ML18019B004

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Forwards marked-up FSAR Section 6.2.4 Re Containment Isolation Valves.Fsar Will Be Formally Revised in Future Amend
ML18019B004
Person / Time
Site: Harris Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 06/04/1986
From: Zimmerman S
CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To: Harold Denton
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NUDOCS 8606110260
Download: ML18019B004 (65)


Text

I'EQUL Y INFORMATION DISTRIBUTI SYSTEM (RIDS)

>Q ACCESSION NBR: 86061102b0 DOC. DATE: 86/06/04 NOTARIZED:

NO DOCKET 0 FACIL:50-400 Sheav'on Hav v'is Nucleav'owev Planti Unit ii Carolina 05000400 AUTH. NAj'fE AUTHOR AFFILIATION ZINMERNANiS. R.

Cav olina Power 5 Light Co.

RECIP. NAI'lE RECIPIENT AFFILIATION DENTON> H. R.

Office of Nuclear Reactor. Reguiationi Directov'post 851125

SUBJECT:

Forwav'ds mav ked-up FSAR Section

6. 2. 4 v e containment isolation valves. FSAR thrill be formallg v evised in futuv e amend

~

DISTRIBUTION CODE:

B001D COPlES RECEIVED: LTR ENCL SI 2E:

TITLE: Licensing Submittal:

PSAR/FSAR Amdts 8r Related Cov'respondence NOTES: Application for pev mit renewal filed.

05000400 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NANE PWR-A ADTS PWR-A EICSB PWR-A PD2 LA BUCKLEY,B 01 PWR-A RSB INTERNAL: ADN/LFNB IE FILE IE/DGAVT/GAB 21 NRR PWR-B ADTS R

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SINK Carolina Power & Light Company SERIAL: NLS-86-178 Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT NO.

1 - DOCKET NO.50-000 CONTAINMENTISOLATIONVALVEFSAR CHANGES

Dear Mr. Denton:

Carolina Power i'.r. Light Company submits marked-up changes to FSAR Section 6.2.0 regarding Containment Isolation Valves.

These changes are submitted to provide the NRC with an advance copy for their review. The FSAR willbe formally revised in a future amendment.

If you have any questions, please contact Mr. Gregg A. Sinders at (919) 836-8168.

Yours very truly, GAS/pgp (3916GAS)

Attachment cc:

Mr. B. C. Buckley (NRC)

Mr. G. F. Maxwell (NRC-SHNPP)

Dr. 3. Nelson Grace (NRC-RII)

Mr. Travis Payne (KUDZU)

Mr. Daniel F. Read (CHANGE/ELP)

Wake County Public Library S

. Zi erman M

ager Nuclear-icensing Section Mr. Wells Eddleman Mr. 3ohn D. Runkle Dr. Richar.d D. Wilson Mr. G. O. Bright (ASLB)

Dr. 3. H. Carpenter.(ASLB)

Mr. 3. L. Kelley (ASLB) 8b06iio o

gOOOOOO.,

pDR ADOCH O5

@DR, A

411 Fayettevilte Street o P. O. Box 1551 o Raleigh. N. C. 27602

SHNPP FSAR

'anual

valves, closed remote~anual
valves, and closed automatic valves which remain closed after a loss-of-coolant accident.

Locked closed isolation valves are under administrative control to assure that they cannot be inadvertently opened.

6.2.4.2.4.2 General Design Criterion 55 Lines which are connected to the reactor coolant pressure boundary are shown in Table 6.2.4-1.

Each penetration is provided with one of the following

'valve arrangements conforming to the requirements of 10CFR50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion 55, as follows:

a)

One locked-'closed-isolation valve inside and one locked-closed-isolation valve outside Containment; or b)

One automatic-isolation valve inside and one locked-closed-isolation valve outside Containment; or c)

One locked-closed-isolation valve inside and one automatic-isolation valve outside Containment; a simple check valve is not used as the automatic-isolation valve outside Containment; or d)

One automatic-isolation valve inside and one automatic-isolation valve outside Containment; a simple check valve is not used as the automatic-isolation valve outside Containment.

Isolation valves are located as close to the Containment as practical and, upon loss of actuating power, solenoid and air-operated automatic-isolation valves fail closed.

An exception of GDC 55 is taken for the RHR suction lines.

The lines from the

'CS hot legs to the RHR pump suctions each contain two remote manual (motor operated)

valves, which are locked closed during normal plant power operation and are under administrative control to assure that they cannot be inadvertently
opened, in accordance with SRP Section 6.2.4 Item II.f.

The valves are interlocked such that they cannot be opened when the RCS pressure is greater than the design pressure of the RHR system.

This valve arrangement is provided in accordance with Westinghouse Systems Standard Design Criteria, Number 1.14, Revision 2 and Appendix B of ANSI Standard N271-1976.

P An exception to Criterion 55 is taken for several isolation valves in lines which penetrate Containment and are required to perform safeguards functions following an accident.

Lines which fall into this category include the RHR and safety injection lines, and RCP seal injection lines.

Since these valves must remain open or be opened, a trip signal cannot be used.

Instead, each of these motor operated valves is capable of remote manual operation Upon completion of the safeguards function of the line, the operator can close the isolation valve from the Control Room.

Leak detection capabilities for these ines is discussed in Section 5.2.5.

ee. Inset~

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enera es gn Criterion 56 The lines that penetrate the Containment and communicate directly with both the atmosphere inside and outside of the Containment are of two types.

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SUPP FSAR SIGNAL INDEX FOR TABLE 6.2.4-1 1

Containment isolation Phase A (Signal 'T')

2 Containment isolation Phase B (Signal 'P')

3 Safety injection actuation (Signal 'S')

4 Two out of four RWST low-low level 5

Main steam line isolation 6

Two out of three low-low level in any steam generator 7

Loss -of main feedwater pumps 8

Containment ventilation isolation 9

Containment inside/outside differential pressure

< - 2.5 in. wgo 10 -

Containment inside/outside differential pressure

< 0o25 in. wg.

11 Containment spray actuation 12 Two out three reactor coolant pump undervoltage 13 Two out three low-low level in any steam generator jg 14 Main feedwater line isolation 15 Main steam line isolation + steam generator low pressure 16 Steam generator low-low level + excessive auxiliary feedwater flow to same generator

<<<ili0.rg Feed ~a4er ISolakIon

~+

I-oSS of oAsihe Power I5 Any Zj earn generakov.

Low-Lo~ Level 6.2.4-11

SKIP FSAR,'EFINITIONS FOR TABLE 6.2.4-1 ACCIDENT SIGNAL A signal which automatically initiates positioning of valves other than containment isolation valves to positions required to perfor'm their safety-related function.

2o AUTOMATIC ACTUATION Initiation of a powex-operated valve by automatic means without any action by a plant operator upon receipt of an accident/isolation signal from a protection system.

3%

CLOSED SYSTEM A safety-related piping system which penetrates and is a closed system either inside or outside the Containment.

The system is subject to the pump and valve operability test requirements and the inservice inspection requirements of the APifE Code Section Xl.

Under normal operating or LOCA conditions for closed systems inside Containment, the fluid in the system does not communicate directly with either the Reactor Coolant System or containment atmosphere.

Under normal operating or LOCA conditions for closed systems outside Containment, the fluid in the system does not communicate'directly with the environs.

4.

CONTAIRKNT ISOLATION SIGNAL - A signal which automatically initiates positioning of valves other than engineered safety feature valves to positions required to perform their containment isolation function.

CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE A valve which establishes a mechanical barriex in appropriate fluid systems penetrating the Containment; which could otherwise represent open paths to the environment from inside the Containment for fission product 6.

LEAKAGE PATH A penetration that is not part of a safety-related closed system and that could provide a direct path to the environment.

7 ~

LOCKED CLOSED ISOLATION VALVE A valve that is in a closed position by administrative controls by one of the following:

(1)

A mechanical device locking the valve in the closed position.

(2)

A normally closed valve with a seal or lock on any manual override, if present, and a seal or lock on the power breaker or power source in a manner that prevents power from being supplied to the valve.

POWER TRAIN The source of emergency electrical power from one or both of the redundant A and B emergency buses.

See'ection 8.3 REMOTE MANUAL ACTUATION Initiation of a power-operated valve by a discrete manual action such as operation of a control switch.

Maximum

RESPONSE

TIME - Stro e time for a valve to move to its safety-related

'position.

sec inscv5 R o4:otkaehrnenp

'f TYPE C TEST 10CFR50 Appendix test as described in Section 6.2.6o 6.2.4-12

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SEEP FSAR NOTES FOR TABLE 6. 2. 4-1 The inside containment barrier is a closed system inside Containment.

The closed system is subject to the inservice inspection requirements of APifE Section XI.

The system remains at a pressure greater than 45 psig post-LOCA.

2 ~

Sce in S.erg of o~. )

The outside containment isolation barrier is a closed ESF system outside the Containment.

The system is subject to the pump and valve operability test requirements and the inservice inspection requirements 5 f the ASNE Code Section XI.

inment valve which is not relied u

ontaznment isolation functxo s not relied upon for containment isola ype C test is required.

4 ~

Remote manual instrument isolation valve.

Valve is maintained open for both normal and post-LOCA operation.

5.

i&nual or remote-manual which is locked (physically locked or administratively controlled) and remains locked post-LOCA.

6.

7.

I The valve is used periodically during operation.

Any leakage through the valve would 'be detected during normal operation.

Valve is only opened when adding water to the pressurizer relief tank or RCP standpipe.

It is interlo'eked to cl'ose on a Phase A containment isolation signal.

8.

Valve is only opened when adding water to the accumulators.

It is interlocked to close on a Phase A containment isolation signal.

Valve is opened only to verify leaktightness of accumulator check valve.

It is interlocked to close on a Phase A containment-isolation signal.

10 Valve is opened only when charging nitrogen to the accumulators it is interlocked to close on a Phase

.A containment isolation signal.

~ay c,

Center shaft butterfly valve tested in the reverse direction Leakage is equivalent since the same sealing surfaces are tested when test pressure is applied from either direction.

12.

13 Wedge-disk gate valve tested in the reverse direction.

Results obtained

'in this configuration are equivalent to testing in the accident direction.

Because of the disk seat design, testing in either direction measures the leakage across both seating surfaces.'lobe valve tested in the reverse direction.

The results obtained are conservative since test pressure tends to unseat the valve disk.

14.

Diaphragm valve tested in the reverse direction.

Leakage is equivalent since the same seating surface is tested when test pressure is applied from either direction.

SHNPP FSAR NOTES TO TABLE 6.2.4-1 (CONT'D) 15.

These penetrations are connected directly to the sump.

During an

accident, they will be filled with water.

This water seal will exist during the entire post-accident period.

16.

Both the pressure sensor and the hydraulic isolators have an internal beLLows which serve as isolation barriers for the capillary tubes.

17.

The isoLation valve is sealed with a seal.-fluid with sufficient fluid inventory to assure the sealing function for at Least 30 days at 1 ~ 10 P

5 W

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We,< - La.qu p 6.2.4-13a Amendment No.

25

SHiilPP FSAR ABBREVIATIONS FOR TABLE 6. 2.4-1 Fluid A-Air G Gas S

Steam W Water CF-Capillary Filling Valve Tv e BF Butterfly CK Check DA Diaphragm GA - Gate GL Globe RG Regulating RL Relief XC Excess Flov Check Valve

Actuator, AO Air Operator EH Electro-hydraulic M Manual i'lO Motor. Operator.

SA Self-Actuating SO - Solenoid Operator.

Primary/Secondary Actuation Modes A - Automatic Manual Valve Position AE As Es C - Closed Cy - Cycle LC Locked Closed LO Locked Open 0 - Open TH - Throttled TL - Locked Throttled

6. 2. 4-14 RF Reverse Floe RM Remote Manual Amendment No.

8

TABLE 6.2.4-2 CONTAINMENT.ISOLATION VALVE POSITION FOLLOWING AN ACCIDENT Penetration No.

Penetration Name Essential or>

1 Non Essential Valve Position Ml M2 M3 MS-SG A

HS-SG B

MS-SG C

NE NE NE CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED M4 M5 M6 FEEDWATER SG A

FEEDWATER SG B

FEEDWATER SG C

NE NE NE CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED Ml HB M10 Mll H12 M13 M14 M15 M16 M17 m

M18 c.

H19 M20 n

M21 M22 0

M23 H24 NO L LETDO N C-UCS Nor~a.l CHARG NG SEAL INJECTION RC PUHP A SEAL INJECTION RC PUHP B

SEAL INJECTION RC PUMP C

RC PUHP SEAL INJECTION AND EXCESS LETDOWN EXCH OUTLET LOW HEAD SI TO COLD LEG LOW HEAD SI TO COLD LEG RHR LOOP 1

(NORMAL OPERATION MODE)

RHR LOOP 2

(NORHAL OPERATION MODE)

N i h Head Sy ~ Cold Le LOW HEAD SI TO HOT LEG SPARE HIGH HEAD SI TO HOT LEG HIGH HEAD SI TO HOT LEG HIGH HEAD SI TO COLD LEG CONTAINMENT SPRAY CONTAINMENT SPRAY NE NE E

E E

NE NE NE E

pe E

CLOSED CLOSED OPENED OPENED OPENED CLOSED OPENED OPENED CLOSED CLOSED OPENED CLOSE (S P

BY 0 OR N/A ACTION LONG CLOSE (5) T COOLIN CLOSE (5

Ca.o>CO (~ )

OPENED:"

OPENED:""-

25

TABLE 6.2.4-2 (Cont'd)

CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE POSITION FOLLOWING AN ACCIDENT Penetration No.

Penetration Name Essential or Non Essential Valve Position M25 M26 M27 M28 M29 M30 M31 M32 M33 M34 M35 M36 M37 M38 M39 M40 M41 M42 M43 M44 M45 M46 M47 M48 M49 M50 M51 M52 M53 M54 M55 CONTAINMENT FAN COOLER AH3-SW IN CONTAINMENT FAN COOLER AH2-SW IN CONTAINMENT FAN COOLER AH1-SW IN CONTAINMENT FAN COOLER AH4-SW IN CONTAINMENT FAN COOLER AH3-SW OUT CONTAINMENT FAN COOLER Af SW OUT CONTAINMENT FAN COOLER AHl-SW OUT CONTAINMENT FAN COOLER AH4-SW OUT POST ACCIDENT GAS SAMPLE RETURN ILRT ROTOMETER COMPONENT COOLING WATER RC PUMP COMPONENT COOLING WATER RC PUMP COMP COOLING WATER EXC LETDN & RCDT COMP COOLING WATER EXC LETDN & RCDT COMP COOLING WATER - RC PUMP THERM BARR MAKEUP WATER TO PRESSURIZER SERVICE AIR SUPPLY RCDT PUMP DISCHARGE SPARE S

F PURIFICATION PUMP TO REFUELING CAVITY REFUELING CAVITY WATER CLEANUP-OUT SPARE SUMP RECIRC (RffR A)

SUMP RECIRC (RHR B)

SUMP RECIRC (CONT SPRAY A)

SUMP RECIRC (CONT SPRAY B)

SG A BLOWDOWN SG B

BLOWDOWN SG C

BLOWDOWN SG A BLOWDOWN SAMPLE SG B

BLOWDOWN SAMPLE E

E E

E E

E NE NE NE E

NE NE NE NE NE E

E

~

E E

NE NE NE

. NE NE C.to&ED CLoSEO OPENED OPENED OPENED OPENED OPENED OPENED OPENED OPENED CLOSE

<3)

CLOSED

.0 CLOSED 20 SIGNAL)-'-':-"

cn CLOSED CLO ED CASED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED N/A CLOSED CLOSED N/A OPENE

+)

OPENE OPENE f'f)

OPENE CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED LLY C PEN 0 ATER IN RWST

TABLE 6.2.4-2 (Cont'd)

CONTAINi1EifT ISOLATION VALVE POSITION FOLLOWING AM ACCIDENT Penetration No.

Penetration Name Essential or Non Essential Valve Position H56 L157 i~f58 H59 H60 H61 H62 H63 H64 H65 H66-H68 H69 H70 H71 H72 SG C

BLOWDOWN SAHPLE CONTAINMENT PURGE HAKEUP CONTAIi%1ENT PURGE EXHAUST VACUUH RELIEF A SPARE H2 PURGE HAKE-UP CONTHT LEAK RATE TEST PRESS INDIC.

H2 PURGE EXHAUST SPARE FUEL TRANSFER TUBE SPARE CONTAINHENT PRESSURE SENSING A CONTAINHENT PRESSURE SENSING B

CONTAINlfENT PRESSURE SENSING C

CONTAINHENT PRESSURE SENSING D

NE NE NE NE NE CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLO E

CLOSED Cf.OSED N/A CLOSED N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A H73A H73B H74 H75

?176A H76B H77A H77B H77C H78A H78B H78C H78D H79 H80 H81-fif85 CONTAINHENT ATH H2 RADIATION HONITOR CONTAINHENT ATH H~ RADIATION HONITOR CONTAINHENT SU'fP PUHP DISCHARGE SPARE ACCUHULATOR FILL ACCUHULATOR TO RWST Ng TO~CCUHULATOR PRT Hf & CDT CONNECTION RCDT H2 SUPPLY

& GAS SAHPLE RC LOOP 2

& 3 SAHPLE PRESS.

LIQUID SAHPLE PRESS'TEAH SAHPLE ACCUHULATOR SAHPLE FIRE PROTECTION-STANDPIPE SUPPl Y INSTR AIR SUPPLY SPARES p/ ~

E p

NE NE NE NE NE NE NE NE NE NE NE NE CLOSED*

CLOSED*

CLOSED N/A CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSE (3)

CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED N/A

TABLE 6.2.4-.2 (Cont'd)

CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE POSITION FOLLOWING AN ACCIDENT Penetration No.

M86A M86B M87 M88 M89 M90 M91 M92 M93 M94A,B M95A>B M94C M95C M96 M97 M98 M99-M102 M103A M103B M103C M104 M105 M106 M107A M107B M107C M108 M109 M110 Penetration Name CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN ANALYZER COHTAINMEHT HYDROGEN ANALYZER SPARE POST ACCIDENT LIQUID SAMPLE RETURN SPARE DEMIN. WATER TO FUEL TRANSFER SYSTEM CONTR PANEL & REFUELING CAVITY DECON CONTAINMEHT FAN COIL UNITS SW OUT CONTAINMENT FAN COIL UNITS SW - IN SPARE CONTAINMENT VACUUM RELIEF SENSING LINES CONTAINMENT VACUUM RELIEF SENSING LINES o~h ltJ)vlEMT OUTSibE'IFFEREnlTIRC pRGssukB se>sic&

CONTAINMENT LEAK RATE TEST SUPPLY 6 EXHAUST SPARE VACUUM RELIEF B SPARES RVLIS RVLIS RVLIS SPARE FIRE PROTECTION SPRINKLER SYS HDR SPARE RVLIS RVLI8 RVLIS AUX FEEDWATER TO SG A AUX FEEDWATER TO SG B

AUX FEEDWATER TO SG C

Essential or Non Essential NE NE NE E

NE NE NE Valve Position CLOSED*

CLOSED~

N/A CLOSED (3)

N/A CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED N/A OPEN OPEN OPE~<

N/A CLOSED N/A CLOSED N/A N/A N/A H/A N/A CLOSED N/A N/A N/A N/A OPENED +

OPENED

+

OPEHED +

g 20 20 20

TABLE 6.2.4-2 (Cont'd)

CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE POSITION FOLLOWING AN ACCIDENT 2)

ISOLATION VALVE CLOSED ON PHASE A CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SIGNAL.

REOPEN MANUALLY FOR POST ACCIDENT H2 SAMPLING.

NORMALLY CLOSED.

OPEN ON CONTAINMENT SPRAY ACTUATION SIGNAL.

A "P" SIGNAL IS DEFINED AS A CONTAINMENT PHASE B SIGNAL.

WILL BE CLOSED TO ISOLATE FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR (ie.,

LOSS OF SG PRESSURE BOUNDARY)

ESSENTIAL:

LINES REQUIRED TO MITIGATE AN ACCIDENT, OR WHICH, fF UNAVAILABLECOULD INCREASE THE MAGNITUDE OF THE EVENT.

NON-ESSENTIAL:

LINES WHICH ARE NOT REQUIRED TO MITIGATE AN ACCIDENT, AND WHICH IF REQUIRED AT ALL WOULD BE REQUIRED FOR LONG TERM RECOVERY ONLY; ie.,

DAYS OR WEEKS FOLLOWING AN ACCIDENT.

3)

Aft.UES CtM'>PLEO gd~GRm >rrENrLy +OR'cS7 - +cC1Deu'7 SAmpzinjc IQI7 rlHLc y cc.osEu op&/ on/ Low %8rEH c,E'vEL w sp(n/57-Or-'E~CD i3Y CP~~+rDR 4C770hl FO+ LO~'Q

SHNPP FSAR During a type A test, the steam generator'econdar side is to be vented outside the containment atmos here.

The systems connected to the secondary side of the steam generator are identified in Table 6.2.4-1.

6.2.6-2a Amendment No.

26

SHNPP FSAR 6.2.6.3 Containment Isolation Valve Leaka e Rate Tests (T

e C Tests)

Table 6.2.4-1 lists aLL valves which are associated with the penetrating piping systems.

Table 6.2.4-1 also indicates for all valves listed which are considered to be containment isolation vaLves and which of the containment isolation valves are to be subjected to Type C test The EoLlowing criteria were used to determine which containment isolation valves are Local leak tested:

a)

The penetrating system provides a direct connection between the inside and outside environments of the Containment under normal operation.

b)

The system is isolated by containment isolation valves which close automatically to effect containment isoLation in response to a Phase A

containment isolation signal.

26 c)

The system is an engineered safety features system which does not require leak testing because the system is a closed system outside of Containment in accordance with SRP 6.2.4 and because the isoLation valve is sealed with a seal-fluid with sufficient Eluid inventory to assure the sealing function for at least 30 days at 1..10 Pa.

, ~ 'H d)

The system is an engineering safety features system which has only a single isolation valve located outside Containment requiring testing because the system is a closed system outside of Containment in accordance with SRP 6.2.4o

~

~

~

The engineering safety features systems and penetrations which are not leak tested because they are in accordance with item "c" are:

ECCS low head safety injection to the cold legs (M-13 and M-14), the Containment sump water.

supply.to the ECCS low head (RHR) pumps (M-47 and M-48), and the Containment sump water supply to the Containment spray pumps (M-49 and M-50).

The fluid seal within the pipe and the closed system outside of Containment preclude release of containment atmosphere to the environment.

No containment air leakage can occur due to a single active failure in any of these systems.

The engineered safety features and penetrations which are leak tested in accordance with item "d" are:

ECCS high head safety injection to the cold legs (M-17 and M"22),

ECCS low and high head safety injection to the hot legs (M-18, M-20, and M-21), and the CVCS seal water supply to the Reactor Coolant Pumps (M-9, M-10, and M-11).

The single isolation valve outside Containment and the closed system outside Containment preclude release of the containment atmosphere to the environment.

No containment air Leakage can occur due to a single active failure in any of these systems.

26 Service Water to and from the fan coolers is a closed ASME Class 2 system inside containment in accordance with FSAR paragraph 6.2.4.2.4.4.

No single active failure of any component could provide a potential leakage path Eor post-LOCA containment atmosphere.

This system is described in FSAR Section 9.2.1.

General Design Criterion 57 is applicable to this system as discussed in FSAR Section 6.2.4.

6.2.6-6 Amendment No.

26

SHNP P FS AR 26 t

PLL portions o

the secondary side o

t e steam generators are consxdere an extension oE the Containment.

These systems penetrate the containment shell at penetrations numbered 1 through 6, 51 through 56, and 108 through )10. ~L (hlSCgT' o $ ~++~+~en The test, vent and drain (TVD) connections that are used to facilitate local Leak testing are under administrative controL, and subject to periodic surveiLl.ance, to assure their integrity and verify the efEectiveness of administrative controls.

These procedures meet the requirements of SRP Section 6.2.6 Item II.

7 The containment pressure transmitters are designed to meet the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.11 and are described in Section 7.3.

These lines have no isolation valves and rely on closed systems both inside and outside of the Containment to precLude the release oE the containment atmosphere.

The integrity oE these cLosed systems is verified during the periodic Type A

tests'hese Lines penetrate the Containment at penetrations 69, 70, 71, and 72.

/fl5a P~

As noted in Subsection 6.2.4.2.4.4, e

o8 a,/hJ.

3 The test equipment to be used during the Type C tests consists oE a connection to an air supply source, pressure regulator, pressure

gauge, flow indicator, and associated valving or equivalent test setup.

Isolation val.ves are positioned to their post-accident position by the normal method with no accompanying adjustments.

Fluid systems are properly drained and vented with the valves aligned to provide a test volume and atmospheric air back pressure on the isolation vaLve(s) being tested.

The test volume is pressurized to the test pressure P

, 41.0 psig.

The pressure regulator(s) maintain the test volume at a minimum of 41.0 psig.

The air flow rate into the test volume is recorded, as is the pressure

reading, at the intervals specified on the data Eorm.

These records are utilized to determine the l.eakage rate in cubic centimeters per minute.

26 For Larger test

volumes, a pressure decay method may be util.ized to determine the leakage rate.

The total leakage rate for Type B and C tests will be Less than 0.6 l..

The individual testing performed on valves requiring a Type C test is described in Technical Specifications.

In accordance with 10CFR50 Appendix J III.C.1, valves may be tested in the non"accident pressure direction when it can be determined that the results from the tests for the pressure applied in the non-accident direction wil.l provide equivalent or more conservative results.

Fi.2.6-7 Amendment No.

26

The Containment Isolation Valves on the Component Cooling Water lines which provide cooling water to the Reactor Coolant Drain Tank and CVCS Fxress Letdown Heat Exchangers via penetrations 0-V7 and H-38 are not leak tested.

The components inside containment provide a closed system designed in accordance with General Design Criteria 57.

Two simultaneous passive failures of Class 2, or better, systems is not considet ed a credible event.

A LOCA is a passive failure of the Reactor Coolant System, and therefore it is not credible to assume a

.imultaneous passive failure of'he CCM closed system.

Therefore, the closed system inside containment is sufficient, to insure that the Containment atmospher e is not released to the environment. following an accident.

These systems provide a clo

.ed system designed in accordance with

...General Design Criteria 57.

They are not leak tested because the closed system inside containment is sufficient to insure that the Containment atmosphere is not released to the environment following an accident.

m ERTlR%

~0 AvuuabIe Ou Aperture Card PENETRATlON DATA TABLE 6.2.4-l CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM SHNPP I

FSAR DATA VALVE DATA PENETRATION DETAIL

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A A

A A

5i0 PK<(I C

C C

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"0 C

C C

C C

C C

C C

C C

C C

C YES YES YES YES YES NO NO NO NO HO YG

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~ 0 0

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NO NO NO NO NO s

IRC ORC MSR11 P)

>I TC 57 S

YES MAIN STEAM LOOP B R2 R5 R8 R11 R14 P19 V2 F2 V60 V8 V124 I

B A&B A&B A

6 8

10

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A A

A A

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C C

C C

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C C

C C

C C

C C

C C

AI C

C C

C C

C C

C C

C C

YES YES YES YES YES NO NO NO NO YES NO YES YES YE YES 0

0 0

0 0

NO NO NO NO 0

NO IRC ORC a

FQ>j TC MS4l1Z

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R3 R6 R9 R12 R15 P20 V3 F3 V61 V9 V126 A

P&B JI&B A

Q

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6 8

10 7

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GL GL GL GI GA Gl SA SA SA SA SA EH AO AO AO MO AO A

A A

A A

A C

C ~

C C

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0 C

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C C

C C

~cy' C

C 0

C C

C C

C C

C C

C C

AI C

C C

C C

C C

C C

C C

YES YES YES YES YES NO NO NO NO YES NO YES YES YES S

'/f'ES NO 0

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= ISOLATION SYSTEM DATA SHNF P,,

FSAR VALVE DATA IRC PEHETRAT)OM DETAIL ORC o+

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IRC TC ORC TC TC FW-V24 TC SEE NOTE A 044 57 W

NO NO FEEDWATER LOOP A FEEDWATER LOOP B V26 V123 V89 V90 V27 V124 V91 V92 A&B A&B A&B A&B A&B A&B g ql g 25'A L EH AO AO AO EH AO AO AO A

A A

A A

A A

A 4a

~I3 l3

+6 jA'I3 gl 5

IO 0

C 0

0 0

C 0

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C

)

-C C

NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO FWVI2l SEE NOTE A IRC TC, ORC TC TC 044 W

NO FEEDWATER LOOP C

V28 V125 V93 V94 A&B A&B A&B A&B glgfI 25'/q /

yq/ gL EH AO AO AO A

A A

A 5

IO 50gC 0

C 0r gO C

C C

C C

C C

C HO NO'O NO YES YES YES YES NO NO NO HO C )

RV-VINS EO NOTE A Cs.VSI1 I

IRC PRC CLVS14 803 55 W

NO CVCS-NORMAL LETDOWN R500 V511 V512 V513 V518 A

A A

l7 17 1

GL GL GL SA AO AO AO AO A

A A

A 10 10 10 10 C

CY 0

CY 0

HO NO HO NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES IRC ORC CS VSI0 803 NO CVCS-NORMAL CHARGING V515 V610 CK GA SA MO 10 AZ NO NO YES YES YES YES NOTE A

The arrangement is shown as detail C

"Typical Bypass at Feedwater Isolation Valve" of FSAR Figure

10. 1.0-3 6.21416 SC06 > > 0360 Amendment No. 14

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'SHNPP FSAR

'ENETRATION DATA VALVE DATA PENETRATION DETAIL o+

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803 NO CVCS-SEAL WATER TO RCP 'A'25 V522 B

CK GL SA MO AI YES YES IRC ORC 803 NO CVCS-SEAL WATER TO RCP 'B'26 V523 CK GL SA MO 0

0 AI YES YES f46 b)0

'AS'S~S

)23 IRC ORC 803 NO CVCS SEAL WATER TO RCP 'C'27 V524 CK GL SA MO AI YES YES NO ES

)VO YES I 23 TC M

IRC ORC TC g

803 NO NO CVCS-SEAL WATER, RETURN &

EXCESS LETDOWN V67 V516 V517 A

B 2

CK GL GL

.SA MO MO A

A 10 10 C

0 0

AI AI NO NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES IRC ORC TC TC 13 810 NO SAFETY INJECTION-LOW HEAD TO COLD LEGS V581 V579 CK GA SA MO C

0 AI YES NO YES NO NO 2

3 IRC ORC 810 NO SAFETY INJECTION-LOW HEAD TO COLD LEGS V580 V578 CK GA SA MO AI YES N

YES NO NO 2

3 Py

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RH RH.V503 iIQ IRC ORC R

501 1S ~~

NO RHR SUCTION FROM HOT LEG R501 V502 V503 B

A 10 12 SA MO MO M

M AI AI S

YES 0

NO NO NO

  • Exception to GDC 55 See Section 6.2.4.2.4.2 62

't7 8 uoe s ~ 0260-03 Amendment No 23

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'SHNPP, FSAR YALYE DATA PENETRATION DETAIL IRC ORC o+

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~4v 4.

CO 4

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R NO RHR SUCTION FROM HOT LEG R500 V500 V501 1

12 SA MO MO M

M C

C C

AI AI YES NO NO NO 2,3,I8 RH-VSOOr TC p5 St-yq gI-V sI3 a.vn cf I

a.va

~s<- vsse p ORC 808 W

NO SAFETY INJECTION-HIGH HEAD TO COLD LEGS V17 V23 V29 V440 V439 V438 V30 V505 V506 B

A 144 3

2 3

CK CK CK GL GL GL GL GA GA SA SA SA M

M M

if MO MO M

M M

M A

A 10 10 C

C C

TL TL TL LC C

C C

C C

TL TL TL LC C

C 0

0 0

TL TL TL LC 0

0 AI AI C

C C

TL TL TL LC C

C YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES NO NO NO NO NO N

Y YES YES NO NO NO NO NO NO NO YES YES IRC ORC TC 5

10

,8 Q-V511 TC M

5 I.V587

$ 10 SAFETY INJECTION-L(M HEAD TO HOT LEGS V510 vsaa V587 53 55 a

CK CK GA SA SA MO AI YES YES YES NO NO YES NO No Is g~s YES 19 SPARE IRC TC I

5I

'V t3O 5i vie Sl Vee (4tVSO 5 I-V'ItO'I ORC 808 NO SAFETY INJECTION-HXGH HEAD TO HOT LEGS V84 V90 V96 V431 V430 V429 V500 A

82 36 a40 81 35 139 1

CK CK CK GL GL GL GA SA SA SA M

M M

MO M

M M

RM C

C C

TL TL TL C

C C

C TL TL TL C

~C.

lgi C

'C TL TL Qc AI C

C C

TL TL TL C

YES YES YES YES YES YES YES NO NO NO NO NO NO YES NO NO NO NO NO NO YES

  • Exception to GDC 55 See Section 6.2.4.2.4.2 6.2A18 8 606 11 0260-Og Amendment No. 14

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M M

MO M

M M

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C C

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YES YES YES YES YES YES YES NO NO NO NO NO NO YES NO NO NO NO NO NO YES 2.5 iS (RC ORC TC TC TC 050 56 YES NO CONTAINMENZ SPRAY V27 V21 P'g CK P'g GA SA MO ao C

,C AI YES YES YES YES YES YES CT-V51 IRC ORC CT V43 050 56 NO CONTAINMENT SPRAY V51 V43 CK GA SA MO 10 AI YES YES YES YES YES YES IRC 0RC TC p AM 25 047 57 W

NO NO SERVICE WATER TO FAN COOLER AH-3 B46 1

BF MO RM 0

0 0

AI 0

YES Yes NO

  • Exception to GDC 55 See Section 6.2.4.2.4.2 6.2.419 8606 3 1 0260 05 Amendment No. 14

4

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y

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AH-2 28

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NO NO SERVICE WATER TO PAN COOLER AH-2 B45 A

Qa'z MO RM g-0 0

0 AI 0

YES IRC ORC QM AH.1

'l 047 57 NO NO SERVICE WATER TO PAN COOLER AH-1 B52 B

I BF MO RM y

o 0

0 AI 0

YES NO IRC ORC TC 2IJ4 I 047 57 W

NO NO SERVICE WATER TO FAN COOLER AH-4 B51 B

I 1

BF MO RM 0

0 0

AI 0

YES pgs NO TC IRC ORC 047 W

NO SERVICE WATER FROM FAN COOLER AH-3 B47 Rl

'A MO SA AI YES YES

Loi, IRC 0RC 047 W

NO NO SERVICE WATER FROM FAN COOLER AH-2 B49 R3 BF RP MO SA Q~

o C

AI YES YES NO 0

IRC OR C AH 1 3\\

047 57 W

NO NO SERVICE WATER FROM FAN COOLER AH-1 B48 R2 BF RP MO SA o

C AI YES YES PO 0

TC IRC ORC TC SW Ri QM 8

I A@4 32 SW-850 047 57 W

NO NO SERVICE WATER PROM FAN COOLER AH-4 B50 R4 MO SA o

AI YES YES 0

.>ST' 6,2A20 8606 j. L 0260-0&

Amendment No. 14

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