ML18019B004

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Forwards marked-up FSAR Section 6.2.4 Re Containment Isolation Valves.Fsar Will Be Formally Revised in Future Amend
ML18019B004
Person / Time
Site: Harris Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 06/04/1986
From: Zimmerman S
CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To: Harold Denton
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NUDOCS 8606110260
Download: ML18019B004 (65)


Text

Y INFORMATION I'EQUL DISTRIBUTI SYSTEM (RIDS)

>Q ACCESSION NBR: 86061102b0 DOC. DATE: 86/06/04 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET 0 FACIL: 50-400 Sheav'on Hav v'is Nucleav'owev Planti Unit ii Carolina 05000400 AUTH. NAj'fE AUTHOR AFFILIATION ZINMERNANi S. R. Cav olina Power 5 Light Co.

RECIP. NAI'lE RECIPIENT AFFILIATION DENTON> H. R. - Office of Nuclear Reactor. Reguiationi Directov'post 851125

SUBJECT:

Forwav'ds mav ked-up FSAR Section 6. 2. 4 v e containment isolation valves. FSAR thrill be formallg v evised in futuv e amend ~

DISTRIBUTION CODE: B001D COPlES RECEIVED: LTR ENCL SI 2E:

TITLE: Licensing Submittal: PSAR/FSAR Amdts 8r Related Cov'respondence NOTES: Application for pev mit renewal filed. 05000400 RECIPIENT COPIES I REC I P ENT COPIES ID CODE/NANE LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAI'fE LTTR ENCL PWR-A ADTS 1 PWR-A EB PWR-A EICSB 2 2 PWR-A FOB PWR-A PD2 LA 1, PWR-A PD2 PD 1 BUCKLEY, B 01 2 2 PWR-A PSB 1 PWR-A RSB 1 1 INTERNAL: ADN/LFNB 0 ELD/HDS1 0 IE FILE 1 1 IE/DEPER/EPB 36 1 IE/DGAVT/GAB 21 1 NRR BWR ADTS 0 NRR PWR-B ADTS 1 0 NRR ROE'. L 1 R D FT/HFIB 1 1 NRR/DHFT/NTB 1 R C FIL 04 1 1 RQN2 3 3 R I/l'/IB 1 0 EXTERNAL: 24X 1 1 BNL(ANDTS ONLY)

Dl'1B/DSS (Al'lDTS) LPDR 03 NRC PDR 02 1 NSI C 05 PNL CRUEL> R 1 1 TOTAL NUMBER QF COPIES REGUIRED: LTTR 33 ENCL. 28

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SINK Carolina Power & Light Company SERIAL: NLS-86-178 Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation .

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT NO. 1 - DOCKET NO.50-000 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE FSAR CHANGES

Dear Mr. Denton:

Carolina Power i'.r. Light Company submits marked-up changes to FSAR Section 6.2.0 regarding Containment Isolation Valves. These changes are submitted to provide the NRC with an advance copy for their review. The FSAR will be formally revised in a future amendment.

If you have any questions, please contact Mr. Gregg A. Sinders at (919) 836-8168.

Yours very truly, S . Zi erman M ager Nuclear- icensing Section GAS/pgp (3916GAS)

Attachment cc: Mr. B. C. Buckley (NRC) Mr. Wells Eddleman Mr. G. F. Maxwell (NRC-SHNPP) Mr. 3ohn D. Runkle Dr. 3. Nelson Grace (NRC-RII) Dr. Richar.d D. Wilson Mr. Travis Payne (KUDZU) Mr. G. O. Bright (ASLB)

Mr. Daniel F. Read (CHANGE/ELP) Dr. 3. H. Carpenter.(ASLB)

Wake County Public Library Mr. 3. L. Kelley (ASLB) 8b06iio ADOCH o

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411 Fayettevilte Street o P. O. Box 1551 o Raleigh. N. C. 27602

SHNPP FSAR valves, closed remote~anual valves, and closed automatic valves which

'anual remain closed after a loss-of-coolant accident. Locked closed isolation valves are under administrative control to assure that they cannot be inadvertently opened.

6.2.4.2.4.2 General Design Criterion 55 Lines which are connected to the reactor coolant pressure boundary are shown in Table 6.2.4-1. Each penetration is provided with one of the following

'valve arrangements conforming to the requirements of 10CFR50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion 55, as follows:

a) One locked-'closed-isolation valve inside and one locked-closed-isolation valve outside Containment; or b) One automatic-isolation valve inside and one locked-closed-isolation valve outside Containment; or c) One locked-closed-isolation valve inside and one automatic-isolation valve outside Containment; a simple check valve is not used as the automatic-isolation valve outside Containment; or d) One automatic-isolation valve inside and one automatic-isolation valve outside Containment; a simple check valve is not used as the automatic-isolation valve outside Containment.

Isolation valves are located as close to the Containment as practical and, upon loss of actuating power, solenoid and air-operated automatic-isolation valves fail closed.

An exception of GDC 55 is taken for the RHR suction lines. The lines from the hot legs to the RHR pump suctions each contain two remote manual (motor

'CS operated) valves, which are locked closed during normal plant power operation and are under administrative control to assure that they cannot be inadvertently opened, in accordance with SRP Section 6.2.4 Item II.f. The valves are interlocked such that they cannot be opened when the RCS pressure is greater than the design pressure of the RHR system. This valve arrangement is provided in accordance with Westinghouse Systems Standard Design Criteria, Number 1.14, Revision 2 and Appendix B of ANSI Standard N271-1976.

P An exception to Criterion 55 is taken for several isolation valves in lines which penetrate Containment and are required to perform safeguards functions following an accident. Lines which fall into this category include the RHR and safety injection lines, and RCP seal injection lines. Since these valves must remain open or be opened, a trip signal cannot be used. Instead, each of these motor operated valves is capable of remote manual operation Upon completion of the safeguards function of the line, the operator can close the isolation valve from the Control Room. Leak detection capabilities for these ines is discussed in Section 5.2.5.

ee. Inset~ C o4 a.++a.ch~en4 2.

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ enera es gn Criterion 56 The lines that penetrate the Containment and communicate directly with both the atmosphere inside and outside of the Containment are of two types. The 6.2.4-5 Amendment No. 14

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t ~ SUPP FSAR SIGNAL INDEX FOR TABLE 6.2.4-1 1 - Containment isolation Phase A (Signal 'T')

2 - Containment isolation Phase B (Signal 'P')

3 - Safety injection actuation (Signal 'S')

4 Two out of four RWST low-low level 5 Main steam line isolation 6 - Two out of three low-low level in any steam generator 7 Loss -of main feedwater pumps 8 - Containment ventilation isolation 9 - Containment inside/outside differential pressure < - 2.5 in. wgo 10 - Containment inside/outside differential pressure < 0o25 in. wg.

11 Containment spray actuation 12 Two out three reactor coolant pump undervoltage 13 Two out three low-low level in any steam generator jg 14 Main feedwater line isolation 15 Main steam line isolation + steam generator low pressure 16 Steam generator low-low level + excessive auxiliary feedwater flow to same generator

<<<ili0.rg Feed ~a4er ISolakIon

~+ I- oSS of oAsihe Power I5 Any Zj earn generakov. Low- Lo~ Level 6.2.4-11

SKIP FSAR,'EFINITIONS FOR TABLE 6.2.4-1 ACCIDENT SIGNAL A signal which automatically initiates positioning of valves other than containment isolation valves to positions required to perfor'm their safety-related function.

2o AUTOMATIC ACTUATION Initiation of a powex-operated valve by automatic means without any action by a plant operator upon receipt of an accident/isolation signal from a protection system.

3% CLOSED SYSTEM A safety-related piping system which penetrates and is a closed system either inside or outside the Containment. The system is subject to the pump and valve operability test requirements and the inservice inspection requirements of the APifE Code Section Xl. Under normal operating or LOCA conditions for closed systems inside Containment, the fluid in the system does not communicate directly with either the Reactor Coolant System or containment atmosphere. Under normal operating or LOCA conditions for closed systems outside Containment, the fluid in the system does not communicate'directly with the environs.

4. CONTAIRKNT ISOLATION SIGNAL - A signal which automatically initiates positioning of valves other than engineered safety feature valves to positions required to perform their containment isolation function.

CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE A valve which establishes a mechanical barriex in appropriate fluid systems penetrating the Containment; which could otherwise represent open paths to the environment from inside the Containment for fission product

6. LEAKAGE PATH A penetration that is not part of a safety-related closed system and that could provide a direct path to the environment.

7 ~ LOCKED CLOSED ISOLATION VALVE A valve that is in a closed position by administrative controls by one of the following:

(1) A mechanical device locking the valve in the closed position.

(2) A normally closed valve with a seal or lock on any manual override, if present, and a seal or lock on the power breaker or power source in a manner that prevents power from being supplied to the valve.

POWER TRAIN The source of emergency electrical power from one or both of the redundant A and B emergency buses. See'ection 8.3 REMOTE MANUAL ACTUATION Initiation of a power-operated valve by a discrete manual action such as operation of a control switch.

Maximum RESPONSE TIME - Stro e time for a valve to move to its safety-related

'position.

sec inscv5 R o4:otkaehrnenp 'f TYPE C TEST 10CFR50 Appendix test as described in Section 6.2.6o 6.2.4-12

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SEEP FSAR NOTES FOR TABLE 6. 2. 4-1 The inside containment barrier is a closed system inside Containment.

The closed system is subject to the inservice inspection requirements of APifE Section XI. The system remains at a pressure greater than 45 psig post-LOCA.

2~ The outside containment isolation barrier is a closed ESF system outside the Containment. The system is subject to the pump and valve operability test requirements and the inservice inspection requirements Sce in f the ASNE Code Section XI.

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5 inment valve which is not relied u ontaznment isolation functxo s not relied upon for containment isola ype C test is required.

4~ Remote manual instrument isolation valve. Valve is maintained open for both normal and post-LOCA operation.

5. i&nual or remote-manual which is locked (physically locked or administratively controlled) and remains locked post-LOCA.

I

6. The valve is used periodically during operation. Any leakage through the valve would 'be detected during normal operation.
7. Valve is only opened when adding water to the pressurizer relief tank or RCP standpipe. It is interlo'eked to cl'ose on a Phase A containment isolation signal.
8. Valve is only opened when adding water to the accumulators. It is interlocked to close on a Phase A containment isolation signal.

Valve is opened only to verify leaktightness of accumulator check valve. It is interlocked to close on a Phase A containment-isolation signal.

10 Valve is opened only when charging nitrogen to the accumulators it is interlocked to close on a Phase .A containment isolation signal.

~ay c, Center shaft butterfly valve tested in the reverse direction Leakage is equivalent since the same sealing surfaces are tested when test pressure is applied from either direction.

12. Wedge-disk gate valve tested in the reverse direction. Results obtained

'in this configuration are equivalent to testing in the accident direction. Because of the disk seat design, testing in either direction measures the leakage across both seating surfaces.'lobe 13 valve tested in the reverse direction. The results obtained are conservative since test pressure tends to unseat the valve disk.

14. Diaphragm valve tested in the reverse direction. Leakage is equivalent since the same seating surface is tested when test pressure is applied from either direction.

SHNPP FSAR NOTES TO TABLE 6.2.4-1 (CONT'D)

15. These penetrations are connected directly to the sump. During an accident, they will be filled with water. This water seal will exist during the entire post-accident period.
16. Both the pressure sensor and the hydraulic isolators have an internal beLLows which serve as isolation barriers for the capillary tubes.
17. The isoLation valve is sealed with a seal.-fluid with sufficient fluid inventory to assure the sealing function for at Least 30 days at 1 ~ 10 P 5 W C ) wloq QQ oped eg Iog oping ~~~

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SHiilPP FSAR ABBREVIATIONS FOR TABLE 6. 2.4-1 Fluid Valve Tv e A- Air BF Butterfly G Gas CK Check S Steam DA Diaphragm W Water GA - Gate CF-Capillary Filling GL Globe RG Regulating RL Relief XC Excess Flov Check Valve

Actuator, AO Air Operator EH Electro-hydraulic M Manual i'lO Motor. Operator. Primary/Secondary SA Self-Actuating Actuation Modes SO - Solenoid Operator. A - Automatic Manual RF Reverse Floe Valve Position RM Remote Manual AE As Es C - Closed Cy - Cycle LC Locked Closed LO Locked Open 0 - Open TH - Throttled TL - Locked Throttled
6. 2. 4-14 Amendment No. 8

TABLE 6.2.4-2 CONTAINMENT.ISOLATION VALVE POSITION FOLLOWING AN ACCIDENT Penetration Essential 1 or> Valve No. Penetration Name Non Essential Position Ml MS-SG A NE CLOSED M2 HS-SG B NE CLOSED M3 MS-SG C NE CLOSED M4 FEEDWATER SG A NE CLOSED M5 FEEDWATER SG B NE CLOSED M6 FEEDWATER SG C NE CLOSED Ml NO L LETDO N NE CLOSED C-UCS Nor~a.l HB CHARG NG NE CLOSED SEAL INJECTION RC PUHP A E OPENED M10 SEAL INJECTION RC PUHP B E OPENED Mll SEAL INJECTION RC PUMP C E OPENED H12 RC PUHP SEAL INJECTION AND EXCESS NE CLOSED LETDOWN EXCH OUTLET 25 M13 LOW HEAD SI TO COLD LEG OPENED M14 LOW HEAD SI TO COLD LEG OPENED M15 RHR LOOP 1 (NORMAL OPERATION MODE) NE CLOSED M16 RHR LOOP 2 (NORHAL OPERATION MODE) NE CLOSED M17 N ih Head Sy ~ Cold Le E OPENED m M18 LOW HEAD SI TO HOT LEG $ CLOSE (S P BY 0 OR

c. H19 SPARE N/A ACTION LONG M20 HIGH HEAD SI TO HOT LEG CLOSE (5) T COOLIN n M21 M22 HIGH HEAD SI TO HOT LEG HIGH HEAD SI TO COLD LEG pe E CLOSE (5 Ca.o>CO (~ )

0 M23 CONTAINMENT SPRAY OPENED:"

H24 CONTAINMENT SPRAY OPENED:""-

TABLE 6.2.4-2 (Cont'd)

CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE POSITION FOLLOWING AN ACCIDENT Penetration Essential or Valve No. Penetration Name Non Essential Position M25 CONTAINMENT FAN COOLER AH3-SW IN E OPENED M26 CONTAINMENT FAN COOLER AH2-SW IN E OPENED M27 CONTAINMENT FAN COOLER AH1-SW IN OPENED M28 CONTAINMENT FAN COOLER AH4-SW IN E OPENED M29 CONTAINMENT FAN COOLER AH3-SW OUT E OPENED M30 CONTAINMENT FAN COOLER Af SW OUT OPENED M31 CONTAINMENT FAN COOLER AHl-SW OUT E OPENED M32 CONTAINMENT FAN COOLER AH4-SW OUT E OPENED M33 POST ACCIDENT GAS SAMPLE RETURN NE CLOSE <3)

M34 ILRT ROTOMETER NE CLOSED 20 M35 COMPONENT COOLING WATER RC PUMP C.to&ED .0 SIGNAL) -'-':-" cn M36 COMPONENT COOLING WATER RC PUMP CLoSEO CLOSED M37 COMP COOLING WATER EXC LETDN & RCDT CLOSED M38 COMP COOLING WATER EXC LETDN & RCDT NE CLO ED M39 COMP COOLING WATER - RC PUMP THERM BARR E CASED M40 MAKEUP WATER TO PRESSURIZER NE CLOSED M41 SERVICE AIR SUPPLY NE CLOSED M42 RCDT PUMP DISCHARGE NE CLOSED M43 SPARE N/A M44 S F PURIFICATION PUMP TO REFUELING NE CLOSED CAVITY M45 REFUELING CAVITY WATER CLEANUP- OUT NE CLOSED M46 SPARE N/A M47 SUMP RECIRC (RffR A) E OPENE +) LLY C M48 SUMP RECIRC (RHR B) E OPENE PEN 0 ATER M49 SUMP RECIRC (CONT SPRAY A) ~

E OPENE f'f) IN RWST M50 SUMP RECIRC (CONT SPRAY B) E OPENE M51 SG A BLOWDOWN NE CLOSED M52 SG B BLOWDOWN NE CLOSED M53 SG C BLOWDOWN NE CLOSED M54 SG A BLOWDOWN SAMPLE . NE CLOSED M55 SG B BLOWDOWN SAMPLE NE CLOSED

TABLE 6.2.4-2 (Cont'd)

CONTAINi1EifT ISOLATION VALVE POSITION FOLLOWING AM ACCIDENT Penetration Essential or Valve No. Penetration Name Non Essential Position H56 SG C BLOWDOWN SAHPLE NE CLOSED L157 CONTAINMENT PURGE HAKEUP NE CLOSED i~f58 CONTAIi%1ENT PURGE EXHAUST NE CLOSED H59 VACUUH RELIEF A NE CLOSED H60 SPARE NE CLO E H61 H2 PURGE HAKE-UP H62 CONTHT LEAK RATE TEST PRESS INDIC. CLOSED H63 H2 PURGE EXHAUST Cf.OSED H64 SPARE N/A H65 FUEL TRANSFER TUBE CLOSED H66-H68 SPARE N/A H69 CONTAINHENT PRESSURE SENSING A N/A H70 CONTAINHENT PRESSURE SENSING B N/A H71 CONTAINlfENT PRESSURE SENSING C N/A H72 CONTAINHENT PRESSURE SENSING D N/A H73A H73B CONTAINHENT ATH H2 RADIATION HONITOR CONTAINHENT ATH H~ RADIATION HONITOR p/ ~ E p

CLOSED*

CLOSED*

H74 CONTAINHENT SU'fP PUHP DISCHARGE NE CLOSED H75 SPARE N/A

?176A ACCUHULATOR FILL NE CLOSED H76B ACCUHULATOR TO RWST NE CLOSED H77A Ng TO~CCUHULATOR NE CLOSED H77B PRT Hf & CDT CONNECTION NE CLOSED H77C RCDT H2 SUPPLY & GAS SAHPLE NE CLOSED H78A RC LOOP 2 & 3 SAHPLE NE CLOSE (3)

H78B PRESS. LIQUID SAHPLE NE CLOSED H78C PRESS'TEAH SAHPLE NE CLOSED H78D ACCUHULATOR SAHPLE NE CLOSED H79 FIRE PROTECTION-STANDPIPE SUPPl Y NE CLOSED H80 INSTR AIR SUPPLY NE CLOSED H81-fif85 SPARES N/A

TABLE 6.2.4-.2 (Cont'd)

CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE POSITION FOLLOWING AN ACCIDENT Penetration Essential or Valve No. Penetration Name Non Essential Position M86A CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN ANALYZER CLOSED*

M86B COHTAINMEHT HYDROGEN ANALYZER CLOSED~

M87 SPARE N/A M88 POST ACCIDENT LIQUID SAMPLE RETURN NE CLOSED (3)

M89 SPARE N/A M90 DEMIN. WATER TO FUEL TRANSFER SYSTEM CLOSED CONTR PANEL & REFUELING CAVITY DECON M91 CONTAINMEHT FAN COIL UNITS SW OUT NE CLOSED M92 CONTAINMENT FAN COIL UNITS SW - IN NE CLOSED M93 SPARE N/A M94A,B CONTAINMENT VACUUM RELIEF SENSING LINES E OPEN M95A>B CONTAINMENT VACUUM RELIEF SENSING LINES OPEN g M94C o~h ltJ)vlEMT OUTSibE'IFFEREnlTIRC OPE~<

20 M95C pRGssukB se>sic& N/A M96 CONTAINMENT LEAK RATE TEST SUPPLY 6 EXHAUST NE CLOSED M97 SPARE N/A M98 VACUUM RELIEF B NE CLOSED M99-M102 SPARES N/A M103A RVLIS N/A M103B RVLIS N/A 20 M103C RVLIS H/A M104 SPARE N/A M105 FIRE PROTECTION SPRINKLER SYS HDR NE CLOSED M106 SPARE N/A M107A RVLIS N/A M107B RVLI8 N/A 20 M107C RVLIS N/A M108 AUX FEEDWATER TO SG A OPENED +

M109 AUX FEEDWATER TO SG B OPENED +

M110 AUX FEEDWATER TO SG C OPEHED +

TABLE 6.2.4-2 (Cont'd)

CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE POSITION FOLLOWING AN ACCIDENT ISOLATION VALVE CLOSED ON PHASE A CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SIGNAL. REOPEN MANUALLY FOR POST ACCIDENT H2 SAMPLING.

NORMALLY CLOSED. OPEN ON CONTAINMENT SPRAY ACTUATION SIGNAL.

A "P" SIGNAL IS DEFINED AS A CONTAINMENT PHASE B SIGNAL.

WILL BE CLOSED TO ISOLATE FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR (ie., LOSS OF SG PRESSURE BOUNDARY)

ESSENTIAL: LINES REQUIRED TO MITIGATE AN ACCIDENT, OR WHICH, fF UNAVAILABLE COULD INCREASE THE MAGNITUDE OF THE EVENT.

2) NON-ESSENTIAL: LINES WHICH ARE NOT REQUIRED TO MITIGATE AN ACCIDENT, AND WHICH IF REQUIRED AT ALL WOULD BE REQUIRED FOR LONG TERM RECOVERY ONLY; ie., DAYS OR WEEKS FOLLOWING AN ACCIDENT.
3) Aft.UES CtM'>PLEO gd~GRm >rrENrLy +OR'cS7 - +cC1Deu'7 SAmpzinjc IQI7 rlHLc y cc.osEu op&/ on/ Low %8rEH c,E'vEL w sp(n/57-Or-'E~CD i3Y CP~~+rDR 4C770hl FO+ LO~'Q

SHNPP FSAR During a type A test, the steam generator'econdar side is to be vented outside the containment atmos here.

The systems connected to the secondary side of the steam generator are identified in Table 6.2.4-1.

6.2.6-2a Amendment No. 26

SHNPP FSAR 6.2.6.3 Containment Isolation Valve Leaka e Rate Tests (T e C Tests)

Table 6.2.4-1 lists aLL valves which are associated with the penetrating piping systems. Table 6.2.4-1 also indicates for all valves listed which are considered to be containment isolation vaLves and which of the containment isolation valves are to be subjected to Type C test The EoLlowing criteria were used to determine which containment isolation valves are Local leak tested:

a) The penetrating system provides a direct connection between the inside and outside environments of the Containment under normal operation.

b) The system is isolated by containment isolation valves which close automatically to effect containment isoLation in response to a Phase A containment isolation signal.

c) The system is an engineered safety features system which does not require leak testing because the system is a closed system outside of Containment in accordance with SRP 6.2.4 and because the isoLation valve is sealed with a seal-fluid with sufficient Eluid inventory to assure the sealing function for at least 30 days at 1..10, ~ 'H Pa.

d) The system is an engineering safety features system which has only a single isolation valve located outside Containment requiring testing because the system is a closed system outside of Containment in accordance with SRP 6.2.4o

~ ~

The engineering safety features systems and penetrations which are not leak tested because they are in accordance with item "c" are: ECCS low head

~

26 safety injection to the cold legs (M-13 and M-14), the Containment sump water.

supply .to the ECCS low head (RHR) pumps (M-47 and M-48), and the Containment sump water supply to the Containment spray pumps (M-49 and M-50). The fluid seal within the pipe and the closed system outside of Containment preclude release of containment atmosphere to the environment. No containment air leakage can occur due to a single active failure in any of these systems.

The engineered safety features and penetrations which are leak tested in accordance with item "d" are: ECCS high head safety injection to the cold legs (M-17 and M"22), ECCS low and high head safety injection to the hot legs (M-18, M-20, and M-21), and the CVCS seal water supply to the Reactor Coolant Pumps (M-9, M-10, and M-11). The single isolation valve outside Containment and the closed system outside Containment preclude release of the containment atmosphere to the environment. No containment air Leakage can occur due to a single active failure in any of these systems.

Service Water to and from the fan coolers is a closed ASME Class 2 system 26 inside containment in accordance with FSAR paragraph 6.2.4.2.4.4. No single active failure of any component could provide a potential leakage path Eor post-LOCA containment atmosphere. This system is described in FSAR Section 9.2.1. General Design Criterion 57 is applicable to this system as discussed in FSAR Section 6.2.4.

6.2.6-6 Amendment No. 26

SHNP P FS AR 26 7

The containment pressure transmitters are designed to meet the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.11 and are described in Section 7.3. These lines have no isolation valves and rely on closed systems both inside and outside of the Containment to precLude the release oE the containment atmosphere. The

~

integrity oE these cLosed systems is verified during the periodic Type A tests'hese Lines penetrate the Containment at penetrations 69, 70, 71, and 72.

/fl5a P As noted in Subsection 6.2.4.2.4.4, e

o8 a,/hJ.

3 t PLL portions o the secondary side o t e steam generators are consxdere an extension oE the Containment. These systems penetrate the containment shell at penetrations numbered 1 through 6, 51 through 56, and 108 through )10. ~L (hlSCgT' o $ ~++~+~en The test, vent and drain (TVD) connections that are used to facilitate local Leak testing are under administrative controL, and subject to periodic surveiLl.ance, to assure their integrity and verify the efEectiveness of administrative controls. These procedures meet the requirements of SRP Section 6.2.6 Item II.

The test equipment to be used during the Type C tests consists oE a connection to an air supply source, pressure regulator, pressure gauge, flow indicator, and associated valving or equivalent test setup.

Isolation val.ves are positioned to their post-accident position by the normal method with no accompanying adjustments. Fluid systems are properly drained and vented with the valves aligned to provide a test volume and atmospheric air back pressure on the isolation vaLve(s) being tested.

The test volume is pressurized to the test pressure P , 41.0 psig. The 26 pressure regulator(s) maintain the test volume at a minimum of 41.0 psig. The air flow rate into the test volume is recorded, as is the pressure reading, at the intervals specified on the data Eorm. These records are utilized to determine the l.eakage rate in cubic centimeters per minute.

For Larger test volumes, a pressure decay method may be util. ized to determine the leakage rate.

The total leakage rate for Type B and C tests will be Less than 0.6 l. . The individual testing performed on valves requiring a Type C test is described in Technical Specifications.

In accordance with 10CFR50 Appendix J III.C.1, valves may be tested in the non"accident pressure direction when it can be determined that the results from the tests for the pressure applied in the non-accident direction wil.l provide equivalent or more conservative results.

Fi.2.6-7 Amendment No. 26

The Containment Isolation Valves on the Component Cooling Water lines which provide cooling water to the Reactor Coolant Drain Tank and CVCS Fxress Letdown Heat Exchangers via penetrations 0-V7 and H-38 are not leak tested. The components inside containment provide a closed system designed in accordance with General Design Criteria 57. Two simultaneous passive failures of Class 2, or better, systems is not considet ed a credible event.

A LOCA is a passive failure of the Reactor Coolant System, and therefore it is not credible to assume a .imultaneous passive failure of'he CCM closed system. Therefore, the closed system inside containment is sufficient, to insure that the Containment atmospher e is not released to the environment. following an accident.

These systems provide a clo .ed system designed in accordance with

...General Design Criteria 57. They are not leak tested because the closed system inside containment is sufficient to insure that the Containment atmosphere is not released to the environment following an accident.

m 6.2.4-l ERTlR% ~0 AvuuabIe Ou TABLE Aperture Card CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM DATA SHNPP I FSAR PENETRATlON DATA VALVE DATA

~4v VALVE POSITION

'V o~ o~ ~tv ~4m o ~o 4 PENETRATION DETAIL v e4(

C'y o+

Og Oy 8.~ ~O ~e. ~4 o cP A.

e~~ e~~o e NOTE Rl- 41 SA C C C YES NO IRC ORC R4 61 SA C C C YES YG ~ 0 R7 8'01 SA C C C YES ~Ye 0 R10 RL SA .C C C YES Jy6~~ NO 042 57 S YES NO MAIN STEAM R13 RL'GL SA C C YES YE 0 LOOP A P18 EH A C C NO YES NO MS.V1 V1 L&B GL AO A 5 0 C NO YES NO F1 A&B 371 GL AO A i0 C C NO YES NO V59 E&B 25' cGL AO A PK< 0 C NO YES NO MSI'1 V122 J,&B GL AO A (I "0 C HO YES NO R2 SA C C C YES 0 IRC ORC R5 6 SA C C C YES 0 R8 8 SA C C C YES 0 R11 10 SA C C C YES 0 57 S YES MAIN STEAM R14 I

~

1 SA C C C YES 0 MSR11 P) LOOP B P19 B EH A C C NO NO V2 A&B 7 AO A 5 0 C C C NO YES NO s

F2 A&B 3 AO A 1 C C C C NO YES NO

>I > TC V60 V8 A 6'L gl IGA AO MO A

A (t

PO 3C 0

C C

0 C

AI C

C NO YES YE NO 0

V124 ~GL AO A 0 C C C NO YES NO IRC ORC R3 4 RL SA C C C C YES NO R6 6 RL SA C ~ C C C YES 0 R9 8 RL SA C C C C YES 0 R12 10 RL SA C C C C YES 0 R15 R SA C C C C YES 0

  • )

+

MS4l1Z MSR15 ~ 042 S YES NO MAIH STEAM P20 A GL EH A C ~cy' C NO YES NO LOOP C V3 P&B 7 GL AO A 0 C C NO YES NO a F3 JI&B GL AO A C C C C NO YES NO V61 GI AO A 0 NO FQ>j TC V9 A

Q GA MO A C C

0 C

AI C

C YES S

'/f'ES NO NO V126 &B Gl AO A 0 C C C NO NO 6.2A l5 8606>> O260-0 Amendment N0. ~4

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V <<~>>

sq r) ~

T TABLE 6.2.4- I

'APER RE. ~,bI, P,

~ ~ CONTAINMENT ISOLATION

=

SYSTEM DATA Aperture Carl SHNF P,, FSAR PENETRATlON DATA VALVE DATA VALVE POSITIOM o+ 4(g ~4/

e OO OO 4 A. ~

PEHETRAT)OM DETAIL Col

+ A, c

~4 o 4/ k~v

~v I, 4 ~ B' cFW ev e NOTE IRC ORC V26 ql g 25'A EH A 0 C NO YES NO TC 57 NO FEEDWATER V123 g L AO A C C NO YES NO FW-V24 TC LOOP A V89 A&B AO A 4a 0 )

-C NO YES NO V90 A&B AO A ~I3 0 C NO YES NO SEE NOTE A IRC ORC V27 A&B EH A l3 5 0 NO YES NO TC TC 044 W NO FEEDWATER V124 A&B AO A +6 IO C NO YES NO LOOP B V91 A&B AO A jA'I3 0 NO YES NO SG B V92 A&B AO A gl 1~0 NO YES NO FWVI2l SEE NOTE A IRC ORC V28 A&B glgfI EH A 5 0 C C HO YES NO TC, 044 W NO FEEDWATER V125 A&B AO A IO C C C NO'O YES NO TC 25'/q

/ 0r LOOP C V93 A&B AO A C C YES NO TC V94 A&B yq/ gL AO A 50gC gO C C NO YES HO C

EO ) RV-VINS NOTE A IRC PRC R500 l7 SA C HO YES YES 803 55 W NO CVCS- V511 A 17 GL AO A 10 CY NO YES YES NORMAL V512 A AO A 10 0 HO YES YES LETDOWN V513 A GL AO A 10 CY NO YES YES V518 1 GL AO A 10 0 NO YES YES Cs.VSI1 CLVS14 I

IRC ORC 803 NO CVCS- V515 CK SA NO YES YES NORMAL V610 GA MO 10 AZ NO YES YES CHARGING CS VSI 0 NOTE A The arrangement is shown as detail "Typical at Feedwater Isolation Valve" of FSAR Figure 10. 1.0-3 C Bypass 6.214 16 SC06 > > 0360 Amendment No. 14

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TI TA8LE 6.2.4- I 0

>rg ~b ~ g~j CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM DATA

'SHNPP  ! FSAR DATA 'ENETRATION VALVE DATA VALVE POSITION o+ O~ v v ~4v

+ ~o @o PENETRATION DETAIL O4v o ~o+

+ I e~ A~ O'A~ Oo 4v Pi ~4'A,o e-Qa >

~4v ~ ~4v ~Z v o g+ v Q A. ~44. goo

+o o a+o v NOTE IRC ORC CVCS-

[sg VC.

803 NO

'A'25 SEAL WATER TO RCP V522 B CK GL SA MO AI YES YES 9

IRC ORC f46 b)0 CVCS-803 NO

'B'26 SEAL WATER TO RCP V523 CK GL SA MO 0

0 AI YES YES ~S

'AS'S

)23 IRC ORC NO )VO 803 NO CVCS

'C'27 SEAL WATER TO RCP V524 CK GL SA MO AI YES YES ES YES I 23 IRC ORC 803 NO NO CVCS- V67 CK .SA C NO YES YES TC TC SEAL WATER, V516 A 2 GL MO A 10 0 AI NO YES YES M g RETURN & V517 B GL MO A 10 0 AI NO YES YES EXCESS LETDOWN IRC ORC TC TC 810 NO SAFETY V581 CK SA C YES NO NO INJECTION- V579 GA MO 0 AI YES NO 2 3 13 LOW HEAD TO COLD LEGS IRC ORC 810 NO SAFETY V580 CK SA YES N NO

)23 INJECTION- V578 GA MO AI YES NO 2 3 LOW HEAD TO COLD LEGS Py IRC ORC NO RHR SUCTION R501 SA NO FROM HOT LEG V502 B 10 MO M AI S 0 NO g] R 501 V503 A 12 MO M AI YES NO RH RH.V503 1S ~~

iI Q

  • Exception to GDC 55 See Section 6.2.4.2.4.2 62 't7 8 uoe s ~ 0260-03 Amendment No 23

P 0

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Jm Oa, Also Available TABLE'.2.4- I VERTU% Aperture Cagg CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM DATA

,CAlRB

'SHNPP, FSAR PENETRATION DATA YALYE DATA r VALVE POSITION o+ Cy V ~4v

~

o oo Cy 4.

eP ~+ 4, ~Co PENETRATION DETAIL < ~e gc CO 4 ~++

~4o O e~ ev NOTE IRC ORC NO RHR SUCTION R500 SA C NO FROM HOT LEG V500 1 MO M C AI YES NO 2,3,I8 g R V501 12 MO M C AI NO RH-VSOO r

TC V17 CK SA C C 0 C YES NO NO V23 CK SA C C 0 C YES NO NO p5 St-yq ORC 808

  • W NO SAFETY V29 CK SA C C 0 C YES NO NO INJECTION- V440 GL M M TL TL TL TL YES NO NO HIGH HEAD TO V439 GL M M TL TL TL TL YES NO NO COLD LEGS V438 144 GL M M TL TL TL TL YES N NO V30 3 GL if M LC LC LC LC YES Y NO V505 B 2 GA MO A 10 C C 0 AI C YES YES YES gI - V sI3 a.vn V506 A 3 GA MO A 10 C C 0 AI C YES YES YES cf I a.va

~s<- vsse p

IRC ORC TC TC SAFETY V510 53 CK SA YES NO NO M $ 10 INJECTION- vsaa 55 CK SA YES NO No Is g~s 5 10

,8 L(M HEAD TO V587 a GA MO AI YES YES YES 5 I.V587 HOT LEGS Q-V511 19 SPARE IRC ORC V84 82 CK SA C C ~C. C YES NO NO V90 36 CK SA 808 NO SAFETY V96 a40 CK SA C C lgi 'CC C YES NO . NO C C C YES NO NO INJECTION- V431 81 GL M M TL TL TL TC TL YES NO NO HXGH HEAD TO V430 35 GL M M TL TL TL TL I HOT LEGS V429 V500 A 139 GL M M TL TL TL YES YES NO NO NO NO 5I 'V t3O 5i vie 1 GA MO RM C C Qc AI C YES YES YES Sl Vee (4tVSO 5 I - V'ItO'I

  • Exception to 55 See Section 6.2.4.2.4.2 6.2A GDC 18 Amendment No. 14 8 606 11 0260-Og

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TA8LE CONTAINMENT ISOLATION

'SHNPP ~

6.2.4- I FSAR SYSTEM DATA PENETRATION DATA VALVE DATA VALVE POSITION o+

~cv I cv cv ~( v ~cv gV cv O O + +

cv PENETRATION DETAIL ce' e+ + < c v

co o

~+ o+< ~o y ~+ 4~o g~ ecv p+ ~ ecv e~ e~ 4 > e + NOTE V39 ~8 CK SA C C g'5 C YES NO NO IRC ORC V45 'g8 CK SA C C ~C C YES NO NO 808

  • W YES NO SAFETY V51 CK SA C C gi'C, 'L C YES NO NO SI-V 88 NJECTION- V434 GL M M TL TL TL YES NO NO HIGH HEAD TO V433 I jP GL M M TL =

TL TL TL YES NO NO HOT LEGS V432 - lVi 13 GL M M TL TL TL YES NO NO Qsa V501 B 1 GA MO RM C C AI C YES YES YES Sl-V51

'Si-V I V63 CK SA C C C YES NO NO IRC ORC V69 CK SA C C C YES NO NO Sl-VlI3 l 808 W YES NO SAFETY V CK SA C C yrO C YES NO NO

~~i~ TC HIGH HEAD TO/

COLD LEGS j~c 0 GL GL GL M

M M

M M

M TL TL TL TL TL TL TL TL TL TL TL YES YES YES NO NO NO NO NO NO 2 .5 iS n V502 a GA MO RM C C AI C YES YES YES

.I, YtI3I I

VMS V(I3$

(RC ORC TC TC TC 050 56 YES NO CONTAINMENZ V27 P'g CK SA C YES YES YES SPRAY V21 P'g GA MO ao ,C AI YES YES YES IRC ORC V51 YES YES YES 050 56 NO CONTAINMENT CK SA AI YES YES SPRAY V43 GA MO 10 YES CT-V51 CT V43 IRC 0RC 047 57 W NO NO SERVICE B46 1 BF MO RM 0 0 0 AI 0 YES NO AM 25 TC p WATER TO FAN COOLER AH-3 Yes

  • Exception to GDC 55 See Section 6.2.4.2.4.2 6.2.4 19 Amendment No. 14 8606 3 1 0260 05

4

'I C l r

II s

TI 6.2A-.I TABLE

'APERARE CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM DATA CMM Pp~~, sea sHNpp FSAR PENETRATlON DATA VALVE DATA AJ VALVE POSITION o+ ~+ 4v ~4v ~4v oo oo g+ ++ +4v 4

PENETRATION DETAIL A% 0 oe+

4 A, y 'V Cy

~4o cP A.

Co v ~4k g A.

QQ 4o v Q e o ev ev > e F e NOTE IRC ORC AH-2 28 ~}

g>

047 W NO NO SERVICE WATER TO PAN B45 A Qa'z MO RM g- 0 0 0 AI 0 YES COOLER AH-2 IRC ORC SERVICE I 047 57 NO NO WATER TO PAN B52 B BF MO RM o 0 0 AI 0 YES NO AH.1 'l QM COOLER AH-1 y

IRC ORC SERVICE I AI J4 I 047 TC 57 NO NO WATER TO FAN B51 BF W B 1 MO RM 0 0 0 0 YES NO 2I COOLER pgs AH-4 IRC ORC SERVICE 047 W NO WATER FROM B47 'A MO AI YES Loi, TC FAN COOLER Rl SA YES AH-3 IRC 0RC SERVICE 047 W NO NO WATER FROM B49 BF MO Q~ o AI YES NO FAN COOLER R3 RP SA C YES 0 AH-2 IRC OR C SERVICE 047 57 W NO NO WATER FROM B48 BF MO o AI YES PO FAN COOLER R2 RP SA C YES 0 AH 1 3\ AH-1 TC IRC ORC SERVICE 047 57 W NO NO WATER PROM B50 MO o AI YES 0 TC FAN COOLER R4 SA YES .>ST' SW Ri

! 8 QM I

AH-4 A@4 32 SW-850 6,2A 20 Amendment No. 14 8606 j. L 0260-0&

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TI Also Available 0< TABLE 6.2.4-l Card Q@RD Aperture CONTAlNMENT 1SOLAT ION SYSTEM DATA t%

SHNPP FSAR PENETRATION DATA VALVE DATA g( POSITION o+ v VALVE 4v ~4v O O + + /+

v ipse'V PENETRATION DETAIL ce o l,

~+ 0> P < W~ @o+

O><~ so

~+ g v io ~4~0 O g

+@+ o v Z >Z 4 W O 4 A~ NOTE TC IRC ORC PS QS GAS SAMPLE 33 052 56 A NO YES V408 SO A 10 C NO YES YES SP V%05 SP v%09 OM POS ACCIDENTSKIDP2 v409 SO A 10 C NO YES YES IRC ORC LC. ILRT 34'T V 416 56 A NO YES ROTOMETER V2 G Jt LC LC LC 0 NO YES YES lRC ORC COMPONENT TC TC 821 56 HO-TC W NO NO COOLING V171 CK SA 0 YES WATER - TO V170 GA MO A 10 0 AI YES YES RCP CC V170 IDIO IRC ORC COMPONENT 821 56 W NO NO COOLING V51 CK SA YES YES TC M 'WATER FROM V184 A GA MO A 10 AI YES'ES RCP V183 B- GA MO A 10 AI I YES YES II pro MO QQ-91191 ~c cRc COMPONENT COOLING CK Sh 0 g /

Ao

'(8 821 57 W NO NO WATER TO V172 B '.

MO A 10 AI NO I ~0 CCVlTL REACTOR V182 B I MO A 10 AI NO NO COOLANT DRA TANK AND TC EXCESS LET- g2. QQ pJO gO DOWN HEAT t;0 <0 EXCHANGERS Tc g.c-R4+

LRC OIIC COMPONENT 821 56 W NO NO COOLING V50 3 CK SA YES WATER FROM V191 A RZ'A MO A 10 AI C

YES YES YES CC V191 99 4 RCP THERMAL BARRIERS V190 B GA MO A 10 0 (~g AI YES YES C V50 lRC 0RC 801 56 W NO DEMIN V525 CK SA YES 0 NO YES WATER D525 DA AO NO YES YES TO PRT 6.2.4 21 Amendment No, 19

~II 061~ 0260-oa

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TI APERTU11 Also Available On TABLE 6.2.4- I CAM Aperture Card CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM DATA shape FsiR PENETRATION DATA VALVE DATA

'NLVE POSITION o+ o~ o~ ~4v

'V o o PENETRATION DETAIL Ce' ~O g A,

4+

++ o Cy

~4v @cv ~4v

~to

~>o~ we~ v v o~o ev NOTE 1RC ORC TC TC 300 A TC 56 NO YES SERVICE V15 CK SA C C C C NO YES YES AIR V14 GL M LC LC LC LC NO YES YES SA-V 15 'A.V14 1RC ORC D653 DA M M 0 0 0 0 NO NO NO 813 56 W NO YES RCDT PUMP D654 DA M M 0 0 0 0 NO NO NO DISCHARGE D651 DA M M LC LC LC LC NO YES YES TC TC L600 GL AO A 10 0 0 C C NO YES YES D650 DA AO A 10 0 0 C C NO YES YES SPARE ORC 061 56 W NO YES REFUELING D164 DA M LC LC LC LC NO YES YES LC. 1 L.

CAVITY D165 DA M LC LC LC LC NO YES YES 14 4

44 CLEAN-UP SF 01ES

~6 IRC ORC 061 56 W NO YES REFUELING D25 DA M M LC LC LC LC NO YES 114 YES LC. i" L.C. CAVITY D26 DA M M 5, 14 LC LC LC LC NO YES YES CLEAN-UP SF.D25 SR)25 SPARE IAC ORC

'l4 I VALVECHAllBER CONTAI&KNT 2.0 810 W YES NO SUMP TO V571 GA MO 3,4 1 0 AI YES NO NO RHR PAP

$ 1 V571 1AC ORC CONTAINMENT 2.0 I 14 VALVEau44EE1L I

810 W YES NO SAP TO V570 GA MO 3,4 0 AI YES NO NO 15 RHR PUMP Ei.VETO

  • Exception to Section 6.2.4.2.4. '.2.4 22 GDC 56 See 3 8 6061 i 0260 -Og Amendment No. 14 14

'1 i

8 Lc.ai l'

TI TABLE 6.2A-I

'APERTUIIE A CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM DATA GAJRD SHNPP FSAR PENETRATION DATA VALVE DATA VALVE POSITION O~ O~ ~4@

O O

+

PENETRATION DETAIL c~ v A. 0 o< A.

~+ 4o wA

~4 gA. O e" e~ Ccg NOTE ORC C NTAINHENT I 12r I VALVECNAMeeR 050 NO SUMP TO V6 A MO A RH AI NO NO 15 CT PUMP IRC VALVa uuueaR'50 NO CO HTAINHENT SUMP TO CT PUMP V7 B A RH

~ ~0 AI NO NO IO2 QO VL lRC OR SG Go-6 60-I'6

"~51- 051 57 YES HO STEAM GENERATOR P6 V2 V3

'$+S 7i . L AO AO M

A A

M

( 0 0

C C

C C.

NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO I2o

'A'LOWD(MN Vll A GL AO A ~C@ 0 C NO YES NO )20 V F6 GL AO A 0 C NO NO NO 51 Bb-, I 1RC. ORC Ok qo~ooo P7 G AO A NO NO NO 051 57 YES NO STEAM V5 AO A NO NO NO

)2o QQ.V~u GENERATOR v6 GL M M NO NO NO

(

eo v5 'B'LOWDOWN V15 GL AO A NO YES NO [20 ea O

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