Text

LLC Supplemental Response to NRC Request for Additional Information No. 27 (Erai No. 8788) on the NuScale Design Certification Application
	ML17310A296
Person / Time
Site:	NuScale
Issue date:	11/03/2017
From:	Rad Z; NuScale
To:	; Document Control Desk, Office of New Reactors
References
	RAIO-1117-57010
	Download: ML17310A296 (39)
	v • d • e

RAIO-1117-57010 NuScale Power, LLC 1100 NE Circle Blvd., Suite 200 Corvalis, Oregon 97330, Office: 541.360.0500, Fax: 541.207.3928 www.nuscalepower.com November 03, 2017 Docket No.52-048 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk One White Flint North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852-2738

SUBJECT:

NuScale Power, LLC Supplemental Response to NRC Request for Additional Information No. 27 (eRAI No. 8788) on the NuScale Design Certification Application

REFERENCES:

1. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Request for Additional Information No. 27 (eRAI No. 8788)," dated May 22, 2017

2. NuScale Power, LLC Response to NRC "Request for Additional Information No. 27 (eRAI No.8788)," dated July 19, 2017 The purpose of this letter is to provide the NuScale Power, LLC (NuScale) supplemental response to the referenced NRC Request for Additional Information (RAI).

The Enclosure to this letter contains NuScale's supplemental response to the following RAI Question from NRC eRAI No. 8788:

08.01-1 This letter and the enclosed response make no new regulatory commitments and no revisions to any existing regulatory commitments.

If you have any questions on this response, please contact Darrell Gardner at 980-349-4829 or at dgardner@nuscalepower.com.

Sincerely, Zackary W. Rad Director, Regulatory Affairs NuScale Power, LLC Distribution:

Gregory Cranston, NRC, OWFN-8G9A Omid Tabatabai, NRC, OWFN-8G9A Samuel Lee, NRC, OWFN-8G9A : NuScale Supplemental Response to NRC Request for Additional Information eRAI No. 8788 Za Zackary W. Rad Director Regulatory Affairs

RAIO-1117-57010 NuScale Power, LLC 1100 NE Circle Blvd., Suite 200 Corvalis, Oregon 97330, Office: 541.360.0500, Fax: 541.207.3928 www.nuscalepower.com :

NuScale Supplemental Response to NRC Request for Additional Information eRAI No. 8788

NuScale Nonproprietary Response to Request for Additional Information Docket No.52-048 eRAI No.: 8788 Date of RAI Issue: 05/22/2017 NRC Question No.: 08.01-1 General Design Criteria (GDC) 50, Containment Design Basis, requires, in part, that the design of containment penetrations, including electrical penetrations containing circuits of the ac power system and the capability of electrical penetration assemblies in containment structures to withstand a loss-of-coolant (LOCA) without loss of mechanical integrity and the external circuit protection for such penetrations. The staff has reviewed the following sections in the design certification application and noted some inconsistencies in addressing the Electrical Penetration Assemblies (EPA) and their conformance to GDC 50.

FSAR Tier 2 Section 3.1.5.1 states that the NuScale Power Plant Design conforms to GDC

50. However, FSAR Tier 2, Section 8.1.4.3, bullet 3, states that the AC and DC electrical power system circuits do not penetrate the containment vessels; therefore, conformance with GDC 50 is not necessary.

FSAR Tier 2, Section 8.3.1.2.7, under GDC 50, states that the only circuits that penetrate the CNVs are I&C circuits that serve to control power and operate safety-related and nonsafety-related equipment (e.g., sensors, execute devices) associated with each NPM as described in Section 7.0.4. There are no AC electrical power system cables that penetrate the CNVs.

FSAR Tier 2, Section 8.3.2.2.2, under GDC 50 compliance, states that The CNV electrical penetration assemblies for the Class 1E and non-Class 1E circuits are included in the containment design and conform to GDC 50 as discussed in FSAR Tier 2 Section 6.2.1.

EPAs are further discussed in the following:

Electrical penetration assemblies (example: CNV38/39) are indicated in FSAR Tier 2 Table 6.1-1, FSAR Tier 2 Figure 6.2-2b shows electrical penetration assembly, FSAR Tier 2, Section 6.2.4, under Containment Isolation, itemized Electrical Penetration for power supply as 3 total on the top head, and, FSAR Tier 2, Section 6.2.6.2 describes the leakage tests for Electrical Penetration Assemblies (EPA)

FSAR Tier 1, Section 2.1.1, under Design Commitments, the 10th bullet states that The NPM Class 1E containment electrical penetration assemblies are sized to power their design loads. In addition, FSAR Tier 1 Section 2.1.1, the last bullet states, The CNTS Class 1E containment electrical penetration assemblies are rated to withstand fault

NuScale Nonproprietary currents for the time required to clear the fault from its power source.

FSAR Tier 1 Table 2.1-2, and Table 2.1-3 lists Class 1E electrical penetrations for CNTS pressurizer heater power, and control rod drives. It is not specific whether these equipment require AC/DC power supply.

The staff requests NuScale to:

clarify whether or not electrical penetration assembly in the Class 1E containment 1.

conforms to GDC 50, clarify whether there are electrical penetration assemblies for power circuits and supplies, 2.

provide a list of the safety-related low voltage power circuits and control power circuits (AC 3.

and DC) that penetrate the containment (i.e., EPA), and if there is a Class 1E circuit that is included in the containment design, as stated in FSAR 4.

Tier 2 Section 8.3.2.2.2, explain why the EPA will not meet GDC 50 as Class 1E containment EPA, as stated in FSAR Tier 2 Section 8.1.4.3.

NuScale Response:

This response supplements the docketed response originally provided to Request for Additional Information (RAI) No. 27 (eRAI No. 8788) by NuScale letter RAIO-0717-55011 dated July 19, 2017. Pursuant to conference calls between NRC staff and NuScale on August 23, 2017 and October 4, 2017, NuScale has revised certain FSAR sections related to the design and testing of containment electrical penetration assemblies (EPAs) to address NRC staff comments on the original response.

FSAR Section 3.8.2.1.6 was revised to add additional information on the mechanical design of the EPAs. FSAR Table 3.11-1 was revised to add clarity to the EPA component descriptions for environmental qualification purposes, and a table note for commodity items was added. FSAR sections on EPA testing were revised consisistent with these FSAR changes. Certain FSAR sections that describe the EPA design and refer to FSAR Section 8.3.1 as applicable information were changed to FSAR Section 8.3 to not exclude relevant parts of FSAR Section 8.3.2. The remaining revisions are conforming changes.

The revisions to the EPA design descriptions are consistent with the acceptance criteria for EPAs described in Part 6 of the DSRS Acceptance Criteria in NuScale DSRS 8.3.1, AC Power Systems (Onsite) and in Part 7 of the Technical Rationale in NuScale DSRS 8.3.2, DC Power Systems (Onsite).

The revised FSAR sections and tables are listed below.

Table 1.9-2 Conformance with Regulatory Guides Table 1.9-3 Conformance with NUREG-0800, Standard Review Plan (SRP) and Design Specific Review Standard (DSRS) 3.1.5 Reactor Containment

NuScale Nonproprietary 3.8.2.1.6 Containment Electrical Penetration Assemblies and 3.8.2.8 References Table 3.11-1 List of Environmentally Qualified Electrical/I&C and Mechanical Equipment Located in Harsh Environments Section 8.1.4.3 Regulatory Requirements and Guidance Table 8.1-1 Acceptance Criteria and Guidelines for Electric Power Systems Section 8.3.1.2.5 Containment Electrical Penetration Assemblies Table 14.3-1 Module-Specific Structures, Systems, and Components Based Design Features and Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Cross Reference In addition to the FSAR changes above, the following Tier 1 sections and tables were revised.

Section 2.1.1 (NuScale Power Module) Design Description Table 2.1-2 NuScale Power Module Mechanical Equipment Table 2.1-3 NuScale Power Module Electrical Equipment Table 2.1-4 NuScale Power Module Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Section 2.8.1 (Equipment Qualification) Design Description Table 2.8-1 Module Specific Mechanical and Electrical/I&C Equipment Table 2.8-2 Equipment Qualification Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Impact on DCA:

The FSAR and Tier 1 sections have been revised as described in the response above and as shown in the markup provided in this response.

NuScale Tier 1 NuScale Power Module Tier 1 2.1-3 Draft Revision 1 The CNTS supports the DHRS by closing CIVs for main steam valves and feedwater valves when actuated by MPS for DHRS operation.

The ECCS supports the RCS by opening the ECCS reactor vent valves and RRVs when their respective trip valve is actuated by MPS.

The DHRS supports the RCS by opening the DHRS actuation valves on a DHRS actuation signal.

The CNTS supports the MPS by providing electrical penetration assemblies to route instrument cables for MPS actuation through the CNV.

The NPM performs the following nonsafety-related, risk-significant function that is verified by Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria:

The CNTS supports the RXB crane by providing lifting attachment points that the RXB crane can connect to so that the NPM can be lifted.

The NPM performs the following nonsafety-related functions that are verified by Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria:

The CNTS supports the SG by providing structural support for the SG piping.

The CNTS supports the CRDS by providing structural support for the CRDS piping.

The CNTS supports the RCS by providing structural support for the RCS piping.

The CNTS supports the feedwater system by providing structural support for the feedwater system piping.

Design Commitments The NPM American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code Class 1, 2 and 3 piping systems listed in Table 2.1-1 comply with ASME Code Section III requirements.

The Nuscale Power Module ASME Code Class 1 and 2 components conform to the rules of construction of ASME Code Section III.

The Nuscale Power Module ASME Code Class CS components conform to the rules of construction of ASME Code Section III.

Safety-related structures, systems, and components (SSC) are protected against the dynamic and environmental effects associated with postulated failures in high-and moderate-energy piping systems.

The Nuscale Power Module ASME Code Class 2 piping systems and interconnected equipment nozzles are evaluated for leak-before-break (LBB).

The RPV beltline material has a Charpy upper-shelf energy of greater than 75 ft-lb.

The CNV serves as an essentially leak-tight barrier against the uncontrolled release of radioactivity to the environment.

The CIV closure times limit potential releases of radioactivity.

The length of piping shall be minimized between the containment penetration and the associated outboard CIVs.

RAI 08.01-1S1

NuScale Tier 1 NuScale Power Module Tier 1 2.1-4 Draft Revision 1 The NPM Class 1ECNTS containment electrical penetration assemblies are sized to power their design loads.

Physical separation exists between the redundant divisions of the MPS Class 1E instrumentation and control current-carrying circuits, and between Class 1E instrumentation and control current-carrying circuits and non-Class 1E instrumentation and current-carrying circuits. The scope of this commitment includes the cables from the NPM disconnect box to the instrument.

The RPV is provided with surveillance capsule holders to hold a capsule containing RPV material surveillance specimens.

The CNTS safety-related valves change position under design differential pressure.

The ECCS safety-related valves change position under design differential pressure.

The DHRS safety-related valves change position under design differential pressure.

The RCS safety-related check valves change position under design differential pressure and flow.

The RCS safety-related excess flow check valves change position under excess flow conditions.

The CNTS safety-related hydraulic-operated valves fail to their safety-related position on loss of electrical power under design differential pressure.

The ECCS safety-related RRVs and RVVs fail to their safety-related position on loss of electrical power to their corresponding trip valves under design differential pressure.

The DHRS safety-related hydraulic-operated valves fail to their safety-related position on loss of electrical power under design differential pressure.

The CNTS safety-related check valves change position under design differential pressure and flow.

RAI 08.01-1S1 The CNTS Class 1E containment electrical penetration assemblies are rated to withstand fault currents for the time required to clear the fault from its power source.

2.1.2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.1-4 contains the inspections, tests, and analyses for the NPM.

NuScale Tier 1 NuScale Power Module Tier 1 2.1-7 Draft Revision 1 RAI 08.01-1S1 Table 2.1-2: NuScale Power Module Mechanical Equipment Equipment Name Equipment Identifier ASME Code Section III Class Valve Actuator Type Containment Isolation Valve RCS integral RPV/SG/Pressurizer RPV-VSL-0001 1

N/A N/A RVI upper core plate N/A CS N/A N/A RVI core barrel N/A CS N/A N/A RVI reflector blocks N/A CS N/A N/A RVI lower core plate N/A CS N/A N/A RVI core support blocks N/A CS N/A N/A CNTS containment vessel CNV-VSL-0001 1

N/A N/A RCS reactor safety valve RCS-PSV-0003A 1

N/A No RCS reactor safety valve RCS-PSV-0003B 1

N/A No RCS pressurizer spray check valve RCS-CKV-0323 1

N/A No RCS injection check valve RCS-CKV-0332 1

N/A No RCS discharge excess flow check valve RCS-CKV-0333 1

N/A No RCS high point degasification excess flow check valve RCS-CKV-0400 1

N/A No ECCS reactor vent valve ECC-HOV-0101A 1

Hydraulic No ECCS reactor vent valve trip valve ECC-SV-0102A 1

Solenoid YesNo ECCS reactor vent valve reset valve ECC-SV-0103A 1

Solenoid YesNo ECCS reactor vent valve ECC-HOV-0101B 1

Hydraulic No ECCS reactor vent valve trip valve ECC-SV-0102B 1

Solenoid YesNo ECCS reactor vent valve reset valve ECC-SV-0103B 1

Solenoid YesNo ECCS reactor vent valve ECC-HOV-0101C 1

Hydraulic No ECCS reactor vent valve trip valve ECC-SV-0102C 1

Solenoid YesNo ECCS reactor vent valve reset valve ECC-SV-0103C 1

Solenoid YesNo ECCS reactor recirculation valve ECC-HOV-0104A 1

Hydraulic No ECCS reactor recirculation valve trip valve ECC-SV-0105A 1

Solenoid YesNo ECCS reactor recirculation valve reset valve ECC-SV-0106A 1

Solenoid YesNo ECCS reactor recirculation valve ECC-HOV-0104B 1

Hydraulic No ECCS reactor recirculation valve trip valve ECC-SV-0105B 1

Solenoid YesNo ECCS reactor recirculation valve reset valve ECC-SV-0106B 1

Solenoid YesNo ECCS reactor recirculation valve trip valve ECC-SV-0107 1

Solenoid YesNo CNTS solenoid valves None 1

Solenoid No CNTS reactor coolant system injection inboard CIV CNT-CVC-ISV-0331 1

Electro-hydraulic Yes CNTS reactor coolant system injection outboard CIV CNT-CVC-ISV-0329 1

Electro-hydraulic Yes CNTS pressurizer spray inboard CIV CNT-CVC-ISV-0325 1

Electro-hydraulic Yes CNTS pressurizer spray outboard CIV CNT-CVC-ISV-0323 1

Electro-hydraulic Yes CNTS reactor coolant system discharge inboard CIV CNT-CVC-ISV-0334 1

Electro-hydraulic Yes CNTS reactor coolant system discharge outboard CIV CNT-CVC-ISV-0336 1

Electro-hydraulic Yes CNTS reactor pressure vessel high point degasification inboard CIV CNT-CVC-ISV-0401 1

Electro-hydraulic Yes

NuScale Tier 1 NuScale Power Module Tier 1 2.1-9 Draft Revision 1 CRDM heat exchanger CRDS-CRD-004 2

N/A N/A CRDM heat exchanger CRDS-CRD-005 2

N/A N/A CRDM heat exchanger CRDS-CRD-006 2

N/A N/A CRDM heat exchanger CRDS-CRD-007 2

N/A N/A CRDM heat exchanger CRDS-CRD-008 2

N/A N/A CRDM heat exchanger CRDS-CRD-009 2

N/A N/A CRDM heat exchanger CRDS-CRD-010 2

N/A N/A CRDM heat exchanger CRDS-CRD-011 2

N/A N/A CRDM heat exchanger CRDS-CRD-012 2

N/A N/A CRDM heat exchanger CRDS-CRD-013 2

N/A N/A CRDM heat exchanger CRDS-CRD-014 2

N/A N/A CRDM heat exchanger CRDS-CRD-015 2

N/A N/A CRDM heat exchanger CRDS-CRD-016 2

N/A N/A CRDM cooling water supply flex hose CRDS-FHS-0101 thru CRDS-FHS-0116 2

N/A N/A CRDM cooling water return flex hose CRDS-FHS-0201 thru CRDS-FHS-0216 2

N/A N/A CRDM latch housing N/A 1

N/A N/A CRDM rod travel housing N/A 1

N/A N/A CRDM rod travel housing plug N/A 1

N/A N/A CNTS instrumentation and controls division I electrical penetrationI&C Division I Electrical Penetration Assembly (EPA)

CNV8 1

N/A N/A CNTS instrumentation and controls division II electrical penetrationI&C Division II Electrical Penetration Assembly (EPA)

CNV9 1

N/A N/A CNTS pressurizer heater power #1 electrical penetrationPZR Heater Power #1 Electrical Penetration Assembly (EPA)

CNV15 1

N/A N/A CNTS pressurizer heater power #2 electrical penetrationPZR Heater Power #2 Electrical Penetration Assembly (EPA)

CNV16 1

N/A N/A CNTS instrumentation and controls channel A electrical penetrationI&C Channel A Electrical Penetration Assembly (EPA)

CNV17 1

N/A N/A CNTS instrumentation and controls channel B electrical penetrationI&C Channel B Electrical Penetration Assembly (EPA)

CNV18 1

N/A N/A CNTS instrumentation and controls channel C electrical penetrationI&C Channel C Electrical Penetration Assembly (EPA)

CNV19 1

N/A N/A CNTS instrumentation and controls channel D electrical penetrationI&C Channel D Electrical Penetration Assembly (EPA)

CNV20 1

N/A N/A CNTS control rod drive system electrical penetrationCRD Power Electrical Penetration Assembly (EPA)

CNV37 1

N/A N/A Table 2.1-2: NuScale Power Module Mechanical Equipment (Continued)

Equipment Name Equipment Identifier ASME Code Section III Class Valve Actuator Type Containment Isolation Valve

NuScale Tier 1 NuScale Power Module Tier 1 2.1-10 Draft Revision 1 CNTS rod position indication group #1 electrical penetrationRPI Group #1 Electrical Penetration Assembly (EPA)

CNV38 1

N/A N/A CNTS rod position indication group #2 electrical penetrationRPI Group #2 Electrical Penetration Assembly (EPA)

CNV39 1

N/A N/A RCS instrumentation and controls channel A electrical penetration RPV39 1

N/A N/A RCS instrumentation and controls channel B electrical penetration RPV40 1

N/A N/A RCS instrumentation and controls channel C electrical penetration RPV41 1

N/A N/A RCS instrumentation and controls channel D electrical penetration RPV42 1

N/A N/A Table 2.1-2: NuScale Power Module Mechanical Equipment (Continued)

Equipment Name Equipment Identifier ASME Code Section III Class Valve Actuator Type Containment Isolation Valve

NuScale Tier 1 NuScale Power Module Tier 1 2.1-11 Draft Revision 1 RAI 08.01-1, RAI 08.01-1S1 Table 2.1-3: NuScale Power Module Electrical Equipment Equipment Name Equipment Identifier Remotely Operated Loss of Motive Power Position CIV Closure Time (sec)1 ECCS reactor vent valve trip valve ECC-SV-0102A Yes Open N/A ECCS reactor vent valve reset valve ECC-SV-0103A Yes Close N/A ECCS reactor vent valve trip valve ECC-SV-0102B Yes Open N/A ECCS reactor vent valve reset valve ECC-SV-0103B Yes Close N/A ECCS reactor vent valve trip valve ECC-SV-0102C Yes Open N/A ECCS reactor vent valve reset valve ECC-SV-0103C Yes Close N/A ECCS reactor recirculation valve trip valve ECC-SV-0105A Yes Open N/A ECCSreactor recirculation valve reset valve ECC-SV-0106A Yes Close N/A ECCS reactor recirculation valve trip valve ECC-SV-0105B Yes Open N/A ECCS reactor recirculation valve reset valve ECC-SV-0106B Yes Close N/A ECCS reactor recirculation valve trip valve ECC-SV-0107 Yes Open N/A CNTS reactor coolant system injection inboard CIV CNT-CVC-ISV-0331 Yes Closed

< 57 CNTS reactor coolant system injection outboard CIV CNT-CVC-ISV-0329 Yes Closed

< 57 CNTS pressurizer spray inboard CIV CNT-CVC-ISV-0325 Yes Closed

< 57 CNTS pressurizer spray outboard CIV CNT-CVC-ISV-0323 Yes Closed

< 57 CNTS reactor coolant system discharge inboard CIV CNT-CVC-ISV-0334 Yes Closed

< 57 CNTS reactor coolant system discharge outboard CIV CNT-CVC-ISV-0336 Yes Closed

< 57 CNTS reactor pressure vessel high point degasification inboard CIV CNT-CVC-ISV-0401 Yes Closed

< 57 CNTS reactor pressure vessel high point degasification outboard CIV CNT-CVC-ISV-0403 Yes Closed

< 57 CNTS containment evacuation inboard CIV CNT-CE-ISV-0101 Yes Closed

< 57 CNTS containment evacuation outboard CIV CNT-CE-ISV-0102 Yes Closed

< 57 CNTS flood and drain inboard CIV CNT-CFD-ISV-0130 Yes Closed

< 57 CNTS flood and drain outboard CIV CNT-CFD-ISV-0129 Yes Closed

< 57 CNTS reactor component cooling water system supply inboard CIV CNT-RCCW-ISV-0185 Yes Closed

< 57 CNTS reactor component cooling water system supply outboard CIV CNT-RCCW-ISV-0184 Yes Closed

< 57 CNTS reactor component cooling water system return inboard CIV CNT-RCCW-ISV-0190 Yes Closed

< 57 CNTS reactor component cooling water system return outboard CIV CNT-RCCW-ISV-0191 Yes Closed

< 57 CNTS feedwater #1 CIV CNT-FW-ISV-1003 Yes Closed

< 57 CNTS feedwater #2 CIV CNT-FW-ISV-2003 Yes Closed

< 57 CNTS main steam #1 CIV CNT-MS-ISV-1005 Yes Closed

< 57 CNTS main steam line #1 bypass valve CIV CNT-MS-ISV-1006 Yes Closed

< 10N/A (see Note 1)

CNTS main steam #2 CIV CNT-MS-ISV-2005 Yes Closed

< 57 CNTS main steam line #2 bypass valve CIV CNT-MS-ISV-2006 Yes Closed

< 10N/A (see Note 1)

NuScale Tier 1 NuScale Power Module Tier 1 2.1-12 Draft Revision 1 DHRS actuation valve DHR-HOV-1002A Yes Open N/A DHRS actuation valve DHR-HOV-1002B Yes Open N/A DHRS actuation valve DHR-HOV-2002A Yes Open N/A DHRS actuation valve DHR-HOV-2002B Yes Open N/A CNTS instrumentation and controls division I electrical penetrationI&C Division I Electrical Penetration Assembly (EPA)

CNV8 N/A N/A N/A CNTS instrumentation and controls division II electrical penetrationI&C Division II Electrical Penetration Assembly (EPA)

CNV9 N/A N/A N/A CNTS pressurizer heater power #1electrical penetrationPZR Heater Power #1 Electrical Penetration Assembly (EPA)

CNV15 N/A N/A N/A CNTS pressurizer heater power #2 electrical penetrationPZR Heater Power #2 Electrical Penetration Assembly (EPA)

CNV16 N/A N/A N/A CNTS instrumentation and controls channel A electrical penetrationI&C Channel A Electrical Penetration Assembly (EPA)

CNV17 N/A N/A N/A CNTS instrumentation and controls channel B electrical penetrationI&C Channel B Electrical Penetration Assembly (EPA)

CNV18 N/A N/A N/A CNTS instrumentation and controls channel C electrical penetrationI&C Channel C Electrical Penetration Assembly (EPA)

CNV19 N/A N/A N/A CNTS instrumentation and controls channel D electrical penetrationI&C Channel D Electrical Penetration Assembly (EPA)

CNV20 N/A N/A N/A CNTS control rod drive system electrical penetrationCRD Power Electrical Penetration Assembly (EPA)

CNV37 N/A N/A N/A CNTS rod position indication group #1 electrical penetrationRPI Group #1 Electrical Penetration Assembly (EPA)

CNV38 N/A N/A N/A CNTS rod position indication group #2 electrical penetrationRPI Group #2 Electrical Penetration Assembly (EPA)

CNV39 N/A N/A N/A RCS instrumentation and controls channel A electrical penetration RPV39 N/A N/A N/A RCS instrumentation and controls channel B electrical penetration RPV40 N/A N/A N/A RCS instrumentation and controls channel C electrical penetration RPV41 N/A N/A N/A RCS instrumentation and controls channel D electrical penetration RPV42 N/A N/A N/A Note:

1)

CNTS main steam line #1 and #2 bypass valves receive a containment isolation signal. The bypass valves have no CIV closure time requirement because they are passive valves that are normally closed, fail closed, and are only open for short durations during plant startup.

Table 2.1-3: NuScale Power Module Electrical Equipment (Continued)

Equipment Name Equipment Identifier Remotely Operated Loss of Motive Power Position CIV Closure Time (sec)1

NuScale Tier 1 NuScale Power Module Tier 1 2.1-13 Draft Revision 1 RAI 08.01-1, RAI 08.01-1S1 Table 2.1-4: NuScale Power Module Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No.

Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 1.

The NuScale Power Module ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 piping systems listed in Table 2.1-1 comply with ASME Code Section III requirements.

An inspection will be performed of the NuScale Power Module ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 as-built piping system Design Reports required by ASME Code Section III.

ASME Code Section III Design Reports for the NuScale Power Module ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 as-built piping systems listed in Table 2.1-1 meet the requirements of ASME Code Section III, NCA-3550.

2.

The NuScale Power Module ASME Code Class 1 and 2 components conform to the rules of construction of ASME Code Section III.

An inspection will be performed of the NuScale Power Module ASME Code Class 1 and 2 as-built component Data Reports required by ASME Code Section III.

ASME Code Section III Data Reports for the NuScale Power Module ASME Code Class 1 and 2 components listed in Table 2.1-2 and interconnecting piping exist and conclude that the requirements of ASME Code Section III are met.

3.

The NuScale Power Module ASME Code Class CS components conform to the rules of construction of ASME Code Section III.

An inspection will be performed of the NuScale Power Module ASME Code Class CS as-built component Data Reports required by ASME Code Section III.

ASME Code Section III Data Reports for the NuScale Power Module ASME Code Class CS components listed in Table 2.1-2 exist and conclude that the requirements of ASME Code Section III are met.

4.

Safety-related SSC are protected against the dynamic and environmental effects associated with postulated failures in high-and moderate-energy piping systems.

An inspection will be performed of the as-built high-and moderate-energy piping systems and protective features for the safety-related SSC.

Protective features are installed in accordance with the as-built Pipe Break Hazard Analysis Report and safety-related SSC are protected against or qualified to withstand the dynamic and environmental effects associated with postulated failures in high-and moderate-energy piping systems.

5.

The NuScale Power Module ASME Code Class 2 piping systems and interconnected equipment nozzles are evaluated for LBB.

An analysis will be performed of the ASME Code Class 2 as-built piping systems and interconnected equipment nozzles.

The as-built LBB analysis for the ASME Code Class 2 piping systems listed in Table 2.1-1 and interconnected equipment nozzles is bounded by the as-designed LBB analysis.

6.

The RPV beltline material has a Charpy upper-shelf energy of greater than 75 ft-lb.

A vendor test will be performed of the Charpy V-Notch specimen of the RPV beltline material.

An ASME Code Certified Material Test Report exists and concludes that the initial RPV beltline material Charpy upper-shelf energy is greater than 75 ft-lb.

7.

The CNV serves as an essentially leak-tight barrier against the uncontrolled release of radioactivity to the environment.

A leakage test will be performed of the pressure containing or leakage-limiting boundaries, and CIVs.

The leakage rate for local leak rate tests (Type B and Type C) for pressure containing or leakage-limiting boundaries and CIVs meets the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J.

8.

Containment isolation valve closure times limit potential releases of radioactivity.

A test will be performed of the automatic CIVs.

Each CIV listed in Table 2.1-3 travels from the full open to full closed position in less than or equal to the time listed in Table 2.1-3 after receipt of a containment isolation signal.

NuScale Tier 1 NuScale Power Module Tier 1 2.1-14 Draft Revision 1 9.

The length of piping shall be minimized between the containment penetration and the associated outboard CIVs.

An inspection will be performed of the as-built piping between containment penetrations and associated outboard CIVs.

The length of piping between each containment penetration and its associated outboard CIV is less than or equal to the length identified in Table 2.1-1.

10.

The NPMCNTS Class 1E containment electrical penetration assemblies are sized to power their design loads.

i.

An analysis will be performed of the NPMCNTS as-designed Class 1E containment electrical penetration assemblies.

i.

An electrical rating report exists that defines and identifies the required design electrical rating to power the design loads of each NPMCNTS Class 1E containment electrical penetration assembly listed in Table 2.1-3.

ii.

An inspection will be performed of NPMCNTS Class 1E as-built containment electrical penetration assembly.

ii.

The electrical rating of each NPMCNTS Class 1E containment electrical penetration assembly listed in Table 2.1-3 is greater than or equal to the required design electrical rating as specified in the electrical rating report.

11.

Physical separation exists between the redundant divisions of the MPS Class 1E instrumentation and control current-carrying circuits, and between Class 1E instrumentation and control current-carrying circuits and non-Class 1E instrumentation and current-carrying circuits. The scope of this commitment includes the cables from the NPM disconnect box to the instrument.

An inspection will be performed of the MPS Class 1E as-built instrumentation and control current-carrying circuits.

i.

Physical separation between redundant divisions of MPS Class 1E instrumentation and control current-carrying circuits is provided by a minimum separation distance, or by barriers (where the minimum separation distances cannot be maintained),

or by a combination of separation distance and barriers.

ii.

Physical separation between MPS Class 1E instrumentation and control current-carrying circuits and non-Class 1E instrumentation and control current-carrying circuits is provided by a minimum separation distance, or by barriers (where the minimum separation distances cannot be maintained),

or by a combination of separation distance and barriers.

12.

The RPV is provided with surveillance capsule holders to hold a capsule containing RPV material surveillance specimens.

An inspection will be performed of the as-built RPV surveillance capsule holders.

Four surveillance capsule holders are installed in the RPV beltline region at approximately 90 degree intervals.

13.

The remotely-operated CNTS containment isolationsafety-related valves change position under design differential pressure.

A test will be performed of the CNTS safety-related valves.

Each remotely-operated CNTS safety-related containment isolation valve listed in Table 2.1-2 strokes fully open and fully closed by remote operation.

14.

The ECCS safety-related valves change position under design differential pressure.

A test will be performed of the ECCS safety-related valves.

Each ECCS safety-related valve listed in Table 2.1-2 strokes fully open and fully closed by remote operation.

Table 2.1-4: NuScale Power Module Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria (Continued)

No.

Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria

NuScale Tier 1 Equipment Qualification Tier 1 2.8-1 Draft Revision 1 2.8 Equipment Qualification 2.8.1 Design Description

System Description

The scope of this section is equipment qualification (EQ) of equipment specific to each NuScale Power Module. Equipment qualification applies to safety-related electrical and mechanical equipment located in harsh environments and digital instrumentation and controls equipment in mild environments. The electrical equipment identified in 10 CFR 50.49 as electric equipment are subject to EQ.

Design Commitments The Seismic Category I equipment, including its associated supports and anchorages, withstands design basis seismic loads without loss of its safety-related function(s) during and after a safe shutdown earthquake (SSE).

RAI 08.01-1S1 The Class 1E electrical equipment located in a harsh environment, including its associated connection assemblies, withstands the design basis harsh environmental conditions experienced during normal operations, anticipated operational occurrences (AOOs), design basis accidents (DBAs), and post-accident conditions, and performs its function for the period of time required to complete the function.

The non-metallic parts, materials, and lubricants used in safety-related mechanical equipment perform their safety-related function up to the end of their qualified life in the design basis harsh environmental conditions (both internal service conditions and external environmental conditions) experienced during normal operations, AOOs, DBAs, and post-accident conditions.

The Class 1E computer-based instrumentation and control systems located in a mild environment withstand design basis mild environmental conditions without loss of safety-related functions.

The Class 1E digital equipment performs its safety-related function when subjected to the design basis electromagnetic interference, radio frequency interference, and electrical surges that would exist before, during, and following a DBA.

The safety-related valves are functionally designed and qualified to perform their safety-related function under the full range of fluid flow, differential pressure, electrical conditions, and temperature conditions up to and including DBA conditions.

The safety-related relief valves provide overpressure protection.

The safety-related decay heat removal system (DHRS) passive condensers have the capacity to transfer their design heat load.

RAI 08.01-1S1 The CNTS containment electrical penetration assemblies located in a harsh environment, including associated connection assemblies, withstand the design basis harsh environmental conditions experienced during normal operations, anticipated operational occurrences (AOOs), design basis accidents (DBAs), and post-accident conditions, and performs its function for the period of time required to complete the function.

NuScale Tier 1 Equipment Qualification Tier 1 2.8-3 Draft Revision 1 RAI 06.02.04-2, RAI 08.01-1S1, RAI 14.03.03-2 Table 2.8-1: Module Specific Mechanical and Electrical/I&C Equipment Equipment Identifier Description Location EQ Environment Qualification Program Seismic Category I Class 1E EQ Category(1)

Containment System CNV-8 I&C DIv I NozzleCNTS I&C Division I Electrical Penetration Assembly (EPA)

RXB - Top of Module CNV-6 RXB - Inside Containment Harsh Electrical Mechanical Yes YesNo A

CNV-9 I&C DIv II NozzleCNTS I&C Division II Electrical Penetration Assembly (EPA)

RXB - Top of Module CNV-6 RXB - Inside Containment Harsh Electrical Mechanical Yes YesNo A

CNV-15 PZR Heater Power #1 NozzleCNTS PZR Heater Power #1 Electrical Penetration Assembly (EPA)

RXB - Top of Module CNV-6 RXB - Inside Containment Harsh Electrical Mechanical Yes YesNo A

CNV-16 PZR Heater Power #2 NozzleCNTS PZR Heater Power #2 Electrical Penetration Assembly (EPA)

RXB - Top of Module CNV-6 RXB - Inside Containment Harsh Electrical Mechanical Yes YesNo A

CNV-17 I&C Channel A NozzleCNTS I&C Channel A Electrical Penetration Assembly (EPA)

RXB - Top of Module CNV-6 RXB - Inside Containment Harsh Electrical Mechanical Yes Yes A

CNV-18 I&C Channel B NozzleCNTS I&C Channel B Electrical Penetration Assembly (EPA)

RXB - Top of Module CNV-6 RXB - Inside Containment Harsh Electrical Mechanical Yes Yes A

CNV-19 I&C Channel C NozzleCNTS I&C Channel C Electrical Penetration Assembly (EPA)

RXB - Top of Module CNV-6 RXB - Inside Containment Harsh Electrical Mechanical Yes Yes A

CNV-20 I&C Channel D NozzleCNTS I&C Channel D Electrical Penetration Assembly (EPA)

RXB - Top of Module CNV-6 RXB - Inside Containment Harsh Electrical Mechanical Yes Yes A

CNV-37 CRD Power NozzleCNTS CRD Power Electrical Penetration Assembly (EPA)

RXB - Top of Module CNV-6 RXB - Inside Containment Harsh Electrical Mechanical Yes YesNo A

CNV-38 RPI Group #1 NozzleCNTS RPI Group #1 Electrical Penetration Assembly (EPA)

RXB - Top of Module CNV-6 RXB - Inside Containment Harsh Electrical Mechanical Yes YesNo A

CNV-39 RPI Group #2 NozzleCNTS RPI Group #2 Electrical Penetration Assembly (EPA)

RXB - Top of Module CNV-6 RXB - Inside Containment Harsh Electrical Mechanical Yes YesNo A

MS-ISV-1005 MS #1 CIV (MSIV #1)

RXB - Top of Module Harsh Electrical Mechanical Yes Yes A B MS-ISV-2005 MS #2 CIV (MSIV #2)

RXB - Top of Module Harsh Electrical Mechanical Yes Yes A B MS-ISV-1006 MS line #1 Bypass Valve (MSIV Bypass #1)

RXB - Top of Module Harsh Electrical Mechanical Yes Yes A B MS-ISV-2006 MS line #2 Bypass Valve (MSIV Bypass #2)

RXB - Top of Module Harsh Electrical Mechanical Yes Yes A B

NuScale Tier 1 Equipment Qualification Tier 1 2.8-18 Draft Revision 1 RAI 08.01-1S1 Table 2.8-2: Equipment Qualification Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No.

Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 1.

The Seismic Category I equipment, including its associated supports and anchorages, withstands design basis seismic loads without loss of its safety-related function(s) during and after an SSE.

i.

A type test, analysis, or a combination of type test and analysis will be performed of the Seismic Category I equipment, including its associated supports and anchorages.

ii.

An inspection will be performed of the Seismic Category I as-built equipment, including its associated supports and anchorages.

i.

A seismic qualification record form exists and concludes that the Seismic Category I equipment listed in Table 2.8-1, including its associated supports and anchorages, will withstand the design basis seismic loads and perform its safety function during and after an SSE.

ii.

The Seismic Category I equipment listed in Table 2.8-1, including its associated supports and anchorages, is installed in its design location in a Seismic Category I structure in a configuration bounded by the equipments seismic qualification record form.

2.

The Class 1E electrical equipment located in a harsh environment, including itsassociated connection assemblies, withstands the design basis harsh environmental conditions experienced during normal operations, AOOs, DBAs, and post-accident conditions and performs its function for the period of time required to complete the function.

i.

A type test or a combination of type test and analysis will be performed of the Class 1E electrical equipment, including itsassociated connection assemblies.

ii.

An inspection will be performed of the Class 1E as-built electrical equipment, including itsassociated connection assemblies.

i.

An EQ record form exists and concludes that the Class 1E electrical equipment listed in Table 2.8-1, including itsassociated connection assemblies, performs itstheir function under the environmental conditions specified in the EQ record form for the period of time required to complete the function.

ii.

The Class 1E electrical equipment listed in Table 2.8-1, including itsassociated connection assemblies, isare installed in itstheir design location in a configuration bounded by the EQ record form.

3.

The non-metallic parts, materials, and lubricants used in safety-related mechanical equipment perform their safety-related function up to the end of their qualified life in the design basis harsh environmental conditions (both internal service conditions and external environmental conditions) experienced during normal operations, AOOs, DBAs, and post-accident conditions.

A type test or a combination of type test and analysis will be performed of the non-metallic parts, materials, and lubricants used in safety-related mechanical equipment.

A qualification record form exists and concludes that the non-metallic parts, materials, and lubricants used in safety-related mechanical equipment listed in Table 2.8-1 perform their safety-related function up to the end of their qualified life under the design basis harsh environmental conditions (both internal service conditions and external environmental conditions) specified in the qualification record form.

NuScale Tier 1 Equipment Qualification Tier 1 2.8-20 Draft Revision 1 8.

The safety-related DHRS passive condensers have the capacity to transfer their design heat load.

A type test or a combination of type test and analysis will be performed of the safety-related DHRS passive condensers.

A report exists and concludes that the safety-related DHRS passive condensers listed in Table 2.8-1 have a heat removal capacity sufficient to transfer their design heat load.

9.

The CNTS containment electrical penetration assemblies located in a harsh environment, including associated connection assemblies, withstand the design basis harsh environmental conditions experienced during normal operations, AOOs, DBAs, and postaccident conditions and performs its function for the period of time required to complete the function.

i. A type test or a combination of type test and analysis will be performed of the CNTS containment electrical penetration assemblies equipment including associated connection assemblies.

ii. An inspection will be performed of the containment CNTS electrical penetration assembles, including associated connection assemblies.

i. An EQ record form exists and concludes that the CNTS electrical penetration assemblies listed in Table 2.8-1, including associated connection assemblies, performs their function under the environmental conditions specified in the EQ record form for the period of time required to complete the function.

ii. The CNTS electrical penetration assemblies listed in Table 2.8-1, including associated connection assemblies, are installed in their design location in a configuration bounded by the EQ record form.

Table 2.8-2: Equipment Qualification Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria (Continued)

No.

Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Conformance with Regulatory Criteria Tier 2 1.9-5 Draft Revision 1 RAI 08.01-1, RAI 08.01-1S1, RAI 08.02-4, RAI 08.02-6, RAI 08.03.02-1, RAI 09.02.06-1 Table 1.9-2: Conformance with Regulatory Guides RG Division Title Rev.

Conformance Sta-tus COL Applicabil-ity Comments Section 1.3 Assumptions Used for Evalu-ating the Potential Radiologi-cal Consequences of a Loss of Coolant Accident for Boiling Water Reactors 2

Not Applicable Not Applicable This guidance is only applicable to BWRs.

Not Applicable 1.4 Assumptions Used for Evalu-ating the Potential Radiologi-cal Consequences of a Loss of Coolant Accident for Pressur-ized Water Reactors 2

Not Applicable Not Applicable This RG pertains to existing reactors; RG 1.183 is specified in SRP Section 15.0.3 to be used for new reactors.

Not Applicable 1.5 Safety Guide 5 - Assumptions Used for Evaluating the Potential Radiological Conse-quences of a Steam Line Break Accident for Boiling Water Reactors Not Applicable Not Applicable This guidance is only applicable to BWRs.

Not Applicable 1.6 Safety Guide 6 - Indepen-dence Between Redundant Standby (Onsite) Power Sources and Between Their Distribution Systems Partially Conforms Applicable The onsite electrical AC power systems do not contain any Class 1E distribution systems. The EDSS design conforms to the guidance for independence of standby power sources and their distribution systems.

8.3 1.7 Control of Combustible Gas Concentrations in Contain-ment 3

Not Applicable Not Applicable The containment vessel design is such that its integrity does not rely on combustible gas control systems.

6.2 1.8 Qualification and Training of Personnel for Nuclear Power Plants 3

Not Applicable Applicable Site-specific programmatic and operational activities are the responsibility of the COL applicant.

Not Applicable 1.9 Application and Testing of Safety-Related Diesel Genera-tors in Nuclear Power Plants 4

Not Applicable Not Applicable Based on reduced reliance on AC power, the design does not require or include safety-related emergency diesel generators.

8.3 1.11 Instrument Lines Penetrating the Primary Reactor Contain-ment 1

Not Applicable Not Applicable No lines penetrate the NPM containment.

6.2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Conformance with Regulatory Criteria Tier 2 1.9-14 Draft Revision 1 1.60 Design Response Spectra for Seismic Design of Nuclear Power Plants 2

Not Applicable Not Applicable The Certified Seismic Design Response Spectra (CSDRS) was not developed using RG 1.60.

However, it is demonstrated that the design envelops the RG 1.60 spectra anchored to 0.1g.

3.7 1.61 Damping Values for Seismic Design of Nuclear Power Plants 1

Conforms Applicable In accordance with the guidance of RG 1.61, an alternative damping value for the NPM sub-structure was determined. The NPM subsys-tem is comprised of vessels, bearing joints, cables, internals, friction surfaces, etc.

3.7 3.12 Appendix 3A 5.3 1.62 Manual Initiation of Protec-tive Actions 1

Conforms Applicable This RG refers to Point 4 of BTP 7-19, Revision 5, dated March 2007. NuScale intends to apply BTP 7-19, Revision 6 (including Point 4).

7.1 7.2 1.63 Electric Penetration Assem-blies in Containment Struc-tures for Nuclear Power Plants 3

Partially Conforms Applicable IEEE 741-1997 is used for external circuit pro-tection of electrical penetration assemblies.

Although IEEE 741-1997 is not endorsed by RG 1.63 (endorsing IEEE 317-1983) the design phi-losophy does not deviate from RG 1.63.The portion of the RG 1.63 guidance that endorses IEEE-317-1983 is applicable. IEEE 741-1997 is used for external circuit protection of electrical penetration assemblies instead of IEEE 741-1986 as endorsed by RG 1.63. The 1997 version, including the additional design enhancements, is consistent with RG 1.63.

3.113.8.2 3.11 8.1 8.3 1.65 Materials and Inspections for Reactor Vessel Closure Studs 1

Partially Conforms Applicable This RG provides guidance for use in selecting reactor vessel closure stud bolting materials and properties, and conducting preservice and inservice inspection of the closure studs. Per-formance of inservice inspection is the respon-sibility of the COL applicant.

3.13 5.3 6.1 1.68 Initial Test Programs for Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants 4

Partially Conforms Applicable This guidance is applicable except for aspects that (1) are BWR-specific or address specific PWR SSC design features not in the NuScale design; or (2) involve site-specific program implementation activities that are the respon-sibility of the COL applicant.

4.4 5.4 8.3 10.4 14.2 21.2 Table 1.9-2: Conformance with Regulatory Guides (Continued)

RG Division Title Rev.

Conformance Sta-tus COL Applicabil-ity Comments Section

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Conformance with Regulatory Criteria Tier 2 1.9-55 Draft Revision 1 RAI 06.02.04-8, RAI 08.01-1, RAI 08.01-1S1, RAI 08.02-4, RAI 08.02-6, RAI 08.03.02-1, RAI 09.02.06-1, RAI 14.03.12-2, RAI 14.03.12-3 Table 1.9-3: Conformance with NUREG-0800, Standard Review Plan (SRP) and Design Specific Review Standard (DSRS)

SRP or DSRS Section, Rev: Title AC AC Title/Description Conformance Status COL Applicability Comments Section SRP 1.0, Rev 2:

Introduction and Interfaces II.1 No Specific Acceptance Criteria No Specific Acceptance Criteria.

X SRP 1.0, Rev 2:

Introduction and Interfaces II.2 SRP Acceptance Criteria Associated with Each Referenced SRP section Conforms Applicable None.

Ch 1 SRP 1.0, Rev 2:

Introduction and Interfaces II.3 Performance of New Safety Features and Design Qualification Testing Requirements Conforms Applicable None.

Ch 1 SRP 2.0, (March 2007): Site Characteristics and Site Parameters II.1 Specific SRP Acceptance Criteria Contained in Related SRP Chapter 2 or Other Referenced SRP sections Conforms Applicable This acceptance criterion is a pointer to other SRP sections.

2.0 SRP 2.0, (March 2007): Site Characteristics and Site Parameters II.2 COL Application Referencing an Early Site Permit Not Applicable Applicable This acceptance criterion is applicable only to COL applicants that do not reference the DCA.

2.0 SRP 2.0, (March 2007): Site Characteristics and Site Parameters II.3 COL Application Referencing a Certified Design Not Applicable Applicable This acceptance criterion is for COL applicants to meet the design parameters established in the Design Certification Application.

2.0 SRP 2.0, (March 2007): Site Characteristics and Site Parameters II.4 COL Application Referencing an Early Site Permit and a Certified Design Not Applicable Applicable This acceptance criterion is for COL applicants to meet the design parameters established in the Design Certification Application.

2.0 SRP 2.0, (March 2007): Site Characteristics and Site Parameters II.5 COL Application Referencing Neither an Early Site Permit Nor a Certified Design Not Applicable Applicable This acceptance criterion is applicable only to COL applicants that do not reference the DCA.

Not Applicable SRP 2.0, (March 2007): Site Characteristics and Site Parameters App A Table 1: Examples of Site Characteristics and Site Parameters Partially Conforms Applicable NuScale provides design Parameters where applicable.

Table 2.0-1 SRP 2.0, (March 2007): Site Characteristics and Site Parameters App A Table 2: Examples of Site-Related Design Parameters and Design Characteristics Partially Conforms Applicable NuScale provides design Parameters where applicable.

Table 2.0-1

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Conformance with Regulatory Criteria Tier 2 1.9-132 Draft Revision 1 NSDSRS 8.3.1, Rev 0: AC Power Systems (Onsite)

II.5 Compliance with GDC 18 Departure Departure The NuScale design supports an exemption from GDC 18 that includes the associated requirements for the onsite AC power system.

8.1.4 8.3.1 NSDSRS 8.3.1, Rev 0: AC Power Systems (Onsite)

II (No Number)

Compliance with GDC 33 Departure Departure The NuScale design supports an exemption from GDC 33.

8.3.1 NSDSRS 8.3.1, Rev 0: AC Power Systems (Onsite)

II (No Number)

Compliance with GDCs 34, 35, 38, 41, and 44 Departure Departure NuScale complies with a set of principal design criteria in lieu of these GDC.

8.3.1 NSDSRS 8.3.1, Rev 0: AC Power Systems (Onsite)

II.6 Compliance with GDC 50 Conforms Applicable The AC and DC electrical power system circuits do not penetrate the containment vessels; therefore, conformance with GDC 50 is not necessary.The electrical design requirements associated with GDC 50 for electrical penetration assemblies (EPAs) are included in Section 8.3.

8.1 8.3.1 NSDSRS 8.3.1, Rev 0: AC Power Systems (Onsite)

II.7 Compliance with 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4)

Not Applicable Applicable The 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) assessment is applied to main onsite AC power system SSCs that: (1) are determined to meet the 10 CFR 50.65(b) criteria; and (2) a risk-informed evaluation process has shown to be significant to public health and safety. As indicated in Section 17.6, the development of the maintenance rule (10 CFR 50.65) program - including the identification of SSCs that require assessment per 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) - is the responsibility of the COL applicant referencing the certified design.

8.3.1 NSDSRS 8.3.1, Rev 0: AC Power Systems (Onsite)

II.8 Compliance with 10 CFR 50.55a(h)

Not Applicable Not Applicable No onsite electrical AC power system equipment is required to conform to 10CFR50.55a(h) and IEEE Std.603-1991.

8.1.1 8.3.1 NSDSRS 8.3.1, Rev 0: AC Power Systems (Onsite)

II.9 Compliance with 10 CFR 52.47(b)(1)

Conforms Applicable None.

8.1 Table 1.9-3: Conformance with NUREG-0800, Standard Review Plan (SRP) and Design Specific Review Standard (DSRS) (Continued)

SRP or DSRS Section, Rev: Title AC AC Title/Description Conformance Status COL Applicability Comments Section

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Conformance with Regulatory Criteria Tier 2 1.9-133 Draft Revision 1 NSDSRS 8.3.2, Rev 0: DC Power Systems (Onsite)

II (No Number)

Compliance with GDC 2 Conforms Applicable The onsite DC power systems conform to GDC 2 to the extent described in Section 8.3.2.2.2.