ML17313A730
| ML17313A730 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 12/29/1998 |
| From: | Harrell P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | James M. Levine ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE CO. (FORMERLY ARIZONA NUCLEAR |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9901120049 | |
| Download: ML17313A730 (39) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION IV 6I I RYAN PLAZA DRIVE SUITE 400 ARLINGTON TEXAS 75011 8064 2 9 1~~3 James M. Levine, Senior Vice President, Nuclear Arizona Public Service Company P.O. Box 53999 Phoenix, Arizona 85072-3999
SUBJECT:
INSPECTION PLANNING REVIEW (IPR)-
PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION
Dear Mr. Levine:
On December 2, 1998, the NRC staff completed a newly instituted Inspection Planning Review (IPR) of the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station. The staff normally conducts Semiannual Plant Performance Reviews for all operating nuclear power plants to develop an integrated understanding of safety performance and accordingly adjust inspection resources.
However, due to the suspension of the Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance process, we implemented an abbreviated inspection Planning Review process for plant issues and to develop inspection plans. The IPR for the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station involved the participation of both the Reactor Projects and Safety Divisions in evaluating inspection results and safety performance trends for the period of April23 to October 28, 1998.
Based on this review, inspection resources have been prioritized and scheduled.
No changes to inspection resources were made.
Enclosure 1 contains an historical listing of plant issues since October 1, 1997, referred to as the.Plant Issues Matrix (PIM), that was considered during this IPR process to arrive at an integrated view of performance trends.
The PIM includes only items from inspection reports and other docketed correspondence between the NRC and Arizona Public Service Company.
The IPR may also have considered some predecisional and draft material that does not appear in the attached PIM, including observations from events and inspections that had occurred since the last NRC inspection report was issued, but had not yet received full review and consideration. is a general description of the PIM table labels. This material will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.
This letter also advises you of our planned inspection effort resulting from the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station IPR. It is provided to minimize the resource impact on your staff
- and to allow for scheduling conflicts and personnel availability to be resolved in advance of inspector arrival on site. Enclosure 3 details our inspection plan for the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station over the next 8 months.
The rationale or basis for each inspection outside the core inspection program is provided so that you are aware of the reason for emphasis in these program areas.
Resident inspections are not listed because of their ongoing and continuous nature. We will inform you of any changes to the inspection plan.
990ii20049 'II8i229 PDR ADOCK 05000528 6
Arizona Public Service Company If you have any questions, please contact Phil Harreli at (817) 860-8250.
Since rel, H rrell, Chief Project Branch D Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos:
50-528 50-529 50-530 License Nos:
Enclosures:
- 1. Plant Issues Matrix.
- 2. General Description of PIM Table Labels
- 3. Inspection Plan cc w/enclosures:
Mr. Steve Olea Arizona Corporation Commission 1200 W. Washington Street Phoenix, Arizona 85007 Douglas K. Porter, Senior Counsel Southern California Edison Company Law Department, Generation Resources P.O. Box 800
- Rosemead, California 91770 Chairman Maricopa County Board of Supervisors 301 W. Jefferson, 10th Floor Phoenix, Arizona 85003 Aubrey V. Godwin, Director Arizona Radiation Regulatory Agency 4814 South 40 Street
. Phoenix, Arizona 85040
Arizona Public Service Company Angela K. Krainik, Manager Nuclear Licensing Arizona Public Service Company P.O. Box 52034 Phoenix, Arizona 85072-2034 John C. Horne, Vice President Power Supply El Paso Electric Company 2025 N. Third Street, Suite 220 Phoenix, Arizona 85004 Terry Bassham, Esq.
General Counsel El Paso Electric Company 123 W. Mills EI Paso, Texas 79901 Mr. John W. Schumann Los Angeles Department of Water & Power Southern California Public Power Authority P.O. Box 51111, Room 1255-C Los Angeles, California 90051-0100 Mr. David Summers Public Service Company of New Mexico 414 Silver SW, ¹1206 Albuquerque, New Mexico 87102 Mr. Brian Katz Southern California Edison Company 14300 Mesa Road, Drop D41-SONGS San Clemente, California 92672 Mr. Robert Henry Salt River Project 6504 East Thomas Road Scottsdale, Arizona 85251
Arizona Public Service Company 29 [c" E-Mail report to T. Frye (TJF)
E-Mail report to D. Lange (DJL)
E-Mail report to NRR Event Tracking System (IPAS)
E-Mail report to Document Control Desk (DOCDESK)
E-Mail report to Richard Correia (RPC)
E-Mail report to Frank Talbot (FXT) bcc to DCD (IE01) bcc distrib. by RIV:
Regional Administrator DRP Director Branch Chief (DRP/D)
Senior Project Inspector (DRP/D)
Branch Chief (DRP/TSS)
The Chairman (MS: 16-G-15)
Deputy Regional Administrator Commissioner Dicus Commissioner Diaz Commissioner McGaffigan Commissioner Merrifield W. D. Travers, EDO (MS: 17-G-21)
Associate Dir. for Projects, NRR Associate Dir. for Insp., and Tech. Assmt, NRR SALP Program Manager, NRR/ILPB (2 copies)
Bateman, NRR Project Director (MS: 13-E-17)
M. Fields, NRR Project Manager (MS: 13-E-16)
Resident Inspector DRS-PSB MIS System RIV File Carol Gordon Records Center, INPO C. A. Hackney B. Henderson, PAO B. Murray; DRS/PSB SRls at all RIV sites y>g006 DOCUMENT NAME: G:FDRPDIR<l RhPV To receive co of document. Indicate Inb x: "C" ~ Co viithout enclosures "E ~ Co with enclosures "N' No co RIV:C:DRP/D PHHarrell;df 12/16/98 RVA D:DR ATHo I
DD:DRP KEBr man D:DRP TPG nn 1264/98
/98 OFFICIALRECORD COPY
Arizona Public Service Company E-Mail report to T. Frye (TJF)
E-Mail report to D. Lange (DJL)
E-Mail report to NRR Event Tracking System (IPAS)
E-Mail report to Document Control Desk (DOCDESK)
E-Mail report to Richard Correia (RPC)
E-Mail report to Frank Talbot (FXT) bcc to DCD (IE01) bcc distrib. by RIV:
Regional Administrator DRP Director Branch Chief (DRP/D)
Senior Project Inspector (DRP/D)
Branch Chief (DRP/TSS)
The Chairman (MS: 16-G-15)
Deputy Regional Administrator Commissioner Dicus Commissioner Diaz Commissioner McGaffigan Commissioner Merrifield W. D. Travers, EDO (MS: 17-G-21)
Associate Dir. for Projects, NRR Associate Dir. for Insp., and Tech. Assmt, NRR SALP Program Manager, NRR/ILPB (2 copies)
W. Bateman, NRR Project Director (MS: 13-E-17)
M. Fields, NRR Project Manager (MS: 13-E-16)
Resident Inspector DRS-PSB, MIS System RIV File Carol Gordon Records Center, INPO C. A. Hackney B. Henderson, PAO B. Murray, DRS/PSB SRls at all RIV sites DOCUMENT NAME.'tDRPDIR>l RttPV To receive co of document, Indicate In b x: "C" ~ Co without enclosures "E = Co with enclosures N" = No co RIV:C:DRP/D PHHarrelt;df 12/16/98 RVA D:DR ATHo I
12/
8 DD:DRP KEBr man D:DRP TPG nn 12/24/98
/98 OFFICIALRECORD COPY
PALO VERDE PLANTISSUES MATRIX ENCLOSURE 1 DATE 09/28/98 09/22/98 TYPE POS NEG SOURCE IR 98-07 IR 98-07 ID SPA TEMPLATE CODE NRC OPS 1A 3A NRC OPS 1B ITEM DESCRIPTION Observation of core offload activities associated with the Unit 3 refueling outage indicated that refueling personnel consistently used good communications and demonstrated a safety-conscious approach to performing refueling operations The control room staff responded in a prompt manner to the loss of a nonsafety-related load center in Unit 3. The operations crew exhibited good oversight of activities during the response by appropriately prioritizing the critical plant parameters in order oi safety significance.
However, recognition that the safety.related battery chargers had been I at the onset of the event was not accomplished in a timely manner.
Once discovered, corrective actions were accomplished to restore the baltery chargers 09/21/98 P OS 09/18/98 POS 09/10/98 NEG IR 98-07 IR 98-07 IR 98-07 NRC OPS 1A NRC OPS 1A 3A NRC OPS 1A 3B Operator oversight and direction of the evolution to drain Unit 3 to the midloop condition.
and decisions to take conservative actions during the evolution, were excellent.
The Unit 3 reactor shutdown for the seventh refueling outage was well planned and conducted in accordance with procedures.
Supervisory oversight and direction of the operating crew and operator performance during the shutdown were excellent An unclear work plan for preparing the acid system for maintenance, and failure of auxiliary operators to followthe work plan for establishing a vent path for the acid tank, contributed to the rupture of the tank. The recovery plan following the incident was prompt and appropriate 08/31/98 08/06/98 POS POS IR 98-07 IR 98-15 NRC OPS 1B NRC OPS Corrosion induced failure of a nonsafety-related pressure switch in the secondary plant caused Unit 1 to experience a power transient.
Operator response to the transient was good Control room personnel responded to the letdown back pressure oscillation and leak event appropriately.
Appropriate evaluations associated with the immediate consequences of the event were performed by licensee engineers.
07/21/98 Negative IR 98-14 NRC OPS 5A The licensee's event investigation report was objective and provided a candid self-assessment of its performance; however, it did not evaluate inspector-identified issues i the areas of operations or online maintenance.
These issues included: the failure to record in the control room logs the October 10 and 28, 1997, unexpected safety injectio tank level decrease events; and, the impact on system operability of online maintenance on one train of the high-pressure safety injection system when the opposite train had an ino erable um dischar e check valve..
October 28, 1998 Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station
PALO VERDE PLANTISSUES MATRIX ENCLOSURE 1 DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE CODE ITEM DESCRIPTION 07/21/98 EEI LER IR 98-14 EA 98-382 98-006 SELF OPS 1A 2A 2B Two examples of an apparent violation of Technical Specification 3.5.2, which required an operable high.pressure safety injection system flowpath.
- 1) The Unit 1, Train "B" high-pressure safety injection system flowpath was inoperable for approximately 6 years because of an incorrectly assembled check valve. 2) The Unit 2, Train "A"high-pressur safety injection system ftowpath was inoperable for approximately 5 years because of an incorrectl assembled check valve.
07/21/98 EEI IR 98-14 EA 98-382 LER 98.06 NRC OPS 1A 2A 2B Three examples of an apparent violation of Technical Specification 3.0.3 were identifi One example of not initiating actions, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />, to place Unit 1 in a mode in which Technical Specification 3.5.2 did not apply when the Train "A high-pressure safety injection system was declared inoperable because of a problem with a check valve.
07/21/98 07/01/98 06/29/98 EEI POS VIO SL IV IR 98-14 EA 98-382 LER 98-06 IR 98.05 IR 98-05 NRC
- OPS, 1C NRC OPS 1B NRC OPS 1A Two examples of performing online maintenance on the Unit 1 Train "A"and Unit 2 Train "B high-pressure safety injection system systems without isolation from the opposite train, in excess of 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br />, while the associated high-pressure safety injection pump dischar e check valves were ino erable.
Two examples of an apparent violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1, which required that abnormal conditions be recorded in the control room logs. Abnormal conditions were not recorded in the Unit 2 control room logs when an unexpected safety injection.
tank level decrease occurred on October 10, and 28, 1997.
Effective licensee decision making was demonstrated by the evaluation performed when uncertainty was identified in the abilityto test trip functions associated with the four core protection calculators channels of local power density. Operations department performance was good as demonstrated by use of three-way communications during power changes, management oversight and direction, and development of an action plan to address operability issues The lock was missing on a normally-locked valve in the Unit 1 chemical and volume control system and was not documented, as required by procedure.
The failure to document the removal of a locking device resulted in a loss of configuration control and is a violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1.a.
This is a repeat violation from a June 1997 inspection 05/30/98 P OS IR 98.04
.NRC OPS 3A AuxiliaryOperators conducted thorough checks of plant equipment with a good questioning attitude and attention to detail, as demonstrated by identification of a small oil leak on an emergency diesel generator and a high spray pond pump discharge pressure that indicated line blockage.
October 28, 1998 Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station
PALO VERDE PLANT ISSUES MATRIX ENCLOSURE 1 DATE 05/02/98 TYPE POS SOURCE IR 98-03 ID SFA TEMPLATE CODE NRC OPS 2B ITEM DESCRIPTION Observed portions of the Unit 2 auxiliary feedwater system were consistent with the UFSAR description, to the piping and instrumentation diagrams and procedure requirements.
The material condition of the auxiliary feedwater system was good 05/02/98 POS 05/02/98 POS IR 98-03 IR 98.03 NRC OPS 2B NRC OPS 2B Maintenance of the control room essential filtration system was very good as evidenced by the excellent material condition of the components.
The licensee's response to questions concerning control room stay times with the system operated in the isolatio mode was good.
The observed as-built configuration of the Unit 3, "A"train of the containment spray system conformed to piping and instrumentation drawings. The licensee's analysis and design modification performed on the containment spray system, in response to Generic Letter 95-07 concerns, was well prepared and complete.- The associated 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation was thorough. The material condition of the containment spray system including, circuit breakers, was good. The licensee maintained the containment spray system at a very high level of reliability. The system engineer was very knowledgeable of the containment spray system 05/02/98 05/02/98 05/02/98 04/20/98 STR NCV STR NEG IR 98-03 IR 98-03 IR 98-03 IR 98-04 NRC OPS 1A LIC OPS 1A NRC OPS 1A LIC OPS 3A The licensee demonstrated good communications and a formal safety-conscierice approach when performing refueling operations.
Operations exercised good judgement by suspending core alterations and movement of irradiated fuel in containment while a containment integrity issue was being resolved A weakness in attention to detail by two licensed operators resulted in improper danger tagging of electrical disconnect switches.
This was an isolated situation and a non.cited violation of the clearance procedure On March 17, Unit 1 was drained to the midloop condition by a crew dedicated to midloop operations.
Operator oversight and direction of the evolution and decisions to take conservative actions during the evolution were excellent.
Licensee activities relate to midloop operation demonstrated a strong safety focus During the Unit 1 startup, non-conservative decision making by the Control Room Supervisor caused a conservatively set limitfor the power ascension ramp rate to be exceeded.
Other contributors to the event were weakness in communications between the licensed operators and failure to include the reactor engineer in the pre-job brief for power ascension October 28, 1998 Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station
i
PALO VERDE PLANT ISSUES MATRIX ENCLOSURE 1 DATE 03/07/98 03/07/98 03/07/98 03/07/98 TYPE WK NEG STR POS SOURCE IR 98-02 IR 98-02 IR 98-02 IR 98-02 ID SFA TEMPLATE CODE LIC OPS 3A LIC OPS 1A NRC OPS 2A NRC OPS 1B ITEM DESCRIPTION Licensee actions to continue receipt/inspection of new fuel. after having dropped a new fuel shipping container a small distance, demonstrated an improper level ol sensitivity o the part of the new fuel receipt team to the seriousness of the event.
Untimely communications between the new fuel receipt/inspection team and operations demonstrated a continuin roblem with interde artmental communications.
Weaknesses in Operations Department logkeeping practices allowed inconsistencies in the way different crews maintain logs. Operations management was aggressive in th assessment of the problem with log entries, and was taking action to reinforce ex ectations with allO erations ersonnel.
As-built plant configuration of Unit 1 emergency diesel generators conformed to plant drawings.
Emergency diesel generators in all three Palo Verde units performed with 100% reliabilit. The s stem en ineer was ve knowled cable about the s stem.
Operator response to a Unit 1 reactor trip, caused by a decreasing steam generator level, was good. The management review team and plant review board deliberations and assessments, to evaluate the root cause and determine the plant readiness to restart, were thorou h and effective.
03/07/98 NEG 03/0?/98 NCV IR 98-02 IR 98.02 LIC OPS 1A LIC OPS 1A A control room supervisor exercised an insufficient degree of attention when approving a clearance for issuance.
This resulted in unplanned opening of the a.c. supply breaker to the "A"vital battery charger, leaving only the "A"battery supplying PKA-M41 (125 Vdc bus for 35 minules.
An auxiliary operator exercised an insufficient degree of attention when restoring a clearance, which resulted in unplanned opening of Control Room Essential AHU Outsi Air Intake Damper HJB-M02. This was a non-cited violation iin accordance with Sec VII.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Polic of the clearance rocessin rocedure.
03/07/98 03/05/98 POS POS IR 98-02 IR 98-11 NRC OPS 3B 1C NRC OPS 1B 3A 3C Licensed operators were knowledgeable of existing workarounds, such as the one for opening the feedwater downcomer isolation vavles after a cooldown event. The progra to track o erator workarounds was effectivel im lemented.
The licensee's response to the declared hazardous material emergency on January 23, 1998, was excellent. The licensee promptly recognized the radiological complications associated with the event and implemented timely and effective measures to mitigate th radiological impact. Management oversight, which involved all levels of site mana ement was rom t decisive and effective October 28, 1998 Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station
PALO VERDE PLANTISSUES MATRIX ENCLOSURE 1 DATE 03/05/98 02/27/98 TYPE VIO SL IV NCV SOURCE IR 98-11 IR 98-12 LER '/d3-97-005 ID SFA TEMPLATE CODE NRC OPS 1A 3A 3B LIC OPS 5A ITEM DESCRIPTION Unit 2 operators and site personnel displayed a lack of sensitivity to the hazard posed by highly concentrated sulfuric acid and ongoing inter-and intra-organizational communication problems between January 6 through 23, 1998. This performance resulted in a violation [Technical Specification 6.8.1 as implemented by Regulatory Guide 1.33) of regulatory requirements (failure to make a log entry) and contributed to the release to the environment of highly concentrated sulfuric acid in excess of state and federal environmental limits. The event was complicated by the presence of low level of radioactive contamination in condensate waste s stems.
The licensee identified and corrected failure to properly implement Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 4.5.2.c.2 for daily containment debris inspection, reported by Licensee Event Report 50-528;-529;-530/97-006, was identified as a noncited violation.
02/27/98 VIO IR 98-12 SL IV LER YR/3-97-006 NRC OPS 5A The failure to document missed ASME Code inspections by means of a condition report/disposition report for 6 weeks was identified as a procedure violation [of 10 CFR 50 A endix B, Criterion V. One exam le of two; VIOLATION98012-01 02/27/98 POS IR 98-12 NRC OPS.
1C Audits of operations and maintenance were comprehensive and critical. The audit reports were concisely written, and the audit teams were appropriately staffed.
Self assessments were critical, comprehensive, and of appropriate scope and depth to meet the ob'ectives of the assessments.
02/27/98 VIO IR 98-12 SL IV LER 2/3-97004-04 NRC OPS SB The condition reporting/disposition requests and licensee event reports were well written contained sufficient detail for analysis, and identified appropriate corrective actions commensurate with safety.
However, The failure to perform an adequate root cause evaluation for a reviewed and approved Procedure, 40ST-9ZZ34, "Standard Full Pow Surveillance," that specified an incorrect acceptance criterion for power channel chec was identified as a procedure violation [of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion VI. [One exam le of two; VIOLATION98012-01 02/27/98 02/27/98 02/27/98 STR NCV POS IR 98-12 IR 98-12 LER 'h/3-97-006 IR 98-12 NRC OPS 5A 5B 5C LIC OPS NRC OPS 1C Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station had a good corrective action program.
Conditions that could degrade the quality of plant operations were, for the most part, bein effectivel identified, resolved, and revented.
The licensee identified and corrected failure to perform technical specification required ASME inservice inspections of portions of the nuclear cooling system, as reported by Licensee Event Re ort 50-528;-529;-530/97-006 was identified as a noncited violation.
The plant review board, offsite review committee, and condition report/disposition request committee were effective. However, the plant review board timeliness of rovidin fnformation to the offsite safet review committee was Iackin October 28, 1998 Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station
PALO VERDE PLANTISSUES MATRIX ENCLOSURE 1 DATE TYPE 01/18/98 STR SOURCE IR 97-18 ID SFA TEMPLATE CODE NRC OPS-5A 5C ITEM DESCRIPTION Three Operations Department self-assessments were thorough, provided good insight into the assessed areas, and were effective in providing early problem identification and intervention.
11/29/97 POS IR 97-17 NRC OPS 1A 3A The AuxiliaryOperators, during their plant rounds, conducted thorough checks of plant equipment with a good questioning attitude, and took data as required by their controllin procedures.
The auxiliary operators performed two clearances methodically and use ro er inde endent verificalion.
11/29/97 11/29/97 POS POS IR 97-17 LER 2-97-006 IR 97-17 NRC OPS 1B 3A NRC OPS 1A Operator response to a failed Unit 2 reactor coolant pump lower journal bearing, and the subse uent reactor tri, was acce table.
Control room turnover briefings were conducted thoroughly and professionally.
Minimu shift crew composition consistently conformed to Technical Specification requirements and operators were knowledgeable of the reasons that certain annunciators were in alarm.
11/29/97 NCV IR 97-17 LER 2-96-006 LIC OPS 1A A noncited violation, resulting from weaknesses in operator attention to detail, was identified as a result of both trains of the Low Pressure Safety Injection and Containmen Spray System being momentarily inoperable in Mode 1. The licensee's Licensee Event Report provided a thorou h event description and corrective action.
10/18/97 10/18/97 STR VIO SL IV IR 97-16 IR 97-16 NRC OPS 1B 3A LIC OPS 1B 3A On September 8, 1997, the Unit 2 reactor coolant system was drained to the hot midloo condition by a dedicated midloop operating crew which augmented the normal operating crew during the evolution. Operator oversight and direction of the evolution and decisions to take conservative actions during the evolution were excellent. The use of a.
desi natedmidloo o eratin crewwasseenasastren th.
On October 6, 1997, the Unit 2 reactor coolant system was drained to the cold midloop condition. A dedicated midloop operating crew augmented the normal operating crew during the evolution. During the draindown, a discrepancy between the "A"and "B" channels of reactor water level indication system was discovered, which was caused by an open shutdown cooling bypass valve. This resulted in less than 3780 gpm of flow through the core. a violation of Technical Specification 3/4.4.1.4.2.
Operator oversight and direction of the evolution and decisions to take conservative actions related to the discrepancy observed with reactor level measurement were excellent.
Immediate corrective actions were timel.
October 28, 1998 Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station
0
PALO VERDE PLANTISSUES MATRIX ENCLOSURE 1 DATE 10/03/98 10/03/98 TYPE NEG POS SOURCE IR 98-07 IR 98-07 ID SFA
'EMPLATE CODE NRC MAINT 3B NRC MAINT 3A ITEM DESCRIPTION A prejob sensitive issues brief for transferring new fuel assemblies from dry storage to the spent fuel pool was characterized by poor communications and poor questioning attitude displayed by all participants.
This was evidenced by the lack of a thorough discussion of contingencies for possible problems and unfamiliarity with the requirement for the fuel building roll up door to be fullyfunctional prior to new fuel movement.
Once begun, the fuel transfer was conducted in accordance with approved procedures Qualified engineers and technicians used approved procedures to effectively conduct rriain steam safety valve testing. The licensee promptly and appropriately considered the affect of Unit 3 main steam safety valves, with out.of-tolerance setpoints, on the other two units. When a similar problem was identified in Units 1 and 2, the licensee conducted testing in a timely manner and returned out-of-tolerance main steam safety valves to Technical Specification acceptable values 10/03/98 POS 08/06/98 POS IR 98-07 IR 98-15 NRC MAINT 3A NRC MAINT A proactive approach for the prevention of material condition deficiencies caused by boric acid corrosion was implemented by the licensee.
Pre.outage containment walkdowns and zone inspections of auxiliary building components resulted in the early identification of potential problems that would result from boric acid corrosion Maintenance personnel appropriately replaced the damaged letdown piping and pipe supports.
A lack of an adequate valve lineup initiallyprevented venting of the piping that resulted in a defect of the pipe weld and required replacing the pipe a second time.
07/21/98 EEI IR 98-14 EA 98-382 LER 98-06 NRC MAINT 3A 4C SELF 5A Five examples of an apparent violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI were identified:
Two examples of a failure to identify and correct a condition involving excessive rev flowthrough a high-pressure safety injection pump discharge check valve followingti safety injection tank level decrease events on October 10 and 28, 1997.
Two examples of inadequate corrective actions in the development of testing and maintenance procedures following operating experience assessments of NRC Information Notices 88-70 and 89-62. These actions failed to develop adequate testing procedures to identify excessive check valve reverse flow and adequate maintenance procedures for correct assembly of Borg-Warner check valves.
One example of a missed opportunity to correct an inoperable condition of a high-pressure safety injection pump discharge check valve when a personnel error was made during maintenance, resulting in the valve being reassembled incorrectly. This incorrect assembl resulted in a failure to correct excessive reverse leaka e
October 28, 1998 Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station
PALO VERDE PLANT ISSUES MATRIX ENCLOSURE 1 DATE TYPE 07/03/98 P OS 07/11/98 POS SOURCE IR 98-05 IR 98-05 ID SFA TEMPLATE CODE NRC MAINT 2B NRC MAINT 3A ITEM DESCRIPTION Performance of surveillance tests during the Unit 1 outage was good, as determined by a review of 20 surveillance test packages.
The tracking of interval-based surveillance tests effectively scheduled tests, which prevented exceeding the expiration date, as determined by a review of the surveillance tracking database Electrical maintenance performed good troubleshooting activities on Startup Transformer NAN-X02. During the restoration of the startup transformer, good communications, and management oversight were noted. Work control tagging was properly administered throughout all phases of the troubleshooting activities 06/09/98 05/30/98 05/02/98 POS NCV POS IR 98-05 IR 98-04 IR 98-03 NRC MAINT 1B LIC MAINT 3A NRC MAINT 2A Operations personnel conducted effective prejob briefs and demonstrated good communication practices during the testing of the Unit 2 steam-driven auxiliary feedwater pump. Auxiliaryoperators demonstrated good altention to detail during the test as demonstrated by the identification of minor material deficiencies and errors in procedure drawings Weakness in attention to detail by instrumentation and control technicians resulted in a failure to conduct required maintenance retests.
On three separate occasions, retests were not performed as specified by maintenance procedures Observable material condition of the three units was good. Material condition of the interior of components disassembled for the Unit 1 outage was also good. Material condition of equipment in the Unit 1 containment was good 05/02/98 VIO IR 98-03 SELF MAINT 3A A violation was identified by the licensee for failure to comply with procedure prerequisit steps that required action to correct a low level in the fuel transfer canal prior to relocating a spent fuel assembly within the spent fuel pool. The failure to raise fuel transfer canal levei as required resulted in unexpectedly high radiation levels in one location inside the fuel building 05/02/98 VIO IR 98-03 NRC MAINT 3A Engineering personnel performed boroscope inspections of the Unit 1 "A"emergency diesel generator cylinder liners prior to obtaining authorization from maintenance personnel to start the work, a violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1 and the Conduct of Maintenance procedure 05/02/98 POS IR 98-03 NRC MAINT 4B The permanent repair of a leak in the Unit 1 Steam Generator 2 downcomer sampling line was consistent with the system design requirements.
By seal welding the threaded fitting at the connection to the steam generator nozzle, the licensee had taken additional conservative measures, beyond the design requirements, to ensure system leak tightness October 28, 1998 Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station
PALO VERDE PLANT ISSUES MATRIX ENCLOSURE 1 DATE 05/02/98 TYPE NEG SOURCE IR 98-04 ID SFA TEMPLATE CODE LIC MAINT 2A 3A ITEM DESCRIPTION Inadequate reinstallation of a vibration probe flange on Unit 1 Main Feedwater Pump A during the Unit 1 outage allowed oil to leak onto the pump high pressure journal bearing.
The oil ignited and resulted in a small fire that was extinguished quickly. Subsequent corrective actions for the event were comprehensive, effective, and timely.
03/07/98 STR IR 98-02 NRC MAINT 2A The visual material condition of the three units was good. Licensee efforts, initiated as a result of the Unit 2 sulfurinc acid spill, to assess and identify material condition proble in all Units at a low threshold were ood.
02/27/98 VIO SL IV 02/27/98 P OS IR 98-12 IR 98-12 NRC MAINT 5A NRC MAINT 2A The licensee identified problems and trends in system engineering and trend reports.
However, the failure to initiate a condition report/disposition request to review work requests tor transportabiTity of chronic free air regulator failures was identified as a violation of 10 CFR 50 A endix B, Criterion V.
The external material condition of the systems (i.e., control building ventilation, high pressure safety injection, essential spray pond, and emergency diesel generator) inspected was very good in that the equipment was tree ot water, air, and oil leaks; significant corrosion or rust; and external damage.
An exception was that there was an accumulation of bird feathers in the emergency diesel generator housings.
In addition su orts, insulation, and coatin s a eared acce table.
01/18/98 01/18/98 01/18/98 11/29/97 POS POS STR POS IR 97-18 IR 97-18 IR 97-18 IR 97-17 NRC MAINT 3B NRC MAINT 2B NRC MAINT 2A NRC MAINT 3A 3B 1&C technicians were very knowledgeable of their duties and demonstrated good use ot rocedures while re lacin ressure transmitter RCDPT-101D inside containment.
The Maintenance Rule program was effective in identifying the declining trend in the performance ot the pressurizer pressure transmitters. The decision to recommend the evaluation of 2 transmitters tor the establishment of goals and monitoring requireme was conservative.
During plant tours, the inspectors consistently found that plant equipment status was well maintained and that plant material condition was generally good and well monitored b the lantstatf.
Observation ot troubleshooting activities and the replacement of a failed differential pressure transmitter inside containment demonstrated good independent verification ot critical steps; however, one instance of weak attention to detail was identified when the inspectors informed the instrumentation and control technicians of a loose electrical conduit connection.
11/29/97 P OS I 1/29/97
'NEG IR 97-17 IR 97-17 NRC MAIN1 2A NRC MAINT 2A Routine lant tours identified ood material conditions.
Some housekeeping weaknesses were identified in infrequently accessed areas.
October 28, 1998 Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station
PALO VERDE PLANTISSUES MATRIX ENCLOSURE 1 DATE 10/18/97 10/18/97 TYPE NCV NEG SOURCE IR 97-16 IR 97-16 ID SFA TEMPLATE CODE NRC MAINT 3A NRC MAINT 3A 3C ITEM DESCRIPTION When calibrating the refueling water level indication system detectors to support the Unit 2, Cycle 7, refueling outage, Instrumentation & Controls personnel failed to adhere to procedural guidance.
This resulted in a non-conservative eight inch error in reactor water level indication. The noncited vio'lation of procedures represents poor work practlceh by the technicians. The licensee's corrective actions were sufficiently complete and thorou h.
The licensee installed steam generator nozzle dams in the Unit 2 steam generators during the Cycle 7 refueling outage to support eddy current testing of the steam generator tubes. The licensee did not provide the foreign material exclusion responsible person the viewing point and communication tools to properly monitor all items entering and exiting the steam generator Zone IIIarea; a weakness that has since been corrected.
However, the licensee's steam generator nozzle dam installation procedure and foreign material exclusion training provided to the nozzle dam installers ensured tha acce table forei n material exclusion ractices were maintained.
October 28, 1998 10 Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station
PALO VERDE PLANTISSUES MATRIX ENCLOSURE 1 DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE CODE ITEM DESCRIPTION 10/03/98 08/06/98 08/06/98 NEG POS NCV IR 98-07 IR 98-15 IR 98-15 NRC ENG 4A 3A NRC ENG LIC ENG The initialdocumented evaluation of an information nolice did not fullyaddress the issue of the refueling water tank level instrumentation being affected by the fuel building ventilation system.
However, instrument uncertainty appropriately accounted for the maximum level error that the refueling water tank would experience due to ventilation system operation Licensee engineers performed comprehensive evaluations of numerous facets of the event to determine the equipment root cause of failure.
The nonrepetitive, licensee-identified, low-safety significant, failure to install the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Chapter 15.6.2, described letdown flow hi/lo alarm in all three Palo Verde units was identified as a noncited violation pursuant to Section VII.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement 07/21/98 URI IR 98-14 NRC ENG 4A 4C The licensee did not update design documents when it implemented a design change to a high-pressure safety injection pump discharge check valve. This issue is unresolved pending NRC review of the licensee's condition report evaluation for this issue and further review of the ade uac of the licensee's desi n conlrol rocess.
07/11/98 POS IR 98-05 NRC ENG 5A Licensee actions to identify deficiencies and initiate corrective actions associated with a plant modification, which installed flow meters in the spent fuel pool cooling system were good. The licensee identified that incorrect material had been used to install the flow meters; however, the use-as-is evaluation provided appropriate justification based on testing and material type 05/06/98 05/02/98 05/02/98 POS POS POS IR 98.04 IR 98-03 IR 98-03 NRC ENG 4B NRC ENG 4B NRC ENG 4B Engineering support for the Furmanite repair to the regenerative heat exchanger shell side vent was good.
The licensee's 10 CFR 50.59 screening and evaluation for the modification to add an inspection port to Unit 1, Steam Generator 1 was thorough, comprehensive, and clear Licensee plans to address operational and equipment problems resulting from the inabilityof some components and computer software to correctly interpret some dates that occur before and atter the year 2000 were excellent 03/07/98 11/29/97 NCV STR IR 98-02 IR 97-17 LIC ENG 4A NRC ENG 4B The licensee had not adequately maintained design control for startup transformer voltage in degraded voltage scenarios.
The LER which reported this condition was not self-critical in that it did not report or discuss the loss of design control as a root cause.
A non-cited violation was identified for failure to maintain ade uate desi n control.
Engineering evaluation of a failed Unit 2 reactor coolant pump lower journal bearing and the su ort of maintenance or anization re air efforts was excellent.
October 28, 1998 Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station
PALO VERDE PLANT ISSUES MATRIX ENCLOSURE 1 DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE CODE ITEM DESCRIPTION 11/07/97 11/07/97 NCV VIO SL IV IR 97-25 IR 97-25 LIC ENG 4A NRC ENG 4C One noncited violation was identified for the inability of the auxiliary feedwater system to automatically provide feedwater to the steam generators upon an auxiliary feedwater actuation si nal under certain accident conditions.
One violation iof 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion Viwas identified for failure to have adequate acceptance criteria for the inspection ot the reactor coolant pump motor lubricating oil collection system flexible covers.
10/18/97 STR IR 97-16 NRC ENG 4A 4B Engineering performed an accurate calculation and generated a good temporary procedure to verify (by testing) the adequacy of the shutdown cooling system to cool the fuel in the reactor vessel and supplement the spent fuel pool cooling system, as required by the UFSAR. Although the calculations indicated performance of the test was unnecessary, the decision to verity the calculations through testing was a good example of conservative lant o erations.
October 28, 1998 12 Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station
PALO VERDE PLANT ISSUES MATRIX ENCLOSURE 1 DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE CODE ITEM DESCRIPTION 10/24/98 10/24/98 STR VIO IR 98-13 IR 98-13 NRC PS 1C NRC PS 3A Continued excellent performance indicated by response to a potential bomb threat, management effectiveness, access control, and audits and self assessment.
The licensee effectively implemented the safeguards contingency plan in response to a born threat.
Senior management support for the security organization was very good. The security program was implemented by a well qualified and highly professional staff.
Audits of the security, access authorization, and fitness for duty programs were elfective thorough, and intrusive. A very good program for searching personnel, packages and vehicles was maintained.
Revision 40 to the physical security plan was a violation in that changes were not made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(p).
Revision 40, dated March 1, 1998, contained 10 changes, three of which were implemented, which were reductions in safeguards effectiveness contrary to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(p)(2).
The licensee implemented proper corrective actions, therefore, no written response was required.
09/10/98 NEG IR 98-07 NRC PS 1B 3A An untimely initial declaration (44 minutes) of a Notification of Unusual Event was made in response to rupture of the Unit 1 sulfuric acid day tank because the shift manager left the control room to personally assess the scene instead of implementing his emergency response responsibilities 08/24/98 08/24/98 07/11/98 STR STR POS IR 98-16 IR 98-16 IR 98-05 NRC PS 3A NRC PS 3A NRC PS 3A Radiation exposure controls were good.
Radiological areas were posted properly and high radiation areas were controlled effectively. High quality pre-job briefings on radiological hazards and dose reduction techniques were provided to radiation workers.
Radiation protection technicians provided good oversight of work activities. Radiation survey information was current, and a good calibration program was maintained for radiation protection instruments.
Licensee controls worked effectively to keep radioactive material inside the radiological controlled area.
A good audit of the radiation protection program was performed by the Nuclear Assurance Division. The audit team consisted of members that were well qualified. The scope and depth of review were appropriate, and the audit findings demonstrated that the audit findings demonstrated that the audit was self. critical.
Good radiological practices were followed during performance of surveiilances to measure chemistry and specific activity of the reactor coolant system.
The chemistry technician was knowledgeable of the procedures and of the usage of the test instrumentation October 28, 1998 13 Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station
PALO VERDE PLANTISSUES MATRIX ENCLOSURE 1 DATE TYPE 06/29/98 POS SOURCE IR 98 ID SFA TEMPLATE CODE NRC PS 1C ITEM DESCRIPTION Radiological protection postings of observed radiation, high radiation, and locked high radiation areas were accurate for existing conditions.
Radiological housekeeping practices In observed contaminated areas were adequate.
Decontamination activities and subsequent surveys of the letdown heat exchanger valve gallery after a letdown line break in the room were satisfactory 05/27/98 05/27/98 05/27/98 05/27/98 POS NEG POS NEG IR 98.04 IR 98-04 IR 98-04 IR 98-04
. NRC PS 1C NRC PS 5C 1C NRC PS 1C NRC PS 1C Performance of the Technical Support Center staff during the annual emergency preparedness exercise was good. The staff demonstrated effective communications, with frequent and informative briefings provided by the emergency coordinator.
Good access control and accountability were established and maintained.
Corrective actions for improvement of the emergency plan exercise scenario development process in response to an exercise weakness were not fullyeffective in that a scenario was created which did not provide sufficient information for operators to promptly recognize and declare the desired Emergency Action Level.
The training program for the emergency response organization was effectively implemented, as demonstrated from the 50 records reviewed by the inspectors.
The Emergency Response Organization critique process was effective in identifying areas in need of corrective'action.
However, the severity of identified weaknesses was not accurately reflected in the drill report.
05/27/98 NEG 05/06/98 POS IR 98-04 IR 98-04 NRC PS 1C NRC PS 3A Relocation of the Operations Support Center to an alternate facilityduring the annual emergency preparedness exercise was disorganized, which extended the amount of time taken to attempt the relocation.
Because of this, an opportunity to demonstrate operations from the relocated Operations Support Center was missed.
Radiological planning for the Furmanite repair of the regenerative heat exchanger sh side vent valve was good. The as-low-as-reasonably-achievable review reduced the area dose rate from 500 to 75 mRem/hr and the total exposure for the job did not exceed 592 mRem.
03/05/98 NEG 01/16/98 POS IR 98-11 IR 98-01 NRC PS SC NRC PS 2B The licensee decontaminated areas affected by the 1993 steam generator tube rupture and condensate spill to levels below regulatory requirements.
Consequently, the licensee was not required to retain the records in a decommissioning file. However, the licensee had been ineffective in carrying out corrective actions to satisfy its intent to establish decommissionin records that exceeded the uidance in 10 CFR 50.75 The program for protecting safeguards information was effective October 28, 1998 14 Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station
PALO VERDE PLANT ISSUES MATRIX ENCLOSURE 1 DATE 01/16/98 01/16/98 01/16/98 TYPE VIO SL IV POS STR SOURCE IR 98-01 IR 98-01 IR 98-01 ID SFA TEMPLATE CODE NRC PS 2A NRC PS 2B NRC PS 3A 3B ITEM DESCRIPTION A violation [of paragraph 2.E of the license, 10 CFR 73.55, and pursuant to the authority of 10 CFR 50.90 and 10 CFR 50.54(p), as implemented in the physical security plan]
was identified in that three zones of perimeter detection failed intrusion tests.
The licensee's corrective actions included increased testing of the protected area detection aids.
An excellent system was in place for reporting safeguards events.
The alarm stations were redundant, well protected, and the operators were alert, well trained, and efficienL 01/16/98 STR IR 98-01 NRC PS 2B A significant improvement was noted in the security program implementation of all areas inspected.
12/12/97 12/12/97 12/12/97 STR STR NCV IR 97-26 IR 97-26 IR 97-26 LER 3-96-001 NRC PS 1C 3C NRC PS 1C 3C LIC PS 1C 3A Very good solid waste management program was implemented.
The generation of dry active wastes had been reduced.
A very good transportation program for radioactive materials and radioactive waste was maintained.
The licensee satisfactorily implemented the revisions of 49 CFR and 10 CFR Part 71. Shipments of radioactive materials were made consistent with the latest revisions to the De artment of Trans ortation and NRC re ulations.
The post-accident sampling system was inoperable for 75 days exceeding the 7-day limi forino erabilit
. Inattentiontodetailand oor roceduralcommunications.
12/12/97 STR 12/12/97 STR IR 97-26 IR 97-26 NRC PS 3C NRC PS 5A 5B 5C Excellent facilities were maintained for the storage and management of solid radioactive wastes and trans ortation activities.
An effective audit/self-assessment program was maintained.
Strong management oversight was maintained of the solid radioactive waste management and transportation ro rams.
11/29/97 NCV IR 97-17 LIC PS 3A A noncited violation was identified by the licensee as the result of a worker alarming the personnel contamination monitor when exiting the radiologically controlled area and not making a second attempt to pass the monitor or contact a radiation protection (RP) technician. The event demonstrated inattention to detail by both the radiation worker and RP technicians.
11/29/97 POS IR 97-17 NRC PS 3A The inspectors observed good radiation protection practices by the instrumentation and control technicians performing work and by the RP technician covering replacement of a failed differential ressure transmitter.
October 28, 1998 15 Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station
DATE 11/07/97 TYPE STR SOURCE IR 97-24 ID SFA TEMPLATE CODE NRC PS 1C 3C ITEM DESCRIPTION Overall, excellent radiological environmental and meteorological monitoring programs were implemented.
Environmental sampling locations were properly established and met Offsite Dose Calculation Manual requirements.
Environmental sampling equipmen and chemistry laboratory radio chemistry analytical instruments were properly calibrated and maintained.
Appropriate changes were made to the environmental sample location described in the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual as a result ol the land use census.
Good radiological environmental monitoring implementing procedures were maintained.
The meteorological tower instrumentation was properly calibrated and maintained.
The meteorolo ical data recove rate was reater than 99 ercent.
11/07/97 STR 11/07/97 STR 11/07/97 NEG IR 97-24 IR 97-24 IR 97-24 NRC PS SA 5C NRC PS 3A 3B NRC PS 3B Excellent, comprehensive annual audits of the radiological environmental monitoring program were performed. Timely corrective actions were implemented.
Qualified auditors, who were assisted by experienced and knowledgeable technical specialists, performed the audits. There was an appropriate evaluation performed of the central environmental laborato s
erformance.
Good training and qualification programs were implemented.
The knowledge and erformance of the environmental mana ement and technical staff were excellent.
No individual responsible for implementing the radiological environmental monitoring ro ram was full ualified.
10/18/97 STR IR 97-16 NRC PS 3A 3B The licensee removed the Unit 2 core barrel during the Cycle 7 refueling outage for the 10 year inservice inspection.
The licensee's thorough planning, coordination of activities and training of personnel resulted in a successful removal of the core support barrel fro the reactor vessel with minimal radiation exposure to personnel.
The licensee's activitie to ensure that radiation dose rates remained low were excellent October 28, 1998 16 Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station
ENCLOSURE 2 Date GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF PIM TABLELABELS Actual date of an event or signilicant issue for those items that have a clear date of occurrence, the date the source of the information was issued (such as the LFR date), or, for inspection reports, the last date of the inspection period. Ifthe event date is earLier than the current assessment
{plant performance review) period, the document issue date/end ol'inspection should be used and the event date documented in the ITEM DESCRIPFION column.
Type SFA Sources ID Issue Description Codes The categorization of the issue - see the Type Item Code table.
SAI.P Functional Area Codes: OPS for Operations; MAINTfor Maintenance; ENG for Engineering; and PS I'or Plant Support.
The document that contains the issue information: IR for NRC Inspection Report; LER for Licensee Event Report; letter I'or NRR letter.
Identification of who discovered issue: NRC for NRC; LICfor Licensee; or SELF for Self Identifying {events).
Details ofthe issue from the LER text or from the IR Executive Summaries.
Template Codes - see table.
ED WK EF.I 4 VIO NCV DEV POS NEG LF.R URI E
LIC MISC TYPE ITEM CODES Enforcement Action Letter with CivilPenalty Enforcement Discretion-No CivilPenalty Overall Strong Licensee Performance Overall Weak Licensee Performance Escalated Enforcement Item - Waiting Final NRC Action Violation Level I, H, HI, or IV Noncited Violation Deviation from Licensee Commitment to NRC Individual Good Inspection Finding Individual Poor Inspection Finding Licensee Event Report to the NRC Unresolved Item from Inspection Report Licensing Issue from NRR Miscellaneous - Emergency Preparedness Finding (EP),
Declared Emergency, Nonconformance Issue, etc.
TEMPLATECODES Operational Performance: A - Normal Operations; B - Operations During Transients; and C - Programs and Processes Material Condition: A - Equipment Condition or B - Programs and Processes Human Performance: A - Work Performance; B - Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities/
Training; C-Work Environment Engineering/Design: A - Design; B - Engiheering Support; C - Programs and Processes Problem Identification and Resolution: A - Identification; B - Analysis; and C-Resolution NOTES:
~ EEIs are either: (I) apparent violations of NRC requirements that are being considered for escalated enforcement action in accordance with the "General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Action" (Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600, or {2) issues, which may represent a SL IV potential violation, that remain open pending receipt of the licensee's corrective actions to determine ifan NCVor VIOexists. However, the NRC has not reached its final enforcement decision on the issues identiTied by the EEIs and the PIM entries willbe modified when the final decisions are made.
Before the NRC makes its decision for escalated enforcement items, the licensee willbe provided vvith an opportunity to either: (I) respond to the apparent violation or (2) request a predecisional enforcement conference.
~~URIs are unresolved items about which more information is required to determine whether the issue in question is an acceptable item, a deviation, a nonconformance, or a violation. However, the NRC has not reached its final conclusions on the issues, and the PIM entries willbe modiTied when the Iinal conclusions are made.
PALO VERDE INSPECTION PLAN ENCLOSURE 3 IP - Inspection Procedure Tl - Temporary Instruction
'ore inspection - Minimum NRC Inspection Program (mandatory all plants)
INSPECTION TITLE/
PROGRAM AREA NUMBER OF INSPECTORS PLANNED INSPECTION DATES TYPE OF INSPECTION COMMENTS IP 71001 Licensed Operator Requal. Program Evaluation 01/25 - 29/99 Core Inspection IP 84750 Radioactive Waste Treatment, and Effluent and Environmental Monitorin 01/25 - 29/99 02/22 - 26/99 Core Inspection IP 82301 Evaluation of Exercises IP 81700 Ph ical Securit Pro ram IP 73753 Inservice Ins ection IP 83750 Occu ational Radiation Ex osure IP 86750 Solid Radioactive Waste Management 8
Trans ortation of Radioactive Material IP 93809 Safety System Engineering Inspection 03/08 - 12/99 01/15 - 19/99 04/12 - 16/99 04/12 - 16/99 05/03 - 07/99 06/'l4 - 18/99 06/28/99- 07/02/gg Core Ins ection Core Ins ection Core Ins ection Core Ins ection Core Inspection Core Inspection
IL