ML18032A604
| ML18032A604 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
| Issue date: | 10/16/1987 |
| From: | TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18032A603 | List: |
| References | |
| TAC-R00034, TAC-R00035, TAC-R00036, TAC-R34, TAC-R35, TAC-R36, NUDOCS 8710200294 | |
| Download: ML18032A604 (62) | |
Text
ENCLOSURE 1 PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS REVISIONS BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1, 2, AND 3 (TVA BFN TS 236) 8710200290 8710ih eaa
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REMOVE/INSERT PAGE LIST UNIT 1 REMOVE INSERT 1.0-3 through 1.0-4 3.7/4.7-17 through 3.7/4.7-18 1.0-3 through 1.0-4 3.7/4.7-17 through 3.7/4.7-18
0
<1.0 DEFINITIONS (Cont'd)
N.
Rated Power Rated power refers to operation at a reactor power of 3,293 MMt; this is also termed 100 percent power and 1s the maximum power level authorized by the operating license.
Rated steam flow.
rated coolant flow, rated neutron flux, and rated nuclear system pressure refer to the values of these parameters when the reactor ln at rated power.
Design power, the power to which the safety analysis applies, corresponds to 3,440 NMt.
0.
Primar Containment Inte rit Primary containment integrity means that the drywell and pressure suppression chamber are intact and all of the following conditions are satisfied:
- l. All nonautomatic containment isolation valves on lines connected to the reactor coolant systems or containment which are not required to be open during accident conditions are closed.
These valves may be opened to perform necessary operational activities.
2.
At least one door in each airlock is closed and sealed.
3.
All automatic containment isolation valves are operable or 4.
All blind flanges and manways are closed.
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3.7/4.7 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS I
LIMITING CONDITIONS POR OPERATION e
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.7.C.
Secondar Containment
- 4. If refueling zone secondary containment cannot be maintained the following conditions shall be met:
- a. Handling of spent fuel and all operations over spent fuel pools and open reactor wells containing fuel'shall be prohibited.
- b. The standby gas treatment system suction to the refueling zone will be blocked except for a controlled leakage area sized to assure the achieving of a vacuum of at least 1/4-inch of water and not over 3 inches of water in all three reactor zones.
D.
Primar Containment Isolation Valves D. Primar Containment Isolation Valves all isolation valves listed in Table 3.7.A,and all reactor coolant system instrument line flow check valves shall be OPERABLE except as specified in 3.7.D.2.
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- 1. The primary containment isolation valves surveillance shall be performed as follows:
- a. At least once per operating cycle the OPERABLE isolation valves that are power operated and automatically initiated shall be tested for simulated automatic initiation and closure times.
- b. At least once per quarter:
BPN Unit 1
3.7/4.7-17 (1)
All normally open power operated isolation valves (except for the main steam line power-operated isolation valves) shall be fully closed and reopened.
J
3.7/4.7 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.7.D. Primar Containment Isolation Valves 4.7.D.
Primar Containment Isolation Valves 4.7.D.l.b (Cont'd)
(2)
With the reactor power less than 75%, trip main steam isolation valves individually and verify closure time.
- c. At least twice per week the main steam line power-operated 1solation valves shall be exercised one at a time by partial closure and subsequent reopening.
- d. At least once per operating cycle the operability of the reactor coolant system instrument line flow check valves shall be verified.
- 2. In the event any 1solation valve specified in Table 3.7.A becomes INOPERABLE, reactor power operation may continue provided at least one valve~in each line having an INOPERABLE valve> 1s +n-
- 2. Whenever an isolation valve listed in Table 3.7.A is INOPERABLE, the position of 'at least one other valve in each line having an INOPERABLE valve shall be recorded daily.
- 3. If Specification 3.7.D.l and 3.7.D.2 cannot be met, an orderly shutdown shall be initiated and the reactor shall be 1n the Cold Shutdown condition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
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REMOVE/INSERT PAGE LIST UNIT 2 REMOVE INSERT 1.0-3 through 1.0-4 3.7/4.7-17 through 3.7/4.7-18
~ 1.0-3 through 1.0-4 3.7/4.7-17 through 3.7/4.7-18
4
1.0 DEFINITIONS (Cont'd)
N.
Rated Power Rated power refers to operation at a reactor power of 3,293 HWt; this is also termed 100 percent power and is the maximum power level authorized by the operating license.
Rated steam flow, rated coolant flow, rated neutron flux, and rated nuclear system pressure refer to the values of these parameters when the reactor is at rated power.
Design power, the power to which the safety analysis applies, corresponds to 3,440 MWt.
O.
Primar Containment Inte rit Primary containment integrity means that the drywell and pressure suppression chamber are intact and all of the following conditions are satisfied:
- l. All nonautomatic containment isolation valves on lines connected to the reactor coolant systems or containment which are not required to be open during accident conditions are closed.
These valves may be opened to perform necessary operational activities.
2.
At least one door in each airlock is closed and sealed.
3.
All automatic containment isolation valves are operable or l a c'A I>n e ~gicl con ~ainS in'er'*4)e4v'a,lac is iso J<<leg a.s re( mid"ed.
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All blind flanges and manways are closed.
P.
Secondar Containment Inte rit l.
Secondary containment integrity means that the reactor building is intact and the following conditions are met:
a)
At least one door in each access opening to the turbine building, control bay and out-of-doors is closed.
b)
The Standby Gas Treatment System l.s operable and can maintain 0.25 inches of water negative pressure in those areas where secondary containment integrity is stated to exist.
c)
All secondary containment penetrations required to be closed during accident conditions are either:
2.
Capable of being closed by an operable secondary containment automatic isolation system, or Closed by at least one secondary containment automatic isolation valve deactivated in the isolated position.
2.
Reactor zone secondary containment integrity means the unit reactor building is intact and the following conditions are met:
a)
At least one door between any opening to the turbine building, control bay and out-of-doors is closed.
BFN Unit 2 1.0-4
3.7/4.7 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS LIMITIHG CONDITIONS POR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.7.C.
Secondar Containment
- 4. If refueling zone secondary containment cannot be maintained the following conditions shall be met:
- a. Handling of spent fuel and all operations over spent fuel pools and open reactor wells containing fuel'shall be prohibited.
b.
The standby gas treatment system suction to the refueling zone will be blocked except for a controlled leakage area sized to assure the achieving of a vacuum of at least 1/4-inch of water and not over 3 inches of water in all three reactor zones.
D.
Prima s
ation Valves D. Primer Containment Isolation Valves all isolation valves listed in Table 3.7.A and all reactor coolant system instrument line flow check valves shall be OPERABLE except as specified in 3.7.D.2.
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Condoi nflelf S nay rI $~ is fera.iree.
- 1. The primary containment isolation valves surveillance shall be performed as follows:
- a. At least once per operating cycle the OPERABLE isolation valves that are power operated and automatically initiated shall be tested for simulated automatic initiation and closure times..
- b. At least once per quarter:
"" Unit2'.7/4.7-17 (1)
All normally open power-operated isolation valves (except for the main steam line power-operated isolation valves) shall be fully closed and reopened.
I 3.7/4.7 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 0
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.7.D. Primar Containment Isolation Valves 4.7.D.
Primar Containment Isolation Valves 4.7.D.l.b (Cont'd)
(2)
With the reactor power less than 75%, trip main steam isolation valves individually and verify closure time.
- c. At least twice per week the main steam line power-operated isolation valves shall be exercised one at a time by partial closure and subsequent reopening.
- d. At least once per operating cycle the operability of the reactor coolant system instrument line flow check valves shall be verified.
- 2. In the event any isolation valve specified in Table 3.7.A becomes INOPERABLE, reactor power operation may continue provided at least one valve>in each line having an INOPERABLE valve> is~
- 2. Whenever an isolation valve listed in Table 3.7.A is INOPERABLE, the position of at
~ least one other valve.in each line having an INOPERABLE valve shall be recorded daily.
- 3. If Specification 3.7.D.l and 3.7.D.2 cannot be met, an orderly shutdown shall be initiated and the reactor shall
. be in the Cold Shutdown condition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
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REMOVE/INSERT PAGE LIST UNIT -3 REMOVE INSERT 1.0-3 through 1.0-4 3.7/4.7-17 through 3.7/4.7-18 1.0-3 through 1.0-4 3.7/4.7-17 through 3.7/4.7-18
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1.0 DEFINITIONS (Cont'd)
N.
Rated Power
- Rated power refers to operation at a reactor power of 3,293 HWt; this is also termed 100 percent power and is the maximum power level authorized by the operating license.
Rated steam flow, rated coolant flow, rated neutron flux, and rated nuclear system pressure refer to the values of these parameters when the reactor is at rated power.
Design power, the power to which the safety analysis applies, corresponds to 3,440 MWt.
O.
Primar Containment Inte rit Primary containment integrity means that the drywell and pressure suppression chamber are intact and all of the following conditions are satisfied:
- l. All nonautomatic containment isolation valves on lines connected to the reactor coolant system or containment which are not required to be open during accident conditions are closed.
These valves may be opened to perform necessary operational activities.
2.
At least one door in each airlock is closed and sealed.
3.
All automatic containment isolation valves are operable or ep oA ji'n p MAi'ch Cow/~~'nS 4.n i'hogef p.>~+ A Vp
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- I
3.7/4.7 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS S
LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVL'ILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.7.C.
Secondar Containment
- 4. If refueling zone secondary
.containment cannot be maintained the following conditions shall be met:
- a. Handling of spent fuel and all operations over spent fuel pools and open reactor wells containing fuel shall be prohibited.
b.
The standby gas treatment system suction to the refueling zone will be blocked except for a controlled leakage area sized to assure the achieving of a vacuum of at least 1/4-inch of water and not over 3 inches of water in all three reactor zones.
I D.
Primar Containment Isolation Valves D. Primar Containment Isolation Valves all isolation valves listed in Table 3.7.A and all reactor coolant system instrument line flow check valves shall be OPERABLE except as specified in 3.7.D.2.
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- 1. The primary containment isolation valves surveillance shall be performed as follows:
- a. At least once per operating cycle the OPERABLE isolation valves that are power operated and automatically initiated shall be tested for simulated automatic initiation and closure times.
- b. At least once per quarter:
BFN Unit 3 3.7/4.7-17 All normally open power-operated isolation valves (except for the main steam line power-operated isolation valves) shall be fully closed ana reopenea.
3.7/4.7 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUlREMENTS 3.7.D. Primar Containment Isolation Valves 4.7.D.
Primar Containment Isolation Valves 4.7.D.l.b (Cont'd)
(2)
With the reactor power less than 75%, trip main steam isolation valves individually and verify closure time.
- c. At least twice per week the main steam line power-operated isolation valves shall be exercised one at a time by partial closure and subsequent reopening.
- 2. In the event any isolation valve specified in Table 3.7.A becomes INOPERABLE, reactor power operation may continue provided at least one valve>in each line having an INOPERABLE valve> is +n
- d. At least once per operating cycle the operability of the reactor coolant system instrument line flow check valves shall be verified.
- 2. Whenever an isolation valve listed in Table 3.7.A is INOPERABLE, the position of at least one other valve in each line having an INOPERABLE valve shall be recorded daily.
- 3. If Specification 3.7.D.l and 3.7.D.2 cannot be met, an orderly shutdown shall be initiated and the reactor shall be in the Cold Shutdown condition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
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Enclosure 2
Description and Justification Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN)
Descri tion of Chan e
The Technical Specifications of Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant are changed to revise:
A. Limiting, Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.7.D.1, to require primary containment isolation valves be operable when primary containment integrity is required.
Primary containment integrity is required by LCO 3.7.A.2.a when the reactor is critical or when the reactor water temperature is above 212 F.
Currently, LCO 3.7.D.1 required primary containment isolation valves be operable only during reactor power operations.
B.
LCO 3.7.D.2, to permit reactor operation to continue for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> with an inoperable primary containment isolation valve, without requiring a redundant valve be placed in the isolated position, and provided that at least one isolation valve in the line having an inoperable isolation valve is operable, and C. Definition 1.0.0.3, Primary Containment Integrity, to reference specification 3.7.D.2 which defines under what conditions reactor operation is acceptable with an inoperable primary containment isolation valve.
Reason for Chan es A.
LCO 3.7.D.l requires primary containment isolation valves to be operable only during reactor power operation.
This is inconsistent, with LCO'.7.A.2.a which requires primary containment integrity be maintained when the reactor is critical or when the reactor water temperature is above 212 F.
Therefore, LCO 3.7.D.1 is being revised to be consistent with LCO 3.7.A.2 by requiring the primary containment isolation valves be operable when primary containment integrity is required.
B.
LCO 3.7.D.2 action does not specify a time period for isolating the line which contains an inoperable primary containment isolation valve.
The revised LCO 3.7.D.2 specifies a time period for completing this action and provides increased operational flexibility by allowing the repair of an inoperable valve as an alternative to isolating the affected line.
C. Definition 1.0.0.3 is being revised to be consistent with revised LCO 3.7.D.2 action.
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Justification for Chan es A.
LCO 3.7.D.l requires primary containment isolation valves be operable only during reactor power operations.
Reactor power operation is defined as any operation with the mode switch in the "Startup" or "Run" position with the reactor critical and above 1
percent rated power..
This revision will require primary containment isolation valves be operable whenever primary containment. integrity is required.
LCO 3.7.A.2.a requires primary containment, integrity when the reactor is critical or when the reactor water temperature is above 212 F.
Therefore, this change will additionally require the primary containment isolation valves be operable when the reactor is in hot shutdown or a hot standby condition.
Hot shutdown is when the reactor is in the shutdown mode with control rods fully inserted and the reactor coolant temperature greater than 212 F.
Hot Standby condition means operation with coolant temperature greater than 212 F, system pressure less than 1055 psig, the main steam isolation valves closed and the mode switch in the Startup/Hot Standby position.
Since this change will require the primary containment isolation valves be operable over a broader range of operating conditions, it constitutes additional operating restrictions and is therefore conservative.
B. The change to LCO 3.7.D.2 action permits reactor operation to continue for a short period of time (4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />) when a primary containment isolation valve is inoperable, without requiring a redundant valve be placed in the isolated position, provided that at least one isolation valve in the same line is operable.
The BFN primary containment isolation valve system is designed to provide the capability for rapid isolation of lines which penetrate the primary containment.
The primary containment isolation valves are designed to limit leakage of primary containment atmosphere to the environment after an accident and, in the case of lines connected to the reactor coolant system, to limit loss of reactor coolant due to a line break outside containment.
The probability of such an accident and a single failure of the operable primary containment isolation valve occurring during the four hour time period is negligible.
This change is consistent with other Browns Ferry Technical Specification requirements as demonstrated by Table 3.2.A, Note ll, which allows a channel of the primary containment isolation instrumentation to be placed in an inoperable status for up to four hours for surveillance without placing the channel in the tripped condition.
This change is also consistent with recently approved Technical Specifications for other facilities as demonstrated by 3.6.3.a of the Hope Creek Generating Station Technical Specifications (NUREG-1202, July 1986) which allows four hours to restore the inoperable primary containment isolation valve or isolate the affected penetration.
Justification for Chan es C. Definition 1.0.0.3 must be consistent with revised LCO 3.7.D.2 action so as to satisfy the definition of primary containment integrity during the four hours that a line penetrating the primary containment is permitted to remain open when an isolation valve is inoperable.
This change is purely administrative and does not affect nuclear safety.
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Enclosure 3
Determination of No Significant Hazards Consideration Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Units 1, 2, and 3
Descri tion of Amendment The proposed amendment would modify the Technical Specification (TS) of BFN units 1, 2 and 3 to:
A.
Require that primary containment isolation valves be operable whenever primary containment integrity is required to be maintained.
B.
Permit a primary containment isolation valve(s) to be inoperable for up to four hours without placing a redundant valve in the isolated position provided that at least one operable isolation valve in the same line is operable.
C.
Revise the definition 1.0.0.3, Primary Containment Integrity, to be consistent with Item B.
Basis for Pro osed No Si nificant Hazards Consideration Determination The Commission has provided standards for determining whether a significant hazards consideration exists as stated in 10 CFR 50.92(c).
A proposed amendment to an operating license involves no significant hazards considerations if operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not:
(1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated, or (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident, from an accident previously evaluated, or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
1.
This proposed amendment does not involve an increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
A) The change to increase the requirements for having the primary containment isolation valves operable for all the operating conditions when primary containment integrity is required, rather than just during reactor power operation, is an upgrade in required valve operability which does not influence the probability of any accident initiating events.
The consequences of any accident previously evaluated would not be increased since the primary containment isolation valves would still be operable for isolating any previously analyzed release pathway.
B) The action to specify a time period (four hours) for a primary containment isolation valve(s) to be inoperable without placing a redundant isolation valve in the isolated position, provided that a redundant isolation valve is operable, would not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
This change does not influence the probability of any accident initiating event.
In order for the change to result in adverse consequences to the plant, all of the following events would have to occur sequentially within a four hour time period:
a)
A primary containment isolation valve would have to be declared inoperable and be in an unisolated state.
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It l
,Basis for Pro osed No Si nificant Hazards Consideration Determination (Cont'd) b)
An accident would have to occur which would require the isolation of the primary containment.
c)
The second primary containment isolation valve in the affected line would have to suffer a failure which would leave it in an unisolated state.
This sequence of events is considered to be highly improbable.
The probability of an accident and a single failure of the operable primary containment isolation valve occurring during the four hour time period is negligible.
This change is consistent with Technical Specifications recently approved for other facilities.
C) The change to the definition of primary containment integrity has no impact on the probability or consequences of an accident as described in B above.
2.
(A)
The possibility of a new or different kind of accident from an accident previously evaluated is not created by conservatively requiring the primary containment isolation valves be operable over a br~~Ror range of operating conditions.
(B) and (C)
This Technical Specification change will still r~
operable primary containment isolation valve be available to consequences of an accident.
Reliance on a single operable i valve for a short (four hour) time frame is sufficient, to ass M affected line will isolate as previously analyzed.
Allowing containment isolation valve to be inoperable for four hours d
create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident accident previously evaluated.
3.
(A)
The TS revision will broaden the operating conditions under which primary containment isolation valves are required to be operable.
This change does not affect. any margin of safety.
(B) and (C)
The change to allow a primary containment isolation valve to be inoperable for four hours deals only with the reliability of the affected line to isolate.
A safety margin is not affected if isolation of the affected line is assumed to occur as in Item 2 above.
Since the application for amendment involves a proposed change that is encompassed by the criteria for which no significant hazards consideration
- exists, TVA has made a proposed determination that the application involves no significant hazards consideration.
1072y
ENCLOSURE 1 PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS REVISIONS BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1, 2, AND 3 (TVA BFN TS 236)
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REMOVE/INSERT PAGE LIST UNIT 1 REMOVE INSERT 1.0-3 through 1.0-4 3.7/4.7-17 through 3 '/4.7-18 1.0-3 through 1.0-4 3.7/4.7-17 through 3.7/4.7-18
i 1.0 DEFINITIONS (Cont'd)
N.
Rated Power Rated power refers to operation at a reactor powei of 3,293 NWt; this ls also termed 100 percent power and ls the maximum power level authorized by the operating license.
Rated steam flow, rated coolant flow, rated neutron flux, and rated nuclear system pressure refer to the values of these parameters when the reactor at rated power.
Design power, the power to which the safety analysis applies, corresponds to 3,440 ~t.
0 ~
Primar Containment Inte rlt Primary containment integrity means that the drywell and pressure suppression chamber are intact and all of the following conditions are satisfied:
All nonautomatic containment lsolat'ion valves on lines connected to the reactor coolant systems or containment which are not required to be open during accident conditions are closed.
These valves may be opened to perform necessary operational activities.
2.
At least one door in each airlock is closed and sealed.
3.
All automatic containment isolation valves are operable or 4.
All blind flanges and manways are closed.
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0 3.7/4.7 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.7.C.
Secondar Containment
- 4. If refueling zone secondary containment cannot be maintained the following conditions shall be met:
- a. Handling of spent fuel and all operations over spent fuel pools and open reactor wells containing.fuel'shall, be prohibited.
b.
The standby gas treatment system suction to the refueling zone will be blocked except for a controlled leakage area sized to assure the achieving of a vacuum of at least 1/4-inch of water and not over 3 inches of water in all three reactor zones.
" D.
Primar Containment Isolation Valves D. Primar Containment Isolation Valves
- l. ~usa I
all isolation valves listed in Table 3.7.A.and all reactor coolant system instrument line flow check valves shall be OPERABLE except as specified in 3.7.D.2.
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The primary containment isolation valves surveillance shall be performed as follows:
- a. At least once per operating cycle the OPERABLE isolation valves that are power operated and automatically initiated shall be tested for simulated automatic initiation and closure times.
- b. At least once per quarter:
BFN Unit 1 3.7/4.7-17 (1)
All normally open power operated isolation valves (except for the main steam line power-operated isolation valves) shall be fully closed and reopened.
S 4
I
3.7/4.7 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.7.D. Primar Containment Isolation Valves 4.7.D.
Primar Containment Isolation Valves 4.7.D.l.b (Cont'd)
(2)
With the reactor power
)ess than 75%, trip main steam isolation valves individually and verify closure time.
- c. At least twice per week the main steam line power-operated isolation valves shall be exercised one at a time by partial closure and subsequent reopening.
- d. At least once per operating cycle the operability of the reactor coolant system instrument line flow check valves shall be verified.
2.'n the event any, isolation valve specified in Table 3.7.A becomes INOPERABLE, reactor power operation may continue provided at least one valve~in each line having an INOPERABLE valve> is~
- 2. Whenever an isolation valve listed in Table 3.7.A is INOPERABLE, the position of 'at least one other valve in each line having an INOPERABLE valve shall be recorded daily.
- 3. If Specification 3.7.D.l and 3.7.D.2 cannot be met, an orderly shutdown shall be initiated and the reactor shall be in the Cold Shutdown condition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
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REMOVE/INSERT PAGE LIST UNIT 2 REMOVE INSERT 1.0-3 through 1.0-4 3.7/4.7-17 through 3.7/4.7-18 1.0-3 through 1.0-4 3.7/4.7-17 through 3.7/4.7-18
C
l.0 DEFINITIONS (Cont'd)
N.
Rated Power Rated power refers to operation at a reactor power of 3,293 MWt; this is also termed 100 percent power and is the maximum power level authorized by the operating license.
Rated steam flow, rated coolant flow, rated neutron flux, and rated nuclear system pressure refer to the values of these parameters when the reactor is at rated power.
Design power, the power to which the safety analysis applies, corresponds to 3,440 MWt.
0.
Primar Containment Inte rit Primary containment integrity means that the drywell and pressure suppression chamber are intact and all of the following conditions are satisfied:
l.
All nonautomatic containment isolation valves on lines connected to the reactor coolant systems or containment which are not required to be open during accident conditions are closed.
These valves may be opened to perform necessary operational activities.
2.
At least one door in each airlock is closed and sealed.
3.
All automatic containment isolation valves are operable or 8a, ~A ii'n e ~dick con ~a.'n 5 a,~
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All blind flanges and manways are closed.
,P.
Secondar Containment Inte rit Secondary containment integrity means that the reactor building is intact and the following conditions are met:
a)
At least one door in each access opening to the turbine building, control bay and out-of-doors is closed.
b)
The Standby Gas Treatment System is operable and can.
maintain 0.25 inches of water negative pressure in those areas where secondary containment integrity is stated to exist.
c)
All secondary containment penetrations required to be closed during accident conditions are either:
1.
Capable of being closed by an operable secondary containment automatic isolation system, or 2.
Closed by at least one secondary containment automatic isolation valve deactivated in the isolated position.
2 ~
Reactor zone secondary containment integrity means the unit reactor building is intact and the following conditions are met:
a)
At least one door between any opening to the turbine building, control bay and out-of-doors is closed.
BFN Vnit 2 1.0-4
ii I'l
- 3. 7/4. 7 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS LIMITIHG CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.7 AC. Secondar Containment
- 4. If refueling zone secondary containment cannot be maintained the following conditions shall be met:
- a. Handling of spent fuel and all operations over spent fuel pools and open reactor wells containing fuel'shall be prohibited.
b.
The standby gas treatment system suction to the refueling zone will be blocked except for a
,controlled leakage area sized to assure the achieving of a vacuum of at least l/4-1nch of water and not over 3 inches of water in all three reactor zones.
D.
P 1ma s
atio Valves D. Primar Containment Isolation Valves all isolation valves listed in Table 3.7.A and all reactor coolant system instrument 11ne flow check valves shall be OPERABLE except as specif1ed
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The primary containment isolation valves surveillance shall be performed as follows:
- a. At least once per operating cycle the OPERABLE isolation valves that are power operated and automatically ini.tiated shall be tested for simulated automatic initiation and closure times.
- b. At least once per quarter:
BFN Unit 2 3.7/4.7-17 (l)
All normally open power-operated isolation valves (except for the main steam line power-operated isolation valves) shall be fully closed and reopened.
0
3.7/4.7 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.7.D. Primar Containment Isolation Valves 4.7.D.
Primar Containment Isolation Valves 4.7.D.l.b (Cont'd)
(2)
With the reactor power less than 75't, trip main steam isolation valves individually and verify closure time.
- c. At least twice per week the main steam line power-operated isolation valves shall be exercised one at a time by partial closure and subsequent reopening.
2; In the event any isolation valve specified in Table 3.7.A becomes INOPERABLE, reactor power operation may continue provided at least one valve>in each line having an INOPERABLE valve> is~
- d. At least once per operating cycle the operability of the reactor coolant system instrument line flow check valves shall be verified.
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- 2. Whenever an isolation valve listed in Table 3.7.A is INOPERABLE, the position of at least one other valve in each line having an INOPERABLE valve shall be recorded daily.
- 3. If Specification 3.7.D.l and 3.7.D.2 cannot be met, an orderly shutdown shall be initiated and the reactor shall
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. be in the Cold Shutdown condition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
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REMOVE/INSERT PAGE LIST UNIT 3 REMOVE INSERT 1.0-3 through 1.0-4 3.7/4.7-17 through 3.7/4.7-18 1.0-3 through 1.0-4 3.7/4.7-17 through 3.7/4.7-18
l J
1.0 DEFINITIONS (Cont'd)
N.
Rated Power
- Rated power refers to operation at a reactor power of 3,293 HWt; this is also termed 100 percent power and is the maximum power level authori.zed by the operating license.
Rated steam flow, rated coolant flow, rated neutron flux, and rated nuclear system pressure refer to the values of these parameters when the reactor is at rated power.
Design power, the power to which the safety analysis applies, corresponds to 3,440 NWt.
O.
Primar Containment Inte rit Primary containment integrity means that the drywell and pressure suppression chamber are intact and all of the following conditions are satisfied:
l.
All nonautomatic containment isolation valves on lines connected to the reactor coolant system or containment which are not required to be open during accident conditions are closed.
These valves may be opened to perform necessary operational activities.
2.
At least one door in each airlock is closed and sealed.
3.
All automatic containment isolation.valves are operable or ea o~
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All blind flanges and manways are closed.
BFN-Unit 3 1.0-4
3.7/4.7 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 6
LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.7.C.
Secondar Containment
- 4. If refueling zone secondary containment cannot be maintained the following conditions shall be met:
- a. Handling of spent fuel and all operations over spent fuel pools and open reactor wells containing fuel shall be prohibited.
b.
The standby gas treatment system suction to the refueling zone will be blocked except for a controlled leakage area sized to assure the achieving of a vacuum of at least 1/4-inch of water and not over 3 inches of water in all three reactor zones.
D.
Primar Containment Isolation Valves D. Primar Containment Isolation Valves all isolation valves listed in Table 3.7.A and all reactor coolant system instrument line flow check valves shall be OPERABLE except as specified in 3.7,D.2.
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- 1. The primary containment isolation valves surveillance shall be performed as follows:
- a. At least once per operating cycle the OPERABLE isolation valves that are power operated and automatically initiated'hall-be tested for simulated -automatic initiation and.closure times.
- b. At least once per quarter:
BFN Unit 3 3.7/4.7-17 All normally open power-operated isolation valves (except for the main steam line, power-operated isolation valves) shall be fully closed and reopened.
3.7/4.7 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 3.7.D. Primar Containment Isolation Valves SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.7.D.
Primar Containment Isolation Valves 4.7.D.l.b (Cont'd)
(2)
With the reactor power less than 75%, trip main steam isolation valves individually and verify closure time.
- c. At least twice per week the main steam line power-operated isolation valves shall be exercised one at a time by partial closure and subsequent reopening.
- 2. In the event any isolation valve specified in Table 3.7.A becomes INOPERABLE, reactor power operation may continue provided at least one valve>in each line having an INOPERABLE valve> is +n
- d. At least once per operating cycle the operability of the reactor coolant system instrument line flow check valves shall be verified.
- 2. Whenever an isolation valve listed in Table 3.7.A is INOPERABLE, the position of at least one other valve in each line having an INOPERABLE valve shall be recorded daily.
- 3. If Specification 3.7.D.l and 3.7.D.2 cannot be met, an orderly shutdown shall be initiated and the reactor shalJ be in the Cold Shutdown condi.tion within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
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5
Enclosure 2
Description and Justification Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN)
Descri tion of Chan e
The Technical Specifications of Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant are changed to revise:
A. Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3 '.D.1, to require primary containment isolation valves be operable when primary containment integrity is required.
Primary containment integrity is required by LCO 3.7.A.2.a when the reactor is critical or when the reactor water temperature is above 212 F.
Currently, LCO 3.7.D.1 required primary containment isolation valves be operable only during reactor power operations.
B.
LCO 3.7.D.2, to permit reactor operation to continue for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> with an inoperable primary containment isolation valve, wi.thout requiring a redundant valve be placed in the isolated position, and provided that at least one isolation valve in the line having an inoperable isolation valve is operable, and C. Definition 1.0.0.3, Primary Containment Integrity, to reference specification 3.7.D.2 which defines under what conditions reactor operation is acceptable with an inoperable primary containment isolation valve.
Reason for Chan es A.
LCO 3.7.D.l requires primary containment isolation valves to be operable only during reactor power operation.
This is inconsistent with LCO 3.7.A.2.a which requires primary containment integrity be maintained when the reactor is critical or when the reactor water temperature is above 212 F.
Therefore, LCO 3.7.D.1 is being revised to be consistent with LCO 3.7.A.2 by requiring the primary containment isolation valves be operable when primary containment integrity is required.
B.
LCO 3.7.D.2 action does not specify a time period for isolating the line which contains an inoperable primary containment isolation valve.
The revised LCO 3.7.D.2 specifies a time period for completing this action and provides increased operational flexibility by allowing the repair of an inoperable valve as an alternative to isolating the affected line.
C. Definition 1.0.0.3 is being revised to be consistent with revised LCO 3.7.D.2 action.
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c, Justification for Chan es A.
LCO 3.7.D.l requires primary containment isolation valves be operable only during reactor power operations.
Reactor power operation is defined as any operation with the mode switch in the "Startup" or "Run" position with the reactor critical and above 1
percent rated power.
This revision will require primary containment isolation valves be operable whenever primary containment integrity is required.
LCO 3.7.A.2.a requires primary containment integrity when the reactor is critical or when the reactor water temperature is above 212'F.
Therefore, this change will additionally require the primary containment isolation valves be operable when the reactor is in hot shutdown or a hot standby condition.
Hot shutdown is when the reactor is in the shutdown mode with control rods fully inserted and the reactor coolant temperature greater than 212 F.
Hot Standby condition means operation with coolant temperature greater than 212 F, system pressure less than 1055 psig, the main steam isolation valves closed and the mode switch in the Startup/Hot Standby position.
Since this change will require the primary containment isolation valves be operable over a broader range of operating conditions, it constitutes additional operating restrictions and is therefore conservative.
B. The change to LCO 3.7.D.2 action permits reactor operation to continue for a short period of time (4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />) when a primary containment isolation valve is inoperable, without requiring a
redundant valve be placed in the isolated position, provided that at least one isolation valve in the same line is operable.
The BFN primary containment isolation valve system is designed to provide the capability for rapid isolation of lines which penetrate the primary containment.
The primary containment isolation valves are designed to limit leakage of primary containment atmosphere to the environment after an accident and, in the case of lines connected to the reactor coolant system, to limit loss of reactor coolant due to a line break outside containment.
The probability of such an accident and a single failure of the operable primary containment isolation valve occurring during the four hour time period is negligible.
This change is consistent with other Browns Ferry Technical Specification requirements as demonstrated by Table 3.2.A, Note 11, which allows a channel of the primary containment isolation instrumentation to be placed in an inoperable status for up to four hours for surveillance without placing the channel in the tripped condition.
This change is also consistent with recently approved Technical Specifications for other facilities as demonstrated by 3.6.3.a of the Hope Creek Generating Station Technical Specifications (NUREG-1202, July 1986) which allows four hours to restore the inoperable primary containment isolation valve or isolate the affected penetration.
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c.
Justification for Chan es C. Definition 1.0.0.3 must be consistent with revised LCO 3.7.D.2 action so as to satisfy the definition of primary containment integrity during the four hours that. a line penetrating, the primary containment is permitted to remain open when an isolation valve is inoperable.
This change is purely administrative and does not affect nuclear safety.
17
Enclosure 3
Determination of No Significant Hazards Consideration Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Units 1, 2, and 3
Descri tion of Amendment The proposed amendment would modify the Technical Specification (TS) of BFN units 1, 2 and 3 to:
A.
Require that primary containment isolation valves be operable whenever primary containment integrity is required to be maintained.
B.
Permit a primary containment isolation valve(s) to be inoperable for up to four hours without placing a redundant valve in the isolated position provided that at least one operable isolation valve in the same line is operable.
C.
Revise the definition 1.0.0.3, Primary Containment Integrity, to be consistent with Item B.
Basis for Pro osed No Si nificant Hazards Consideration Determination The Commission has provided standards for determining whether a significant hazards consideration exists as stated in 10 CFR 50.92(c).
A proposed amendment to an operating license involves no significant hazards considerations if operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not:
(1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated, or (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from an accident previously evaluated, or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
1.
This proposed amendment does not involve an increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
A) The change to increase the requirements for having the primary containment isolation valves operable for all the operating conditions when primary containment integrity is required, rather than just during reactor power operation, is an upgrade in required valve operability which does not influence the probability of any accident initiating events.
The consequences of any accident previously evaluated would not be increased since the primary containment isolation valves would still be operable for isolating any previously analyzed release pathway.
B) The action to specify a time period (four hours) for a primary containment isolation valve(s) to be inoperable without placing a redundant isolation valve in the isolated position, provided that a redundant isolation valve is operable, would not, involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
This change does not influence the probability of any accident initiating event.
In order for the change to result, in adverse consequences to the plant, all of the following events would have to occur sequentially within a four hour time period:
a)
A primary containment isolation valve would have to be declared inoperable and be in an unisolated state.
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Basis for Pro osed No Si nificant Hazards Consideration Determination (Cont'd) b)
An accident would have to occur which would require the isolation of the primary containment.
c)
The second primary containment isolation valve in the affected line would have to suffer a failure which would leave it in an unisolated state.
This sequence of events is considered to be highly improbable.
The probability of an accident and a single failure of the operable primary containment isolation valve occurring during the four hour time period is negligible.
This change is consistent with Technical Specifications recently approved for other facilities.
C) The change to the definition of primary containment integrity has no impact on the probability or consequences of an accident as described in B above.
2.
(A)
The possibility of a new or different kind of accident from an accident previously evaluated is not created by conservatively requiring the primary containment isolation valves be operable over a broader range of operating conditions.
(B) and (C)
This Technical Specification change will still require one operable primary containment isolation valve be available to mitigate the consequences of an accident.
Reliance on a single operable isolation valve for a short (four hour) time frame is suEEicient to assure the aEfected line will isolate as previously analyzed.
Allowing a primary containment isolation valve to be inoperable for four hours does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from an accident previously evaluated.
3.
(A)
The TS revision will broaden the operating conditions under which primary containment isolation valves are required to be operable.
This change does not affect any margin of safety.
(B) and (C)
The change to allow a primary. containment isolation valve to be inoperable for four hours deals only with the reliability of the affected line to isolate.
A safety margin is not afEected if isolation of the affected line is assumed to occur as in Item 2 above.
Since the application for amendment involves a proposed change that is encompassed by the criteria for which no significant hazards consideration
- exists, TVA has made a proposed determination that the application involves no significant hazards consideration.
1072y
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NSING TRANSMITTAL TO NRC
SUMMARY
AND CONCURRENCE SHEET DATE 9/2/87 DATE DUE NRC ACTION NO.
SUBMITTAL PREPARED BY S.
M. Kane FEES REQUIRED YES X NO PROJECT/DOCUMENT I.D.
Re uest for Browns Ferr Nuclear Plant Technical S ecification (TS) Amendment - BFN TS 236 PURPOSE/
SUMMARY
The ur ose of the amendment is to rovide a
ro riate and consistent o erabilit re uirements for rimar containment and to s ecif actions and time limits when an isolation valve is ino erable.
RESPONSE
TO (RIMS NO.)
COMPLETE RESPONSE YES NO PROBLEM OR DEFICIENCY DESCRIPTION The current TS are inconsistent concernin when rimar containment inte rit is re uired.
The current TS also do not s ecif a time eriod for isolatin a line with an ino erable isolation valve.
TVA has a reed to rovide the ro osed TS rior to an unit startu CORRECTIVE ACTION/COMMITMENT No new commitments are involved.
SAME ORGANIZATION CONCURRENCE SIGNATURE OR LETTER REFERENCE DATE R. L. Lewis BFN-Plant Mana er SDSP 15.8 Attachment 1
7!31/87 M. H. Hannum NSRB L42 870921 803 9/21/87 M. J.
Ma BFN-Licensin Mana er P. J.
S eidel DNE B22 870902 009 9/2/87 CCTS Coordinato APPROVED 1072y D
MANAGER DATE
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