ML18005A823
| ML18005A823 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 02/16/1989 |
| From: | Bradford W, Dance H, Shannon M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18005A821 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-400-88-40, NUDOCS 8903270396 | |
| Download: ML18005A823 (13) | |
See also: IR 05000400/1988040
Text
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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
'l01 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323
Report No.:
50-400/88-40
Licensee:
Carolina
Power
and Light Company
P. 0.
Box 1551
Raleigh,
NC
27602
Docket No.:
50-400
Licensee
No:
Facility Name:
Harris
1
Inspection 'Conducted:
November
21,
1988 - January
20,
1989
Inspectors:
2//6 $ $
Approved by
W.
H. Bradford
M.
C.
Shannon
H. Dance,
Section Chief
Reactor Projects
Section
1A
Division of Reactor Projects
Date Signed
Z 4a
Da
Si
ed
>
h-;
K'a
e Signe
SUMMARY
Scope:
This
routine
sa,ety
inspection
was
conducted
in
the
areas
of
operational
safety
verification,
surveillance
observations,
maintenance
observations,
licensee
event 'reports,
followup of events
at
operating
power
reactors,
and
plant
nuclear
safety
committee
meeting.
Results:
Within the area~
inspected
two violations were identified.
The first
violation involved
a failure to adequately
pe~form post maintenance
testing
which resulted
in
a safety related
room cooling unit being
for approximately
61
days,
paragraph
2.b.
The
second
violation involved
a failure to follow a clearance
procedure
which
resulted
in
a loss of approximately
55,000 gallons of water from the
spent fuel pool to the
new fuel storage
pool, paragraph 2.c.,
Additionally, the licensee
has established
a task force .to determine
the
root
cause
for the
turbine
driven auxiliary
pump
trip which occurred
on January
16,
1989.
Resolution
of
this matter is under inspector follow-up.
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8
REPORT
DETAILS
Persons
Contacted
A
'R.
A. Watson,
Vice President,
Harris Nuclear Project
- C. G. Hinnant, Plant General
Manager
C.
R. Gibson, Director,
Progra'ms
and Procedures
"D. L. Tibbits, Director, Regulatory
Compliance
C.
S.
Bohanan,
Director, Special
Programs
"R.
B.
Van Metre,
Manager,
Technical
Support
- T. C. Morton, Manager,
Maintenance
J.
M. Collins, Manager,
Operations
"J.
R.
Sip'p,
Manager,
Environmental
and Radiation Monitoring
D. A. Braund, Supervisor,
Security
T.
F. Lent,
Systems
Engineering
W.
R. Wilson, Reactor/Performance
Engineering
L. J.
Woods, Testing
and Maintenance
Support
W.
H. Batts,
Supervisor,
Mechanical
Maintenance
"J.
H. Smith, Supervisor,
Operations
Support
C.
S. Oleik, Supervisor,
Shift Operations
"G.
L. Forehand,
Director,
QC/QC
~F.
E. Willet, Manager,
Outages
and Modifications
Other
licensee
employees
contacted
during
this
inspection
included
technicians,
operators,
mechanics,
security
force
members,
engineering
personnel
and office personnel.
~Attended exit interview
Acronyms and initialisms used
throughout this report are listed in
paragraph
9.
2.
Operational
Safety Verification (71707)
Plant Tours
The inspectors
conducted
routine plant tours during this inspection
period to verify that the
licensee's
requirements
and
commitments
were
being
implemented.
These
tours
were
performed
to verify that:
systems,
valves,
and breakers
requi red for safe plant operations
were
in their
correct
position; fire protection
equipment
and
spare
equipment
and materials
were
being maintained
and
stored
properly;
plant
operators
were
aware
of
the
current
plant
status;
plant
operations
personnel
were documenting
the
status
of out-of-service
equipment;
security
and
health
physics
controls
were
being
implemented
as
required
by procedures;
there
were
no
undocumented
cases
of unusual
fluid leaks,
piping vibration,
abnormal
hanger
or
seismic
restraint
movements;
all
reviewed
equipment
requiring
calibration
was current;
and general
housekeeping
and control of fire
hazards
were
satisfactory.
Tours
of the plant included
review of
site
documentation
and
interviews
with plant
personnel.
The
inspectors
reviewed
the control
room operators'ogs,
tagout
logs,
chemistry
and
health
physics
logs,
control
boards,
and
panels.
During these
tours the inspectors
noted that the operators
appeared
to
be alert,
aware
of changing
plant conditions,
and manipulated
plant controls properly.
The inspectors
evaluated
operations
shift
turnovers
and
attended
shift briefings.
They
observed
that
the
briefings and turnovers provided sufficient detail for the next shift
crew and verified that the staffing met the
TS requirements.
Site security
was
evaluated
by observing
personnel
in the protected
and vital
areas
to .ensure
that
these
persons
had
the
proper
authorization
to
be
in the .respective
areas.
The inspectors
also
verified that vital area portals
were
kept
locked
and
alarmed.
The
security personnel
appeared
to be alert and attentive to their duties
and those officers performing
personnel
and vehicular
searches
were
thorough
and
systematic.
Responses
to security
alarm conditions
appeared
to be prompt
and adequate.
Selected activities of the licensee's
Radiological Protection
Program
were
reviewed
by the
inspectors
to verify conformance
with plant
procedures
and
NRC
regulatory
requirements.
The
areas
reviewed
included:
operation
and
management
of the plant's
health
physics
staff,
ALARA implementation,
Radiation
Work Permits for compliance to
plant procedures,
personnel
exposure
records,
observation
of work and
personnel
in radiation
areas
to verify compliance
to
radiation
protection
procedures,
and
control
of radioactive
materials.
No
discrepancies
were noted.
Several
inspector
hours
were
spent
on
back shift inspections
and
observations.
This included observing
the unit coming off line and
cooling down for
a maintenance
outage
and
the
subsequent
restart
of
the, unit.
Various other aspects
of plant operation
were observed
and
evaluated.
The operators
appeared
to be awake, alert,
knowledgeable,
and
compentent
in their duties.
The licensee
has
developed
a high
degree
of professionalism
in the control
room staff.
'I
RAB Emergency
Exhaust
System
During the last refueling
outage
the licensee
replaced
the bearings
on
26 air handling
motors.
This work was
performed
under
two Work
Request
(WR/JO)
No.
88-AQPN2
and
88-AQPM2.
A master
clearance
was
prepared
and
Equipment
Records
(EIRs)
were initiated to
track the status
of the equipment.
On
September
16,
1988,
heating
and
ventilating
equipment
room
number
2 cooling unit,
AH-26 ( 1A-SA),
was tagged
out of service
and
on
September
23,
1988,
the
fan motor leads
were disconnected.
The
motor bearings
were
replaced
on
September
24,
1988,
and
the safety
clearance
was
canceled
on
September
28,
1988'ost
maintenance
testing
requirements
(PMTR) were prescribed
which required
a check
for proper rotation
and
a check for unusual
noise or vibration after
the
fan
was started.
This testing
was not adequately.
performed,
in
that only the supply breaker indicating light was
checked
to verify
fan operation.
On
December
5,
1988, during preventative
maintenance activities,
the
licensee
discovered
the motor leads
had not been terminated
on AH-26.
AH-26 functions
as
a room cooler to support
RAB Emergency
Exhaust
Fan
E6-1A-SA (Train A) by maintaining
room air temperature
less
than
104
degrees
fahrenheit.
E6-1A-SA is required to operate
during
a design
basis
loss of coolant accident to minimize the off-site dose
from
a
postulated
leak of
RCS water into the
RAB.
The licensee
immediately declared
RAB Emergency
Fan
E6-lA-SA to
be
AH-26 motor leads
were terminated,
properly tested,
and
AH-26 and
E6-1A-SA was declared
The licensee
inspected
the
other
25 fan units to verify that
maintenance
and post
maintenance
testing
had
been
properly
completed.
This
event
appears
to
be
isolated in that it was
1 of 26 fan units which received the bearing
modification and did not receive
proper post maintenance
testing.
The
FSAR states
that
each train of the
RAB Emergency
Exhaust
System
consi sts of 100:o'apacity
fan and filter subsystems.
Upon receipt of
an
SIS,
the
normal
ventilation
close
and
both
Emergency
Exhaust
Systems
are automatically
energized.
Either unit
may
then
be
manually
stopped
from the control
room
and placed
in
standby.
A single
active failure
in
any
component
of
the
Emergency
Exhaust
System will not
impair the
system's
ability to
fulfill the objectives
given in the design
basis'he
licensee
identified this
event
and
reported it to NRC'n
LER-88-34.
The licensee
performed
an analysis
on the post accident
affects
on
E6-1A-SA caused
by loss
of its
associated
AH-26
room
cooler.
From this analysis,
the licensee
determined that:
(1)
The E6-1A-SA fan motor qualified life would not be
a factor.
(2)
The vortex damper actuator qualified life would be reduced
from
1.85 years to 62.5 days.
(3)
Failure of the vortex damper would result in the damper failing
open.
(4)
With the vortex
damper failed open,
negative
pressure
would be
maintained greater
than the
TS requirement of negative
1/8-inch
water wi.h no detrimental effect to the motor or ductwork.
(5)
The dose rates at E6-1A-SA would be
.25 to 2.5 mrem/hour,
which
would permit operators
to manually control the vortex damper.
(6)
The radiation monitors
on the
E6-1A-SA discharge
duct and
on the
vent stack would give warnings of any releases
past the system's
filter unit if possible
damage
were to occur.
Based
on the
above,
the licensee
concluded that the consequences
of
the loss of AH-26 during
a post accident condition is minimal
and
can
be safely compensated
for by operator action.
TS 3.7.7 requires
that
two independent
RAB Emergency
Exaust
Systems
be operable
in Modes
1-4.
Although the operability of AH-26 is not
directly addressed
in
TS 3.7.7, it is required to support
the
long
term operation of the
E6-1A-SA fan,
and is therefore
considered
to be
a support
system for the
A train of the
RAB Emergency
Exhaust
System.
Accordingly,
when
the
plant
entered
Mode
4
on
October
5,
1988,
EG-1A-SA
was
technically
This
is
a
violation
of
and 3.0.4.
which require both trains to
be operable
before changing
Modes
from
5 to 4.
Additionally, since
AH-26 was
from October 5,
1988, until
December
5,
1988,
approximately
61
days,
the
limiting condition
for operation
of
was exceeded.
The
licensee's
post
maintenance
testing
program
for
fan
motors
requires that the rotation is verified and that the unit is monitored
for
unusual
vibration or noise.
The
operations
staff failed to
perform the required
PMTR which resulted
in the unit being inoperable
for approximately
61
days.
Additionally,
the
maintenance
staff
failed
to
properly
reconnect
the
fan
motor
during
the
maintenance
process.
The
maintenance
procedure
for ventilation
motors did not
have
an
adequate
signoff step
to
ensure
the
motor
would
be
reconnected
following maintenance.
The
licensee's
failure to perform adequate
post maintenance
testing is considered
to
be
a violation of
NRC requirements
and is identified
as violation
400/88-40-01:
Failure
to
Adequately
Perform
Post
Maintenance
Testing.
Loss of Spent
Pool
Level
At 2: 15 a.m.,
on January
17,
1989, approximately five feet of water
from the
spent
fuel
pool
was inadvertently
drained
to the
new fuel
storage
pool.
The event occurred during the improper restoration
of
clearance
OP-89-0071
which
had
been
issued
to support preventative
maintenance.
Maintenance
Work Request
MWR/JO 88-NSI404
had been
issued
in order to
perform preventative
maintenance
on
a
spent
fuel cooling
pump.
The
clearance
authorization
required that valve
crosstie
to
new
fuel pool,
be verified "closed" before opening valve 1SF-11, crosstie
to spent
fuel pool.
These
valves
are
located
in the
overhead
and
require
a ladder for operation.
The operator
did not
use
a ladder
and
instead
climbed
on equipment in order to reach the valves.
From
his vantage
point he could not see
the valve position indicator for
and mispositioned
the valve to the
open position.
Valve
was
opened
as
required,
which crosstied
the spent fuel
pool to the
new fuel pool.
The control
room received
a
low spent
fuel
pool
level
alarm
and
immediately initiated
a valve
lineup
verification.
Valve
was
found to
be
mi spositioned
and
was
returned to its required position.
The
loss
of five feet
in
spent
fuel
pool
level
calculates
to
approximately
55,000 gallons of water.
The design
of the crosstie
into the spent fuel pool is such that
a maximum of five
feet of spent
fuel
pool
level
could
be lost following equipment
failures or personnel
errors.
By design this maintains
18.5 feet of
water above the spent fuel.
Technical Specification 3.9. 11
requires
that
at
least
23 feet of
water shall
be maintained
over the top of spent
fuel seated
in the
storage
racks.
Following the loss of level the action statement
was
followed, in that
no crane operations
or fuel movements
were allowed.
Level was restored within six hours
and was considered
to be timely,
even
though the action
statement
requires
level to be restored within
four hours.
Clearance
OP-89-0071
required valve 1SF-19 to be verified closed.
No
valve manipulation
was required,
in that the valve was danger
tagged
in the closed position.
The operator failed to follow the clearance
instructions,
in that
he did not actually verify the position of
and manipulated
a valve that did not require
manipulation.
The operator's
error in not following the clearance
is considered
to
be
a violation of HRC requirements
and is identified
as
a violation
400/88-40-02:
Failure to Follow Procedures.
Two violations
and
no deviations
were identified.
3.
Monthly Surveillance
Observation
(71709)
The
inspectors
witnessed
the
licensee
conducting
surveillance
test
activities
on safety-related
systems
and
components
to verify that
the
licensee
performed
the activities in accordance
with applicable require-
ments.
These
observations
included witnessing
selected
portions of each
surveillance,
review
of
the
surveillance
procedure
to
ensure
that
administrative
controls
were
in force,
determining
that
approval
was
obtained prior to conducting
the surveillance test,
and verifying that the
individuals conducting
the test
were qualified in accordance
with plant
approved
procedures.
Other
observations
included ascertaining
that test
instrumentation
used
was
calibrated,
data
collected
was
within the
specified
requirements
of
TS,
identified
discrepancies
were
properly
noted,
and
the
systems
were correctly returned
to service.
Portions of
the following test activities were observed
or reviewed
by the inspectors:
OST-1013
OST-1023
OST-1029
OST-1027
OST-1026
OPT-1510
OST-1006
OST-1411
OST-1124
EPT-031T
Emergency
Diesel Generator
( lA-SA) Operability
Offsite Power Availability Verification
Containment
Outside
ECCS Accumulator Valve Breaker Verification
RCS Leakage
Measurement
A and
B Diesel Generator Daily Check
Boron Flowpath Verification
( 1X-SAB) Quarterly
6.,9
kv
Emergency
Bus
Trip Actuating
Device
Operability
6.9
kv
1A-SA Emergency
Bus Undervoltage
Contact Actuation
Procedure
OST-1124
and
EPT 031T
On
December
20,
1988,
the
licensee
performed
OST-1124,
6.9
kv Emergency
Bus
Trip Actuating
Device
Operational
Test.
This
is
a
monthly test
and is required
in Modes
1 through 4.
In this test both the
lA-SA and
1B-SB trains
are
tested
to verify that
proper
alarms
are
actuated
when
primary
and
secondary
devices
of the
6 '
kv
.Emergency
Buses
are actuated
from a local test
push
button.'he
test
was
successful
on "B" tr ain,
but
was not sati sfactory
on "A"
train
due to certain
bus relays
not functioning properly and resulted
in
an inadvertant
bus
loss.
A similar event
occurred
on
May 20,
1988,
and
was reported
in
LER 88-013.
Following the initial failure, the licensee
made
several
attempts
to repeat
the failure;
however,
the failure
was
elusive
and
could not
be
repeated.
As the
cause
of the initial failure
could
not
be
determined,
the
equipment
was
returned
to
service
and
satisfactorily
passed
the monthly surveillance
from June
through
November.
Following the failure
on
December
20,
1988,
the
licensee
developed
a
special
test procedure,
EPT-031T, 6.9.kv
1A-SA Emergency
Bus Undervoltage
Contact
Instrumentation
Procedure,
which was
performed
on
December
29,
1988.
The
inspectors
observed
the
performance
of this test
procedure.
The procedure
instrumented
certain contacts for the degraded
grid and loss
of offsite power relays.
The test
found that relays
UVTX (agastat
model
87014)
and
2/SA (General
Electric
Model
012SAMLlB22A) were
not operating
properly.
These
relays
were
replaced
and
OST-1124
was
conducted
on
December
29,
1988.
Proper
operation
of the
bus
device
was
verified.
The licensee
is continuing their investigation
of this matter
to verify that
no further hidden
sporatic
relay operations
occur.
The
licensee
is reporting
the incident in
LER 88-035.
The faulty relays
are
part of the 6.9
kv undervoltage test circuitry and did not appear to have
compromised
equipment operability.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
7
4.
Monthly Maintenance
Observations
(62703)
Station
maintenance
activities of safety-related
systems
and
components
were observed/reviewed
to ascertain
that they were conducted
in accordance
with approved
procedures,
regulatory guides,
industry codes
and standards,
and
were
in
conformance
with TS.
Items
considered
during
the
review
included verification that
LCOs were met while components
or systems
were
removed
from service;
approvals
were
obtained
prior to initiating the
work; approved
procedures
were used;
completed work was performed prior to
returning
components
or systems
to service;
quality control
records
were
maintained; activities were accomplished
by qualified personnel;
parts
and
materials
were properly certified;
and radiological
and fire prevention
controls
were
implemented.
Work requests
were also reviewed to determine
the status
of outstanding
jobs to assure
that priority was
assigned
to
safety-related
equipment
maintenance
which
could
affect
system
performance.
Portions of the following activities were observed
or reviewed:
RC-103
and
RC-107; Pressurizer
spray valve packing leaks
AFW-93, AFW-155,
and AFW-71; Auxiliary feedwater valve packing
HD-46; Feedwater
heater ¹4
packing
RCDT;
Pump shaft replacement
Main feedwater
pump seal
water leak-off line replacement
Cleaning
and inspecting various
460 vac load centers
"A" condensate
booster
pump fluid coupling repairs
Rod drive urgent failure
The
Shutdown
Bank
B Group
2 rod control cabinet
experienced
an urgent
failure
on December
20,
1988.
After replacement
of the
phase control
and
firing circuit boards, it was discovered that transformer
"T2" was faulty.
The inspector witnessed
the maintenance activities associated
with removal
and replacement
of the "T2" transformer
in an energized
cabinet.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
5.
Licensee
Event Reports
(92700)
The
following
LERs
were
reviewed
for potential
generic
problems
to
determine
trends,
to determine
whether information included in the report
meets
the
NRC
reporting
requirements,
and
to
consider
whether
the
corrective
action
discussed
in
the
report
appears
appropriate.
The
licensee's
action
was reviewed to verify that the event
has
been
reviewed
and evaluated
as
required
by TS; that corrective action
was taken
by the
licensee;
and that safety limits, limiting safety settings,
and
LCOs were
not exceeded.
The inspector
exami'ned incident reports,
logs
and records,
and interviewed selected
personnel.
The following reports
are
considered
closed:
LER-87-56
Reactor
trip
caused
by
de-energization
of
P-13
permissive
bistable
due to insufficient modification
installation instructions.
LER-87-57
Failure
to
implement
all
required
in-service
inspection
tests
for diesel
fuel oil transfer
pumps;
procedural
deficiencies.
LER-87-58
Excessive
RCS leakage
due to valve failure in
head
vent system during testing.
LER-87-59
Loss of offsite
power
due to incoming line breaker
opening
caused
by
personnel
error
and
a
loss
of
emergency
service
due to procedural
deficiency.
LER-87-60
Isolation
of
RHR during testing
of valve interlocks
due to test
equipment failures
LER-87-61
Technical
Specification violation due to missed
flow
rate estimate
caused
by personnel
error.
LER-87-62
Personnel
error
in
setting
steam
dump controller
resulted
in safety
injection,
main
steam isolation,
and reactor trip when
MSIVs were opened.
LER-87-63
Plant trip caused
by loss of main
feed water
due to
mispositioned
condensate
recirculation valve.
LER-87-65
First
stage
turbine
pressure
setpoints
for
P-13
permissive
were
incorrectly
set
due
to
personnel
error.
LER-87-66
Failure to perform satisfactory
actuation
logic test
for
containment
ventilation
isolation
due
to
procedural
inadequacy.
LER-87-67
Containment
ventilation
system
i solat'ion
due
to
a
spurious
high
radiation
alarm
while
sampling
at
monitor.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
6.
Follow-up on Plant Events
(92702)
a.
On
December
14,
1988,
the
Unit
was
shutdown
for
a
five
day
maintenance
outage.
Maintenance
work
was
performed
on
the
pressurizer
spray valves, auxiliary feedwater
valves,
drain tank pump,
and various other components.
The Unit was returned
to power operation
on December
19,
1988.
b.
On January
16,
1989, at 3: 18 p.m.,
the Unit tripped from 100~ power.
The trip was
due to low condenser
vacuum in the main condenser.
The
vacuum loss
was due to
a open vent valve
on the auxiliary condensate
system which allowed atmospheric
pressure
to the main condenser.
All
systems
functioned
as
designed
with the, exception
of the turbine
driven auxiliary feedwater
pump.
The turbine received
a start signal
but tripped
on overspeed.
Condensate
in the main
steam line to the
turbine
was the apparent
cause
of the
trip.
The licensee
has
had
previous
problems
with condensate
in this line
and
had
performed
a modification to the moisture
removal
system
during the
last
refueling
outage.
The
licensee
has
initiated
a
program
to
periodically
blowdown the
condensate
removal
system
to ensure
that
condensate
is removed
and not allowed to collect in the
steam line.
On January
17,
1989,
the
PNSC decided that
a task force would
be
appointed
to perform
a design
review of the turbine driven auxiliary
system
to determine
the root cause
of the
over speed trip
and to recommend
action to totally resolve
any problems.
The inspectors will follow the efforts of this task force.
This item
will remain
open
pending
completion of the review and is identified
as
inspector
followup item,
IFI 400/880-40-03:
Review
Task
Force
Resolution of Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater
Pump Overspeed
Trip.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
7.
Plant Nuclear Safety Committee
(40700)
The inspectors
attended
one of the routine weekly plant operations
review
committee
PNSC meetings.
The
PNSC
was established
to advise
the plant
general
manager
on all matters
related
to nuclear
safety.
Technical Specifications, Section 6.5.2 provides the requirements
for the
committee
concerning:
function,
composition,
meeting
frequency,
size
and
members
required, authority,
and in general
the responsibilities
assigned
to the
members.
A quorum was present.
During the meeting,
Plant
Change
Request
(PCR)
3547 - Radioactive
Waste
Demineralizer
and Draft
LER-88-035
were discussed.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
10
8.
Exit Interview
The
insoection
scope
and
findings
were
summarized
during
management
interviews throughout the reporting period
and
on January
20,
1988, with
those
persons
indicated
in paragraph
1.
The inspection
findings listed
below were discussed
in detail.
The licensee
acknowledged
the inspection
findings and did not identify as proprietary
any material
reviewed
by the
inspector during the inspection.
Item Number
400/88-40-01
400/88-40-02
400/88=40-03
9.
List of Initialisms
Status
Open
Open
Open
Descri tion/Reference
Para
ra
h
Violation - Failure to Adequately
Perform
Post
Maintenance
-Testing
(paragraph 2.b.)
Violation - Failure to Follow
Procedure - (paragraph 2.c.)
IFI - Review Task Force Resolution of
Turbine
Driven
Auxiliary
Trip - (paragraph 6.b.)
AH
EIR
EPT
IFI
KY
LCO
LER
MS
Air Handling
As
Low As Reasonably
Achievable
Emergency
Core Cooling System
Equipment
Records
Engineering
Periodic Test Procedure
Final Safety Analysis Report
Inspector
Follow-up Item
Kilo Volt
Limiting Condition for Operation
Licensee
Event Report
Loss of Coolant Accident
11
NRC
OP
PMTR
PNSC
SF
TS
Vac
WR/JO
Maintenance
Surveillance=Test
NRC Regulatory
Commission
Operating
Procedure
Plant .Change
Request
Post Maintenance
Test Requirements
Plant Nuclear Safety
Committee
Reactor Auxiliary Building
Reactor Coolant Drain Tank
Reactor
Coolant System
Residual
Heat
Removal
System
Radiation
Work Permit
Spent
Fuel
Safety Injection Signal
Technical
Specification
Volts A.C.
Work Request/Job
Order