2 096,352 6 heat Deluge systems Cable trays 25, 326 detection for reactor 718 SM Notor Control Ctr Fiberglass 1, 407 18, 000 ze Oil 9,500 19,000 180~500 feed pumps 6 Bz ) Pumps 2,358 ~ 184 seal oil unit Botors Insul. 10,000 60 25 Negligible Snoke 3-5 FA 64 715 NZ El 261'-0" 2,405 None detection 9A Turbine building foam room Notors Insul. 54 10,000 540 19 660 15 min Saoke ) 2e 9A 37 FA 50 752 NZ El 306 20,800 None Bise equip Insul. 816 12,000 9,792 detection 'Ur'entilation room Insul. 33, 117 12, 000 39~7404 Cables Notor Control Ctr Fiberglass 67 18,000 408,942 Smoke mr 9A 3-7 PA 80 761 NZ El 306'-0" 816 Hone No combus- detection Clean access area, tibles 754 El 306r-orr 1,170 Hone Rotors Insul. 10,000 20 17 Negligible Smoke ) 26 9A 3 7 PA 50 NZ detection Clean steam Reboiler room A Rotors Insul. 10,000 10 10 Negligible Smoke 9A 3-7 PA 50 756 NZ El 306'-0" 1,000 None detection Clean steam reboiler room 8 Amendment 26 of 5 Na y 1986 %5405(bf oog7 g~ TI APERTURE CAR@ Ooclett '-'DIAol W psrs~esssrssee ((c(:amlWY OeNEr AQ Nine Nile Point Unit 2 FSAB TABLE 9A. 3-6 (Cont) Figure Fire Area (PA) or Safety- Fire No, 1'ire Suh Area 1FSAl Pire Zone Related Fire Barzier Equipment Pire Hazard Required Detection Extinguishing Number Name in Area Combus- Total Btu Loading t~uf t~z ~hr ~min Svstem Name tible ~Btu Lh ~thousand~s g8 Insul.. 2,000 10,000 20,000 472 1 min Smo ke and Fixed vater ) se 9A. 3-7 PA 50 755 NZ El 306'-0" 44,270 Hone Turbine heat de- spzay and local and 336' 10" generator tection application General area Turbine Eydrogen 65,000 65 on bear- COz systems generator ings 6 provided for hydrogen exciter turbine C Rotors Insul. 21 10,000 210 Insul. 50 12,000 600 enclosure generator Bise equip hearings 8 20,875 alternator exciter enclo-sure Smoke 9A 3-7 FA 50 762 HZ El 306 0 rr ~ 740 None No combus- detection Decontamination tibles 8 health physics storage rooms Smoke 9A.3-7 PA. 50 764 NZ . El. 306 s-Orr 792 Hone Ha combustibles detection Contaminated instrument roam Notors Insul. 10,000 167 Neqligible Smoke 2 5 9A. 3-7 FA 50 751 NZ El 3255-8a 240 Bone detection Elevator Hachine Boon No 1 8ators Insul. 10,000 30 119 Negligible S leo xe 9 A. 3-7 PA 50 753 NZ El 322s Erv 252 Hone detection Elevator Nachine Room No. 2 Rotors Insul. 10,000 40 210 Negligible Smoke 9A.3-7 PA 50 763 NZ El.. 322'-6" 190 None detection Elevator Bachine Room No.. 3 Amendment 26 5 of 5 Nay 1986 TI 'APERTURE CAHB Nine <<ile Point Unit 2 FSAR TABLE 9A.3-7 DI-SEL GENERATOR BUILDING Figure Pire Area (PA] or Safety No. Fire Suh Area (PSA1 Pire Zone Related Pire Area Equipment Pire Hazard Fire Barrier Name El 261'-0" ~ft 2 in Area<1> Comhus- ~uantity Total Btu Loading Required< >> Detec on Eztinguishing Number Name tible lb Gal ~Btu Lb ~thousands) LB~tu fta 1eee 402 Division I diesel 2,200 Division I motors Insal 556 10 ~ 000 5, 560 2.0 hz Sieoke Automatic 9A 3 5 FA 28 SN generator room diesel Diesel Oil 11,628 1, 530 19,000 220, 932 160,374 detect'on preaction generator generator sprinkler Day tank Diesel fuel 5 '28 660 19r000 ~99 332 system 352,824 9A.3-5 FA 66 402 SN Division I fuel 120 Division I fuel Oil tank Diesel fuel 5,228 660 19,000 99,332 827,767 19.3 hr Smoke Automatic oil day tank room oil day tank detection preaction sprinkler system 9 A. 3-5 PA 28 401 NZ Division I 416 Division I diesel disc Equip. Insul. 1r023 12,000 12,276 29,726 23 m3.n Smoke detec-i.on diesel genezator generator controls Hotors Insul 9 10,QOO 90 control room 12 ~ 366 II diesel Insul 148,088 1..9 hz Smoke Automatic 9A 3-5 WA 29 403 SN Div II diesel generator room 2,200 Division generator Notozs Diesel Oil 553 11,628 1,530 10,000 19,000 5, 530 220,932 detection preaction generator Diesel fuel 5,228 660 19,00Q ~99 332 sprinkler Day tank 325r794 syste m Automatic 9A. 3-5 PA 67 403 SN Division oil day II fuel tank room 120 Division oil day II tank fuel Oil tank Diesel fuel '5,228 660 19,000 99,332 827,767 10. 3 hr Smoke detection preaction sprinkler system 9A.3-5 PA 29 401 NZ Div II diesel 416 Division II diesel Bise Equip Insul Insul. 1,023 12,000 12, 276 29,726 23 min Smoke detection Automatic preaction generator control generator controls Rotors 9 10,000 90 sprinkler ee room 12,366 system diesel Notors Insul 303 10,000 3, 030 66,141 50 min Smoke Automatic (1e 9A.3-5 FA 30 404 SM High-press core 2,200 HPCS detectioa preaction spray (HPCS) Divi- generator Diesel Oil 2,271 358 19,000 43r 149 sprinkler sion III diesel- generator system generator room Day tank Diesel fuel 5,228 660 19,000 ~99 33 2. 145, 511 Amendment 26 1 of 2 Nay 1986 Nine Nile Point Unit 2 FSAR TABLE 9A.3-7 (Cont) I'igure Pire Area (PA) or Safety Fire Fire Related Barrier No. Fire Sub Area (FSA) Number Name Zone Area Equipment in Area<'> Name Combus-tible Pire Hazard ~ua~ntit Lb Gal t / et Total dtttd Btu d Pire Loading t J ~l ~ 'etection Required< >> Svstem<e> Extinguishing ~Sstem < 5 '> 9A.3-5 FA 68 404 SN HPCS oil Division tank room III 120 HPCS diesel gener-ator fuel oil day Oil tank Diesel fuel 5,228 660 19,000 99,332 827,767 10. 3 hr Saoke Automatic detection preaction tank sprinkler system -9A 3 5 FA 30 401 NZ HPCS Division III 416 HPCS diesel gener- Bise Equip. Insul. 600 12,000 7r200 17,524 13 min Smoke >e diesel generator ator controls Hotors Insul. 9 10,000 90 detection ( control room 7, 290 Amendment 26 2 of 2 Hay 1986 TI 'APERTURE CARD . Ihchtk Cn~ ~ r~ernnree '-e9MY NCKO f5f Nxne Hale Po Unxt 2 PSAR TABLE 9A 3-8 SCREEHHELL BUILDING igure Pire Area (F A) or Safety- Pire Ho. ~h re Pire Zone Related ~Pi e Eazard Pire Barrier Area Equipment Combus- ~ua~ntit Tot d Btu Loading Required Detection - Ertinguishing Number Name gf t+z in Area<e> Name tihle BtuLLb nddn= dd r ~hr minJ I ee 9A.3-5 FA 71 803 HZ El 215 ~ Or> 1,600 None Rotors Insul. 572 10,000 5,720 6,342 5 ain Smoke Circulating vater Lube oil Oil 228 30 19, 000 4,332 detection pump pit A Risc equip Insul. 8 12,000 06 10r148 9A 3-5 PA 71 803 NZ El 215 -0n ~ 2,935 None Rotors Insul. 572 10r000 5,720 3,596 3 min Smoke Circulating vater Lube oil Oil 228 30 19,000 4r 332 detection pump pit 8 Risc. equip Insul. 41 12, 000 xg 2 10,554 9A 3-4 FA'1 806 NZ El 224'0" 1,980 Service vater Rotors Insul. 152 10,000 1,520 36,296 27 min Smoke ee 9A 3-5 Service vater pumps A, C, Lube oil Oil 162 21 19,000 3,040 detection J pump room A and .E Rotor cont cntrs Fiber insul. 399 18,000 7, 182 Cable trays Insul 4,735 12,000 56 '20 Risc. equip Insul. 277 12, 000 3 124 71, 866 9A-3-4 9A 3-5 FA 60 807 RZ El 224 'rr Service rater 1 870 Service vater Hotors- Insul.. 152 10,000 1, 520 32,073 24 min. Smoke I ee pump room 8 PumPS and Br Dr Lube oil Oil 160 21 19,000 3, 340 detection F Rotor cont cntrs Fiber insul 352 18,000 6, 336 Cable trays Insul 3,853 - 12,000 46 236 Risc equip Insul. 237 12,000 9A 3-4 PA 55 811 HZ El 241 -Orr ~ No combustibles Smoke screenvell detection pit area Amendment 26 1 of 2 Hay 1986 II( 05K-aar7-zq TI 'APERTURE CARD Nine Nile Point Unit 2 FSAR TABLE 9A.3-8 (Cont) Piguze Pire Area (PA),.or Safety- Pire No Related Fire Aazard Fire Barrier Area Equipment Combus- Total Btu Loading Required Detection Eztinguishing Numhez Name ~f t~a in Azea<z> Name tible lh Gal ~Btu Lh ~thousand~s QBt~uf~ta ~hrrrmin) Svstem 91.3-5 PA 62 804 NN El 261'-0" 1r377 None Diesel fire pump Oil 43 5 6 19, 000 817 68,965 52 ain Smoke Sprinkler Diesel fire Diesel fire pump Diesel 4,940 660 19, 000 93, 860 detection system pump room fuel oil tank fuel Risc. equip. Insul. 24 12,000 288 94,965 91.3-5 FA 63 805 NZ El 261 ~ -Uv 500 None Rotor Insul. 34 10 F 000 340 680 1 min Smoke Electric fire detection pump room 9A.3-5 FA 71 803 NZ El 26 1 '0" Screenvell build-24,777 None Risc equip Rotors Insul. Insul. 522 114 12, 000 10,000 6, 264 '1, 140 43,813 33 min saoke detection ing general area Rotor control ctz Fiber. 268 18r000 ur 824 including vater Cahle trays Insul. 89,443 12, 000 ~107~3316 treatment area -1,085,544 9A.3-5 FA 71 803 NZ El 280'-0" 29,400 None cahle trays Insul. 33,888 1 2r 000 406 r 655 13 832 11 min Smoke General area detection Amendment 26 2 of 2 1 r 1 F 86 09 05()C)Q$ 7 TI APERTURE newer+ CO(()ERf4 f 0((a)Ifr. IKQRAYILYNCNNm Nine Sile Poir. <<mi~<<t 2 PSAR T'ze <<91 3-9 RIILDING 'b RAD{AASTE Safety- Pire Pigure Fire Area {FA) or Related l'ire Hazard Pire Barrier No. Fire Sub~Area ~FSAR Fire Zone Combus- ~uanti~t Btu/Lb . Totai Btus Loading Required Detection Extingmhing Area Equipment Number Name in Area<re tible Gal Ze<< je *e ~hr min) Motors Insul. 71 710 79,936 1..0 hr Smoke Automz- c fze El 240' 2" 6, 812 None 9A.3-4 PA 58 941 NR LRS geueral area Misc equip Cables In su 1. Insul. 26530'0,000 61 5462 12,000 12 ~ 000 732 65544 detection spritz = svstem Fiberglass, liquid Piberglass 18,000 477540 Radvaste stq 544526 tanks Motors Insul. 1 10,000 10 1 <<482<<689 18 5 hr Smoke Autoz - ze 9A-3-4 PA 57 961 NR El 245'-0" 1,156 None stg tank Asphalt 94651 18,000 1703718 detection zspr syste m f Asphalt storage tanks C pump Asph Asph fill pipe Asphalt 570 18,000 10 260 1713988 rooms -'utomz:0 Rotors Insul 2 10,000 20 414,088 5.2 hr Smoke fze 91.3-5 PA 58 911 NR El 261'" 2,869 None Piberglass, liquid Fiberglass 66000 18, 000 1'1 88000 detection 5 print= system LRS tanks Radvaste stg 1188020 tanks Rotors Insul. 10<< 000 10 Negligible Smoke fze 9 A. 3-5 PA 58 904 NZ El 261'-0" 936 Hone detection LRS evaporators 0'tot's Insul. 27 10,000 270 67 '06 51 min S moke 9 A. 3-5 FA 58 901 NZ El 261'-0" 4, 253 None H Misc equip Insul. 255 12,000 3060 cletection L'RS general area 282924 Cables Insul. 23577 12,000 286254 4800 8000 38400 12,057 9 min smoke Automz- = fze 9A.3-5 FA 59 921 SR El 265'-0" 4,512 Mone LSA Boxes Rood Clothing 1000 8000 8000 detection spritz' syster RSS compactor Clothing 8000 8000 area Trash Bags Paper 1000 54400 Motors Insul. 50 10 ~ 000 500 240 1 min Smoke Autozz: fze 9A-3-5 FA 59 951 NR El 265'-0" 2,081 None detection sprir.k:<<r system Truck loading 6 RSS storage 541,294 19.3 hr Autorr== ze Motors Insul 3 10,000 30 1 Smoke f 3,270 detection spri 'r =- system 9A 3-6 PA 59 951 NR El 270e 0<< None 'RSS liners Asphalt 280000 ..18,000 5040000 Truck loading C 5040030 RSS storaoe Motors Insul. 1 10,000 10 231,728 2..9 hr 'fan& Smoke ze 9A 3-6 FA 59 908 NZ El 279 ~ 0<< 2, 175 None Rss liners Asphalt 28000 18,000 504000 detection f RSS general area 504010 Amendment 26 1 of 3 <<av 1986 05(goo s7 z) "APERTURE ()Ndke+ y Ceehel l)Bye ~ eg~g~ 00am~) (I<I()OINK Nine Nile Point Unit 2 PSAB TABLE 9A 3-9 (Cont) Pigure Fire Area (FA) or Safety- Pire Na. Fire Sul Area (PSAR) Fare Zone Related Fire Hazard Pire Barrier Area Equipment Btu/Lb Total Btus Loading Required Detection Extinguishing Number Name gft~z in Area<z> Name e tible Lh Gal ~thousan~ds f zeez ~sstem 2* 700 min Smoke t'z e 9A.3-6 FA 58 906 El 279'-0" 5,796 Rotors Insul.. 4 10,000 40 1 NZ None Risc eguip Insul. 335 12,000 4020 detection LRS general area 4060 El 279e-Oa 3, 154 None Notars Insul 10, 000 20 Negligible Smoke Automatic )ze 9A.3-6 PA 58 911 NR detection sprinkler system LRS tanks Smoke ze 9A 3-6 PA 58 904 NZ El 279'-0" 1,040 None No combus-detection [ LRS evaporators tibles combus- smoke Automatic ) ze 9A-3-7 PA 58 911 NR El 291 6e e 3,010 None Na detection sprinkler system LRS tanks tibles 5,646 extruder liner Asphalt 4008 18,000 72000 19,232 15 min Smoke Automatic 9A 3-7 FA 59 951 NR El 291 0>> e None RSS detection sprinkler system RSS general RSS piping Asphalt 1489 18,000 26802 area RSS extruder Asphalt 325 18,000 5850 Oil, RSS piping Lube oil 170 19,000 3230 Oil, RSS extruder Lube oil 37 19,000 703 108585 e 53, 154 40 min Smoke ze 3-7 PA 58 904 NZ El 291'-6" 6,722 None Resin stg tanks Bus 134 19800 18,000 356400 j 9A LRS evaporztors Pilter Plastic 50 18,000 900 detection 357300 Natars Insul 69 10,000 690 57, 108 43 min Smoke Automatic A. 3-7 FA 58 911 NR El 309e On 8,940 None detection sprinkler system 9 LRS qeneral Risc equip Insul. 12 12,000 144 area Cables Insul. 8576 12,000 1029 12 Used resin stg tk Resin 22600 18 F 000 406800 510546 Amendment 26 2 o 3 Nay -1986 OeCket1)I Sceeen 4CP. Sale Slememee SSSSS Nine Nile Paint Unit 2 PSAR TABLE 9A.3-9 (Cont) Figure Pire Area (PA) or Safety- Fire Pire Sub Area IPSARI Pire Zone Belated Pire Barrier Na, Area Equipment Fire Barard Loading Required Detection Ertinguishing Combus- Btu/Lb Total Btus ~sstem Number Name g~ft a tible Lb Gal ~Btu f t~a ~hr m~in Name 10,000 100 15 Negligible Smoke Automatic ) se 951 El 309'-0n 6,624 None Rotors Insul 10 detection spr>>kler system 9A.3-7 FA 59 NR Truck loading 6 RSS storage Automatic se Insul., 10,000 20 Negligible Smoke ) 9A, 3-5 PA 70 905 NR- El 261 ~ On 5,060 None Rotors detection sprinkler system Decon area 6 dirty vorkshop Total flooding se 12,000 101232 46,867 36 min Smoke 9A.3-6 PA 70 395 XI, El 279 'On 2, 160 None Cables In sul. 8436 detectron Con Radvaste svitch-gear room 12,000 124200 44 '38 34 min Smoke Total flood>>g 91.3-6 FA 70 390 XG El 279'-0" 2,770 None Cables Insul 10350 detection Ralon Radvaste control room se Insul 10,000 210 49 Negligible Smoke ) 9A37FA70 903 NZ El 306' 0n 4, 350 None Risc equip 21 detection Decon bldg RVAC equipment room 2 6 Amendment 26 3 of 3 Hay 1986 e Nine faile Point Unit 2 PSAR TABLE 9A.3-10 NOBNAL SNITCHGEAR BUILDING Figure No. 9A.3-4 Pire- Area PA 51 (PA) Sub Area ~PSAj ol'ire Number 601 XL Name Fire Zone El 237'-0" Area ~ft~z 2 735 Safety-Belated Equipment in Area None Name Bise. equip. Combus-tible Insul. Fire Hazard Lb ~uanti~t 797 Gal Btu/Lb Total Btu 12,000 ~thousan~ds 9, 564 372 Pl.re Loading 110,842 pire Barrier Required LA. 1.4 hr Smoke 'xtinguishing Detection o detection SXstem Total flooeling co, I e e General area vest Cable trays Insul 24,281 12, 000 ~291 cross-zone d 300r 936 Insul. '49 12,000 446, 988 113,070 1.4 hr smoke Total flooding I 9A.3-4 FA 52 602 XL El 237t-0" 3,990 None Cable trays 37 4, 092 detection coz General area east Bise, equip. Insul. 341 12, 000 70 cross Notors Insul. 7 12, 000 zoned 451, 150 ze atterie Stprene 1,964 18, 000 35, 352 1 18,754 1 5 hr Smoke j 9A 4 FA 53 603 NZ El 237'-0" 780 None B s Insul 4,773 12,000 276 detection lA battery room Cable traps ~57 92,628 18r000 35,352 135,585 1.7 hr Smoke )ze El 237'-0" 780 Batteries styrene 1,964 9A.3-4 FA 53 603-NZ None Cable traps Insul. 5,867 12,000 ~70 40 4 detect io n 18 battery room 105 756 Insul- 1,736 12 F 000 20,832 94,695 2 hr smoke 9A 3-4 FA 53 603 NZ 23'ee 220 None Cable trays 1 detection Noon 4A cable trays Insul- 1,736 12,000 94,695 1..2 hr Smoke 9A.3-4 PA 53 603 NZ El 237'-0" 220 None detection Boom 48 12,000 782,264 163;675 2.1 hr Smoke Total flooding 9A-3-5 78 612 Xl El 261'-0" ur 820 None Bise- eguip- Insul. 6,522 706,440 detection Coz FA Cable trays Insul. 58,870 12,000 General area vest cross-Notor control 18,000 ~4 194 zoned centers Fiber. 233 788,898 Insul 4,315 12,000 51,780 164,220 2.1 hr Smoke Total flooding 4,590 None Nlsc. equip. detection Con 9A. 3-5 PA 79 613 XI, El 261 0 Notor control General area east Piber. 297 18,000 5, 346 cross-centers zoned Cable trays Insul 58,053 12,000 ~696 636 753,762 9A.3-4 PA 52 604 NZ El 237' 0" 440 None No combustibles 2 e Security storage room Amendment 26 1 of 2 Nay 1986 IkeNS "e -., liam~ flK CostnNP ~ 666U0(TURY NCKEf edddmddm Nine Nile ooint Unit .2 PSAR T'LE 9A. 3-10 (Cont) Figure Pire Area (FA) or Safety-No. Fire Sub A~rea ~FSA Fire Zone Related Fire Area Equipment Pzr~e azard Pire Barrier in Area Number Name Name Combus-tible ~uanti~t Lb . Gal Btu/Lb ~dd Total Btu Loading ~Bt u f~tz Required g~hr m i Detection Svstem Extinguishing Svstem 9A.3-6 PA 77 621 NZ El 293r-0" 2, 189 None Rotors Insul. 15 10,000 150 69 Negligible Smoke Ventilation detection zr, equipment penthouse 9A.3-6 FA 77 621 NZ El 293'-0" 1,290 None Rotors Insul. 70 10,000 700 6,096 5 min Smoke NG set penthouse Risc. equip. Insul. 597 12r000 ~7164 detection ze 7,864 Amendment 26 2 of 2 Nay 1986 TI APERTURE Oeckst4 W Control 4'eet~eeeveeee RENlATSN SORT ~ Nine Nile Point Unit 2 FSA3 TABLE 9A.3 11 MISCELLAHEOUS BUILDINGS Figure Fire Area (PA) or Safety- Pire Fi.re Zone Related Pire Barrier No. Area Equz.pment Fire Hazard Required Detectzon Extznguxshxng Total Btus Loading NRmbeE Name ~ft~z in Area<zZ Name Combus-tible I.b Gal Btu/Lb neee ~hrgEinL Svstem 1,378 min Smoke ze Valves Rotor Insul. 4 10,000 40 1 9A.3-5 PA 71 802 NZ El 261'-0" 4,680 Risc. equip. Insul. 165 12e000 1,980 detection Inta?e and dis- piberglass 246 18r000 428 NCC ze charge shafts 6e448 area ze Insul. 39 10,000 390 1 02r 1 19 1.3 hr Smoke 808 Auxiliary 3,080 None Notors 4,032 detectxon 9A.3-5 FA 60 NZ boiler building Bise equip Insul. 336 12,000 310 104 Cable trays Insul. 25,842 12,000 314,526 18,000 1,018,800 95,932 2 hr Smoke Automatxc f'ze 902 NV El 265'0" 6 10,620 None Storage tanks Fiberglass 56,600 1 detection sprinkler 9A 3-.5 6 FA 56 9A 3-6 295 Da ~ svstem condensate storage tank building Insul. 10,000 90 19,851 15 min Smoke 801 NZ Demin, vater 5,850 None Notors 9 detectxon 9A.3-4 PA 69 Risc. equip. Insul. 45 12, 000 540 9A-3-5 storage tank Insul- 12,000 102c900 .building Cable trays 8, 575 9 A. 3-6 PVC piping PVC 700 18 F 000 ~12 600 1 16 ~ 130 Amendment 26 1 of 1 May 1986 gg 05($ 00 6 7 P$ APERTURE Nine Nile Point Unit 2 PSAR TABLE 9A. 3-12 PIPING TUNNELS AND STEAN TUNNEL Pire Safety- Pire Barrier Figure Pire Area (PA) or Related Fare Bazard Total Btu- I.oading Required Detection Ertinguishing pire Zone No. Pire Sub Area (PSAi Area Equipment tible Btu/Lb ~thousand~s +Bantuf~tz ~hr mini ~sstem Number Name in Area<~> Name Smoke No combustibles detection 9A.3-u FA55 362 NZ Piping tunnel Smoke No combustibles detect>on 9A 3-4 PA55 361 NZ Piping tunnel Smoke 9 A. 3-3 No combustibles detection 9A.3-a FA55 363 NZ Piping tunnel 100 18r000 17r 100 8, 6u1 6. 5 min Beat tain steam. Hydraulic fluid Oil 950 detection 256 NZ Steam tunnel 1980 isolation valves 10,000 10 9A. 3-5 FA50 Rotors Insul. hydraulic units 17,110 Amendment 26 1 of 1 Nay 1986

ML18038A159

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ML18038A159

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