ML17304A396
| ML17304A396 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 08/24/1988 |
| From: | Marlone Davis Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Karner D ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE CO. (FORMERLY ARIZONA NUCLEAR |
| References | |
| TASK-2.K.3.05, TASK-TM GL-86-06, GL-86-6, TAC-59412, TAC-64110, TAC-64111, NUDOCS 8808310028 | |
| Download: ML17304A396 (10) | |
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UNITED STATES
'NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 August 24, 1988 Docket Nos.:
50-528, 50-529 and 50-530 Hr. Donald B. Karner Executive Vice President Arizona Nuclear Power Project Post Office Box 52034 Phoenix,.Arizona 85072-2034
Dear Hr. Karner:
SUBJECT:
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION -
IMPLEMENTATION OF THI ACTION ITEM II.K.3.5 - AUTOMATIC TRIP OF REACTOR COOLANT PUMPS (TAC NOS.
59412%
64110 AND 64111)
(1)
Letter from E.
E.
Van Brunt, ANPP, to NRC Document Control
- Desk, dated June 27, 1988.
Subject:
Response
to NRC Request for Information-Reactor Coolant Pump Trip Strategy.
(2)
Letter from E. A. Licitra, NRC, to E.
E.
Van Brunt, Jr.,
- ANPP, dated February 23, 1988.
Subject:
Request for Additional Information, Palo Verde Response to Generic Letter 86-06.
(3)
Letter from J.
G. Haynes, ANPP, to E. A. Licitra, NRC, dated November 24, 1986 (ANPP-39138).
Subject:
Implementation of TMI Action Item II.K.3.5, "Automatic Trip of Reactor Coolant Pumps" (Generic Letter 86-06).
(4)
Letter from F. J. Miraglia, NRC to All Applicants and Licensees with Combustion Engineering (CE) Designed Nuclear Nuclear Steam Supply Systems (NSSSs)
(Except Maine Yankee) dated May 29, 1986.
Subject:
Implementation of THI Action Item II.K.3.5, "Automatic Trip of Reactor Coolant Pumps" (Generic Letter 86-06).
By reference (1) you provided addition information concerning the ANPP response to Generic Letter 86-06 that had been previously submitted to the NRC by Reference (3).
Because Combustion Engineering revised the approved generic topical reports CEN-268 and CEN-268 Supplement 1, the staff has determined that a second request for additional information is needed for Palo Verde Units 1, 2, and 3
to complete the review of the Reactor Coolant Pump Trip Issue (THI Action Item II.K.3.5).
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@DR 0028 88082'DOCg0S000 PDC
-ol The specific information required is discussed in the enclosed request.
We ask that you provide the requested information and that you inform us of the submittal date within two weeks of receipt of this letter.
If you have any questions regarding this request, please let me know.
Sincerely,
Enclosure:
As stated Michael J.
Da is, Project Manager Project Directorate V
Division of Reactor Projects - III, IV, V and Special Projects cc:
See next page
August 24, 1988 The specific information required is discussed in the enclosed request.
We ask that you provide the requested information and that you inform us of the submittal date within two weeks of receipt of this letter.
If you have any questions regarding this request, please let me know.
Sincerely, original signed by Michael J. Davis, Project Manager Project Directorate V
Division of Reactor Projects - III, IV, V and Special Projects
Enclosure:
As stated cc:
See next page DISTRIBUTION NRC Im Local PDRs PD5 Reading GMHolahan JLee MJDavis OGC (for info only)
EJordan BGrimes ACRS (10)
DRSP/PDS DRSP/D:Pk MJDavis:dr GWKnighton 8/pg/88 8//.g/88 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
Mr. Donald B. Karner Arizona Nuclear Power Project Executive Vice President Post Office Box 52034 Phoenix, Arizona 85072-2034 Palo Verde CC:
Arthur C. Gehr, Esq.
Snell 5 Wilmer 3100 Valley Center Phoenix, Arizona 85073 Mr. James M. Flenner, Chief Counsel Arizona Corporation Commission 1200 West Washington Phoenix, Arizona 85007 Charles R. Kocher, Esq. Assistant Council James A. Boeletto, Esq.
Southern California Edison Company P. 0.
Box 800
- Rosemead, California 91770 Mr. Mark Ginsberg Energy Director Office of Economic Planning and Development 1700 West Washington - 5th Floor Phoenix, Arizona 85007 Mr. Wayne Shirley Assistant Attorney General Bataan Memorial Building Santa Fe, New Mexico 87503 Mr. Tim Polich U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission HC-03 Box 293-NR Buckeye, Arizona 85326 Regional Administrator, Region V
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1450 Maria Lane Suite 210 Walnut Creek, California 94596 Ms. Lynn Bernabei Government Accountability Project of the Institute for Policy Studies 1901 gue Street, NW Washington, DC 20009 Mr. Charles B. Brinkman, Manager Washington Nuclear Operations Combustion Engineering, Inc.
7910 Woodmont Avenue Suite 1310
- Bethesda, Maryland 20814
Arizona Nuclear Power Project Palo Verde CC:
Chairman Arizona Corporation Commission Post Office Box 6019 Phoenix, Arizona 85003 Arizona Radiation Regulatory Agency ATTN:
Ms. Clara Palovic, Librarian 4814 South 40 Street Phoenix, Arizona 85040 Mr. Charles Tedford, Director Arizona Radiation Regulatory Agency 4814 South 40 Street Phoenix, Arizona 85040 Chairman Maricopa County Board of Supervisors 111 South Third Avenue
- Phoenix, Arizona 85003
ENCLOSURE ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS ON ARIZONA NUCLEAR POMER PROJECT'S
RESPONSE
TO GENERIC LETTER 86-06 IMPLEMENTATION OF TMI ACTION ITEM II.K.3.5 FOR PALO VERDE, UNITS 1, 2, AND 3 1.
Arizona Nuclear Power Project's (ANPP's) letter of November 24, 1986 did not clearly identify which of the criteria presented in CEN-268 was selected to trip the second set of pumps during a small break LOCA (SBLOCA) at Palo Verde, Units 1, 2, and 3 (PV-1,2,3).
The submittal identified that the following parameters were used in the pump trip strategy:
pressurizer
- pressure, reactor coolant system hot and cold leg temperatures, and subcooled margin monitor.
Clarify how these parameters are used in the plant specific pump trip strategy.
Also, no reference was made to either containment radiation or secondary radiation alarms that would be used to distinguish between a
SBLOCA and a steam generator tube rupture (SGTR).
Clarify if either of these parameters are used to determine whether the second set of pumps should be tripped.
If containment radiation is used, see question 2.
If secondary radiation is used, then identify the instrumentation used to monitor it and provide the associated uncertainty.
If secondary radiation is not used at PV-1,2,3 or a satisfactory response to question 2 is not received, then note the following staff positions.
First, the plant specific pump trip strategy for PV-1,2,3 is not in agreement with CEN-268.
This is because the report states that two parameters are needed to distinguish between a
SBLOCA and a
non-LOCA event.
Second, if only one parameter is used to determine when to trip the second set of pumps and this results in the second two pumps being tripped during the design basis SGTR, then the PV-1,2,3 pump trip strategy is not in compliance with SECY-82-475, which requires the pumps remain in operation for the design basis SGTR.
2.
Subsequent to ANPP's submittal of November 24, 1986, the Combustion Engineering Owners Group (GEOG) revised CEN-268 in May 1987.
In CEN-268, Rev.
1, and in CEN-268, Supplement 1, Rev. 1, it was stated that a containment radiation alarm was no longer recommended for use in the T2/L2 pump trip strategy.
This was because containment radiation was determined not to have satisfactory sensitivity. If PV-1,2,3 use containment radiation in the plant specific pump trip strategy answer the following question.
In light of the recommendations in CEN-268, Rev. 1, justify continued use of containment radiation in the PV-1,2,3 pump trip strategy.
Provide information to show the PV-1,2,3 containment radiation alarms are sufficiently sensitive to perform the function assigned them in the PV-1,2,3 plant specific T2/L2 pump trip strategy.
Also, identify the instrumentation used to monitor containment radiation and provide the associated uncertainty.
3.
In CEN-268, Rev.
1, the GEOG stated that containment isolation could cause the loss of pump cooling water and continued operation under these conditions could result in reactor coolant pump (RCP) damage.
Timely operator action could restore essential water service and prevent pump damage.
Each utility was to review its plant specific pump cooling water, service system requirements and make any changes necessary.
On April 23, 1985, the licensees with CE plants were sent a
request for additional information on this area.
In Generic Letter 86-06, the staff stated the response to this request f'r information was not available for PV-1 and the review of this item would be completed as part of the plant specific implementation SE review.
The submittals for PV-1,2,3 have not addressed this issue.
Therefore, provide the following information.
a.
Identify the essential water services required for pump operation.
Does any containment isolation signal or other signal, such as a safety injection actuation signal, terminate any of these services?
If so, identify the signals and systems affected.
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b.
If essential water services are terminated, describe the operator guidelines, training, and procedures in place or to be implemented which assure these services are restored in a timely manner to prevent seal or pump damage or failure once a non-LOCA situation is confirmed.
How long would it take to restore these water services?
What would be the operator response if required water services could not be restored?
C.
Usually.
RCP cooling water service is provided for both seal injection and component cooling (such as motor bearings).
Are both component cooling water and seal injection required for pump operation or is it possible to operate the RCPs with only one of these services?
If cooling water services to the pumps were terminated, would seal injection or component cooling be restored first?
d.
Confirm that containment isolation with continued RCP operation will not lead to seal or pump damage or failure.
Include a
description of the the technical basis for reaching this conclusion.
4.
Because RCP trip is required for LOCAs, assurance must be provided that RCP trip will occur when required.
To address this concern, provide the following information:
a ~
Identify the components required to trip the pumps.
Include
- relays, power supplies,
- breakers, or other equipment.
Address equipment reliability, alternate trip methods, and operator training.
How much time are the operators allowed to try and trip the RCPs from the control room before they use an alternate trip method?
How much time is required to travel to an alternate trip location?
b.
If necessary, as the result of the location of any critical component, include the effects of adverse conditions inside or outside containment on RCP trip reliability.
Describe the basis for the adverse conditions selected.