ML17341B488
| ML17341B488 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Turkey Point  |
| Issue date: | 11/04/1982 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17341B487 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8211160148 | |
| Download: ML17341B488 (5) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON,'b. C. 20555 SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 89 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. IDPR-31 AND AMENDMENT NO.
83 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO.
DPR-41 FLORI DA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY TURKEY POINT PLANT UNIT NOS.
3 AND 4 DOCKET NOS.
50-250 AND 50-251 I.. INTRODUCTION By letter dated'May 6, 1982, the Florida Power and Light Company (the licensee) submitted a request to modify the Technical Specifications for the Turkey Point Plant Unit Nos.
3 and 4.
The amendments would change the Technical Specifications to conform to iIhe Bulletins and Orders Task Force review following the Three Mile Island Accident.
The requirements of this Task Force regarding Auxiliary Feedwater System were set forth in our letter dated October 16, 1979.
II.
BACKGROUND The licensee has addressed this issue in their responses dated December 20, 1979, July 22, 1980 and January 14, April 13 and July 23, 1'981.
We reviewed their responses and issued Amendment. Nos.
75 and 69 on December 24, 1981 based on our initial Safety Evaluation (SE).
We indicated in our SE that open items remained for which an additional Technical Specification change and information was necessary to complete our review.
The automatic initiation and flow indication, NUREG-0737 Item II.E.1.2, portion of the auxiliary feedwater review were determined to be in compliance with the long term safety grade requirements.
The acceptability of this portion of the Auxiliary Feedwater System and the SE were sent to the licensee in a letter from Steven A. Varga dated September 15, 1982.
III.
IMPLEMENTATION OF OUR RECOMMENDATIONS We have completed our review of the licensee's responses dated January 7, flay 6, and June 9, 1982 which address the open items identified in our initial.SE.
The results of the review and implementa'tion of our recommendations are:
pgggghoj48 8211 40 PDR *DOC/ 05000Z50 P
A.
Recommendation GS "Emergency procedures for transferring to alternate sources of AFW supply should be available to the plant operators.
These procedures should include criteria to inform the operators
- when, and in what order, the transfer to alternate water sources should take place.
The following cases should be covered by the procedures.
l.
The case in which the primary water supply is not initially available.
The procedures for this case should include any operator actions required to protect the AFW system pumps against self-damage before water flow is initiated; and, 2.
The case in which the primary water supply is being depleted.
The procedure for this case should provide for transfer to the atlernate water sources prior to draining of the primary water supply."
Technical Specifications are in place which insure the minimum condensate storage tank level is 185,000 gallons.
This quantity of water is suffi-cient to maintain a hot standby condition for 15 hours1.736111e-4 days <br />0.00417 hours <br />2.480159e-5 weeks <br />5.7075e-6 months <br /> and a subsequent cooldown to 350'F followed by initiation of the residual heat removal system.
Alarms warn the operator of low level situations so that make-up flow can be established from alternate water supplies to the condensate storage tank.
Procedures are in effect for initiation of makeup from the condenser hotwell, the primary water system or the service water system.
Thus, it is insured that water will always be initially available for the AFW pumps.
Following automatic initiation of the auxiliary feedwater
- pumps, the operator ascertains adequate condensate storage tank level, sufficient flow to the steam generators and notifies the Nuclear Turbine Operator to inspect the pumps for proper operation, The minimum condensate storage tank level control and the emergency procedures to establish alternate water supplies, insure an adequate quantity of water is available to the pumps, for the case there the con-densate storage tank is being depleted.
We conclude that this recommendation is satisfactorily met, B.
Additional Shor t Term Recommendations 1.
Recommendation
- "Licensees with plants which require local manual d
p l dl << 'ill train, and there is only one remaining AFW train available for operation, should propose Technical Specifications to provide that a dedicated individual who is in communication with the control room be stationed at the manual valves.
Upon instruction from the control room, this operator would realign the valves in the AFW system train from the test mode to its operational alignment."
4 By letter dated May 6, 1982, the licensee submitted a proposed amendment to Technical Specification 4.10 which applies to periodic test requirements of the auxiliary feedwater system.
The amended Technical Specification requires that:
"If any local manual realignment of valves is required when operating the Auxiliary Feedwater
- pumps, a dedicated indivi-
- dual, who is in communication with the control room, shall be stationed at the auxiliary feedwater pump area.
Opon instructions from the control room, this operator would realign the valves in the AFW system train to its normal operational alignment."
We conclude that the amended Technical Specification fulfills the requirements of the additional short term recommendation, pending approval of it by the Division of Licensing.
C.
Recommendation
- "The AFW pump discharge lines and turbine driven AFW pump steam supply lines for each unit combine into single lines through which all water and steam respectively from either unit must flow.
A pipe break in either of these single flow paths would cause loss of the capabili'ty to provide AFW flow to all the steam generators of one unit.
The licensee should evaluate the consequences of a postulated pipe break in these sections of the AFW discharge or steam supply assuming a concurrent single active failure and 1) determine any AFW system modifications or procedures necessary to detect and isolate the
- break, and direct the required AFW flow to the steam generators before they boil dry or 2) describe how the plant can be brought to a safe shutdown condition by use of other available systems following such a postulated pipe break."
The licensee has developed procedures regarding shutdown through the use of alternate systems and regarding isolation os AFWS steam supply or feedwater line piping breaks.
The proposed AFW pipe modifications, described in the June 7, 1982 letter in response to the above requirement, will provide sufficient redundancy to eliminate the concern of a single pipe break disrupting feedwater flow to the steam generators.
I We conclude that this recommendation has been satisfactorily met, D.
Basis for Auxiliar Feedwater S stem Flow Re uirements The licensee was requested to supply Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) design basis information in Enclosure 2 of our October 16; 1979 letter.
By letter dated January 7, 1982 the licensee supplied the AFW system flow design bases and criteria.
The licensee verified that the AFW minimum flow rate requirements could be maintained under the following transient conditions:
1.
Loss of main feedwater 2.
Loss of main feedwater with concurrent loss of offsite AC power 3.
Loss of main feedwater with concurrent loss of onsite and offsite AC power 1
4.
Rupture of a main steam line 5.
Small break Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) 6.
Tur bine trip with and without turbine bypass valve 7.
Main steam isolation valve closure 8.
Plant cooldown 9.
Startup (Enclosure 3 of June 9, 1982 letter)
Based on our review of the licensee's submittal, we conclude that the AFW system can provide sufficient flow for heat removal requirements following any design basis transient or 'accident with a concurrent worst case single active failure.
E.
SUMMARY
We have determined that the licensee has fulfilled all the requirements necessary to conform with the Commission's Bulletins and Orders Task Force review regarding Auxiliary Feedwater Pump requirements following the Three Mile Island Accident.
IV.
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION We have determined that the amendments do not authorize a change in effluent types or total amounts nor an increase in power level and will not result in any significant environmental impact.
Having made this determination, we have fur ther concluded that the amendments involve an action which'is insignificant from the standpoint of environmental impact and, pursuant to 10 CFR 551,5(d)(4),
that an environmental impact statement or negative declaration and environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with the issuance of these amendments.
V.
CONCLUSION We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:
(1) because the amendments do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated, do not create the possibility of an accident of a type different from any evaluated previously, and do not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety, the amendments do not involve a significant hazards consideration, (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed
- manner, and (3) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
Date':
, November 4, 1982